This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

COLBURN'S

UNITED SERVICE

MAGAZINE,

AND

Naval and Military Journal.

1859. PART III.

LONDON:
HURST AND BLACKETT, PUBLISHERS,
(SUCCESSORS TO HENRY COLBURN,)
13, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET.

SOLD BY ALL BOOKSELLERS.



CONTENTS

TO THE

THIRD PART FOR 1859.

Our National Defences.—Fortifications, or our Army in the Field . 1
Royal Naval Reserve 15
General Bormann on the Shrapnel and Boxer Shells and Fuze . 23
A German View of the Italian War. 27, 207
Comparative View of Sir John Burgoyne's Opinions, and of the Reports of Lieutenant-General Macintosh on the Defence of Turkey 42
Firearms 51
The Peace Movement 54
Peeps from the Loopholes of Retreat. By Retired Major Marksman 63, 240, 382, 578
Campaign of 1848 in Lombardy 71, 231
Franco-Sardinian Alliances 86
Desertion.—The True Method for Effectually Checking it. . 94
Legislation for India 102
Our Home Defences. With a few Words on our Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers 109
Enquiries Touching the Ethnology of certain Tribes of Africans Interior to the Bight of Biafra. By Consul Thomas J. Hutchinson, F.R.G.S. 115
Our Land Forces. England.—Second Line of Defence . . 159
The Admiralty and Sir Howard Douglas's Screw Propeller, with diagram 177
Harbours of Refuge 182, 344, 596
The Arts of Camp Life, (with Illustration). By Colonel Sir J. E. Alexander, K.C.L.S., 14th Regiment . . . 193
The British Navy During the Russian War. By Theseus, late R.N. 218
Captain Blakely and the Armstrong Gun 226
The War Office Committee and the Trevelyan Scheme . . 248
Admiral Hope in the Peiho River 268
The Seikhs for China 271
Manning the Navy 325
The Relative Strength of France and Germany . . . 336
Colonization of India 362

The Last Chinese War. From the Attack, Capture, and Occupation of Canton, 1857, 1858-9, by the Allied Forces of England and France, to the Departure of the Plenipotentiaries 371, 547
The Foreign Troops of France 389
A Glance at our Chinese Policy 397
From Camp to Quarters; or Life in an Indian Cantonment after Field Service 401
The Defences of Turkey 413
Russian Description of the River Amoor 416
The First Anniversary of Balaklava. 428
Some Account of Cannibalism and other atrocities in Western Africa. By Consul Thomas J. Hutchinson, F.R.G.S., &c. 439
Defence of Great Yarmouth 446
Monument to the late Lord Francis Gordon. 445
The Militia Commission, the Ballot, and our Volunteer Corps . 483
Reserve of Royal Naval Volunteers 495
The Army Medical Department 507
The Relative Strength of France and Germany 521
General Sir Howard Douglas on Fortification and National Defence 527
The Proper Strength of the British Navy. By Theseus, late R.N. 536
The Defence of Turkey.—Sir John Burgoyne and General Macintosh 547
Ships and Gales, and the Simultaneous Observations of Wind and Weather 568
Official Account of the Siege of Sebastopol 475
The Launch of the Victoria 585
Campaign of 1849 in Piedmont 587
Editor's Portfolio; or Naval and Military Register 119, 274, 446, 603
Critical Notices 123, 277, 450, 607
Notice to Correspondents 124, 608
General Correspondence 125, 279
Naval and Military Intelligence . . . 127, 282, 452, 609
Distribution of the Bombay Army . . 135, 306, 462, 616
Distribution of the Madras Army . . 136, 307, 463, 617
Distribution of the Bengal Army 618
Stations of the British Army. . . 138, 309, 465, 621
——— Embodied Militia . . 139, 310, 466, 622
——— Royal Navy in Commission . 140, 311, 467, 623
——— Indian Navy in Commission . 143, 314, 470, 626
——— Bengal Naval Brigade . . 143, 314, 479
Promotions and Appointments . . . 145, 316, 472, 627
Militia Gazette . 148, 150, 151, 153, 157, 318, 320, 322, 323, 475, 478, 479, 480, 481
Deaths, ... 158
Brevet . 148, 150, 153, 155, 156, 157, 318, 319, 322, 323, 475, 477, 480
Marriage 482

COLBURN'S

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

OUR NATIONAL DEFENCES.—FORTIFICATIONS, OR AN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

The question of our national defences, after all that has been said and written about them, has for the most part been discussed in two extremes, and, generally speaking, with but little regard to the dignity or the greatness of the resources of the country, or in a manner to raise the estimate of our national character. According to the opinions of one party, by far the most noisy, if not the most numerous and the most influential, it would seem as if we were utterly at the mercy of our enemies, or nearly so, and that it is only necessary to will and to do on the part of those we think likely to attack us, to be successful in attempting an invasion. While with others who take a very sanguine view of affairs, but who are rather senseless in most instances in their way of arguing, there is scarcely any imaginable madness or folly equal to the idea of supposing it possible that a foreign army could, under any circumstances, get into England, or at any rate, of its being allowed to exist for forty-eight hours after it got there. There is a somewhat contemptible excess of fear on the one hand, and a perhaps still greater excess of very stupid confidence on the other—stupid because there is no sufficient or sensible data set forth to justify it. The alarmists have had it pretty nearly all their own way for some time past. They have sounded the trumpet of the national distress so loudly, they have painted the precariousness of our position in such gloomy colours, and have indicated our weak points with so much science and minuteness of detail, that the wonder is the enemy, who has had so much trouble saved by having every probable mode of attack discussed for him, and the assurance over and over again of our defencelessness, does not come on at once. The treachery of his disposition has been asserted, he has been taunted and insulted with all the virulence and perseverance the press is capable of, the only thing we can say for him is that he is far more ready for war than we are. What, then, can he be delaying about? Surely, if all, or even a fair proportion of what is said has any foundation in truth, there can never again be a more favourable moment for his carrying out the project we give him credit for intending than that which is now passing. Our relative weakness and his relative strength can never be much more against us than they are now. Why on earth then if he means to do it ever, and is the character he is described to be, does he not declare war and invade us forthwith? He might have done it perhaps to still greater advantage a year or two ago, when we had the Indian mutiny on our hands, but having missed that oppor-

tunity it would be far better for him, if he means it at all, to try it at once than to wait until we are more prepared for him. Time is everything to us, it can be nothing, according to all accounts, to him. He is said to be ready, and the only readiness about us is to admit that we are just the reverse. We go into all the public places we can and declare it. It must be a matter of surprise also, if the fears of the alarmists are so great as they are expressed to be, that this party should be so content, as they apparently are, to see so much relating to our defences done in so bungling and extravagant a manner as is so frequently the case, not only with regard to the army, but as regards the far more important service of the navy also. Powerful and influential as some of these people are, they might, surely, if they were to stir themselves, effect some improvement in this respect. Impressed as they seem to be, almost to despondency, with the bad state of the national defences, why don't they agitate to get rid of some of the incompetent hands that have to do with them. Above all, why don't they help to get for the country a fairer approach to the worth of the money laid out than is now the case? They ought for their own sakes, and the fears that haunt them, to establish a more equitable ratio in the progress of the national security, and the annually increasing estimates which are voted for the purpose. The latter are double and quadruple to what we have had them in previous years, if we go back a little, but somehow or other the cry is still for more, and the worst of it is that even as the estimates mount up, the ships, and the men, and the fortifications, all the things we are so anxiously craving for, seem to be quite as deficient for all intents and purposes as ever they were. There are indeed strong and reasonable doubts, amongst many well-informed persons, whether what we are obtaining now in some of these respects is as good or as suitable as what we used to get for less money formerly. There is more than enough to justify these doubts with regard to the men, whether sailors or soldiers, and as to the fortifications, especially the coast batteries, if they come under that term, which latter we have been constructing at the rate of from one thousand to two thousand pounds a gun, the less said about them the better. They have been graphically and accurately described, at least in one instance, as a "disgrace to the science of engineering."

As commissions are so much the fashion that nothing can be done without them, a commission to inquire into the value of the batteries and defences we have been erecting for some years past, if the responsibility of their glaring defects could by any possibility be visited on any one, might be productive of a great deal of useful economy in future. There is one consideration connected with the armaments which are called for which has hardly attracted the notice which it deserves, and that is what we intend to do with them, suppose no enemy attacks us, when we have got them all ready? When even Lord Lyndhurst and Sir Charles Napier can sleep with a feeling of security, and when we are really quite up to the mark, and able not only to hold our own but, perhaps, as a majority of us may think, to do something more, and when we find ourselves expending some 30 or 40 millions annually with a system we can't let down without throwing it out of gear altogether, what is

it all to come to then? Are we, when fully armed and prepared, no longer dreading invasion, but feeling ourselves a match for any one under any circumstances, are we to be satisfied with the purely defensive tactics we hear so much about now? Will the country be so very Christianlike and forgiving as to forget the threatening state of things which will have driven it into such expensive security, and be content to remain there? Are we, with the income tax and a crowd of other taxes, keeping us in a lively state of irritation, likely to be so meek, when once we have arrived at a state of readiness for whatever may happen (that is to say if we are ever likely to arrive at it under the present system) as to rest satisfied with a mere passive result, and to continue year after year a heavy expenditure for the purpose of maintaining it? May we not wish to put an end to such a disagreeable and unsatisfactory state of things by turning to active account the means at our disposal? Is there anything treasonable to the national character or opposed to our history in the past in entertaining such a supposition? It is not in the nature of men or nations to be prepared for war and to keep the peace for any long continuance. We boast ourselves to be a practical people, but there would be very little that is practical in maintaining and paying for huge armaments without making some use of them other than that of keeping them merely as a means to save us from being molested. Might we not, under such circumstances, be inclined to be a little aggressive? The inducement to be so would be greater at all events when we are armed at all points than when we have some gaping chinks in our armour, as at the present moment. It must be plain to the commonest understanding that what is now passing in the rivalry of national armaments between this country and its nearest neighbour, can have no other result if it goes on unchecked much longer but in a war. We must endeavour, therefore, to put a stop to it by inducing the Emperor of the French to give up his well-ordered system, and to take up a bad one like our own, or adopt a better one ourselves if we can; or, failing this, we must look sooner or later for an inevitable trial of strength between the two countries, and set ourselves to the task of preparing for it with all the earnestness which the greatness and importance of such a struggle require. The time must come when the people of one or both countries will be sick of peace at a war price. Their antagonism to each other will go on increasing, for it will be fed by the most irritating attacks of the press on both sides, and feelings and jealousies, the seeds of which are deeply implanted, will show themselves with a rancour which will only become the more intense the longer the cause of them is kept open. Better to prepare to fight it out at once, the sooner the better, than go on snarling for years at each other with that result after all. We are alarmed just now because we think our neighbours more ready for war than we are, but let the balance in this respect become, as we want to have it, a good deal in our favour—let the invasion fever be abated by the possession of a powerful fleet and something more than we now have on shore, and can we assure ourselves that a good deal more arrogance and provocation to hostilities will not be exhibited on our part than we have, so far at least, had to complain of in others?

Our enemies may mistrust us then, just as we mistrust them now, and it is plain that the race, as the badness of our system and the goodness of our neighbour's forces us to conduct it, must sooner or later bring us to blows. We have not been very polite or forbearing even when we have been discussing the matter with the odds, as so many of us believe, against us, how will it be with us when we are differently situated, and have or fancy we have the odds in our favour? Will our disposition to abuse and offensiveness become less as our insecurity diminishes? It is the great defect of our system that we can never be safe with it with moderate establishments, for it is not one that can be placed on a war footing without a considerable time to prepare, and that is just what a judicious enemy will never allow us to have. We must always be in the most expensive state of readiness, or we can never be ready at all. It is impossible to pursue a more objectionable course also than that of discussing through the press, and in the most public manner, everything that relates to our military establishments and the difficulties we may have to contend with regarding them. There is still less sense in letting our military policy appear to be in the least dependent, however it may actually be so, on the character of any foreign potentate, or even upon the armaments which he may choose to keep up. We have a right to have a judgment of our own in such matters, and it would be an advantage if we kept our own counsel more than we do about them. Every one knows how these things are influenced, and there is no necessity for too loudly proclaiming it. It would be as well to leave them entirely in the hands of the government. It is scarcely possible to believe that there would be any party in power reckless or stupid enough to neglect a subject of such vital importance as the security of the country, nor is it easy to suppose that, if thus left to their own responsibility and made to feel its reality, things would be done in so blundering and extravagant a manner as they are now. It is the natural result of the way in which we act and the system we maintain that the danger of war should be perpetual. At one time it proceeds from the low scale to which everything is allowed to drop, and which we are naturally alarmed at when we find it out. By and bye it may proceed from the very opposite cause. We are always in extremes. We must either be in a position which tends to make us arrogant, or in one of such abject weakness as to invite attack. What a miserable contrast in our organisation do we not present at the present moment to the power we think likely to assail us. It is almost pitiable to contemplate it. The latter is virtually unable, however desirous she might be, to come down to the level which might relieve us of our fears. Her system is so admirable, according to those acquainted with it, that if she threw half her fleet (the strength of which alone affects us in the least) out of commission to-morrow, it would be nothing to justify our following a proportionate example. She could call it again into existence in a month, whereas we could not arm even a single ship in six times the period. What is the use of striving to contend with such a system as ours against such a system as this. One might just as well set a baby to contend against a giant. If France or the French Emperor is

bent upon attacking us, and if it is the well-considered opinion of our rulers that such is the case, we must apply all our energies in some way or other to meet the organization, formidable as it is, which exists on the part of our expected enemy by something of the same kind, equally as effective on our side. It is a palpable absurdity to talk of fortifications here, there, and everywhere, or of so many line-of-battle ships to be built, unless we can in some ready manner know where to lay our hands on the men to man them. Half our danger is that we may be attacked suddenly and when we are off our guard.

It is not in the inert material that we are at all deficient, we have enough and to spare of it, but it is the system which will give us men, men of the right stamp, far more freely and readily than we can now obtain them, and without whom all other means are unavailable and useless, that is our real want. If we can only establish a system, and there can be no insurmountable difficulty to doing so, by which we can obtain men, everything else will be forthcoming abundantly enough. Until we can devise and adopt some plan which will give us sailors and soldiers in more adequate proportion to the need we may at any time have for them, and so organised and disciplined that they can be turned to account at the shortest notice, it is putting the cart before the horse to discuss other measures, no matter what they may be, for putting our national defences on a proper footing. We must endeavour, moreover, to lead the country at large out of the common impression that the army and navy are but temporary institutions, to be dispensed with some day or other, as civilization advances. They must be looked upon as those which it is most indispensable at all times to maintain in the utmost possible state of efficiency, and for which many sacrifices must be made. Until we can approach, or, rather, until we can stand on something like equal terms with other countries in their military institutions, we cannot reasonably expect to be as strong or as secure as we ought to be, or to make the progress we are desirous of attaining, to meet whatever exigencies may threaten us. The class of the population on whom we have so long been entirely dependent for men, have not only advanced so much in the enjoyment of comforts which diminish the inducement to enlist, but they begin to understand their own value better than they did. Every day the bidding for their services goes higher, while every increase thus made only tides over the difficulty for a time, to augment it on some future occasion, or in some other form. There are not many able-bodied men in the country who cannot earn on an average at least their ten or twelve shillings a week, or they can emigrate and seek their fortune wherever their fancy leads them. It is idle to expect these men to come forward in sufficient numbers for the army, when their actual pay is so much less than they receive elsewhere, although the difference may be made up a good deal in other ways, and where they are subjected to an irksome discipline, with the certainty, besides, of being banished from home and friends for the best part of their lives to wretched and unhealthy climates, knowing, moreover, as they must do by this time, that the soldier's calling, even apart from the proper risks of his profession, is more fatal than any other

to the longevity of human life. It must be evident that the more reckless and worthless part of the community can alone be got on such terms, and even these won't sell themselves now as cheaply, or come forward as freely, as they once did. The badness of the bargain is too evident even for such as these to be attracted by it. They only accept the bounty and then desert. These are not times in which voluntary enlistment will meet the wants of the service in men, or anything like it. Like everything else that has been a long time in wear, it is beginning to wear out. If it maintains under certain encouragement the strength of the army in India, and the colonies, with the bare reliefs required, it is the utmost we can possibly expect from it, and more, perhaps, than it will long continue to afford us. To look to it for our home defences as well, is to rest upon a broken reed; it can never supply both, and to attempt to make it do so we must bid with the one hand against the other. The army required to meet or prevent an invasion must be obtained on very different principles to those we are ordinarily accustomed to. We cannot hope to be prepared to contend successfully, and at any short notice, against the possibility of such a calamity without making some unpleasant sacrifices. Free institutions are not to be contemned, but if the country is brought under foreign domination by a too sentimental or overstrained regard for them, what are they worth? The first step to the formation of any useful or efficient military system, defensive or otherwise, must depend on our taking a different view of this matter to what we have been in the habit of doing. It must be placed before the mind of every man in the country in some way or other, that his first duty is to defend it, and that in the performance of this duty he is not in the least entitled to the enjoyment of a will of his own. There is no possible way in which the thing can be done in an efficient manner but by the conscription or the ballot (they are synonymous terms), applied with the most rigid impartiality to every class and calling in the United Kingdom. Such a measure would soon become bearable and popular enough if it was instituted as it ought to be, with the most perfect fairness to every one. We may rest assured that nothing but this will aid us materially or satisfactorily, and so long as we are determined to evade it there will only be these makeshift measures left to us, of which we are seeing the foolish and extravagant consequences every day. When it is a debated question whether we can assemble 30,000 men for the defence of England, with nothing to look to but the slow process of voluntary enlistment for men, we have a crowd of pamphlets, essays in magazines, and articles in the newspaper press, described in almost every instance as able productions, in which fortifications are advocated upon the most extensive and extravagant scale, as if fortifications without men to man them could be of any use. The basis of a sound military defence of the country, with those who advocate these numerous works, would seem to be little else but bricks and mortar. It is true they say we ought to have the men, but would it not be best to know exactly how we are to get them before discussing anything about fortifications to put them into? If these writers would advocate the ballot for the formation of an army to act within the

limits of the United Kingdom, and leave all mention of fortifications alone, they would be doing far more service. The defence of the country would be more cheaply and infinitely better cared for by a numerous and well-appointed army in the field, taken from every class of the population, if by any turn of fortune our fleet failed us, than by any other means ; nor is it either becoming or necessary to argue that the best way of employing it would be behind stone walls. Under any circumstances we are not in a state now to trouble ourselves much on the subject of fortifications, and the time is distant indeed when we need bestow the slightest regard upon the huge works recommended for the defence of London and other places, the construction of which would swallow up almost as many men as an enemy could send over. There is surely no sensible person, with his nerves and wits about him, who would desire to see us embarked in such a system as this ; we have already had more to do with it than might be wished, as the works at Alderney and other places are an unpleasant proof of. We must never admit for a moment that this country can be the scene of prolonged hostilities, but if we set to work constructing fortresses we at once do so in the most unmistakeable manner. Whatever we do we must take our account to leave something to fortune, and it will not be much if we are only true to ourselves and adopt these measures, to give us, as promptly as they are obtained by other countries, disciplined and organised men when we want them. Considering the advantages of our position it is absolutely easier for us to get them than any other people. If with our population and resources, and the spirit we have always taken credit for, we cannot submit to the ballot to secure us against invasion, our case is indeed a gloomy one. It is hard to see how we are to get out of our difficulties. We can certainly never look forward to the luxury of a peace establishment with any degree of comfort, for to have it we must be in the same abject condition that has occasioned all our panics of the last few years. The recommendations to build up fortifications as any remedy against the evils we are labouring under, is one which, we earnestly hope, will never be attended to. It is not in such counsels that our safety is to be found. We will do better to seek it in the organisation of a reasonable amount of the population, drawn annually by the ballot and trained as our militia is now trained. We would drop this latter designation, which is a kind of licence for certain abuses, and a certain amount of inefficiency, and divide these men into first, second, and third war reserves, according as they are more or less advanced in instruction. If it is incompatible, strange to say, with our free institutions to adopt anything of this nature, all we can hope for is that the day may not arrive when we shall have to put up with something infinitely worse. As a specimen of what is forced upon us by the present state of things we have a defence committee at the Horse Guards, and a commission on the defences lately appointed somewhere else ; if there is any truth in the proverb of too many cooks we are progressing towards having everything in a precious mess by-and-bye. The question of fortifications, if we had the right men in the right places in our military affairs, might have been promptly decided without

any commission at all; those proposed and those we have already would absorb at the least 150,000 men, and be imperfectly manned after all. With the utmost appreciation of the value of what we have at stake are we fallen so low in our own estimation that we cannot feel even tolerably easy in our minds until we have strong places for this army of Englishmen to fly to, contending against an enemy on their own ground, and for everything that is dear to them. To imply such a thing is to admit that we are half defeated even before the strife has begun. We are not arguing for any silly confidence, or under any stupid impression that one Englishman is equal to two or more foreigners; what we submit is, that whenever we can get 150,000 men in England, reasonably well trained and organized, the very worst possible use we can make of them will be to put them into fortifications. If they are untrained and unorganized they will be of very little use anywhere. Let us only have 150,000 men, as we may with the most perfect ease, and but a very moderate amount of inconvenience to the country, and there will be no reason to mistrust our prospects, though we have not an engineering stone wall or ditch in all England to shelter us. Thrown into a somewhat undignified state of alarm by our fears, we are apt to imagine an invasion a far more easy affair than a little calm reflection ought to convince us is the case. An invading force, under the best of circumstances, must have many difficulties to contend against; it would be foolish to exaggerate them, but we question whether it is not quite as great folly to make too light of them. Until we can estimate them at their true value very little can be done in a satisfactory manner in deciding upon the amount of force we ought to have. Is the channel to be perfectly free for an enemy to come and go just as they please, and as the route from France and England was to the Crimea in the Russian war? This is the utmost extreme of the case we have to provide against. It is the very best for them and the very worst for us. Can we possibly hope to contend against it by voluntary enlistment, or by any amount of volunteers hastily collected, without organization and without discipline? No commonly prudent person would like to try it. If our navy is not utterly annihilated, or closely blockaded in all its ports, we hold that the conveyance of 200,000 men, with all, or even a fair proportion, in the first instance, of their artillery, stores, and material, could not be attempted without some serious casualties. Supposing the original strength to be at 200,000, we doubt, allowing almost everything in their favour, if more than 120,000 would ever make a day's march from their ships. An invasion would probably never be attempted with a less number than this, and it is hardly reasonable to think of making a provision for anything much exceeding it. 150,000 men, or 200,000 men on our part at the utmost, would make everything amply secure. If the danger is at all imminent, we ought at once to put that number into training and as they become instructed, if we remain at peace, dismiss them to their homes, until we work down gradually to a peace establishment. If the calling out of so many men at once would be apt to involve us in the war we wish to avoid, and which we are just now so little prepared for, we ought to disband the present efficient regi-

ments of militia, and embody others in their places, proceeding in this way until we have a war establishment of trained men in the country, on whom we could lay our hands in a moment when they were required, and who would cost little or nothing in their disembodied state; that is to say, if anything with us can be made not to cost ten times more money than it ought to do.

Reverting again to the question of fortifications, the utmost extent to which we would go in such works is the security from anything like a "*coup de main*" of our principal and more exposed dockyards. Unless an invasion is shown to be utterly visionary and impossible this is a point which should not be neglected. Essential as it is, however, it would be difficult to urge it at the present moment in the face of the want of men, and the absence of any effective means of obtaining them.

If all that has been openly stated as to the extreme weakness of our army for home defence is true, and there is very little reason we fear for doubting it, the fortifications we have already would far more than absorb every soldier we are possessed of. What folly must it not be then, under such a state of things as this, to have dinned into our ears the necessity for spending millions in the construction of more works. To be told, as we are, in a work recently published by a distinguished officer, that we ought to fortify Woolwich, Chatham, Sheerness, Dover, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, not with moderate defences, but by a series of "detached works, at about one mile distant from each other, of masonry; and each work of such strength as to require a regular attack, supported by heavy ordnance for its reduction." A more preposterously absurd suggestion was never made, anything more exaggerated as to what we require could hardly be conceived by the most timid imagination. To crown it all, no less than 240,000 men, local militia, and volunteers are set down as the necessary garrison; and, besides, there are to be 50,000 regular troops and 50,000 embodied militia—one's breath is almost taken away in enumerating them all, and this is to be considered the permanent force, "even in times of complete peace." 375,000 men are set down altogether for the United Kingdom, independent of the pensioners, Royal Marines who happened to be on shore, dockyard corps, and 12,000 Irish constabulary. 120,000 men are told off for the defence of London, and 120,000 for that of five other places, the force for the field being 100,000 only. It is doubtful how many the invaders are supposed to be, but no mention is made of their exceeding 100,000; one would expect them to be half a million at the least by the preparation declared necessary even for the mere expectation of their coming, the chances against their effecting a landing being, according to the same writer, as ninety to ten, though how these odds are calculated we cannot say. Some further extracts will show the disparaging tone to ourselves in which the subject is handled. Taking our force as above, we quote from the same author, he says:—"If the enemy's force was anything under 100,000, the 50,000 regular troops and 50,000 embodied militia assembled around London, or between London and the point of disembarkation, should be launched against the in-

vading force with all the rapidity that could be obtained by the assistance of railways, and other means of conveyance, leaving it to the skill of the commander of that force to use it against the enemy in the way in which he thought most expedient. But should the invading force amount to upwards of 100,000 men, the opposing force should be advanced with caution, and only to such known position of strength as gave it a decided advantage." With 240,000 men and fortifications besides, these are the kind of tactics recommended by a general officer against a 100,000 invaders, more or less. If the enemy should happen to be 90,000 strong we are to go headlong at him with our 100,000. If he happens to exceed us in numerical strength, no matter how trifling the disparity may be, our 100,000 are to pursue a Fabian course, they are to make for some position of known strength, and there wait the attack. We venture to say, that in deciding on an action on our own ground, especially with so much at stake as we should have, there should be no headlong proceeding of any kind; whether the enemy was 100,000 strong or only 50,000, no proper precaution should be neglected. He should beassailed with the utmost energy and determination, and with the utmost care also. There is no maxim in war requiring more to be remembered than that of never despising your enemy. As to leaving it to the skill of the commander of the force to use it against the enemy in the way he thought most expedient, we should like to know who could possibly think of interfering with him at such a moment. It would be rather difficult, however, to appreciate the skill of a commander, who could act as recommended, who could shut up 240,000 men, even though imperfectly organized and trained, and keep only 100,000 men in the field, in dealing with an invading army of just the latter strength and no more. Surely the 240,000 men massed together and handled with any skilfulness ought to make victory tolerably sure. If that is denied, we fear the fortifications would be of very little use to us. The worst of it is, according to the alarmist view of the case, things always go against us. We never see the back of the enemy from the time he lands until the time he chooses to go away loaded with pillage. Even after the two suppositions we have just mentioned have been made—whether the enemy is stronger than we are, and we approach him with caution, for it would be a "vast error" it is said, under certain circumstances, to expose an inferior force to the first great effort of a superior enemy, or whether he is inferior to us, and we get into contact with him as fast as steam or anything else can convey us, the result is the same—we find him after all still advancing, nothing can stop him until he comes within sight of those detached forts, one mile apart, in the vicinity of London, built of masonry, and requiring regular attacks supported by heavy ordnance for their reduction. Then and not till then he pulls up. The 100,000 regulars and militia are nothing to him in the field, he is made to march over them, or through, it is not stated which, but the 120,000 of indifferent material manning the works about London bring him to bay at once. It is not clear what he does, embarrassed as he must be by so much masonry, and such artful engineering,

whether he continues day after day, and month after month, to knock his head against it until there is finally nothing of him left, and the garrison comes out triumphant in the success of its glorious tactics; or whether he goes back at once by the way he came, picking up such scraps of consolation as some of our large provincial towns, and the wealth of the country generally, may afford him, is not told to us. All we know is, that the fortified dockyards are not taken, and that London is not sacked. Everything else may be in the hands of the enemy, but these are safe. So that after all the heavy insurance which is estimated for all our wealth only secures a portion of it. We wish to be safe from invasion, but the utmost we can do it seems, even when the whole country is bristling with armed men and we have built all the fortifications recommended for us, is to keep the Bank of England intact, and our naval stores from being burnt. We cannot believe that so insensate a scheme as that of these huge fortifications will ever be entertained. It is anything but assuring or pleasant, however, to see the favour it has received from the public. The position we ought to endeavour to arrive at is that of possessing a good deal of latent strength. The less display we make in ordinary times the better. The actual existence of large armaments tend to promote quarrels. If we wish to preserve peace by being prepared for war, which is the golden rule after all, the way to do it is to establish something which in time will admit of 200,000 or 300,000 men, already accustomed to training and discipline, being promptly embodied, and who, coming at once under a stringent military code, on the declaration of hostilities would give us the most ample security. It is quite in vain to look for anything that will do this in a purely voluntary system. We may strain after it how we may by the demoralizing system of excessive bounties, but the failure is certain. A certain amount of coercion, if we may use the term, must be put in force. Men who would never become soldiers of their own free will will serve cheerfully and contentedly enough when once they find they can't help it, and that fortune has made them what they would never have thought of becoming otherwise. We may flatter ourselves upon the different principles on which our army is kept up as compared with continental nations; but the difference is not much to be proud of if it allows of such panics as we are continually falling into. The system we have, and which we seem so anxious to keep in its integrity, can never lead to a satisfactory result. We have tried it long and often enough, and we ought to know its fruits. If we really intend to have things improved we must come down from the stilts on which we are continually walking in comparing ourselves with other people, and proceed in the same practical way that they do. The conscription, or anything like it, is not to be mentioned forsooth to Englishmen, their fighting even for their own hearths and homes is to be done by a class, by the poor and needy who can be tempted by bounties, or the reckless who are ready to sell themselves for the means of a few days' drunkenness and dissipation, and this is what we are solely dependent upon as a means of national defence. People may well be in a fright when they come

to think of it, and know how different it is with those we expect to assail us. It is useless to discuss the improvement of our army so long as it is maintained on the purely sordid principle which we dignify by the name of voluntary enlistment. The men we get must, in most cases, either enlist or starve, or they have taken to a still worse alternative, and adopt the British uniform by way of change, possibly as a hope of escape from punishment for their misdeeds. It is well known that few men of respectable characters and doing at all well in civil life ever join the army. The profession is only taken up as a last resource. With the great mass of it, recruited as it is, who but the dregs of the population will think of joining it? Instead of rising in the scale the recruits we obtain are every day becoming worse and worse. As our necessities press upon us the standard of physical qualities goes lower and lower, and as to previous habits, conduct, or character in a recruit, no questions are ever asked! It is extraordinary the light in which we allow ourselves to view these matters, taking pride for things as a free people which we ought in reality to be ashamed of. We deceive ourselves, and imagine what the real facts of the case do not justify. We praise up voluntary enlistment, and flourish it in the face of foreign countries as something infinitely beyond them; but it is, in fact, nothing better than trading for soldiers on the necessities of those who can't well help themselves. If we wished to exhibit our inconsistency in the strongest light, we could not do it more effectually than in the way we act on this subject. We profess a great deal about the army, but we rigidly confine ourselves, and boast of our doing so, as if it was a virtue, to recruiting it exclusively by means which, although there may be exceptions under it, can only admit the lowest of the lower classes. If we would only turn our backs upon cant and hypocrisy, and see some of our institutions as they really are, and as this one of voluntary enlistment is, we might form a truer estimate of our condition, and hesitate less about adopting the proper remedy. We were accustomed to the ballot in former years, or rather our fathers were, and if we would only adopt it now, under a strictly impartial enforcement of it, with a freedom to purchase substitutes, there is no limit scarcely to the number of men we might, with a judicious system, train and organize. We venture to say that doing this would not press one half so heavily on the country as the taxation which is now kept up, and which must go on increasing for the maintenance of that which, pay what we may for it, can never satisfactorily give us what we want. If we would only adopt the ballot, the whole population of the country, if we chose it, might be called out by relays, and an army, second to none in numbers and efficiency, would be at hand at all times whenever we required it. We have no right to estimate the large armies of continental powers, obtained by conscription, as one bit better than what we could obtain on our own plan, if we set about it. If there are constitutional difficulties in the way of doing our defences as they ought to be done, and as they can alone be done efficiently, or if we prefer a good deal of nonsense about free Englishmen, who needn't defend their country if they don't choose it, to the

national security, there is very little use in discussing the matter further; we have made our choice, and there is nothing left for those who don't like it but to screw up their nerves to bear it in the best way they can. The ballot would effectually prevent desertion, for it would be the interest of every man to see that deserters were apprehended. It would be of much more consequence to the community at large than to the government to have them caught. With such an institution, worked as it might be, and with a strong and highly efficient force of field artillery, we might laugh at the alliance of all the despotic powers in the world. We would be safe at all points, for even though the command of the channel was lost to us, an invading army would think twice before it came over to meet the array we could launch against it. There is no reason in the world why, with judicious measures on the subject, we should not have levies equal to any infantry in the world, and if they were sufficiently numerous and supported by a superior force of artillery—the latter always maintained—to that of the enemy, surely the chances of the lottery—for war is little else at the best—would be as vastly in our favour as any reasonable person could desire. Light field batteries, judiciously disposed so as to be able to concentrate rapidly on any assailed point, especially with the Armstrong gun, would be the very best and most economical force on which to place a considerable portion of our reliance. A good and sufficient force of this arm is the very best basis we can possibly have for a land defence. There is no originality claimed in urging it; it has been mentioned over and over again; nevertheless, there is no part of the service of which our military authorities are so generally ignorant, and certainly none that is more habitually treated with contumely, and when not neglected altogether, with a meddling incapacity ruinous to everything connected with it. Its senior officers, whose experience might be turned to the most valuable account, are ignored for employment altogether, and a taint, which at once affects the zeal and efficiency of the whole service, is communicated to it.

As if to crush all "*esprit de corps*," moreover, those who attain to the rank of general are immediately stripped of the uniforms they have worn all their lives previously, and which mark them as artillery officers. There is, extraordinary as it may appear, no general officer of artillery who can be distinguished as such by his uniform, or in any other way, in the British army. An order was fulminated from the Horse Guards, in no measured terms, on the 23rd of June, 1857, because two general officers, believing they were right in the change of dress that took place about that time, appeared at a levee in blue tunics. They were told that there was "no deviation allowed in the dress of general officers of artillery from that established for general officers of the army at large." Those who make light of such matters know nothing of the feelings of soldiers, or of that professional pride which animates zeal and promotes efficiency. Out of thirty-five officers of artillery in the rank of general there are only two at this moment in any active employment, one entirely unconnected with the arm, and the other in a position which does not give him much opportunity to advance it in any way. The same thing could not be said of the artillery

service of any other country in the world, and we leave it to any unprejudiced person to judge what the result of it must be. It may drag through while the promotion is rapid for the junior ranks, but it is more than probable it will bring serious discredit on the service, and perhaps be the cause of no trifling disaster to the public interest some day or other. It is a question which we think it would puzzle the Horse Guards to answer satisfactorily. If the 30,000 officers and men, speaking in round numbers, of the Royal Artillery, scattered all over the world, with the immense quantity of material of great intricacy of detail, in connection with them, can be looked after and cared for by a staff of but two regimental lieutenant-colonels and a captain, what necessity can there be for a number of the highest grades of general officers for the more simple details on the staff of the rest of the army? Captain Leicester Vernon has given notice of a motion relative to the staff of our army for next session. If it can be shown that our artillery can be maintained in its efficiency, no general officer whatever being employed in connection with it, there is unquestionably room for very considerable reduction in the staff of the army, and the thirteen millions voted in our estimates for military purposes will admit of some better application than that which devotes only three and a-half millions of it to the pay of the soldier. There is something extraordinary, considering the anxiety displayed about our national defences, and the vast importance of artillery in connexion with them, in the way in which that arm is treated. The experience of its highest officers is set aside in the most systematic manner. It is governed more like a mercantile establishment than a military body. Pen and ink and a certain routine knowledge of detail are the highest qualities in connection with it. While the staff is absolutely a burlesque upon a staff in its meagreness, not a single appointment is left in connection with the service, in which the principle is recognised of its requiring to be governed by any practical professional knowledge. The command in Ireland had been reduced to that of a colonel, and when the appointment of an Inspector-General of Artillery could no longer be resisted without risking an attack likely to prove fatal to that useless and unnecessary office in the guards, the infantry and the cavalry, instead of selecting from amongst the rank of general officers, of whom there were several quite competent, it was bestowed on a regimental-colonel sixty-seven or sixty-eight years of age, and of whom it may be said, without wishing to speak disparagingly of him in the least, that there is scarcely one of those above him, over whom he has been preferred, who does not possess equal if not superior talent and ability, professional and otherwise, or who, if tested on the score of bodily activity, would be found his inferior. As if to make the appointment depressing to juniors as well as to seniors, this officer is a colonel of horse artillery; and, although he has had a new rank made for him, that of a "temporary general," (there is no end to novelties now-a-days) he retains the remunerative office of his inferior grade. We do not blame the party indicated in the least, nor his aid-de-camp either, who is also a pluralist. A good deal depends on these things. There are some who will,

perhaps, condemn the rough way of treating them, but these are not times when we should mince matters; and the day may come when those inclined to censure will wish they had listened to plain speaking. The arm of artillery is least of all in this country to be trifled and jobbed away in its efficiency, for the sake of those who would call a spade a pitch fork, if they thought it would please to do so. We would earnestly recommend the authorities to place themselves under the counsel and advice of Sir Robert Gardiner, and one or two officers of his standing and experience in artillery matters. They will find the advantage of it not only in certain efficiency, but in economy, and in ease and comfort to themselves. They must be satisfied by this time that they are only getting deeper and deeper into the mire of confusion. Although it has become the fashion of late years to cry up the greater employment of civilians in those scientific matters relating to artillery, it can truly be said that nothing in England ever stood higher than the material of the arm, the departments for the construction of which were invariably governed by artillery officers. It was a pattern which foreigners were always glad to study and to follow. The organization of the service was the same, and is that, although we have got rid of it, which in many of the most essential points exists in the French artillery, and which they took from us. They find somehow or other as a general principle that the same man will do for a gunner and driver in the field batteries, and, it is to be doubted, if they insist on the folly that a brigade of artillery of 48 or 54 guns is the same as, or that it can be treated like, a regiment of infantry. The late Colonel Colquhoun and Captain Boxer, now at the head of the laboratory, whose improvements and inventions would have gained him the very highest distinction in any other country, show what artillery officers can do even under the most thankless system. We submit that it would promote that which the country is seeking after, if some of these minor details were more rigidly and impartially attended to.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.

At length the British Government have resolved to grapple with the great national question of a Royal Naval Reserve, of making, in fact, a substitute for the universally admitted evil, impressment. The necessity for a Naval Reserve must be apparent, even to the least reflective member of the community. This year the Royal Navy may require the services of 100,000 men; next year the requisite number may be reduced to 50,000; and *vice versa*. To sustain the navy at its maximum extent would not only involve a heavy outlay, but excite the envy and distrust of other countries. On the other hand, it would be dangerous to rely upon the minimum. A reserve which can be called upon in an emergency, is, therefore, needful to avoid unnecessary expense, and to guard against the exigences which a war would give rise to.

So long as the mercantile navy was exclusively manned by British seamen, and privileges were accorded to British shipowners, which seemed to afford a set-off for the obligation they were under to train apprentices, and find sailors in time of need, the case was different. Free trade policy, however, demolished those privileges, and the liability to furnish men for the navy, as a natural sequence, also fell. But, prior to the abrogation of the navigation laws, plans for establishing a Naval Reserve were set on foot.

Sir Francis Baring took a favourable view of the reserve question, and in 1852 obtained a vote sufficient to form 5,000 men; but, at this juncture, a committee for manning the navy was appointed by the Admiralty, to which the plan was referred. The committee, however, had, as they supposed, hit upon an expedient which was to operate as a panacea for all the evils of the service. This expedient was the continuous service system; the residuum obtained from which, in the shape of short service, or ten year pension men, would, the committee conceived, render any other reserve uncalled for. It is just possible that this might have proved a correct decision on their part; but, unfortunately, the continuous service plan did not succeed with seamen generally, and the small root it had taken was torn up by Sir Charles Wood in 1857, in his endeavours to reduce the navy to a peace establishment.

In the meanwhile, the number of British seamen in the merchant service continued to decrease. The Russian war had had the effect of drawing foreign seamen into the merchant ships, to supply the void occasioned by the withdrawal of the seamen who entered the navy. Although the number did not exceed 13,000, it had the effect of displacing permanently so many of the best sailors, and consequently of diminishing the prospect of obtaining a full supply of seamen for the navy, from that source, on any future occasion.

The Manning Commission in 1858 took the question up with much spirit. Numerous witnesses were examined, and a variety of points with reference to it discussed. The Registrar-General of seamen was examined at great length, and expressed an opinion that it would be no difficult task to form a reserve of 30,000 men in the coasting and short foreign voyage trade. His project was to pay these men at the rate of £6 a-year, deducting £1 to be applied to a pension fund, from which, at the age of 50 or 55, the reserve man should be entitled to a pension of £15 or £20 a-year, with reversion to his widow. It was supposed that these men would be able to give up a sufficient portion of their time in the course of the year for the purpose of training, and so become very efficient men, well calculated to man ships of the royal navy in time of need.

The arguments of the registrar appeared to carry much weight, and one of the Royal Commissioners, Mr. Cardwell, no doubt influenced to some extent by them, submitted a scheme upon which the recommendations of the commission appeared ultimately to have been based. Returns of the number of men engaged in the Baltic, North American, and Mediterranean voyages, showed from 60,000 to 100,000 (including masters), and from this source it was supposed that twenty or thirty thousand might readily be obtained upon cer-

tain conditions. These men, it was believed, might be induced to join the reserve by the concession of the following privileges :—

1. A badge or title of honour, as belonging to the Queen's service.
2. An annual payment, or retaining fee.
3. Pension at the age of 50.
4. Payment for time spent in practice.
5. Participation in the benefits of Greenwich Hospital.

It was anticipated that a number of men under the denomination of Aquatics might also be induced by these terms to join this reserve.

Upon this basis the present Government appear to have built their superstructure. A bill, prepared by parties very incompetent to the difficult task, was recently submitted to Parliament, but it was so vague and imperfect that it was found necessary to pass an Act which should empower the Admiralty to raise 30,000 men as a reserve, and to frame the regulations for carrying it into force. The Act, in point of fact, is very nearly a *carte blanche*, which the Admiralty, by and with the advice of the shipping authorities of the Board of Trade, may fill in as needful. It gives power to raise the men, fixes the periods of service, determines the extent of training, and the mode of calling out the reserve by Act of Parliament or Royal Proclamation. The retaining fee is left blank, thereby enabling the Admiralty to make it five or ten pounds, or any intermediate sum, according to circumstances. So also with respect to the amount of pension, and the age at which it is to be payable, which points will be determinable by the regulations to be adopted.

Such, in brief, is an outline of the scheme for supplying one of the greatest wants now known. If it were necessary to double the army the machinery is so good with respect to recruiting, bounties, pensioner corps, and militia, that the difficulty would be inconsiderable; and a soldier, it must be remembered, is made much more quickly than a sailor. The gay dresses, music, and excitement accompanying a review are sure to bring forward a good supply of recruits; but all these auxiliaries are wanting in the navy. On the contrary, strange stories are bandied about from father to son, and from brother to brother, about a sea life. The effect produced is not unaccompanied by a presentiment of danger, and a feeling of distaste. And then every low class paper tells horrible stories about "the cat." These stories are particularly rife in mercantile sea ports, where it is the interest of crimps and watermen to combine in running down the navy. All these drawbacks must be overcome before the navy gains a proper hold upon the masses.

There was a time when cupidity was aroused by the chink and profusion of Jack's gold. But fried watches and devoured bank notes are no longer heard of, and the man-of-war sailor returns home at very distant intervals, with none of that *eclat* about him which once made a blue jacket envied. True, there are medals galore; three discs of silver, hanging to discoloured ribbons, may be seen dangling very often upon a thread-bare jacket; and when it is known that these are all the warrior has obtained for his hard battles—generally not underrated—they excite no feeling of emulation in the

beholder. An account showing the receipt and expenditure of naval prize, bounty, salvage, and other monies, between the 1st of April, 1857, and 31st March, 1858, printed by order of the House of Commons, in July, 1858, and comprising a statement of captures made under the Russian prize act, makes some very damaging disclosures. It shows that between June, 1854, when the first Russian prize was captured by the Tribune, to the 30th November, 1855, when hostilities virtually terminated, the total amount of captures divisible among the crews of the Baltic, and Black Sea, and Pacific squadrons —divisible among some thirty or forty thousand persons—was only at the rate of about a pound a-head. The sum disbursed to the admirals, captains, officers, and crews, amounted, in the whole course of the war, to no more than £35,338 18s. 3d., and when it is borne in mind that the lion's share of prize money does not fall to the lot of the foremast man, this fact shows that if a calculation were made of the sums actually distributed among the sailors who risked life, health, and limb, and did incredible mischief to their outward man, "*five shillings*" would be its highest average!

The few prizes captured were principally in the Baltic, the men employed in the Black Sea and many in the Sea of Azoff did not get a sixpence.

In previous minor wars, as that in Syria and China, something in the way of bonus, where no prize-money was obtained, was granted by Parliament; but in the case of the Russian war, not a penny was granted, although the men had been serving for little more than half the wages which were obtainable in the merchant service. To make the matter worse, at the end of the war ships were paid off rapidly, and men were turned adrift by thousands to starve in the streets.

Later still, there has been a very sharp war in China; Canton, the strongest city in China, has been captured, and numerous fleets of war and piratical junks destroyed. The forts which guarded the entrance to the Pekin river have been gallantly forced, lots of fine fellows have been knocked down and placed *hors de combat* by fever and casualties, and many laid low by Chinese bullets; and with what beneficial result to the sailors? There is a sum under the head of "booty money" to be paid to those who captured Canton, but, alas! for all the rest, they have not a cowry in store.

Before the Admiralty can succeed in establishing a reserve, it is very necessary that the active service should be made as popular as circumstances will admit of.

A man-of-war, as a general rule, can never have charms for the working man. The honour and glory annexed to the service are reserved for the superior classes, and he, therefore, looks to it merely as a labour mart, from which he derives a living. The class from whom the sailor is drawn think little of patriotism, and much of lucre. If they can once be impressed with the notion, by having facts clearly set before them, that the Queen's service, all things considered, is the best paid and most eligible, that impression will sway them. We do not wish to be understood as saying that the poorer classes have no patriotic feelings. They are patriotic to the extent of their means and understanding, but when patriotism calls

upon them to serve for lower wages than they can obtain elsewhere, they are apt to turn a deaf ear to the invitation. If a volunteer reserve is to be formed, therefore, the offers made to the "seafaring men, and others" must be tempting.

The men and the women too—for married men, particularly sailors, are very much influenced by the softer sex—must be made to comprehend the advantages accruing from joining the reserve before they elect to join, or the wives give their consent to their husbands joining. A vast deal will consequently depend upon the regulations which are to accompany the promulgation of the Act; for should there be any niggard spirit about the terms, or any suspicious of a trap, or should too much be demanded in return for the retaining fee, the project will assuredly fall and expire under its own weight. More than that, its fall will be so detrimental to the cause, that no one for many years to come will be bold enough to attempt another plan of the kind.

We will now examine into the probable working of the "Reserve Volunteer Force of Seamen Act." The first question which will present itself to the mind of a young seaman, say in the Mediterranean trade, will be, "What is the remuneration?" If that suits him, he will go further into the matter, and ascertain, as well as he can, from a perusal of the documents set before him, what is expected from him in return. Presuming that he thinks the pay and prospective work worthy his consideration, he will look to the extent of the obligation to serve, and perhaps to the pension, &c., in the distance. He may, if a thoughtful fellow, take into calculation wounds, hurts, infirmity, or old age; and should he discover in the provisions made for him anything cheering, and likely to be realized, he will probably present himself to the receiving officer, and put down his name. We have taken the Mediterranean trade as the most eligible for the purpose. The men brought up in this trade commonly enter as apprentices, and look forward to becoming mates, although, perhaps, not aspiring to commands. The voyage out and home occupies from three to four months, and they are as many weeks in port. The vessels in which they sail belong to various country ports, at which the men have friends and relatives, whom they take great pleasure in visiting on their return from sea. Sailors rarely remain single from choice. Their first object, if they see the shadow of a chance of existing, is marriage, and they are apt wooers. Most of these young men, therefore, have a yet stronger tie to the locality, and much as the man and his helpmate would like the additional pay, and prospective pension, yet were they annexed to a *three years'* separation, we doubt much if the terms would be agreeable. If the reserve man were to be liable to serve for a limited period only, and not to be taken away to another hemisphere to fight, he would probably be found willing to enlist, and the wife would not dissent.

And here we would beg to observe that the concoctors of the bill, whose knowledge of Parliamentary documents must have been upon a par with their experience of merchant sailors, have taken upon their shoulders a needlessly heavy load.

A reserve differs very materially from a permanent force. We do not want 30,000 men to embark for "three" years or "five" years. Experience has demonstrated of late the extremely exhausting effect of war. The Russian war in two years drained Russia and France of immense resources, bringing those countries, for the time, to the verge of bankruptcy; and the late war in Italy was brought to a sudden termination, so sudden as to make the belief general that both France and Austria,—to employ a Yankeeism—were "used up." So enormous are the expenses of munitions of war, and of rapid transit, and so devastating the losses accruing from hostile collision, that months now will effect what it took years to bring about under the old system of warfare. With this fact to guide the authorities, we think they would have done well had they limited the period of service for the reserve men to *one* year, to be increased to *two* upon any great emergency.

The grand object to be achieved is to have the means of equipping a large fleet in a very brief space of time—to be able to make a powerful and prompt demonstration; and this may be effected by having thirty thousand available men, trained and efficient, whether the term of their engagement be one year or five. By reducing the period of servitude to one year, the probability is, that not only would the whole number required be speedily raised, but that a second division, upon easier terms, might also be formed in the long voyage trade, from which ships on a foreign station might be recruited on an emergency. Hundreds of men would volunteer for service in the navy if they were assured that their term of service would be short or that it would last only during a particular service; and this consideration would induce them to look with much satisfaction upon the immediate, though small, benefit offered, as an equivalent for the liability, and the future of a comfortable retirement in old age.

The Naval Coast Volunteer Corps must be considered a failure. The ten thousand men asked for, and for whom the money has been year after year voted, were never raised, although the recruiting system was admirably organized. One reason for this was the paltry sum named as an inducement. A man was offered ten shillings on entering his name, and the same sum annually; and for this he was to be under training twenty-eight days, and to be held liable to serve within 100 leagues of his own shore, when called upon. The pitiful measure met with the response which most people anticipated. The chief of those who enrolled themselves on the English coast were idle vagrants, who had no settled mode of life—poachers, smugglers, servants out of place, &c. In Scotland a hardy race of fishermen were induced to volunteer, but they did so very guardedly, and with the clear intention on their part to serve the shortest possible period. In Ireland a most wretched crew of spalpeens, ginglemen and hodmen, whose rags and dirt excited the disgust of the sailors belonging to the training ships, formed the staple of the volunteers. Upon the whole, about as motley a gang as these volunteers would hardly be found elsewhere; but what could be expected for *ten shillings per annum?*

The new Act will, we trust, eschew the errors of the past, and cause our reserve to be respectable and respected. Clause VII.

enacts that every volunteer shall, while he be such, be exempt from service in the militia, and *from serving as a peace or parish officer*, and, upon his entering the reserve volunteer force of seamen, shall cease to be a Royal Naval Coast Volunteer, if then belonging to that force; and further directs that every volunteer shall, under such regulations as the Lord High Admiral, or the Commissioners for executing the office, may from time to time establish, be eligible for admission into the Royal Hospital at Greenwich, and be, thereupon, entitled to the same privileges and advantages as men who are, or may be, or have been, in her Majesty's navy.

This latter privilege, if worked out fairly, and to the full extent of which it is susceptible, will be a powerful lever. If we understand the origin of Greenwich Hospital aright, it was to encourage men to betake themselves to the sea service, in order that they might be available for the defence of the country, in time of need. But before this inducement can have its due weight, that establishment must undergo a radical change and purification. The evils pointed out by Sir Charles Napier, have, we fear, only too solid a foundation. Men look upon Greenwich Hospital not as a great national institution, the pride and glory of the land, to which feeling it should give rise, but as a naval poorhouse—a shade better than a Union. The Admiralty have promised an investigation into the working of this establishment, and we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of their intentions; but no half measures will suffice.

In order that the "Reserve Volunteer Force of Seamen Act" should have a fair chance, it should be read and expounded to a knot of young merchant seamen in a sailors' home, by a Greenwich pensioner, whose outward man divested of a costume which excites ridicule, and clothed like a retired mariner, bespoke comfort and competence, and who could testify as the result of his own experience that Greenwich Hospital had been thoroughly cleansed of its objectionable characteristics, and become, in all respects, a desirable home for sailors. The coat and pocket of the man should tell their own tale. Imagine the effect upon the hard working "body," whom the young sailor we alluded to just now had married, if she knew that her husband by joining the volunteer force would possibly be providing an asylum for herself, should shipwreck or battle deprive her and her children of their support! and this we contend would be a legitimate application of the funds of Greenwich Hospital. Let the sailor's wife understand that the wives of the pensioners of Greenwich Hospital are no longer dependent upon the refuse of the pensioners' tables, but that they too are, to a certain extent, cared for, and Greenwich Hospital will weigh its full pound in the Government scale.

In a word, nothing should be left undone to make this plan not alone acceptable, but desirable. We would have sea-faring men, particularly the fine young fellows now begrimed with dirt and coal dust in our coasters and colliers, divest themselves of their abhorrence for cleanliness, and rally round the standard of the volunteer force. The skilled boatman and the sturdy bargeman should also see in the proposition a something very much to their advantage, and

study to qualify themselves to fight for their country, their homes and hearths, should they be threatened.

But not so fast. Before this most desirable feeling can be brought about, there must be a great change wrought in the service of which they may at any time be required to form part. These men will not render themselves liable to be seized up and flogged at the caprice of one man, although that one man be the Captain; and they must be made to understand that, as in the army, a Captain cannot punish without the preliminary of a fair trial. Instances have been known of most arbitrary punishments, and these not many years since either. These things must cease. Neither must punishment be aggravated by being inflicted in the presence of strangers. It might not be judicious to abolish corporal punishment at once. It should probably be retained for grave offences; but a court-martial should determine the degree of gravity. Corporal punishment, as Lord Clarence Paget said recently in the House, should be allowed "to die out." All these improved points of discipline, duly set forth, would have a wondrous effect, and, in that case, the officers entrusted with the duty of entering men for the reserve, would have a comparatively easy and pleasant task.

The monthly pay offered to the volunteer for training should not be less than £3. It should be remembered that he is drawn from some remunerative occupation; not like the vagrant coast volunteer, who is glad to embark for the sake of a month's feed; and that he sacrifices at least that amount of wages while undergoing a month's training.

There is another point worthy of much consideration; it is the mode and place of training. Upon the presumption that the Reserve Volunteers are really sea-faring men, or sailors, there is no good reason why they should be sent on board a ship to acquire a knowledge of gunnery, &c. They have their sea legs already. If the reserve men were taught according to the admirable system of gun drill established in the Coast Guard batteries along shore, they would acquire all that is really necessary without the trouble and expense of sending them on board hulks or training ships. Instruction batteries might be formed at various parts most convenient to the reserve men, and at these depôts they might be made expert riflemen and swordsmen, and be as perfectly indoctrinated in the great gun exercise as they could be on board ship. The Coast Guard training ships would not then be overtaxed by having to train an additional number of reserve men, nor any confusion be occasioned by their being mixed up with the Coast Volunteers.

Should the plan now advanced fail, there is only one chance left—a general register of *all* seafaring men and aquatics of every denomination, and a ballot for a naval militia. The country cannot be left in a dependent position. Impressment, by universal consent, is condemned; and nothing but an enemy's fleet in the channel could render that most obnoxious resort tolerable. The establishment of an efficient reserve may obviate this painful and dangerous necessity, and also the scarcely less obnoxious plan of a general register and maritime inscription.

A well formed reserve in the merchant service would be produc-

tive of other advantages; it would arrest the process of denationalisation now going on in the British Mercantile Navy, and would form so strong a tie between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Marine generally, as to render service under the pendant no longer distasteful. Every one, therefore, has an interest in the success of this scheme. The merchant captain, the shipowner, the yachtsman, all should unite in recommending it, and do their utmost to induce those over whom they have any control to fall into the Government proposition.

Among the numerous details which will have to be considered in forming the regulations, will be the question of pension. If pensions are only to be given when men are over fifty, and worn out, the Government will have to consider the allowance, whatever it is, in the light of a retirement. If, on the other hand, the pension—a smaller one—given after the man has been enrolled, say fifteen years, which might bring his age to 40, he could still be available for service, and thus very considerably augment the reserve force. The best plan which occurs to us, therefore, is the grant of a retaining pension at forty to be increased to a retiring pension at fifty. The country would then have the advantage of holding the pension in reserve for ten years, by which means, instead of 30,000, we might have an available force of 50,000 effective men.

There are many other questions to be settled yet, all of which have relation more or less immediately to the Reserve. We allude now to the establishment of nautical schools. All who give themselves any concern about the maritime service of the country—and one pays a bad compliment to the sense of Englishmen in supposing any to be altogether indifferent—must see that very much requires to be done. We exist only as a maritime nation; for the instant we lose our place on the ocean, we imperil our being as an independent state. Our ships must, as far as possible, be manned with sons of the soil; and every means should be resorted to, to encourage that feeling of nationality, that spirit of patriotism, which is the life and soul of our prosperity. We must train up the young, encourage manhood, and foster old age. Our best interests as a nation lie in this direction; and our sympathies and feelings are also strongly enlisted in behalf of the tars of old England.

GENERAL BORMANN ON THE SHRAPNEL AND BOXER SHELLS AND FUZE.

An article in the *United Service Magazine* for February, 1854, from the pen of an experienced officer of the Indian Artillery, has elicited from Major-General Bormann, an artillery officer of the Belgian army, and aide-de-camp to his Majesty King Leopold, an elaborate reply, designed to refute the statements of our gallant contributor on the subject of the Bormann and Boxer fuzes. This literary projectile is intended to do immense execution, but the Bormann fuze is notorious for not effecting its object, and we have received the whole charge of paper and print without being sensibly damaged. The volume, in fact, is nothing more than a salvo in honour of its author—a puff of his own inventions, and a depreciation of those of every other artillerist. It is true General Bormann

thinks there is something in the Shrapnel shell, but he ungenerously endeavours to deprive us of the credit of introducing it, by affirming that General Shrapnel was not its inventor. A foreigner will never allow merit in an Englishman. After all that English genius has done for civilization, and the ready homage we pay to the intellect of other countries, we are still met by the cry—"Can any good come out of Nazareth?" General Bormann is one of the unbelievers. He came over to England with his metallic fuze in 1852, and, by direction of the authorities, he obtained every facility in the Laboratory, at Woolwich, for the manufacture both of his fuze and shells, at the public cost; but, though the Select Committee showed him every indulgence, the result of repeated experiments was conclusive against his system. In revenge, General Bormann is not only very fierce upon the shell and fuze of Captain Boxer, which, after similar trials, gave results of the most decisive character, but he snatches the iron wreath from the skull of General Shrapnel himself. We are now told, on the authority of a Captain Toll, of the Prussian Artillery, that there somewhere exists a manuscript which proves that a shell of a similar description was dreamt of in Germany in the sixteenth century. Captain Toll, who deserves to be styled Captain Fool, has some idea of the weakness of his case, for he admits that "at first sight it may strike the reader that in the contemporary *printed* works on artillery this invention is not mentioned;" and, secondly, that "the authors of these books, *particularly German*, were chiefly bunglers;" but he logically infers that, "at all events, it must be granted, *as long as the contrary is not proved*, that it is to the German artillerists that the honour is due of having had the first idea of the Shrapnel," &c. We put it to Captain Fool, whether he is more likely to win credence for his discovery by calling on the world to "prove the contrary," or by himself proving the fact. But, perhaps, he will be satisfied with the solitary conversion of General Bormann, who, with a charming credulity, accepts his unsupported statement as conclusive evidence. Indeed, the gallant General claims, "in honour of truth, (?) that the invention in question, which the world appears inclined to attribute solely to General Shrapnel, may be considered—not only in Germany, but also in other countries—as due to German genius." On such evidence, he might attribute to Germany every invention and every discovery ever given to the world; and, in fact, his Prussian friend does take this ground, and declares that "German inventions, at all times, have met with adoption in Germany only after having returned into their fatherland, from foreign countries, under foreign names." We have a great respect for the intellect, as we have friendship for the people of Germany; but, with the exception of the printer's type—a mighty gift—we know not what are the inventions we owe to the Teutonic race.

A man of General Bormann's attainments should be the first to admit merit in others, even in a case where he has not himself been successful. His name as an artillerist stands high, and the projectiles he has originated are not so faulty but what they reflect honour on their inventor. The Bormann fuze has been adopted by the Belgian Government, and modifications of it, in forms calculated to correct some of its defects, are in use in the armies of several of the secondary German Powers. But the severe trial at Shoeburyness proved that it was too complicated for the hands of ordinary artillerymen, and open to other objections of the most

serious character. The gallant General is not bound to accept this decision, though no artillerist who is acquainted with the result of the experiments will incline to any other; but it is neither fair nor generous, because he has been worsted in the trial, to try to disparage his successful competitor. Captain Boxer's shell and fuze have been subjected to every ordeal that science or envy could suggest, and the more they have been tried the more has their efficiency been established. Many of the objections urged against them by General Bormann have been refuted again and again, on the evidence of practical results in action, and the rest are founded on simple misstatements. Thus, the General affirms that the fuze bore no part "in the glorious deeds of the Royal British Artillery in the Crimea;" whereas, we have the testimony of official reports that it was extensively used, and that in its operation it left nothing to be desired. At page 20, the gallant author states that "the wooden case of the Boxer fuze has three longitudinal channels, a transverse one, and nine little holes in two longitudinally-placed rows, and this fuze requiring, moreover, a second case of brass *(ampoulette)*, with two screw threads, two metallic disks, and a metallic cap *(chapeau)*, with one screw thread, I think the simpler construction, and, consequently, also the simpler, easy fabrication is rather on the side of the metallic fuze than on that of the Boxer fuze." But this is arguing from premises which are altogether unfounded; for the Boxer fuze does not, as we are here misinformed, require "a second case of brass, with two screw threads, two metallic disks," &c. These little contrivances form part of the *shell*, not of the *fuze*. No wonder General Bormann is drawn into a maze, when, to borrow a homely phrase, he has got the wrong sow by the ear. We have heard of people who don't know a B from a bull's foot, but we little expected to meet with an artillerist—and one of no slight eminence—who could not distinguish a fuze from a shell.

There is a want of candour in endeavouring to meet the objection raised to the Belgian fuze, on account of its complicated character, by affirming that the British artillerymen have already overcome on the field greater difficulties of this kind, in connection with the Boxer fuze. The truth is, that the soldiers of the Royal Artillery went to the Crimea without having received any instruction in the use of the Boxer fuze; yet they not only experienced no difficulty with it, but applied it in every case with effect. This is a conclusive testimony to the simplicity of its construction.

In his attack on the Boxer fuze, General Bormann is equally at sea as to its cost, which he puts down at from £100 to £120 per 1,000, while the actual price is only £6 10s.; and, estimating that of the Belgian fuze at £14 per 1,000, he adds "it will be readily agreed that on this point, also, the Belgian system is more advantageous than the new English one." But the trifling error of £113 10s. in his calculation gives all the advantage of this argument to the English system, with a balance of £7 10s. per 1,000 in its favour.

The criticisms on the Boxer fuze and shell, which General Bormann borrows from Colonel Delobel, another officer of the Belgian Artillery, show only that the Colonel is no better informed than himself of the real character of these inventions. The Colonel gravely says, "The series of operations necessary at the very moment of the fire for the preparation of the Shrapnel, the regulation of the fuze and the driving it into the *ampoulette*, will require too much time, without taking into

account that, if all this may be done properly and without error on the practice ground, it would not be the same on the field of battle; for the complete boring of the regulating hole up to the column of fusing composition, the introduction of the fuze into the *ampoulette*, so that the row of ciphers correspond to the groove, and its hole or vent *(lumiere)*, and especially the driving home of the fuze into the *ampoulette*, are things very difficult to do rapidly and well during the excitement of battle and amidst a thick smoke, and which will certainly occasion a great number of failures in igniting and premature bursting." What it is to get among military *savans!* Now, here is a tide of learning and a swarm of conjectures, all, like Barry's passages, leading to nothing. The ancient Egyptians invented a beautiful system of geometry, which based all its problems on a mistake, and this is precisely what has been done by Colonel Delobel. The Boxer fuze would, indeed, be of no more value than that of General Bormann, were it open to the objections here enumerated; but how will the gallant Colonel be surprised to hear that none of them apply! He may now learn what few of our readers will need to be told, that the fuze may be inserted with the row of holes in any position, and a smart blow on the wheel is all that is required to fix it. So all his fine conclusions fall to the ground!

Both General Bormann and Colonel Delobel are as much puzzled by Captain Boxer's diaphragm shell, as by his fuze. They roll it over and over, rip it open, and turn it inside out, and like the Irishman who found the dead alligator, and declared it was neither flesh, fowl, nor good red herring, they seem finally to decide that it is neither a shell nor a shot. The gallant General is so bent on demolishing the shell, that he rends it into fragments. No lady ever picked another to pieces in the same cruel style. The shell, we are told, has "a double swelling of iron *(boudin)* nearly in the middle of the inner space, in order to fix the diaphragm, and, besides this, the part of the shell opposite the fuze-hole is reinforced or thicker in iron than the other part of the shell, probably with a view to place the centre of gravity of the whole system in this hemisphere. But this increase of thickness, the swelling and the vault-shaped diaphragm, are sufficient to determine the shell's breaking first at its thinner, weaker part, which surrounds the fuze, and, consequently, causing this part to be thrown on one side, and the thicker, stronger part, with the bullets, on the other." Now the peculiar construction which the General describes has an object quite different from what he supposes, and, as all who are acquainted with the shell are aware, not only secures that object, but, at the same time, provides against the defects he anticipates. Nor is the gallant author correct in ascribing any speciality to the rotary motion of the diaphragm shell. Its eccentricity neither accelerates nor prolongs its rotation; for the wood sabôt is fixed in such a manner as to prevent such an effect, and, in fact, no greater rotary motion is imparted to the diaphragm than to any other Shrapnel. Whatever objection made be made to the diminution in the number of the bullets in the diaphragm, it applies with equal force to the shell of General Bormann; for though the separation of the bullets from the powder by the insertion of the diaphragm necessarily causes a reduction of their number, the amount is, on the averge, only 1-6th or 1-7th per cent. less than the original Shrapnel, and the bullets, instead of being lighter, as is here stated, are of the same size as those used for the Belgian shell. Colonel Delobel is of

opinion that the position of the bursting charge and that of the diaphragm must interfere with the explosion, but this is entirely erroneous, and repeated trials have proved that the sheaf of bullets is even more perfect in the diaphragm than in the Shrapnel. The Colonel is equally wrong in supposing that the mode of loading, through the ampoulette, causes inequality of weight in shells of the same calibre, and consequent irregularity of fire; for the structure of the shell leads to quite a different result, and there is greater regularity in the weight than was possessed by the original projectile. It is stated that the stopper disks may be pushed back by the bullets into the ampoulette, as they are not fixed, and that this derangement will render it impossible to adjust the fuze; but the stopper disk is, on the contrary, securely screwed in, and cannot be moved by any amount of jolting. As regards the range of the shell and the cost of construction, both of which are made the subject of objection, we may remark that it can be prepared for any particular range by ordinary artillerymen, after about two hours' instruction, in from five to ten minutes; and the cost of the ampoulette and fuzes, instead of being from 2s. to 2s. 4½d., does not exceed 7d. In conclusion, we will only add that the Belgian system of shell, which this volume so disingenuously advocates, is the adoption of the original Shrapnel, which has been proved, by a very long and extensive course of experiments, to possess a most fatal defect, and that this defect is entirely overcome by the diaphragm construction.

S. W. F.

A GERMAN VIEW OF THE ITALIAN WAR.

A NARRATIVE of the late war in Italy has recently appeared in the semi-official columns of the *Augsburg Gazette*. In a short introduction, the editor announces that the writer is a person in every respect competent to give a fair and impartial account of the campaign, that he has every facility afforded him, and that his *data*, founded on the most authentic returns, may be relied upon as perfectly correct.

The subjoined is a translation of the said narrative, with the omission of such matter as would be tedious to the English reader, and the addition of such notes as will render the account a valuable historical document:—

CHAPTER I.

The Austrian Army crosses the Ticino—The English mediation—Gyulai's plans—Skirmish at Frasinetto—The Dora-Baltea line—The Austrian position—The Reconnaissance to Montebello—Battle of Montebello.

On the 29th April—two days, therefore, *after* the expiration of the time allowed by Count Buol's *ultimatum*—the Austrian army crossed the Ticino on three points—on the high road from Milan to Novara, at Abbiate-grasso, and Pavia. This delay of two days was caused by the English proposal of mediation, and was in so far detrimental to Austria, as already on the 25th French troops were advancing towards Mont Cénis and Mont Genèvre, and on the 26th the first French auxiliary corps landed at Genoa. Within eight days this corps could join—without, it is true, its full complement of artillery and cavalry—the wings and centre of the Piedmontese army,

by rail from Genoa to Novi and Casale, and from Turin to Alessandria and Casale. The Piedmontese army, consisting of from 60,000 to 80,000 regulars, was already concentrated between Alessandria and Casale, protected against an attack on the part of the Austrians by the Po, the Tanaro, and the Sesia, and having as *points d' appui* the entrenched camp of Alessandria, that fortress, the *tête de pont* and ramparts of Casale. It was thus enabled daily to receive fresh reinforcements of French troops, and keep open its communications with Turin. It was impossible for the Austrian army to turn this position, it could not undertake anything from Vercelli against Turin as long as the Sardinian army remained on its flank or rear. Its only choice was either to relinquish all idea of an advance on Turin, first carry Casale, and besiege Alessandria, after defeating the Sardinians, or to advance from Pavia across the Po on Novi, drive back the French auxiliary troops arriving from Genoa, and attempt a decisive blow against the Sardinians at Alessandria. If the Austrian army had been strong enough, with one half to keep the Sardinian army before Alessandria in check, and drive back the French detachments as they arrived, the other half might have marched on Turin. But for this, two armies were requisite.

This was so self-evident to the Piedmontese Generals, that the Sardinian army remained quietly encamped between Casale and Alessandria; they took, however, the precaution of occupying the Dora-Baltea line from Turin to Ivrea, to protect Turin against any sudden attack.

General Gyulai's conduct under these circumstances has been the subject of much comment. He had four *corps d'armée* under his orders: Zobel, Benedek, Lichtenstein, and Schwarzenberg in the Lomellina, and the Vercelli-Valenza-Pavia triangle, protected by the Sesia and the Po. At Pavia, and beyond Pavia, there was a fifth corps (Stadion's), and further on at least shortly afterwards, a portion of the sixth armée corps (Schaffgotsche) for the defence and partial occupation of the valley of the Trebia. Thus, in the first week of the invasion, Gyulai might have brought an army of 120,000 men against the main point of the Piedmontese right wing, and attempted a *coup de main* against Voghera and Novi, before the Franco-Sardinian army had completed its centre at Alessandria. The first French Generals who arrived seemed to have been aware of this, as they particularly exhorted the men in the *ordres du jour* boldly to withstand the first attack of the enemy.* The attempt, however, was not made.

Fan-like, the Austrians spread themselves in detached bodies and outposts from Vercelli, Lumello, and Mortara, in every direction, to ascertain, as it was then said, a knowledge of the enemy's position. This may have been necessary at first, but after one week Gyulai must have known, even from the Sardinian bulletins and papers, and the public announcement of the position of the French between Novi and Casale, where the enemy was, and where he was open to attack. How did Gyulai act? On the 2nd May the Austrians occupied Vercelli. On the 3rd they attempted to cross the Po at three

* Vide "Ordre du jour dated Novi, 3 May.

points—at Frasinetto, Valenza, and Cambio. It is possible these were only feints to alarm and mislead the enemy. After a somewhat severe skirmish the attempt to cross at Frasinetto was abandoned on the 4th; at Valenza communications with the opposite shore were established, the railway bridge blown up; at Cambio a bridge was thrown across the Po, establishing communications with the right bank on the direct road to Tortona. It appeared now as if the Austrians intended to make a stand on the lower Scrivia to secure themselves against an attack from the south, as they occupied Castelnuovo, burnt the bridge over the Scrivia, and blew up the arches of the railway bridge. They occupied Tortona, and commanded the road to Pavia and Piacenza. A bridge thrown over the Po at Cornale, below the mouth of the Tanaro, assured communications with the left bank.

It really appeared that Gyulai intended an advance on Turin. On the 5th and 6th May the Austrians suddenly left all their southern positions on the other side of the Po, evacuated Tortona, Casei, Alzano, Voghera, and Pontecurone, advancing from Vercelli to Trino, Pobiesto, Gattinara, and Biella. On the 8th the Austrian outposts were in sight of Ivrea, and an attack on the Dora-Baltea line was hourly expected. This line was but weakly defended; as the Austrians advanced the Piedmontese outposts fell back, and there is no doubt that two armée-corps would have sufficed to make a successful *coup-de-main* on Turin, provided it had been possible to keep the whole line from Pavia to Vercelli with the other three corps, and defend the rear against the enemy.

It is true that the occupation of Turin was no great object; the French were assembling in masses at Novi and Alessandria, joining the Piedmontese army. But still they were scarcely yet in a position to attack three Austrian corps d'armée, to attempt to force the passage of the Po or the Sesia, or to make an attack on Pavia, being unprovided with sufficient artillery and cavalry. The occupation of Turin would have had a good moral effect, even had it been necessary to evacuate it after a few days' occupation, and to fall back again on Vercelli. It would have cut off the communications between Turin and Mont Cenis, and Alessandria, and would have delayed the advance of detached French and Piedmontese troops. To strike this blow required daring energy. The results would not have been otherwise great. The King of Sardinia had left, the government was prepared to take flight to Genoa, and it would have been impossible to hold the capital any length of time.

On the morning of the 9th May the Austrians evacuated all their advanced positions towards Turin. Livorno, Tronzano, Santhia, Saluzzola, were abandoned, then Caresana and Stroppiana, and the army, withdrawn from Palestro, Robbio, and Garlasco, on Pavia, was again concentrated within the Vercelli-Valenza-Pavia triangle. The Austrian sentinels now lined the left banks of the Po and Sesia from Vercelli to Valenza; the Austrian head-quarters faced south, towards Novi, Genoa, and Alessandria, where the main body of the French had already arrived, awaiting only its last instalment of artillery and cavalry.

Hitherto, all the movements of the Austrians had been reconnaissances, forced marches, without an object, feints, alarms, and outpost skirmishes. They now took up a good defensive position behind the Sesia and the Po; from which a blow migh tbe attempted, or any attack of the enemy, who would have to cross the broad Po or the swollen waters of the Sesia, could be successfully repulsed.

During the next ten days nothing worth mentioning occurred. The Sardo-French army continued to complete its organization, took up its positions, and the Emperor Napoleon III. arrived at Alessandria from Genoa. The combined forces consisted now of four French divisions, and the 'Garde,' and five Sardinian divisions. The last detachment of the cavalry of the 'Garde' was advancing by way of Nice, along the Riviera di Ponente. Thus, an army of from 150,000 to 160,000 French, and a Sardinian army of 80,000 men (including the free corps) stood ready for attack, opposed to four Austrian corps d'armeé.*

And how were the Austrians occupied during these ten days which preceded the battle of Montebello? On the 11th of May, according to the Piedmontese bulletins, 3000 Austrians advanced over the Stella bridge, to the right bank of the Po towards Stradella, another body of 4000 men took up a position between Castel San Giovanni and Borgo-nuovo on the same road in the direction of Voghera; 600 men occupied Rivergaro, in the valley of the Trebbia, and the Austrians entrenched themselves in six small forts at the head of the Stella bridge, sending out skirmishers from Broni as far as Casteggio. The Piedmontese fully expected an attack, the more so as on the 19th, the Austrians completely evacuated Vercelli, thus giving up their last point of attack against Turin, blowing up two arches of the bridge over the Sesia. The destruction of the French pontoons at Valenza by the Austrian artillery also seemed to denote an attack southwards, as it showed an endeavour to protect the centre and right wing.

We now come to the "forced reconnaissance" as far as Montebello on the 20th of May. This expedition has been much censured, on the presumption that it really was the intention of the Austrian Commander to drive back the right wing of the Franco-Sardinian army, and to occupy Casteggio. But this was never intended. The number of troops engaged was far too small for such an object. The only object of that reconnaissance was to ascertain the strength of the right wing of the Franco-Sardinian army. This reconnaissance has been attributed to bad generalship, but it must not be overlooked that the main body of the Austrian army was in a defensive position, separated from the enemy by two rivers, and that it was only possible to ascertain that enemy's strength by continual and bold reconnaissances. The position being such that the Austrians

* According to French estimates, the four divisions of the French army in Italy consisted each of 40,000 men, to which must be added the Imperial guard, grenadiers, voltigeurs, Zouaves, cavalry of the guard and artillery, making a total of 200,000 men, which force was to be regularly maintained by fresh arrivals. This, with the Sardinians, volunteers and Tuscans would bring the Sardo-French to 300,000 men.

were compelled to await the initiative on the part of the enemy, not being in sufficient force to attack an army of 200,000 men in a very strong position, there was nothing to be done except to keep well-informed of the enemy's movements. That strong reconnaissances of this description were not made in the other direction from Vercelli and the Sesia towards Casale, that is to say towards the left wing of the Sardo-French army, that was a fault which was afterwards bitterly expiated.

The battle of Montebello made a deep impression on the French and Piedmontese, and appears to have induced them to relinquish the idea of attacking the Pavia-Piacenza line.

On the 19th May Count Stadion's division (Pavia) was ordered to make a strong reconnaissance toward Casteggio and Voghera, starting from Vaccarizza, near Pavia, to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy. It was undertaken by three brigades of Paumgarten's division, the brigade of General Braun of Urban's corps, two regiments of Boer's brigade and the regiment Hess. Urban advanced on the high road towards Casteggio, Paumgarten followed in the plain with Bils's brigade toward Casatisma, Gaal's brigade against Robecco. The Prince of Hesse's brigade formed the right wing and marched through Verrua towards Branduzzo. Towards noon Urban took possession of Casteggio and Montebello, which were only occupied by Sardinian cavalry. It was only at Genestrello that the Jägers of the third and fourth battalions of the regiments "Hess" and "Don Miguel" came upon a very superior body of French infantry, whom they drove back and then occupied Genestrello. The Sardinians and French were taken by surprise. The Sardinian cavalry, about 600 men of the Novara Chevaux Légers, held their ground most gallantly at first, charging no less than six times during the day, but they suffered so much from the riflemen, and were finally so cut up by Haller's hussars, that they lost nearly half their number. It is not to be wondered at, then, if they could not keep their ground to the end of the battle. Meantime French auxiliary troops were coming up in heavy bodies by railway from Voghera. General Forey, in his official report speaks, it is true, of only four battalions and the rest of the division, and the Piedmontese cavalry (about 15,000 men), as the numbers he brought against Genestrello and then against Montebello; but it is an admitted fact Baraguey d'Hillier's whole corps was in position at Voghera, and was joined also by a Piedmontese division. Masses of these troops were continually thrown from noon till six in the evening upon the battle field, which is only one mile distant from Voghera;* so that in a short time, by means of the railway, five regiments of the line, one battalion of Chasseurs-á-pied, in addition to the Chasseurs d'Afrique, and the batteries of three artillery regiments, besides the Piedmontese, containing a force of not less than 20,000 men, were engaged.† The Austrian force consisted, at Genestrello, of five battalions and

* A German mile is three miles English.

† This is corroborated by the decorations awarded by the French Emperor to five regiments, one battalion Chasseurs, to the Chasseurs d'Afrique, and to three artillery regiments.

one division of Haller's hussars, with two six and four twelve-pounders at Montebello, besides six battalions and two and a half companies, one squadron of Haller's hussars, with two six and four twelve-pounders in the battle. This gives at the outside 12,000 to 13,000 men engaged.

The Piedmontese accounts before the battle speak of 12,000 Austrians, after the battle they speak of 18,000. It would, perhaps, have been wise of the Austrian general had he withdrawn his men earlier from the houses at Genestrello and Montebello, but the surprising effect of the Austrian artillery against the lesser artillery force of the French, the deadly fire of the Austrian infantry and the daring of Haller's hussars kept back the French masses so effectually, that a retreat was not sounded till half-past six in the evening, when the object of the reconnaissance had been more than obtained. General Forey, in his report of the 20th May, says himself:

"I deemed it prudent not to follow up further the successes of the day; I placed my troops in position on the high ground near the churchyard of Montebello, and from thence I *saw* the Austrian troops evacuate Casteggio, leaving an *arrière-garde* in its place."

He adds that the losses of the French were considerable, especially in superior officers. The French loss was estimated at 700 or 800 killed and wounded, but 2,000 is nearer the mark, for in the hospitals at Alessandria alone there were 800 Frenchmen wounded at Montebello, and the Piedmontese admit the loss of nearly half their cavalry engaged. The Austrian official return gives 718 men and 10 horses wounded, 294 men and 20 horses killed; missing 283; altogether 1,295. In addition to this, amongst the prisoners taken in the houses at Montebello by the French were 150 seriously wounded.

The impression made by this battle was very favourable to the Austrians.

No pursuit was made, and the object was obtained. The Austrians had proved themselves good riflemen, and more than once allowed the enemy's cavalry to charge within thirty yards before they fired, and then drove them back at the point of the bayonet. The artillery brought up their guns to within one hundred yards of the enemy; at last the French artillery fired at a long range. The Hungarian hussars maintained their reputation.

CHAPTER II.

Hesitations—Garibaldi—Garlasco—The King of Sardinia crosses the Sesia—Position of the Allied Armies—The Battle of Palestro—The fight at Vinzaglio—Imperfect information of the Austrians—Gyulai's opportunity.

After the affair of Montebello the Austrian head-quarters appear to have gone to sleep. On the day after the battle of Montebello, on the 21st May, the Sardinian General, Cialdini, crossed the Sesia, north of Vercelli, driving back the Austrian outposts; on the 22nd, King Victor Emanuel in person made a reconnaissance against the three villages, Palestro, Venzaglio, and Casalino, where the advanced posts of the Austrian right wi entrenched. This was

regarded as a certain indication that the Sardinians premeditated an attack in this quarter. On the 23rd, Garibaldi, with 6,000 of the free corps, crossed the Ticino, close to the Lago Maggiore; on the 24th he occupied Varese; on the 26th he drove back 2,000 Austrians, and on the 27th he entered Como. Everywhere he issued revolutionary proclamations, declaring traitors all men who did not take arms against the Austrians. Somewhat alarmed by these independent measures, the Piedmontese Generals announced that General Niel was advancing to act in concert with Garibaldi.

The Austrian head-quarters remained perfectly quiet at Garlasco; Austrian detachments occupied Bobbio, in the valley of the Trebia, and the defiles of Stradella, which had been evacuated by the Franco-Sardinian army. On the 30th May, the King of Sardinia, at the head of his army (four divisions), crossed the Sesia near Vercelli, and attacked the entrenchments at Palestro, Vinzaglio, and Casalino.

This was the commencement of that memorable circumvention of the Austrian army, which was totally overlooked at Gyulai's head-quarters.

We have now to follow the movements of an army more than 220,000 strong, in presence of an enemy defended and protected, it is true, by the Po and the Sesia, on a ground of thirteen geographical miles extent, on the bow formed from Voghera to Vercelli and Novara, the string of which was in the hands of the Austrian army.

On the 28th May all the corps of the Franco-Sardinian army held their former positions on the right banks of the Po and Sesia. The Emperor Napoleon III. was in Alessandria with the Imperial guard; Baraguey d'Hilliers and MacMahon, with their divisions, held Voghera, Casei, Castelnuovo, Serivia, and Sale; Canrobert was at Pontecurone; Niel at Bassignana and Valenza. The Sardinian army, with Cucchiari's division, watched the Po near Frassinetto, and the divisions Fanti, Durando, and Cialdini, kept guard on the Sesia near Gazzo, Motta, Caresana, Prarolo, and Vercelli. Castelborgo's division acted as reserve, stationed partly at Casale, partly at Terra-Nuova.

General Cialdini was the first to cross over to the left bank of the Sesia, whereupon the French and Piedmontese engineers commenced throwing two bridges across, whilst Canrobert's corps came up by rail to Casale, to advance on the 29th and 30th to Prarolo (opposite Palestro, on the Sesia), there to prepare the passage by three bridges. On the 29th the three Piedmonsese divisions, Fanti, Durando, and Castelborgo advanced as far as Vercelli; on the same day the Imperial guard and General Niel arrived there, whilst MacMahon's and Baraguey d'Hilliers corps, who had the longest stretch, were advancing by forced marches towards Novara. On the morning of the 30th May the whole of the four divisions of the Piedmontese army crossed the Sesia, although only one bridge was completed; Fanti advancing against Consienza, Durando against Vinzaglio, Castelborgo against Casalino, and Cialdini on Palestro.

According to the Piedmontese official reports, the plan was that Fanti should attack Vinzaglio with superior force, and drive out

the Austrians, whilst Durando should then come up, pass through without fighting, and advance rapidly on Palestro, to take it by storm, with Cialdini. Fanti, however, remained behind, and Durando and Cialdini had to storm the village alone. An obstinate fight ensued, with the small body of Austrians quartered in the village, consisting of two divisions, not quite one Austrian brigade,* and whose instructions were to defend the village, and to keep open the communications with Vinzaglio, Casalino, Confienza, and Robbio.

The village of Palestro is situated on the road which leads from Vercelli to Mortara; it is built on an elevation, surrounded by rice-fields and deep canals for draining purposes. Close to the village the road runs through a hollow to the extent of 400 metres in the direction of Vercelli. Here the Austrians had entrenched themselves, but evidently they were deficient in number and in artillery. Their outposts reached as far as the rivulet and the Roggia-Gamara bridge, and here the skirmishing commenced with the Piedmontese Bersaglieri. The Piedmontese now formed into two strong columns on the right and left of the road, placed their artillery on the Gamara bridge, and shelled the village. The right column, led by Colonel Brignone, advanced boldly to the attack, but was driven back with heavy loss two or three times before it gained a footing in the village. At this juncture, two fresh battalions joined the Austrians from Robbio, and took possession of the church-yard, but, at the same moment, the 5th and 10th Sardinian regiments came up to support their men. After a fierce encounter, the Austrians were driven out of the church-yard and surrounding houses. Here, according to Piedmontese accounts, 300 Austrian prisoners were taken of the regiments Leopold and Wimpffen. Isolated Austrian soldiers defended themselves in the last houses of the village like lions; the odds were six to one against them, but they did not surrender till the courtyards were strewed with corpses. The Sardinian officers were so surprised at this desperate resistance, that they asked Captain Davidonawski, who was taken prisoner, why he made so obstinate and hopeless a resistance against such superior numbers. Did he suppose the Sardo-French had instructions not to give any quarter? His reply was, that to the last moment, he confidently expected help from Robbio. No official list has been published of the loss of the Piedmontese in this affair.

About noon on the same day, Vinzaglio was attacked and carried by the three Piedmontese divisions, supported by the cavalry regiments, "Genoa" and "Royal-Piedmont." The village of Vinzaglio is equally well suited for defence as Palestro. It is built on high ground, surrounded by rice-fields, and protected by a deep stream. The bridge over this stream is commanded by the tower and castle. The Austrians had here barricaded themselves, and defended the entrance to the village with great courage, but were finally driven back. They withdrew on Confienza and Palestro, when they again came upon the Piedmontese, as the 2nd division (Fanti) had taken

* The Piedmontese "division" is 15,000 strong. The Piedmontese army is not divided into *corps d'armée*, but into five divisions. It is estimated at 80,000 men.

possession of Casalino and Confienza, and sent a portion of its men to Palestro. The loss of the Piedmontese at Vinzaglio was 200 killed and wounded.

Up to the 31st May, the Austrian head-quarters were still in the dark as to the movements and plans of the allied armies, although the day before General Niel had crossed the Sesia, near Vercelli, with his whole corps, and had reached Borgo-Vercelli. His outposts occupied Orfengo, and he was thus already on the right flank of the Austrians. A futile attempt to retake Palestro on the 31st, with Zobel's corps, proves how totally ignorant the Austrians were of the enemy's intentions.

The advance of the whole Piedmontese army (except one division) to take up a position to the right of Palestro, had been successfully carried out, thus masking the march of the French army on the Austrian flank, and making the Austrian head quarters believe that the Sardinians intended attacking Mortara in front. Gyulai is said to have received information through a Piedmontese channel that Canrobert was preparing to cross the Sesia, near Prarolo (opposite Palestro), though some doubt has been thrown on the statement by the Austrian report of the affair of the 21st of May.

Canrobert's plan to cross the Sesia on three bridges to the rear of Palestro—that is to say, covered by the Sardinian army, and then to push on to Novara to join Niel, very nearly failed, and could not be carried out so easily as it was planned. Owing to heavy rains on the 30th, the Sesia rose considerably; one bridge was swept away, and a second very nearly suffered the same fate; only one was serviceable. On the 31st the weather cleared up, and the two first divisions crossed the Sesia on that morning near Prarolo.

This was Gyulai's opportunity. The Piedmontese reports admit it. He should have thrown himself with every available man upon the Sardinian army and Canrobert's advancing columns, and driven them back into the river. Gyulai had at least three *corps d'armée* which he could have concentrated in the afternoon at Robbio, to attack, perhaps to annihilate, 80,000 of the enemy. But there was not a moment to be lost; the attack ought to have been instantaneous before the other French divisions had completed their march from Vercelli to Novara and taken up position.

In the narrow space between Palestro and Vercelli, when the French were coming up "at ease," the confusion would have been intense. The Piedmontese, still more to mislead Gyulai, planned a feint attack on Robbio, to give the French time. This attack was in some measure anticipated by Zobel's attack on Palestro on the 31st. The Piedmontese reports speak of the "inconceivable hesitation" of the Austrians. If (say those reports) the Austrians had attacked us with only 70,000 or 80,000 men, we should have been placed in a considerable dilemma.

It is almost incredible, but it is nevertheless true, that Zobel's two brigades which made the attack on Palestro, were allowed to be driven back without any troops being advanced to their support, and Bourbaki's division belonging to Canrobert's corps was allowed to cross unmolested.

The attack of the two Austrian brigades was made with great energy and skill, over very difficult ground, intersected by canals, hollows, and tributaries of the Sesia. Zsabo attacked Rosasco (one mile German) south of Palestro, near the Sartirana canal. But to get at the Piedmontese, it was necessary to cross a small, narrow, little stone bridge at the canal lock. The artillery advanced with the brigade which waded the Sesietta, and attacked the Piedmontese right in the hollow ground at Scotti. Had the attack succeeded, the Piedmontese would have been driven back towards Vercelli, their communications with Canrobert cut off, and, unless in great force, they would have lost their position against Robbio. For at the same time they were outflanked by Weigl's brigade on the north, near the Cascina San Pietro, although that brigade had to cross several bridges over the Gamara and Scotti canals. By a clever manœuvre, it wedged itself in between the first and second line of the Piedmontese, compelled the first line to make a retrograde movement, and poured a heavy fire into its flank. At ten a.m. the fighting near the Cascina San Pietro was very severe. Cialdini was attacked on both flanks, and nearly lost his position. Had a vigorous attack been made at the same time on the Piedmontese front, they might have been routed. Weigl's brigade entered the streets of Palestro, and for a moment kept a footing there. But Zsabo's brigade was too weak to follow up the success. With a canal in its rear, it was attacked by one of Canrobert's brigades in front, whilst the third regiment of Zouaves attacked it on the Sardinian left, just where the French had crossed near Rivotella. The brigade was obliged to beat a retreat before such odds. This was no easy matter. It was the King of Sardinia himself who, seeing matters were perilous, called for the help of the third Zouaves. The seventh battalion of the Austrian Jägers, nevertheless, stood firm to cover the retreat, and the Zouaves, though three times as numerous, did not dare, in face of the deadly aim of the riflemen, to charge, except under cover of the fire of artillery. It was only when the seventh battalion of the Piedmontese riflemen (Bersaglieri) and the 16th regiment of the line came to their support that they made a tremendous rush at the Austrians, who were hurrying over the narrow bridge over the deep canal at Sartirana. Many were drowned in the canal, eight guns were left behind, and some hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the Sardinians.

It was two o'clock in the afternoon when Weigl's brigade found itself alone opposed to the French and Piedmontese. It beat a retreat at Rosasco and Robbio. The Cascina San Pietro was reoccupied by the Piedmontese; the whole front took up the same positions it had occupied in the morning. The official returns of the Austrian losses in the two days of Palestro is given at 2,100 men killed and wounded, including 1 general, 23 officers, and 878 men wounded, 321 officers and 1,278 men killed or made prisoners. The Piedmontese bulletins speak of considerable losses in the sanguinary affair which they style a "brilliant feat of arms." They give their loss at 188 killed and wounded at Vinzaglio, and 589 at Palestro on the 31st. They were driven back by two Austrian brigades, and saved by the French.

At the same time a feint attack was made by the Austrians at Confienza, but it only led to an exchange of shots.

The great fault of the Austrian generals in this affair was that they did not bring sufficient troops into action. The worst part of the story has to come. During the fight Canrobert completed the passage of his troops, and MacMahon left Vercelli unobserved. On the following day, 1st of June, the French troops continued to advance unopposed, and on the 2nd the corps of Niel, MacMahon, Baraguey d'Hilliers, and the French Guard were at Novara; an avant garde had even reached the bridge at Buffalora, and was exploring the north passage of the Ticino at Turbigo.

On the 3rd the Piedmontese army and Canrobert advanced from Novara to Galliate and Trecate, and MacMahon actually crossed the Ticino with a division of the Guards.

And what was Gyulai doing during these three days, when every minute was of account? First of all he did not dare to attack the rear of the enemy, which might have been successfully done on the 2nd. Then he commenced his retreat to Abbiategrasso by Vigevano from Mortara and by Bereguardo and Pavia from Garlasco. This movement was too late, as the road from thence to the high road to Milan, which the French now entered unhindered, is some seven miles longer than that from Novara to Buffalora (three miles), or via Turbigo (3½ miles). If, even as late as the 2nd of June, he had directed the five corps d'armée under his orders (four on this side and one on the other side of the Ticino at Pavia), and what Schaffgotsch could have spared him, at once on Abbiategrasso and Binasco, the Austrian army might on the evening of the 3rd of June, at least 120,000 to 150,000 strong, have fallen upon the enemy's flank, south of the high road to Milan. On this very road 7,000 men under Cham-Gallas were on their way from Milan to Buffalora, the bridge there was mined, and even had the French commenced to cross on the 3rd, they could not all have crossed. Their separate detachments might have been attacked and annihilated. Instead of which, we find Gyulai's head quarters on the 3rd still at Resate, on the 4th only at Abbiategrasso, with only two brigades, one division advanced to Turbigo, another in Magenta, all other troops so far from the probable battle-field that, if they did come up, they would be too late.

CHAPTER III.

The battle of Magenta—The Buffalora Bridge—The French advance—The Imperial Guard driven back.

We now come to the battle of Magenta. It is the opinions of high military authorities that it was by no means necessary, according to strategic rules, to oppose the passage of the enemy with the whole force, and that the proper course of action would have been to have selected a strong flank position south of the road to Milan, as this would have prevented the Sardo-French advance on that capital. Gyulai might there, with six *corps d'armée*, have given battle or defended himself. Let us compare the French, Piedmontese, and

Austrian reports of the combats at Turbigo, Buffalora, and Magenta on the 3d and 4th of June.

On the 2nd June, at 5 o'clock in the evening, the Austrians attempted to blow up the San Martino or Buffalora bridge, on their retreat to the left bank. Sufficient powder was not used, and the explosion was so unimportant that only two arches sank, without falling in, so that even artillery was enabled to cross.

As it was Gyulai's intention to oppose the passage here, it was a fault on the part of Lieut. Field-Marshal Clam-Gallas to abandon this position until the bridge was destroyed. Gyulai counted upon its destruction, and upon the enemy being driven back on this point.* General Espinasse, with a division of the guards, advanced from Trecate, took possession of the Buffalora bridge, found the Austrian entrenchments deserted, three mortars, two guns, and some ammunition waggons. On the same day (2nd June) a second division of the Imperial guard crossed the river at Turbigo without opposition. Thus the nearest passages over the river were in the hands of the French on the very same day upon which Gyulai commenced his retreat, and whilst he still had a footing on the right bank.

At half-past nine o'clock on the morning of the 3rd June MacMahon's armée corps left Novara; at 2 P.M. it crossed the river at Turbigo, where it found a brigade of the Imperial guard already in possession of the village and bridge, and then pushed on towards Robechetto, to take up a position on the plateau. MacMahon describes Robechetto as a very advantageous position. It is a considerable village, two kilometers from Turbigo, and commands the surrounding country. Almost at the same moment an Austrian column was advancing from Buffalora to occupy the village. This was Cordon's brigade, which is only mentioned once in Gyulai's report, as having been sent against Turbigo. Although MacMahon was sure of great superiority in numerical strength (one corps and one division of the guards), yet he ordered General Lamotterouge to attack with three battalions, and then sent up to his aid the other regiments of his division. Two of these regiments, with the artillery and the voltigeurs of the guard,† supported the attack of the three battalions, so that the Austrian column, after a sharp fusilade, was compelled to evacuate the village. From Castano to the north of Turbigo the head of an Austrian division of cavalry showed itself, but withdrew after a few rounds of artillery.

Here, again, to oppose the passage of which Gyulai was informed on the 3rd of June, the Austrians were either too weak numerically, or arrived too late.

The 4th of June had been fixed upon by the Emperor Napoleon III. for the definitive occupation of the left bank. Mac Mahon's instructions were to advance with his whole corps, and the division of the Voltigeurs of the *garde*, and followed by the whole Sardinian army from Turbigo on Buffalora and Magenta, whilst the division of Grenadiers of the *garde* and Canrobert's corps crossed

* Clam-Gallas could not have known on the 2nd June that the *tête de pont* at Turbigo had been turned.

† MacMahon had at least thirteen battalions of it with him.

the Buffalora bridge; Niel's corps and that of Baraguey d'Hilliers' were to follow. Thus, on the north side a force of certainly 100,000 men was expected, whilst the Emperor Napoleon III. crossed unopposed at S. Martino to the south with his Grenadiers.

The second and third division of the Piedmontese arrived also on the 4th at 11 a.m., close upon the heels of MacMahon's corps, on the left bank near Turbigo, a good mile (German) distant from Buffalora.* They were, however, stopped in their advance on Magenta by the news that the Austrian Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Urban was at Gallarate (two miles to the north), and might threaten the Sardinian flank. The Piedmontese sent out reconnoitering parties, which came upon Austrian cavalry, which withdrew in an easterly direction towards Busto Garolfo. At seven in the evening, however, the Sardinians arrived on the battle-field of Magenta by the railway, and took part in the last act, the storming of Magenta to Corbetta. MacMahon had at least 60,000 to 70,000 men engaged (namely, his own corps 30,000, the division of the *garde* 15,000, and two Piedmontese divisions each 15,000 strong).

Canrobert's corps met with some delay between Novara and Buffalora, owing to the road being encumbered with the French baggage train; he was however sure to arrive at the other side of the bridge on the afternoon of the 4th, where somewhat hastily the Emperor Napoleon III. had joined the division of the Garde and Zouaves.

It was not without some anxiety that the Emperor awaited the signal of the arrival of MacMahon at Buffalora, when about 2 P.M. heavy platoon firing and a cannonade was heard from that quarter.

The fighting had commenced at noon at Ponte di Magenta.† From 2 and afterwards till 4 the Imperial guard was driven back by the Austrians towards the Ticino. This is not mentioned in the *Moniteur*, but it is nevertheless true. The official reports on both sides are meagre. Gyulai did not wish to bring into notice the small body he sent against MacMahon at Turbigo, and because at this juncture, he himself rode to Magenta to give his orders. If MacMahon was to speak out honestly, he would own that up to 7 o'clock in the evening he was only opposed by one Austrian division (Lillia), and later, perhaps, at Buffalora, by a small portion of Reischach's division—that is to say, that with 50,000 men and two Piedmontese divisions as reserve, he was kept at bay all day by from 15,000 to 20,000 Austrians. Meantime the grenadiers of the guard, and the Zouaves under the Emperor Napoleon III., were kept back by Clam-Gallas' corps, 7,000 strong, and portions of the second corps (Liechtenstein's), and matters wore so serious an aspect that the Emperor Napoleon III. had already issued the order to bring up the artillery to cover his retreat over the Ticino.‡

Here again, as on every occasion, the fault of the Austrians consisted in giving obstinate battle with forces numerically inferior to the enemy.

The battle-field, after the first skirmishes, was divided into two

* This is not stated in the French reports.

† Vide Gyulai's report.

‡ The writer here bitterly complains of the cooked-up statements in the *Moniteur*,

parts, north and south, separated by the railway earthworks, and the road leading from the Ticino viâ Magenta to Milan. The little town of Magenta was, however, the Austrian centre, if a centre can exist without wings. From Magenta the Austrians sent Lillia's division northward, that is to say, against MacMahon's army, at least 45,000 strong, and supported by two divisions of the Sardinian army. Cordon's division was at Turbigo. This division, separated more than a geographical mile from the other, had to sustain the whole onslaught of an army corps and a division of the *garde;* it had then to fall back on Buffalora, which was the junction point of MacMahon and the Emperor, so that it was attacked on both sides.

It is a wonder that it was not cut off at first, as the only help it could expect was from Clam and Liechtenstein, who had advanced from Magenta toward Mercallo (half an hour's march north of Magenta), to oppose MacMahon's left wing. These troops, however (Clam-Liechtenstein), had at the same time to hold Magenta as a main position, and to defend the whole line of road, houses, lanes, defiles over the canal (*naviglio*), towards the Imperial guard, which had crossed the Tessin near San Martino, and had advanced as far as the great canal. Reischach's brigade (seven corps) was still in Corbetta, about an hour's march beyond Magenta, and about one geographical mile from the bridge over the great canal. When the battle had been waging some time, three brigades came up from Abbiategrasso, and attacked the enemy's flank. To understand this battle it is necessary to keep in view the middle bridge over the great canal. The Austrian front was very strong, or it could never have maintained its position till dusk, or retaken it. The French *garde*, after crossing the Tessin at San Martino, had still a mile and a half (one-half German mile) to advance, eastwards, towards Ponte di Magenta, that is, to the little village which lies on either side of the bridge, and where there are four large stone buildings, used as stations and custom-houses. The French troops advancing on Magenta had to carry those houses to reach the bridge, and as they debouched beyond the bridge, were open to a fire from the houses at the other side. On the right and left of the road are rice fields, intersected by canals, hedges, and swampy ground, and starting from Magenta there is a ridge of hillocks running north and south to Buffalora and Robecco. At Buffalora and Robecco are two other bridges over the great canal, which had also to be taken by the French, whilst from Magenta on the Austrian side the road from Buffalora and Ponte di Magenta could be crossed without a bridge, those places being on the other side.

The Austrian Generals committed a great fault here—they entrusted this position at Ponte di Magenta to too small a force. The houses on the canal and bridge were carried by the French at the first charge about noon by the third regiment of grenadiers and Zouaves of the guards, whilst Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely advanced the second grenadier regiment at once on Buffalora, to make good his communications with MacMahon. At about 2 o'clock the French, who had already heard MacMahon's cannonade in the north, occupied the position.* The Zouaves and the grenadiers of the third

* [illegible] report.

and first regiments, supported by the *chasseurs de la garde*, and the artillery of the division, now attempted to advance on Magenta, but they were so warmly received by the Austrians, here in considerable force, that they were driven back behind the houses of Ponte di Magenta, the cavalry finding shelter behind the bridge. It was the whole of Mellinet's division of the *garde* (except the second regiment, under Colonel Alton, which had been sent to Buffalora,) that is to say, the two brigades, Cler and Wimpffen, which, with the artillery and cavalry of the *garde*, in vain attempted to resist the determined attack of Reischach's division, who, not only recaptured the Ponte di Magenta, but at 4 p.m. reached Buffalora. At this hour the Austrians fancied they had won the day, and, as Regnault observed, they were so far not wrong, as they had retaken the most important position of the front, and threatened the communications of the enemy. In this fight, which lasted for two hours, the French suffered terribly.

The sound of MacMahon's artillery, however, led them to expect help from that quarter. MacMahon left Turbigo at 10 a.m., advancing on Magenta. From Cuggiono to Buffalora, he had a march of seven miles and a half (German), and to Magenta, two miles. He led the Voltigeurs of the Garde, and his whole corps, at least 45,000 strong, and he had, moreover, two divisions of Piedmontese in reserve, who joined him at eleven, and he had already crossed the great canal at Turbigo, so that he had no local impediments to apprehend, and an enemy much inferior in number to cope with.

He divided his corps into two heavy columns, so as to advance on both roads against Buffalora and Magenta, and enjoyed the immense advantage that the two roads were never further apart than a quarter of a mile or half a mile, so that he was enabled to maintain communications between his two columns, until he reached the battle-field.

Lamotterouge's and Camou's divisions took the west road by Cuggiono, Casate, Buffalora; Espinasse's division the east road by Mezero, and Mercallo on Magenta, both on the Austrian right flank. The first division reached Buffalora without difficulty; the two Austrian regiments which had been advanced to Casate had immediately to fall back before the two divisions. A little before 2 o'clock the two first divisions came upon Lillia's division at Buffalora, whilst Espinasse's division was met at Mercallo (quarter of an hour's march north of Magenta), by Clam Gallas.

According to MacMahon's own report, it was about 2 o'clock, that he commenced an overpowering attack on Buffalora, just as Clam's corps was driven by the Imperial guard, and Reischach's division wanted at least half an hour's time to reach Corbetta. Nevertheless, Lillia's division kept its own for nearly two hours against the enemy, more than double its number, driving them back more than once. MacMahon ordered Espinasse to come up closer, to extend his right wing to Cascina and Gazzasame, and that he would then storm with Lamotterouge's and Camou's divisions. At the same time the Austrians were taken in the rear by the 2nd regiment of Grenadiers under Colonel Alton.

(To be continued.)

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF SIR JOHN BURGOYNE'S OPINIONS AND OF THE REPORTS OF LIEUT.-GEN. MACINTOSH ON THE DEFENCE OF TURKEY.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

SIR,—Having in my letter of the 18th ult. observed that the information comprised in that portion of Sir John Burgoyne's recent work, headed "Turkey and Russia in 1854," had been communicated by me to Government, previous to the month of February in that year, when Sir John's opinions were written, I consider it incumbent on me to show the accuracy of that statement, which it appears to me can be best accomplished by placing Sir John Burgoyne's remarks and my own side by side, as I have arranged them below.

I am aware that the length of my communication will be severely tasking your space, but considering the importance of the subject, and the interest it has excited in military circles, I trust you will consider it not unsuited to your pages.

It may be proper to observe, that at the time my reports, hurriedly put together, were made, I was not on the Active List—that I was totally unaided in carrying through the exploratory journeys which enabled me to make them, and that the different Ministers to whom they were addressed are no longer in office.

In my letter of the 18th ult. I have made a slight clerical error in stating that I wrote to Lord Raglan, "to draw to his recollection and notice *the following passage in my report* of 1834." I should have said that I wrote to his Lordship "*the following passage* to draw to his recollection and notice *my report of* 1834."

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A. F. MACINTOSH, Lieutenant-General.

The subject will be best introduced by the following communication from General Macintosh to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte, bearing date "Therapia [near Constantinople], 6th July, 1853," which touches on the various points connected with the defence of Turkey, gone into in more detail in his subsequent papers, which will be found in parallel columns with the extracts from Sir John Burgoyne's *Military Opinions*.

1* "I venture to submit for perusal a few reflections which occurred to me when formerly in this country, connected with its defence on the side towards Russia.

2 "In the first place, the line of the Danube is so extended, and the nature of the country in its immediate vicinity so favourable for a large manœuvring army, if opposed to one in the state of training beyond which the Turks have not yet advanced, that it seems almost hopeless that the latter should meet their opponents successfully in such a locality unless powerfully aided. It may, therefore, be submitted that the best plan of procedure would be

* These figures, as those in the subsequent parallel statement, and also the alphabetical characters, do [illegible] introduced to facilitate reference.

only to garrison the fortresses on the Danube, and to strengthen duly the line of the Balkan, at as early a period as possible as the best situation in which the Turkish army could receive their assailants.

3. "With this view everything should be done to put Shumla and Varna in as complete a state of preparation to receive their garrisons as possible, and, moreover, all the passes leading through the mountains in their rear should be artificially strengthened with field works, looking towards those fortresses.

4. "Heavy cannon, such as ships' guns, might be placed in these works, which could not be easily used against the troops on this side in the event of any portion of the works falling into the temporary possession of an enemy.

5. "It would be impossible to prepare such works at a period when active operations might be going on in the field, and the expense would be greatly diminished by employing in their construction the troops which are already in that neighbourhood, before their dispersion renders this impossible.

6. "There is a range of mountains called the Lesser Balkan, behind the great range, looking towards the sea, the pass through which, near Faki, should also be strengthened with a view to its occupation, as a force landing behind the passes through the Balkan, which lie in rear of Varna, might otherwise turn the main position, and penetrate from thence into the country.

7. "Should the enemy succeed, as before, in reaching Adrianople, I believe that Constantinople might be defended by occupying a position which extends towards the Black Sea from the creeks or lakes called Buyuk Chekmedgee and Kutchuk Chekmedgee on the sea of Marmora. This position, however, ought also to be artificially strengthened.

8. "Lastly, the Peninsula, on the European side of the Dardanelles, ought to be strengthened against a land attack, by works raised across the narrowest part of the Isthmus north-east of Gallipoli, as most of the batteries on that side of the Strait could easily be carried from the heights behind them, if left as they now are.

9. "It would also be very desirable that the Gulf of Saros, behind that peninsula, should be accurately surveyed, and the soundings near the Isthmus correctly laid down, a favourable opportunity for doing which is afforded by the presence of the fleet at Besika Bay. I say this in the belief that no such survey at present exists.

10. "In the event of our ships having at any period to act there, and possibly to land troops, this would be found of great utility.

11. "Your Lordship is aware that works are, to a certain extent, in progress in rear of the batteries on the Bosphorus, which was a precaution much called for. The other localities which I have adverted to would require *the careful examination of scientific officers of engineers, who would afterwards lay down the works, and superintend their execution*; and I fear that the Turkish Military Establishment does not afford a sufficient number for this undertaking; and it is indeed the impression on my mind that the whole staff arrangements in this country are still very deficient.

12. "I presume that it is ascertained that the Bays of Bourgas and Varna would afford practicable stations for our ships of war; but I am informed that the shores of the Black Sea generally are not very well known to any navy, unless it may be that of Russia; and its various harbours, which are, I believe, difficult to find, except by running along shore, are not accurately laid down

13. "Some previous examination of the ports of the Turkish shore, executed while it may be practicable, might, I should suppose, prove useful if our squadron were hereafter to enter the Black Sea, which could at present be best done, perhaps, by British naval officers, assisted by some able seamen on board a good Turkish steamer, with a commander and men generally acquainted with these coasts.

14. "If the Principalities are to be forcibly occupied by Russia, it is very pro-

bable that troops may frequently be sent by water between the peninsula of the Crimea and the opposite shore, to which our cruizers in that sea might cause great interruption, and by assailing Odessa (which, I believe, still only possesses an insignificant fort, as was the case when I was there), as well as other open places on the coast, might draw forth the Russian squadron from its stronghold of Sebastopol.

15. "At Lord Ponsonby's request, I wrote some account of that harbour and its works (then finished and in progress), when I was there in the end of 1834, and of Balaklava, near it.

16. "The memorandum was marked 'Remarks on the Operations of Russia near the Black Sea,' and was sent by his Lordship to the Foreign Office."

The following is an extract from his Excellency's reply, in acknowledgment of the foregoing communication :—

"Allow me at all events to thank you for your interesting suggestions respecting the Danube, and the means of defending Constantinople.

"I have put them in a way to be useful."

In placing the following statements of Sir John Burgoyne and General Macintosh in parallel columns, it is not intended to show that the information they respectively comprise was conveyed in precisely the same form, but that its purport, and even the details, were in both cases the same, thus proving that the facts had been previously communicated to the authorities by General Macintosh :—

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

After some remarks on the comparative numbers and quality of the Russian and Turkish armies, and their position at that time (Feb., 1854), Sir John Burgoyne proceeds :—

a. "To whatever extent they may threaten the two flanks, or make partial attacks there, or whatever line they may determine to take for their subsequent advance, the real point where they will make their great effort to cross the Danube with their main forces, may be fully expected to be in or about the centre. By this means the whole of the defensive line of the river will be cut in two, and the Russians once firmly established on the right bank, the Turks must necessarily retire to Shumla and the Balkan; and it is to be hoped that this will be effected before the detached corps on the flanks shall be too much compromised.

b. "A river of the extent of this portion of the Danube, that is, some hundreds of miles, forms no feature of defence to a country; it presents merely an obstacle which some portable bridges in a few hours obliterate.

LT.-GENERAL MACINTOSH.

The following was addressed to a Staff Officer high in rank on the 11th October, 1853, after reaching England :—

17. "When I was at Constantinople in summer, at which period apprehensions existed that the advance of the Russians would not stop at the Danube, I took the liberty of making some suggestions of a professional nature to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in consequence of this, and he looked upon those suggestions as worthy of attention.

18. "My having passed a great many months in the provinces and capital of Turkey in former years, enabled me to speak about that country from personal observation on these subjects, and according to published accounts my suggestions have already been adopted by Omar Pacha, &c., in the direction of the Balkan and the Danube.

19. "The cause of my writing to you just now is to say, that I think that although the Russians were to have the best of it, in case of hostilities with the Turks, and even to occupy Constantinople, the Darda-

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

e were any *strong* fortresses line of the enemy's route, they be well garrisoned, and would e particularly harassing to an r if there was attached to them ally strong *tête de pont*, so as ire access to both banks. The iance of defence on this part of ntier would be by retaining a ight hold on the river (except there might be *good** for-), and by concentrating the n the rear, ready to fall upon st advance across it, should cir-nces afford a favourable op-ity, which is hardly to be ed.

he first real defence then that ld appear could be prudently would be on the Balkan passes; f these, it is said, presents very features that might, no doubt, y much improved by entrench-and engineering work of dif-kinds. It is probable that the f real attack on the Balkan be more clearly indicated or asily ascertained than that on nube, and against it the means rces would naturally then be nted; still a leading arrange-for defence would be good re-in the rear, to support whatever ould be found to require it. n the Balkan it is to be hoped he Turkish armies would, by rrangements, be under such advantages of position as to them to make an obstinate and if not deceived in the poir.t of attack, and thereby d to be well prepared to meet ht perhaps give their enemy a liscouraging check. Still the long, the passes must be many, e enemy, still numerous, would ly at length establish himself it; but, by this time, feeling ects of the campaign and for-movement in such a country, ld find a difficulty in keeping er such large bodies, in main-their efficiency, and obtaining s for them. These difficulties ch as they are, they have always ry well defended by the Turks.

GEN. MACINTOSH.

nelles might be held in spite of them by a power having the command of a fleet.

20. "You know that the European side of the Dardanelles is a peninsula, connected by a narrow neck with the mainland. The old Turkish castles or batteries, so well known, are chiefly on the water's edge, and would not defend the European side of the peninsula in case of a land attack, and the peninsula once occupied, they must themselves very soon fall into the hands of the assailants.

21. "To prevent the occupation of the peninsula by a force passing over the neck or isthmus, I would propose that *a strong line of works should be erected across its narrowest part, which is only a few miles broad*, and at which point the slope of land is favourable for the purpose. It lies some miles above (*i. e.* N.E.) of Gallipoli.

22. "If the Russians were enabled to advance on Constantinople there is no doubt they would make a simultaneous movement on the Dardanelles, and would easily carry the batteries on the European side at the gorge, where they are completely commanded.

23. "Constantinople is so extensive that an army might occupy its inland portion without a fleet being able to dislodge it, though it might bombard and batter the districts near the water.

24. "A struggle of this kind would cause the entire destruction of the city, but mere operations from the sea would have little other result.

25. "As the fortification of the Gallipoli isthmus would require time, and as the winter there is usually not so severe as to prevent the erection of such works, it might be worthy of consideration whether *this should not be commenced as soon as the risk of hostilities in spring may appear to be great.*

26. "I really think that if works were also added on the shore of the peninsula, along the Gulf of Saros, a naval power might make a stronghold of it."

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

would greatly increase as he prolonged his advance. With little or no exterior, or even internal commerce, the country, it is presumed, would furnish very few resources, even for the subsistence of the troops after entering the Balkan. He would find no great husbanded stores of grain and provisions, such as are met with in other countries, or the little there would have been consumed, in a great degree, by the Turkish troops, who will have been before them. The cattle driven out of their reach, or at least very scarce; the means of transport all by land, and with no facilities by great roads; with a large number of sick, which would have to be removed or provided for; with greatly lengthened lines of communication, and various intermediate stations to be protected, amidst a suffering and consequently inimical population, aided, as it might be, by irregulars; and both flanks on the sea entirely in the power of the allies, from whence the one army would be threatened, and the other greatly assisted.

f. "It may be considered that at such a period a well-prepared field of battle covering the capital, and whose flanks could not be turned, could be relied on for effectually preventing the invader from attaining his great and final object; and there is no doubt but that circumstances afford facilities for the arrangement of such a field of battle along the line of the Carason river, from its mouth in the lake of Bujuk Checkmedge, on the sea of Marmora, to Kara Bournu, on the Black Sea. The length of this line from sea to sea is twenty-four or twenty-five miles, but each flank being covered by lakes and rivers would be easily watched and secured, and the extent of the real fighting ground would be by these features reduced to nine or ten miles of plain, but with favourable undulations, affording a good command over the front, and which might be improved in strength in a most powerful degree by a great development of respectable field works.

GEN. MACINTOSH.

The Staff officer already referred to evinced great promptitude and zeal for the service on receiving the foregoing, and replied in the following terms on the 21st October, 1853:—

27. "Your letter of the 11th, regarding Turkish affairs and the defence of the Dardanelles, &c., has been duly perused by Lords Hardinge and Raglan,* and now I send it to Lord Clarendon, as containing much good and useful matter."

The following is extracted from the journal of General Macintosh, kept in 1835, and sent during that year to the Embassy at Constantinople. A copy was forwarded to Lord Raglan soon after General Macintosh's return to England in 1853:—†

28. "The country, for a distance of eight or nine miles after leaving the Adrianople gate of Constantinople, resembles the neighbourhood in general of that city. The road then ascends some considerable heights, and on the opposite side of these lie the village and Lake of Kutchuk Chekmedgee, which we reached about two hours after leaving the city. This lake is separated from the sea by a marshy isthmus of little breadth, which is traversed by outlets, passing between the lake and the sea. The breadth of the lake—the waters of which are brackish—is here about half a mile, increasing higher up, and dividing at the distance of several miles into a fork; that nearest to Constantinople receiving a river which is generally called by the same name as the lake.

29. "About eight miles further on towards Adrianople, lie the great lake and isthmus called Buyuk Chekmedgee.

30. "On the Constantinople side of

* A copy of it was sent to Lord Raglan.

† A much larger extract regarding Bulgaria was added to this in 1835, at Constantinople, and sent also to Lord Raglan before the war.

Sir John Burgoyne.

g "One most important advantage to be obtained from the occupation of this position would be, that it covers the entire Bosphorous, and would therefore enable our fleets to remain masters of the navigation of the Black Sea to the last, and preclude the enemy from the use of it.

h "To apply the resources of this position with effect, two ingredients must be available; first, early and energetic measures for entrenching so great an extent, so as to give it the greatest possible strength; and the other, that an adequate force should remain available for its occupation and defence. The first would require the application of several thousand workmen for several months, and could only be effected by the employment of troops, but with an understanding that a degree of benefit would be derived from their very first labours which would be progressively improved to the very last moment. The second would require 50,000 good troops, or a proportionate increase in number of such as might be inferior. These may appear to be heavy demands, but can scarcely be considered so, as the main and last stand to prevent the fall of an empire!

i "We have now to consider the part that can be taken by the allies, France and England, in these and other operations.

k "Their fleets are already near to, and quite prepared to act in, the Black Sea, where they can render very great services. They will maintain the power to the Turks of a water communication to the frontier of Georgia, while they interrupt that of the enemy, and thus render essential support to the Circassians; they will threaten Sebastopol, which can only be secured from an attack by maintaining a large force in its neighbourhood; they will powerfully co-operate in the operations of first emergency by securing to the Turk, and obstructing to the enemy, the navigation all along one flank; and the power of approach to the coasts of the Sea of Marmora, and the

Gen. Macintosh.

Kutchuk Chekmedgee there is a commanding position where the heights are very strong, although quite unaided by art.

31. "A few works on the heights, above and to the left of the town, near a burying ground, would command the isthmus and shut this road from Adrianople, or a *tête de pont*; or perhaps a couple of Martello towers, not immediately commanded from the opposite height, would probably have nearly the same effect.

32. "Boats could easily navigate the lake, and indeed might be brought into it from the sea, although none were to be seen upon it.

33 "Nothing seems to have been done on any side with judgment to cover the capital, so strongly situated by nature.

34. "Over the bridge at the great lake at Buyuk Chekmedgee, on the Constantinople side, is a second very important position, which we reached a little before dusk, after crossing the dilapidated causeway which traverses the isthmus, and proceeding over a country of heights and valleys, the former becoming bolder to our right, but which, notwithstanding the muddy condition of the ways, were quite easily crossed. A zig-zag road leads down from the crest of the position, into the town of Buyuk Chekmedgee.

35. "Next morning, leaving Buyuk Chekmedgee, we proceeded by a paved road along the marshy isthmus which divides the lake from the sea and is very narrow, and nearly similar to that at Kutchuk Chekmedgee.

36. "On both sides, especially on the Adrianople side, the land is lower than at Kutchuk Chekmedgee, but admits also of being made very strong. On the side last mentioned it is smooth and open, an undulating slope reaching from the heights down to the sea.

37. "A river, known as the Karasoo, runs through the lake from the heights of the lesser Balkan."

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

shores of Roumelia at the head of the Archipelago, will be obtained from their maritime ascendancy. But to retain all these benefits it is absolutely necessary that we should secure the being perfect masters of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; without the first we must retire from the Black Sea, without the last not only from the Black Sea but from the Sea of Marmora also, losing with it even all communication with Constantinople, except by the inconvenient and distant route from Smyrna. And it must be remembered that the Dardanelles, the possession on which everything hangs, *is much nearer for the enemy to gain than Constantinople*, and that his first effort would naturally be made against that station, in order to cut off the communication between Turkey and her allies, and thus preclude all further exertion in her favour.

l "The only mode of securing the Bosphorus has been adverted to. The situation of the Dardanelles is detached, but presents far greater facilities for its protection, though still requiring considerable means. This is to be effected by occupying powerfully the neck of land, which connects the great European Peninsula (the old Chersonese of Thrace), with the main land. At about seven miles in front of Gallipoli, and near the village of Boulahir, this neck is only three miles wide, being *the narrowest part*, and presents at that identical part a position that, duly fortified and garrisoned, may be given enormous strength. The whole extent of coast round the Peninsula, in rear of that line, would be protected by the naval forces. Large means would be required to be applied to the preparation of this position within a short time; 4,000 workmen would do it in three months, understanding, as in all cases of field works, that benefit is obtained, even from the earliest proceeding, which is successively improved, and a garrison of 12,000 good troops would be necessary for its defence, if powerfully attacked.

m "The use of this position, how-

GEN. MACINTOSH.

The return journey through the position is described in the annexed extract, taking the localities in a reversed order:—

38. "We reached Chatsalda a little before sunset. It is said to be three hours from Buyuk Chekmedgee, and from Derkon on the Black Sea about eight.

39. "Leaving Chatsalda we proceed by a narrow road of square stone blocks running across the stream, which, forming a marsh in its course, enters the lake of Buyuk Chekmedgee.

40. "On leaving this marsh, on the Constantinople side, the ground runs into *a fine commanding position in full view of the great lake, with its isthmus and town, and the sea of Marmora beyond it.*

41 "A similar road leads to Derkon on the Black Sea.

42. "Ascending the heights for about two miles we observed, west of the road a little, a commanding spot fit for a fort or telegraph, and a little further on, ground forming a second position.

43. "These heights are nearly in a line between Buyuk Chekmedgee and Kara-Bornoo, *and are therefore in the line of defence.*

44. "The lakes in question form the left of that strong defensible line, *which has its right on the fort of Kara-Bornoo, on the Black Sea, which is again strengthened by the proximity to its front of another salt lake. Between the fort and the entry of the Bosphorus, there is no practicable landing place for a hostile force.*

45. "The town of Chatsalda is about ten miles from the passage over the marshy ledge, which separates the greater lake of Buyuk Chekmedgee from the sea. That lake and the adjoining one are gradually lost in a marsh near the town of Chatsalda, and the advance of troops might be rendered very difficult, by taking advantage *of the nature of the country immediately east of Chatsalda, and strengthening it artificially.*

46. "The distance from Chatsalda to the Black Sea is under twenty miles,

Sir John Burgoyne.

ever would not be solely confined to securing the retreat of the fleet, but would be very threatening for offensive measures also; it would cover a very extensive district, within which might be rapidly collected, by sea, any force that it might be thought advisable at any time to advance, either to the front or flank of the invader, with a comparatively short communication, and secure depots and retreat; it is, in fact, the point that would form the best base of operations for any forces acting in alliance with Turkey, excepting those which would be applied to the immediate protection of Constantinople, although the water communication would be open to the Gulf of Enos, and, perhaps, up the Maritza, the depots, hospitals, reserves, &c., should be established on this Peninsula.

n "To return to the consideration of the defences for Constantinople A second line has been designed round the city, at only a mile or two in advance; this has been what, till a recent period, has always attracted notice, and to which alone attention was turned. The ground is extremely favourable, and affords great advantages to a defender, as well around the city itself as its suburbs beyond the Golden Horn. It would cover the whole space from the sea of Marmora to the Bosphorus, and, well entrenched, would be capable of considerable resistance, but it has several defects.

o "1. It can hardly be deemed sufficiently extensive and influential for the last resort of a great army.

p "2. It would be too near the city and the proceedings and feelings of the forces would be greatly influenced by the turmoils, panics, insurrections, treacheries, and confusion of the place, so much so that no vigorous defence could be expected from it.

q "3. It would be considered as a last hold, and merely as a point for surrender.

r "4. It would not cover the whole of the Bosphorus, and, consequently, it would necessitate the evacuation of the Black Sea by our fleets, and

Gen. Macintosh.

and a little to the north-east the range of the little Balkan begins, which runs pretty steeply down to the shore of the Bosphorous, and slopes towards the Black Sea. The routes through it are difficult and unmade, *and there can be little doubt that this line, if properly strengthened and defended, would put Constantinople beyond the risk of capture.* It would cover effectually the great bends or reservoirs on which the city depends for water, and the country which would be enclosed by it might afterwards be rendered fruitful and prosperous.

47 "From hence a highly defensible country, intersected by steep ravines, extends towards Constantinople, studded with occasional walled farm yards and copious fountains at intervals.

48. "We proceed on leaving the dilapidated lines and batteries near the great barracks of Ramish Chiflik, and passing several large aqueducts which convey water across the valleys from the reservoirs to Constantinople, and crossing the valley and river of Ket-Khaneh-Sou, which runs into the Golden Horn, reach Pera by a well-made road, which had brought us without interruption from Chatsalda.

49 "The unfavourable treaty of Adrianople in 1829 was hurriedly concluded to save Constantinople from the presence of Diebitche's army, the advanced guard of which had reached Chatsalda."

From the foregoing statement it will be seen that General Macintosh, in his letter to Lord Stratford, paragraphs 1 and 2, had previously given an estimate of the capabilities of the Danube as a strategetic line, recommending the defence of the river to be confined to the occupation of its fortresses, being the substance of Sir John Burgoyne's remarks, paragraphs *a* and *b* of the parallel columns, who therein alludes to

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

give to the enemy the vast advantage of its navigation between their own territory and their advanced position.

s. "On these accounts I attach no value to it whatever, provided the Carason position be taken up. At the same time I am bound to admit that a contrary opinion is held by officers for whose abilities I have great respect. They consider that it might check an enemy from entering the city, even if he succeeded in penetrating the great line. My great objection is, that whatever efforts and means are applied to the protection of this position, which I hold to be of very inferior importance, must be taken from those available for the other, which is the vital station."

GEN. MACINTOSH.

the probable necessity of the Turks retiring to Shumla and Varna, an occurrence anticipated also by General Macintosh in paragraph 3 of the letter alluded to, where the General recommends that these fortresses should be immediately prepared to stand a siege. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of his letter, General Macintosh continues his recommendation to strengthen the Balkan passes, a subject taken up by Sir John Burgoyne in his remarks, paragraphs *c* and *e*. In paragraphs *e* and *f*, Sir John describes the position of Karasoo, or the Checmegees, which extends from the Sea of Marmora to Kara Bornoo on the Black Sea, and covers Constantinople from attack. General Macintosh in paragraph 7 of his letter to Lord Stratford, and in paragraphs 28 to 47 of his report, given in the parallel statements, had previously described and pointed out the importance of that position, and recommended its being fortified.

General Macintosh in his letter to Lord Stratford, paragraphs 9 to 14, points to the opening for naval operations, corresponding with the suggestions made by Sir John Burgoyne in his remarks, paragraphs *i* and *k*.

General Macintosh in his letter to Lord Stratford, paragraph 8, and again in the parallel statement, paragraphs 19 to 25, recommends the fortification of the isthmus north-east of Gallipoli *in its narrowest part*, for the protection of the peninsula on the European side of the Dardanelles; and Sir John Burgoyne in his observations, paragraph *l*, subsequently prescribes the same measure in exactly the same terms.

Finally, General Macintosh in the parallel statement, paragraph 25, recommends that these defensive works at Gallipoli should be commenced as soon as the risk of hostilities might appear to be great; and in his letter to Lord Stratford, paragraph 11, suggests that scientific officers of engineers should be ordered to examine the localities referred to, and to superintend the execution of the necessary works—both which suggestions were, within a short time of their being submitted to the authorities, carried out, Sir John Burgoyne being dispatched to Turkey for this purpose by her Majesty's Government.

V. F. M.

FIREARMS.

After all the efforts of the Peace Congress, it is now universally admitted that the time has not arrived when we may turn our spears into pruning-hooks. On the contrary, there never was a period when men were so bent upon applying them to a deadly use, rendering them still more destructive, and giving them the keenest edge that steel will take. "Sharpen your cutlasses" was not such a bad order of the day, but it was out of date; for if we had intended to keep pace with other nations, we ought to have had our cutlasses sharpened long before. In fact, we received a similar admonition two centuries ago, when Cromwell told us to keep our powder dry. It is the same sentiment in different words. We are reminded that, to hold our own, we must be ready—ever ready; not only sharpen our cutlass, and take care of our powder, but look to our priming—ay, and our gun, too. Who would now go into battle with Cromwell's matchlock, or lumbered with Brown Bess? We might just as well take David's sling. The armourer's art, indeed, is making such strides—a year, a month, a day gives it such novel developments—it proceeds so rapidly in the path of invention and discovery—that we are really puzzled to know what weapon is the best. How shall we arm?—with carbine, rifle, or revolver? If with revolver or rifle, or both, with which and whose? This is the problem; and who shall solve it, when so many are interested in keeping it close? Instead of giving a prize medal now to this gunmaker, and now to that, for some new device, improvement, simplification, or complication, it would be far wiser in Governments and Exhibitions to award such a distinction to the writer of this article, who is about to do them the service of pronouncing which arms, of all those that claim pre-eminence, are the best. But it is not likely that a step so rational will be resolved on; and we must be content that our observations will obtain recognition in these widely-read pages.

No doubt each shrewd manufacturer is breathlessly expecting that we shall give the palm to himself, but few of our readers will demur, when, without circumlocution, we at once assign it to Colt. Others may have done well, but it must be allowed that, in modern times, no one has contributed so much to alter the nature of warfare and the fashion of our arms as the American Colonel. He it was who first gave us the revolver, and it is he who has since perfected the principle, and applied it to every description of fire-arms. Wherever he learnt his craft, whether as a watchful shot in the back-woods, or a practical mechanic at the forge, certain it is that he has it at his fingers' ends; and all the testimonials before us, parading the high encomiums of authorities and oracles, say not so much in his praise as the rifle we fired yesterday, or the revolver we have proved in need. True, we hear of trifling objections, but they have little real ground, and the best shots always declare that, after all said and done, Colt is the man. Had it been possible to realise the *beau idéal* of the sporting Irishman, and make a gun that would fire round the corner,

we believe this useful weapon would long ago have been found at Colt's shop in Pall-Mall. As it is, we are presented with arms quite as effective, and more adapted to the routine of war. In some cases it requires practice, in others a little care, to master the whole use of the weapon—the capping, ramming, charging, or cleaning; but all this is a necessary initiation, not peculiar to Colt; and once acquired, we see that facility depends on attention, and is regarded as much by Colt as by any other maker.

After the famous cavalry charge at Balaklava, some noise was made about the inefficiency of the carbine, and the necessity of equipping our dragoons with a better weapon. But it is very difficult to introduce such a change into the British army. We have our traditions, and they are held in more reverence in high quarters than were those of the elders and Pharisees in ancient days. How desperate was the struggle we made for Brown Bess, and when the poor old stock was wrenched from our grasp, we all believed or pretended to believe that our glory had departed. Let us make the same noble stand for blunt sabres and useless carbines. The carbine ought especially to be retained; for it has come down to us from our ancestors as an heirloom, embodying all their unhandiness, and stamped with the prestige of antiquity. In the first place, its attachment to the saddle on the right side is so contrived, with the butt resting against the cantle and valisse, that mounting is rendered extremely difficult, the dragoon having to pass his leg under the carbine, which employs his right hand at the moment when it is required to assist his seat. Thus the whole weight of his body may be thrown on a region peculiarly tender, and in soldiers deficient in dexterity, this has led to permanent injuries of the most painful character. Nor is this the only disadvantage resulting from the position of the carbine; for on active service in the field the dragoon finds it both an impediment and a peril. If his horse is shot under him—a common incident in action—let him devoutly hope to go over on the left side; for if he should fall on the right, his thigh may be snapped like a twig, pressed down by the weight of the horse on the carbine, which, attached to the saddle, will act on his limb with the force of a lever. As a fire-arm, the carbine wants both wieldiness and precision. To load and fire it in action, when the most docile horse is plunging about, and others are all but unmanageable, demands more adroitness than we can reasonably expect in ordinary soldiers; but he would indeed be a dead shot who could answer for the effect of his fire. If such a difficulty is apparent on home service, how must it be increased in India, where the dragoon is mounted on a horse of a very different character, the weak and timid progeny of Australia or Asia, or at best, a dubious beast from the Cape? Corporal Shaw, the Life-Guardsman, wisely foreswore his carbine at Waterloo, and trusted to his muscular strength and blunt sabre, or he never would have done such havoc among the Frenchmen. In the face of the improved equipment of foreign cavalry, it would be the height of folly to leave our dragoons to this resource in future. They must be armed, like those they will have to meet, with the best and handiest weapons, and such as they may feel they can depend on.

We believe this requirement has been met by Colonel Colt. In the Pistol Carbine, with breech attachment, or stock, which he has lately fabricated, we have an excellent substitute for the present cumbrous weapon. An immense advantage is secured even before entering action, by the provision of six shots, which, from the great range of these revolvers, may be delivered with effect, while the dragoon himself is out of fire. At any rate, he is not exposed to the risk of loading in face of the enemy; and the ease with which the discharged pistol may be detached from the stock, and its place supplied by the reserve weapon in his holster, enables him, however prolonged the combat, to defer this operation till he is out of danger. Of course, the revolver is incomparably more wieldy, can be cocked and shot with one hand, and, as a consequence, the combatant gains that precision of aim, which the weight of the carbine renders impracticable in advancing. At the same time, the new arm is so contrived that when not in use, it does not, like the carbine, become an incumbrance; but the pistol is detached and placed in the holster, while the butt is slung by a strap over the back, or at the side. As the weapon used is the 7½-inch barrel Army and Navy Revolver, we need not bear testimony to its efficiency, as by most of our readers it has been practically tested; and, as every one admits the necessity of a change, we trust the authorities will lose no time in arming our cavalry with this effective weapon.

As Colonel Colt was the first to apply the revolving principle to the pistol, he also claims priority in connecting it with the rifle. It must be confessed that he has here produced the very weapon required for a volunteer force, which, without a more rigorous training than is contemplated, cannot be expected to become expert with the Enfield. With Colt's rifle the volunteer is at once relieved from the toil of frequent loading. He comes on the field forearmed, and necessarily with increased confidence, while he is able, from the great range of his weapon, to deliver his fire at a distance very inspiriting to untried troops. An admirable guard on the chambers renders the rifle safe in the most careless hands, as notches between the nipples receive the end of the hammer, and prevent the cylinder revolving. On the other hand, the contrivance for rotation is just as simple, and the cylinder attached to a base-pin, is revolved by the operation of cocking. We know not whether any large supply of these arms could be readily obtained, but the authorities ought seriously to consider its aptitude for the movement we have now on foot, and enter into an arrangement with this view. Whatever predilection they may have in favour of the Enfield, it is manifestly not the weapon for guerillas; and, moreover, if it were not open to this objection, we know that it cannot be obtained, and a long period must elapse before we shall even have a sufficient supply for the Militia. As our deficit is in men, let us make up with material, and our drafts for colonial service may at once be multiplied six fold, by arming them with Colt's revolver. At the Cape and Hobart Town the Volunteer Cavalry are already armed with this weapon by the local authorities; and we cannot too soon extend its distribution to

India, for which country, left as it now must be to the care of a diminished force, it is especially adapted. Its aptitude for fencible troops is equally striking; but self-supporting Rifle Corps should not depend on the Government in this matter, but act for themselves, and we strongly urge them to select Colt's rifle.

Nor must we close this paper without indicating to those who are yet but prentice hands, a good manual for the use of the rifle, and certainly a better could not be provided than that of Captain Jervis, who was so long connected with the Small Arms Department, and which is so well known by its title of *The Rifle Musket*. A second edition of this valuable and really practical little work has just appeared, and comprises in its pages all that a Rifleman can desire to know of his weapon and its management. The contents are lucidly arranged under special heads, which bring the subject home to every comprehension, and, at the same time, facilitate reference. Though we could name no one more competent to treat of the subject in its widest range, the gallant author has confined the present work to an account of the actual state of the rifle, as it now exists, and the various details it embraces. This is introduced by a description of the process of manufacture; and when our weapon is thus presented to us in its several parts, and, as it were, put together before our eyes, barrel and trigger and ramrod and stock, a perception of the mechanism brings with it a more thorough appreciation of its powers. Captain Jervis then tells us how to fabricate cartridges, cast bullets, and even make gunpowder; and, in short, there is no point connected with the rifle on which he does not give useful information. We recommend the book not only to the members of Volunteer Corps—it ought to be widely circulated in the army; and as its modest price renders it easily attainable, we doubt not that, when its merits are sufficiently known, Commanding Officers will consider this an object worth attention.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT.

We live at a period when the whispers heard on the back-stairs of the Palace of the Tuilleries supply the place of a free assembly and a free press in France, and when the passions and emotions of our powerful neighbours are under the control of a Bonaparte. A significant nod, or a stiffness of demeanour, from this "pattern democrat" sets the *corps diplomatique* shivering in their shoes, and an angry word sends couriers flying from one end of Europe to the other, and influences every "bourse" in the civilized world.

It would really seem, therefore, that peace or war, or in other words, the happiness or misery of millions of human beings depend upon the will of one man. It becomes a curious question, which future historians only will be able to answer truly, to what combination of circumstances does this remarkable man owe the predominance he possesses over so large a portion of mankind? Does he

express the tone of thought and belief as well as the aims of the masses of the intellectual men of the age? Does he carry with him, for instance, the power and affections of vast numbers? Is he really the exponent of public will in France? If so, he must owe his power to the fact that France contains amongst her population a vast majority of little Napoleons, kindred spirits only differing in degree, thinking and acting as he does.

The last few years, however, has shown that, for good or evil, he wields a power in France that is unmistakeable. If he desires war—plague, pestilence, and slaughter come at his bidding. It remains to be seen whether he can produce a lasting peace. We disbelieve in his power to do so, even if he really possessed the inclination. There is a standing antagonism between this working despot and the peaceable classes. Napoleon III. represents the interests of labour of the military and ambitious kind. Of active, bold, self-relying, needy, and hungry men, who have fortunes to make by the sword. He is the attorney of this class. He pleads their cause, and represents their interests. He is their Captain as well as their King.

Disguise the fact as you will, the rich and the aristocratic fear and dislike him. This is the case in France as well as elsewhere. England, the centre of capital and commerce, following her peaceable occupations, and being also the rival of France, is naturally anxious about such a leading spirit. She neither hates nor fears him. Englishmen simply mistrust him, and having a wholesome knowledge of his power to do mischief, calmly wait for events. Austria, the centre of tradition and genealogy, has recently received severe castigation at his hands, and has reason to hate him; while it is presumed that the dull and conservative instincts of Russia and Prussia, must, in the long run, not only fear, but dislike this great agitator and destroyer of prescription.

The chances of a lasting peace with a nation like France, sullen and discontented with her barren victories over Austria, are problematical. Napoleon III. is the type of millions of active minded and sensitive Frenchmen, who are like millstones in motion, when they have no other grist to grind will set fire to one another. It must further be remembered, that there are many stirring natures in Europe, independent of the volcanic masses in France. Italy and Hungary are full of discontented men. Garibaldi heads some thousands of disappointed Italian patriots, who count themselves undone while they are doing nothing. These restless spirits employ themselves in mutual jars and contentions, and may fan the dying embers of the last war into a flame. But the grand idea that would unite all Frenchmen, whether Republicans, Napoleonists, or Orleanists, that would heal all differences of opinion, and make up all breaches, was openly expressed on the quays of Marseilles the other day, when the populace shouted as one man, and without any apparent reason for so doing, "*Guerre aux Anglais.*"

It cannot fail to strike any one as very singular that such an expression as the above should be heard in a populous sea-port in France, at a time when the *Moniteur de la flotte* corroborates the

statements of the official papers relative to the disarming of the Imperial Navy. "Orders have been given," continues the *Moniteur*, "at all the Atlantic ports that the ships-of-war fitting or fitted out are to be disarmed."

And this brings us to a point touching our navy that has been much mooted of late. Let us admit, as is possibly the case, that the Emperor Napoleon is honest in his intentions and means to carry his pacific policy into effect. Can we imitate him with safety? Can we dismantle our ships and disperse our seamen? And in noticing this subject it is no business of ours to inquire why our "faithful ally" has come to the sudden resolution to put off his war harness and to assure the world that *L'Empire c'est la paix*. We never cared much about his great armaments, his screw liners, his transports, or his fortified fort of Cherbourg. Our duty was to arm if he armed, and be prepared for the tiger spring that somehow everybody seems to expect he will some day make at us—*if we are unprepared*.

There are several reasons why we cannot disarm our ships; but the principal reason is that France, from her peculiar organization as well as the temperament of her people, is always better prepared for sudden war than England. The Emperor may disarm his ships and send their crews to their ordinary occupations, still this proceeding would not be disarming in the same sense as we should, supposing that we paid our ships off and discharged their men. We may ticket and label our spars, masts, and gear, and store them away for instant use, but then we should not be prepared for instant war like our neighbours would be in case of a rupture. Not only are the spars, masts, and gear of the French ships of war ticketed and laid by in store, so as to be ready when required, but the men are *ticketed and labelled* also. Every man, from the captain to the cook's mate, in a French line-of-battle ship, frigate, or sloop, although he may be discharged from active service, is compelled by the terms of the *inscription maritime* to state where he is to be found, and in the event of his services being required by the state, he can be called upon at a moment's notice to repair forthwith to the port mentioned in his summons, and go on board his ship, take his station, and resume his seagoing duties. Now the case with us is very different. When we disarm and dismantle our ships we act as though war could never disturb the political horizon again. We scatter our trained seamen and gunners to the uttermost ends of the earth, so that it is quite possible that within three months after a line-of-battle ship is paid off that her complement of about 1,000 men may be serving in every navy except our own.

"But," says the Frenchman, "that is no affair of ours. We have disarmed, and we call upon you, if you are inclined for peace, to imitate our example. We cannot comprehend your free institutions. It is your fault if your naval organization is imperfect. Imitate our *inscription maritime*; it is not very different in severity from your press warrants which you have repudiated and abolished. Rely upon compulsion instead of choice and you will be as ready for sudden war as we are."

Now we cannot follow the example set us by our neighbours. We

have come to the conclusion that our sailors have no right to be considered as the only slaves in England. If we want their services we must go into the seaman's labour-market and bid for him. Nevertheless, we can follow the example set us by our neighbours in the spirit in which it is offered. For the whole matter turns upon organization, or preparedness for war. We can retain our seamen on board our ships instead of discharging them. We can keep them constantly employed in their several duties, and so keep them in an efficient state. This proceeding would be more expensive than that of our neighbours, but that is not the question, which is, being prepared for sudden war. Of course we can adopt the same line of argument as our "faithful ally" and say, "Oh, we don't understand your institutions, your *inscription maritime* and its arbitrary and tyrannical laws are inimical to our free policy. Imitate our example, and you will be as ready for hostilities at a moment's notice as we are." If the whole matter is made to hinge upon organization then the nation whose preparedness for war is most perfect must be the best organized. We can also say with justice and truth that our ships have very heavy duties to perform, and that they are distributed over every sea—that they are charged with the police of the ocean, and consequently it is a duty, a necessity, for England to maintain a large navy, and have a large body of seamen in her pay. It is idle to talk of our intention of invading France or injuring her interests in any part of the earth, but that from the nature of our institutions it is not only the cheapest but the best mode of manning our navy to retain our trained seamen constantly in our pay on board our ships.

We are not supposing that the French government are acting otherwise than in perfect good faith in disarming at the present moment, but disarmament, after the French model, leaves the French means of attack undiminished or nearly so, while, as everybody knows, every seaman paid off in England is lost to the service and the ships laid up are useless.

These facts are patent to all the world, and, on our part, something ought to be done. We must either keep up a large standing navy or have powerful reserves of seamen capable of being brought forward at any time. We must either make it worth the while of our maritime population by pay or pension to hold themselves in readiness to man our ships when required, or we must breed, instruct, and retain permanently in the service sufficient men to meet the demands of the navy. France, with a maritime population inferior in every respect to our own, owing to the *inscription maritime*, has an immense naval reserve maintained at no cost to the nation. The *inscription* not only includes coast boatmen, long shoremen, but merchant seamen, fishermen, carpenters, shipwrights, and naval artificers of every description. The services of this vast body is of course very valuable to the nation, but it is compulsory. The men have no choice. They are draughted off into the fleet every year, where they are instructed very carefully in gunnery and the duties of men-of-war's men. It should, however, be mentioned that *gunnery* is made the most of during the period of instruction. When each section of the maritime community has been thoroughly instructed

and thought efficient the men are released from their servitude, and are allowed to return to their occupations in the merchant service, as boatmen or fishermen as the case may be. It will be seen, therefore, that as a means of offence it is of slight consequence to France how many ships she disarms and unmans, for the crews are always maintained intact, and are constantly fed with fresh men, as they pass through the period of their annual instruction.

How painful is the comparison of our system with that we have so briefly described. When we reduce our naval defences we break up our trained seamen and abandon them as if they were so many worthless logs. When the State has no further or pressing need of them they are sent adrift. We exercise a mean economy when we feel secure, but which has too often proved to be the wildest extravagance. What is the consequence? At the next threat of disturbance a panic seizes the nation—we have to create and remanufacture a new fleet at a moment's notice. We have to coax, entice, and meanly solicit by paltry allurements the men we so wantonly discharged. They stand aloof; we then resort to bounties, and so by a dilatory process we get, by half dozens at a time, the worst hands that can be found. The system, if it may be so called, which we employ to man our navy is not only a disgrace to a practical people like ourselves, but it renders us the laughing stock of every maritime power in the world. Besides being a costly system it is inefficient, and has been aptly described as a scheme for rendering the manning of the navy difficult, and instead of bringing a supply of seamen it drives them away. Our ships, when commissioned, often lie six months at their anchor waiting for a crew, while our neighbours, with a population whose maritime instincts are inferior to our own, can man and arm twenty sail of the line in less time than our Admiralty, with all its powers, could get a single ship to sea.

The sudden manning of a large fleet of ships may some day be of immense importance to this country, and consequently we must not allow our fleet to be reduced, unless we have some system of naval reserves, quite equal to the inscription maritime of our "faithful ally." Nothing is more deceptive than the disarmament of a French ship when seen through the official eye of our "higher powers." But for the public press few individuals in England would have known the state of preparation for sudden war, possessed by France, even when she has not a single ship in commission. Let us suppose, for instance, that at Cherbourg and Brest, and at the Atlantic ports on the French coast, thirty or even forty sail of screw lines of battle are lying, what in England would be said to be in ordinary. These ships may be manned by our "faithful ally" in an incredible short space of time. In the first place they would have all their guns on board, their masts, spars, rigging and sails would be stowed away ready for instant use, but what is of the most consequence, 20,000 or 30,000 seamen could be summoned on board by telegraph, and each man would have his place assigned to him on board the ship he was told off to.

It is evident, therefore, under such a system as the above we cannot reduce our fleet, unless we devise some plan by which 20,000

or 30,000 trained seamen can be informed by telegraph, that they must proceed by railway to Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Sheerness, or elsewhere, and fall into their stations on board their ships, without any further ceremony, naturally, and at once. It is quite clear that no such system is known at our Admiralty; but it is no exaggeration to suppose, that unless some method is devised by which the superior organization of the French mode of manning their ships is neutralized, that we shall sooner or later be at the mercy of a foreign squadron. We must, now that steam has altered the conditions of naval warfare, have a naval reserve of some sort. It only provokes a smile when we hear the Secretary of the Admiralty get up in the House of Commons and gravely tell the landsmen, of which that august assembly is composed, that in case of necessity the navy could be reinforced by 231 merchant vessels. Gracious goodness! ! ! The navy of Great Britain! The navy of the greatest maritime power on earth! The navy upon which more millions of hard-earned taxes are lavishly spent, than upon all the navies of the world put together. This navy, which ought to be the standard of excellence, the model of all others, we are told by our highest naval authority, may fall back upon the merchant service, and be reinforced to the extent of 231 vessels. Well, it is refreshing to know, that one gallant seaman got up and told the "House" that such a statement "was all nonsense," and "that months would be required to fit out the vessels, and in the mean time what was to become of the merchant service." With blunt honesty and common sense, he further told the "house" that nothing short of fifty sail of the line in two divisions, one ready for sea and the other in a forward state, would render England secure against the combinations that might be entered into against her.

It is some consolation to know that now, at the eleventh hour, we are endeavouring to form a naval reserve. Lord C. Paget has introduced a bill, which if it receives the sanction of the legislature, will, it is to be hoped, give us a volunteer force of some sort. He has explained the provisions of the measure, which is to provide a militia force for the sea, as a reserve for recruiting the navy. And it is certainly a perfect marvel that a nation like England, whose existence may be said to depend upon the efficiency of her navy, should not possess even at the present time anything like a proper naval reserve.

It is now admitted that it is but of little use to rely only upon the coast-guard, which is an efficient force as far as it goes, but the number of men disposable as a reserve are less than 4,000. And with respect to the coast volunteers, as that body cannot be compelled to go farther than 300 miles from our shores, it cannot be regarded as of any utility for the general purposes of the navy. And further, it is acknowledged that impressment is abandoned, and no substitute has been provided for it, so that we cannot rely upon that tyrannical process for the future. Under these circumstances, successive boards of Admiralty have applied certain clumsy plans for raising men, which have always failed to produce the desired result. Various schemes have also emanated from individuals, viz., Sir

James Graham, Sir Charles Napier, and Sir Francis Baring, but none of them could man our ships with seamen.

At length, in 1852, a committee was appointed to consider this important matter, and amongst other suggestions it recommended the continuous service system, the increase of the coast-guard, and the enrolment of the coast volunteers. However, the difficulty of manning ships of war remained much the same. Then came the Royal Commission of last year, which recommend an increase of the Royal Marines, and also that from 20,000 to 30,000 men should be enrolled as a reserve force, under the title of Royal Naval Volunteers. It was proposed by the last committee that each volunteer should receive a retaining fee of £6 per annum, of which £1 should be deducted and set apart for a pension. It was further recommended, that at the age of 50 or 55, these men should be entitled to a pension of sixpence a day, and that they should have the option of either receiving that pension or a smaller amount, which should be continuous to their widows and families.

Such was the outline of the suggestions of the last Royal Commission, and Lord Paget's bill is framed after them. By it 30,000 men will be invited to enrol themselves for a period of five years, receiving £5 per annum. The men will be called out for training for twenty-eight days in each year, and during that time will receive non-continuous service pay according to their respective rating. It is also proposed to give the men the option of retiring from the force at the expiration of the five years, or of re-enrolling for a further period of five years.

According to this scale of payment, each man would receive £25 in five years, in addition to the month's pay during the training, and, if they were enrolled at the end of ten years' service, they would be entitled to a pension.

There are some details in Lord Paget's bill, respecting pensions, which it would be difficult to embody in a legislative measure, and it was considered advisable to leave them to the regulation of the Admiralty, should the house give consent to the bill.

Now, while we wish every success to this or any other measure intended to furnish a constant and efficient supply of good seamen to the navy, we doubt whether the £5 retaining fee will be temptation strong enough to overcome the prejudice unfortunately prevailing in the minds of the merchant seamen and coast boatmen against the navy. We have, however, no desire to utter one word against the official scheme, and, if the allurement is sufficient, we will be the last to counsel giving more, and we hope that our maritime population, generally, will see that is to their interest to accept the terms offered, for we feel assured that the object proposed by the bill must be attained somehow. It is imperative for England to have a reserve of seamen equal, at least, to that maintained by our "faithful ally" on the other side of the Channel, who, as we have shown, possesses the power of manning twenty or thirty sail of the line at a very short notice.

It has often occurred to us to inquire what it would be worth to insure to the inhabitants of these realms perfect security from all

alarms of invasion. A good round sum is spent every year with this object in view. For instance, the money votes in the six years from 1852 to 1858, for labour, timber, and stores, for building ships and keeping the navy in repair, was £14,105,096. This enormous amount, be it remembered, does not include the purchase of steam engines or coals. Then, for gunboats and floating batteries we laid out £3,000,000 more. And, if we add steam engines to the above huge totals, we find that the sum expended between 1852 and 1858, according to the report on this subject printed by order of the House of Commons, exceeded, by a few odd hundreds, £24,000,000. But even this sum did not include ordnance and other items, such as powder, shot, shell, and other expensive materials. One would have reasonably supposed that for this amount the navy would have been in a perfect working condition, and yet we hear nothing but alarms from the Admiralty, piteous declamations in Parliament, and lamentations in the press, because we are not secure against Zouaves, and Turcos, and other mauraders.

The truth is, we have found out that ships, guns, and steam-engines only go half way in forming a navy. We must have men to make the service complete. We have tried many inducements, and failed to catch Jack; he has a prejudice against the navy, whether well-founded or not we will not stop now to determine. Good-conduct-badges, crosses of honour, better provisions, free kits, and £10 bounty don't man the fleet. We have also abandoned the press-gang, and yet there is a want of seamen for the navy! Now, what will the "Gentlemen of England" give, per annum, to "live at home at ease?" We have seen, from authority, that they don't mind £24,000,000 in six years, or £4,000,000 a-year, for ships to perish with the dry rot, to be cut down, re-converted, and twisted and altered to all shapes and sizes, and then sold for an old song at last. Now, what are they prepared to give for men? Ships, noble ships we have, or are in the way of having them; stores of all kinds we possess in profusion; but the sinews and muscles to put these huge fabrics in motion—good, hardy seamen—are wanting.

Much as we value the power of money, we question whether the difficulty of finding seamen for the navy hinges entirely upon hard cash. Any man who takes the trouble of calculating the difference of pay between the best of the great merchant shipowners of this country and the pay, pensions, and other emoluments offered by the Crown, will perceive that the advantage in the long run is on the side of the navy. And yet seamen won't join. What is the cause why the good men stand aloof from the service? Why do they refuse good pay, pensions, honorary distinction, good diet, berths in the coast-guard, and opportunities for promotion? We believe the cause to be the natural and necessary consequence of that long-continued State crime—impressment. Our seafaring population have handed down from sire to son the despotism of former governments, who seized men, sent them on board men-of-war, and flogged them into submission: and, then, when their services were no longer required, they were too often discharged penniless, Such conduct, in time, caused the coast population to look upon the navy with terror,

and the remembrance of these byegone days still survives. We may call it an unaccountable prejudice against the navy, or what we will, but we believe the wrong inflicted years ago upon the seafaring population has its effect at the present hour. But we have done away with impressment! impatiently exclaims the reader. True—but flogging still remains. The cat was the accompaniment and necessary consequence of impressment; stubborn, sulky, impressed men, smarting with the injustice inflicted upon them, must be flogged into willing, handy seamen. This spirit still prevails in the navy. Returns of the House of Commons prove that in the five years from 1853 to 1857, as many as 5,823 men were flogged in her Majesty's ships, and no less than 182,779 lashes inflicted. The bulk of these punishments, or more than 90-100th, were inflicted without even the investigation of a court-martial, at the discretion of the commanding officer; and, being so inflicted at the mere discretion of any one—and no one is infallible—these punishments constitute an irreconcilable difference between the navy and civil life; and, in our opinion, they are sufficient to account for the otherwise strange fact, that the most glorious service in the world never can obtain sufficient hands.

It is to be regretted that the Royal Commissioners took no notice of this mode of punishment. They contented themselves with increasing the supply of provisions, free kits, allotting of wages, pay for good conduct, free promotion for warrant officers, and an outfit when promoted These recommendations are very good as far as they go, but as we have now experience to show, they do not man the fleet; they are of trifling importance compared to the removal of the blight that now hangs over the service, and which acts as a scare-crow and prevents good men entering the navy.

Now we have not dwelt upon these unpleasant facts in a spirit of hostility or disrespect to any officer in her Majesty's navy. In all probability no officer could have avoided flogging such men as were flogged. They were certain to have been the worst hands in the respective ships in which they served. It is the system that is in fault; a system that partakes of the old fogyism of the last century, which prevents men of good character entering the navy. Again, as was noticed the other night in the House of Commons by several eminent naval authorities, the Articles of War require revision. At present they impose the penalty of death for nearly every offence enumerated in them. Such grievances as these tend to deter merchant seamen from entering a Queen's ship. The Articles of War were considered by Sir Charles Napier of very doubtful legality; if so—and surely a British Admiral is no mean authority upon such a subject—it would only be justice to modify them to suit the present enlightened age. We believe if this was done, unnecessary drill abolished, and flogging abandoned, and some other punishment substituted for it, more would be done towards removing the prejudices existing in the minds of our maritime population against the navy, than any of the recommendations of the Royal Commissioners.

We have extended our remarks upon this subject further than we intended, but feeling the necessity that a supply of seamen must be found somewhere, we have thrown out the above hints, which we

have heard growled out of the rough throats of strong, hardy men, upon our beach at Southsea, in the hope that they may attract attention. We have an urgent need for the services of these men, for we never had a robust faith in the French alliance; indeed we never could fancy that we were allied to France, but to Napoleon III.; and, in taking him by the hand, we lent him the moral force which he wanted. A free nation like England would not ally herself to a despot without disgrace; and our policy up to the present hour has been inspired by fear, and Napoleon has had the wit to divine our policy, and has used us to further his designs.

France can organize, and may rely upon her organization for manning her navy; but we must depend either upon the free services of our skilful mariners, or keep up a large standing navy. It would be preferable to maintain a powerful fleet to any system of organization, at all events until we are satisfied that the "Empire is really peace;" and considering the few years the empire has been in existence, and that it has undertaken two of the bloodiest wars ever known, we have not at present much faith in its protestations. Who can believe in the continuance of the peace of Villafranca? Already Italy is in a ferment, and the new holy alliance between the three despotic powers of France, Austria, and Russia, bodes evil to freedom. The traditions of the empire are fatal to peace, and war is to it a necessity. If the empire represented a principle, one might put faith in it; but it represents nothing but aggrandisement, and war as a means. It is a power created by a military genius and usurpation. The empire—or Napoleon III., for the two are one and the same—can be maintained only by action. Peace would be fatal to it. Peace is a time of reckoning, and a trial for rulers, but war is a period of excitement, when domestic troubles are forgotten in the death-struggle for foreign mastery. And these are the baubles for which Frenchmen are willing to barter away their liberty. Who, then, can be deluded into the belief that "*L'Empire c'est la paix.*" Napoleon has been civil to us to serve his turn, but freedom, as understood by Englishmen, is incompatible with a Bonaparte; and in allying ourselves with a man, and not with the nation, we committed a grave error. For these reasons, then, we would rather put our faith in twenty sail of the line in the narrow seas, well manned with Englishmen, and dismiss for the present all ideas about the peace movement.

Portsmouth.

PEEPS FROM THE LOOPHOLES OF RETREAT.

By Retired Major Marksman.

There is one great advantage possessed by a despotism over a constitutional Government. All military changes and improvements advance uninterruptedly. A commission is appointed to investigate certain inventions or proposed alterations. The scientific and experienced officers engaged pursue the enquiry with ardour, make their

report, and their recommendations are either carried out or put aside at the discretion of the autocrat. No time is needlessly lost. Under a Government like our own, on the other hand, the obstacles to great ameliorations are considerable. Parliament appoints a select committee from among its own members. The inquisition proceeds, evidence is taken, matters approach maturity. Suddenly a change of ministry involves an appeal to the national constituency. The whole country is thrown into a ferment by a general election, and business is suspended. Weeks elapse; the returns are made, and some of the members of the select committee are found to have lost their seats. With the substitution of a few new men the inquiry is resumed, and perhaps goes on for two or three weeks, when, *presto*, the autumn arrives, the session breaks up, the members fly to the sea shore, the cover side, or the continent, and the investigation is deferred for months.

Such has been the history of the Military Organization Committee. Its appointment was urged more than a year since by Captain Vivian. Six months ago he obtained the committee. In April it met for one day; Parliament was dissolved; the committee resumed its duty in July, and at the beginning of last month it again adjourned until February next! Yet the subjects embraced in the inquiry are of the greatest national importance, and their solution should not have been deferred one single hour beyond the period when certain important truths had been elicited.

A copy of the evidence, so far as it has gone, has accidentally fallen into my hands, and its perusal has deeply interested me, because, though no longer in a position to be affected by any changes that may be wrought in our military system, I am, I hope, far from indifferent to that which concerns men "of the cloth" who are still actively employed. The inquiry which has been instituted does not, it is true, directly affect questions of discipline, but inasmuch as the army must more or less benefit by the arrangements instituted for its government and the insurance of its efficiency in a time of war, all that has been given in evidence does, to a certain extent, materially concern its members. An abstract, therefore, of the main features of the committee's proceedings will not be unacceptable.

The points to which attention seems chiefly to have been directed are the relations of the Horse Guards to the War-Office, the powers of the Secretary of State for War, the education of the army, the disposal of commissions, the direction of the ordnance, commissariat, and clothing departments, the patronage of engineer and artillery appointments, and the state of the national defences.

Without regarding the order of the enquiry—which, indeed, has not proceeded upon any very regular system, as respects the division of subjects—I will take first the state of our national defences. That Sir De Lacy Evans, who is on the committee, does not consider that this point has been sufficiently weighed is clear, from his having moved in his place in Parliament for a separate commission to investigate our position, which motion the ministry have staved off by the public assurance that they are doing all that is requisite in that way, of which there seems to be little reasonable doubt.

For instance, in reference to the coast fortifications, it appears, by what fell from Sir John Burgoyne, that very much has been done of late years to add to our national security. But five years' time, and an expenditure of a million of money, are yet requisite to put every point in a proper state of defence. A good foundation has been laid at Dover, which "is a very fine position, and will make a very strong place." A great deal is doing there, upon a very good scale, and shows a great improvement. "It will be a *place d'armes* of the first class when complete." The Isle of Wight is regarded as of great importance; the Needles have been made powerful; the back of the island is excessively strong, and a few precautions (forts are being constructed there at present) would make it very powerful indeed. "I shall then," says Sir John, "look upon the Isle of Wight as tied on to the main land, which would be unassailable." The precise defence of Spithead is under consideration. Portland is capable of being rendered very strong, and works are in progress to attain this end. Alderney has been fortified, and with a garrison of 2,500 men would be impregnable. The most exposed part of Devonport will be defended when the works now in progress are completed; but there is still much to be done. There are favourable positions in every direction around Plymouth which will enable it to be made a powerful fortress. The sea batteries at Pembroke, to guard against an entrance by shipping, are being much increased, at the instance of the Duke of Cambridge. Batteries, in fact, are raising, or to be raised, at the entrance of all our great rivers and estuaries. Liverpool, Aberdeen, and the Humber, for example; and, so far, we shall have fortifications enough to resist an enemy, appear at what point he may.

The *matériel* being complete, or in progress, the *personnel* to whom the defence of the country is to be entrusted comes next under consideration. On this point Sir John Burgoyne takes comprehensive views. He does not depart from his original idea of the worthlessness of undrilled rifle corps. He would have 200,000 men of the line and militia always ready, the militia to be embodied constantly, at least as long as "the French have an army of 500,000 men, which they can send at any time." "With the means which they have of crossing over that short channel you never can be safe; a war might come in a month or less, and you cannot get up your troops in less than a year." Sir John has no objection to volunteer local corps of artillery, who, without being removed from their ordinary places and occupations, would be available during time of war, and always efficient. He thinks that 4,000 to 5,000 might be mustered at Liverpool to act as artillery and infantry, but he would not give them a fine uniform. "A little forage cap, and a common workman's jacket would be uniform enough, and they should have an interest in the thing in some way."

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who was examined at great length, does not speak so distinctly as Sir John Burgoyne as to the amount of the defensive force which should be kept up constantly. He considers that the existence of a large reserve force, and a large embodied militia, would render so many as 200,000 men

needless. In effect he says the same thing as Sir John. But the Duke is either so much in dread of infringing the prerogative of the Secretary for War, or of overstepping the boundaries of his natural modesty, that he constantly stops short upon the threshold of his recommendations, in obvious fear of the "financial considerations." When Mr. Horsman asks if any financial difficulties or any expense to any amount ought to stand in the way of averting dangers to the country, the Duke replies:

"That is a matter of course for the Government to decide; it is for the policy of the Government. I should say not; but at the same time it is for the Government to decide those questions, and not the Commander-in-Chief. He only reports what his views are, and upon that the Government act; it rests entirely with the Government."

Methinks this tone, however true the facts it embraces, is only calculated to rivet the chains by which the Commander-in-Chief is linked to the authority of the War Office. It is humiliating enough to know that the highest authority at the Horse Guards is not supreme when the expenditure of one shilling of the public money is in question, without the frequent declaration of the melancholy fact.

The account which his Royal Highness gives of the state of the army is satisfactory as far as the allowed amount of force goes. "I am happy to say the army is more complete than people imagine. From all our returns to the Horse Guards, I believe that in ordinary times of peace we were never so little under our establishment as we are this moment." But he nevertheless admits the correctness of Colonel Herbert's statement in the House of Commons, that we have not more than 38,000 men of the line actually available for service in this country. His Royal Highness adds: "Nobody has any idea of the deductions which you must make from a force. You put down 95,000 men; you must deduct 10 per cent. for sick and absent, and men in the depots." And then take 30,000 for the colonies and India! This is a long way from the force actually needed for defensive purposes, if we have but a small number of militia regiments embodied. The Duke, however, thinks highly of the depot battalions, who would answer well for the occupation of the garrisons in time of war, if in sufficient strength—that is to say, before the drafts sail for India to join their respective service companies. His Royal Highness is not equally favourable to the volunteer corps. He would not like to rely too much upon them; they are very dangerous means of meeting an invasion—"They may be useful, but it is a very great question with me whether they would not be quite as much in the way." He has never met with a military man who, in the case of the sudden landing of an enemy trying to make a rapid march to London, would rely at all upon the population of the country to repel that attack. Still, his Royal Highness is not opposed to volunteeer artillery working the coast guns.

General Peel goes along with the Duke of Cambridge and Sir John Burgoyne in deeming the country badly protected. The General did not ask Parliament for a larger force than we actually

have, because there is no use in going to the House of Commons for 200,000 men when the army is 10,000 below the number actually authorized. There was good sense in this. A paper force is of no practical effect beyond furnishing a ground work for the discontent of the tax payers. General Peel is strongly of opinion that the volunteer artillery should be encouraged. He would give them so many days' pay in the course of the year to insure their training; he would "take them for so many years, and they should have so many days' training during the course of the year." General Peel does not think that the militia could be increased without resort to the ballot, and, after all, if the country sanctioned the raising a large additional force of any kind, where is it to be put? We are very deficient of barrack accommodation. "Even now," says the late Secretary for War, "it is impossible to carry out the recommendations of the Sanitary Committee, and to give the quantity of cubic feet of air to each man which is recommended by them." Nevertheless, General Peel would prefer, if it were possible, the presence of trained to untrained troops, and he incidentally refers to the expedition with which good battalions may be created. "I am happy to say that, even as regards those battalions which have been raised within the last two years, the state of efficiency at which some of them have arrived is perfectly wonderful. A great many of them are now sent out to Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands, and Sir Henry Storks told me that he had seen three regiments of second battalions at Malta, and that he never saw finer regiments."

Thus we come to the conclusion that England is very badly supplied with troops for defensive objects; that if Parliament gave the money we could not get the men; the rifle corps are not to be relied upon, and that our dependence for protection must, therefore, be upon the volunteer local artillery! This explains Mr. Sidney Herbert's late circular, addressed to the riflemen, who have been slowly "forming." Every encouragement is given to gentlemen on the coast to enrol themselves in local artillery corps, and they are even allowed the privilege of raising their own earth works on sites where the Government may be disposed hereafter to place guns.

The education of the officers of the army is the next subject of importance discussed by the committee. It appears that the Duke of Cambridge is very far from being satisfied with the present system, and although he is the President of the Council of Military Education, he objects *in toto* to the rules by which it is made obligatory upon candidates to take up given qualities of this or that kind of knowledge.

"I am of opinion that the obligatory marks are objectionable. I think that what you wish to have is the general education of the country. I think that whether a man is a good classic, or a good mathematician, signifies very little, and I should take a good classical man just as willingly as a good mathematical man. I am precluded from taking a good classical man, but I must take a mathematical man. Therefore it must become a cramming system. It is all cramming mathematics, and the other subjects are left out." Lord de Ros's pamphlet, pointing out the pedantic and useless

extremes which have been gone to, was brought, it seems, to the notice of the Duke of Cambridge and the Council of Education; but no action has been taken in consequence because the Council had pronounced it imprudent to make any change until they saw how the present system worked. The consequence of its continuance is a great difficulty in getting young men to enter the cavalry. The candidates being, for the most part, the sons of gentlemen of fortune, do not care to run the risk of failure. "It is not" (the Duke, *loquitur*) "that they cannot pass their examination as well as any other persons, but I think they do not consider it worth while to run the risk of being plucked." As the standard of education, and especially of mathematical proficiency, acts injuriously, His Royal Highness has endeavoured to procure its reduction, and in this object he finds a *collaborateur* in Professor Mosely. But the Council is obdurate. Yet many men besides Lord de Ros deem the standard of education preposterous and injurious. Sir John Burgoyne, in particular, naturally valuing scientific attainment in the engineer officers, seems to deride scholarship altogether in the other branches of the service. "I don't think," he replies to a question from Mr. Horsman, "that the men who pass the best examinations always make the best officers;" and, in answer to Sir James Graham, he says,—"You do not get moral quality—you get education apart from moral quality. I should like *a fox hunter for a staff officer better than a man of the highest attainments*. I think that men who make *the best cricketers*, and so on, are the best persons for *first commissions*."

The great diversity of sentiment on the subject of education cannot be easily reconciled. There seems but one way to untie the Gordian knot, and that consists in the establishment of a military college, or in the extension of the appliances of Sandhurst to the whole of the candidates for the Guards and the Line. This is a favorite notion with His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, and every well-wisher to the British army must desire to see it carried out. The Duke declares that he wishes to extend the area of education as much as possible, and to get what is taught in the general schools of the country: "Not particular schools—not preparatory schools—for these examinations; I want to get the young men from Harrow, or Eton, or Winchester, or where not, and to take the education which they receive there, and to let them show that they have attained proficiency in that education, whether it be mathematical, or classical, or modern languages, or whatever it may be." And, having got them, His Royal Highness would send them to Sandhurst, where, in a department of the college especially established for their use, they should acquire a professional training before obtaining a commission. They should be taught "pontooning, field works, surveying, military riding, and all those various professional pursuits which really young officers, except at such a college, have not an opportunity of ever seeing."

I think it would be difficult to devise a better system of military education for the young officer. Before he could possibly commence his "professional training," he would have

been grounded in mathematics, geometry, drawing, and so-forth; and the very conditions of his admission would stimulate the schools of the country to adopt a more general system of education. The worst of it is, at present, that the heads of schools are either very learned or very ignorant. The former *magistri* are from the universities, and their standard of excellence is centred in a high degree of classical or mathematical attainment; the latter, especially, employ masters and professors of whose capacity they are unable to judge, and a sort of academical chaos, consequently figures the contents of the pupil's mind.

The main object of the Military Organization Committee being to simplify the business of the War Office, and place the relations of the Secretary of State, the Commander-in-Chief, and the various departments upon a sounder basis, the inquiry has gone very much into that particular matter, and it is quite clear that, as far as the evidence has proceeded, the investigation has not been commenced one hour too soon. Never was anything so cumbrous, so complicated, so costly, so unsatisfactory. One twentieth part of the money which is spent in public correspondence—needless correspondence, as will presently be seen—would give a handsome increase to the pay of infantry subalterns, and relieve the cavalry subalterns of the cost of forage. Imagine the War Office receiving, registering, and replying to something like 350,000 letters per annum (about 1,000 per diem), of which number about 30,000 come from its immediate neighbour, the Horse Guards! To open these letters the Office employs (I quote the testimony of Sir B. Hawes) a first class clerk, of considerable experience, assisted by two or three other clerks. The opening begins at half-past nine, the letters are cast into baskets for the different departments to which they relate. There are three deliveries per diem. By eleven a.m., the first delivery is distributed; at one p.m., a second delivery takes place; and at three p.m., a third delivery; so that nearly the whole of an official day is consumed in the receipt and sorting of letters. Before the distribution, and after the opening, the letters go to the Registrar, in an adjoining room. That officer and his assistants place upon them a number which indicates the subject of the correspondence, and marks them to the particular branch for which they are intended. Clerks in the several branches then annex to the letters such previous correspondence as may be necessary to enable the Secretary of State to answer the particular letter or application which may be forwarded. In the office of the Commander-in-Chief, every letter goes first to the Military Secretary or Adjutant-General, or Quarter-Master-General, who sends it down to the clerks with memorandums pencilled thereon, and the letters are either again sent up with former papers, or are acted upon instanter. In the War Office a different system prevails. After registry, a letter goes to a junior clerk, who, to show his knowledge of business, makes a minute upon it; then to a superior clerk, who makes another minute; then to a third; and so on through the different grades of Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, until it reaches the Secretary of State, with half a dozen memorandums upon it, contradicting each other, and all upon some trifle! This system

of reference and minutes causing an immense consumption of time and waste of paper, is illustrated by Mr. Smith, the Commissary-General, in his evidence.

"There was a question about messes at Malta, involving an expense of a penny a day. The paper (containing Mr. Smith's statement) was of such an obvious nature that it required no explanation on my part. The subject matter was to place a senior messenger upon the same footing as two juniors; that is, to give him an extra penny a day. I could not sanction it upon my own responsibility. If I had done so, the Accountant-General would probably have objected to it. I therefore sent it to Sir Benjamin Hawes in the Financial Office of the War Office, simply requesting him to approve of it. Instead of his approving of it at once (I do not know whether it reached him or not), it was sent by the assistant chief clerk to the Accountant-General to know whether he concurred in my recommendation; then a second-class clerk in the Accountant-General's office made a minute, criticising the whole thing from beginning to end; then the chief clerk sent it to me to know whether I could explain what the second-class clerk had done. I wrote an explanation. Then the chief clerk sent it back to the Accountant-General, and said that he saw no objection to it. Another clerk in the Accountant-General's office made a minute, saying that he saw no objection to it; then the chief clerk sent it to Sir Benjamin Hawes, and said he might approve of it, and he did approve of it, and that was a thing which involved a penny a day. This small transaction occupied nine days in transit."

Another illustration of this absurd and complicated system of reference and correspondence is supplied by Mr. Godley, the assistant Under Secretary of State. Hear him:—

"If a communication comes from a combatant officer to the Commander-in-Chief, upon which he (the Commander-in-Chief) wishes to forward a communication to the Secretary of State, he minutes, or the Adjutant-General for him minutes, the communication from the officer to the effect, 'Apply to the Secretary of State.' That minute goes down to a clerk there, is translated into a long letter, in which the whole affair is recited; the draft of that comes up to the Adjutant-General to be approved; it goes down to be copied; it is then entered and sent; it arrives at our (the War) Office; it is there registered; it goes down to a Board to be reported upon; it goes up to the Secretary of State to be decided upon; the Secretary of State puts his minute upon it, 'Approval' or 'Disapproval;' the approval or disapproval, instead of going back direct to the Commander-in-Chief in that form, is translated into another letter, in which the contents of the letter to which it is an answer are recited, and probably, instead of three lines, it extends over three pages; then it is rough drafted, is approved, is sent down again to be copied, is then sent up again to be signed; it goes down again to be entered, and then issued and sent by a messenger to the Commander-in-Chief's office. There are no less, probably, than six or seven processes, most of them lengthy and laborious ones, instead of one, which would have been the mere transfer

of the Secretary of State's minute to the Board concerned; that is the difference. I really do not think that I exaggerate when I say that, if we could transact with all the world our correspondence by minutes, we might save more than half the clerks of the department. * * * I think it is very foolish unnecessarily to multiply the amount of correspondence."

Sir Benjamin Hawes, who appears inveterately attached to all existing systems, thinks there is virtue in allowing junior clerks to write minutes, and much value in a multiplication of correspondence. The former enables a secretary to discover talent, and the latter insures accuracy. But surely both these ends may be attained by simpler means, and with a much less consumption of time? The Commander-in-Chief says that his experience and that of the officers in his department "goes to an amazing delay" in the answers which they receive to the letters addressed to the War Office. "Letters which are marked 'urgent' will come back in a day or two, but if you do not put that on I should say the average was *nine or ten days certainly*." General Peel is decidedly opposed to the dilatory system. He agrees with Mr. Commissary General Smith in thinking the system of correspondence generally in the War Department the worst system possible. In war time the machinery would not work at all. He adds, "I have no hesitation in saying that I think that a great many papers have more minutes than is at all necessary. I should have directed my attention to reducing the number of minutes if I had remained at the War Department."

The consequence of all this vast accumulation of correspondence and writing is the presence of upwards of 500 clerks in the War Department, on salaries varying from £90 to £1,500 and £2,000 per annum. It is high time that the entire system were *bouleverse*, and the public money caused to flow in a more profitable channel. The civil departments of the army are overflowing and converted into unhealthy marshes, while the military soil is left waste for want of a little fertilising moisture. The press will do good service in ventilating this subject, applying its commentaries to established facts before the session of Parliament is renewed. As far as my aid can go it shall not be withheld. But for the present I think that I have communicated enough. There are many other points of great interest in connection with this inquiry into the organization of our military establishments which I must reserve until next month.

CAMPAIGN OF 1848 IN LOMBARDY.

(Continued from page 515.)

CHAPTER V.

Second Offensive Movement of Radetzky—Battle of Somma Campagna—Battle of Custozza—Fall of Milan—Conclusion of the Campaign.

By the 12th of July, all their reinforcements had come up to the Austrian main army, and they were very great. 12,000 of these were detached by General Welden from his corps after the reduction

of the Venetian mainland, and were forwarded to Legnago on the Adige, where being joined by some battalions from Verona, they were formed into a separate corps under Major General Culoz. The remainder of the reinforcements were Bohemian and German regiments forwarded through the Tyrol and Carinthia. The total Austrian force in Italy amounted to 132,000 men, organised in 126 battalions and 60 squadrons. The cavalry were nearly 9,000 strong, and there were 240 guns. This large force was divided into five corps, of which three (Wratislaw, Aspré, and Wocher,) were concentrated around Verona; one (Thurn) was in the Tyrol on the right, one (Culoz) at Legnago, on the Adige, on the left, and one (Welden) in the rear, blockading Venice, and keeping up the communications. A garrison of 2,000 was left by Aspré in Vicenza when he advanced to Verona, and he had been rejoined before he moved by the brigade which he had detached to open up the communication with Rovereda by the Arsa valley. From the force of the army in the field must, however, be deducted 12,000 men sick, and two strong battalions still on the march.

Of the Piedmontese forces it is impossible to state the numbers so exactly, but there can be no doubt that they were numerically superior to the Austrians, and that more particularly their active army under their King was very considerably so to that commanded by Radetzky. The reason of this was that the blockade of Venice, the observation of the line of the lower Po, and the garrison in the Venetian mainland, were far greater deductions from the troops in the field than Charles Albert required to make, all of whose communications were secure, and order in whose rear was kept up by the National Guard, consequently nearly all his troops were disposable for active operations, except that on the right bank of the Po, a good many Piedmontese reserve battalions were placed in Piacenza, Parma, Modena, Ferrara, and Bologna. The main army on the Adige, numbering about 60,000 men, was divided into two great corps, commanded by Generals Bava and Sonnaz, and consisted of seven divisions, viz., those of Arvillars, Ferrere, Broglia, and the Duke of Genoa, the Lombard divisions of Perrone and Visconti, and the reserve under the Duke of Savoy; Sonnaz commanded the left, Bava the right wing. Beyond the main body the extreme left consisted of a division of Lombards and free corps, commanded by Durando, who was stationed on the western shores of the lake of Guarda; the extreme right of General Pepé's division in Venice. The old Piedmontese troops were fully a match for an equal number of Austrians, but the Lombard divisions were much inferior, and the number of recruits and newly-raised battalions which had been incorporated with the old Piedmontese veterans, had much impaired their efficiency, and rendered them, as a whole, inferior to their opponents in the power of moving under fire.

Charles Albert, unable to attempt anything against the army in his front, and assailed by a perfect torrent of abuse for his inaction by the revolutionary press in his rear, now determined to undertake a measure which was the immediate cause of his ruin. This was the siege of Mantua. No movement could be more dangerous than

this, in the way in which he proposed to execute it. His plan was to complete the investment and undertake the siege of that place, situated on his extreme right, without giving up either the plateau of Rivoli on his left, or his works in front of Verona in the centre. In other words, he was about to accumulate the mass of his forces around Mantua on his right, whilst he left his now attenuated and weakened left and centre in their old positions opposed to the bulk of his adversary's forces concentrated around Verona. Such was the distance between the two wings of the Piedmontese army, and so near was Radetzky to their centre, that to attack it from Verona he had a far shorter distance to march than Charles Albert had to bring up support from Mantua. To undertake such a movement, involving a dissemination of his whole army in the face of a powerful and concentrated adversary, would seem, at first sight, to show a total want of military skill in the Sardinian King, and were he merely a general in command of an army this judgment would be just, but he was more than a general, he was King of Sardinia, and head of the Italian League, and consequently with him military movements were constantly made subject to political considerations. This is a circumstance which must always be kept in view in criticising the actions of a commander. He often is obliged to undertake movements, in a military view dangerous in the highest degree, but in a political absolutely necessary. Of this nature was the prolonged stay of Napoleon at Dresden, even when, as a military position, it had become untenable from the junction of Austria with the Allies, and the present movement of the King on Mantua. As leader of an ill-cemented league, his sole condition of existence was success. It was the moral force of victory and action which could alone secure, not only his position at the head of all the Italian states, but even keep his own crown upon his head. Inaction was certain ruin. Already the murmur of treachery was heard from the democratic party in his rear. He must do something. Retreat he dare not. Attack he could not. His only resource, therefore, was to undertake the siege of Mantua. For that, considering his political position, he cannot be blamed. It was a military fault dictated by a political necessity. But in the execution of it he certainly seems not to have taken the most prudent military course. He might have followed two courses. Instead of maintaining a considerable force at Rivoli, and in front of Peschiera, he might have abandoned the country between the Guarda lake and the Adige, made Peschiera his left, and thus shortened his line from right to left, by resting it on the natural obstacle of the Guarda lake, whilst he occupied and fortified the line of the Mincio as the battle ground of his centre with strong *tetês de pont*, and fortifications in the heights bordering its left bank, where they commanded the right. This would have enabled him with comparative safety to have undertaken the blockade of Mantua with his right wing and reserve, which should have been protected by strong defensive works thrown up on the side of Verona and Legnago. Even in this way it would have been a very hazardous undertaking, for he would have abandoned to the enemy the greater part of the important line of heights between Verona

and the upper Mincio. But the danger would have been much lessened, inasmuch as the line from Rivoli to the Mincio below Mantua is far longer than from Peschiera to the same place. If properly fortified with field works it is in itself a stronger line, and from its less extent could have been better manned and more quickly reinforced at the menaced point, and it is further removed from the entrenched position of Radetzky at Verona. (2). Or he might have still kept the bulk of his forces concentrated in his fortified position on the heights of Sona and Somma Campagna, but abandoned Rivoli and all the positions to his left entirely, and merely kept round Mantua a force sufficient to restrain the garrison and oppose the corps at Legnago. Then, if Radetzky attacked him from Verona, he would have met the bulk of his forces in a carefully fortified position. If he marched on Mantua by the right bank of the Adige, he could fall upon his right flank by Villafranca during the movement. If he attempted to relieve it by descending its left bank to Legnago and crossing there, he could move by a shorter parallel line, and anticipate him at Nogara. This would probably have been the best plan. But to keep his left at Rivoli, and his centre in front of Verona, whilst he accumulated the bulk of his forces around Mantua on the extreme right, where they were at a greater distance from his centre than Radetzky, was madness.

On the 12th the movement began. Charles Albert fixed his head-quarters at Roverbella. Ferreré's division marched from Goito in the centre and undertook the blockade on the side of Fort Belfiore, and the inundation of Berese; to the villa La Parma, opposite Fort Pietoli, it was continued by the new Lombard division just come up from the Oglio, to whom a brigade and rifle battalion were added to enable it to continue the investment to the river above the town. This completed the blockade on the right bank of the Mincio. To do the same on the left bank the Duke of Savoy's division, which had been withdrawn from the left at Rivoli, was, on the 18th pushed on to Castellaro (on the Legnago road), whilst the Duke of Genoa's moved to Mozzecano, and the head-quarters were shifted to Marmivolo. A variety of minor changes also took place, all involving the left and centre for the reinforcement of the right. We must now turn for a moment to the opposite bank of the Po.

Since the commencement of the revolutionary movement the citadel of Ferrara (in the Papal States to the south of the Po), which contained an Austrian garrison, had been subject to what the inhabitants of the town had been pleased to call a blockade. In reality a convention was concluded by which, on the garrison's engaging not to bombard the place, the citizens promised to supply them regularly with provisions. Shortly before this, however, a Piedmontese garrison was thrown into the town, who, of course, enforced a real blockade, and it was in consequence reduced to great straits for want of provisions. To relieve it, Radetzky directed Major General Culoz, who lay with his corps at Legnago, to detach 5,000 men under Prince F. Liechtenstein. These setting out on the 13th, crossed the Po in boats near Occhiobello, and reached Ferrara on the following day, the Piedmontese troops, too weak to oppose

them, withdrawing. A convention was then concluded between the Austrian commander and the townsmen, with the sanction of the Piedmontese commanding officer, that the citadel should be re-victualled by the inhabitants every two months. The day after Liechtenstein set out on his return, crossed the Po, and, in obedience to his instructions, directed his march on Governolo. This small town is situated on the Mincio, close to its junction with the Po, and has a bridge over the former stream. It was held by a small Austrian detachment, and Leichtenstein's instructions were to cross the river there and move up its right bank, against the rear of the corps blockading Mantua on that side, and they were to be assisted by a sally of the garrison. On approaching it, however, he learned that it had fallen into the hands of the enemy. In fact, as soon as Charles Albert heard of Leichtenstein's movement, he directed General Bava to cross the Po to oppose him with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and two batteries, and he had actually reached Borgoforte, and crossed over some of his men, when he learned that the Austrians had recrossed the river. Instantly divining their project, he marched his whole force on Governolo. The small Austrian garrison, consisting of only three companies, with four guns, made a gallant resistance, but driven from the defence of the bridge by the superior fire of the artillery, they were speedily surrounded in the open plain beyond it by the cavalry, and their square being shattered by a discharge of grape, it was broken, and they were nearly all taken prisoners. Two of the guns with a few men managed, however, to get off, and threaded their way in safety to Mantua.

Bava immediately occupied this important post, which completely secured the right flank of the blockading corps, in force. The Piedmontese having collected in force at Castellaro, Leichtenstein received orders, to prevent his being attacked in flank, to turn aside from Governolo, and march on Sanguinetto, a village on the road between Legnago and Mantua, not far from the former town, where he would be in communication with, and form the advanced guard of his own corps. He reached this point on the 21st. Having been ordered to proceed to Mantua to confer with the governor, he was cut off by the completion of the investment, and General Simbschen took the command of his division.

But more important events were now on the wing. Radetzky had watched with an eagle's eye the false movement of Charles Albert, but he was careful not by the slightest move on his own part to give him notice of the coming storm. On the contrary, to lull him into a still more fatal security, he issued a bulletin to his troops pointing to a still longer continuance of their defensive attitude. Like Napoleon at Austerlitz, he was determined not to interrupt the enemy in the execution of their false manœuvre. As soon as he saw the investment of Mantua by the bulk of their forces completed, still further to distract their attention from the centre, the point he had determined to overwhelm with his whole force, he directed Count Thurn to collect all the disposable force of his corps in the Tyrol, and descending the right bank of the Adige, assail their left

at Montebaldo and Rivoli. Having collected his troops to the number of twenty-three companies on the 21st, he advanced to the attack in two columns on the morning of the 22nd. The right column, consisting of ten companies under Thurn in person, moved against the Piedmontese, who were posted to the number of about 1,000 men near La Ferrara, on the northern slopes of the Montebaldo. They stormed the heights under a heavy fire of musketry, and toiling on under a burning sun over those rugged cliffs, finally drove them back to their main position on the plateau of Rivoli. There, however, their column was checked, the Piedmontese batteries received them with a heavy and well-directed fire, fresh troops were brought up to encounter men worn out with heavy toil, and far from being able to make an impression on the left flank of the plateau, they could with difficulty maintain themselves at San Martino, at the foot of the southern slope of the Montebaldo. There they halted for the night. Nor was the left column more successful. It was commanded by Count Lichnonsky, and consisted of eight companies with four guns. It moved against the plateau of Rivoli, by the road which descends along the right bank of the Adige. Its course, consequently, lay in a narrow pass, with the river on its left, and the mountains overhanging its right, and to enable it to advance a flanking party had to be sent to view the nearest heights, and move along their summit abreast with the column in the valley below. In this order they got as far as Incanale; there the road leaves the banks of the river, and turning to its right, ascends through a narrow winding gorge the steep flank of the plateau of Rivoli, to the village of Zoana on the summit. Here they were met by General Sonnaz in person, with 3,000 men, with four guns, the head of the column jammed together in the narrow pass, now smitten with grape, whilst its flank was exposed to a destructive fire from the light troops posted amidst the overhanging rocks, and it could make no way, but after sustaining a heavy loss, was obliged to fall back. Upon the Monte Pastello, on the opposite bank of the river, the Austrians had planted an eighteen pounder and some other guns, which did good service during the attack, for they silenced some works which the Piedmontese had thrown up to command the road, and from their elevated position, were able to play, across the stream, upon almost every part of their camp. The Austrian loss in killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 8 officers, and 201 men. Twice the pass leading up to the plateau of Rivoli has witnessed the repulse of the Austrian arms, for there it was that Quasdanovich's column was defeated by Napoleon in person on the 14th January, 1797. In the evening they occupied much the same position as they had done on the day before that celebrated battle, for one column held the Montebaldo, while the other lay at the foot of the ascent near the river side. The extreme danger of his position induced General Sonnaz, in spite of his success, to retreat, for he foresaw that the attack would be renewed on the following day, whilst any movement of Radetzky from Verona, against the weak and extended centre, would lead inevitably to his retreat being cut off, and consequent destruction. Accordingly, at

nine in the evening his columns abandoning the plateau, fell back upon Peschiera.

Radetzky now saw that the hour had come. The bulk of his opponents' forces were grouped round the marshes of Mantua far on the right, while the entrenchments on the heights in his front were weakly manned by their attenuated centre and left. Swift and strong as the spring of the lion from his lair was the stroke of the old man. On the evening of the 22nd he led forth his army from the entrenched camp of Verona, and, having placed a strong garrison there under Baron Haynau, disposed them for the fight. From Verona, as already mentioned, a hilly range extends to the Mincio, and from the banks of that river westward as far as Castiglione, it is bounded on the east by the Adige, on the south by the great plain of Mantua, which runs up to its foot in the neighbourhood of Villafranca on the left, and of Goito on right bank of the Mincio, and on the west by that of the Chiese, which reaches it at Lonato and Castiglione. It is composed of a succession of swelling hills, extremely like one another both in shape and altitude. This line of heights immediately to the south of the Guarda lake and north of the Mantuan plain, and bisected by the Mincio, forms the true line of defence of that river; for an army in possession of it, and established *à cheval* on the river, is not only in a position of great strength in itself both for offence and defence, but in one which no opponent can venture to pass by, as his flank, rear, and communications would all lie exposed to attack in the plain, extending from its southern front to the Po. This was the position held by Charles Albert with his whole forces, before he undertook the siege of Mantua, and to expel him from which was the object of Radetzky's flank movement in May. The strength of it he had experienced in his unsuccessful attack on Goito on that occasion. Taught by this failure, his object now was, by a front attack with his whole force, to carry this hilly range and establish himself upon it, on both banks of the Mincio, in a position facing Mantua; in other words, on the very ground held by the Piedmontese in the end of May. The part of the position which he required first to carry, and that on which the Piedmontese centre stood, was its eastern face looking to Verona. Here lie three parallel ranges of hills running north and south, one behind the other. On the foremost of these the Sardinian line was established, and on it stand four villages, all of which was strongly entrenched and occupied and were the keys of the ground. On the Sardinian left was the village of Santa Guistina, in the centre Sona, on the right Somma Campagna, each of these were distant about three quarters of a league from each other; about a league south west from the latter, that is in a direction thrown back at an oblique angle from their right, was Custozza, behind this range, which formed their first battle ground, lies a second similar range of which the culminating point is the Monte Godio, behind it again rises a third range, called, from a village which stands on it, that of San Giorgio; in the valley between the second and third ranges the small stream of the Tione flows. On the first ridge, holding the villages, General Sonnaz posted his men. Their position was strong

both from nature and art, for it was covered with entrenchments on which the whole army had laboured, but he had not a force nearly sufficient to man such extensive works. For, of the four brigades which originally composed his corps one had been sent to Mantua, and another, that which had formed the left wing and had fought at Rivoli, had retired as before noticed to Peschiera, so that he had only two left disposable to occupy the ground. He could not therefore bring above 12,000 Piedmontese into line. The Tuscan division was, however, posted in the plain, on his right, at Villafranca. To bear upon this weak force Radetzky brought about 45,000, who were arranged for the attack as follows:—Aspré's corps formed the right wing, it was to attack in two columns. The first, consisting of an infantry and cavalry brigade, under Count Schaffgatsch, was to move against Santa Guistina and the extreme Piedmontese left; the second, consisting of three infantry of brigades, under General Wimpfen, on Sona in their centre. Wratislaw's corps formed the left wing, it was also to attack in two columns. Wohlgemuth was to lead three brigades against Somma Campagna and the front of the Piedmontese right. Clam one brigade against Custozza and their right flank, and Colonel Wyss with some light cavalry was to cover this movement by advancing on the extreme Austrian left into the plain towards Villafranca, so as to observe the Tuscans. Wocher's reserved corps moved in rear of the centre, so as to support any menaced point. It consisted of three infantry and one cavalry brigade, and the reserve batteries. Each brigade of Aspré's and Wratislaw's corps had a battery of artillery, and one or two squadrons attached to it. Charles Albert therefore so managed matters, that with an army on the whole equal in numbers to that of Radetzky, he yet could collect on the decisive point to fight the battle of Italy, only 12,000 men to meet his opponent with 45,000; and this affords the measure of his generalship, for Napoleon had said that the decisive mark of an able general is to be, with forces on the whole inferior, superior to his adversary at the point of attack.

It was on the evening of the 22nd that the Austrian army marched forth from Verona. Radetzky's original plan was for all the columns to move on to the attack at 1 o'clock on the ensuing morning, but a terrible tempest of wind and rain came on in the night, the men were drenched to the skin, and no movement was possible while it lasted. With the early dawn, however, the clouds cleared off, the sun shone out in all its brilliancy and the advance commenced. It was Sunday, the 23rd of June, a memorable day in the annals of Italy At seven o'clock, Wimpfen began the action by throwing his heavy column into action against Sona and the adjoining heights held by the Piedmontese centre; the action continued for four hours with great violence, the Piedmontese making a most gallant resistance; from the nature of the ground a regular advance in line or column was impossible, the whole side of the hill was covered with vineyards, separated from each other by high walls, amongst these the regular order of the assailants was soon broken, and the struggle turned into a confused and broken one, the Piedmontese when forced from one wall retiring to the next, the Austrians clambering

hem and assaulting with the utmost gallantry; so mingled
er did both parties become, that frequently the Austrians
the bayonets of their enemies muskets as they were presented
gh the loopholes, and twisting them off, fired themselves through
pertare in return. At last, however, numbers prevailed, and by
y the Austrian colours were advanced to the summit of the
, and the Piedmontese, after being driven from all their en-
hments in the centre, were in full retreat to the heights in the
Meanwhile on the Austrian right, Schaffgatsch led on
en against Santa Guistina, to secure his flank against a counter
t from Bussolengo, he detached a small column to observe the
y there, and with the main body went right against Santa
ina; his orders were to make only a false attack, but seeing
pfen's triumphant advance, he converted it into a real one, and
d the village with a rush. Aspré, having now won the whole
e and left of the enemy's position, led his corps across the inter-
g ridge against that of San Giorgio, where they had collected their
red forces for a second stand. This village was stormed by
tenstein's brigade, and the whole corps passed on without a
to Castelnovo on the road to Peschiera, upon which latter
the enemy fell back.

the Austrian left, Wohlgemuth led on his column at the
time that Aspré's corps attacked. The position of the
y about Somma Campagna was very strong; at the
of the height on which the village stands were three strong
hed houses connected together by garden walls, these and the
t above were defended by 3,000 men with four guns, and though
ed to an immensely superior force, they made a most determined
ance. Placing his own and Supplicaz's brigade in front, and sup-
g them by Strassoldo's, Wohlgemuth threw his force freely
ction; the advanced line above mentioned was defended with
obstinacy, and a sally even was made against the flank of the
ing columns, but the odds were too great. The post was at
ame instant stormed in front and turned on both flanks, and
the Austrians uniting their columns rushed together up the
f the hill against the main position, and by the sheer weight
mbers swept the Piedmontese right before them. Clam,
e left, was approaching Custozza with his brigade, when its
ders, seeing the general retreat of the line, abandoned it.
islaw, thus successful in both his attacks on the Piedmontese
ordered a general advance of his corps over the intervening
towards the Mincio. Clam, having occupied Custozza, pushed on
f his men to the heights on the other side of the Tione. Wra-
, with Wohlgemuth's column passed on to Oliosi, the Piedmon-
ll back in all haste before him to the opposite side of the
, and Strassoldo with his leading brigade was established,
night fell, on the summit of the Monte Vento, and looked
on the river flowing along tranquilly at his feet. The reserve
which was never engaged advanced to San Giorgio, where head
rs were established. On the extreme right, Count Thurn with
rps occupied the abandoned position of Rivoli, and, though

difficulty in bringing up supplies prevented his further progress that day, he had entered into communication with, and was ready to support, the main body of the army. By the operations of this day Radetzky had carried all the intrenchments of the Piedmontese centre, driven it and their left wing across the Mincio, and obtained possession of the whole range of heights to the north of the Mantuan plain as far as that river.

So far the Austrian advance had been triumphant, but it was not unattended with danger, for whilst they were pressing on over the hilly range towards the shores of the Mincio, Charles Albert was employed collecting a strong force at Villafranca, in the plain behind their left. This position, which was strongly barricaded, had been left by their forward movement in rear of the Austrians, and it was to observe it that their extreme left was held, refused by Clam's brigade being halted at Custozza, and on the heights on each side of the Tione about that place. Villafranca was not above half a league distant from the foot of the heights. When the Austrians had advanced to the Mincio, two courses lay open to Charles Albert, either to raise the siege of Mantua, collect all his forces on the right bank of that river, and throwing himself across their onward path, fight a general defensive action near Goito, or to concentrate the bulk of his forces about Villafranca, and from thence assail the heights on their left, and having won them threaten their rear and communications. This was the bolder course and the more perilous, but it was likely to lead to the greater results, and was the one he adopted. The two armies thus came into a very peculiar position, they had mutually passed each other and menaced each others communication. Radetzky, pressing on across the Mincio, threatened to gain the roads to Milan; Charles Albert attacking from Villafranca seemed about to seize that to Verona. Each party aimed a vital thrust, and each in so doing laid himself open. Radetzky's position on the heights was the strongest, but his troops pressing on to their front were scattered and open to a flank attack. Charles Albert had his men better in hand for a sharp and decisive stroke. This he delivered with good effect on the 24th, but to understand it we must advert to the Field-Marshal's movements on that day.

He had a double object in view (1) to gain possession of the high grounds on the right bank of the Mincio, (2) to secure his flank and rear from attack. This double strain in opposite directions necessarily led to a dispersion of his force. To secure the first object, he brought up Wocher's reserve corps to the Mincio at Salionze, and pushed two of its brigades there over the river. The passage was effected after a smart skirmish. Meanwhile, lower down the stream, Wohlgemuth's and Supplicaz's brigades of Wratislaw's corps crossed at Mozambano. To effect the second, Strassoldo's brigade of the same corps remained on the Monte Vento, and occupied Vallegio facing the plain of Mantua, and in echelon next to him Clam stood at Custozza, with orders to move on when relieved by Simbschen from Sanguinetto. Aspré's corps observed Peschiera, and Thurn advanced to Cola and Sandra, close to the high road leading from Verona to Peschiera. The general result of their movements was,

that while four brigades were crossed over to the right bank of the Mincio, three were disposed in echelon on the left flank of the army, to make head against Charles Albert in the plain, and two corps were collected in the neighbourhood of Peschiera who could be directed to any threatened point. At the same time, foreseeing the possibility of his retreat to Verona being cut off, Radetzky ordered his pontoon train to be marched back from the rear of the active army to Ponton (immediately below Rivoli) on the Adige. The movement of one body here requires to be explained: at the time of the general advance from Verona, on the 23rd, Simbschen's brigade at Sanguinetto received orders to advance towards the main army, in such a way as to join its extreme left. It would thus require to traverse the plain near Villafranca diagonally from the lower Adige near Legnago, towards the upper Mincio, and would become a flanking party to the left and rear of the army during its advance. On this day (24th), it had come so far up that it was ordered to occupy the high ground between Somma Campagna and Custozza, and to relieve in the latter post Clam's brigade, which was then to rejoin its own corps. It had a long and weary march through the burning plain, and it was 5 o'clock, p.m., ere its leading battalion reached that point; as soon as it did, however, and without waiting for the remainder of the brigade, Clam marched for the Monte Vento, and thus the entire defence of the flank and rear of the army between the Monte Vento and Verona, came to depend upon this single and exhausted brigade, not numbering 5,000 men, which were stretched in a loose marching column along the high grounds all the way from Custozza to Somma Campagna. The consequence of this imprudent haste on Clam's part was soon apparent.

At this very time Charles Albert, having concentrated about Villafranca five infantry brigades, and a cavalry division, numbering altogether about 25,000 men, commenced his offensive movement. His cavalry were stationed on his right on the plain towards Verona, the infantry to the left, moved direct against that range of heights on which Custozza and Somma Campagna are situated, which they would thus assail from the south east. Having won this position, he proposed to advance rapidly towards the Mincio, assailing in rear Radetzky's whole army. The advance of the Piedmontese brought them directly upon the brigade Simbschen, of which one regiment only (Haynau's), had reached the Monte Torre, close to Custozza, the next (Prince Emil), was on the heights between that and Somma Campagna, and the third (Nugent's), was in that village. They could oppose no effectual resistance to the immense mass of fresh troops thus poured suddenly upon their flank, but were broken through and shivered to pieces in an instant. Haynau's regiment, on the right, contrived to hold its ground the longest, and fall back in tolerable order to San Giorgio, but Prince Emil's, in the centre, attacked at once in front and rear, was cut off from the remainder of the brigade, and nearly all taken prisoners. Its broken remains, as well as those of Nugent's regiment, from Somma Campagna, had the utmost difficulty in making their escape to Verona. In this disastrous action the brigade lost 1,317 men, and 43 officers, and by its results the

Piedmontese were established on the foremost range of heights over which the Austrian army had so recently advanced. The latter, victorious in their front, suddenly found the force covering their left completely defeated, and their adversaries in possession of a strong position in their rear.

In these circumstances Radetzky's resolution was at once taken. He determined to face his army to the right about, and assailing with his whole forces Charles Albert on the heights of Custozza, drive him back from thence into the plain on Villafranca. The orders were issued late that evening, the movement to begin the following morning. All the troops which had passed over to the right bank of the Mincio were withdrawn, except those required to garrison Borghetto, Mozambano, and Salionzi. From his army having faced to the rear, Wratislaw's corps (formerly the left) became the right, and Aspré's (formerly the right) the left wing. Radetzky's plan was dictated by the ground on which his troops and the enemy's lay. His right held the whole of the hilly range between the Mincio and the Tione; but the Piedmontese had now the southern portion of the ridge between that stream and the Adige, the northern portion of it, however, still remaining in the hands of the Austrians. He determined, therefore, to remain on the defensive with his right, but to assume the offensive vigorously along the summit of the ridge beyond the Tione with his left. For this purpose Wratislaw was ordered to occupy Vallegio strongly with Strassoldo's brigade on the extreme right, whilst he drew up the remainder of his corps along the summit of the Monte Vento as far as the Tione, with instructions to hold that position against any attack from the plain at his feet, on the south, or from the opposite bank of the Tione to the east. Aspré was ordered to bring up the whole of his corps from the side of Peschiera, and having concentrated it in the direction of Sona on the northern portion of the ridge on which that village, Somma Campagna, and Custozza all lie, to advance along its crest from north to south, driving before them the enemy from the two latter points, until he had fairly pushed them over its southern side back into the plain. To support him Haynau was ordered to send a strong brigade from Verona, which he, with much judgment, on witnessing the progress of the action, directed against the right flank of the enemy at Somma Campagna. Wocher's reserved corps was brought up to the neighbourhood of Oliosi behind the centre, to resist any attempt to force that portion of the line of battle, whilst Thurn's corps was to observe Peschiera, and afford any further support that might be required. It was calculated that the troops would reach their respective positions, and be ready to attack, before midday. Charles Albert on his side also prepared to resume the offensive on the evening of the following day. For this purpose the Duke of Genoa, who, with his division, was posted at Somma Campagna, and formed the right wing, was to advance on Oliosi. The Duke of Savoy, with the guards and the brigade Coni, was to advance from his position at Custozza, in the centre, against Salionije, whilst General Bava, on the left, was to assail Vallegio from the plain with the Aosta brigade. Instructions were also sent to General Sonnaz,

who had fallen back to Volta, on the right bank of the Mincio, to support Bava's attack by an advance on Borghetto, which lies opposite Vallegio. Thus both parties prepared to assail each other at the same moment, Radetzky intending to hurl his adversary from the high ground he had won, back into the plain; Charles Albert desiring to win the remainder of the heights which lay between him and the Mincio, and thus cut off Radetzky entirely from Verona and his communication. Both played a bold game. Each was trying to checkmate his opponent.

The morning of the 25th broke with a cloudless sky, not a breath of air was stirring, and the sun shone out with more than its wonted fierceness, the thermometer rising to 28° of Reaumur in the shade. Amidst this almost insupportable heat the battle had to be fought. It began with the advance (about 8 o'clock) of Bava against Vallegio, on the Austrian right. On approaching that place, however, he found the mass of Wratislaw's corps assembled there so formidable that he did not venture to attack until reinforced by a regiment of the guards from the centre; they did not reach him till mid-day. He then assaulted the village, but could make no progress; his columns received by a heavy fire of grape and musketry from the defences, charged in flank by cavalry, and smitten from the heights by round shot from the batteries there, were driven back in disorder. Again he advanced, and again experienced the same fate. Convinced now that Wratislaw's position was impervious to an attack in front, he determined to assail it in flank from the side of the Tione; but meanwhile the roar of a heavy cannonade was heard from the right, in the direction of Somma Campagna, and the high grounds there were soon enveloped in smoke. This was caused by the advance of Aspré's corps. That able commander directed the brigades of Guilay and Liechtenstein along the ridge from Sona against Somma Campagna and the front of the Piedmontese right, whilst Perin's brigade, sent by Haynau from Verona assailed its flank. Guilay came first into action, but was received by so heavy a fire from the defences of the village that he could make no way. Perin now arrived, and combining their attacks the two brigades assailed it at the same instant, the one from the Sona, the other from the Verona side, but so vigorous was the defence of the Duke of Genoa's division, that for long no progress was made; the Austrian batteries thundered incessantly, the infantry lined every wall and hedge, and frequently threw themselves on with the bayonet, but the line of the Piedmontese fire would not recede. At last, sinking from fatigue beneath that burning sun, and having suffered a severe loss, the Austrians fell back. A short lull now took place, but as soon as they had recovered they again advanced to the attack; their officer led gallantly in the front, old Aspré was seen in person encouraging his men, and after a severe struggle the foremost houses and enclosures were won, and a secure footing in the village gained. But a long fight ensued before the Piedmontese were expelled, for every street and every house was defended. During this struggle, Liechtenstein's brigade, further to the Austrian right, was assailing the Casa Beretara and the heights to the Piedmontese left of Somma Campagna, the foremost of which it carried, after a hard fight; but the Duke of

Genoa made a bold attempt to regain them, and when repulsed held fast to Monte Boscone, the most important, as well as the last, of the whole, and which commanded the field on that side. Radetzky, with his silver hair streaming in the wind, and followed by his whole staff, now rode forward into the front line of the skirmishers. He was received with deafening shouts from the men, which pealed long and loud over the whole field, and, excited to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by his presence, the Austrians, now reinforced by Perin's and Guilay's brigades from Somma Campagna, rushed forward with a resistless energy to the assault of the Monte Boscone, the summit of which was soon crowned by their white-coated columns. The whole Piedmontese right, driven from their ground, fell back along the ridge.

Their centre was very strongly posted on the Monte Gosio in front of Custozza. There, under the Duke of Savoy, stood the guards, the flower of the army, and the brigade Coni. This point was attacked as soon as the engagement had become warm on the Somma Campagna side, by Kerpen's brigade, forming the right of Aspré's corps. For long the Croats and Kinsay regiment who composed it, could gain no ground. Hour after hour passed by, and still no progress was made. Schwarzenberg's brigade was now ordered up in haste to support them; so terrible at this time was the heat that, during his advance, one of his battalions alone left a third of its number behind, and many struck by *coup de soleil*, "frothed at the mouth, and died." The arrival of this brigade, together with that of another from Wocher's reserve corps, who were despatched by Radetzky himself, at last gave the Austrians the superiority of numbers, and as evening came on the height was won, and the Duke of Savoy driven back on Custozza. The Austrians continued their triumphant advance both from this point and Somma Campagna, and the Duke of Savoy, seeing that his position had become untenable by the retreat of the Duke of Genoa on his right, abandoned Custozza, and uniting with the latter they both fell back into the plain. When night came on Aspré's corps, sweeping over the crest of the ridge, halted on its southern slope looking down on Villafranca, and the heights which had so recently been crowded by the Piedmontese columns were covered with the Austrian watch fires.

We left General Bava with the Piedmontese left wing, after his repulse by Wratislaw's corps at Vallegio, preparing to assail it in flank by the valley of the Tione. For this purpose, having crossed the rivulet with the brigade Aosta leading and the regiment of guards in support, he advanced up its left bank till he came opposite the Monte Mamaor, which is on the right bank, and on which the flank of Clam's brigade, forming the left of Wratislaw's corps, rested. There bringing up his right shoulder he recrossed the stream and stormed the height. Clam now effected a change of position on his right, left thrown back, so that he formed a line at right angles to his original position, and facing to the east, and this he maintained against all Bava's attacks. The Monte Vento rises to the north of Clam's position, and there was some danger that Bava, by outflanking him, might gain possession of its eastern extremity, but a rifle battalion posted there sufficed to vindicate its rugged sides. Supplicar's

brigade was now brought up by Wratislaw in all haste to Clam's support, but its leading battalion had only just joined him when, encouraged by the rapid progress of the Austrian fire on his left, he suddenly assumed the offensive, and leading on his men to the charge, carried the Monte Mamaor at the point of the bayonet, and hurled Bava's exhausted and now dispirited troops down into the plain. This occurred about the same time that the Piedmontese right and centre fell back before Aspré. Everywhere the ridge of heights was won, and the whole front line of the Austrian army, brought up to their southern edge, lay along the summit like a heavy thunder cloud, threatening at every moment to descend upon and envelope the Piedmontese army collected in the plain around Villafranca at its feet. Bava's retreat had been harassed by some squadrons and horse artillery detached from Vallegio. On the right bank of the Mincio General Sonnaz made no attack; he found that his men were too dispirited with their defeat on the 23rd, and worn out with the long and harassing marches they had since had to be adequate to the exertion. A trifling skirmish in that quarter was all that ensued. The Austrian loss in the battles of the 23rd and 25th amounted to 72 officers and 1904 men killed, wounded, and missing; that of Simbschen's brigade on the 24th to 43 officers and 1317 men. Their total loss in the three days' fighting therefore amounted to 115 officers and 3221 men, including about 800 prisoners. Of the Piedmontese loss no return exists, but it must have been even more considerable.

By the result of this battle Charles Albert's position had become very critical; his blow against the flank and rear of his adversary, ably conceived and strongly delivered, had failed. The main body of his troops were collected on his right about Villafranca, another division was still in the rear, watching Mantua, his left, under Sonnaz, was at Volta, on the opposite bank of the Mincio. Radetzky, with his whole army well in hand, lay on the heights in his front, and held both banks of the Mincio: he might either fall on the King at Villafranca, or, crossing the river, overwhelm Sonnaz's corps, and descending on Mantua, cut off his retreat. Not a moment, therefore, was to be lost in reuniting the Piedmontese army on Sonnaz's corps and their left, so as to secure their communications. At midnight accordingly the King broke up from Villafranca, and forming his troops into two heavy columns, marched with the utmost expedition by Quaderni and Roverbella to Goito on the Mincio. Nothing could exceed the order and regularity of their retreat. The rear guard, consisting of the Queen brigade and regiment of Acqui, which came up from Mantua, retired in echelon, one taking up a position and waiting there till the other had marched past it, and assumed a new one in its turn. At daybreak the rear guard was assailed by some Austrian hussars and horse artillery, who took a few prisoners, but beyond this no loss was sustained; the two columns united and crossed the Mincio at Goito, were they met Sonnaz's corps, who, however, was immediately ordered back to Volta, which position it was for the present to maintain, so as to cover the march of the Piedmontese army from that side.

(To be Continued).

FRANCO-SARDINIAN ALLIANCES.

WHEN, during the Crimean war, the King of Sardinia joined the allied armies then waging war against Russia, we all remember with how much consideration he was looked upon in this country. He seemed to be more particularly connected with England than with her Gallic ally; indeed it was pretty generally believed that no very friendly feeling existed between the French and Sardinian armies in the Crimea. When Victor Emmanuel visited London he was received with something very like enthusiasm. Fêtes were made for him, and addresses presented to him, with a good will and deference, to which the sovereign of a small state could not *per se* lay claim. But public sympathy was enlisted in his favour. A large class of the English people regarded the King of Sardinia with a patronizing friendliness; they looked on him as a protegé of England, being, as they thought, the representative of constitutional monarchy in Italy. Magnified, as it were by the combined influence of these circumstances, Victor Emmanuel occupied a larger space in the public eye than he was entitled to by his actual political dimensions. Through the influence of England, Sardinia was represented at the Congress of Paris. Her presence, as was well known, was by no means desired by the continental powers. The consideration at that time shown to the King of Sardinia was mainly owing to the fact of his being the ally of England. He was her petted favourite. And so we all cherished Victor Emmanuel, and propped him up as a small prince needed to be propped, when striving to take place beside monarchs of the first magnitude.

The taking of Sebastopol terminated the warfare in the Crimea, and soon after we saw friendships springing up between those who shortly before had stood in battle array against each other. Not only did the French and Russian Emperors forget their difference, but, in the popular phraseology of the day, the soldiers of the two armies commenced to fraternize. Like the gentleman in the play, who declared he never liked a man so well as after he had fought him, the mutual affection of the two Emperors seemed to have acquired zest from the previous exchange of hostilities.

Things went on in this happy train between the two Imperial eagles, but Sardinia was not yet smiled on by her mighty neighbour. We have said that she owed her place at the Paris conference to the influence of England, and there is no exaggeration in saying that she was mainly sustained in her political position by the moral support she received from this country.

But the day arrived when things changed for Sardinia. Victor Emmanuel was taken into favour at the Tuilleries, and the friendship between the two sovereigns was sealed by a matrimonial alliance, the King of Sardinia giving his daughter in marriage to the cousin of the Emperor. Soon the merry peal of the wedding bells was drowned in the noisy clang of the war tocsin, but the banner that was unfurled before invading armies bore the sunny inscription of freedom. It was in behalf of suffering Italy that the generous

feelings of the Emperor Napoleon were awakened, and Victor Emmanuel, wafted aloft on the strong wing of the Gallic eagle, was to become master of the fair plains of Lombardy, and perchance of still more extended domains. But all Italy, even to the shores of the Adriatic, was to be released from foreign rule and foreign influences. Italy should belong to the Italians, and her great emancipator protested that he sought for himself no territorial aggrandizement—he came as the champion of Italy, and the friend of Victor Emmanuel. These glorious tidings called forth, even to the most latent spark, the fire of Italian patriotism, and Victor Emmanuel stood forth, in the eyes of Europe, a representative man. He was the incarnation of constitutional liberty in Italy; he, by the aid of his powerful and generous brother-in-arms, was to restore to his country her ancient rights; he was, in short, to give Italy to the Italians. Victor Emmanuel was to do all this, for though the French troops outnumbered immeasurably the Sardinian, and as the success of the campaign must necessarily depend on the exertions of the former, still as the Emperor Napoleon repudiated all idea of personal enrichment, Victor Emmanuel was plainly the man who, by the aid of his ally, was to confer great benefits on his country.

And then the French army entered on the campaign. Victory followed victory, the Austrians fought bravely, so much greater the glory of their conqueror. But they had a generous victor to deal with, for it was from him that the first overtures of peace proceeded. And the two Emperors met tête à tête, untrammelled by the presence of ministers or secretaries. The result of this interview was announced by Napoleon III. in a telegram to his empress, the first line of which ran:—"Peace has been concluded between the Emperor of Austria and me." And Victor Emmanuel, in whose behalf such mighty things had been undertaken, where was he? His existence as a contracting power is ignored. It is true, he is to have Lombardy, but it has not been ceded to him; it has been given up to the French emperor, and Victor Emmanuel receives his accession of territory from the hands of Napoleon. This looks as if Sardinia were only the nominee of France, and the Emperor, we now learn, finds it prudent to keep an army of 50,000 men in Lombardy. He seeks no territorial aggrandizement, it is true, but there are rumours that Savoy is becoming discontented with the rule of Piedmont, and wishes to become incorporated with France. We all know that one of the earliest fruits of French influence in Piedmont during the first revolution was the absorption of Savoy under the title of "Department of Mont Blanc."

And now the question arises, what will be the result of French interference in the affairs of Italy? None wishes better to the cause of Italian freedom than we do. Enjoying the blessings of constitutional liberty ourselves, we should be glad to see all as happy as we. But it seems certain that there is in some races, in some peoples, an aptitude, so to speak, for certain forms of government. The conditions for political well-being seem to vary in different nations, and each people can best solve for itself the problem of what these conditions are. Tuscany has taken the initiative amongst the

newly freed Italian States, and shows a capability for self-government which we trust will be allowed time for development.

But we might ask whether Victor Emmanuel's position has bettered by the changes that have been made, and whether it is likely to be improved. Supposing the King of Sardinia to be the untrammelled ruler of his new possessions, the part he will have to perform does not appear an easy one. Doubts are already entertained as to the possibility of amalgamating the different nationalities of the States over which he has been placed. And these 50,000 French soldiers in Lombardy, for what purpose are they to be employed? Where there is so much uncertainty, there is large room for conjecture. Should Sardinia derive no greater benefit from her present alliance with France than she has done from her former ones, Victor Emmanuel will have little cause to rejoice. We propose to give a succinct account of these alliances, and of the circumstances that led to them.

When the political troubles, which terminated so fatally for Louis XVI., commenced in France, that monarch, a prisoner in Paris, implored the interference of the other monarchs of Europe. It was the common cause of royalty; and the Emperor of Germany, the King of Sardinia, and the King of Spain formed a treaty with the object of aiding the King of France. Large forces were to be assembled. The Emperor of Germany was to send 30,000 men to the frontiers of Flanders; 15,000 soldiers of the Germanic body were to advance towards Alsace; 15,000 Swiss were to appear on the frontier of Franche Conte; 15,000 Piedmontese on the borders of Dauphiné, and the King of Spain undertook to collect 20,000 men on the Pyrenees. These five armies, thus advancing on different frontiers of France, were to unite with any of the French who still continued loyal to their king. These Allies reckoned at least on the neutrality of England, though they received an intimation that, as Elector of Hanover, the King of England would lend his support to the Allies. It was agreed that, in the following June, a protestation should be issued by the Princes of the house of Bourbon, and this was to be followed by a manifesto from the Allies. It was further declared that the object in assembling these troops, was to terrify the French people into submission to their king.

The contingent of 15,000 furnished by the Piedmontese seems a large proportion for so small a state, but in fact the army of the King of Sardinia consisted at that time of some of the best disciplined troops in Europe. The King could bring into the field, 30,000 infantry and 3,500 horse, besides these, the country could furnish 15,000 militia. As these soldiers were for the most part mountaineers, and well acquainted with the fastnesses of their native mountains, they would be able to oppose the passage over the Alps of an army far superior to them in numerical strength.

The King of Sardinia took a very prominent place amongst the Allies. Besides his sympathy with the royal prisoner of France, he saw symptoms in the conduct of his own subjects that served to give an impulse to his conduct. Amongst the people of Italy, none expressed a stronger sympathy with the French revolutionary prin-

ciples than some of the inhabitants of Piedmont. If other Italian States felt galled by their rulers, and caught up the echo of the great cry of political freedom, which resounded throughout France, still none showed stronger inclination to adopt the principles of the revolutionists than some subjects of the King of Sardinia. Jacobin clubs were already established in Savoy, and the King, understanding perfectly well the dangers to royalty involved in the spread of Jacobin principles, used every exertion in aid of the Bourbon cause.

The geographical position of Piedmont, which makes her the natural guardian of the Alpine passes, gives her an importance to which her extent could not entitle her, whilst it exposes her to all the dangers that must arise to a small state situated between two powerful neighbours. She is by these circumstances constantly forced to maintain a military attitude. The French Republic, appreciating these advantages, and aware of the favor that republican principles found in Savoy, proposed to form an alliance with the King of Sardinia. The King refused, and a French army, commanded by General Montesquiou, entered Savoy. The invading forces met with rapid success. The whole district as far as Mont Cenis was soon in possession of the French, the Piedmontese were repulsed, and Savoy being subdued, they next turned their arms against Nice. A land and naval force were simultaneously directed against the place, the people within showed signs of discontent, and the commander of the garrison, who had only two thousand men under his command, was obliged to retire. Nice fell into the hands of the French, and the use they made of their victory was not very encouraging to their Italian partisans. Though the people had shown the most friendly feeling towards the French, yet when the latter obtained possession of the town they plundered and burned the houses and put thousands of the inhabitants to death. It is true these crimes were committed by an unbridled soldiery, in opposition to the commands of their general, and it cannot be denied that the Convention instituted a Commission of Inquiry to ascertain the amount of loss sustained by the Italians. But it is one of the greatest misfortunes of war that the outrages perpetrated by a licentious army are such, even independent of the loss of life, for which no reparation can be made. The first fruits of the Italian campaign were, that in the course of a few weeks, Piedmont lost Savoy and Nice, her army was repulsed, and her strength paralyzed.

We have said that revolutionary principles had taken deep root in Savoy. The Jacobin clubs established there threw off branch societies throughout the country, democratic opinions obtained a decided ascendancy, a National Convention assembled at Chambery, where kingly rule, tithes, and the privileges of orders were renounced, deputations from all the clubs were sent to Paris, where the Government received them warmly, and within a month Savoy was incorporated with France as the department of Mont Blanc; Nice was soon after absorbed under the title of the Department of the Maritime Alps, and Monaco soon followed.

The King of Sardinia had no reason to congratulate himself on

the effects of French influence in his dominions. After the execution of King Louis, Russia and Great Britain entered into an alliance, by which they bound themselves to carry on, by every means in their power, the war against France. Great Britain also formed a treaty with Sardinia, by which the latter power was to receive an annual subsidy of £200,000 during the continuance of the war, in return for which she was to keep up an army of 50,000 men, and the English Government, moreover, engaged to procure for Sardinia the entire restoration of the territory she had lost.

The King of Sardinia was playing for a large stake. He had already lost Nice and Savoy; and we find in the early part of 1793 a republican army, 25,000 strong, entering Sardinia. They were opposed by a force of 40,000, composed of Piedmontese and Austrians. Some engagements took place rather to the disadvantage of Sardinia, but the results were not important.

In 1796 things had assumed a still more serious aspect. The greatest amongst the crowned heads of Europe were leagued against revolutionary France. Had the Allies acted with vigour and unanimity from the beginning, it is very probable that the republican cause would never have gained the preponderance it afterwards attained. The Emperor of Austria, indeed, was actively preparing for war, and had sent fresh troops into Piedmont to support the King of Sardinia. Russia promised largely, but had as yet sent no troops. Prussia professed to maintain an armed neutrality; in fact, she was too busy with the spoils she had lately acquired in Poland to lend any active assistance against a foe by whom she was not immediately threatened. England had spoken plainly enough; of her intentions there was no doubt.

France, then, was at war with all Europe, but the Directory, unintimidated, was planning fresh conquests. Germany was to be invaded from the Rhine, Austria was to be attacked on her own soil, and the King of Sardinia was to be compelled either to make peace or submit to the loss of his dominions. But the invasion of Italy was the darling project of the Directory. The conquest of Lombardy would be a severe blow to Austria and Northern Italy, won either by conquest or alliance, the rest of the peninsula might be easily subdued. General Bonaparte was chosen for the command of the Italian army, and as the projected invasion was in a great measure the result of his own advice, his joy at the appointment was irrepressible. He anticipated the most complete success.

With 30,000 soldiers, ill-provided either with clothes or food, Bonaparte was opposed to an army of 60,000 men, of whom 20,000 were Piedmontese, the remainder Austrians. The destitution and misery of the French army seemed to have reached an almost incredible excess. Soldiers without shoes, without food; officers not receiving during entire years more pay than about twenty francs a week, and not a horse for the staff officers. An effort was made in the financial department, and an advance of four louis was made to each general of division to enable him to prepare for the coming campaign.

But privations and destitution only served as stimuli to the famished soldiers. The rich plain of Italy would furnish abundant provisions, and her noble cities offered abundant plunder. Such was the substance of the general's address when he told his soldiers their country owed them much, but could not reward their courage and their constancy; but the wealth of Italy was laid before them, they had only to grasp it.

The eloquence of the commander enkindled the courage of the soldiers; they were ready to dare anything; and dissensions amongst the enemy, who could not agree upon the plan of action, were not less favourable to the designs of the French general than the enthusiasm of his own troops. After the most masterly manœuvring, Bonaparte succeeded in his design of separating the Austrian from the Piedmontese forces, the conquest of each became easier; confusion prevailed all through Piedmont—the King received such contradictory counsels from his allies that he knew not what resolution to take. The English and the Austrians advised him to shut himself up in Turin, and send his army beyond the Po; they expatiated largely on the danger of exposing his people to the corrupting influence of revolutionary principles, and recommended that he should yield the three fortresses of Tortona, Alessandria, and Valenga to the Austrian general, who should then be able to defend himself in the triangle these fortresses form with the bank of the Po.

The situation of the Sardinian King was most perplexing. He dreaded the revolutionary French, but he feared as much, or perhaps more, his powerful and ambitious neighbours of Austria. He could not agree to put them in possession of three important fortresses. In this perplexity he resolved to negotiate with the French. Bonaparte was not empowered to make peace, but he granted an armistice, though he imposed conditions that looked more like the dictum of a conqueror. He demanded that the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alessandria should be given up, with all the stores they contained. These supplies he needed for the support of his army, but he promised they should be paid for by the French government. It was also stipulated that the Piedmontese roads should be left free for the passage of French troops; that the Sardinian army should be dispersed in the fortresses. Bonaparte's object in making this last condition was to secure his rear. He had the wisdom to perceive that the reduction of Piedmont would be a work of great time and difficulty, if, indeed, it could be entirely effected. His opinions on the subject were not in accordance with the wishes of the Directory, who had given orders for the total subjugation of Piedmont; but many reasons, founded on actual observation, induced Napoleon to adopt a different line of conduct. Nor was his tact as a diplomatist less conspicuous than his skill as a general. In his interview with the Sardinian minister and other members of the court, he contrived, without committing himself by any promise, to awaken hopes in their mind that Piedmont's best interests would be secured by an alliance with France, whilst Austria was represented as her natural foe. But it was whilst feeding the hopes thus awakened that he wrote in the following terms to the Directory:—"The King of Sardinia has surrendered at

discretion, given up three of his strongest fortresses, and the half of his dominions. If you do not choose to accept his submission, but resolve to dethrone him, you must amuse him for a few weeks, and give me warning. I will get possession of Valenga and march upon Turin. On the other hand, I shall impose a contribution of some millions on the Duke of Parma, and detach twelve thousand men to Rome as soon as I have beaten Beaulieu, and driven him across the Adige; and when I am assured, you will conclude peace with the King of Sardinia, and strengthen me by the army of Kellerman. As to Genoa, by all means oblige it to pay fifteen millions."

Within a fortnight a treaty of peace was concluded between the King of Sardinia and the Republic. The King renounced the alliance he had formed with Great Britain and the other allied powers, and gave to the French Savoy, Nice, and all of Piedmont west of the Alps, granting besides, as we have seen, a free passage through his dominions to the French troops.

This alliance with Piedmont was essential to the carrying out of the designs of France in Italy. Without a certainty of the neutrality of Piedmont, any attempt at the invasion of Southern Italy would have been chimerical; and when Napoleon advanced through the peninsula, marking his way by a succession of conquests, he owed to the alliance with Piedmont the safety with which he ventured into a foreign country. It may indeed be objected that Sardinia fell from her first promises; but let us remember that the position of a small state in the vicinity of two powerful neighbours is by no means enviable. If they quarrel, and she sides with either, she provokes the resentment of the other; if the party to whom she has allied herself is defeated, she is exposed to the rage of the conqueror; if, on the contrary, she be on the winning side, she soon feels she has been used as a cat's-paw in the struggle, and that her ultimate fate may be dismemberment or annexation.

And such was the result of Piedmont's alliance with the French Republic. We have seen how useful this alliance had been to Bonaparte, as it gave to the Italian army a base of operations in Italy, and by delivering into their possession three important fortresses, made them masters of the Alpine passes. But Victor Amadeus, who had severed himself from the Allies, found that those to whom he had transferred his friendship were determined on his downfall when their purpose should be served. The French were now the actual masters of Piedmont, and Victor Amadeus was soon made to feel that his sovereignty had dwindled to a mere shadow. He was subjected to the severest mortifications by his new allies; his power in his own dominions was ignored, his country was traversed in every direction by French troops, of whose approach he received no other intimation than a command to supply their wants; and, to add to his annoyance, the spread of revolutionary opinions in his dominions every day increased under the protection of French authority.

At length some of the Sardinian provinces revolted; the French ambassador would fain persuade the King to pardon the insurgents

whilst he at the same time endeavoured to induce the King to give up the citadel of Turin to the French.

The King was in a truly wretched position. Convinced that his rebellious subjects were encouraged by his perfidious allies, he still dared not declare his belief. Indeed, the French authorities made no secret of their predilections, for they openly took part with the insurgents; and when the rebels were defeated by the Piedmontese soldiers, the Directory showed their true disposition by pretending that a conspiracy to murder all the French in Piedmont had been discovered, and if the King wished to prove he was not an accomplice in the plot, he would instantly deliver up the citadel of Turin. Placed in so difficult a position, the King was obliged to yield. He yielded the fortress, and was thenceforth little better than a prisoner in his own palace, where he was surrounded by French guards. Foreign ambassadors, seeing this state of things, begged of their governments that they might be recalled, and now the poor King was left unprotected in the midst of his false friends. He was forced to dismiss his ministers, both civil and military, because of accusations brought against them, and the republican generals arranged everything as they pleased at Turin.

But at length the time came when even the shadow of authority was taken from Victor Amadeus. He was accused by the French of having, in a secret correspondence with Vienna, expressed a hope that he might soon be delivered from his new allies. For this offence he was fined £320,000. On another occasion, when accused of some imaginary transgression, he was obliged to provide a contingent of eight thousand men: at another time, a pretext was found for demanding the surrender of all the royal arsenals; in short, the unhappy King was completely the victim of the ill-faith and ambition of the French government. He was ultimately obliged to resign all his continental dominions, which fell to the share of his perfidious allies. Under the shelter of night, and favoured by the protection of Talleyrand, then French minister at the Court of Turin, he retired to the island of Sardinia. General Grouchy took possession of the royal treasury and all the fortified places in Piedmont. A provisional government was formed, whose members were all of the most violent republican opinions, and a proclamation was issued, saying that any noble found engaged in an insurrectionary movement should be sent to France, and half of his property confiscated.

Such was the disastrous position of the King of Sardinia. In 1802 the First Consul, by a public decree, annexed Piedmont to the Republic. These were the fruits Sardinia reaped from her alliance with France. As a modern historian says: "Thus Sardinia, which was the first of the European states that submitted to the power of Napoleon, which, after a fortnight's struggle, opened its gates to the youthful conqueror, and had since, through every change of fortune, remained faithful to his cause, was rewarded for its early submission and long fidelity by being the first to be destroyed; and the keys of Italy were placed without opposition in the hands of the French Republic.

Peel concurs with the commissioners on the point, and will be ready to consider applications from regiments for the supply of the necessary apparatus, and for the hire of cricket-grounds, &c.

"B. HAWES."

We used the words "pretending to institute" advisedly, for it is notorious that half the inquiries are instituted, and the consequent circular issued to allay some public feeling, and without any intent to remove whatever existing evil may be under agitation. Witness, for instance, the numerous commissions which the state of our army, as exposed by the Crimean war, brought into existence, crowned by that at Chelsea. No one who pays attention to these things can imagine for a moment that the least good has resulted from any one of these inquiries, or that, in the event of another war, the like evils and blunders would not again prevail, and with like impunity to their authors, and for the simple reason given above—namely, that the object of these commissions was to allay public feeling, and not to discover and eradicate the evil, because in so doing the punishment of those who more immediately caused the disasters of the war could not have been effected without laying bare matters which would have deeply compromised the whole of our military system. But letting alone byegones, it would really appear upon the surface that an attempt is about to be made to do something more in this instance than appease the public mind.

We do not, however, give the authorities the credit of having devised these means for the suppression of the crime above alluded to, knowing that the order has been issued solely in deference to the report of the sanitary commissioners, which, while assigning four causes as militants against the health of the troops, lays great strength on "the want of proper exercise;" and rightly, because it is the only one in which the soldiers have not the advantage over the class from which they are drawn. The other three—"night duty, intemperance, and bad air,"—though doubtless in themselves most detrimental to health, are experienced by other trades and callings, in a far higher degree, and without producing half the sickness prevailing in the army. "It is, therefore," to use the words of Mr. Neison, "to the physical conditions which affect the respiratory organs," which he elsewhere describes as being markedly destroyed by the sort of exercise the foot soldier undergoes, "that we must look for a solution of the problem, as to the health of the army."

To return, however, to the circular. With whatever object it may have been issued, if energetically acted upon, and the instructions contained therein honestly carried out, it will, we are convinced, abolish, to a great extent, the cause of the crime of desertion, and that is the only way to permanently abolish the crime itself. This we think we shall be able to demonstrate, and have undertaken the task solely to show, if possible, to all concerned, the necessity of not allowing the matter to rest here.

Many have taken up the pen to give their ideas, and offer suggestions on this subject, but there has been, we think, a want of depth in all of them—a desire, as it were, to counteract, and not eradicate, the disease.

The greater part have had reference to the recruiting system. One proposes raising greatly the reward to bringers of recruits; another suggests doing away with the employment of pensioners on the recruiting service; another writes that, owing to the double bounty, and consequent double reward to recruiting serjeants, the militia staff frequently enlist a man for the line the day after they have enrolled him in the militia. We are ourselves of opinion that the amount of bounty offered, and the number of recruiting parties, we may say systems—in short, the inefficiency of this branch of the service, first opened the rogues' eyes to the possibility of getting a living by a systematic course of desertion and re-enlistment. But the methods proposed not striking at the root of the evil, if attempted, must fall far short of effecting the desired result.

Others have dwelt upon the necessity and degrees of punishment: one proposes to punish deserters by forcing them to serve abroad for a term of years. This, if carried out, would have the effect of making all regiments on foreign service penal corps. Where could officers be found for such? or where indeed men—save the convicts in question? or if found, what *esprit de corps* could possibly exist in them? Every infantry regiment in its turn would thus be ruined, and then what becomes of the service? The writer could scarcely imply by his suggestion that there should be a certain number of regiments abroad composed entirely of convicts; for to put arms in the hands of a body of a thousand lawless men would hardly be deemed advisable by the most strenuous supporters of the ticket-of-leave system. It is manifest, however, that, with reference to the punishment of such delinquents, the authorities do not take sufficiently stringent measures to deter them. For instance, a sapper, James Lloyd, was tried in the spring of the year at Chatham, for deserting a second time from the royal engineers, and sentenced to *one hundred and twelve days' imprisonment*. Supposing this to have been a first offence, and destitute of aggravating circumstances, such as a re-enlistment into another corps for the sake of the bounty, and that the crime of desertion in the army was small, the punishment would have been in no wise severe; but when we see the pitch to which this crime had then reached in the service, and looking to James Lloyd's character, find that he, after receiving the high bounty usually paid to recruits in the royal engineers, on his first enlistment, in 1858, almost immediately deserted, re-enlisting into the 60th rifles, thereby defrauding the public of another bounty; that he, on being convicted of insubordination there, gave himself up as a deserter, was tried as such, and suffered, in accordance with the sentence of the court, eighty-four days' imprisonment (he would probably have had fifty lashes tacked on to his punishment had he been tried for insubordination); that, having at the expiration of this imprisonment been forwarded to his proper corps, he immediately re-deserted, and again attempted to enlist into another corps. We must aver that the punishment awarded—112 days' imprisonment—for this second desertion, was not only insufficient, but directly an encouragement to a renewal of the offence. What can be expected from a man of this stamp? Surely the most sanguine

of moral reformers could hardly hope to make an effective soldier of him. By retaining him in the service great expense is incurred, and the injury to the regiment to which he belongs, by the force of bad example, is incalculable. Ten years penal servitude would not only not have been too severe a punishment for the man himself, but it was absolutely necessary, for example's sake, to punish, and at the same time get rid of, so worthless a fellow.

We have heard other suggestions too, having reference neither to the improvement of the recruiting service, nor to the inadequacy of punishment, one of which, emanating from an excellent and experienced officer, is sufficiently practical to deserve notice. He suggests, in order to immediately check this disgraceful trade, that every officer and soldier should be indelibly marked by a round black spot, about the fifth of an inch in circumference, on the left arm, four inches above the wrist; officers, in order that the mark should not be invidious; and men, for the apparent reason, that no deserter could enlist a second time without detection. Many will shake their heads at this idea, call it barbarous, and other hard names, but upon reflection, and a glance at their wives' or sisters' ears, they will rescind them, and, we think, admit that the mark would be but a badge of honourable service, differing little, to our mind, from the external badges common to all professions. Men are not ashamed of such; on the contrary, the Prime Minister holds himself more erect than usual when clothed in his robes of office, from the feeling that the better portion of his cotemporaries are envying him his position; the weight of the chain which the Lord Mayor so conspicuously wears, but helps to convince him the more of the weight of his own consequence; the Life Guardsman listens with pleasure, as he canters down "the row" at noon to the clanking of his steel scabbard; the soldiers grumble not at having to shave their whiskers to regulation; and the late order, making it compulsory for every officer and man to wear as much hair on their upper lips as they can coax Dame Nature to supply them with, was received with universal satisfaction throughout the army. But enough of examples; we have only adduced them to show that no uproar would be created in the service by such a decree as that proposed; in short, that the method suggested is practicable.

One thing is certain, and that is that a stop must be put to this unsoldierlike and ruinous crime. Full well we know that to permanently prevent such imposture the service must be made an honourable as well as an attractive one, and this can only be effected by a grand alteration in our military system, which at present is little better than an ill-organized swindle. Throughout there is a total absence of all honesty, and *here is the real root of the evil.* The system as it now stands may be divided into three classes, under the following heads:—

1st. Deception of recruits.

2nd. Want of consideration for (we had nearly written—ill treatment of) soldiers.

3rd. Neglect of pensioners and discharged men.

On the first of these heads—"Deception of recruits"—we will not dilate, because the shortcomings of the recruiting service have become so apparent that the military authorities themselves are forced to acknowledge their existence; indeed the Secretary for War has publicly promised to revise the system.

On the second—"Want of consideration for soldiers"—sufficient could be said to fill a volume, but as this paper is only, as before stated, to draw the attention of those more immediately responsible to the good effect which a just development of the "Horse Guards Circular" must have on the mental and physical health, and consequently comfort and efficiency of our soldiers, we shall content ourselves with merely pointing out a few instances of such want of consideration for them as should cause ordinary honesty and justice to blush.

1st. Why should soldiers abroad be compelled to pay for the freight, insurance, &c., of the necessaries supplied from home, at an increased rate on their value of, in our nearest colony, 11 per cent?

2nd. Why should they be paid in a manner so obnoxious to their feelings, so insulting to the reason of rational beings?

3rd. And this is particularly appropriate to the present matter—why have the authorities hitherto so stedfastly set their faces against all amusements or attractive employment for the men in their leisure hours? "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy;" but when Jack grows up to be a man he becomes less submissive, and if play be still beyond his reach, he seizes the only substitute within it—drink. Although the Sanitary Commissioners have failed to point out the intimate connection between drink and no play, or that by the adoption of their suggestion with reference to gymnastics the temptation to drink would be lessened, and thus two birds be killed with one stone, two causes assigned by them for the ill health of the troops, can be, to a great extent, removed by one act, yet such is readily deducible from the evidence taken before them, as anyone will acknowledge who takes the trouble to peruse it. There is little occasion for this, however, since all know that the fruit of idleness is intemperance.

We are aware of an instance where an officer proposed, at his own and brother officers' expense, to erect a gymnasium in a vacant corner of a barrack, but was told the thing was impossible, because unprecedented. Allusion should here be made to the following paragraphs in the Queen's Regulations:—

"Cricket-grounds and fives-courts, *having been constructed at the public expense for the exercise and amusement of the troops, officers commanding regiments and depots are reminded they* form part of the barrack establishment, and, consequently, the expense of repairing any injury done to them will be charged as barrack damages.

"These cricket-grounds and fives-courts are under the immediate charge of the barrack master, who, however, cannot be expected to protect them effectually, unless he is assisted by the authority of the commanding officer and the good feeling of the troops

themselves, for whose amusement and recreation they have been formed." *

If we erase the words fives-courts from this, we should like to ask what truth there is in it at all? Where are these cricket-grounds? Any one reading the above would of course suppose they were attached to every barrack, or, at any rate, to the principal ones, and doubtless such is the impression intended to be conveyed. What, then, will the public think when we declare that, having visited some thirty quarters at home and abroad, we have only seen *one*, which was made at the expense of the officers who were quartered there first, and has been maintained at the cost of their successors ever since, without the smallest aid from the Government, further than the permission to use the land. The story goes that when the Government decided to build a barrack at this station, the agent selected its present site because he was informed that the town in the immediate vicinity was spreading rapidly, and in that direction, a circumstance calculated to raise the value of any superfluous land the Government might invest in. It is needless to add that he met the fate of other Government agents—he was duped. The town was truly increased, but all the new buildings have been erected on the opposite side. Thus the piece is used as a cricket-ground by the troops because the Government cannot part with it on advantageous—should we not, perhaps, say any—terms.

But, because we have been so unfortunate as not to have seen other cricket-grounds, it does not follow that they exist not, but such is naturally the impression made upon us. One thing, however, we think we can safely assert, and that is, that whatever land may have been allotted by the Government for this purpose, no *cricket ground*, as stated in the regulation, has been made by them, or any further assistance given for that end. If there be any such, they are only, we may rest assured, there to dupe the public into a belief that they are general, even as the large cloaks hanging in every sentry-box or nook convenient at St. James's and Buckingham Palaces lead the passers by to imagine that the boon is common to all soldiers. Little dream they that in our North American provinces, where the cold and damp exceed anything ever experienced by the residents in this isle, the sentry, on his limited and slippery midnight path, with the thermometer perhaps at five degrees, has no covering over his red tunic, save the old ordinary soldier's great coat, deemed of late insufficient even in this mild climate. We need say no more on this head. The want of consideration—ay, honesty—is too apparent; and until there be honesty on the part of the employer, we must expect dishonesty on that of the employed. What is more common than to hear a well-educated, well-bred man chuckle over having "done the Government," as he terms it? To what can this be attributed but to the fact—for fact it is—that he is triumphing over an enemy conquered with his own weapons. The soldiers and Government labourers have few opportunities of this sort, but readily and naturally do the unprincipled of their number

* The words in italics have been omitted in the later editions, a twinge of conscience having, we suppose, seized the compiler.

take advantage of them when they do offer. Witness the trade of desertion and fraudulent re-enlistment we are now deploring. And what of those possessing principles? asks the reader. They bear and forbear till tolerance can no further go, and then they "strike," as at Woolwich lately, and force their masters into the terms which justice, if not a sense of their own dignity, ought to have anticipated. Or, they bring a civil action, as the Army Works Corps, and compel restitution from the Government by its own laws. Or, they are driven to meeting, as the local European force in India, to gain their just demands, thereby causing the representation of the most deplorable and pitiable picture we can conceive—that of a great nation fearing to visit the most heinous of offences with the punishment its own laws have apportioned to it—in short, unable to sustain its own dignity. In fact, a dealing with government is looked on much in the same light as a barter in horse flesh. It is well allowed that in this you may "do" your own father, and why? Because you are aware that the old gentleman is trying to overreach you. And this is just the case with the Government and its servants. Again we repeat that, until there be honesty on the side from whence it should emanate, it cannot be hoped for on the other.

These being our sentiments, therefore, the promulgation of the Horse Guards Circular is hailed by us with unfeigned satisfaction, as holding forth the hope, that more consideration for the soldier's comfort may, with the hearty co-operation of the more responsible officers, be expected for the future. When it is considered, that all the vice and crime in the army arise from drink, to which the soldier is driven by the absence of all resource in the barrack square, this order is indeed of happy augury. Libraries there are, it is true; but on the average only one eighth of an infantry regiment subscribes to them, and this not from any distaste to reading, but from sheer incapacity. Even supposing, however, that all soldiers could take advantage of this boon, it would not in itself be sufficient employment for the men, and still less when the naturally excitable and physical temperament of the soldier is remembered. Reading is all very well on a wet day, or in the evening of a fine day, but we must ourselves own to the difficulty—ay, indeed, impossibility—of setting to any sedentary occupation, with the bright and glorious sun shining in at the window, and bidding our physical nature war against our mental. It always ends, with us, in a complete victory for the former. Books and papers are laid aside, and the cricket bat, fishing rod, or gun, usurps dominion. Now our feelings on this score are not singular, indeed we are aware that among soldiers it is the very reverse which is singular. Some, do what you will for them, will prefer to loll about the streets or lanes in the vicinity of their barracks, till in sheer ennui they enter a public house; even as some officers, with a sickening lassitude, shew themselves at the hour of fashionable promenade, and drivel away the rest of their time in the billiard or whist room. Little good can be expected from either, but harm may, for bad example, without any counteracting influence, such as is now so happily proposed, makes many

converts. The first step towards a better state of things having now been taken, it only remains to be seen whether generals and commanding officers have the real interests of their men at heart, or only think how best to obtain their own selfish ends. Doubtless it would be more agreeable to the Secretary for War if none of these officers made application for moneys, or if those that did, would, by some ingenious inuendos, give a loophole for refusal. But let us hope that, in this, the Secretary for War may be disappointed, and the true interests of the army, and consequently the nation, be attained. Depend upon it, oh, ye worshipers of the War Office Mammon, a clear conscience is far preferable to a field marshal's baton.

On the third head, "Neglect of pensioners and discharged men," we would first denounce the unjust proposal of a writer in one of the periodicals to do entirely away with pensions. We know that such a course would not only be, in the highest degree, impolitic and injudicious, but opposed to all Christian principles. Neither is it a fact, we are glad to say, that such is the practice in civil life. Does a gentleman, having a declining servant, who has served him faithfully for ten or a dozen years, pay him his wages, and allow him to crawl to the workhouse? Does he even allow his horse, under similar circumstances, to descend to a cab? We thank God, no! Then how much rather should a Christian nation exercise—not generosity—justice towards its servants. But, apart from Christian principles and arguments of right and wrong, is it not most impolitic in a nation, to breed distrust and discontent in the minds of its people by any measure? And what sensible man can doubt the inevitable result of the one we now denounce. We are too morally sure that, beside the contentment of our soldiers, to render recruiting permanently successful, the comfortable old pensioner in his native village must be the bait. We attach the greatest importance to this, from the conviction that a recruiting party, marching through a village in which one or more pensioners are wiling away the few remaining years of their lives in ease and contentment, would have greater numerical success, and obtain a far steadier class of men, that day, than one billeted there, as at present, does in a twelvemonth. Indeed, we are of opinion that a placard to the effect that a few young men were wanted for the — regiment, would produce the desired result. It is, at any rate, worthy the consideration of the authorities, whether great economy in the recruiting service might not be effected by the just allotment of pensions.

What leads young gentlemen to take up the profession of arms, but that they may hear their fathers or relatives extol it, and see the position they take in society in virtue of their uniform. Does the labourer in his country village hear like encomiums on the service from the old discharged soldier who lives there from hand to mouth, a plague to himself and a curse to the hamlet? or does he envy him his position? Alas! no; the veteran can only recount the debauched scenes of his early life, some seventeen years experience of cells, defaulters' drill, and may be the lash, and then when health forsook him, as needs it must under such circumstances, he tells us of his discharge to his native place in a worse condition than

when he enlisted. Is it to be wondered at that well-conditioned lads shrink from witnessing such scenes, or incurring such treatment?

Do not let it be supposed, however, that all men turn out badly in the army, and that none live through these trials, brought on by maladministration, without becoming contaminated. We know very many really good men who, after long years of service, have obtained their discharge with a first rate and well-deserved character; but what has been their fate? It grieves us to tell it. A simple instance will suffice. Happening to spend a few days lately in a small country town, we came on an old soldier, almost crippled from chronic rheumatism, produced by continual exposure during a service of sixteen years and upwards. He had been discharged as unfit for active service, on the commencement of hostilities with Russia, on a pension of *ninepence a day*. He had been a man of excellent character; had three good conduct badges (the greatest number a man can obtain in that period of years), and an equal number of children, having married with the permission of his commanding officer. What was before this poor fellow but starvation? Fortunately an officer of his late regiment interested himself about him, and obtained for him the post of groom to a gentleman in the town; but as the poor man remarked to us, "How can I hope to keep a situation, for which I am becoming daily more unfit, and which even now, though my master makes everything as light as possible, is too much for me."

With this sad, but, alas, too true tale, we close this paper, sincerely trusting that the dawning of a new era in the soldier's life, which we hope we recognise in the oft-quoted circular, will grow into a full and bright reality, and that those in whose power the carrying out of the embodied measure lies, may be induced to do their duty, even as we have striven, in this feeble manner, to do ours.

LEGISLATION FOR INDIA.

How is it, we ask, that everything connected with India partakes of jobbery? How is it that a bill for determining the strength of the European local force for that country cannot be introduced at a time sufficiently early in the session to give it fair inquiry, but must be smuggled in, and India's requirements give way to grouse shooting? Why, may we ask, at this late hour, does the Secretary of State for India find it necessary to place the number of local troops beyond all doubt, and have that number legalized? Even by his own statement, as far back as 1853, the local army was raised to 24,000 men, including those on their passage out. The question as to the legality of that number never becoming practical. After the mutinies, the Government considered 24,000 as the legal limit, and as many as 25,500 had been consented to as an aggregate. If, then,

from 1853 to 1859 so large a force as 25,000 men was considered as not exceeding the legal limit of European local force for India, why is there a necessity for determining its legality now?

The question is yet pending whether there be any local army, and the report of the Army Reorganization Commission has been bandied about for further report between this country and India for the past six months. If, then, this question is unsettled, where, we ask, is the necessity for smuggling in this bill, and, in the words of the Secretary of State for India, "to legalize that which is a fact, not to legalize anything that was illegal, but to place the matter on a solid basis, and to remove all doubt."

It seems that suddenly it is feared that the number of 25,500 men may be exceeded, and to prevent this is the bill now brought forward; at any rate, we are told so, as "it by no means prejudged the question which might be raised about the Indian army, which must be the subject of a future decision."

All that read the Secretary of State for India's speech, indeed, many that heard, do not think the bill quite independent of any prejudging the future question of the army of India; nor are we quite sure that Sir C. Wood himself did not hope that the number of local troops, once legally fixed, would greatly tend to decide the question of local or general service. We are the more inclined to think that this was the case, from the few words spoken on "the disputed point," immediately following the previous statement.

The "disputed point," or, in other words, the having a local army at all in India, ought, as we before said, have been brought before this to the notice of the House of Commons, and should have received from the Secretary of State for India more "than a few words."

The uneasy feeling at present existing in the local force, its cause, and the best means for removal, deserved more than a few words; and should not have been dragged in with matters foreign to the subject. That it existed and exists is too sure to be doubtful; and its cause, if arising from want of loyalty in a local army, would be a sufficient reason for not perpetuating or sanctioning for any time such a force; but if the cause of this uneasy feeling arises from ill-treatment or want of consideration in the authorities in India, then, before further power was given to these authorities, or the present "legal force legalized," it would have been well to have had some investigation. The government of India is a puzzle,—however much it is ruined by misrule. Whatever may occur in that land, tending to bring discredit on the supreme government, appears to pass unnoticed. How happy ought to be the governor of such a land. No matter whether his financial arrangements lead to bankruptcy, he gets a marquisate, and a pension. No matter whether his cringing to a rebellious native army leads to mutiny and murder. No matter whether his unjust treatment of a European army leads to acts disloyal and disgraceful; he, the fortunate governor of this happy land, shall not be brought to account, but have also a step in the peerage, and greater powers for destruction given him.

Contrast this with the governor of a smaller and not improbably

worthless dependency, and how different is the treatment. In the latter each act is investigated, and its unhappy governor finds his place no bed of roses. For his misdeeds or short-comings there is no friendly Secretary of State to smuggle in little bills through the Commons House, or bring forward disagreeable matters at such times as there is no chance of investigation. For him there is no *thorough ignorance of the subject*, to cast a friendly shade over the past, and prevent good being done for the future. No. His small territory is known. The confusion is not too confounded; and for him neither promotion nor pension is awarded for doing that which he should not.

Having said this much on the method in which any investigation into the affairs of India is generally conducted, we shall proceed to comment on the causes of the late outbreak of ill feeling in the local European forces in India; and also "say a few words" on the necessity for a local army of Europeans in India.

Few who have been in India and served in any of the campaigns beginning with the relief of the Cabul prisoners, and ending with the relief of Lucknow, but must have observed that the local European forces of the late Company, either artillery or infantry, however short of the home army in absolute discipline, were nothing inferior in loyalty or courage, and wherever a hard fought battle had been gained, in it had served some of the European forces of the Company, vieing with their comrades of her Majesty's service in devotion and deeds of valour. Good service has been performed by these local troops. Indeed, better service has never been performed, even by that glorious army which stood before Sebastopol, and dug from the hard earth with frozen fingers the damp roots wherewith to parch the green coffee ration.

Something wrong, very wrong, must have occurred to make this local army lately so loyal. To make this army that stood almost alone before Delhi, that retook Benares and Allahabad, that quelled the revolt at Mooltan, that shared with their brethren of the home service the grand advance on Cawnpore, and the relief of Lucknow. Something, we repeat, must be wrong to make this army no longer loyal. To make this army so far forget its duty, its loyalty, its love for the land of birth, and of the Queen that reigns over that land, as to think of intrenching themselves, and ceasing to obey the orders of those put in authority over them. Were the cases of dissatisfaction isolated, then we would imagine the soldiers in the wrong; but when we see almost entire regiments standing out for what they term their rights, regiments that cared not, two years ago, whether they fought for Queen or Company, so long as England retained or regained her name—then we must believe that that army has a grievance; and such an one as should have been treated respectfully. They were soldiers. White soldiers, was the argument of an irresponsible governor, and as such not to be treated with persuasion or argument. A lawyer's opinion first, and failing this, the shot and bayonets of those who, erst as companions, stood shoulder to shoulder on the crumbling walls of the magazine at Delhi.

For these—white soldiers—it was sufficient to be told that the nent of India was transferred to the Crown, and with the

"osses," they were to be transferred also. What mattered it to an irresponsible governor that many of these soldiers had only been sworn to serve the Company, and that with the master the services of the man were probably lost? What mattered it that many of these men had chosen the Company's service in preference to her Majesty's, because of the many prizes for good conduct, and the few to share them? What mattered it that the advent of eighty thousand more soldiers made the prizes scarcer? What mattered it that a new style of discipline was established, which, being superior to their own, made their chances of obtaining promotion and appointments yet slighter? What mattered it that, until the sudden transfer of the Government, neither they nor their officers were fully recognized? The latter by courtesy, the former not at all; and when invalided home, or receiving ill-treatment at the India House, had no attention paid to their claims? What mattered it that a bounty had always been given on a man in her Majesty's service transferring his services; or even that the Prime Minister of England had said, that the men would be entitled to their discharge, or fresh bounty? All and each of these mattered not. The soldiers were white. They were few, could be overpowered, and pounds, shillings, and pence, were to be considered before the rights, expectations, or moderate requests of an army whose name will survive long after its detractors are gone.

As these men were heard to say, "Had we been niggers we should not have been treated in this way." Yes, indeed, had they been native soldiers, then would their wants have been conceded. Clemency Canning would have been the first to guarantee their rights, and neither should we have heard of "Delhi recovered for thirty-seven rupees, twelve annas," nor an order forcing half an army to resign and return, either to re-enlist or burden the parish; failing this to remain on, yielding unwilling service. This service being extracted from them through an inability to accept the terms of "return or serve."

To those men having families or in debt, serving under such terms cannot be considered optional.

For these local forces no soothing order is issued. For these no words of comfort, reminding them of how much they have done for the state, of how much that state is indebted to them. No promises of "extra batta" or increased pay if they will only be good enough to continue their services. No, not even a semi-severe order, wrapped up in regrets and threats, and ending with a prayer lest those to whom it is addressed should come to grief, and be shot for mutiny or rebellion. For such as these—white soldiers—there is no need for clemency. No need to direct their being forwarded under proper escort to Allahabad, or any other place near their houses, should they be so ridiculous as to rise and murder their officers and families.

That a local force is necessary for India we will now endeavour to prove; and putting aside all causes of irritation, such as we think we have shewn in the previous pages, we may safely assert that in loyalty, discipline, and usefulness, it will be second to none in her Majesty's service. At the time of the transfer of India to the Home

Government, it was stated that the terms on which the army was to be transferred, were, "the like pay, pensions, allowances, and privileges, and like advantages as regards promotion and otherwise, as if they had continued in the service of the said Company." Now, were there to be no local force, and all the present local army incorporated with the line for general service, faith would not, under such circumstances, be kept. For however pleasing the change might be to some of the late Company's officers having a little money, the option of serving in Canada, New Zealand, or England, still to those local officers without money, being incorporated with the line and its system of purchase, would be ruin. It would be impossible without a local army to continue the "like advantages as regards pay, promotion, &c., &c.;" and as these advantages have been promised by the people of Great Britain, it would, to say the least for it, be dishonorable to break that promise, simply because its fulfilment is disagreeable, and opposed to the wishes of a Horse Guard's clique.

For the better government of India, and for Oriental purposes generally, a local army is necessary, both on the score of economy and usefulness. An army continually being moved from one distant part of the earth to another would be much more expensive than one stationary. The passage-money of officers alone would be a large sum, and that of the men enormous. With locals, the passage-money of officers is avoided, and that of the men has to be paid but once, or, if invalided home, twice in a lifetime. The communication necessary to be kept up—not only with the Horse Guards, but the colonies generally, should the Indian army not be local—would be another very serious item of expenditure. The transfer of officers and men from India to Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, &c., would entail a separate staff, and various incidental expenses. So much for the economy question: and now for a few words on the usefulness of a local force.

To understand either the language of the inhabitants, the best method of preserving life, or the ways and habits of the natives of India, a long residence among them is necessary, and also a disposition on the part of aliens to consider the country as not improbably a home. This last never could be with officers and men only coming to the "beastly country" to be able to live on their pay, and living only in the hope that the day would arrive quickly on which the regiment might be ordered to a cooler land, or that they could have saved money enough to allow of an exchange. However much the inducement to learning the languages might be, still with the possibility of being at any time—when *rich enough*—able to exchange into a healthier climate, would render it impossible to retain the services of efficient officers. The love of home, of health, or even of change, would overcome the desire to save more money, or allow such an idea to rise up as the duty of remaining. The learning of the native languages being particularly dull work, and requiring much application, would only be undertaken by the few—among officers and men, and chiefly in the former class, by those whose poverty made more than a very short residence in India a likely event. The learning them being only [illegible] an appointment, and the

eans of collecting the sum to quit the land, would not tend to make e learner a thoroughly efficient officer.

To the natives of India the continual change of those over them ould not be advantageous. They would not be slow to discover at the new masters had but little interests in common with them, id that a superficial study of their habits, sentiments, and language as only undertaken for the purpose of enabling the Englishman e sooner to return to his native land. Asiatic cunning would not long in finding out his immediate superiors' weak point—longing r home—and he would make the most out of it. Ill feeling and appointment would arise, dissatisfaction be general, and neither ould the country nor its master be well served.

This is looking at the officers of regiments for general service get- ng civil employ; but how will it answer in a military point of view, hen applied to the command and charge of regiments or companies native troops? We fear worse.

To understand the native soldier, his language, and habits ust be studied, and this can be better done by a young man than a later period in life. The habits of a native soldier, sailor, or vilian are totally different from those of a similar class elsewhere, ul require studying much. Impressions are easier made, and ore charitable views of prejudices are taken at the age of youth an in more mature years; and the officer of ten years' service in regiment of the line, fully impressed with the dignity of discipline id the want of it in native levies, would be incapable of either oroughly learning the native language, making allowance for dif- rence of creed, or forming that attachment between officer and an without which a native army is worthless. The native soldier n appreciate brute courage or the gallantry that will lead the way the deadly breach; but it is to be hoped this is not the only ing for an European officer to do. The native soldier requires him be able to enter into his little griefs, to be his adviser, leader, and est friend, and this cannot, and will not be, if that officer is liable constant removal or his place taken by others without knowledge, even the wish to acquire such.

A native army must be kept up in India, and this army must local; that is, an army looking to India as its home. If the army local, and has local interests, these interests will be best cared for local officers.

An European local army is equally necessary, and will, as we before id, by just and proper treatment, be nothing inferior to other regi- ents in the colonies. The knowledge of the country and its nguage is good, both for man and his officer; and the certainty at in choosing the Indian service—the choice is for ever—will ake many a soldier strive to attain some of the prizes obtainable by perior knowledge in the land of his adoption. It is vain to expect st either officer or man of a local army will qualify himself for taining appointments if he finds them shared equally by those ho, coming but for a short time, have chances in other prizes ob- inable in better climates; and if, on the other hand, there is no cal army, but the prizes of India left open to the scramble of those riven from home by poverty *or promises* of patronage, then farewell

to *esprit de corps*—farewell to that striving to excell which has produced so many good officers, and ere long, farewell to India. The natives of India have learnt their power. They have seen that in combination lies their strength, and even justice would not blame the Eastern peoples that would unite to throw off the yoke of a nation treating them as conquered, and using their country and its producing powers as a means of self-aggrandizement alone.

India is not what it was, even ten years ago. Money is scarce there, and the means of living difficult to obtain. The common necessaries of life are there, by their prices, enhanced into luxuries; and of all our colonies or tribute states, it is far the most expensive to live in. Long years ago, when the Englishman was scarce in the land—when peculation was the rule, honesty the exception, when indeed there was an opening to wealth for most men willing to work hard and wink at iniquity—then was there no difficulty for the Government to find men willing to leave the land of their birth and devote their energies to their own and the country's welfare. There were prizes for all grades, from the superintending of a bridge building to representing the highest authority at the court of a native king. Not so is it now. The expense of living is ten-fold; the prizes are less in value, and shared in by thousands. Make India as part of the general tour for the whole of the British army, doing away with all local European forces, and the prizes will diminish still more. The desire to obtain them would be but transient. Comparisons would be made as to their value, and their resignation would be immediate in the first offer of even a tolerable appointment elsewhere.

Have a native force only local and you behave most unfairly to the European officers attached to it. To them the pay of the lower ranks is not sufficient to avoid debt. They would be superseded daily by the line. They would be looked down upon by their brethren as possessing only local knowledge. The very want of the perfection of discipline in their native levies would be a cause of irritation. Treated as inferiors, considered as mere adjuncts to the line, which was to be kept up in sufficient strength to crush at any time incipient rebellion, the breach would be wider than ever existed between Queen's and Company's.

For the good of India we believe a local army, both European and Native, is necessary. In the first, a young officer could learn his duties, and would, by remaining with it, at any rate learn something of India and its inhabitants. In the second, a young officer learns how to command Asiatics, and will, by habits of study and attention, be not improbably a valuable servant of the government giving him employ.

With these officers and troops all promises should be kept, and separate advantages held out. Let the discipline be strict, and attention to duties fully exacted from both officers and men; but let not cause for heart-burnings and jealousies exist. Do away with all invidious distinctions. If, as a local force, eighteen years of residence in India is to be exacted from the officer, give him certain advantages in the land of his exile. Do not expect him to share contentedly the prizes with men who ha[illegible] option of serving

elsewhere. The brevet promotion obtained by the line for service in parts of the world known only to the local officer as sanitaria, will be and is galling enough, and often deprives him of command. This he expects and only regrets; but when he sees things for which he has come so far, studied so hard, suffered so much, and expatriated himself for eighteen long years, taken by those whose life has been one of luxury and ease, the local officer and soldier, whether in an European or native battalion, feels that his treatment is not in keeping with justice or faith; and that Great Britain, in her anxiety to provide for those drawing her pay, or having friends with influence, has omitted to remember the claims of those doing her good service elsewhere.

OUR HOME DEFENCES.

With a few Words on our Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers.

II.

The preparations connected with the defence of Great Britain naturally resolve themselves into three distinct and separate classes, according as to whether we regard them with a view to encountering the enemy on the open sea, to endeavouring to prevent his landing when he has arrived in force upon our coasts, or, as a last resource, to advancing against him, when he has evaded or overcome our efforts to arrest his progress, and has succeeded in obtaining a firm footing upon our shores. Of these three classes—although none may be neglected with impunity—that which provides for the proper development of our naval strength and resources ought to be made to occupy the first place, for our national greatness owes its existence to our colonies and commerce quite as much as it does to our popular institutions and solidity of character; the one produces an effect, and the other stimulates to its production. Like our national emblem, the oak, our vitality depends upon the protection of the wide-spreading and leafy branches in as great a degree as it does upon the preservation of the root: lop off the branches, and the trunk is at once involved in a premature decay. Besides this, by the creation of a properly organized and overwhelming naval force, we can alone allow ourselves to hope that we may be enabled to confine the horrors and miseries of active warfare to an element upon which its ravages are brought within comparatively narrow limits.

In a former article* on the subject of our Home Defences, we referred more particularly to naval operations, in advocating the formation of a "steam flotilla, to be manned by a maritime militia." We pointed out that, by the adoption of such a plan, we should give increased facilities of action to our fleets; and we argued that, by availing ourselves more extensively of the services of those amongst our countrymen gifted with nautical tastes and habits, who are but so imperfectly represented by our coast-guard volun-

* May, 1859.

teers, we might add immensely to our naval strength by creating an inner line of maritime defence in addition to, and not at the expense of, what is usually considered as constituting the sum total of our naval resources, and without interfering with the proper employment of the reserves, which should be considered as belonging to the more advanced lines, to which indeed they form the legitimate supports.

It will be seen from the heading of this paper that it is not our present intention to go over the same ground. Though the conviction of the necessity of the adoption of some such plan as was proposed by us has been greatly strengthened by recent circumstances, and the various statements and considerations brought before the public by those who interest themselves in naval matters, we shall leave to the effects of time and the natural course of events that progress towards the accomplishment of our views which our continued advocacy might do but little to hasten, and, retiring somewhat from our former position, take up a fresh one in its rear; and under the disagreeable supposition that the enemy, from some fortuitous and accidental cause, has managed to force his way through all our maritime means of resistance, proceed to consider what we could then best do to oppose him.

If it were requisite for us to defend every portion of our coast line in an equal degree, we might well despair of being able to accomplish anything that would prevent the landing, or even impede the progress, of an invading force, and our insular position would be rather a source of weakness to us than otherwise; but fortunately distance and natural obstacles interpose difficulties which must have the effect of reducing the attempts of an enemy within certain limits, so that we can apply the immense increase of strength that concentration affords to those points most open to attack.

Besides the command of the Channel, which we have already supposed the enemy to be in possession of, there are two conditions indispensable to the successful issue of an undertaking which requires to be favoured by fortune, as well as to be skilfully conceived and boldly executed, viz., smooth water, and a sudden and unexpected appearance upon that part of the coast upon which it is decided the debarkation is to take place; for, although the real attack may be covered by false ones, carried on at several different points at the same time, the advantages of telegraphic communication would soon enable us, *in the event of our being sufficiently prepared*, to make such dispositions as would either oblige the enemy to attempt the landing in the face of an equal or superior force, or else to fight a battle without being able to select his own ground, immediately on having accomplished it.

We have said "in the event of our being sufficiently prepared." Upon this simple sentence our future safety will have to depend; it is the very pith and kernel of the matter; but, unfortunately, opinions seem to differ so immensely as to the true meaning of the word "sufficiently," that we may be lost whilst we are endeavouring to determine it. Not that the subject is in reality a very

difficult one, for the dangers to which we are exposed, and the manner in which they should be met, are clear and obvious to most reflecting minds. The real obstacles which present themselves to our taking such measures as would render our future less problematical than it now is, are to be found less in individual convictions, than in the lamentable fact that of late years our political system has been almost entirely based on financial considerations, so that it may be said that there are but two parties in the State—those who endeavour to combine popularity with a lavish expenditure, and those who would secure the applause and good will of the masses by a niggardly economy. In the one case we find a frank confession of the dangers we may be beset with: but an attempt is made to prove that money, a profuse outlay of money, is the one thing needful to our security, and it is made to take the place of those personal sacrifices which every citizen ought to be prepared to make who has the welfare and stability of his country at heart. In the other case, the true policy of the age is said to consist in the dissemination of those pacific principles, which, in developing the arts of peace, are, it seems, to prevent war by rendering nations unfit for it! Occasionally a panic occurs, both parties combine, and a scene of unexampled confusion takes place, every branch of our military system is complicated by a rapid succession of changes, schemes for our protection which require tens of years and millions of money are introduced, whilst those simple expedients which experience and common sense naturally suggest, are despised for their simplicity, or sneered at for their very plainness.

Thus, whilst we find millions are spent in building ships, and thousands in bounties to seamen, our navy remains in nearly as disorganized a state as it was fifty years ago; and whilst millions more are being expended in fortifying our arsenals, and in erecting batteries along our coasts, the defence of the country is made to depend upon a small regular force, assisted by a weak and badly-organized militia; this last defect one would naturally suppose might be easily remedied, but what do we do? We add to our weakness, rather than increase our strength, by the creation of a fresh element of complication in the shape of a badly-defined and imperfectly-constructed force of volunteers!

Contrast the existing state of affairs with the state of England when Napoleon had assembled his legions at Boulogne, and mark the difference—where we had hundreds of soldiers then, we could not number our tens now. Yet the chances in our favor then, in a period of war, were vastly greater than they are at the present moment, in a period of peace. Steam has annihilated time and space; but we still act as if timely warning would be given us of our danger—as if the game of war required neither skilful training nor careful preparation, and we live in the vain hope that in our greatest need some great man may rise up to rescue us by the spontaneous efforts of his individual will, or that some providential assistance may be afforded to shelter us from that ruin which we ourselves have done so little to avert.

It is not pretended that it is requisite for us to keep up a large

standing army, or that we should paralyze trade, and interfere with the peaceful occupation of our operative classes by large demands upon their time, in order to afford them military instruction, but we must and do insist upon the necessity of some organization that will guarantee to the country an armed force, large enough to create that feeling of security which none but fools can now possess. We may render our arsenals impregnable, our ports inaccessible, our shores difficult of approach, but until we possess the means of rapidly assembling large bodies of troops, and concentrating them upon given points, we may be said, as far as the power of resisting an invading force by land may be concerned, to have done nothing.

It is obvious that the size of our regular army during a period of peace must be kept within certain limits, more or less dependent upon the state of India, and the requirements of our colonial possessions; but there is no reason why our militia and yeomanry might not be vastly increased, and so organized as to give us a defensive army, second to none in efficiency, or in the physical strength and moral character of the individual soldiers composing it; but to succeed in doing this, we must become somewhat old fashioned in our ideas, and return to that, against which no man possessing one spark of manly or patriotic feeling dare raise an objection—the ballot. Not that the power of raising men by ballot has ceased to exist, for it is still the law of the land, but it became expedient (that is the word with which in these days we cover such a multitude of sins) to allow it to fall into disuse, and a more fatal error could hardly have been committed. What has been the consequence? It has at the same time ruined the militia, and materially injured the regular army. The militia, because its regiments, always far short of their proper strength, are composed of boys and a very inferior class of men, and the regular army, because it loses the chance of obtaining the description of men who, under the ballot system, would have discovered that they had a fondness for a military life, and would have transferred their services to the line. In addition to this, a considerable sum would be rendered available, which is now wasted in bounties.

In a speech made by Lord Palmerston, a short time since, he is reported to have said: "He thought it was desirable that, when gentlemen turned their attention to questions of national defence, they should divest themselves of feelings suggested to their minds merely by temporary and accidental circumstances, instead of which they ought to look to permanent arrangements." Very admirable advice this, and coming as it does from the first Minister of the Crown, advice that ought to have great weight. We shall do well to bear it in mind.

With this intention then it should be our object to organize our militia and yeomanry—it is to be feared that we cannot include our volunteers—on a permanent basis; and to endeavour to establish a system, the action of which shall be less dependent on the pressure created by a panic than our present one is. The "spirit of the country" cannot always be relied on; it is sometimes far from being easily aroused, and it is often as difficult to control it as it is to excite

it into action. Occasional periods of agitation and hurried preparation are at the best but poor substitutes for that calm and self-reliant attitude which a great nation like ours should be enabled at all times to exhibit.

The militia of Great Britain and Ireland, with a nominal establishment of one hundred and twenty thousand men, is at the present time divided into one hundred and sixty regiments, twenty-seven of which are artillery, and the remainder infantry. Of this force thirteen regiments of artillery and twenty-four regiments of infantry, comprising a total of some twenty-three thousand men, are embodied, and form the only portion of it which could be brought into the field in the event of any sudden emergency arising; for although the disembodied regiments are always spoken of as being in a state that would enable them to be made available for active service in a very short space of time, they barely number forty thousand in their ranks; and with respect to all practical intents and purposes, may be looked upon as constituting a mere paper force, or what is worse, a force upon which a certain dependance is placed, under the supposition that it possesses a military value which does not in reality belong to it.

Now what we propose to substitute for our present unsatisfactory system, is one that would ensure our being able at all times, and under every circumstance, to embody our whole defensive force, in such numbers, and in such a state of preparation, as might admit of its undertaking the performance of its legitimate duties without delay, and of the authorities being disembarrassed in the hour of trial from that attention to minor details and constructive arrangements which so materially interferes with prompt and vigorous action. We would suggest:

1. That the ballot should be annually resorted to, in all cases in which the number of volunteers for the militia are insufficient to complete the strength of any regiment to its prescribed establishment.

2. That a regimental system should be introduced, somewhat similar to that recommended in the report of the Militia Commission as regards the union of the smaller counties; but differing from it in this, that we would form each regiment into three battalions of equal strength.

3. That a regimental depôt should be permanently formed by the union of the staff of the several battalions; and that to this depôt every officer on first appointment, and every recruit (whether a volunteer or otherwise) should be attached, for such a period as would permit of their being thoroughly instructed in their several duties. The command of this depôt should be entrusted, in rotation, to the several field officers of the regiment.

4. Each battalion should be called out for training for a period of twenty-eight days in each year; the different battalions composing a regiment being called out separately.

5. The men to be enrolled, in the first instance, for a period of five years, at the expiration of which term they might be allowed either to re-enlist, or to have their names registered, with a view to forming a reserve; in the latter case they would be exempt from

being called out for annual training, but in the event of the militia being embodied they might be called upon to serve, and this second period of service would only be allowed to count as "reserve" time.

6. Ten years' enrolment, or five years' embodiment, or five years' enrolment with ten years in the reserve, to constitute the whole period of militia service.

Every able-bodied male in the United Kingdoms, between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, should be subject to the ballot, and cases of exemption should be made as few as possible; but, of course, it would alway be allowable to provide a substitute, and militia men should, under ordinary circumstances, be permitted to purchase their discharge, according to a rate made proportionate to their length of service; but such a discharge should not be allowed to free them from the future action of the ballot.

For the artillery regiments, which would be naturally formed from those counties on the seaboard, certain modifications in the above plan would be necessary; for instance, it is advisable that the instruction of the officers should include a course of practical and theoretical gunnery, and it would be necessary to establish a general school of instruction for that purpose.

The organization of the yeomanry might be assimilated to that of the militia, the regiments being divided into squadrons instead of battalions; the operation of the ballot, when resorted to, being confined to a certain class of householders. The whole of the clothing and appointments should be provided at the expense of the Government, and in order to give every encouragement to volunteering for this branch of the service, in addition to a high rate of pay, the period of service might be shortened to six, three, and nine years respectively.

It may, perhaps, appear, at first sight, as if the liberty of the subject would be seriously endangered by the re-institution of compulsory military service; but when we remember that it has for its object the defence of our hearths and homes, the protection of all that we hold most dear, we must arrive at a different conclusion; for what man is there amongst us who, whilst laying claim to all the advantages of being a citizen of a great and free country, could possibly deny that it is his duty to participate in the dangers or privations attached to its defence.

In the above remarks we have purposely refrained from entering into the newly established system of "Volunteers;" but we would repeat, that unless every great care he taken they will be found to increase our present complications in a very large degree. Let our militia and yeomanry receive the greatest development of which they may be capable, and then and not before "Volunteers,"—Volunteers to any extent, the more the better, provided that they undertake to arm themselves, to dress themselves, and to drill themselves, at their own expense; under no other conditions should their services be accepted, and the country could then afford to allow them an amount of independent action which would be fatal to the efficiency of a military force so essentially necessary to the national safety as the militia and yeomanry of the British Isles.

ENQUIRIES TOUCHING THE ETHNOLOGY OF CERTAIN TRIBES OF AFRICANS INTERIOR TO THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA.

By Consul Thos. J. Hutchinson, F.R.G.S.,
Membre Titulaire de l'Institute d'Afrique, &c., &c.

It will be remembered that a chart of Dr. Barth's explorations in Central Africa had been compiled, as well as published, under the superintendence of Mr. Petermann, before the "Pleiads" expedition up the Niger-Tshadda-Binue, and therefore previous to the Doctor's return to Europe. In that was mentioned a tribe called "Bati," who were pagans, reputed to be "of a white colour and of beautiful shape, to live in houses made of clay, to wear clothes of their own making, and to exist in a country from which a mountain was visible to the S.W., and close to the sea."

From the position in which the Bati country was placed in Mr. Petermann's chart, there can be no doubt that Kameroons was the mountain referred to.

On my first official visit to the river Kameroons, in January, 1856, I made inquiries from the British as well as native traders if such a race were known, and I received information that there was a people styled Bari, not Bati, who, instead of being white, were yellow-coloured; who are of fine shape, and who live near the place indicated on the chart. Any information about their peculiarities of worship, dress, mode of living, doings in trade or agriculture, I found to be perfectly unattainable. I learned, however, that they were very warlike, as well as that they rode on horses, and I forwarded the result of my inquiries to Dr. Barth. He wrote to me in reply that he did not think *Bari* and Bati were of the same tribe, "for," he added, "*r* and *t*, as far as I know, are never changed in these languages, not like *r* and *c*, *p* and *f*, *dh*, and *l*, and others; besides, I think the *a* in Bari is a long vowel, while in Bati it is short. I therefore must suppose these two tribes distinct, but they may live near together. Any information which you will be able to gather about that interesting corner behind the Bay must evidently be of the highest importance; but a great difficulty will of course arise with regard to identifying the various tribes, as there is no doubt that the same tribe may be called by a very different name on the coast and in the interior. So I am almost sure that the Ding-Ding, who are living in huts erected in the branches of large trees, will have quite another name, and the same is probably the case with the Tekar." * * * * * *

"Have you communication with Duke's town? I am uncertain with what country round the Bay I shall identify Mbāfu, a district which has been visited by the predatory excursions of the Tulbe, and which they represent as in continual intercourse with the Christians; it is near the sea shore. * * * *

"Yours truly, (Signed) H. Barth, Dr."

Thinking I might obtain some information on this subject from the Old Kalabar Missionaries, I have transmitted Dr. Barth's letter to the Rev. W. Anderson, and subjoin his reply:—

"Duketown Mission House,
"Old Calabar, July 22nd, 1856.

"My dear sir," I have made diligent enquiry among the Efito people in reference to the Ding-Ding, the Tekar, and the Mbāfu.

"1st, Ding-Ding. Nothing seems known of them here, or of any men living in trees. The people laugh heartily when told of them, and say 'They must be brother to the birds and monkeys.'

"2nd, Tekar. The people here know of no country of that name, 'suppose it to be the Ataka, or Atakha, or Ataga,' who live somewhere beyond Akunakuna. None of the Atakar people are in Old Kalabar.

"3rd, Mbāfu. There is a people, or country, or both far on the other side of Qua, called Mbāfum. Some of them are sometimes brought as slaves to Old Kalabar.

"I have long wished to ascertain the position and distance from Old Kalabar of a country called here Mbrikum, Mburikum, or Mbudikum. Many of them are brought here as slaves. They are more liked in Old Kalabar than many brought from other countries. They are peaceable, honest, energetic; they represent their country 'as being three months journey from Old Kalabar—as being destitute of large trees, and as being not far from some 'big watery,' on which ships are visible. Their country is much infested by men who wear trowsers and ride on horseback.' I suppose some Moorish tribe, and who are called Tibāre. They may be the Tilbe, (Tulbe) referred to by Dr. Barth.

* * * * * *

"I observe that Dr. Barth has not found *r* and *l* interchangeable among the tribes he has visited. They are so in many Efito words. The words in question, if communicated to twenty Kalabarese, would forthwith be pronounced by the one half Bati, and by the other Bari. In Efito we can say either.

"Ku wut owo, or Ku wur ordo. (Don't kill man.)

"Emye okut osang, *or* okur osang. (He secs way.)

"Tat inna, or Tar inna. (Open the mouth.)

"Esit ayat, (or ayar) enye. (He is troubled) literally (heart troubles him.)

"A dat, (or adar) esit. (He rejoices.)

* * * * * *

"Yours truly, (Signed), WM. ANDERSON."

I may observe that the word Tibāre is pronounced long Tibāāre by the Efito people at Old Kalabar, and therefore it seems to me not at all improbable that this name in its being handed about amongst men who are entirely ignorant and unconscious of lexicography, might have been metamorphosed into Bāāri or Bāāti when dictated. As recorded by Dr. Baikie,* there are some of the Baion section of the Bati tribe in Clarence Fernando Po; and they are entirely different from the characteristics of the Batis described by Dr. Barth, or of the Baris as pictured to me by the Kameroons people.

Determined to pursue the matter further, to try and ascertain the

* Vide Baikie's Exploring Voyage, p. 346. Murray, London, 1856.

identity of these hitherto mythical tribes, I wrote to Rev. Mr. Crowther at Lagos, enclosing Dr. Barth's enquiries. The following is his answer:—

"I am afraid I cannot enlighten you much about Dr. Barth's queries. The name Ding-Ding is familiar to me; we have a tribe of Yoruba living somewhere in the neighbourhood of Barqu—sometimes spelt Borgoo—on the right bank of the Kowara, opposite Bousa (so called), but the mode of living in huts erected in the branches of trees leads me to think the Ding-Ding, mentioned by Dr. Barth, must be another people of whom I have no knowledge. Dr. Barth's Mbāfu is in all probability the same as Mbofon of Mr. Koelle (see his map to 'Polyglotta Africana') somewhere about the Ibo country. The name may not be known as such to the people of Old Kalabar, and Kameroons; if it be not this I cannot otherwise guess it. From Dr. Barth's information the Filatahs marched southward in that direction, and from the long intercourse the Kalabarese and Ibos have had with European merchants in the Bight of Biafra, they might with all propriety be said to have intercourse with Christians near the sea-shore. Considering the distance of Hamarrua and Adamawa from the Ibo country, the people of the latter might be said to live near the sea coast.

"Yours sincerely,

"Samuel Crowther."

I received further information respecting these unknown tribes and localities from Rev. Mr. Anderson, in December. From a subsequent letter sent to me by Dr. Barth, he considers Koelle's Ndol to be the Mburikum, of which Mr. Anderson wrote in his first communication. And this latter gentleman, extending his enquiries still further, thus proceeds:—

"1st. The Mburikum (or Mbudikum) call a tribe of the warlike Tibare Ding-Ding, but they do not live in trees. The Tibare wear cloth and ride on horses.

"2nd. Teka is the name of a tribe and country near the Tibare.

"3rd. Mbafum or Mbafongor, or Ekoi, furnishes many slaves for Old Kalabar.

"4th. Mburikum is the name of a large territory, including several other countries or towns, of which the following are the chief:—

"1st. Bamum, a fine strong people, who frequently wage war with the Tibare. 2nd. Ndob, big water at Ndob, and those who come here (to Old Kalabar) from that district can 'live in water same as Kameroons.' This refers to the almost amphibious qualifications of the Kameroonians. 3rd. Babak. 4th. Bariki. 5th. Bangwa. 6th. Isa. 7th. Bansok. 8th. Bambo. 9th. Babi. 10th. Banam. 11th. Alfonsin. 12th. Bandyn.

"All these places are to the east of Efik (Old Kalabar). They all lie 'on side where sun rises.'

"Yours truly,

(Signed) "Wm. Anderson."

On the occasion of a visit which I made to Kameroons in February of this year, 1857, on board H. M. Steamer Merlin, I inquired

from Mr. Johnson, a very intelligent *attaché* to the Baptist Mission community there, if he knew anything of the Ding-Ding, Tekar, Mbāfu, Ietem, Mbudikum, Bari or Bati races. He informed me that the Bayon people, who are of the Mbudikum territory, designated all the Filatahs as Baris. A man from the Bayon district was at that time near Kameroons—unfortunately, at the period of my enquiry, not come-at-able—who states that he met a white man and a black man (stranger) in his country a few years before, coming down.

I left Mr. Johnson a number of questions to ask from this Bayon man, but he has not been able to get any answers to them.

In a letter (Feb. 11th) which I had from Dr. Barth, he writes:—"I cannot think that Mr. Anderson is right in stating the Ding-Ding to be a section of the Tibare. They may be subjected."

Subsequent information received from Mr. Anderson proves that Dr. Barth is right, and seems to me to settle at once the identity of the Ding-Ding.

When I paid a short visit to Old Kalabar in the month of April, 1857, on board H. M. S. S, Firefly, the subject came on in conversation, and Mr. Anderson communicated to me the following recent intelligence which he had obtained. A man was then in Duketown who informed him that the word Ding-Ding with the Tibare is synonimous with slave; that the story of their living in trees would seem to arise from the fact of some of the Mbudikums being constantly posted in the tops of trees, to watch for the coming of two predatory Tibares, which they announce to their people by blowing horns, that are resounded from one to another with the punctuality, though not with the celerity, of an electric telegraph.

Ding-Ding is no doubt a nickname like Baibai (slave or fools), and Nyam-Nyam (canibals). These last are mentioned in the chart of Bayard Taylor's work, "Journey to Central Africa," as fabulous, though reputed to occupy a district between the Blue and White Nile, to the south of Abyssinia and Kordofaw.

It may be asked by those who have followed me so far, what is the practical utility to be derived from investigations concerning these tribes, whilst these inquiries have tended to no ascertained conclusion? I answer—It may be considered no more than an impetus to future attempts, in searching after facts concerning people about whom we have hitherto been entirely ignorant; and that such inquiries may in the end prove as useful as the discoveries of Dr. Livingston concerning unknown tribes on the eastern side of the continent. For I believe the rivers which traverse the hitherto great unknown tract of African land are destined to be the great high ways, by which legitimate commerce, and its consequent civilizing influence, are to be carried on. And even such slight information as this, be it only surmised by many in the light of crude conjectures, might tend to make us know something of these people, as well as lead future explorers to gain clearer and more accurate knowledge of the Ethiopian people, a race the lowest in civilization of all created species, although inhabiting a soil the richest in the production of such industrial resources as tend to the comforts of the great human family.

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;

OR,

NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE.—Peace or war again depends on the nod of a BUONAPARTE. This would be a melancholy prospect for Europe, even if the second empire had not proved, by the whole tenor of its course, that it is founded on the traditions of the first. Regarded only in its progress, the policy of NAPOLEON the Third has the appearance of being tortuous, contradictory, and incomprehensible, and this was precisely the characteristic of that of his uncle. In reality, both are identical; the one object in view is followed through every meandering; and the securing vacillation only indicates the wiles of intrigue. The difference is in the situation of the men, not in their principles or designs. Personal and family aggrandisement is still the spring of action, and it is pursued not only with the same tenacity of purpose, but by the same means—by perfidy, bloodshed, shuffling, and conspiracy, without scruple and without shame. The inconsistencies of the French EMPEROR are susceptible of no other explanation. He made use of the Crimean war to break up the old alliances of Europe, and especially to alienate Russia from England and Austria; and after forcing us into a disgraceful peace, at a moment when we were prepared to act with vigour, he has ever since lent himself to the traditional policy of Russia, as the price of a secret alliance. Austria was next to be humbled, and next to be bought, peace being, as before, granted at a moment when it was likely to prove acceptable, and ere Austria could receive the support of Prussia. The two German powers were thus excited against each other, instead of being marshalled in one camp, while Sardinia was left in the lurch, as England had been before. By the peace of Villafranca, the Duchies were to receive back their former rulers, but the Emperor NAPOOLEON publicly declared that their restoration was optional on the popular will, and should not be effected by force. This, however, presumed that Central Italy would have the good taste to form itself into an independent kingdom, as a provision for Prince JEROME; and since it has become evident that there is no such intention, but that Italy aspires to integral union under the national sceptre of VICTOR EMMANUEL, French envoys have been commissioned to speak other language, and try the effect of threats. In fact, we see everywhere the traces of a crooked

and sinister policy, which warns us to be on our guard. The French disarmament turns out, as every one foresaw, to be a mere sham, and appears to have been concerted with Lord PALMERSTON as a political manœuvre, to influence the debates in Parliament; for we now learn that the naval reductions are suspended, while those of the army are merely nominal, comprising the class whose service expires this year, with a three months' furlough to those men who are the support of their families—in short, the arrangements which, even when the army is only at its ordinary strength, are always made at this period of the year. Everything, indeed, indicates that not many months will elapse before France is again in the field; and in the event of another localised war, we trust that England will not pledge herself to neutrality if the object be to humiliate Prussia.

THE PISTOL POINTED AT THE HEART OF ENGLAND.—A few months ago an article appeared in our pages on the fortification of Antwerp, expounding the project of Captain BRIALMONT, as well as the plan decided upon by the Belgian Government; and pointing out the imperfections of both. The eminent authority from whom those observations emanated gave the preference to the scheme of BRIALMONT, but looking at the results expected from rifled cannon, he expressed a doubt of the policy of fortifying Antwerp at all, inasmuch as no defences could long hold out against artillery of such a character, and Antwerp fortified would not receive from an enemy that consideration which, according to the usages of war, it might claim as an open town. Whether rifled cannon will, indeed, effect such a revolution in the science of defence, has, we submit, yet to be proved, and certainly the recoil of the French legions before the Quadrilateral implies some misgiving on the point; but, be that as it may, the Belgian Government has resolved to carry out the work. Antwerp is to be fortified—that is, its existing fortifications are to be so extended and strengthened, that, in case of an emergency—in the event of the present disquietude of Europe terminating in a convulsion, and a violation of the Belgian territory, there may remain one place of safety, in which the Government can take refuge. This is only a natural measure of precaution. Recently the Emperor NAPOLEON, at a moment when there was no uneasiness in Europe, and when all the powers were exchanging professions of amity, not only confronted our coasts with a port d'aggression, but invited our SOVEREIGN to be present at its inauguration. No one questioned his right to construct such a stronghold, though it was undisguisedly designed, not for the purpose of defence, but of attack. But, while expecting England to take this menace in good part, our imperial ally proves to be very thin-skinned himself. His journalists have received orders to protest against the fortification of Antwerp, which, by a curious logic, is construed into an affront to France. Belgium forfeits her neutrality, and, as a consequence, passes out of the pale of Europe, directly she throws up a rampart. Now, if any one has a right to complain of the fortification of Antwerp, it is surely the King of Holland, whose dominions alone it can be held to threaten; but there is reason to believe that this Sovereign, far from countenancing, is an abettor of the undertaking. The

opposition to it comes first from France, and then by a sidewind from Russia—the two countries, of all others, that, unless they meditate an attack on England or Germany, and propose to make Antwerp its pivot, can have no possible interest in the question. But it is on record that NAPOLEON pronounced Antwerp a pistol pointed at the heart of England, and here lies the secret of all this disputation. France is not afraid of Antwerp being made a *tête-de-pont* by England, for the invasion of the continent; but she is enraged that a position so eligible, forming another Cherbourg, should be rendered less open to a surprise. For our part, we have no apprehensions of this pistol pointed at our heart, so long as it remains in its present hands, but neither England nor Germany could view its seizure by a great military or maritime power without alarm. As regards Belgium herself, Antwerp is the palladium of her independence; and we believe that neither the threatening attitude of France and her army of the North, nor the cajoleries of Russia, will divert LEOPOLD from taking every precaution to secure it. No one knows better than the King of the Belgians that, since the struggle must be, we may as well make our stand now as later.

SIR ROBERT GARDINER'S MINUTE ON THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.—The remarkable articles which have, from time to time, appeared in our pages on the position of the Royal Artillery—not without producing a deep impression—have been ably seconded by the efforts of SIR ROBERT GARDINER, who has not only urged the same statements on the attention of the authorities, but has brought them repeatedly before the public, with all the weight attaching to his name. The latest of these publications is a "Categorical Minute on the Motion of the House of Commons for Inquiry into the Effects of the Military Changes in the Ordnance Departments, with Observations on the Reconstruction of the Royal Artillery," and presents us with a mass of information which every one who desires to understand the question, in all its bearings, should diligently study. We are the more interested in this exposition from so high an authority, inasmuch as Sir ROBERT, as he here avows, was favourable to the change of 1855, which broke up our old Ordnance Board, and placed the Royal Artillery under the control of the Horse Guards; and, with that frankness which forms so honourable an element of his character, he now tells us that the consolidation has proved "an utter failure." So many are concerned in keeping up the present system, and it adds so largely to the patronage of a political Minister, that we can hardly believe it will not be persisted in; but all military testimony is coming round to the opinion that we must eventually retrace our steps. How the House of Commons and the public are to be convinced that the great Duke is a higher authority on such a question than Lord PANMURE or SIDNEY HERBERT is, we confess, a problem we cannot solve. Good men and true are undertaking the task, and the result is with time. Sir ROBERT GARDINER points out the gross injustice done to the Artillery, especially as regards the inadequacy of the General Staff, the exclusion of its General Officers from holding general command, which has only been broken through by the re-

cent appointment of Sir FENWICK WILLIAMS, and the traditional slow promotion. This last grievance he shows to be the result of imperfect organization. In his evidence before the Parliamentary Committee, the gallant General goes fully into the whole structure of the corps, its defects, requirements, and capabilities. We learn that no officers of Artillery or Engineers have been employed on the General Staff of the army for a period of 65 years, except for a short period under the administration of Lord GREY, so that, in fact, we systematically exclude our scientific officers from the very positions they are best adapted for. How different is the practice in foreign armies Sir ROBERT GARDINER shows, by adducing numerous examples. Even the East India Company followed a different course, and we are reminded that three of their Artillery officers, Sir GEORGE POLLOCK, General WHITE, and Sir ARCHIDALE WILSON, commanded respectively at the capture of Cabul, Mooltan, and Delhi. The armament of the Artillery, its strength, the recruiting system, and military administration generally, are successively made the subject of Sir ROBERT'S comments, and on all he offers valuable suggestions, founded on a thorough acquaintance with their working. The *brochure* winds up with an addenda, comprising observations on the formation and training of Volunteer Artillery and Rifle Corps, which, coming from such a quarter, are particularly acceptable at the present moment, and will produce good fruit.

THE OLD SAPPERS.—Quartermaster CONNOLLY'S *History of the Royal Sappers and Miners* has communicated to foreign countries, as well as to the English public, the meritorious services of that gallant and useful corps. In the *Spectateur Militaire* for August, Colonel AUGOYAT has given an admirable summary of the work, catching up the salient points with great felicity, so that the honourable achievements and peculiar characteristics of the "Corps des Sapeurs et Mineurs Royaux" are now as familiar to the French army as to our own. At the conclusion of his article, Colonel AUGOYAT justly observes, "L'Histoire des Sapeurs et Mineurs a été accueillie avec une faveur méritée par tous les organes de la presse anglaise. La quantité considérable de faits que l'auteur a rassemblés suppose des recherches longues et consciencieuses: l'ordre dans lequel ils sont disposés témoigne du soin qu'il a apporté à la composition de son ouvrage." We believe this History is the only instance of such a work having been undertaken by an individual, at his own cost and risk, and left entirely without recognition. The case most nearly resembling it is that of Colonel BEAMISH, whose *History of the German Legion* was undertaken with similar spirit; but the officers of the Legion not only secured him against responsibility, but recognised his labours in a splendid manner, by presenting him with a service of plate of the value of £1000. We know not what return is in store for Quartermaster CONNOLLY, but, so far as we have been able to ascertain, his long years of patient labour and research have, up to this moment, received no acknowledgment either from the authorities or from the corps of which he is the historian. This is a reproach on the Royal Engineers, such as we believe no other service

CRITICAL NOTICES.

A Life for a Life. By the author of John Halifax, &c. 3 vols.

Perhaps it is natural that ladies should be the most successful delineators of the tender passion, as developed in their own sex; for who can so fully understand its influence over their nature, and the sensibilities it awakens. The present tale exhibits its operations in three different forms, represented by three sisters; and thus a field is opened for showing the lights and shades of character in a most effective manner. It is on the youngest sister, however—and, if it must be told, the plainest—that the interest concentres; and it is the position of her lover that gives the book its title. As a young man, Max Urquhart was very gay, and attached to dissolute companions, a party of whom met him on one occasion as he was proceeding to visit his sick brother. He was induced to join their revel, one of them undertaking afterwards to convey him to his brother's residence, but, instead of fulfilling his promise, he drove him in an opposite direction, setting him down in the middle of Salisbury Plain. This practical joke, which he would have treated lightly another time, Max was provoked to resent, and in the scuffle that ensued, dealt his friend an unlucky blow, resulting in his instant death. From this moment he became an altered character; he resolved to devote his life to the good of others in expiation of the life he had taken away—a life for a life. Fortune, reconciled by his steadfastness, at length made him acquainted with Theodora. Innocence and gentleness attoned for her want of beauty, and as their acquaintance progressed, he became more and more charmed. But an insurmountable bar to their union presented itself; Theodora, who alone could give him happinesss, was the sister of the man he had killed. Such are some of the elements of this highly-wrought story, and, in the hands of an author so accomplished, they afford scope for the finest effects of fiction. The book is no way inferior to John Halifax, and will, we doubt not, make as deep an impression.

Female Influence. By Lady Charlotte Maria Pepys. 2 vols.

Female Influence opens a very wide field, affording materials for inquiry to both the political economist and the philosopher, and, of course, to the novelist, who, in these latter days, leaves nothing untouched. Its operation is unlimited and as old as the world itself. Where, indeed, can we go, that it cannot be traced, or where that it does not prevail? In the regal court and the backwoods, among high or low, it is alike perceptible, and most frequently dominant. There are few of us who do not owe something to its teachings, either from the endearing relations with which it surrounds us, or from its action on society. This is the text which Lady Charlotte Pepys, the daughter of a Lord Chancellor and the niece of a Bishop, has here used to point a moral and adorn a tale. The result is a very pleasing narrative, occupying two volumes, and which we could wish had been extended to a third. As far as regards opportunities, no one could be more competent than the author to trace the effects of female influence among the higher classes of society, and though she has, to a certain extent, stepped out of that sphere, she gives us no room for regret. The story is chiefly laid at a fashionable sanitorium in the south of France. We are introduced to a society of English invalids, whose characters are cleverly sketched, and sufficiently varied to be distinct. Oriole, the popular favourite, is a beauty, and the model of the *coterie*. But we soon grow iterested in Adela, who, though less showy, wins upon all by her gentleness and sensibility. The author spends all her art upon Julia, who is indeed a charming creation, but, to our mind, less

natural than Adela. In all, and throughout the book, there are fine touches of womanly feeling and great delicacy of treatment. The story is slight in itself, but its progress is never lost sight of, and we read on with undiminished interest. The diction is fluent, the situations are effective, and the sentiments striking. The book no doubt, will derive prestige from the position of its author, but it also claims success by its own merit.

A FAMILIAR HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA, from the Earlist Period to the Transfer of the Government of India to the British Crown in 1858: By J. H. Stocqueler, Esq., Author of the "Handbook of India," the "Life of the Duke of Wellington," &c. &c.

Here we at last have a book that has long been required, the history of India in a nutshell, compendious without being meagre. Of the many interesting works produced by Mr. Stocqueler, this will, we think, prove not the least useful. The author's personal acquaintance with India gives him a greater advantage in writing such a work; and the long time he has been engaged in training candidates for commissions, with such deserved success, enables him to supply exactly the information that is desired. No work can be better adapted for colleges and schools. Though so small in compass, it brings down the history to the close of the recent mutiny, and even embraces facts and events wholly omitted in larger works, such as the Mutiny at Vellore, the Burmese War of 1824-5, the Barrackpore Mutiny. We recommend it not only for students, but as a valuable addition to regimental libraries, and for all who desire to be well informed on the history of India.

MILITARY EXAMINATION FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS OF INFANTRY, comprising 600 Questions and Answers on Discipline, Drill, Interior Economy, &c.: Prepared by direction of Colonel Sir James Edward Alexander, K.C.L.S. 14th Regiment.

Sir James Alexander has here presented us with a practical manual on the organization and routine of the army, and those branches of professional knowledge in which every officer is now expected to be proficient. The work is designed to assist the Board of Examiners, as well as those who have to answer their interrogatories, and anything more complete could hardly be wished. The field exercise and evolutions of infantry, the mutiny act and articles of war, warrants, circulars, &c., field fortification, and reconnoitering, are some of the subjects which, in the shape of question and answer, Sir James has grasped in this little hand-book. We have looked through its pages, and can honestly testify to the care, ability, and judgment displayed in its preparation; and, as it appears under the high sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, and with the prestige of a name so distinguished as that of Sir James, we doubt not it will obtain a wide success.

AMONG the literary events of the day we may mention that there is in preparation a very curious work illustrative of the manners of the fourteenth century, being the adventures of Master Owlglass, a famous German jester, with the story of whose deeds Germany rings to the present time. The work is by Mr. Kenneth R. H. Mackenzie, a Fellow of the Society of Antiquarians, author of several antiquarian volumes, and is illustrated by the facile pencil of Mr. Alfred Crowquill. Messrs. Trübner & Co., of Paternoster Row, are the publishers.

NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS.

Captain G., Malta, in our next.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

With a view of promoting the interests of the Service, this department of the Magazine is open to all authentic communications, and, therefore, the Editor cannot hold himself responsible for the opinions expressed.—Ed. U. S. Mag.]

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

Sir,—My attention was attracted by a letter in your last number, bearing signature, "Might makes Right," on the subject of the Barrackmaster. May I beg the favour of a small space, wherein to offer a few observations on the matter. Several months have now elapsed since it was reported that a "Warrant" was immediately to be issued, whereby the pay and position of Barrackmaster were to be materially benefitted. Is this "Warrant" a thing of imagination only, or will it, in truth, become an embodied reality? If it does make its appearance, will it increase the Barrackmaster's pay, to a sum commensurate with the responsibilities he undertakes, and will it put him on a par with the Army Chaplain, as regards house allowance, giving him 50*l.* per annum, instead of 40*l.* as at present? Last, though not least, will it at once, and for ever, abolish that outrageous absurdity, "Relative Rank" substituting for it, that which is "nominal" or "honorary?" Your powerful advocacy, so often employed to expose defects in our military system, would do much towards these desirable ends.

I am, Sir, Your Obedient Servant,

"Right Before Might."

"THE MEDICAL AND COMMISSARIAT SERVICES IN INDIA."

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

Sir,—Under the above heading in the *United Service Magazine* for August, 1859, you have widely circulated Lord Clyde's despatch to his Excellency, the Right Honourable, the Governor General of India, under date the 21st of February, 1859, and general order of the latter No. 1, dated the 29th of March, 1859.

In the former, Lord Clyde "warmly recommends to the protection" of the Governor General, "two great departments of the military administration, to which the troops and officers who have commanded them, are under real and great obligations;" and he adds "It has been remarked throughout the army, that from the time of the slender forces taking the field against Delhi, and Allahabad, *in the summer of* 1857, the system of the Indian Commissariat has been found equal to the tasks imposed on it, in spite of the extraordinary circumstances in which it was suddenly placed, and of the actual loss of the resources, viz.: the great contractors and agents with which it had been the custom to work. For this system the army is in a great measure indebted to the late Commissary General, Colonel Ramsay, and his successor, Colonel Thompson. The latter officer being in personal charge, supplied the field force of Delhi under unexampled circumstances, when Sir A. Wilson stood before that city almost cut off from the rest of India. The Commissary General has been nobly supported by his subordinates; and I do but speak the truth when I affirm, that no department has ever possessed a more efficient staff of officers than those forming the establishment of the Bengal Commissariat."

In his General Order the Governor-General endorses Lord Clyde's despatch, and "desires to express to Colonel Ramsay" and others, "the cordial acknowledgments of the Government of India for the important services they have rendered."

The credit and thanks accorded to Colonel Thomson and the junior officers of the department generally, were nobly earned; never was the efficiency of any public department so severely tried, or more satisfactorily established. But how the army could have been indebted to Colonel Ramsay (who was not in India for a single day during the whole course of the rebellion in 1857), for the new system introduced "in the summer of 1857," the beneficial effects of which were felt, according to Lord Clyde's own statement of the case, until February, 1859, it will be by no means easy to explain!

On the 21st of March, 1857, Colonel Ramsay made over the charge of the Commissariat Department of the Bengal Residency *to me*, and proceeded to England on medical certificate, and he neither directly nor indirectly in any way whatever influenced, or was concerned in, or connected with, the system of management established during that year. *I* was chief of the Bengal Commissariat from the 21st of March, 1857, until the evening of the 15th of February, 1858, when Colonel Ramsay relieved me on his return from England; and whatever were the arrangements from the commencement of the outbreak at Meerut on the 10th of May, 1857, until a few days preceding the fall of Lucknow (to Lord Clyde), on the 14th of March, 1858, for which Lords Clyde and Canning have bestowed the credit upon Colonel Ramsey, they were organised by me.

I ask you, in common justice, to do me the favour of publishing this statement of facts in the *United Service Magazine* for September.

I am, Sir, Your Obedient Servant,

T. J. NUTHALL, Colonel.

Late Officiating Commissary-General, Bengal Presidency.

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

GENERAL ORDERS AND CIRCULARS.

PACKING OF ARMS.

Circular Memorandum.—Horse Guards, 16th July, 1859. The General Commanding-in-Chief has reason to believe that sufficient care and attention are not paid to the packing of the arms when Troops proceed to sea.

His Royal Highness accordingly calls the attention of Commanding Officers, and of Officers commanding at ports of embarkation, to the directions on this subject at pages 296 and 315 of Her Majesty's Regulations, and desires that the following additional instructions be likewise strictly adhered to.

When Regiments, or armed Detachments, are warned for embarkation, if a sufficient number of arm-chests—properly fitted with racks to prevent the arms, when packed, from rubbing against each other—should not be in possession, application is to be made for the same to the nearest War Office Storekeeper.

Before the arms are put in the cases, they are to be thoroughly greased, a plug of soft wood, saturated with oil (or some tallow), is to be put into the nipple; the snap-cap is to be on, and the cock let down upon it; and care should be taken that the muzzle-stopper fits closely, so as to render the barrels as nearly as possible air-tight.

These details should not be left to the Armourers alone, but be superintended by Captains, or Officers Commanding Companies, who are responsible that the arms are always kept fit for service; and any Officer who shall fail to attend to these particulars, will subject himself to serious censure, and also become liable to the cost of repairing any damage which may have resulted from his neglect.

When the Troops go on board ship, arrangements must be made with the Commander for the arm-chests being stowed in a dry and convenient place of access; and arms which at the periodical inspections (which are not to be omitted) may be found rusty, are not be replaced in the cases until they have been thoroughly cleaned and put in order.

By Command,
G. A. Wetherall, Adjutant-General.

THE STAFF COLLEGE.—GENERAL ORDER.

Horse Guards, 19th August, 1859.—The following Regulations regarding the examination of Candidates for admission to the Junior Division of the Staff College, for a residence of one year only, under paragraph 13 of the Memorandum from this Department, dated 17th December, 1857, are published for the information of the Army.

The application of any Officers desiring to compete at that Examination will be forwarded to this office with the necessary certificates, in conformity with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Memorandum above referred to, not later than the 31st October.

On their application being sanctioned, Candidates will present themselves at the College on the 24th November next, at 10 o'clock, a.m., with the view to their being tested in field sketching, previous to attending the annual Examination of the Junior Division of Students on the 1st December.

There will be five vacancies in that Division, for which Officers of the Cavalry, Guards, or Line, will be eligible; and one vacancy for which Officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers may compete.

SUBJECTS OF EXAMINATION.

OBLIGATORY.—*Arithmetic, Algebra, Euclid, Plane Trigonometry, and Mensuration.*—According to the Syllabus of Mathematical Studies at the College, which will be forwarded by the Council of Military Education to any Candidate on application.

Fortification.—The principles, construction, and application of Field Works. The principles and construction of Permanent Works, as exemplified in the first system of Vauban, and the modern French system. The defence and attack of Field and Permanent Works.

Military Topography.—A sketch done on the ground with pocket sextant or compass will be required from each Candidate, with one or more finished plans (should he have them in his possession, certified to be his own work).

Military Law.

Military Art and History.—The principles of tactics and strategy, with a critical abstract of one or more campaigns, and of one or more battles, as evidence of the Candidate's knowledge of those subjects.

French.

VOLUNTARY.—*German, Hindustani, Chemistry, Geology.*

The following will be the marks allotted to each subject, viz.:—

Mathematics	600
Fortification	600
Military Art, History, and Geography	600
Military Law	300
Military Drawing and Surveying	300
French	300
German	300
Hindustani	300
Chemistry	150
Geology	150

In the obligatory Subjects a Candidate will be expected to gain one-third of the Marks allotted to each subject, as a proof that he is qualified to enter upon the course of the Senior Class of the College.

By Command of His Royal Highness
The General Commanding-in-Chief,
W. F. FORSTER,
Deputy-Adjutant-General.

A Circular Memorandum, dated Horse Guards, 12th August, 1859, states that it is the desire of the General Commanding-in-Chief that the Defaulter and Court-Martial Sheets of Soldiers who take their discharges on the termination of their engagement for limited service, shall be preserved for the full period, viz., two years—within which such men, on re-enlisting for a further term, are allowed to reckon former service.

THE GREAT GUN EXERCISE.—GENERAL ORDER, HORSE GUARDS, 10th August, 1859.—His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, deeming it expedient that officers and soldiers of infantry should be instructed in the great gun exercise, desires that general officers commanding districts and stations will make the necessary arrangements, in concert with the commanding officers of artillery in forts and garrisons, for carrying out that measure whenever practicable.

By command,
G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

Wages and Badge Pay of Pensioners.—An Admiralty Circular, dated the 30th ult., has just been issued, directing that in future all Pensioners serving afloat on and after the 17th May, 1859, are to be paid the continuous service pay of the rating in which they are actually borne and doing duty. All Pensioners will be entitled to receive the amount of their pensions, and as such pensions have been calculated with due regard to former services and conduct, no Pensioners are entitled to badge pay in any rating, Marine Pensioners are to be paid as Able Seamen, if not actually serving in higher ratings.

Pay Documents of Supernumeraries.—Circular, No. 377, dated the 30th of June, directs that all Supernumeraries borne for wages under their Circular, No. 352, when discharged into other ships, shall be simply discharged by pay list, without transfer list or other document. The existing regulations, regarding the pay documents of men and boys invalided, or in any way discharged out of the Service, are to be rigidly adhered to, and the above regulations strictly limited to the case of Supernumeraries borne under Circular No. 352, and discharged to other ships.

A Recruit Barrack is proposed to be erected by Colonel Frome, Commanding Engineer in Scotland, in that part of Edinburgh called Castle Banks. The object of the building is to avoid the necessity of billetting the men.

Signal Lights.—A series of experiments were lately carried out at the steam factory department of Woolwich Dockyard, for the purpose of testing the efficiency of a telegraphic signal light, intended for the transmission of messages or orders, either by officers of an army in the field, or the vessels of fleet. The telegraph consists of five oil lamps arranged in the form of a diamond, and each letter of the alphabet is represented by the exhibition of a red or white star at a certain point of the diamond, as indicated by a code of instructions, which must of course be understood by the party receiving the message. Two of these telegraphs were erected, and notwithstanding the disadvantage of daylight several messages were transmitted by the inventor, and the receipt instantly acknowledged with the utmost facility.

The authorities at the Horse Guards have decided on despatching several thousand soldiers' wives to Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. The women selected will be sent out from time to time with the Indian reinforcements proceeding from this country, the first detachment to embark during the ensuing month On joining their husbands in India they will be employed in various duties connected with the regiments which are now undertaken by troops, who are thus withdrawn from their usual military duties to the prejudice of the service. In making the selection none but industrious women and those of good character will be allowed to go.

The Late Rajpootana Field Force.—In communicating the detail of the operations of the troops under his command, Colonel de Salis thus speaks of some of the officers—I have to thank Major Seager, commanding 8th Hussars; Major the Hon. E. Massey, 95th regiment: Captain Carmichael, 95th Regiment, commanding detachments; Captain Richards, commanding detachments 10th N.I., and my Brigade Major and Cornet Goldsworthy, 8th Hussars, for their zealous able assistance which enabled me, first, to carry out a long march in a dark night; and secondly, to attack with a definite plan, through very thick jungles, where the sun was the only thing that could be seen. I was much pleased by the spirit and intelligence shown by Captain Parkinson, 95th Regiment; Captain Richards, and Ensign Newport, 10th N.I.; and Cornet Palliser, of the 8th Hussars.

The losses of the Allies and the Austrians in the late War.—The *Debats* publishes a table showing the respective losses of the allied Armies and the Austrians in the different combats and battles which took place

during the campaign in Italy. "At Montebello: Allies 7,000 engaged, 850 killed and wounded, Austrians, 13,000 engaged, 1,150 killed and wounded, and 150 prisoners.—Palestro: Allies, 21,000 engaged, 1,400 killed and wounded. Austrians, 24,000 engaged, 2,100 killed and wounded, 930 prisoners, and 6 pieces of cannon.—Magenta and Turbigo: French, 55,000 engaged, 4,400 killed and wounded, 209 prisoners and 1 cannon; Austrians 75,000 engaged, 13,000 killed and wounded, 7,000 prisoners, and 4 cannon. Melegnano: French, 16,000 engaged, 900 killed and wounded. Austrians, 18,000 engaged, 1,400 killed and wounded, 900 prisoners. Solferino: Allies, 145,000 engaged, 16,800 killed and wounded, 350 prisoners; Austrians, 170,000 engaged, 21,000 killed and wounded, 7,000 prisoners, and 30 cannon." According to this statement the total loss in killed and wounded of the allies was 24,350, and of the Austrians 38,650, making a difference against the latter of 14,300. The number of French taken prisoners was only 300, while the Austrians lost 16,000. The French took 40 pieces of cannon, and the Austrians only 1.

Encroaches of Foreign Shipping.—In 1844 the total entrances and clearances of British shipping amounted to 7,500,285 tons, and of foreign to 2,846,484 tons. In 1849, when the change in the navigation laws took place, the British total had advanced to 9,669,638 tons, and the foreign to 4,334,759 tons—an increase of 28 per cent. in the British and 53 per cent. in the foreign in five years. In 1858 the total British clearances and entrances were 12,891,405 tons, and the foreign 9,418,576 tons, or an increase of 33 per cent. in the former and 118 per cent. in the latter case. To state the matter more clearly, the annual increase in British tonnage from 1844 to 1849 was 5·6 per cent., and in foreign 10·6 per cent.; from 1849 to 1858, the annual British increase was 3·6 per cent., and the foreign, 13·1 per cent. The total entrances and clearances of British shipping in ballast were in 1844, 1,808,605 tons; in 1849, 1,517,081 tons; and in 1858, 1,777,075 tons, so that the comparison as regards the actual business done is rendered slightly more unfavourable as between 1849 and 1858; but if British shipping experienced greater difficulty in obtaining freights in 1858 than in 1849, foreign vessels were in a still worse relative position, the entrances in ballast being 626,764 tons in 1844; 986,138 tons in 1849; and 1,772,945 tons in 1858. The statistics just analysed refer both to sailing and steam vessels, but if the latter are brought into a distinct class from the former it will be seen that ordinary British ships have obtained but a poor share of the increased business done. In 1844 the total entrances and clearances of British steamers amounted to 998,664 tons; in 1849 the total was 1,428,807 tons; and in 1858, 3,484,391 tons. The entrances and clearances of foreign steamers were 171,393 tons in 1844, 308,185 tons in 1849, and 753,231 tons in 1858. The actual increase, therefore, in 1858 in the clearances and entrances of British sailing vessels was only 1,166,183 tons as compared with 1849, while in the same period the entrances and clearances of foreign sailing vessels increased 4,638,780 tons. The bitter complaints made on the subject last year were probably induced by the fact that while the entrances and clearances of British sailing and steam vessels with cargoes fell off 521,937 tons in 1858 the entrances and clearances of foreign vessels with cargoes increased 210,500 tons.

Sir William Armstrong, Superintendent of the Rifled Ordnance Department at Woolwich, has succeeded in accomplishing the method of rifling the whole or any requisite number of the guns employed in the Service which present a surface at the bore fit to secure and maintain the grooves, and which possess a body of sufficient tensile strength to resist the explosive power required to expel, with safety, the heavy shot now in use. Some experiments have been carried out at Shoeburyness in the most successful manner with some of the guns, which have undergone the metamorphosis or transformation

from the smooth to the rifled bore, hitherto considered impracticable. The first gun submitted to trial was an 80-pounder on Sir William's original plan; the second an ordinary 32-pounder service gun, rifled on a plan of Sir Wm. Armstrong, adapted for elongated cast iron shot or shell. They were transported from the department in Woolwich Arsenal without preliminary proof or test, as the most implicit confidence is placed in the judgment of Sir Wm. Armstrong, and were fired over a range of 3,400 yards. The result exceeded the general anticipation. The target was six feet square, into which every shot—namely, six rounds from each gun—penetrated with terrific and certain aim.

Floting Lights.—A second series of experiments have been carried out in the Thames, off Woolwich Dockyard, in order to test the indestructible fire apparatus invented by a French gentleman. Commodore Drummond, with numerous officers and scientific gentlemen, embarked on board the *Bustler*, steam vessel, at eight, p.m., from which the apparatus was thrown into the water; and the cutter of the *Vivid*, fully manned, was also engaged, under the direction of Captain Bruce. The practical utility of the invention to the Royal Navy is demonstrated by the means which it affords of surveying harbours, rivers, or a coast after sunset, with a small boat, in order to ascertain the presence of buoys or other obstacles to the progress of a vessel, whilst its advantages during a period of warfare on an enemy's coast would be of the utmost importance. It has been stated in error that the invention might be applied for purposes of destruction, but we have been informed that the flame proceeding from the apparatus, although affording an intense light, would be harmless for the ignition of any material usually destructible.

Damaged Arms.—It having been found impossible to account for the damage which, in many instances, arms, issued in good condttion from the War Office stores, have sustained, in consequence of the delay which has taken place between their reception by Regiments, and the assembly of the Board of Survey held to examine them—the General Commanding-in-Chief, at the request of the Secretary of State for War, has desired that on all occasions arms and other stores supplied by the War Office may be examined *immediately* after they are received—the packages being opened and counted in the presence of the Board—and any damage they may have suffered is to be at once reported to the Military Store or Barrack Officer who issued the same, in order that he may determine whether the damage was caused by the carelessness of the carriers.

The Wars of England.—Of 127 years, terminating in 1814, England spent 65 in war, and 62 in peace. The war of 1683, after lasting nine years, and raising our expenditure in that period to thirty millions, was ended by the treaty of Ryswick, in 1697. Then came the war of the Spanish succession, which began in 1702, concluded in 1713, and absorbed sixty-two-and-a-half millions of our money. Next was the Spanish war of 1732, settled finally at Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1784, after costing us nearly fifty-four millions. Then came the seven years' war of 1756, which terminated in the treaty of Paris, in 1773, in the course of which we spent 112 millions. The next was the American war of 1775, which lasted eight years; our national expenditure in this time was 136 millions. The French revolutionary war, begun in 1793, lasted nine years, and exhibited an expenditure of 464 millions. The war against Napoleon Bonaparte began in 1803, and ended in 1815. During these twelve years we spent 1,159 millions, 771 of which we raised by taxes, 388 by loans. In the revolutionary war we borrowed 201 millions; in the American, 104 millions; in the seven years' war, 60 millions; in the Spanish war of 1739, 29 millions; in the war of the Spanish succession, 32½ millions; in the war of 1683, 20 millions; total borrowed in the seven wars, during 65 years, about 834 millions. In the same time we raised by taxes 1,189 millions—thus forming a total expenditure of 2,023 millions.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS.—A commission has been formed in India, under instructions from the Supreme Government, to inquire into and report on the Military expenditure of India. Sir Charles Trevelyan has nominated Colonel Balfour as the member for Madras; Colonel Burn will represent Bengal; and Colonel Jamieson, Bombay. The commission is to assemble at once at Bombay.

THE FORTIFICATIONS OF DOVER.—The fortifications of the citadel of Dover are about to be enlarged, and the estimated cost of the works is £150,000. The walls round the ramparts, inside and outside, will be raised many feet, the ditches will be considerably lowered, while on the sea front will be erected a large bastion of Officers' quarters, on the top of which will be a very strong battery, heavily mounted with first-class ordnance. In the centre of the citadel will be a signal-tower, while lower, and over the reservoir, will be placed all the necessary buildings required for such a place, between which and the guns facing outwards will be a covered way to protect the Military passing to and fro. The improvements will extend from the citadel to the drop, at which places, and at the head of the Military-road, will be constructed new draw-bridges of great strength.

FRENCH CAMP LIFE.—A letter from the Camp at Chalons, says:—"Our way of life is this:—At three o'clock in the morning the drums beat for the men to get up; at four the manœuvres commence, and continue to about eight. At nine is a parade by Corps; at half-past nine the men breakfast, and afterwards the officers take coffee, smoke, and read the newspapers; at eleven the names of the men are called over, and from half-past eleven to three we sleep. The manœuvres then recommence and continue to six. At half-past eight the retreat is sounded. The officers are treated with great strictness, the General-in-Chief alone according permission to leave the Camp, and without one they cannot even go to Chalons."

THE MILITIA BILL.—The new Government Bill enacts that all persons hereafter raised and enrolled in and for the regular Militia of the United Kingdom under any Act now in force, or which may be passed hereafter, shall be liable to serve in all parts of the United Kingdom during all or any part of their terms of service in the Militia, and as respects such persons, sections 8 and 9 of the old Act of 51, George III., cap. 118, are repealed. The Queen may employ beyond the period of two years mentioned in the 8th section of the said Act, or before the expiration of six or four years mentioned in section 9, such part of the British and Irish Militia as may make a voluntary offer, so as to extend their services. The Militiamen who volunteer may be employed in addition to the proportion now limited. Militiamen may also volunteer to serve in the Channel Isles, and may be there employed by the Queen. Offers must be purely voluntary. Powers of uniting the Militias of counties are extended by clause 7. Volunteers absenting themselves from annual training in any year, or during any part of such time exceeding 14 days, will be liable to serve for an additional year for every annual period of training from which they so absent themselves. Fraudulent re-enlistment will be deemed and punished as desertion. Deserters may be tried by Court-Martial or summarily dealt with by Justices of Peace. The civil punishment, in the latter case, will be a fine, ranging from 2*l.* to 20*l.*, with the option of working it out in the common gaol or prison, for a period of not less than two nor more than six months. The Secretary at War will direct how deserters shall be tried. This Bill is under the care of Mr. Sydney Herbert and the Right Hon. the Judge Advocate General.

MILITARY SAVINGS' BANK.—This bill, prepared and brought in by Mr. Secretary Sidney Herbert and Mr. Laing, has just been laid on the table of the House of Commons. It is a bill to amend and consolidate the laws relating to Military Savings' Banks. After repealing certain Acts it authorises the establishment [illegible] infants and married women

shall be a sufficient discharge. It then enacts that deposits are to be applied to public expenditure and payments made out of grants from the public. The regulations for these banks are to be made by the Secretary-at-War with the concurrence of the General Commanding-in-Chief.

Royal Memorials at Chelsea.—A graceful tribute has just been paid by Her Majesty the Queen to the memory of the Officers and crew who perished on board the *Birkenhead* troop ship. Her Majesty, desirous of recording her admiration of the heroic consistency and unbroken discipline shown on board that vessel, has caused to be placed on the colonnade at Chelsea Hospital a tablet in commemoration of the event. A tablet has also been erected, by command of Her Majesty, to the memory of Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby Moore, who perished on board the *Europa*.

Reserve Volunteer Naval Force.—A Government bill empowers the Admiralty-office to raise and keep, from time to time, a number of men, not exceeding 30,000, to be called the "Royal Naval Volunteers," such corps to be raised by purely voluntary entry from among seafaring men and others deemed suitable for the service. The term of service will be five years, and no longer. The Volunteers may be trained and exercised twenty-eight days in each year, both on board ship and on shore, and they may be called into actual service in case of need, by command of the Queen. When this extreme measure is resorted to, the Volunteers must serve in the Navy for three years, but the service of Volunteers in actual service may be extended two years by proclamation. Extra service will bring with it extra pay. The Volunteers will be victualled (when called out) like Seamen of the Fleet; they will be exempt from the Militia service, and will be under regulations eligible to our Hospital of Invalids at Greenwich. They may be also pensioned by the Board of Admiralty. Masters of merchant vessels must make notations on their rolls respecting any of their crews belonging to the Volunteer Corps, and report from time to time. Volunteers absent from training and drill will be punished by a fine of 20*l*. The preamble of this important bill recites the expediency of keeping a Reserve Volunteer force of Seamen for service in Her Majesty's Fleet in time of emergency.

East India Army.—A Parliamentary return gives the actual strength of the Queen's and the East India Company's forces in the three presidencies and in the Punjaub, at the date of the last returns received from thence. The accounts are classified under four heads, of European Commissioned Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and rank and file, Native Commissioned Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and rank and file, and totals. Bengal Presidency gives the following totals:—H.M.'s army: Royal Artillery, 2,891; Cavalry, 3,299; Infantry, 48,475. H.M.'s Indian forces: Horse Artillery, 1,616; Foot Artillery (European), 3,311; Foot Artillery (Native) 690; Cavalry (European), 3,207; Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry, 264; Cavalry (Native), 269; Infantry (European), 3,619; European Invalids and Veteran Company, 281; Sappers and Miners, 1,051; disarmed Detachment, 400; Infantry (native), 14,294; Cavalry (Irregular), 6,014; various denominations of ditto, 5,153. Punjaub: Artillery, 667; Cavalry, 5,927; Infantry, 27,813. Local Corps: Artillery, 324; Infantry, 19,752; Lahore Light Horse, 151; police and other corps in the civil department in the lower provinces, 6,380; ditto in the north-west provinces (military), 20,324; Military Police, &c., in Oude, 7,227; civil troops under the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub, 23,070. The abstract of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, Bengal, which does not include Queen's Troops, shows a total of 6,255 Artillery, 36,852 Cavalry, 106,585 Infantry; total, 149,692. Madras Presidency—Her Majesty's army: Royal Artillery, 913; Cavalry, 1,308; Infantry, 10,064. Her Majesty's Indian Forces: Horse Artillery, 732; Foot Artillery (European), 1,585; gun Lascars, attached, &c., 1,182; Foot Artillery (native), 1,187; Cavalry (native), 3,013; Infantry (European), 3,019; Infantry (native), 52,294;

Infantry (native), extra Regiments, 4,571 ; Sappers and Miners, &c., 3,201 ; civil corps, 1,937 ; the abstract of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, Madras Presidency, not including Queen's Troops, 74,590. Bombay Presidency—Her Majesty's army : Royal Artillery, 1,584 ; Cavalry, 3,235 ; Infantry, 13,447. Her Majesty's Indian Forces : Horse Artillery, 904 ; Foot Artillery (European), 1,412 ; Engineers, Sappers, and Miners, 103 ; Infantry (European), 2,850 ; Cavalry (native), 1,515 ; Infantry (native), 28,295 ; Golundauze Artillery ; Gun Lascars, Artillery Drivers, and Sappers and Miners, 2,[illegible] Marine, native, extra, and other Battalions, Lascars, &c., 9,725 ; Irregular Corps, Cavalry, 4,656 ; Infantry, 647 ; Civil Corps, 5,746 ; Salaro Local Corps, Police Corps, &c., 20,684. The abstract of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, Bombay Presidency, shows (not including Queen's Troops, but including 4,970 undisciplined men) total, Artillery, 4,495 ; Cavalry, 7,[illegible] Infantry, 65,828. Grand total, 77,473.

THE DEFENCES OF CEYLON.—Pending the approaching meeting of council, when communications were expected from the Governor respecting the railway, the extension of the telegraph, the state of the colonial finances, and his Excellency's proposed schemes of reproductive expenditure, public attention had been very much directed in Ceylon to the exciting news from the seat of war in Europe. The general wish in Ceylon, as in other portions of the British empire, was that peace might be preserved ; but anxiety was felt to be prepared for contingencies. "It is natural (says the *Ceylon Observer*) that we should wish to see some of Armstrong's new guns mounted in Colombo, and the magnificent harbour of Trincomalee placed beyond the danger of surprise. Two war steamers have left our shores for Australia, and the steamer *Oriental*, with the 61st Regiment for Mauritius, has touched at Galle. We have here proof that other British colonies are cared for. Meanwhile there is a rumour that three more regiments are to be stationed in Ceylon. At present the military expenditure in the island is about 200,000*l.* per annum, of which about 80,000*l.* comes out of the colonial revenue, as contribution to the Queen's chest, island allowances, repairs of fortifications, &c. For 1859 we expect the proportion of the colony will be fully 100,000*l.*, in consequence of the expenditure on new and splendid military quarters, and in consequence of an augmented scale of island allowances. 100,000*l.* is one-sixth of the revenue, and about as much as we can reasonably be expected to defray ; so that if more troops are sent for the defence of this 'key of India,' we trust the additional expenditure will be defrayed out of Imperial funds."

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

llowing is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to the 1st February.

ER MAJESTY'S HOME TROOPS.
e Prince of Wales')
on Guards - - Ahmednuggur
n Field Service- - Field Service
ent - - - - - Sattara
ent - - - - - Sholapore
skilling Dragoons - Kirkee
sars - - - - - Seepree
ng - - - - - - Nusserabad
ht Dragoons - - Gwalior
ent - - - - - Field Service
- - - - - - - Kirkee
ncers - - - - - Mhow
AL REGIMENT OF BRITISH ARTILLERY.
House Artillery - - Mhow
pany, 1st Battalion Rajpootana
pany, 3rd Battalion Poona
pany, 4th Battalion Neemuch
pany, 11th Battalion Aden
pany, 11th Battalion Mhow
pany, 13th Battalion Baroda
pany, 14th Battalion Calpee
pany, 14th Battalion Kulladghee and Dharwar

ROYAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS.
mpany - - - - - Rajpootana Field Force
pany - - - - - Gwalior
L REGIMENTS OF BRITISH INFANTRY.
e King's own Regt.) Ahmedabad
al Irish 1st Battalion Field Service
rth Gloucestershire)
ent - - - - - Bombay
ent - - - - - Nassick
ttingdonshire Regi-
- - - - - - - Poona
e Duke of Welling-
Regiment) - - - Baroda
uth Devonshire) Regi-
- - - - - - - Kurrachee
giment - - - - - Mooltan
st Essex Regiment - Belgaum
ent - - - - - Kulladghee
ent - - - - - Sholapore
ent - - - - - Sattara
giment - - - - - Field Service Khandeish
ent - - - - - Malligaum and Dhoolia
- - - - - - - Aden
giment Foot - - - Futteghur
- - - - - - - Belgaum
hlanders - - - - Gwalior
ghlanders - - - Field Service, Rajpootana
hlanders Detachment Dharwar
hlanders - - - - Bareilly
- - - - - - - Poona
giment Foot - - - Rajpootana
- - - - - - - Deesa
giment Foot - - - Gwalior, under orders to Poona
- - - - - - - Poona
giment - - - - - Rajpootana Field Force
hlanders - - - - Mhow
ent - - - - - Indore
giment Wing - - Seepree
- - - - - - - Deesa
Legion - - - - Poona

AJESTY'S INDIAN BRITISH TROOPS
REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.
igade, Head quarters Poona
Leslie's) Troop, Head
rs - - - - - - Jhansi
2nd Troop - - - - - Rajpootana
3rd Troop - - - - - - Central India
4th Troop - - - - - Booranpor
1st Battalion, Head-quarters Ahmednuggur
1st Company - - - - - Ahmedabad
2nd Company - - - - - Belgaum
3rd Company - - - - - Hydrabad
4th Company - - - - - Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters Bombay
1st Company - - - - - Rajpootana
2nd Do. - - - - - Sattara
3rd Do. - - - - - Sholapore
4th Do. - - - - - Gwalior

RESERVE ARTILLERY.
1st Company - - - - - Shikarpoor
2nd Do. - - - - - Gwalior
Detachment - - - - - Jaulna
3rd Company - - - - - Kolapoor
4th Do. - - - - - Kurrachee

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.
Head Quarters - - - - Poona

INFANTRY.
1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters - - Mooltan
Detachment - - - - - Umritseer
Depot - - - - - - - Kurrachee
2nd European Regiment L. I. Belgaum
Wing - - - - - - - Kolapore
Detachment - - - - - Sanglee
3rd European Regiment - Jhansi
Depot - - - - - - - Ahmednuggur

HER MAJESTY'S NATIVE TROOPS.
ARTILLERY.
3rd Battalion, Head-quarters Ahmedabad
1st Company - - - - - Ahmedabad and Rajcote
2nd Do. - - - - - Ahmedabad
3rd Do. - - - - - Deesa
Detachment - - - - - Field Service
4th Company - - - - - Rajpootana Field Force
5th Do. - - - - - Ahmedabad
6th Do. - - - - - Aden
4th Battalion, Head Quarters Ahmednuggur
1st Company - - - - - Booranpoor
Detachment - - - - - Chopra
2nd Company - - - - - Ahmednuggur
4th Do. - - - - - Mhow
6th Do. - - - - - Booranpore

CORPS OF SAPPERS AND MINERS.
Head Quarters (Bombay) - Poona
1st Company - - - - - Poona
2nd Do. - - - - Aden
Detachment - - - - - Jhansi
3rd Company - - - - - Rajpootana
4th Do. - - - - - Poona
5th Do. - - - - - Poona
Detachment - - - - - Jhansi

LIGHT CAVALRY.
2nd Regiment Madras Light Cavalry - - - - - - Sholapore
1st Regiment (Lancers) - Gwalior
Wing - - - - - - - Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry Rajpootana
Detachment - - - - - Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry Jhansi

INFANTRY.
1st Regiment N I. (Grenadiers) - - - - - - - Bombay
2nd do. do - - - Ahmedabad
3rd Regiment N. I. - - - Sholapore, under orders to Mhow
Detachment - - - - - Malligamm
4th do. do. (Rifles)- Sehore
5th do. N. I. I. - Ahmednuggur
6th do. N. I. - - - Poona

Detachment	Jaulna	
7th do. do.	Bombay	
8th do. do.	Baroda	
9th do. do.	Central India	
10th do. do.	Gwalior	
11th do. do.	Ahmedabad	
12th do. do.	Nusserabad	
13th do. do.	Rajpootana	
14th do. do.	Kurracee	
Detachment	Ahmedaba	
15th do. do.	Kolap d	
Left Wing	Kulludghee	
16h do. do.	Surat	
Detachment	Broach	
17th do. do.	Rajkote	
18th do. do.	Belgaum	
Detachment	North Canara	
19th do. do.	Malwa Division	
20th do. do.	Dharwar	
22nd do. do.	Sattara	
Detachment	Mahableshwur	
Detachment	Punderpore	
23rd do. N. L. I.	Mhow	
24th Regiment N. I.	Jhansi	
Depot	Mhow	
25th do. do.	Gwalior under orders to Poona	
Depot	Poona	
26th do. do.	Khundera	
28th do. do.	Sholapore	
29th do. do.	Aden	
30th do. do.	Dholia	
Detachment	Asseerghur	
31st do. do.	Deesa	
1st Extra Battalion	Kurrachee	
2nd Extra Battalion	Baroda	
3rd Extra Battalion	Belgaum	
1st Belooch Extra Battalion	Allahabad	
Depot	Hydrabad	
2nd Belooch Extra Battalion	Deera Ghazee Khan	
Depot	Shikarpoor	

ENROLLED PENSIONERS.

Detachment	Tanna
Do.	Poona
Detachment	Ingolgee
Do.	Malwan
Do.	Ahmednuggur

IRREGULAR AND LOCAL CORPS.

Military.

Poona Irregular Horse	Field Khandeish
1st Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
3rd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment	Beejapore
2nd Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Marine Battalion	Bombay
1st Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie

Civil

Guzerat Irregular Horse	Ahmedabad
Kutch Irregular Horse	Bhooj
Kutch Legion	Kutch
Guzerat Police Corps	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Police Troop	Special Service Malwa Field Force
Sind Extra Battalion	En route to Deesa

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

The following is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

CAVALRY.

Right Hon the Governor's Body Guard.....Madras
H. M. 1st Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
H. M. 12th Royal Lancers Head quarters and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Left Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's Division
1st Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
2nd do. do.....Sholapore
(under orders to Secunderabad.
3rd Regt. Native Light Cavalry, Head quarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Right Wing .....Bellary
4th Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Benga lField Force
5th do. do.....Bellary
6th do. do.....Bengal Field Service
7th do. do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

ARTILLERY.

H Troops Royal Horse Artillery. St.Thos' Mount
Head quarters Madras Horse Artillery .....Bangalore
A. Troop, Field Service Gen. Whitlock's Division
B. Troop .....Secunderabad
C. Troop .....Bangalore
D. Troop .....Kamptee
E. Troop.....Bengal Field Service
F. Troop .....Field Service Gen. Whitlock's Division
No. 5. Comp.1st Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 1 Field Battery...St.Thos.' Mount
No. 3 Comp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
No. 5 Comp. 14th Bat. Royal Artillery, & No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 6 Cpy.9th Bat. Rvl. Artillery.Secunderabad

FIRST BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....St.Thos.'Mount
A Company { Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore; Half Company ...Penang; Detachment .....Masulipatan
B. Company .....Moulmein
C. Co (No. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellary
D. Com. (No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

SECOND BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Kamptee
A. Cop. (No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
B. Co. Head quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo
Half Company ...Shuayghees
C. Comp. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery) Head quarters and half.....Kamptee
Half Company.....Seetabuldee

Battalion Madras Artillery.
rters .....Rangoon
ny (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service
ny (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tonghoo
ny (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmew
ny (No. 3 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
H Battalion Madras Artillery.
rters .....Secunderabad
ny (No. 1 Horse Bat.)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
ny (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
ny (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
ny Head quarters and rds .....Rangoon
.....Bassein
e Golundauze (Native) Battalion Madras Artillery.
rters .....St. Thos.' Mount
ny Head quarters and rds Company .....Penang
l Company .....Malacca
ny.....Singapore
ny (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
ny (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
ny (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sumbulpore
ny .....Meeaday
emental Company .....St. Thos.' Mount
do. .....Vizianagram
f several Companies ...Labuan
Madras Engineers.
rters .....Fort St. George
as Sappers and Miners—Native.
rters .....Dowlaishweram
ny.....Ditto
tion with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
ny .....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
ny .....Bengal Service
ny .....Rangoon
ny ... .Dowlaishweram
ction with Gen. Whitelock's Division
ny .....Secunderabad
tion .....Paumbum
ny .....Padoungmyo
pany .....Thayetmew
ny .....Tonghoo
ny .....Dowlaishweram
ny .....Field Division Gen. Whitelock
ny .....Dowlaishweram
Infantry.
European.
Royal Regt. (1st Bat.)..Secunderabad
rd Light Infantry .....Gen. Whitelock's Division Field Service
h Regiment .....Fort St. George
h Royal Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
anies.....Bellary
.....Mysore
.....Hurryhur
th Regiment .....Cannanore
ny .....Mangalore
.....Sircee
th Regiment .....Rangoon
th Regiment .....Tonghoo
th Highlanders .....Berhampore
ny .....Sholapore
anies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
ras Fusiliers .....Bengal on Field Service
opean Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
ras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock
Native Infantry.
iment N.I. (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
iment N. I.....Quilon
I. or Palamcottah Light try.....Cannanore
I. .....Thayetmew
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Mangalore
Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secunderabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoo
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Bellary
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N. I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmew
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N. I. .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N. I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N. I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzedah
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. I. .....Kamptee
27th N. I. .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. .....Hoosingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacole Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
35th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnool
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters .....Shuaygheen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmew
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I. .....Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Raichoor Field Service
43rd N. I. .....Russelcondah
44th N. I .....Thayetmew
45th NI .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. .....Moulmein
49th N. I (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitlock's Divisi
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Samulcottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, Regiments N. I., and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal.

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.

European Veterans

Artillery Company .....Palaveram
Infantry Company .....Vizagapatam

Native Veterans

1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. .Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. .Arcot

Depôts.

For H.M Regiments .....Poonamallee
European Infantry .....Arcot
Native Infantry .....Palaveram

Native Infantry Recruiting Depots.

No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dindigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Ellore

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(Corrected up to 27th August, 1859, inclusive.)

[Where two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depot is stationed]

1st Life Guards—Aldershot.
2nd do.—Regent's Park.
Royal Horse Guards—Hyde Park.
1st Dragoon Guards—Madras: Canterbury.
2nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
3rd do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
4th do.—Brighton.
5th do.—Aldershot.
6th do.—Bengal: Maidstone.
7th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
1st Dragoons—Curragh.
2nd do.—Newbridge.
3rd do.—Dublin.
4th do.—Birmingham.
5th do.—Newbridge.
6th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
7th Hussars—Bengal: Canterbury.
8th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
9th Lancers—Emb. for England: Maidstone.
10th Hussars—Hounslow.
11th Hussars—Aldershot.
12th Lancers—Madras: Maidstone.
13th Light Dragoons—Dublin.
14th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
15th Hussars—Dublin.
16th Lancers—Edinburgh.
17th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
18th Dragoons—Aldershot.
Military Train [1st bat.]—Shorncliffe.
Do. [2nd bat.]—On passage home.
Do. [3rd Bat.]—Woolwich
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershott.
Do. [5th bat.]—Curragh. } Depot at Aldershot
Do. [6th bat.]—Woolwich.
Grenadier Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Tower.
Do. [3rd bat.]—St. George's Barracks.
Coldstream Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
Scots Fus. Guards [1st bat.]—Windsor.
Fus. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
1st Foot [1st.] —Madras: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—China: Birr.
2nd do. 1st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Walmer.
3rd 1st [bat.]—Bengal: Limerick.
Do. do. Malta: Limerick.
4th. do. [1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Chichester.
5th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
6th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
7th do. [1st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
8th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
9th do. [1st. bat.]—Aldershott: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
10th do. [1st bat.—Plymouth.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
11th do. [1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
12th do. [1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
13th do [1st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Cape of Gd. Hope and Fermoy.
14th do. [1st bat.]—Cephalonia: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
15th do.—Jersey: Pembroke
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
16th do.— Aldershot: Templemore.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
17th do.—Canada: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
18th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Dublin.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
22nd do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta: Parkhurst.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Walmer; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
25th do.—Gibraltar: Athlone.
26th do.—Bermuda: Belfast.
27th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Embarked for England: Chatham.
30th do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
31st do.—Bombay: Pembroke.
32nd do.—Bengal: Dover.
33rd do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
34th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
35th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
36th do.—Plymouth: Athlone.
37th do.—Bengal: Colchhster.
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
39th do.—Canada: Templemore.
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Devonport.
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham.
44th do.—Madras: Colchester.
45th do.—Preston: Parkhurst.
46th do.—Bengal: Templemore.
47th do.—Shorncliffe: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bengal: Chichester.
52nd do.—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do.—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Curragh: Devonport.
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Aldershott: Birr.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal. Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Aldershot.
61st do.—Mauritius: Chatham
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bombay: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: Athlone
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bengal; Perth.
72nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Devonport.
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Curragh: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
78th do.—Embarked for England: Aberdeen
79th do.—Bengal: Stirling.
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.

1a.—Bengal: Chatham	96th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
do.—Bengal: Canterbury	99th do.—Bengal: Cork
do.—Bombay: Chichester.	100th do —Gibraltar [Parkhurst.
do.—On passage home: Chatham	Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Portsmouth.
do.—Cape: Pembroke	Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester.
do.—Gosport: Buttevant.	Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
do.—Bengal: Buttevant.	Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
do.—Bengal: Colchester	1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
do.—Bombay: Fermoy	2nd do—Jamaica
do.—Bengal: Canterbury	3rd do.—Barbadoes.
1a.—Madras: Pembroke	Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
do.—Bombay; Stirling	Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
do.—Bengal; Aberdeen	Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
do.—ditto: Chatham	St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
do.—Bombay: Fermoy	Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
do.—Manchester: Parkhurst.	Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
do.—Bengal; Colchester	Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (18).

rd—Weymouth.	Norfolk Artillery—Shearness.	Suffolk Artillery—Portsmouth
Hampshire—Portsmouth	North Lincoln—Curragh	Sussex—Glasgow
ex Artillery—Gosport	5th Middlesex—Dublin	1st Tower Hamlets—Cork
	Northumberland Artillery—Tynemouth.	
pshire Artillery—Pembroke	Oxford—Dover.	2nd Warwick—Plymouth
Kent—Portsmouth	1st Stafford—Aldershott	Wilts—Aldershot
nshire Artillery—Shorncliffe	2nd Stafford—Curragh.	1st York, (W. R.)—Edinburgh
		3rd York—Newcastle on Tyne

SCOTLAND (3).

burgh Artillery: Edinburgh	2nd Lanark—Dublin	Stirling—Shorncliffe
ir Artillery—Sheerness		
Artillery—Pendennis		

IRELAND (12).

lm Rifles—Aldershot	Dublin (city)—Shorncliffe	Limerick (County) Plymouth
lm Artillery—Curragh.	Dublin City Artillery—Colchester	Louth (Rifles)—Chiele & Bury
h Cork—Aldershot	Fermanagh—Chester	Tipperary Artil —Gosport
gal—Yarmouth and Deptford	Kerry—Bradford	Waterford Artillery—Pirth

STATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th August.)

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

Aboukir, 90, sc., Capt. C. F. Schomberg, 1851, Channel Fleet.
Acorn, 12, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
Actæon, 26, Com. J. Ward (b), 1858, East Indies.
Adventure, sc. troop-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856, East Indies.
Agamemnon, 91, sc., Capt. T. Hope, 1852, Channel Fleet.
Ajax, 60, screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846, Coast Guard.
Alarm, 26, Capt. D. Curry, 1846, Pacific.
Alert, 17, sc., Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific.
Algerine, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. Arthur, 1854, East Indies.
Algiers, 91, screw, Capt. G. W. D. O'Callaghan, 1846, Channel Fleet.
Amethyst, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
Amphion, 36, sc., Capt. T. Cochran, 1857, Sheerness.
Antelope, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Pike, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Arachne, 18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Archer, 13, screw, Capt. J. Sanderson, 1855, Coast of Africa.
Argus, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram, 1856, Mediterranean.
Arrogant, 47, screw, Capt. W. Edmonstone, 1853, Portsmouth.
Asia, 84, Capt. G. T. Gordon, 1846, Portsmouth.
Assistance, screw troop-ship, Com. W. A. J. Heath, 1856, East Indies.
Assurance, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856, Mediterranean.
Atalanta, 16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Atholl, 4, Com. E. Wilson, 1845, Greenock.
Banshee, 2, st.-vessel, Com. C. A. Campbell, 1858, Mediterranean.
Banterer, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins, 1853, East Indies.
Basilisk, 6, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854, North America and West Indies.
Bittern, tender to Calcutta, East Indies.
Black Eagle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley, 1844, particular service.
Blenheim, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Boscawen, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B., 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Brisk, 16, sc., Capt. A. F. R. D'Horsey, 1857, Cape of Good Hope.
Britannia, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris, 1849, Portsmouth.
Brune, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Brunswick, 80, sc., Captain E. Ommanney, 1846, Mediterranean.
Buffalo, screw, Mas.-Com. A. Brown, 1854, particular service.
Bustard, 2, sc.-gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes 1856, East Indies.
Buzzard, 6, st.-vessel, Com. T. Peel, 1855, S.E. Coast of America.
Cadmus, 21, sc., Capt. H. S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854, Mediterranean.
Cæsar, 90, screw, Capt T. H. Mason, 1849, Channel Fleet.
Calypso, 18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
Cambrian, 40, Captain J. J. M'Cleverty, C.B. 1848 East Indies.
Cambridge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jenkingham, 1851, Devonport.
Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, East Indies.
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle 1847, Mediterranean.
Centurion, 80, sc., Capt. C. G. E. Paley, 1848, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Rear-Admiral J. Hope, C.B., Capt. G. O. Willis, 1856, East Indies.
Clio, 21, screw, Capt. E. Miller, 1855, Sheerness.
Clown, sc.-gunbt, Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855 1842, East Indies.
Conflict, 8, sc., Com. R. W. Courtenay, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Conqueror, 101, screw, Capt. W. J. C. Clifford, C.B., 1847, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc., Com. the Hon. F. A. Fe[illegible], 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, sc., Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Coromandel, st.-vessel, Second Master W. H. Vine (acting, East Indies.
Cossack, 20, sc., Capt. R. Moorman, 1857, North America and West Indies.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. the Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, Mediterranean.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com. W. Greet, 1854, off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com. J. Bythesea, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. A. Philtimere, 1855, particular service.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, Portsmouth.
Dauntless, 31, sc., Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B 1854, Coast Guard.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast.-Com. T. C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Devastation, 6, st.-ves, Com. J. R. E. Baird, 1857, North America, and West Indies.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. P. W. Moorsom, C.B., Channel Fleet.
Donegal, 101, sc., Capt., W. F. Glanville, 1848, Devonport.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Mediterranean.
Dove, screw gunbt., Lieut. C. J. Bullock, 1855, East Indies.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. R. Blane, 1856, East Indies.
Eagle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard.
Edgar, 91, sc., Rear-Adm. J. E. Erskine, Capt. J. E. Katon, 1856, Channel Fleet.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. E. C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H. Campion, 1855, Australia.
Emerald, 51, sc. Capt. A. Cumming, 1854 Channel Fleet.
Esk, 20, sc., Sir. R. J. Le M. M'Clure, K.C.B., 1850, East Indies.
Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852, Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett, C.B., 1850, Portsmouth.
Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. J. J. Stopford, 1841, Mediterranean.

, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Albert
acht, Portsmouth.
n, 17, sc., Com. A. G. Fitz Roy, 1857, Coast
f Africa.
t, 8, Com. W. E. Fisher, 1856, particular
ervice.
rand, 6, st.-vessel, Com. J. Dayman, 1858,
articular service.
, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton,
854, East Indies.
y, 4, st.-vessel, Mast.-Com. Taylor, par-
icular service.
ard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drum-
nond, C.B., Woolwich
g Fish, 6, c., Com. C. W. Hope, 1854,
Channel Fleet.
ter, 2, sc. gunbt, Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes,
853, East Indies.
ddable, 84, J. C. Fitzgerald, [1840, Sheer-
ess.
ard, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. C. R. Robson, 1851,
Devonport.
us, 16, st.-ves., Capt. O. J. Jones, C.B., 1855,
East Indies.
, 6, st.-ves., Com. J.F. Commerell, 1855, E.
ndies.
es, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B.,
Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
ett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854,
Mediterranean.
ator, 6, st.-vessel, Commander H. D.
Hickley (1858). N. America and W. Indies.
an, 6, st.-ves. Com. B. C. T. Pim, 1858, Ports-
nouth.
ler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E
Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
ier, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. A. P. H. Helby,
849, Devonport.
ibal, 91, sc., Rear-Admiral G. R. Mundy,
Capt. M. Connolly, 1858, Mediterranean.
ier, 17, screw, Com. Sir M. MacGregor, Bart.,
1855), South America.
ings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Mends, C.B.,
852, Coast Guard.
ghty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D.
Broad, 1851, East Indies.
nnah, 19, Capt. T. Harvey, 1848, Pacific.
ce, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast
Guard.
d, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846,
Feejee Islands.
es, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854,
Cape of Good Hope.
, 91, screw, Capt. G. H. Seymour, C.B.,
844, Channel Fleet.
er, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846,
East Indies.
nia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Cod-
ington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B.,
845, Malta.
flyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B.,
853, East Indies.
laya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe,
855, particular service
e, 60, screw, Capt. R. J. J. G. Macdonald,
854, Coast Guard
s, 6, st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857,
Devonport.
rious, 72, Com. H. C. Harston, 1845,
Portsmouth.
m, 72, Commodore H. Kellett, C.B., Com.
I. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
egnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds,
C.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854,
Devonport.
reuse, 51, screw, Capt. R. Maguire, 1854,
Portsmouth.
, 78, Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B.
Capt. W. R. Hall, C.B., 1853, North Americ,
nd West Indies.

Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841, South America.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brooker 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Com. J. H. Marryat, 1855, Mediterranean.
Iris, 26, Commander W. Loring, C.B., Australia.
Jackal, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. G. E. Murray, 1846, particular service.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1851, Channel Fleet
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Knevitt, 1855, East Indies.
Jasper, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Pym, 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat. Lieut.-Com. G. D. Bevan, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1856, Mediterranean.
Lee, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. H. Jones, 1852, East Indies.
Leopard, 18, st.-ves., Rear-Admiral Sir S. Lushington, C.B., Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Leven, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. S. Hudson, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, C.B., 1855, Mediterranean.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1846, particular service.
London, 90, screw, Capt. H. Chads, 1848, Mediterranean.
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, receiving ship, Commander E. M. Leycester, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. N. Vansittart, C.B., 1854, E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Fanshawe, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Mars, 80, sc., Capt. J. N. Strange (1854), Sheerness.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B. 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Melpomene, 50, screw, Capt. C. J. F. Ewart, 1855, particular service.
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, Portsmouth.
Minotaur, Capt. E. P. Halsted 1842, Sheerness
Mohawk, 4, screw. Com. G. R. Miall (acting) East Indies.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Syndercomb, (acting), Woolwich.
Nalad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. Dillon, 1843, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B Grant, 1852, apprentice ship.
Neptune, 91, screw, Capt. Sir W. Hoste, Bart., 1848, Channel Fleet.
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. C. P. Mends, 1858, East Indies.
Nile, 90, sc., Rear-Adm. C. Talbot. Capt. A. P. E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, Channel Fleet.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com. R. J. Wynniatt, acting, East Indies.
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Paget, 1852, South Coast of America.
Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. J. B. E. Frere 1854, Mediterranean.
Osborne, st.-vessel, Mas. Com. G. H. K. Bower 1842, Portsmouth.

Osprey, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1858, Mediterranean
Pearl, 21, screw, Capt. J. Borlase, C.B., 1855, Portsmouth.
Pelorus, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1854, East Indies.
Pembroke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, Coast Guard.
Perseverance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 1850, particular service
Persian, 12, Commander E. Hardinge, 1856, Cape of Good Hope.
Pioneer, 6, screw, Com. C. H. May, 1854, Portsmouth.
Plover, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Rason, 1855, East Indies
Plumper, 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, Pacific
Pluto, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 1848, Coast of Africa
Porcupine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1854, particular service.
Princess Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G Thomsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
Princess Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, Mediterranean
Pylades, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, Pacific
Qua'l. 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. Osborn 1856, Mediterranean.
Queen Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, Capt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
Racer, 11, screw, Com. the Hon. T. A. Pakenham 1856, North America and West Indies.
Racoon, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1854, Mediterranean.
Recruit, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Mediterranean.
Renown, 91, screw, Capt. A. Forbes, 1846 Mediterranean.
Retribution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. Edgell, East Indies.
Rhadamanthus, 4, st. ves., Master-Com. F. R. Sturdee, 1843, particular service.
Roebuck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, East Indies.
Rolla, 6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Portsmouth.
Royal Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley, Bt.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport
Royal Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. Freemantle, K.C.B., Capt. E. B. Rice (1855), Channel Fleet.
Russell, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast Guard.
St. Jean D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thompson, 1847, Mediterranean.
St. Vincent, 102, Rear Admiral G. Grey, Capt. T. Wilson, 1853, Portsmouth.
Sampson, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, S.E. Coast of America.
Saracen, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, East Indies.
Satelite, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856, Pacific.
Saturn, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, Pembroke.
Scourge, 6, sc., Com. Prince of Langenberg 1857, Mediterranean.
Scout, 21, sc., Capt. J. Corbett, 1857, Portsmouth.
Scylla, 21, sc., Capt. R. Lambert, 1855, Sheerness.
Seagull, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 1850, particular service.
Sharpshooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Sidon, 22, st.-ves., Capt. R. S. Crawford, 1856, Devonport.
Simoom, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1854, Portsmouth.
Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South East Coast of America.
Skiplack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, particular service.
Slaney, 2, sc. gunbt., Lt.-Com. H. R. Lee, 1855, East Indies.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Ryan, 1854, East Indies.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lieut.-Com. W. C. Chapman, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut. Com. T. B. Collinson, 1850, South East Coast of America.
Starling, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Wakshed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2, sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pellet, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Ballisto, 1845, Woolwich.
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, C. of Africa.
Tartar, 20, sc., Capt. H. Dunlop, 1850, W. Indies and N. America.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1857, South East Coast of America.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse, C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Topaze, 51, sc., Capt. the Hon. J. W. S. Spencer, 1854, Channel Fleet.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Barnett, C.B., 1854, Ascension.
Trafalgar, 91, sc., Capt. E. G. Fanshawe, 1841, Portsmouth.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby, 1846, Pacific.
Trident, 6, st.-v. Com. F. A. Close, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Barlow, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, particular service.
Valorous, 16, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B. 1853, West Indies.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, Commodore C. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B. 1850, Mediterranean.
Victoria and Albert, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt. A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com. W. N. W. Hewett, V.C. L.H., 1858, Coast of Africa.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B. Dunn, 1856 particular service.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858, Pacific.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., Captain F. A. Campbell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1854, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc. gunbt. st. East Indies.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Wellington, 72, Capt. R. S. Robinson, 1846 Devonport.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Rowsanquet, 1855, East Indies.

ST OF H. M. INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to the 23rd June, 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command.

, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wel-
, C.B., R.N. Commander-in-Chief
Capt. J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, Bom-
das.-Com. H. W. Grounds, 1856, Gun-
Officer.
, 6, paddle, Com. J. Stephens,
Red Sea.
2. paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies,
River Indus.
, paddle, Commander J. N. Adams,
Bombay.
6, sch.-yacht, tender to Acbar, Bom-

, screw troop ship, Master-Com. —
1858, Bengal.
2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com.
Chitty, 1847, Bombay.
flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1851,
Indus.
4, Lieut.-Com. W. Collingwood,
Persian Gulf.
Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, Trau-

, 3, Lieut.-Com. J. B. Dickson,
Red Sea.
paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby,
River Euphrates.
, 2, paddle, Master-Commander T.
n, 1849, River Indus.
iel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com.
Fraser, 1846, Bay of Bengal.
2, paddle, Master-Com. T. Gourley,
River Indus.
Flat, Master-Com. ———, Indus.
ec. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon,
Bombay.
, screw troop ship, Com. F. W.
ins, 1858, Bay of Bengal.
y, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River

ne, 12, Lieut.-Com. C. E. Brooman,
Bombay.
, Flat, Master-Com. W. Walton,
River Indus.
Flat, Master-Com. T. Jones, 1858,
Indus.
0, paddle, Commander C. J. Crut-
n, 1855, Bombay.
paddle, Master Commander J. McNeil,
River Indus.
12, Commodore G. Jenkins, C.B.,
an Gulf.
, paddle yacht, Master-Commander
nnelly, 1850, Bombay

Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. F. Warden, 1856 Andamans.
Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. A. S Neale, 1853, River Indus.
Jhelum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. E. L. Lawson, 1856, River Indus.
Keddywarree, guard ship, Lieut. E. Giles, 1847, Port Officer, Kurrachee.
Lady Falkland, paddle tender to Acbar.
Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Peevor, 1846, Red Sea.
Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whish, 1849, Persian Gulf.
Marid, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Constable, 1845, Surveying Vessel, Persian Gulf.
Mootree, 1, pendant ves., Capt. E. W. Daniell, 1857, Kotree.
Napier, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. Forster, 1851, River Indus.
Nimrod, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. B. Butter, 1856, River Indus.
Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. A. Harrison, 1856, River Indus.
Outram, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Fivey, 1858, River Indus.
Planet, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. K. Fletcher, 1853, River Indus.
Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Foulerton, 1857, Calcutta
Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, Bombay.
Pleiad, 2, screw, Mas.-Com. D. White, 1858, Bombay.
Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.
Sutledge, Flat, Master-Com.——, River Indus.
Satellite, 2, paddle, Master-Com. A. Wilkins, 1852, River Indus.
Semiramis, 10, paddle, Com. W. Balfour, 1855, Bombay.
Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.
Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. D. Morrison, 1858, River Indus.
Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1845, River Indus.
Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com. ———, Bay of Bengal.
Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Persian Gulf.
Victoria, 5, paddle, Lieut.-Com. T. S. H. Twynham, 1845, Bombay.
Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. F. E. Manners, 1857, Persian Gulf.

BENGAL NAVAL BRIGADE.

arters, Calcutta, Capt. C. D. Camp-
1857.
any, Fort William, Lieut.-Com. J.
ck, 1858.
any, Mootyhary, Lieut-Com. J. H. B.
, 1859.
pany, Chuprall, Lieut.-Com. C. B.
ler, 1857.
any, Allipore, Lieut.-Com. R. Carey,

pany, Dumdum, Lieut. Com. H. W.
rnes, 1857.

6th Company, Dacca, Lieut.-Com. H. W. Etheridge, 1847.
7th Company Sasseram, Lieut.-Com. G. O. B. Carew, 1855.
8th do, Barackpore, Lieut.-Com. W. H. M. Davis, 1849.
9th Company, Patna, Lieut.-Com. D. S. Duval, 1854.
10th Company, Jeypore, Lieut.-Com. A. T. Windus, 1851.
11th Company, Andaman Islands, Lieut.-Com. H. Jackson, 1858.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

Commander to be Captain—John Stephens, 1848.

Lieutenant to be Commander—R. A. Straddling, 1844.

Mates to be Lieutenants—R. B. Leefe, 1854; H. J. Edwardes, 1856.

APPOINTMENTS.

Captain—J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, to Acbar, Flag-ship.

Lieutenants—L. G. Lewis, acting, 1856; C. E. Beddome, acting, 1859; C. Forster, 1856; A. D. Taylor, 1847; R. Williams, acting, 1855, to Acbar; J. G. Nixon, 1847, to command sc. gunbt. Clyde; C. E. Brooman, 1848, to command Elphinstone; F. W. Shottowe, 1856, to Semiramis; J. Brebner, acting, 1859, to Semiramis; C. V. D'Arcy, acting, 1858, to Elphinstone; B. Ch. S. Clarke, acting, 1859, to Elphinstone; I. L. Seaton, acting, 1857, to Feroze; J. Clarke, 1857, to Auckland; J. B. Dickson, 1851, to command Constance; C. E. Beddome, acting, 1859, to be Inspector of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company; R. B. Leefe, to be Superintendent of Pattimars.

Acting Masters—D. White, 1856, to command Pleiad.

Midshipmen—J. D. Budd; H. W. Estridge; H. Hewer to Acbar; W. Marshall; J. A. Kettley to Elphinstone; C. Williams; R. Richmond to Semiramis; A. Cambell to Assaye.

Clerks—F. W. Daniell, to Indus Flotilla; S. Barrett to Assaye; A. T. Shuttleworth, 1855, to Clyde, in charge; A. S. Fishbourn to Semiramis, in charge.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

NAVY.

ADMIRALTY, July 26.

l Marines—Second Lieut. C. R. to be First Lieutenant, vice placed on Half Pay.

ADMIRALTY, Aug. 25.

of Royal Marines.—To be Lieutenants—Mr. Henry Fuller, Ir. James Lecky, gent., Mr. W. er, gent., Mr. J. Maurice O'Con- t., Mr. R. Drew Tully, gent.

PROMOTIONS.

ander to be Captain—Nicholas urnour.

enant to be Commander—W. H. 852, for services in China, in d of the *Lee*, gunboat.

to be Acting Lieutenant—Lord T. M. D. Scott, in consideration es with the Naval Brigade of jesty's ship *Pearl*, in India.

Assistants to be Chief Engineers Hewlett, George Parks, P. t, Henry J. Layland, C. Cham- , Francis Barr.

ant Paymaster to be Paymaster— Forster, 1852.

APPOINTMENTS.

ins—William K. Hall, C.B., *Indus*, vice Hay, superseded at request; William Edmonstone, m the *Dauntless* to the *Pearl*; rlase, C.B., 1855, to *Dauntless*.

nants—G. Rivington, 1856, to M. Smith, 1846, C. T. Wil- 1856, and A. T. Denham, 1856, *tless*; W. J. H. Grubbe, 1854, ay, 1855, A. C. Adams, 1859, Metcalfe, 1857, to *Arrogant*; J. H. Grubbe, 1854, to *Pearl*; F. Luttrell, 1855, to *Mars*; Twiss, 1856, to *Neptune*; G. gerald, 1855, to *Asia*; C. C. n, 1844, to *Vulcan*; Henry Wal- , to *Mersey*; W. F. Gregory, *Neptune*; C. E. D. Wilcox, *Curacoa*.

rs—John D. Rogers, 1859, (ad- to *Minotaur*; J. E. Scudamore, *Pearl*; John T. C. Webb, 1858, *tless*; John D. Switzer, 1859, al to *Minotaur*; Henry R. 1859, to *Cyclops*; Charles 1887, to *Impregnable*; Robert land, 1854 (additional) to *Asia*; uart, 1854, to *Gladiator*; E. L. B. Williams, 1859, to *Vivago*; R. Knox, 1841, to *Dauntless*; J. E. Scudamore, 1859, to *Arrogant*; and J. T. C. Webb, 1858, to *Pearl*.

Surgeons—W. Loney, M.D., 1845, to *Dauntless*; H. Gimlett, M.D., 1856, to *Arrogant*; F. F. Morgan, 1852, to *Pearl*; W. S. Roche, M.B., B.A., 1859, additional to *Tortoise*; G. B. Hill, 1855, to *Alert*; A. Elliott, M.D., 1851, to *Impregnable*; George H. Ryan, 1854, and Francis B. Pritchard, 1856, to *Tortoise*; Clarke A. Ducket, 1859 (additional) to *Algiers*; Hart Gimlett, M.D., 1856, to *Pearl*; Edward Pearce, 1855, to *Tortoise*; Cecil Crandell, 1865, to *Sidon*.

Assistant Surgeons—James R. Anderson, 1854, to *Locust*; Pierce Mansfield, B.A., 1856, to *Donegal*; John Jefferson, M.D., 1856, to *Asia*; John Bishop, 1859, confirmed in *Centurion*; J. W. Dobbin, 1856, to *Dauntless*; M. W. Cowan, M.D., 1854, to *Emerald*; E. M'Carthy, 1856, to *Victory*; E. B. Broster, 1857, to *Imperieuse*; C. H. Slaughter, 1856, to *Cambridge*; T. H. Taylor, 1854, to *Agamemnon*; R. Ratcliffe, 1852, to *Melpomene*; G. Molloy, 1857, to *Dasher*; R. F. Bridgford (Acting), to *Arrogant*; T. Kipling, (Acting) to *Arrogant*; E. W. Dubuc (Acting), *Cyclops*; John Hudson, 1853 (additional) to *Victory*; J. W. Dobbin, 1856, to *Arrogant*; A. Turnbull, (acting) to *Topaze*; John Noble, 1855, to *Impregnable*; Alen Crosbie (acting) to *Neptune*; Adam B. Messer (acting) to *Mars*.

Paymasters—John M. Forster, 1859, to *Madagascar*; R. Curgenven, 1852, to *Pearl*; W. H. Richards, 1853, to *Arrogant*; J. F. Phillips, 1850, H. S. Collins, 1848, W. E. Kelly, 1857, T. W. Wells, 1853, and T. Goodman, to *Dauntless*. George Love, 1858, to be Secretary to Rear Admiral Dacres. Richard Curgenven, 1852, to *Pearl*; James B. Hay, 1846, to *Princess Royal*.

Mate—B. H. Key, 1859, to *Emerald*.

Mates (Acting)—A. Williams to *Edgar*; Henry Salmond, 1869, to *Trafalgar*; W. Bell, to *Clio*.

Second Masters—Daniel J. May, 1854, to *Donegal*; W. E. McGrath, confirmed in *Curacoa*; Philip Syret, to *Trafalgar*.

Assistant Engineers, First Class—Geo. Watson, to *Supply*; J. M. Sales, to *Firebrand*.

Assistant Paymasters—John E. Skinner, 1859, to *Edgar*; Henry E. Kitchen, 1857, to *Hastings*; W. W. Blaney, 1859, to *Cossack*; Derisly Martin, 1859, to *Pearl*; Francis Oliver, 1855, to *Dauntless*; D. Martin to *Arrogant*; F. Olver, 1855, to *Pearl*; Thomas Goodman to *Arrogant*; John N. Harvey, 1858, to *Aboukir*.

Chaplain—John B. Harbord, M.A., 1855, to *Donegal*.

Acting Second Master—W. Montgomery, to *Clio*.

Midshipmen—R. D. R. Farquharson, to *Aboukir*; F. S. Vander Meulin to *Melpomene*; Basil E. Cochrane, to *Edgar*; W. G. Scott to *Melpomene*; E. Drummond and B.E. Cochrane to *Donegal*; A. E. Hutchinson to *Nile*; J. Cole to *Mars*; E. R. A. Law and C. J. Kent to *Neptune*; R. B. Croft to *Cæsar*; H. F. Stephenson to *Emerald*; A. Warrington to *Sidon*; A. E. Hutchinson, to *Cossack*; W. C. Shuckburgh and H. T. Skeffington, to *Sidon*; H. T. Clanedy, to *Donegal*; Hon. H. H. Molyneux, to *Imperieuse*.

Clerks—George B. Westcott. to *Asia*; Henry P. Houghton to *Melpomene*; John Chambers, to *Dauntless*; P. W. Rouse, to *Pearl*; W. P. Albin, to *Nile*; D. Bayne, to *Brisk*; J. Chambers, to *Pearl*; P. W. Rouse, to *Arrogant*; W., Crump, to *Dauntless*; R. Drury to *Terrible*.

Assistant Clerks—E. G. Ellis to *Esk*; O. L. Wynne, to *Cossack*; R. F. W. Soady, to *Sidon*; A. A. Lyne, to *Figard*; C. L. J. Underwood, to *Neptune*; W. Clay, to *Imperieuse*; T. E. Lemman to *Cæsar*; H. Langworthy, to *Impregnable*; W. B. Jennins, to *Arrogant*; E. Mitchell, to *Cornwallis*; G. S. Goddard and R. Oliver, to *Amphion*.

Naval Cadet—R. H. Byron to *Neptune*.

Masters' Assistants—J. T. Hoskyn, to *Arrogant*; B. J. Sims, to *Clio*; W. W. Anderson, to *Amphion*; H. Higgin, to *Vulcan*; T. J. H. Rapson, to *Seal*; and W. P. Haynes, to *Donegal*; E. C. D. Phillips, to *Sidon*; W. I. Grandy, to *Mars*; James Fisher to *Scylla*.

COAST GUARD.

APPOINTMENTS — *Commanders*—W. R. G. Palliser, 1855, to be Inspecting Commander of the Dartmouth Division, vice DeVere; J. W.D. McDonald, 1855, to be Inspecting Commander of Coast Guard at Banff, vice Diggens, whose time of service is expired.

REMOVALS — *Chief Officers*—Captain William K. Shoveller, R.M., from Kilmore to Ballycotton; Mr. John A. Wallinger from Shorncliffe to Newhaven; Mr. George Wrake, from Reculvers to Shorncliff.

ARMY.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 26.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT. — Deputy Assistant Commissary Gen. A. C. Colquhoun has been permitted to resign his Commission, July 26.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 29.

(The following Commissions to bear date July 29.)

3rd Dragoon Guards — The second Christian name of Lieut. Costobadie is "Hugh."

7th Dragoon Guards — Captain R. Clarke, from the 1st Dragoons, to be Captain, vice Nicholl, who exchanges.

1st Dragoons—Captain H. Nicholl, from the 7th Dragoon Guards, to be Captain, vice Nicholl, who exchanges.

Royal Artillery — Fitz-Thomas Landers, Esq., late Paymaster of the Turkish Contingent, to be Paymaster, July 16. [illegible] Griffith, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Read, deceased, July 20.

Grenadier Guards — Lieutenant and Captain Sir W. T. E. Wallace, Bart., to be Captain and Lieut. Colonel, by purchase, vice Digby, who retires; Ensign and Lieut. J. J. Johnston to be Lieut. and Captain, by purchase, vice Sir W. T. F. Wallace Bart. Ensign H. R. Clinton, from the 71st Foot, to be Ensign and Lieut., by purchase, vice Johnstone.

Coldstream Guards—Assistant Surgeon R. Farquharson, M.D., from the Royal Artillery, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice A. Spittal, M.D., resigned.

3rd Foot—Major J. N. Sargent, to be Lieut. Colonel, by purchase, vice Somerville, who retires. Captain F. W. Gore, to be Major, by purchase, vice Sargent.

10th—H. M. Sproule, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Snooke, promoted.

—F. Watson, gent., to be Ensign, chase, vice Jordan, promoted. T. aleck, gent., to be Ensign, by pur- vice Oliver, promoted.

—W. A. Woodward, gent., to be , by purchase, vice Horne, pro-

—Major F. Yard, from Half Pay, Foot, to be Major, vice Ruttledge, changes. Capt. and Brevet Major R. O'Conor to be Major, by pur- vice Yard, who retires. Lieut. Versturme, to be Capt., by pur- vice Brabazon, promoted, by pur- to an Unattached Majority. En- ad Adjutant A. Ross, to have the f Lieutenant. Ensign H. Burnett, Lieut., by purchase, vice Ver- e. John Mush, gent., to be En- by purchase, vice Wedderburn, ted.

—W. H. Herbert, gent., to be , without purchase, vice J. F. ly, deceased.

—Lieut. W. D. Nunn, to be Cap- y purchase, vice Carden, who re- Ensign R. Fraser, to be Lieut., chase, vice Nunn.

—The second Christian name of Coke, appointed on the 24th 1859, is "Talbot."

—A. G. Fraser, gent., to be En- by purchase, vice Dillon, pro-

—E. B. K. Lacon, gent., to be , by purchase, vice Molyneux, ted.

—N. R. Slator, gent., to be En- without purchase, vice Humfrey, ted.

—W. S. Dent, gent., to be En- y purchase, vice Boyd, promoted.

— Lieut. F. FitzWilliam T. , to be Captain, by purchase, vice nd, promoted; Ensign H. W. D. to be Lieutenant, by purchase, Hobbs.

—Lieut. W. D. Bond to be Cap- without purchase, vice Brevet- H. Reynolds, deceased, July 20; n G. Onslow to be Lieutenant, t purchase, vice Bond, July 20th.

—F. Knight, gent., to be Ensign, chase, vice Dyke, promoted.

—A. Hume, gent., to be Ensign, chase, vice Clay, promoted.

—Major R. Hawkes to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Brevet Col. tchison, deceased, May 4; Capt. rdinge to be Major, without pur- vice Hawkes, May 4; Lieut. G. n to be Captain, without pur- vice Hardinge, May 4; Ensign D. Beaumont to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Sullivan, May 4; Ensign J. H. Green, from the 89th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Beaumont; P. J. Cowan, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Lee, appointed Quartermaster, Depot Battalion.

87th—C. S. Dicken, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Throckmorton, promoted.

89th—C. W. Burton, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Green, appointed to the 80th Foot.

91st—T. G. Elrington, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Baillie, promoted.

94th—J. J. Blake, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Hall, promoted; J. Browne, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Godfrey, promoted, July 30.

96th—F. J. Josselyn, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Ayton, promoted; J. H. Strong, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Houghton, promoted, July 30.

99th—Cornet G. W. V. Cotton, from the 5th Light Dragoons, to be Ensign, vice Sayce, promoted.

Recruiting District.—Lieut. E. B. Goodman, from the 1st West India Regiment, to be Adjutant, vice John O'Neill, promoted, without purchase, to an Unattached Company.

Commissariat Department.—Deputy Assistant Commissary-General J. M. M. Gaudet, having completed the required service as Acting Assistant Commissary General on the Western Coast of Africa, to be confirmed in the rank of Assistant Commissary General, July 7, 1858; Commissariat Clerk W. H. Newland, having completed the required service as Acting Deputy Assistant Commissary General on the Western Coast of Africa, to be confirmed in the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissary General, June 9, 1858; Assistant Commissary General J. W. Woodley, upon Half Pay, has been allowed to retire from the Service, receiving a commutation of his Commission, June 10, 1859.

Hospital Staff. — Surgeon-Major T. Hunter, M.D., who retires on half-pay, to have the honorary rank of Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals in accordance with the Royal Warrant of 1st October, 1858; Staff-Surgeon H. Mapleton, M.D., having completed twenty years' full-pay service, to be Surgeon-Major under the Royal Warrant of 1st October, 1858; for A. Illingworth, gent., to be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces, vice Tothill, appointed to

the 18th Foot, which appeared in the *Gazette* of 18th July, read John A. Illingworth, gent., &c.

CHAPLAIN'S DEPARTMENT.—The Commission of the Rev C. Green, M.A., as Chaplain to the Forces, of the Third Class, to bear date the 1st February, 1856, instead of the 1st February, 1842, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 25th March. The Commission of the Rev. J. T. Twining, D.D., as Chaplain of the Third Class, to bear date the 1st April, 1856, and not the 1st April, 1842, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 8th March.

BREVET.—Capt. and Brevet Maj. N. O. S. Turner, of the Royal Artillery, to be Lieut. Colonel in the Army, April 26. The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent upon the death of General Charles Murray, Earl Cathcart, G.C.B., Colonel of the 1st Dragoon Guards, July 16th; Lieut. General Sir R. J. Harvey, C.B., Colonel of the 2nd West India Regiment, to be General, July 17; Major General W. Chamberlayne, Lieutenant Colonel upon half pay Unattached, to have the rank of Lieut. General, July 17; Major General J. Taylor, Colonel of the 59th Foot, to be Lieut. General, July 17; Brevet Colonel R. Law, of the Royal Newfoundland Companies, to be Major General, July 17; Brevet. Lieut. Colonel J. Roche, Captain half pay Unattached, to be Colonel, July 17; Lieut. Colonel J. Brind, C.B., Bengal Artillery, to be Colonel, April 26th.

Majors to be Lieutenant Colonels—D. Hodson, 3rd Madras European Regiment, July 20, 1858; J. L. Barrow, Madras Artillery, July 20, 1858; J. D. Mein, Madras Artillery, July 20, 1858; G. Carr, 16th Madras Native Infantry, April 26; W. Middleton, 17th Madras Native Infantry, April 26; J. L. Vaughan, 21st Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; H. Hammond, Bengal Artillery, April 26; L. Barrow, C.B., 5th Madras Cavalry, April 26; H. Bruce, C.B., 2nd Bombay European Light Infantry, April 26; C. A. Barwell, 71st Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; S. J. Browne, 46th Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; C. Cureton, 38th Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; R. Cadell, Madras Artillery, April 26.

Captains to be Majors — F. T. Wroughton, 6th Bengal European Regiment, July 20, 1858; F. N. Edmonston, 3rd Bengal European Cavalry, July 20, 1858; C. Dysart, 3rd Madras European Regiment, July 20, 1858; A. C. Plowden, 50th Bengal Native Infantry, July 20, 1858; W. Murray, 46th Madras Native Infantry, July 20, 1858; C. H. Harrison, Madras Artillery, July 20, 1858; J. A. Steel, 17th Bengal Native Infantry, July 20, 1858; C. P. Lane, 3rd Bengal European Light Cavalry, July 20, 1858; D. M'Neill, Bengal Artillery, July 20, 1858; C.W. Miles, 23rd Bengal Native Infantry, July 20, 1858; M. J. Brander, 40th Bengal Native Infantry, July 20, 1858; R. H. Sankey, Madras Engineers, July 20, 1858; A. Howlett, 27th Madras Native Infantry, April 26; G. J. Condy, 27th Madras Native Infantry, April 26; R. Patton, 3rd Bengal European Regiment, April 26; R. Ouseley, 34th Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; L. B. Jones, 56th Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; H. B. Stevens, 41st Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; J. M. MacGregor, 6th Madras Cavalry, April 26th; A. S. Smith, 24th Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; T. Wheler, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, April 26; H. Francis, Bengal Artillery, April 26; C. Warde, 68th Bengal Native Infantry, April 26th, J. F. Stafford, 4th Bengal Native Infantry, April 26; E. Clerk, 4th Madras Cavalry, April 26th; G. G. Pearse, Madras Artillery, April 26; W. Dowell, Bengal Artillery, April 26; L. Bridge, Madras Artillery, April 26.

MEMORANDUM.—The exchange between Assistant Surgeon J. Mahon, from the Staff, and Assistant Surgeon L. O. Patterson, from the 35th Foot, which appeared in the *Gazette* of 13th July, to bear date May 11.

WAR OFFICE, JULY 30.

The Queen has been pleased to give and grant to those officers and men of the late Turkish Contingent who, with the sanction of Her Majesty, have been allowed to receive the Crimean medal conferred by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan for services during the war with Russia, Her Majesty's Royal permission to wear the same.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

2nd or Eastern Norfolk—W. W. Townshend, gent., to be Lieutenant, July 16.

Royal South Lincoln—Ensign E. Crockford, to be Lieutenant, vice T. Ingram, struck off, July 15.

Royal North Lincoln—R. H. Owston, Esq., to be Captain, vice R. C. Elwes, resigned, July 19.

Cornwall Rangers—J. M. Prynne, gent., to be Ensign, July 16.

al Glamorgan Light Infantry—
J. B. K. Tynte, to be Lieutenant,
1.
pshire—Lieut. W. Thursby, to be
n, vice R. C. R. Owen, resigned,
2.
Royal Surrey—J. C. R. Weguelin,
o be Captain, vice J. Dingwall,
d, July 22. Lieut. W. Pontifex,
aptain, vice Godman, resigned,
2.

IGNATION.—The Queen has been
sly pleased to accept the resigna-
Capt. J. Godman, which he held
above regiment.

WAR OFFICE, AUG. 5.

Regiment of Dragoon Guards—
General Sir T. W. Brotherton,
, from the 15th Light Dragoons,
olonel, vice General the Earl of
rt, G.C.B., deceased, July 17.
Regiment of Light Dragoons—
General E. W. Bouverie, to be
, vice Lieut. General Sir T. W.
rton, transferred to the 1st Dra-
uards, July 17. Memorandum—
General Bouverie has repaid the
ice between the full price of a
and Infantry Lieut. Colonelcy,
ng been upon Half Pay of Infan-
n promoted to the rank of Major
1.

WAR OFFICE, AUG. 5.

llowing Commissions to bear date Aug. 5.)

Regiment of Dragoon Guards—
Colonel J. A. Robertson, from
ay Unattached, to be Lieutenant
, paying the difference between
y and Cavalry, vice Brevet Colonel
C.B., who exchanges, receiving
ie; Brevet Lieut. Colonel W. C.
, to be Lieut. Colonel by pur-
vice Robertson, who retires;
T. Jones, to be Major by pur-
ice Forrest; Lieut. J. A. Bragge,
aptain by purchase, vice Jones;
H. E. Bridges, to be Lieutenant
hase, vice Bragge.
ragoon Guards—Cornet E. Gold-
om the 18th Light Dragoons, to
et, vice Molyneux, promoted.
ight Dragoons—Major E. Sea-
be Lieut. Colonel by purchase,
aylor, who retires; Capt. F. E.
ghten to be Major by purchase,
ager; Lieut. H. Montagu to be
by purchase, vice Macnaughten;
H. C. Collier to be Lieutenant
hase, vice Montagu.

9th Light Dragoons—Surgeon J. J. Clifford, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Franklin, who exchanges.

10th Light Dragoons—S. H. Child, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Ball, promoted.

18th Light Dragoons—Lieut. W. Palliser to be Captain by purchase, vice Stacey, who retires; Cornet and Adjutant R. Saunders to have the rank of Lieutenant; Cornet W. H. O'Shea to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Palliser.

Royal Artillery—Second Captain W. J. Grimston to be Captain, vice Anson, placed on the Seconded List; Lieut. R. Hodson to be Second Captain, vice Grimston, July 21; Surgeon Major J. Bent, from the Staff, to be Surgeon Major, vice C. Dempsey, who retires upon Half Pay; Surgeon Major Charles Dempsey, retired upon Half Pay, to have the honorary rank of Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, under the Royal Warrant of 1st October, 1858, Aug. 2.

Grenadier Guards—Lieut. and Capt. F. C. Keppel to be Captain and Lieut. Colonel by purchase, vice the Hon. F. Egerton, who retires.

2nd Foot—W. W. Bennitt, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Hercy, promoted.

4th—F. A. Wright, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Fuller, appointed to the 83rd Foot.

5th—Assist. Surgeon G. S. Cameron, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Collins, appointed to the Staff.

9th—R. D. Hare, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice M. A. Scott, whose appointment, dated the 18th Nov., 1857, has been cancelled.

10th—Lieut. T. Scott, to be Instructor of Musketry, July 25.

11th—G. Theobald, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Miles, promoted.

17th—Ensign H. C. Wilkinson, from the 95th Foot, to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Bunbury, who retires. The fourth Christian name of Ensign Benson, appointed on the 19th July, is Groves, and not Gore, as then stated.

18th—H. G. Heath gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Lipscomb, promoted; Lieut. E. A. Noblett, to be Instructor of Musketry, July 26.

22nd—Lieut. T. C. Hinds to be Captain, by purchase, vice Little, who retires; Ensign G. H. Burt to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Hinds; H. B. Pitman, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Burt.

24th Capt. W. P. Gaskell, from the 94th Foot, to be Captain, vice Peacocke, who exchanges; Lieut. J. Johnstone to be Captain, by purchase, vice Goodison, who retires; Ensign E. H. B. Sawbridge to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Johnstone; Lieut. T. P. Butley to be Instructor of Musketry, May 24.

27th Major H. Stapylton, to be Lieut.-Colonel, without purchase, vice Brevet-Colonel Usher Williamson, who retires upon full pay.

30th Lieut. H. Wood, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Williamson, who retires; Ensign Frederick H. Williamson, to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Wood; Ensign David Matthew La Touche, from the 31st Foot, to be Ensign, vice Williamson.

38th J. B. Sparkes, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Hodges, promoted in the 76th Foot.

42nd Henry Brooke, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice the Hon. H. T. Fraser, promoted in the Scots Fusilier Guards.

44th H. de Parny Rennick, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Heane, promoted.

58th Lieut. A. H. Russell, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Tighe, who retires; Ensign J. Outram, to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Russell; R. Dane, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Outram; H. N. R. Storks, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Onslow, promoted.

59th Lieut. L. B. Bomford, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Bym, who retires; Ensign L. C. Brown, to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Bomford.

60th F. W. Grenfell, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, in succession to Lieutenant Allen, deceased.

61st Quartermaster Serjeant W. Fraser, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Hood, promoted.

66th Assistant Surgeon G. A. Moorhead, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Ffolliott, appointed to the Staff.

74th Lieut. Courtenay H. S. Scott, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Campbell, who retires; Ensign R. Kane, to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Scott, H. G. Dods, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Clinton, promoted in the Grenadier Guards.

76th Ensign E. Harrison, from the 88th Foot, to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice W. McDonell Clarke, cashiered by the sentence of a General Court-Martial.

81st—Ensign W. H. M. Jackson, to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Humphreys, who retires.

86th—Lieut. J. J. Bowness, from the 89th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Sewell, who exchanges. May 30.

89th—Lieut. S. W. Sewell, from the 86th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Bowness, who exchanges. May 30; Assistant Surgeon T. Walsh, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Roe, appointed to the Staff.

94th—Capt. T. G. Peacocke, from the 34th Foot, to be Captain, vice Gaskell, who exchanges.

99th—F. L. Story, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Coates, promoted. The promotion of Lieut. Burton and Ensign Townsend, vice Williams, deceased, to bear date 16th May, 1859, instead of 15th of that month, as previously stated.

St. Helena Regiment—Ensign W. R. Nash, to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Taylor, promoted.

UNATTACHED.—Lieut. T. G. B Atkinson, 46th Foot, having been appointed a Captain in the late Land Transport Corps, by General Orders in the Crimea pending Her Majesty's pleasure, to be Captain without purchase, April 1, 1857.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon Major H. Franklin, from the 9th Light Dragoons, to be Surgeon Major, vice Surgeon Clifford, who exchanges; Assistant Surgeon N. Ffolliott, from the 66th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Moorhead, appointed to the 66th Foot; Assistant Surgeon F. Collins, M.D., from the 5th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Cameron, appointed to the 5th Foot; Assistant Surgeon W. C. Roe, from the 89th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Walsh, appointed to the 89th Foot.

BREVET.—Brevet Colonel U. Williamson, Retired Full Pay 27th Foot, to be Major General, the rank being honorary only.

WAR OFFICE, AUG. 5.

MEMORANDUM.—Lieut. J. McMahon Eager, having obtained a first class certificate at the School of Musketry at Hythe, has been appointed by the General Commanding-in-Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, to act as Instructor of Musketry to the Kerry Regiment of Militia, July 26.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Hampshire—R. Bathurst, Esq., late Captain in Her Majesty's 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, to be Captain, July 23.

Derbyshire—R. Newbold, to be
, vice Condell, resigned, July

Company of Derbyshire Volun-
ffles—Charles E. Newton, Esq.,
Captain, July 23; W. Turpie, to
tenant, July 23; W. H. Cox, to
gn, July 23.

Duke of Lancaster's Own—Lieut.
sby, to be Captain, vice P. H.
ker, resigned, July 20; Ensign
ielden, to be Lieutenant, vice J.
, promoted, July 20.

ridgeshire—Lieut. J. J. T. Hay-
be Captain, vice Ashley, deceas-
e 25.

fries, Roxburgh, and Selkirk-
. Connell, Esq., to be Captain,
S. Chisholm, resigned, July 21.

or North Durham—F. H. Ffol-
ent., to be Assistant Surgeon,
ian, removed, July 15; J. Baker,
be Lieutenant, vice Hood, re-
July 15; R. F. Burrowes, gent.,
aptain, vice Chisholm, resigned,

ighshire Yeomanry Cavalry—R.
lston, Esq., to be Captain, vice
th, resigned, July 22; Cornet
eatham, to be Lieutenant, July
. D. W. Griffith, gent., to be
vice Leatham, promoted, July

Denbigh Rifles—R. A. Her-
e 2nd Dragoons, to be Captain,

Caithness, Sutherland, and Cro-
Rifles—J. C. Robertson, gent.,
nsign.

ORANDUM—Her Majesty has been
ly pleased to accept the resigna-
the commission held by Ensign
er in the 96th, or Ross, &c.,
nt of Militia.

York Rifles—Col. H. C. Wade,
be Lieutenant Colonel Com-
t, under War Office authority,
date the 25th June, 1859; C.
ker, Esq., late Captain 1st Royal
nt, to be Major, vice Jeffrey, re-
Lieut. R. G. Hopkinson to be
, vice the Marquis of Carmar-
signed; Capt. J. W. Contes to
nd Major.

Pembrokeshire Artillery—J.
, gent., to be Second Lieutenant,

Warwickshire—E. A. Hill, gent., to
gn, vice W. T. Miller, promoted,

Eastern Regiment of Norfolk
. Palmer, gent., to be Lieutenant,

2nd Royal Cheshire—G. E. E. Blunt gent, to be Ensign, vice T. B. Turner, resigned, July 20.

Worcestershire—Ensign T. Rainforth, to be Lieutenant, vice H. D. Mitchell, resigned.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* on the 22nd July last.]

Dumfries, Roxburgh, and Selkirk.—R. L. Gledstanes, gent., to be Ensign, vice Thornhill, promoted July 13.

2nd Somerset.—R. T. Woodman, late Lieut. 14th Light Dragoons, to be Captain, vice F. J. B. Spurway, resigned, July 25.

2nd Royal Cheshire—Ensign J. F. Wilkin, to be Lieutenant, vice G. Walker, resigned, July 15.

1st or Royal East Middlesex—A. D. Boyd, gent., to be Ensign, vice Hall, resigned, July 28.

5th or Royal Elthorne Light Infantry of Middlesex—Ensign A. Horrex, to be Lieutenant, vice Randall, appointed to the Ceylon Rifles, July 29.

Memorandum.—1st or Royal East Middlesex.—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commission held in this Regiment by Ensign J. Crispin.

3rd or Royal Westminster Light Infantry Mibdlesex—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commission held in this Regiment by Lieut H. Bulkeley.

4th or Royal South Middlesex.—The Queen has been pleased to accept the resignation of the Commissions in this Regiment held by Captains E. E. Elliott and S. J. Blencowe.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 19th July last:—]

7th Lancashire.—H. W. Matthews, gent., to be Lieutenant, July 1.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

1st Staffordshire (King's Own)—Thomas H. K. Fletcher, gent., to be Ensign; John Hampden Gladstanes, gent., to be Ensign.

3rd Staffordshire (King's Own)—Ensign Alexander William Radford to be Lieutenant, vice George Cole, resigned.

Huntingdonshire — The Hon. H. Stevenson Blackwood to be Lieutenant, vice Stephen R. Woulfe, promoted.

1st Devon—Alex. Ridgway to be Captain, vice Rayer, resigned; Thomas W. Northmore to be Lieutenant, vice Ryde, resigned; John C. D. Agar to be Lieutenant.

Ayrshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Major G. J. Campbell to be Lieut. Colonel, vice Sir Charles Lamb, resigned; Capt. J. O. Fairlie to be Major, vice Campbell, promoted; Lieut. R. Gairdner to be Captain, vice Fairlie, promoted; Cornet R. M. Pollock to be Lieutenant, vice Gairdner, promoted.

2nd North Durham—R. F. Burrowes, late Lieutenant 11th and 49th Foot, to be Captain, vice Chisholm, resigned. [This appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* on the 29th of July last.

WAR OFFICE, Aug. 17.

2nd Regiment of Dragoon Guards—A. Brett, gent., to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Barnes, promoted.

5th Dragoon Guards—Lieut. H. H. Hay, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Brevet Major W. Inglis, who retires; Cornet W. B. Colvin to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Frederick, who retires.

7th Light Dragoons—Major H. A. Trevelyan, from the 11th Light Dragoons, to be Major, vice Fraser, who exchanges.

11th Light Dragoons—Major C. C. Fraser, from the 7th Light Dragoons, to be Major, vice Trevelyan, who exchanges.

18th Light Dragoons.—Cornet W. P. Bagenal to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Savage, who retires.

17th Light Dragoons.—Lieut. J. Gibsone to be Captain, without purchase, vice Taylor, deceased; Cornet R. D. Macgregor to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Gibsone; Cornet J. G. Scott to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Molan, promoted; Cornet R. T. Goldsworthy to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Marshall, promoted.

Grenadier Guards. Ensign and Lieutenant the Hon. Arthur Annesley to be Lieutenant and Captain, by purchase, vice Keppel, promoted; Ensign R. C. de Grey Nyner, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Ensign and Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Annesley.

Scots Fusilier Guards.—Lieutenant and Captain J. R. Farquharson to be Captain and Lieutenant Colonel, by purchase, vice Lord Adolphus F. C. W. Vane Tempest, who retires; Ensign and Lieutenant J. F. B. Elphinstone to be Lieutenant and Captain, by purchase, vice Lloyd Lindsay, promoted; Ensign and Lieutenant F. Palmer to be Lieut. and Captain by purchase, vice Fotheringham, who retires; Ensign and Lieut. the Hon. L. E. Massey, to be Lieutenant and Captain, by purchase, vice Farquharson; the Hon. C. J. Shore to be Ensign and Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Farquharson; J. H. W. Thomas, gent., to be Ensign and Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Palmer.

12th Foot.—Ensign W. C. S. Mair to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Elwood, who retires.

15th.—R. Cartwright, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Coetlogan, promoted.

18th.—Captain J. C. Webster, from half pay Unattached, to be Captain, vice Blacker, who exchanges; Lieut. W. Kempt to be Captain, by purchase, vice Webster, who retires.

19th.—Surgeon H. B. Hassard, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Smith, appointed to the Staff.

20th.—The promotion of Ensign H. R. Bowlby to a Lieutenancy, by purchase, vice Foster-Melliar, which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 24th June, 1859, to bear date 11th January, 1859, but this antedate not to carry back pay.

60th.—Ensign R. A. Massy to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Ewens, who retires; B. H. Davidson, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Massy.

70th.—Lieutenant J. Green to be Captain, by purchase, vice Saltmarshe, whose promotion, by purchase, on March 25, 1859, has been cancelled.

76th.—Ensign E. Harding to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Arnoldi, who retires.

81st.—Captain J. Jones, from half pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Captain, vice Hanley, who exchanges; Lieutenant R. G. Charlton to be Captain, by purchase, vice Jones, who retires.

87th.—Ensign A. Anderson to be Paymaster, vice Perry, who retires upon half pay.

97th.—Brevet Lieut. Colonel Wm. West Turner, C.B., to be Lieutenant Colonel, without purchase, vice Leigh, deceased; Brevet Major S. M. Hawkins, to be Major without purchase, vice Turner; Lieutenant I. Harmond to be Captain, without purchase, vice Hawkins; Ensign J. Cooper to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Harmond.

Rifle Brigade.—Ensign T. L. Mitchell-Innes, from the 69th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Nyner, promoted in the Grenadier Guards; Surgeon H. M. Fraser, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Dempster, appointed to the Staff.

HOSPITAL STAFF.

To be Honorary Physicians to Her Majesty.—Sir John McAndrew, K.C.B., M.D., Half Pay Inspector General of Hospitals; Andrew Ferguson, M.D., Half Pay Inspector General of Hospitals; W. Linton, M.D., C.B. Inspector General of Hospitals; John Forest, M.D., C.B., Inspector General of Hospitals; J. B. Gibson, M.D., C.B., Inspector General of Hospitals; T. G. Logan, M.D., Inspector General of Hospitals.

To be Honorary Surgeons to Her Majesty.—T. Alexander, C.B., Director General of the Army Medical Department; A. Melvin, Half Pay Inspector General of Hospitals; J. R. Taylor, C.B., Inspector General of Hospitals; E. Bradford, Half Pay Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals; Thomas Mostyn, Half Pay Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals; J. A. Bostock, M.D., Surg. Major, Scots Fusilier Guards; Surgeon H. F. Smith, M.D., from the 19th Foot to be Surgeon, vice Hassard, appointed to the 19th Foot; Surgeon D. C. Dempster, M.D., from the Rifle Brigade, to be Surgeon, vice Fraser, appointed to the Rifle Brigade.

CHAPLAIN'S DEPARTMENT.—The Rev. Alexander Henderson to be Chaplain of the Fourth Class.

UNATTACHED.—Major and Brevet Colonel T. W. E. Holdsworth, on Half Pay 2nd Foot, late Deputy Quartermaster General in North America, to be Lieutenant Colonel, without purchase.

BREVET.—Major and Brevet Lieut. Colonel W. W. Turner, C.B., 97th Foot, to be Col. in the Army; Lieut. and Capt. William Henry, Viscount Dangan, Coldstream Guards, to be Major in the Army; Brevet Major R. Boyle, of the Royal Marines, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army; Capt. C. Rigby, 16th Bombay Native Infantry, to have the local rank of Lieut. Col. at Zanzibar; Capt. Scott, 5th Foot, to be Major in the Army; Capt. J. C. Webster, 18th Foot, to be Major in the Army; Brevet Major J. C. Webster, 18th Foot, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army; Capt. James Boyd, Retired Full Pay 86th Foot, to be Major in the Army, the rank being honorary only.

The undermentioned promotions to take place, to complete the succession to General the Earl Cathcart, G.C.B., deceased:—Brevet Major H. C. Powell, Half Pay, Unattached, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Lieut. Col.; Captain R. Hughes, of the 1st West India Regt., to be Major; Brevet Major J. K. Wilson, Half Pay Royal Marines, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Lieut. Col. in the place of Brevet Major H. C. Powell, whose promotion in succession to Col. Bolton, of the Royal Engineers, on the 28th June, 1859, has been cancelled.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Hampshire Artillery.—First Lieut. A. R. Naghten, to be Captain, vice Deacon, resigned; Second Lieut. G. Mansel, to be First Lieut., vice Naghten, promoted.

Royal Monmouthshire Light Infantry.—W. Henry Wheeley, gent., to be Ensign.

Oxfordshire Volunteer Rifle Corps.—E. Warre, Esq., to be Capt. of the 1st Company; J. S. Catlow, Esq., to be Lieut. of the 1st Company; C. G. Lane, Esq., to be Capt. of the 2nd Company; J. H. Warner, Esq., to be Lieut. of the 2nd Company; R. W. Cullen, Esq., to be Capt. of the 3rd Company; C. S. Parker, Esq., to be Lieut. of the 3rd Company.

Royal North Lincoln.—J. Mackenzie, gent., to be Ensign, vice J. W. Keogh, promoted; R. U. Somerville, gent., to be Ensign, vice Gibson, resigned.

1st East Middlesex.—R. Burdett, gent., to be Ensign, vice Kemp, resigned.

2nd Middlesex.—C. F. Carr, gent., to be Ensign, vice Byass, promoted.

5th Middlesex.—F. G. T. Cunynghame, gent., to be Ensign, vice Horrex, promoted.

MEMORANDUM.—4th South Middlesex.—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held in this regiment by Major F. A. Blachford.

1st Duke of Lancaster's Own.—J. Oldman, gent., to be Assistant Surgeon, vice C. J. Roe, deceased.

4th Duke of Lancaster's Own.—Lieut. W. Gibson to be Capt., vice Sir G. Preston, resigned, Ensign H. Vowell, to be Lieut., vice R. E. Howarth, resigned; Ensign H. W. Coyne, to be Lieut., vice W. U. Slack, resigned.

Lancashire Hussars.—Captain F. S. Gerard to be Major; Lieut. Lord O. A. Fitzgerald to be Captain, vice F. S. Gerard, promoted; Cornet F. W. Farl to be Lieut., vice Lord O. A. Fitzgerald, promoted; Aug. 8, Cornet the Right Hon. E. B. Wilbraham, Lord Skelmersdale, to be Captain.

Prince Albert's Own Leicestershire Yeomanry Cavalry.—Ensign H. T.

Boultbee, late Capt. Royal Artillery, to be Cornet, vice Perkins, promoted.

North Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry.—Cornet J. Hippisley to be Capt., vice J. R. Mogg, resigned.

Royal Carnarvonshire.—Capt. E. D. Nares (late of Her Majesty's 97th Regt. of Foot), to be Adjutant, vice Iremonger, resigned.

Queen's Own Worcestershire Yeomanry Cavalry.—The Right Hon. G. Earl of Coventry, to be Captain, vice Lygon, resigned.

Cornwall Rangers.—Ensign R. Kelly, to be Lieut., vice S. N. Usticke, resigned.

West Essex.—R. O. Travers, Esq., Adjutant (late Capt. in the King's Dragoon Guards), to serve with the rank of Captain.

Royal Carnarvonshire.—E. D. Nares, Esq. (late Capt. in her Majesty's 97th Regt. of Foot), to serve with the rank of Captain.

Kent Artillery.—Second Lieut. T. F. Bailey to be First Lieut. vice Lutwidge, resigned.

5th Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles.—A. S. Gladstone, Esq., to be Captain.

1st Somerset.—Lieut. H. C. Henley, to be Captain, vice Adney, resigned; Ensign S. J. Barrett to be Lieut., vice Henley, promoted.

Royal Ayrshire Rifles.—Lieut. A. M'Lachlan to be Captain, vice Lord Colville, resigned.

Queen's Own Oxfordshire Yeomanry Cavalry.—E. S. Harrison, gent., to be Lieut., vice Phillips, resigned; E. W. Taylor, gent., to be Cornet, vice Ramsay, promoted; H. C. Risley, gent., to be Cornet, vice Elwes, promoted.

King's Own Light Infantry. E. C. Strutt, gent., to be Ensign.

1st King's Own Staffordshire.—C. Moore, gent., to be Ensign.

2nd King's Own Staffordshire.—Ensign H. Faulkner, to be Lieut., vice Martin, resigned.

3rd King's Own Staffordshire.—Lieut. W. L. Gresley, to be Capt., vice Martin, resigned.

Oxfordshire.—Lieut. H. Moody, to be Capt., vice Turville, resigned; Ensign E. Ramsay, to be Lieut., vice Moody, promoted.

Royal Carnarvonshire.—Lieut. O. M. Jones, to be Capt., vice Rowlands, resigned.

Kent Artillery.—S. M. Crowe, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice B. Carter, promoted.

1st Regiment Duke of Lancaster's Own.—M. Johnson, gent., to be Surgeon, vice J. H. Brooks, resigned.

1st Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles.—G. H. Robertson, gent., to be Ensign.

Dumfries.—Ensign W. Mitchell to be Lieut., vice T. H. V. D. Hay, resigned.

WAR OFFICE, AUG. 23.

5th Dragoon Guards—Major Gen. the Earl of Cardigan, K.C.B., to be Col. vice Gen. Sir J. Slade, Bart., deceased.

1st Dragoons—Lieut. C. F. Holder to be Capt., by purchase, vice Glyn, who retires; Lieut. F. Radford to be Capt., by purchase, vice Sandeman, who retires; Cornet C. Hall, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Holder; Cornet R. W. Caldwell to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Radford.

11th Light Dragoons—W. Brise, gent., to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Robinson, promoted.

17th Light Dragoons—H. W. Young, gent., to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Corbet, appointed to 16th Light Dragoons.

18th Light Dragoons—J. G. Stopford, gent., to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Williams, deceased.

Royal Artillery—Capt. D. A. Patterson, from the 2nd West India Regiment, to be Paymaster; H. L. de la Chaumette, Esq. late Paymaster, British Legion, to be Paymaster.

Royal Engineers.—Quartermaster Serjeant G. Pringle to be Paymaster; Lieut. H. P. L'Estrange St. George has been permitted to resign his commission.

Military Train—Cornet D. McMahon, from Half Pay of the late Land Transport Corps, to be Ensign, vice M. Cain, whose appointment has been cancelled.

1st Foot—Ensign J. R. Palliser to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Watson, who has retired; Ensign A. Bloomfield to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Willis, promoted.

5th—D. G. Beamish, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Bradford, promoted.

6th—H. T. Braidley, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Giffard, promoted.

12th—C. T. Morris, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Featherstonehaugh, promoted; Colour Serjeant W. Mansell, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Tomlin, deceased.

13th—Ensign R. F. King to be Instructor of Musketry.

14th—E. Jervis, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Laing, promoted.

15th—Capt. A. Grey, from Half Pay, Unattached, to be Capt., vice H. T. Richmond, who exchanges; T. H. K. Fletcher, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Liddell, promoted; H. J. Hadfield, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Fuller, deceased.

18th—The promotion of Lieut. E. A. Noblett to bear date 9th March, 1858, instead of 16th March, 1858, as previously stated.

20th—Capt. R. P. O'Shea, from Adjt., of a Depôt Battalion, to be Capt. vice Flamstead, who exchanges; Z. Macaulay, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Glencross, promoted.

22nd—Lieut. T. S. Robin to be Capt. by purchase, vice Nunn, who retires; Ensign G. H. French to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Hassall, who retires; Ensign R. A. Denn, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Robin.

24th—G. Paton, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Sawbridge, promoted.

41st—E. Younghusband, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Brooke, promoted.

45th—Surg. T. C. O'Leary, M.B., from the 68th Foot, to be Surg., vice Best, who exchanges.

46th—Lieut. H. C. W. Hamond to be Capt., by purchase, vice Piper, who retires; Ensign C. B. C. Speke, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Hamond.

49th—Ensign G. Shirley to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Cooke, deceased.

55th—F. Baird, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Riley, promoted.

57th—Lieut. A. F. A. Slade, to be Capt., by purchase, vice Copland who retires.

59th—P. Chalmers, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Brown, promoted.

68th—Ensign H. G. Cavendish to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Sparke, promoted; Surgeon T. Best, from the 45th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice O'Leary, who exchanges.

73rd—H. Synge, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice W. Hamilton, deceased.

84th—Paymaster W. Vanderkiste, from the Royal Limerick Militia, to be Paymaster, vice Donelan, deceased.

92nd—Ensign G. E. Campbell to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Cooper, promoted.

97th—T.T. Irvine, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Cooper, promoted.

Rifle Brigade—Assistant Surgeon D. R. Pearson, M.D., from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Robertson, appointed to the Staff.

Royal Newfoundland Companies—Major J. J. Grant, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Major in succession to Brevet Col. Law, promoted to be Major General.

Depot Battalions.—Captain F. B. Drew, from 94th Foot, to be Adjutant, vice A. Maclean, appointed Staff Officer of Pensioners. Capt. G. L. W. D. Flamstead, from the 20th Foot, to be Adjutant, vice R. P. O'Shea, who exchanges.

Hospital Staff.—Assist. Surg. A. C. Robertson, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Pearson, appointed to the Rifle Brigade.

Veterinary Medical Department—G. Naden, gent., to be Acting Veterinary Surgeon, vice Dulley, who has resigned.

Brevet.—Col. Commandant H. W. Barke, Retired Full Pay Royal Marines, to have the honorary rank of Major General, under her Majesty's Order in Council of the 13th of November, 1856. Major the Hon. E. C. H. Massey, 95th Foot, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army.

WAR-OFFICE, August 26.

(*The following commissions to bear date August 26.*)

1st Regiment of Life Guards—Cornet and Sub-Lieut. C. W. Duncombe to be Lieut. by purchase, vice A. E. H. G. Viscount Grey de Wilton, who retires; A. W. F. Greville, gent., to be Cornet and Sub-Lieut. by purchase, vice Duncombe.

10th Light Dragoons—H. P. Holford, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Slack, promoted.

15th Light Dragoons—Assist. Surg. J. Griffith has been permitted to resign his commission.

17th Light Dragoons—Gentleman Cadet G. Rosser, from the Royal Military College, to be Cornet without purchase, vice Macgregor, promoted.

Royal Artillery—Assistant Surgeon G. A. Grant, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Farquharson, appointed to the Coldstream Guards.

Royal Engineers—The first Christian name Ensign Haig, is Arthur, not Anthony, as stated in the *Gazette* of 1st July, 1859.

Military Train—Lieut. W. Corbet to be Captain, without purchase, vice Brevet Major H. H. A'Court Inglefield,

deceased, August 15; Ensign J. Taylor to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Corbet, Aug. 15.

8th—Ensign C. D. R. Madden to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Pinniger, who retires.

9th—Capt. W. H. Peel, from the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, to be Captain, vice Bloxsome, who exchanges.

12th—Ensign R. E. Dawson to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Wither, who retires. H. S. Andrews, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice S. Mair, promoted.

17th—J. H. Thorold, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Lawrance; F. Arguimbau, whose appointment has been cancelled, that Officer not having joined since his appointment.

20th.—Ensign Macaulay's appointment bears date 23rd August, 1859, not 23rd August, 1858, as erroneously stated in last Tuesday's *Gazette*.

21st—Capt. A. Beedon, from the 89th Foot, to be Captain, vice De Vic Valpy, who exchanges.

31st—G. M. Lambert, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice La Touche, appointed to the 30th Foot.

41st—Ensign J. Caulfield to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Macleod, who has retired; Ensign N. Montgomery to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Fraser, who retires; Quartermaster J. Simpson, from a Depot Battalion, to be Paymaster, vice Grant, deceased.

46th—Lieut. T. Murphy, from Half Pay late Turkish Contingent, to be Lieut., vice Atkinson, promoted to an Unattached Company, without purchase.

53rd—Ensign C. Pye to be Adjutant, vice Lieut. Macneill, who resigns the Adjutancy only, May 30.

54th.—Ensign J. Chute to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Evered, promoted.

60th.—Surgeon H. J. Shooles, M.D., having completed twenty years' full-pay service, to be Surgeon Major, under the Royal Warrant of the 1st October, 1858. July 22, 1859.

80th. Major C. Sykes, from Half-pay Unattached, to be Major, vice Ormsby, who exchanges. Captain C. F. Studdert to be Major, by purchase, vice Sykes, who retires. Lieutenant H. P. Batchelor to be Captain, by purchase, vice Studdert. Ensign V. O'Connor to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Batchelor. Ensign W. Howard to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Burrows, promoted.

81st.—R. J. MacDonnell, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Jackson, promoted.

86th.—Lieut. W. Knipe, to be Captain, without purchase, vice Boyde, retired upon full pay.

89th.—Captain De Vic Valpy, from the 21st Foot, to be Captain, vice Beedon, who exchanges.

95th.—A. T. Helme, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Wilkinson, promoted in the 17th Foot.

96th.—F. L. G. Grey, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Musters, who resigns.

98th.—Ensign T. T. Simpson to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Lewis, promoted.

2nd West Indian Regiment.—G. F. Coward, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Fyfe, deceased.

Ceylon Rifle Regiment.—Lieutenant J. C. Fielding, to be Captain without purchase, vice Clement, deceased, Aug. 15; Captain B. C. W. C. Bloxsome, from the 9th Foot, to be Captain, vice Peel, who exchanges; Ensign J. A. Denton to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Fielding, Aug. 15; J. Glover, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Denton, promoted.

DEPOT BATTALION.—Major J. W. Dewar, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Major, vice Rowlands, who exchanges.

STAFF.—Lieut. Colonel and Brevet Colonel C. H. Somerset, C.B., 72nd Foot, to be Deputy Adjutant General to the Forces serving in Bombay, vice Brevet Colonel E. H. Greathead, C.B., 8th Foot, who has resigned that appointment; Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Reynolds, Unattached, from Deputy Assistant Adjutant General at Head Quarter, to be Deputy Adjutant General to the Forces in Jamaica, in succession to Brevet Colonel T. H. Tidy, whose period of Staff service has expired, Oct. 1.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon Major H. Mapleton, M.D., to be promoted to the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals. Acting Assistant Surgeon J. Lander, M.D., to be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces. Dated 5th March, 1858.

To have the Brevet Rank of Surgeon.—Assistant Surgeon J. Fayrer, M.D., of the Bengal Medical Staff. Dated 7th September, 1858. Assistant Surgeon S. B. Partridge, of the Bengal Medical Staff. Dated 7th September, 1858. Assistant Surgeon H. M. Greenhow, of the Bengal Medical Staff. Dated 7th September, 1858. Assistant Surgeon R.

the Bengal Medical Staff. Dated ptember, 1858.

VET—The undermentioned pro s to take place, consequent on the f General Sir John Slade, Bart., , Colonel of the 5th Dragoon , on the 13th August, 1859 :— General Sir F. Stoven, K.C.B. .G., Colonel of the 83rd Foot, to neral, Aug. 14 ; Major General Davies, Colonel of the 67th Foot, Lieut. General, August 14 ; Col. arles T. Van Straubenzee, K.C. lf Pay, 3rd Foot, serving on the vith the temporary rank of Major il in command of the Forces in to be Major General, Aug. 14 ; Lieut. Colonel J. W. Major, on ay 42nd Foot, to be Colonel, Aug. revet Major W. M'Donald, 26th to be Lieut. Colonel, Aug. 14 ; n E. M. the Earl of Longford, 2nd uards, to be Major, Aug. 14.

tain W. C. Russell, of the Bengal ry, and Commissary of Ordnance habad, to be Major in the Army, ry 19, 1858 ; Captain H. Finch, 31st Bengal Native Infantry, to jor in the Army, July 30, 1858.

master W. Young, of a Depot ion, having retired upon Half Pay rtermaster previous to the decla- of war with Russia, and who had ted in all a service of thirty years, which as Quartermaster, to have norary rank of Captain, July 1.

WAR OFFICE, AUG. 26.

ERAL ORDER.—The Queen has raciously pleased to command that dermentioned Assistant Surgeons r Majesty's Indian Army be pro- to the Brevet Rank of Surgeons, the 7th September, 1858, in con- ion of their services during the f Lucknow:—Assistant Surgeon ryrer, M.D., S. B. Partridge, H. ecnhow, R. Bird.

ommand of His Royal Highness neral Commanding-in-Chief.

Signed) W. F. FORSTER,
Deputy Adjutant General.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Duke of Lancaster's Own Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet J. C. Starkie to be Lieutenant, vice Ridgway, resigned; the Right Hon. F. C. Cavendish, commonly called Lord Frederick C. Cavendish, to be Cornet, vice Starkie, promoted.

5th Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles—R. J. Tinley, gent., to be Lieut.

Montgomeryshire Yeomanry Cavalry Captain the Right Hon. G. H. R. C. Stuart, Earl Vane, to be Major, vice Williames, resigned ; Lieut. D. Jones to be Captain, vice Bonnor Maurice, resigned ; Lieut. E. Peel to be Captain, vice Earl Vane, promoted ; Cornet G. W. Adair to be Lieutenant, vice Jones, promoted ; Cornet A. S. Tripp to be Lieutenant, vice Peel, promoted ; Cornet W. H. Adams to be Lieutenant, vice Williams, deceased.

Royal Wilts—H. A. B. Bruce, gent., to be Ensign, vice Edwards, promoted ; C. Hurrell, gent., to be Ensign, vice Holman, promoted.

Wiltshire Volunteer Rifle Corps—J. H. Jacob, Esq., to be Captain of the 1st Company.

1st or Handsworth Company of the Staffordshire Volunteer Rifle Corps—H. Elwell, Esq., to be Captain.

1st Company of Northumberland Volunteer Rifles—E. Trotter, Esq., to be Captain ; J. Fenwick, gent., to be Lieut. ; J. Fawins, gent., to be Ensign.

1st Company of Northumberland Volunteer Artillery—A. Potter, Esq., to be Captain ; E. Young, gent., to be First Lieut. ; F. Pilter, gent., to be Second Lieut.

1st or Royal East Middlesex—Ensign R. J. Blyth to be Lieut., vice Iles, resigned.

4th Royal South Middlesex—Capt. A. C. Fitzjames to be Major, vice Blanchford, resigned.

Royal Glamorgan Light Infantry—J. F. N. Hewett, formerly Lieut. in her Majesty's 72nd Regiment of Foot, to be Captain.

76th Highland Light Infantry, or Inverness, Banff, Elgin, and Nairn Shires—Lieut. D. C. Cameron to be Capt., vice the Hon. L A. Grant, resigned.

Royal Perthshire Rifles—Lieut. F. McN. Leslie to be Capt., vice Prender, resigned.

DEATHS.

On the morning of the 23rd of August, sincerely and affectionately lamented, Jane Louisa, wife of Colonel Fitzmayer, C.B., Commanding the Royal Artillery, North Britain, and eldest daughter of the late Major H. Bowyer Lane, of the Royal Artillery, and of Spring Hill, Staffordshire.

On the 11th July, at Barbados, Samuel Brock Alder, Esq., D.A.C.G., aged 29.

On the 6th August, at Tunbridge-wells, Captain T. W. Andrews, Royal London Militia, late of Her Majesty's 25th Regiment of Cameronians.

On the 11th August, at Hackney, Jane, widow of Lieutenant W. Avery, aged 87.

On the 10th August, at Weedon, aged 69, Mr. Richard Barratt, who served through the war in the Peninsula, and also at Waterloo.

On the 13th August, near Ramsgate, Sarah, widow of Captain Boxer, R.N., aged 72.

On the 11th August, at Croydon, [illegible] David Bruce, formerly of the [illegible] Artillery, many years Serjeant Ma[illegible] at Addiscombe.

At Douglas, Isle-of-Man, on the [illegible] August, Humphrey Henry Carwich Esq., late Captain and Paymaster H. 36th Regiment of Foot, aged 80.

On the 14th August, at Carrick-Shannon, Capt. C. T. Clement, of [illegible] Majesty's Ceylon Rifles, aged 36.

On the 27th June, at Cawn[illegible] Lieutenant Robert W. Dent, 1st Bo[illegible] Light Cavalry.

On the 9th April, on his pas[illegible] home from Calcutta, E. L. [illegible] Esq., Bengal Civil Service, only so[illegible] the late Captain E. S. Ellis, H.E.I.C

At Futteghur, on 19th June, Q[illegible] termaster Hamilton, 8th Regiment.

On the 8th August, at Dover, E[illegible] beth, widow of Commander W. E[illegible] chinson, R.N., in her 90th year.

OUR LAND FORCES.

England.—Second Line of Defence.

that the people of England appear to be thoroughly alive to
essity of maintaining a powerful land force—in addition to a
l naval force, so aptly termed England's First Line of Defence,
gestions of even the humblest soldier as regards the Second
Defence, may prove of value; so, without further preface,
ter plunges headlong into the "troubled waters" that beset
e of the many perplexing questions of the day.
ıg into consideration the extensive military organization of
powers, as well as the wide-spread dominions which con-
the British empire, the organized land force required to
the said empire secure from even the meditation of an
cannot safely be set down at less than 700,000 men, to include
ɔpean army for India, but exclusive of a Native Indian Army,
ıt India regiments, and all colonial corps. This force might
ɔrtioned thus:—

The Army for Service . . .	250,000	men.
The Army of Reserve . . .	250,000	„
Auxiliaries (Volunteers) . . .	200,000	„
Total	700,000	men.

he Army for Service.

ɔlative proportions that some of the best authorities on military
have laid down, to be observed in calculating the strength
ɔeveral arms of the service as compared with the infantry, are as
:—viz., Cavalry $\frac{1}{5}$, Artillery $\frac{1}{8}$, Engineers $\frac{1}{30}$, Field Train $\frac{1}{60}$, so
obtain 250,000 men—

Of Infantry there should be . .	184,600	men
Cavalry	33,562	„
Artillery	23,075	„
Engineers	6,153	„
Field Train	2,675	„
Total	250,065	

us now examine what we have of these several arms in our
army, according to our establishments, and according to
ı custom counting only rank and file, and let us take the
stimates of 1859-60 as our guide.
exact strength of European cavalry and artillery specially
ing to the three Presidencies in India, from want of official in-
ion cannot be estimated quite so correctly.

* It appears that of

Infantry, we have	160,650	men.
Cavalry	19,947	„
Artillery	32,985	„
Engineers	3,466	„
Military Train	1,674	„
Total	218,722	men.

At first sight then, it would appear that we require of

Infantry	23,950	men.
Cavalry	13,615	„
Engineers	2,687	„
Military Train	1,001	„
	41,253	
Whilst of Artillery we have a surplus	9,910	
Making total number required	31,343	men.

The great deficiency in cavalry and the large surplus in artiller are the two most striking points in our army "as it is."

Yet, as almost every rule has its exception, so with this. Ou administrators appear to have used sound reason in decreasing ou cavalry, and augmenting our artillery establishments.

The United Kingdom is not a country where cavalry would hav the same field for action as on the Continent. In India the facilitie of raising irregular corps of cavalry are very great, and from them let us draw our principal supplies of that arm, if we should want the Many Indian officers have asserted their opinion that corps might l raised in India, the men of which would readily enlist for general se vice. We have had recent proof how the Turcos can fight for France surely it would be well worth trying the experiment, and to enli those only in India who would agree to such terms.

Notwithstanding our cavalry is too weak—and should be augmente On the other hand, artillery appears to be the grand arm suitable t Europeans: it will be observed that in the statement of the arm "as it is,"† that 16,496 of this arm are in India, sufficient for a army of 132,000 men. Read the evidence of the eminent soldiers wh have appeared before the late Commission on the Indian Army Their counsel is to avoid the employment of natives as artillerymen and to have none but Europeans.

For England's purposes, therefore, it might be argued that th relative proportions of her cavalry and artillery should change places Cavalry to be $\frac{1}{8}$ of the infantry; artillery to be $\frac{1}{5}$, thus:—

Infantry	184,600	men.
Cavalry	23,075	„
Artillery	33,562	„
Engineers	6,153	„
Military Train	2,675	„

* Vide Appendix I. † Vide Appendix.

The Military Train, as organized for European warfare, is out of place in India, and might be reduced to a lower ratio than $\frac{1}{69}$

Our requirements would then stand as follows:—

Of Infantry we want	23,950
Cavalry	3,128
Artillery	577
Engineers	2,687
Military Train	1,001
	31,343

Our Secretary for War lately stated in the House of Commons that we have 23,000 militia at present embodied; he, moreover, did not hold out that it was probable we should be able to dispense with the services of an equal number of militia for some time to come. Deduct this force from 31,343 men required, and the only real increase wanting to our embodied army will be 8,343 men.

All parties agree that it is desirable to hold our militia purely as a reserve force; and most assuredly it is a misnamed reserve, if so considerable a body as 23,000 must be continually embodied.

Let us, therefore, raise our army for service to what our necessities tell us we want.

Great stress, as it undoubtedly deserves, is laid on the minimum European force required for India, as elicited from the evidence given before the Commission on the Indian Army. 80,000 men, it is said, will suffice to adjust the scales. Is it wise to have so near a balance? Throw in 20,000 men, and let the scale sink well down in our favour. The prize at stake is too great to be trifled with.

But to proceed. For the 23,950 infantry required, as no scheme for raising troops has proved so successful on the whole as that of forming second battalions, let us have twenty-five more of them. Let the four battalions of the 60th rifles be henceforth known as the 2nd Rifle Brigade. Raise a new 60th regiment, and from the 25th to the 48th regiments inclusive, add a second battalion to each.* To keep up an army of 100,000 men in India, seventy-six battalions of infantry will not be more than necessary.

For the 3,128 cavalry. Leave the household cavalry as they are. Let 144 men constitute a squadron, and give five squadrons to each cavalry regiment in England as well as in India, it would still leave 422 men below our requirements, but it would be near enough.† Of artillery, the number required is too small to render a suggestion necessary as to how it should be raised.

The Engineers require a considerable increase. The objection commonly made against maintaining a large force of this most useful arm of the service, is the high rate of pay of the men; but it must be remembered, that a considerable portion of this pay is remunerative to the country, being skilled labour that is obtained. By increasing our numbers, the services of a corresponding number of civilians can be dispensed with. There are thirty-six companies. Let 110 men form a company, it would require twenty new companies to be added to the corps.

* Vide Appendix II.

† Vide Appendix II.

The Military Train are divided into six battalions, according to their present formation. By adding one battalion, and increasing the establishment of each battalion, the deficiency that exists might be made good. But one word about this corps. Surely it might be rendered of far more service, and much better suited to the work expected from it in war time, if it were docked of its cavalry pretensions, four horses to a waggon, and two men on the horses. Surely there is a great waste of power here. A strong, serviceable, but light cart for one horse, one man to *walk* alongside, a few spare horses to act as leaders over rough and difficult ground, mounted officers and sergeants—could more be wanted? In peace time employ these men and carts wherever Government work is going on, and do not be too particular about the military nature of the carts' contents. Keep up the military organization of the corps. Let it be officered from our cavalry non-commissioned officer class. A gentleman born and bred so, can never adopt this service without a qualm.

In proposing this increase to our army, those who have had the patience to read thus far, may be saying within themselves—yes, very desirable; but where are the men to come from? Consider the numbers required to complete even our present establishments. The reply should be—to obtain men is a mere matter of legislation. They are required for the country's safety, and must be had. Voluntary enlistment may be a grand affair to boast of, but if it prove insufficient, however painful to our English vanity, there is nothing for it but to have resort to the ballot. There is one powerful agent that is sadly neglected in our military institutions, "esprit de corps." It exists very generally in the army for service, and is the very keystone of the structure of all that is good in a regiment; but to keep up the military spirit of a nation, this "esprit de corps" must expand considerably beyond its present limits. No army of reserve can be kept up cheerfully by any other means. The scheme about to be proposed for the army of reserve has its principal foundation on the liberal use of this most powerful engine of swaying men's minds.

To gain supporters to any new scheme, it is a matter of primary importance to examine into all its financial bearings. How much would it cost? At present let us feel our way, and try to discover whether the plans to be proposed appear as feasible to others as they do to the sanguine author of them.

If pronounced practicable, there will be no lack of clever financiers to count the cost.

The Army of Reserve.

Comments will be made on the title. What! change the old constitutional nomenclature? Yes. Abolish it altogether, as utterly opposed to true military esprit. There should be but one army really—one part embodied on the watch, the other part disembodied, but ready to turn out, equally efficient, or nearly so, at a moment's notice.

It is true we have militia regiments equal to the best of our regulars; but how attained? Only by embodying them for lengthened periods. How would it be if only fifteen days a year? Yet, the

Army of Reserve should be so composed that fifteen days' training would be sufficient.

The several corps of the Army of Service should have told off to them corresponding corps belonging to the Army of Reserve, and both should have a special district from whence to draw their recruits.*

Each service brigade of artillery, each regiment of cavalry, each battalion of infantry or military train, each company of engineers, should be represented in the Army of Reserve—the same arms, same dress, same devices—silver lace in place of gold the sole distinction.

There should be that perfect unity of feeling between the district, county, or town, which gives its name to each separate corps, and the corps itself (Service and Reserve bodies, both), that whilst to the one it should form a matter of pride that from no other sources were the ranks of her regiment filled, to the other it would serve as an additional stimulant to the performance of those great deeds that serve not only as the boast of every Englishman throughout the world, but which more particularly would be cherished from the honour it would shed on its own individual birth place. Again, there is a class of men peculiarly adapted to the Army of Reserve—trained soldiers, who have completed their term of service, or who purchase their discharges before their time is up. These men should have strong inducements offered to them to join the Reserve.

In due course of time we might hope to see the Reserve for the most part filled by men who had been trained as soldiers in the service battalions—men to whom fifteen days annual rubbing up in their old military exercises would prove ample. Another source from which the Reserve might receive supplies, is from men found unfit for foreign service, and sent home to be invalided.

Experience teaches us that many men, strong and active in their native country, knock up at once on a foreign station. Some latent disease shows itself. These men are often sent home and discharged, and the country has been put to much expense to no purpose. Now if these men were posted to the Reserve to work out the remainder of their service, many would completely recover, and prove as good stuff to trust to, as a defence, as many of their more strongly constitutioned brethren in arms.

The entire recruiting should be carried on by the Reserve, each corps of which should have its head quarters in the principal town of the district, or county, or the town itself, whence the original supplies of men are to be drawn. Recruits to be enrolled, in the first instance, in the Reserve battalion, regiment, brigade, or company. The terms of enlistment to be ten years active service, or twenty years reserve service, for the infantry (increased in the cavalry and artillery). The ranks of the Reserve to be kept up to its full establishment by the district to which it is told off—the ballot to be resorted to if men are not forthcoming.

The Service battalion to be kept up to its full establishment by the

* Thus: 1st Brigade Royal Horse Artillery; 1st Brigade Reserve Royal Horse Artillery. 1st Dragoon Guards; 1st Reserve Dragoon Guards. 1st Battalion Royals; 1st Reserve Battalion Royals. No. 1 Company Royal Engineers; No. 1 Company Reserve Royal Engineers.

Reserve, and in the event of volunteers not stepping forward, the ballot to be resorted to in the Reserve. The only men in Reserve corps to be exempted from ballot in such cases to be those who have already passed through the Service corps, and either completed their term or purchased off it; or men who have served an equivalent twenty years in the Reserve.

It would, of course, require carefully drawn up estimates from the census to proportion the numbers that each portion of the country should keep up.

For such men as would prefer a corps recruited generally, it would be desirable to have a certain number. The regiments specially told off for service in India should be of this class.

Some are of opinion that recruits, as a body, like to have their choice of their own regiments; but, if we had a system that offered advantages from ensuring a newly-joined soldier the society of men to whom he is already known, it is only in accordance with human nature to suppose the preference would be given to his own local corps. Thus, all coming from the same district, in the first place, and enrolling themselves in the Reserve, in volunteering for the Service corps, the volunteer would look forward to meeting some old comrades—he would not feel a stranger; and when the day arrived to return to the Reserve, each annual muster would be looked forward to as bringing together a crowd of old acquaintances.

A soldier of the State is entitled to his pension, whether it is active service or reserve service he has rendered. Pensions to be gained by a double service in the Reserve, as compared with active service, thus:

21 years, Infantry 24 years, Cavalry	} Active Service.	42 years, 48 years,	} Reserve Service.

Broken periods to count in the same proportion.

The bounty is the most powerful agent, at present, in providing recruits. A sum of money and a free kit on joining the Reserve, a further sum on joining the Service corps (without a kit, as the uniforms of the Reserve and Service would be exactly the same), and a yet further sum to re-engage for further service, whether in the Service corps or Reserve corps, might be found efficacious.

Discharge by purchase might be carried on as now, except that a reduction might be made in the case of a trained soldier wishing to purchase his discharge out of the Service corps, but having no objection to remain in the Reserve.

Although making it a general rule, to draw supplies of men from the Reserve corps to fill up blanks in the Service corps, there is no reason why "head-quarter recruits," as they are now called—recruits enlisted by the service battalion itself—should not have their wishes gratified. By continuing this practice it might meet the objection respecting the doubtful policy of not letting every man choose his own regiment.

The ex[illegible] are a body which properly belong to the [illegible] require a somewhat different or[illegible]regoing scheme. Its strength [illegible]illery, cavalry, engineers,

and infantry of this force should each be made available in case of need, according to the arm of the service he has been brought up to. The present system is very faulty in this respect.

An old cavalry soldier, though his limbs may be somewhat stiff, would render far more service in a charge than two-thirds of the young cavalry soldiers of even two years' service. A veteran battery of artillery, a veteran troop or squadron of cavalry, or a veteran company or two of infantry—even a veteran squad of engineers would not be out of place in the Reserve corps. It would render the services of staff officers of pensioners unnecessary, as their work would fall to the staff of the Reserve battalion.

To provide for such a contingency as the desire of pensioners and trained soldiers whose first term of service had expired, to be told off to the Reserve corps of the district in which they had found it convenient to settle, arrangements might be made to enable them to do so.

Having given a general idea of this new scheme for replacing the militia with an Army of Reserve, let us now examine more closely a method for organizing the force. In the proposed organization of the Army for Service* it will be observed that the infantry are divided into—

Infantry	175 Battalions
Cavalry	33 Regiments
Horse Artillery . .	3 Brigades
Foot ditto	21 Brigades
Engineers	56 Companies
Military Train . . .	7 Battalions

Our Army of Reserve should preserve the same organization. We must next take into consideration how to turn to account the services of the miscalled force, claiming for itself the attributes of an Army of Reserve, yet fulfilling them so imperfectly, which exists under the name of militia. The yeomanry corps are the cavalry force belonging to the auxiliary or volunteer force, so that we have only two arms of the service to consider, viz. infantry and artillery. A great portion of the regiments of our army at present bear the names of counties and districts, and there are militia regiments assimilating to them in name, yet strange as it may appear, in most cases, no strong tie unites them, consequent thereon. Here, however, is some foundation to begin upon to kindle up the much to be desired *esprit de corps*. The Irish regiments of militia considerably exceed the number of corps bearing their country's titles in the line, the recent formation of 2nd battalions to regiments affords a ready means of remedying this. To give some idea how this proposition might be carried out a list is given.† No doubt many modifications would be necessary, but it will serve to show upon what method it is proposed to draw into closer fellowship the armies of Service and Reserve.

The numbers to be raised for the Army of Reserve would amount to somewhat as follows:—

* Vide Appendix II. † Vide Appendix III.

Infantry—175 Battalions of 1000 men each . . .	175,000
Cavalry—33 Regiments, 4 Squadrons of 144 each . .	19,008
Artillery (Horse), 3 Brigades	5,720
Artillery (Foot), 21 Brigades	31,080
Engineers—56 Companies	5,600
Military Train—7 Skeleton Battalions	700
	237,108
Add Pensioners formed into additional batteries, troops, or companies, say, ...	12,892
Deduct 2,523 not available	250,000

Before quitting this subject of the Army of Reserve, we ought to consider upon the best method of ensuring a proper knowledge of his duties to each soldier, according to the arm of the service to which he belongs. Suppose we were to establish schools of instruction, calling them

Drill Brigades of Artillery.
Drill Regiments of Cavalry.
Drill Battalions of Infantry.
Drill Companies of Engineers.

Every recruit on being enrolled to have to pass through the school of instruction. For infantry, say six months, cavalry twelve, artillery fifteen months. Every soldier would, by such means, be well grounded in his duties, and the annual fifteen days, or twenty-one days training, would not be the farce it is now. Commanding officers and staff of these drill corps to be selected from amongst the most efficient officers of the Service corps.

Company officers and non-commissioned officers, according to the number of recruits undergoing instruction, to be embodied from the Reserve corps for such time as their services might be required.

The drill brigades of artillery and cavalry would entail the necessity of keeping up a certain number of horses on the permanently embodied establishment of the Army of Reserve; but the money would be well laid out. Teach men well at first starting, and they can never quite forget their art.

To carry out the annual training of artillery and cavalry reserve corps, who would be dismounted, it might be arranged to place a dismounted squadron of the Reserve cavalry alongside a squadron of Service cavalry for fifteen days, and let the Reserve squadron use the horses of the Service squadron; the same with a Reserve battery of field artillery, and a Service battery.

These drill battalions would also serve to keep the officers of the Reserve up to their work.

At first starting, these schools of instruction, or soldier manufactories, would have an over-abundant quantity of raw material to work into shape; but time would remedy this, as the Reserve corps began to fill with old trained soldiers.

The Reserve cavalry would, perhaps, of all, most repay a careful system as respects their training, so very difficult is it to fill up

gaps in their arm. The yeomanry cavalry is composed of a class of men who could not fulfil the conditions of a Reserve cavalry in keeping the ranks of our Service cavalry regiments complete.

Depôt battalions for the Service army might be kept as now; they would be eased of some of their labour by getting recruits handed over to them with some knowledge of their profession.

Independent of every contrivance for thoroughly teaching recruits at drill and depôt corps, there should be every means and contrivance to make a soldier's life off duty a popular one; good large airy reading rooms; a comfortable canteen, and more after the description of a popular tea garden than the dreary pot-house affairs usually met with at present; ground for cricket; bowls; gymnastics; even a theatre for amateur theatricals, an amusement soldiers are very fond of. This style of building is also very useful for giving lectures.

When the militia was raised it was expected that it would be from a class superior to that which formed the line, but this has not generally proved to be the case, so that it is better to consider the raw material for both as being of the same quality.

Let us rapidly review the system proposed to ensure our establishments being complete:—

1st.—The Service companies would be supplied from its own depôt as now.

2nd.—The depôt Service companies would be supplied from the Reserve battalion.

3rd.—The Reserve battalion would be supplied from its own district, county, or town.

Voluntary enlistment, with resort to ballot, in case of failure, must supply the Reserve battalion.

Volunteers for active service, or ballot in the Reserve battalions, in case of failure, must supply the Service depôts.

The Service depôts would supply the Service battalions as now.

A regiment or battalion has no need of a depôt when on home service, and the depôt companies should then join the Service ones. The Service drawing its supplies direct from the Reserve corps.

It only remains to say a few words about the *Auxiliary Force, or Army of Volunteers.*

This body would not require so complete an organization as the Army of Reserve. The estimate of their numbers, 200,000 men, may be regarded as the least to be calculated on. If the patriotism of the country breaks out to the extent of five times that number, so much the better.

Let this army be shackled by no rules as to the different proportions of each arm, whether a battalion of rifles, or a company; a regiment of cavalry, a squadron, or troop; a brigade of artillery, a battery, or a squadron to work one pet gun. If the Government is satisfied of their loyalty, pray recognise them; only let it be understood that this is a force whose members must undertake to arm, equip, and clothe themselves, and also to pay for their instruction. All they should expect from Government should be arms and ammunition from the Government factories at cost price.

He who is not sufficiently independent in his circumstances to afford this outlay has no business as a volunteer.

Volunteers should be of that class, who give their attention to arms from pure love of their country, expecting no recompense, seeking no assistance from the public purse.

The Armies of Service and Reserve may call theirs a profession; not so the volunteers. They are amateurs, and such amateurs should they be, as independent Englishmen love to prove themselves in every art and science. Men who put to blush over and over again the professed followers of the very crafts themselves.

An accepted volunteer would be free from the liability to serve in the Army of Reserve, this would be quite privilege enough.

The yeomanry cavalry form a magnificent force of their particular arm, already in existence.

Let us wind up. England will never be in a thoroughly sound position, until she has a system such as described, or one somewhat similar to it, which unites all the land forces of the country, clearly defining to each the part it has to play in the defence of the country. One also that provides against our forces being only "*on paper;*" a sure means of keeping the ranks of each army full up to their establishments is a *sine quâ non*.

The Army of Service must be numerous enough to insure safety to the State when at peace with all its neighbours.

The Army of Reserve must be sufficient to take the place of the Army of Service, when this latter is required to take the field abroad, and also to fill up the blanks in the Army of Service caused by active service in the field, as well as ordinary casualties. The volunteer force can never be required, in addition to the Army of Reserve, until the day arrives that a foe is found rash enough to beard the lion of England in his own den.

Above all things, do not let us be taken in by the professions made by foreign powers to reduce their present armaments. Our army for service at 250,000 men does not allow us one man beyond what is absolutely necessary to render our position as a first-class power a safe one, and in a defensive point of view. Let us be civil to all foreign powers, and yet in a position to make them civil to us. Until this takes place, the disgraceful panics that have seized the public mind of late must be expected to occur again. It is the duty of every Englishman to lend a helping hand towards England's defences, but it is a very different business to be continually informing the French nation that we are defending ourselves against them in particular, in spite of their assertions that they are our faithful allies. Thank them for their friendly assurances, but continue our defences. If we choose to make England one vast citadel, what is it to any foreign power, but why make so much noise about it?

Agitation has done its work, and England's mind is made up to have her defences. Now the time is come to set about it: let us have silence, and the work will be both quicker and better done.

APPENDIX I.

RN OF THE ARMY FOR SERVICE—AS IT IS—INCLUDING ONLY EUROPEANS.

INFANTRY.

CORPS.	BATTS.			STRENGTH.	TOTAL.
... ...	7		... ...	800	5,600
t. of Regts. of Line	100	142 of which	1 (65th) ...	1400	1,400
" "	24		2 (3rd 4 Rifle Brigds)	1300	2,600
" (60th)	1		64 in India	1200	76,800
" (60th)	1		63	950	59,850
rigade	4		12 (Europeans, India)	1200	14,400
ans (India) ...	12				
			142		160,650
Total ...		149 Battalions—160,650 men.			

CAVALRY.

CORPS.	REGTS.		SQUADRONS.	STRENGTH OF REGIMENT.	TOTAL.
ards ...	2	... ...	8	351	702
Horse Guards ...	1	... ...	4	351	351
n Guards ...	7	5 of 5 squadrons	25	676	3380
		2 of 4 "	8	577	1154
Dragoons ...	18	6 of 5 "	30	676	4056
		12 of 4 "	48	577	6924
Light Cavalry...	5	... ...	25	676	3380
	33		148		19,947
Total ...	33 Regiments—148 Squadrons—19,947 men.				

ARTILLERY.

CORPS.	BRIGADES.	BATTERIES.	MEN.	TOTAL.
Horse Artillery	1	10	at home ... 1371 in India ... 748	2119
rtillery ...	14	112	at home & colonies 14505 in India .. 7128	21633
... ...	...	unknown	... ...	613
Bengal.				
Artillery ...	1	9	... ...	1260
rtillery ...	3	18	... ...	2880
Bombay.				
Artillery ...	½	4	... ...	560
rtillery ...	2 demi	12	... ...	1440
... ..	1 demi			
Madras.				
Artillery ...	½	4	... ...	560
rtillery ...	4 demi	16	... ...	1920
Total ...	285 Batteries—32,985.			

actual strength of the Batteries of Indian Artillery not being known the ions have been made at the lowest estimate.

ENGINEERS.

Number of men at home and in Colonies ...		3008
,, in India		458
Total ...		3466
(Divided into 36 Companies.)		

MILITARY TRAIN.

At home		1438
In India		236
Total ...		1674
(Divided into 6 Battalions.)		

APPENDIX II.

RETURN OF THE ARMY OF SERVICE—AS "PROPOSED TO BE."

INFANTRY.

CORPS.	BATTS.			ESTBLSHT.	TOTAL
Guards ..	7		... ...	800	5,600
Regts.—1st Batt.	100	168 of which	say 1 for Australia ...	1400	1,400
,, 2nd Batt.	48		,, 76 for India, China, &c	1200	91,200
Rifles	8		,, 91 for Home Service,	950	86,450
Europeans (India)	12		Mediterranean, &c.		
	175		168		184,650

175 Battalions=184,650.

CAVALRY.

CORPS.	REGTS.		SQUADRONS.	STRENGTH OF EACH SQUADRON.	TOTAL.
Life Guards ...	2	as now ...	8	875	702
Royal Horse Guards ...	1	as now ...	4	878	351
Dragoon Guards ...	7	5 squadrons each	35	144	5,040
Light Cavalry ...	18	do.	90	144	12,960
Bengal Cavalry ...	5	do.	25	144	3,600
	33		162		22,653

33 Regiments—162 Squadrons=22,653.

ARTILLERY.

CORPS.	BRGDS.	BATRS.		TOTAL
Royal Horse Artillery	1	10	of 220 men each ...	2,200
,, Bengal ,,	1	10	... ...	2,200
,, Bombay ,,	½	5	... ...	1,100
,, Madras ,,	½	5	... ...	1,100
Royal Foot Artillery	14	112	say 6 Brgds. Fd. Btrs. 8 Garis.	
,, Bengal ,,	3	24	2 ,, ,, 1 ,,	26,962
,, Bombay ,,	2	16	1½ ,, ,, ½ ,,	
,, Madras ,,	2	16	1½ ,, ,, ½ ,,	
	24	198		33,562

s organization of Batteries into Brigades, amalgamating the Royal and n European Artillery, according to one uniform system, will probably be ed soon. In the above Return Horse Artillery Brigades are given 10 ries, and Foot Artillery Brigades 8 Batteries each.

ENGINEERS.

56 Companies—110 men per Company=6,160 men.

MILITARY TRAIN.

7 Battalions of 375 men each=2,625 men.

Infantry	...	...	...	184,560
Cavalry	...	...	...	22,653
Artillery	...	...	...	33,562
Engineers	...	...	...	6,160
Military Train	...	...	...	2,625
				249,650

luding Officers and Non-commissioned Officers, our Army for Service would d 250,000 men.

---

e Militia Regiments printed in Roman in the following tables correspond with Regiments of the Line opposite them. Those printed in Italic are Militia ents in existence not having corresponding regiments in the Line. Proposed he battalions of the line should take their appellation from them. Those s of counties printed between parenthesis signify that it would be well, in the nstance, to ask the counties which claim the 1st Battalion to raise represen- s. If beyond their power, whatever county can supply the remedy to give name to the battalion. There are nineteen required. Rutland, also, whose a is composed of one company, would require assistance from neighbouring ties to supply the 58th Regiment.

e head quarters of each Reserve Corps to be at the principal town of its own y or circuit, or at the most central town of a district, if several counties are ined to furnish the reserve, as in the case of the cavalry and artillery.

e Indian Reserve might find it convenient to have their head quarters more l, thus—

1st Bengal	Reserve	Infantry	at one place in London.
1st	do.	Cavalry	
1st	do.	Artillery	
2nd Bengal	Reserve	Infantry	at one place in Dublin.
2nd	do.	Cavalry	
2nd	do.	Artillery	

o on.

APPENDIX III.

CORPS.	COUNTY, APPELLATION, ETC.	CORRESPONDING MILITIA.	CORPS.	COUNTY, APPELLALION, ETC.	CORRESPONDING MILITIA.
Gren. Guards, 1 Batt.	Head Quarters.	London.	12th „ 1 Batt.	East Suffolk.	East Suffolk.
„ 2 Batt.		Dublin.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Suffolk).
„ 3 Batt.		Birmingham.	13th „ 1 Batt.	1st Somerset.	1st Somerset.
Coldstreams, 1 Batt.	General	Windsor.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Somerset).
„ 2 Batt.		York.	14th „ 1 Batt.	Buckingham.	Royal Bucks.
Scots Fusiliers, 1 Batt.		Edinburgh.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*4th Middlesex.*
„ 2 Batt.		Glasgow.	15th „ 1 Batt.	York, East Riding.	East York.
1st Foot, 1 Batt.	Royals (Scots).	*Edinburgh.*	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*5th West York.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Glasgow).	16th „ 1 Batt.	Bedfordshire.	Bedfordshire.
2nd „ 1 Batt.	Queens.	*Queen's Own.*	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Bedford).
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Queen's County.*	17th „ 1 Batt.	Leicestershire.	Leicester.
3rd „ 1 Batt.	Buffs, East Kent.	East Kent.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*5th Lancashire.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*West Kent.*	18th „ 1 Batt.	Royal Irish.	*Dublin County.*
4th „ 1 Batt.	King's Own.	*King's Own.*	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*South Cork.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*King's County.*	19th „ 1 Batt.	1st York, N. Riding.	North York.
5th „ 1 Batt.	Northumberland.	Northumberland.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*6th West York.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*2nd Durham.*	20th „ 1 Batt.	East Devonshire.	(East Devonshire).
6th „ 1 Batt.	1st Warwickshire.	1st Warwickshire.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Wexford.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Royal Longford.*	21st „ 1 Batt.	R. N. B. Fusiliers.	(Glasgow).
7th „ 1 Batt.	Royal Fusiliers.	*Royal London.*	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Renfrew.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*4th West York.*	22nd „ 1 Batt.	Cheshire.	1st Royal Cheshire.
8th „ 1 Batt.	King's	*North Mayo.*	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	2nd Cheshire.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*South Mayo.*	23rd „ 1 Batt.	R. Welsh Fusiliers.	*Carmarthen.*
9th „ 1 Batt.	East Norfolk.	2nd East Norfolk.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Brecknockshire.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Limerick County.*	24th „ 1 Batt.	2nd Warwick.	2nd Warwick.
10th „ 1 Batt.	North Lincoln.	North Lincoln.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*4th Lancashire.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Lincoln).	25th „ 1 Batt.	Borderers.	*Dumfries, Roxburgh, & Selkirk.*
11th „ 1 Batt.	North Devon.	1st Devon.	„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Galloway.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Devonshire).	26th „ 1 Batt.	Cameronians.	*Haddington, Berwick.*

CORPS.	COUNTY, APPELLATION, ETC.	CORRESPONDING MILITIA.
26th Foot 2 Batt.	Cameronians.	*Peebles.*
27th „ 1 Batt.	Inniskilling.	*Fermanagh.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Sligo.*
28th „ 1 Batt.	North Gloucester.	N. Gloucester.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(N. Gloucester).
29th „ 1 Batt.	Worcestershire.	Worcester.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Worcester).
30th „ 1 Batt.	Cambridgeshire.	Cambridge.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Cambridge).
31st „ 1 Batt.	Huntingdonshire.	Huntingdon.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Huntingdon).
32nd „ 1 Batt.	Cornwall.	Cornwall Rangers.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Roscommon.*
33rd „ 1 Batt.	Duke of Wellington.	*Royal Meath.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Westmeath.*
34th „ 1 Batt.	Cumberland.	Royal Cumberland.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*6th Lancashire.*
35th „ 1 Batt.	Royal Sussex.	1st Royal Sussex.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*3rd Royal Surrey.*
36th „ 1 Batt.	Herefordshire.	Hereford.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Hereford).
37th „ 1 Batt.	North Hampshire.	Hampshire.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*2nd Surrey.*
38th „ 1 Batt.	1st Staffordshire.	1st Stafford.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Londonderry.*
39th „ 1 Batt.	Dorsetshire.	Dorset.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(Dorsetshire).
40th „ 1 Batt.	2nd Somerset.	2nd Somerset.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Kerry.*
41st Foot 1 Batt.	The Welch.	*Carnarvon and Anglesea.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Radnor and Cardigan.*
42nd „ 1 Batt.	Highlanders.	*Argyleshire, Bute, and Western Isles.*
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Stirling, Dunbarton.*
43rd „ 1 Batt.	Monmouthshire.	Monmouthshire.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Glamorganshire.*
44th „ 1 Batt.	East Essex.	Essex.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*5th Middlesex.*
45th „ 1 Batt.	Nottingham.	Nottingham.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*2nd Derby.*
46th „ 1 Batt.	South Devon.	South Devon.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	(South Devon).
47th „ 1 Batt.	Lancashire.	1st Royal Lancashire.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*2nd Lancashire.*
48th „ 1 Batt.	Northampton.	Northampton.
„ 2 Batt.	... ...	*Kildare.*
49th „	Hertfordshire.	Hertfordshire.
50th „	Queen's Own.	*Dublin City.*
51st „	2nd Yorkshire, W. R.	2nd West York.
52nd „	Oxfordshire.	Oxfordshire.
53rd „	Shropshire.	Shropshire.
54th „	West Norfolk.	1st West Norfolk.
55th „	Westmoreland.	Royal Westmoreland.
56th „	West Essex.	West Essex.
57th „	West Middlesex.	3rd R. Wstmns. & Mdlx.
58th „	Rutland.	Rutland.*
59th „	2nd Nottingham.	(Nottingham).
60th „	... ...	*Kilkenny Fusiliers.*
61st „	South Gloucester.	South Gloucester.

CORPS.	COUNTY, APPELLATION, ETC.	CORRESPONDING MILITIA.
Foot	Wiltshire.	Royal Wiltshire
„	West Suffolk.	West Suffolk
„	2 Stafford.	2nd Stafford
„	2 York, N.R.	3rd West York
„	Berkshire.	Royal Berks
„	South Hampshire.	(Hampshire)
„	Durham.	1st South Durham
„	South Lincoln.	South Lincoln
„	Surrey.	1st Royal Surrey
„	Highland Light Inf.	*2nd Royal Lanark*
„	Highland.	*Rosshire and Cromarty*
„	... ...	*Louth*
„	Highland	*Royal Ayrshire*
„	... ...	*Monoyan*
„	... ...	*Wicklow*
„	East Middlesex.	Royal East Middlesex
„	Highland Rosshire.	*Rosshire N.*
„	Ditto.	*Inverness*
„	Stafford.	3rd Stafford
81st „	Lincoln.	(Lincoln)
82nd „	Prince of Wales.	*Donegal*
83rd „	... ...	*Tipperary*
84th „	York and Lancaster.	3rd Lancashire
85th „	Bucks.	(Buckingham)
86th „	County Down.	Royal North Down
87th „	Royal Irish Fusiliers.	*Royal Tyrone Fusiliers*
88th „	Connaught.	*Galway*
89th „	... ...	*Cavan*
90th „	Perthshire.	Perthshire
94th Foot	Highlanders ...	*Carlow*
95th „	Derbyshire ...	1st Derby
96th „	... ...	*Clare*
97th „	Earl of Ulster's ...	*Armagh*
98th „	... ...	*Royal South Devon*
99th „	Lanarkshire ...	1st Royal Lanark
100th „	Royal Canadian ...	(*Canada*)
1st Rifle Brigade ...	... ...	
„ „ 1 Batt.	... ...	*1st West York*
„ „ 2 Batt.	... ...	*2nd Edmonston R. Rifles*
„ „ 3 Batt.	... ...	*Antrim Rifles*
„ „ 4 Batt.	... ...	*R. Merioneth & Mtgmry.*
2nd Rifle Brigade ...	... ...	
„ „ 1 Batt.	... ...	*7th Lancashire Rifles*
„ „ 2 Batt.	... ...	*R. Denbigh and Flint*
„ „ 3 Batt.	... ...	*Leitrim Rifles*
„ „ 4 Batt.	... ...	*North Cork Rifles*
1st Bengal... ...	General Head Qrs.	London
2nd „	„ „	Dublin
3rd „	„ „	Edinburgh
4th „	„ „	York
5th „	„ „	Glasgow
6th „	„ „	Waterford
1st Bombay ...	„ „	Liverpool
2nd „	„ „	Cork
3rd „	„ „	Birmingham
1st Madras ...	„ „	Bristol
2nd „	„ „	Belfast
3rd „	„ „	Hull

	APPELLATION.	PROPOSED DISTRICTS FOR RECRUITING, AND FOR RESERVES OF CAVALRY.
1st Life Guards ...		
2nd do. ...	... ...	General Recruiting—Hd. Qrs., London
Royal Horse Guards ...		
1st Dragoon Guards ...	... ...	Northumberland and Durham
2nd do. ...	... ...	Yorkshire—North and West Riding
3rd do. ...	... ...	Cumberland and Westmoreland
4th do. ...	Irish	Leinster
5th do. ...	... ...	Shropshire and Stafford
6th Carabineers ...	... ...	Cambridge, Norfolk, and Suffolk
7th Dragoon Guards ...	... ..	Scotland
1st Royal Dragoons ...	... ...	Yorkshire—East and South Riding
2nd Scotch Greys	Scotch	Scotland
3rd Lt. Dragoons	... ...	Derby and Cheshire
4th Lt. Dragoons	... ...	Nottingham and Lincoln
5th Lancers	Irish	Connaught
6th Inniskilling ...	Inniskilling	Ulster
7th Hussars	... ...	Gloucester, Hereford, and Monmouth
8th Hussars	... ...	Munster
9th Lancers	... ...	Northampton, Bedford, Huntingdon, and Rutland
10th Hussars	... ...	Lancashire
11th Hussars	... ...	Worcester, Warwick, and Leicester
12th Lancers	... ...	Wales
13th Lt. Dragoons ...	... ...	Surrey, Kent, and Sussex
14th Lt. Dragoons ...	... ...	Hampshire and Wiltshire
15th Hussars	... ...	Oxford, Berkshire, and Buckingham
16th Lancers	... ...	Hertford, Middlesex, and Essex
17th Lancers	... ...	Devon and Cornwall
18th Hussars	... ...	Somerset and Dorset
1st Bengal Lt. Cavalry	... ...	General — Hd. Qrs., London
2nd do.	... ...	„ Dublin
3rd do.	... ..	„ Liverpool
4th do.	... ...	„ Belfast
5th do.	... ...	„ Edinburgh
Total, 33 Regiments		

ARTILLERY.

1 Royal Horse Artillery	Recruiting Head Quarters Woolwich.
1 „ Bengal „	„ „ London
½ „ Bombay „	General „ Liverpool.
½ „ Madras „	„ „ Bristol.

Total 3 Brigades.

CORPS OF "SERVICE."	PROPOSED DISTRICT FOR RESERVE.
1st Brigade Royal Foot Artillery	*Cornwall* (4) *Devon* (4)
2nd „ „ „	*Hampshire* (5) (Dorset) (2) *Isle of Wight* (1)
3rd „ „ „	*Sussex* (5) *Kent* (6) (Middlesex)
4th „ „ „	*Norfolk* (4) *Suffolk* (5) (Essex)
5th „ „ „	*Northumberland* (4) *and Durham* (4)
6th „ „ „	*Edinburgh* (3) *Fife* (6)
7th „ „ „	*Forfar and Kincardine* (8)
8th „ „ „	*Lancashire* (6) *and* (Cheshire) (2)
9th „ „ „	*Pembroke* (4) *Glamorgan* (3)
10th „ „ „	*Antrim* (6) (Down) *Armagh* (1)

CORPS OF "SERVICE."	PROPOSED DISTRICT FOR RESERVE.
11th " " "	*Donegal* (4) *Londonderry* (1) *Tyrone* (1)
12th " " "	*West Cork* (6) *Royal Cork City* (4)
13th " " "	*Dublin* (4) *South Tipperary* (8)
14th " " "	*Waterford* (8) *Limerick* (3)
1st Brigade Bengal Foot Artillery	General Head Quarters London
2nd " " "	" " Dublin
3rd " " "	" " Southampton
1st " Bombay "	" " Liverpool
2nd " " "	" " Belfast
1st " Madras "	" " Bristol
2nd " " "	" " Hull
21 Brigades of Foot Artillery.	

Memo.—The Counties printed in Italics signify that they have Artillery Corp already. The figures denoting number of Batteries. The Counties printed i Roman indicate that it would be desirable to raise Artillery Reserve Batteries i these Counties.

ENGINEERS.	TOLD OFF TO	COUNTIES AND DISTRIC FOR RESERVE.
1 2 3 4 Companies ...	1st Brigade Foot Artillery	England
5 6 7 8 " "	2nd " "	Do.
9 10 11 12 " ...	3rd " "	Do.
13 14 15 16 " ...	4th " "	Do.
17 18 19 20 " ...	5th " "	Do.
21 22 23 24 " ...	6th " "	Scotland
25 26 27 28 " ...	7th " "	Do.
29 30 31 32 " ...	8th " "	Do.
33 34 35 36 " ...	9th " "	Wales
37 38 39 40 " ...	10th " "	Ireland
41 42 43 44 " ...	11th " "	Do.
45 46 47 48 " ...	12th " "	Do.
49 50 51 52 " ...	13th " "	Do.
53 54 55 56 " ...	14th " "	Do.
Total, 56 Companies		

Memo.—Head Quarters to be at the same place as Head Quarters of Brigade o Artillery, to which the Companies are told off.

MILITARY TRAIN.	RESERVE TO BE IN
First Battalion	Northern Division of England
Second "	West Centre of England and Wales
Third "	East Centre of England
Fourth "	Southern Division of England
Fifth "	Scotland
Sixth "	Northern Division of Ireland
Seventh "	Southern " "
Skeleton Battalions	

THE ADMIRALTY AND SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS'S SCREW PROPELLER.

GREAT mechanical inventions are rarely perfected by one hand. As in the case of the clock, they proceed step by step, till at length they take a practicable form, and attain the object first designed, but rather imagined than reached. Even at this point they are open to improvement. The clock of Henry de Wyck was regulated by a balance, but the balance suggested a scapement, and the scapement itself made way for the pendulum. So the steam engine, now so complete, had its progressive development. What a gulf did it pass from its crude conception by the Marquis of Worcester to its realization by Watt! To take the most notable developments, there was the Marquis's own fire-engine, Papin's digester, Savery's hydraulic machine, and finally Watt's engine. The screw propeller is going through similar transitions. Smith's original apparatus was modified by the Admiralty dual fan, and some further advance was attained by Griffiths's tapered blades, but, apart from some experiments on board the Fairy in 1853 with screws cut into various forms not on scientific data, but on the principle of "rough-hew them how you will," and which led to no result—the screw propeller has been allowed to remain, like the clumsy inventions of the Chinese, half-way between success and failure, its original imperfections all untouched. These, as practical men know, are of a very serious character, consisting first of excessive vibration—secondly, of loss of speed, and, thirdly, of a lapse of steerage way, amounting to a deflection of no less than two and a half points from a straight course. But while our machinists were content to put up with such defects, fabricating screw upon screw without any attempt at improvement, a great outsider was pondering in secret over the problem thus presented, and which threatened to obstruct the extensive adoption of the screw. General Sir Howard Douglas entered on this investigation with no view to personal advantage, but actuated solely by that public spirit which has become a part of his reputation, and to which science—not to mention the army and navy, his more especial province—owes so much. He carried on his experiments in private, and at his own expense, finally achieving a discovery applicable to the objects he sought. Anxious, however, to be fortified by the opinion of practical men, he submitted his proposed modification of the propeller to three of our most eminent machinists, who all pronounced against it—thus, at the same time, attesting that no such form of screw was then known in the engineering world. Great inventions are always met by such discouragements. Watt received more cold water than Clarence did malmsey; Stephenson, before appearing at the awful bar of a Parliamentary committee, was implored by his counsel to reduce his twenty miles to nine; and when Franklin's suggestion for a lightning conductor was communicated to the Royal Society, that dignified body indulged in peals—not of acclaiming thunder, but of laughter. Perhaps such examples encouraged Sir Howard to proceed. At any rate, he took

out a provisional patent for his invention, and in his recent treatise on *Naval Warfare with Steam*, which has attained a world-wide celebrity, he announced its character and objects. The latter comprehended the augmentation of the power of the screw by the diminution of vibration, and, secondly, the correction of the steerage. The incessant tremulous motion in the stern of screw ships caused by the impetuous revulsion of the troubled water in the frame of the screw, is not only excessively disagreeable, but it operates very mischievously on the frame of the ship, may possibly lead to serious results, and, at the same time, involves an important diminution of power, in the ratio of the force of the shake. As the water is comparatively undisturbed by propulsion on each side of the aperture of the screw frame, though it is within so violently agitated by the reaction, Sir Howard was led to think that the curvature of the screw, by cutting off its leading corners, would prevent any shock or discontinuity of action, such as was produced by the angular fan-shaped form of the Admiralty screw, and, consequently, greatly diminish the vibration, and give additional power. Such were the results he satisfied himself would be attained by his invention, and this he now gave unconditionally to the public, the precaution of a provisional patent having only been taken to secure the merit of the discovery. But having regard particularly to the use of the screw by ships of war, Sir Howard invented, at the same time, a provision against the fouling of the screw, by the fall of spars or rigging in action, which, of course, would have the effect of crippling the ship, and leaving it at an enemy's mercy. The curved edges of the Douglas screw are of themselves suited to throw off any floating fragments, and strengthened, as Sir Howard proposes, with edges of hard metal, the screw would cut asunder any rope or spar it encountered in its rotation. It is, however, next to impossible that this task should devolve on it; for the way is effectually cleared by two sharp knife blades, projecting, like tusks, from the trunk in which the screw works, immediately in front of both edges of the blade; and any rope hitched on the boss must necessarily be carried by the vortex along the knife edges, which deriving a drawing power from the action of the engine, will at once cut it in two. The Admiralty lost no time, after the publication of the book, in testing the efficiency of Sir Howard's screw; and here we must claim indulgence for dwelling for a moment on facts with which our readers must be familiar, from their purport having been embodied in an able article in the *Times*. Sir Howard heard with satisfaction of these experiments, though the Admiralty had not paid him the ordinary courtesy of announcing that his invention was under trial, when they might have been more effectively conducted under his personal superintendence; but when rumour announced the perfect success of his screw, the continued silence of the Admiralty appeared so unaccountable, that he thought it right to ascertain from the Admiral Superintendant at Portsmouth what had really been done. Admiral Bowles communicated with Captain Gordon, who had been charged with the trials made at Spithead by her Majesty's frigate,

Doris, with various descriptions of screws, including the improved Admiralty blade of Sir Howard, and elicited the following reply:—

"H.M ship Asia, June 23rd, 1859.

"Dear Admiral Bowles,—I cannot return Sir Howard Douglas's note, without remarking how very gratifying it must be to that talented officer to observe how *correct* his views were as to the necessity of removing the leading corners of the screw propellers, by which the steerage of the ship is much improved, and the vibration diminished.

"Believe me, yours faithfully,

"G. J. GORDON."

The experiments made on board the Doris, were renewed by the Mersey, and, more recently, by the Orlando, and with the same result as regards the Admiralty screw with its leading corners cut off, namely, increased speed, improved steerage of the ship, and diminished vibration. To show the extent to which the objects specified by Sir Howard have been realised, we may remark that the Douglas propeller will enable the Orlando, instead of requiring a port helm of two and a half points to keep her course, the deflection of the ordinary screw ships, to keep a straight helm. Yet the invention that has produced results so decisive, and which, in fact, opens a new era in screw propulsion, the Admiralty now pretend was brought to light by the fruitless experiments of the Fairy in 1853, and has ever since remained in their lockers, waiting, of course, till Sir Howard's book came out to be practically applied. Now the work of emptying this depository has commenced, we may hope for further discoveries of a similar character; and it would not surprise us to hear that some inventive first, second, or third lord, or, perhaps, the whole Board in a body, had hauled out the original designs for Trotman's anchor and Armstrong's gun. Everyone acquainted with nautical affairs is aware that the trials of the Fairy were with screws of a totally different character. These Admiralty Barnacles, who would fasten on Sir Howard's propeller, had better take care of the knife blades he has fixed in the screw trunk. The plain truth has already cut their miserable juggle in two. We have no hesitation in saying their conduct in this affair has brought disgrace on the public service; and furnishes another proof, if any were wanting, of the necessity of a sweeping change in our naval administration. Mr. Osborne once proposed to turn the Serpentine through the Horse Guards: we could wish, now he is himself out of danger, that he would diverge a little further to the left, so that its cleansing powers might be exercised on the Admiralty. The *Times* may well ask "how can any inventor look for success at the Admiralty, when even Sir Howard Douglas, with all his claims upon the consideration of the authorities, cannot get them to acknowledge gracefully that the improvement they get for nothing, is an important one, and is his?" But the matter will not be allowed to rest here. The assertion of the Admiralty has been disproved, but this is not enough; and it is due to an officer who is an ornament to both services, and has conferred such benefits on his profession and his country, that the Board should itself publicly retract a statement so unfounded.

Among the screws tried by the Doris was Griffiths's improve propeller, to which and the curved screw of Sir Howard Douglas th experiments were especially applied. As Sir Howard's propell proved the best, Griffiths now comes forward, in a letter to th *Times*, to appropriate it as an improvement already adopted by himself—in fact, as the very propeller to which it was found superior. The annals of piracy cannot furnish a more impudent claim, urged in more impudent language, for the pretender in this case thinks to carry his point by swagger, throwing the mud of his abuse at one of the most distinguished characters of the British army. It is said he has been set on by a backstairs intrigue. The Admiralty Blondin having been pronounced a myth, we are now told of his capering over a tight rope with Griffiths on his back. The force of folly can no further go; and, for our part, we have only to ask *Which is the liar?* The Admiralty and Griffiths can't both be speaking the truth. If the Admiralty so belied all its traditions, as to come out as an inventor in 1853, it must still yield the merit to Griffiths, who hit upon the very same discovery in 1849; and as neither the one nor the other let the world into their confidence—as both have carefully preserved their secret up to the moment when Sir Howard's invention was tried and succeeded—the world ignores both alike. Sir Howard Douglas has met the Griffiths claim with silent contempt. We have, indeed, only to turn to the specification of Griffiths's improvements, registered in the Patent Office, to find that it is without an atom of ground. Here his improved propeller is described in precise language—"I claim the making of propeller blades narrower or tapered towards their outside extremities, in contradistinction to the form



rto adopted of increasing the width of that part of the blade." a word here of cutting off the leading corners. But we take the same specification a diagram of the Griffiths propeller— ich it will be seen the corners are retained. Not only is there milarity between this blade and that of Sir Howard Douglas, hey present the greatest possible differences, the Griffiths blade , to borrow the words of his own specification, "in contradis- ion to the form hitherto adopted," which is still the rudiment e Douglas propeller. The objects proposed by Sir Howard glas—and all realised by the recent trials—are equally distinct. specifiation says—"My invention of improvements in screw llers consists, first, in a modification of the form of the blades, so he advance or leading edges of the propeller blades shall receive shock in cutting through the water, and therefore produce a equable action of the propeller, which will result in less tremu- motion in the stern of the ship when under weigh, and also y and equalize the propelling force. For this purpose I form dvance edge of the propeller blades of a convex curved form, in manner that the curve of this edge of the blade at the extreme r periphery will be in the rear (as regards its position in the) of the inner termination of the curve or that next the centre; urve is such that it produces an easy cleaving action in the . By this form of the advance edges of the blades a further ntage results, which is this, that any spars, rope, or wreck with the screw blades may come in contact are thrown off in a radial tion, or have a tendency to be so acted on; the propeller there- assists to clear or effectually clears itself from any wreck or rial with which it is liable to come in contact. By forming the ce edges as described, as they enter and leave the opening in the wood of the ship, the transition is gradual and therefore will not e shakes or tremulous motion, so perceptible in all vessels pro- l by screws by reason of the right line edges thereof striking the rbed water throughout their whole length, and the violent reac- of such water in propelling, the water in the dead wood being omparatively quiescent state and inoperative as regards propul- I also form these advance edges of the blades of screw llers of steel or other suitable metal so sharpened or serrated saw that they will sever any unyielding obstacle with which may come in contact in the manner of a circular saw." We in vain to the specification of Mr. Griffiths for any of the ts here enumerated. The only one it puts forward, in connexion the form of the propeller, is the adjustment of "the true pitch propeller to the power and proper speed of the engines." As cians say of the House of Lords, let us be thankful we have a t Office. Mr. Griffiths has put on record the nature and aim invention; they are registered in the book of fate; and the volume which now bears witness against him, preserves to Sir rd Douglas, by the same convincing evidence, all the merit of eat discovery. The attempt to despoil him of this honour has re- on its authors, meeting everywhere with derision and contempt, ly result such proceedings in any similar case will, we trust, ead to.

HARBOURS OF REFUGE.

We seem to have arrived at a period when the natural capabilities of our shores are insufficient to shelter the vessels that navigate them. Time was when the creeks, bays, and rivers of England were amply sufficient to float and shelter her ships. But those were far distant days—so remote, indeed, that we care not to stop to inquire when it was that the creation of wealth became a main fact in British history. Nevertheless it is a curious chapter, how from time to time the commerce of England has outgrown the dimensions of her natural harbours. We are carried back to the all but romantic periods of the Cinque Ports, when Sandwich, Hastings, Dover, and Hythe were to England what Liverpool, Bristol, Portsmouth, and London are now, before we arrive at that point of time. In those days of naval enterprise the rivers and havens of the Cinque Ports, which were the cradle of our navy, were brimming with water, whereon floated nearly the entire sea forces of the kingdom. Ships were then tubs, harbours muddy creeks and inlets, and navigators seldom ventured out of sight of land. In the fullness of time the "needle, navigation's soul," lent its mysterious aid, and ships expanded in dimensions, and men hastened across the pathless ocean under its guidance, and found new worlds. It would be an interesting, but perhaps profitless task to attempt to fill up the gap in the history of commercial enterprise, since the inhabitants of the deserted and dried up Cinque Ports were long-bearded merchants, who cheapened hides with the "Esterlings," and exchanged wool with the Norsemen. We are reminded of ages of progress, in which the headlong bias of English utility has evoked enormous values out of every description of raw material, and of that marvellous creation of machinery that differences England from all other nations.

In tracing the growth of our naval power, and the insufficiency of harbourage upon our coasts, we find abundant evidence to prove that remarkable changes of land and sea have taken place. For instance, the plough boy whistles and the corn waves over the dried up and withered havens of the Cinque Ports. Bold and lofty headlands, gusty promontories and towering sea marks, that guided our Saxon forefathers along our shores in their frail craft, have many of them been sapped, undermined, and swept away by the restless sea. We are also reminded of the heavy tax upon shipping, under the name of "passing tolls," to defray the expenses of keeping the muddy harbour at Dover—the only living Cinque Port—from dying a Cinque Port's death, that is, of being choked with silt and shingle.

These are geological and historical facts, having considerable influence in the selection of proper sites, and in the formation of deep water harbours, to shelter the 40,000 ships that are now entered in "Lloyd's lists." This enormous marine, be it remembered, has not reached its maximum. The Goblin Steam, with his myriad arms, never tired, is working day and night incessantly, and is amassing property that bids fair to outrun figures. To such an extent has the

audacity of commercial enterprise been carried, that we now lose annually by shipwreck, upon and in the immediate vicinity of the British isles, property that is estimated at £1,500,000, a sum equal to the revenue of a small state, and sufficient to supply, in ordinary years, the wear and tear of our expensive navy. If we could by any possibility avoid the annual loss of ships and cargoes upon our shores, and apply the money to maintain our ships of war, the sum saved would go far towards a good navy, and relieve the nation of an enormous burthen. Then as to loss of life, it seems that we lose as many men in about a dozen years as would man a channel fleet, strong enough to watch Cherbourg, while the money value of the wrecked ships and cargoes would, in eighteen or twenty years, amount to from eighteen to twenty millions sterling, or a sum sufficient to build and equip sixty sail of the line.

With such startling facts as the above, annually presenting themselves to our notice, it is not to be wondered at that the necessity of constructing harbours of refuge upon certain convenient points upon our iron-bound shores should have claimed the attention of the Government. Last year, for instance, a select committee of the House of Commons reported upon this national question, and the completion of that committee's report was delegated to other commissioners, charged with the special duty of visiting the coast, and deciding according to their judgment upon the most eligible localities for harbours of refuge. The result of their inquiries has been laid before Parliament, but as we have repeatedly for years back discussed the main question in the *United Service Magazine*, of the great necessity of having harbours of safety upon our coast,* we intend to confine our remarks to the local claims and probable expences, as well as the utility of the sites recommended by the Commissioners.

Before plunging into the thick of the argument we may as well state, that we have no desire to entrap any cursory reader into hard study under false pretences; but if he should wish to know why certain nooks and corners of our coasts are recommended for harbours of refuge, war harbours, or life harbours, let him follow us through a few pages of this Magazine. The subject may appear, at the first glance, to be dry and uninteresting, but we promise him abundant information about storm and shipwreck, details of breakwaters, claims of different localities, casualty returns, distressed ships, loss of life at different ports, fishery statistics, coasting trade, and other information relating to the enormous traffic on our shores. These facts would be interesting, nay invaluable, if they were speculations upon the maritime power of some ancient people, such as Greece, Tyre, or Rome. They would charm us if seen through the magnifying haze of twenty centuries. Let us see if it is not possible, however, to interest even the general reader with statistical and scientific research, bearing upon the strong, stubborn, hearty mariners of England—of the men who make us feel that they are the marrow

* For extended information upon this subject the reader is referred to the following numbers of this Magazine—viz.: February, May, and December, 1856; August, 1857; June and December, 1858; and January, 1859.

and bone of the nation; and although to some their calling—relating as it does to colliers, tallow, hemp, and tow—may appear vulgar, let us remember also that their sufferings in winter gales are often intense, their deeds as heroic as any that come within the scope of human action, and lastly, that their labours are useful.

The magnitude of the evil arising from the want of havens of refuge upon the shores of Great Britain and Ireland will be apparent to the reader, if we state that the Commissioners require an outlay of £2,365,000 to be devoted to their formation. Fearing, however, that this sum may not be attainable all at once, they recommend it to be expended in ten years. The misfortune, however, is, that all recommendations of this sort are certain to largely exceed the amount specified. It too often happens that public works and private jobbery are synonymous terms. We have on several occasions, in this Magazine, exposed the wasteful expenditure of the taxes of the industrious classes upon the gigantic bungles at Dover and Alderney, and therefore, although it is impossible to object to the advance of money for such a sacred purpose as the formation of a good harbour of refuge, in a serviceable locality, yet however strongly the recommendations of the Commissioners may appeal to our selfishness by money saved in ships and cargoes, and to our sympathy in saving life, we will not accept them without a close scrutiny; for we are not insensible to the fact that opportunities have been taken advantage of to promote an extravagant outlay of the public money upon works of very questionable utility, and we regret that it is our opinion that the Commissioners have in some important particulars either misunderstood the wants of certain localities, or overstated the case of others, as it appears to us, to enlist the public in favour of their recommendations.

And, moreover, while admitting that it is established as a principle that harbours of refuge are necessary for the prevention and mitigation of the deplorable calamities that up to the present hour appear to be inseparable from maritime enterprise, yet there seems to be some doubt whether the whole of the casualties recorded at Lloyd's ought to be ascribed to the fair risks of navigation, and, consequently, whether many of them would be obviated by Harbours of Refuge.

Thus, for instance, Lloyd's list proves that more ships are lost by collision, fire, unseaworthiness, not being well found, carelessness, &c., than by stress of weather. Science has done much to render an ordinary voyage along our shores safe. Splendid dioptric lights now flash their friendly warning beams upon every salient point of our coast. Buoys and beacons tell the mariner of every lurking and hidden shoal. Almost every port has its lifeboat and gallant crew; but these and all the other aids for the saving of life and cargoes will be sadly neutralized as long as vessels are sent to sea commanded by drunken captains, with faulty anchors, chafed cables, and weakly manned.

Upon a subject like Harbours of Refuge it is necessary to eliminate error as much as possible, and it appears that out of the gross total of losses at sea, as exhibited in the report of the Commissioners, that many of the casualties there enumerated would have happened if

refuge harbours had been close at hand. In various instances ships foundered near the shore, then some vessels run for the nearest port, in distress, because they were unseaworthy, or, in other words, they ought never to have been sent to sea at all. Others were too old, badly found, or undermanned; and in more than one instance it is stated that vessels were lost even at the entrance of the harbour they were running for, because they were badly handled.

It is obvious that such disasters would not be materially diminished if we spent millions in forming harbours. And it should be mentioned that the Commissioners notice these facts, and while regarding the construction of refuge harbours as a national duty of the highest importance, they think it also necessary to consider whether any public measures can be taken to insure greater safety. It certainly would materially diminish sea risks if all vessels, previous to going to sea, were proved to be seaworthy in their hulls, well found aloft, sufficiently manned, not overloaded, and that want of seamanship, or sobriety, or vigilance, and losses proved to be fraudulent were punishable offences after proper investigation.

It is remarkable with what impunity well found and ably commanded ships perform the most distant voyages. We hear of "clippers" putting a girdle round the earth twice within a year. We hear of *return* tickets to Australia, India, China, and America; of yachts taking a summer cruise to the Cape, calling at New Zealand, dropping in at the Islands of the Pacific, *en passant*, and round the Horn on their return home. Such exploits dispose one to look upon a trip to any part of the world as a mighty pleasant sort of pastime. We regard a voyage to Sidney or New York as a sort of marine holiday, where the lucky passengers go simmering along in floating taverns, and expect to be landed within a day at least of the time specified. And, indeed, such is the marvellous regularity with which the British mail packets make a passage between Liverpool and New York, that punctuality to the hour is oftener the rule than the exception.

This is doubtless very satisfactory. There is, however, another side to this picture of security and nautical triumph. It is a very dark side too, and ought to be examined very carefully before we congratulate ourselves that we have shaken the trident out of old Neptune's grasp. Any one who will take the trouble to consult Lloyd's list, will find it a dry, bald, but terrible chronicle, all sentiment being sacrificed to statistics. However, this remarkable register of maritime disasters has its consoling chapter. For here we find that well found ships pass to and fro over the sea with comparative safety. But few accidents occur to ships ably manned and commanded. They triumph over the storm. Thus, out of 12,000 and odd casualties, only 64 are recorded against ships of 700 tons and upwards. This immunity from accident is not in consequence of their size, but simply because in most large vessels greater care is shown in the selection of a crew, and in the appointment of a competent commander. Nearly all the losses have been sustained by vessels ranging from 90 tons to 500 tons, because these are the description of craft most likely to be sailed *economically*. These are the

vessels too, that are often weak handed, and liable to be commanded by men possessing few recommendations for filling the office of captain, except by being part owner.

Such a union of evils as we have briefly hinted at, affords but a sorry chance of a prosperous voyage, and we expect to find the consequence of such an alliance in Lloyd's list, the wreck chart, and in the report of the Commissioners for Refuge Harbours.

However, the necessity of having good harbours upon every available spot upon our shores, is not one jot abated in consequence of any remarks we have made, and our object in drawing attention to the discreditable manner in which vessels are often sent to sea, is to show what a comprehensive source of mischief results therefrom. The obvious inference of what we have said is, that if owners sent their vessels to sea in a well found and efficient condition, they would escape the risks of the ocean as successfully as any of the great shipping companies.

We will now proceed to notice briefly the advantages we hope to receive from the labours of the Commissioners. Their attention was of course first directed to those parts of our coast where Harbours of Refuge are most needed. And here it will be as well to remark that the Commissioners discriminate between the various classes of harbours, such as harbours of refuge like Holyhead or Portland, and what they term life harbours, or harbours established for the express purpose of relieving the trading vessels on exposed coasts. They draw also a distinction between localities having large local interests and places where no such interests exist. Thus for instance they recommend the sum of £1,000,000 sterling to be spent in improving the entrance to the Tyne, however, only one quarter of this sum is to be furnished by Government, and the other three quarters of a million must be raised on the spot by local taxation. Again the Commissioners recommend the like sum of £1,000,000 sterling to be spent in forming Old and West Hartlepool into a harbour of refuge, but here the Government is called upon to furnish half the amount, and the locality the other half. The case is however altogether altered when we come to the fishing village of Filey, upon which the Commissioners recommend an outlay of £800,000 sterling, the whole of which large sum is to be furnished by the nation at large. It will be seen therefore, that the Commissioners decide that the inhabitants of certain localities, such as the entrance to the Tyne, and Old and West Hartlepool, must tax themselves respectively to the extent of one half and three fourths of the sums required to form a harbour, before the Government will furnish the remainder, while Filey is to be found a harbour at the public expense.

The Royal Commissioners give their reasons for all their recommendations and conclusions, which we intend to notice as we proceed in our investigation of the capabilities of the respective ports and stations recommended by them as proper sites for harbours of life and refuge. From what we can gather in a general way from their report, we should say that any nautical man would have arrived at the same conclusions by his own fireside, if furnished with

and charts, without taking the trouble of visiting each locality, ıg evidence, and without much practical acquaintance with the ct.

Royal Commissioners state with remarkable gravity a fact we should have thought everybody knew, viz., that in bad ıer it is desirable that vessels should have harbours in which ɔan find shelter for the purpose of avoiding the risks, and the and tear of keeping the sea, and the loss of time occasioned by driven back. This simple truth has been repeated over and ıgain for these fifty years past. Such harbours will tend mate- to save both life and property. It so happens, however, on many parts of our coast, and particularly on the north ıf England, which is much exposed to heavy on-shore gales, frequented by an inferior class of vessels, such as coasters, rs, &c., that nothing but tidal and bar harbours are to be found. ıt these places that the Commissioners recommend the forma- ıf *life* harbours.

the other hand, when weak handed and badly found vessels t difficult, if not impossible, to keep off a lee shore, they say, ith truth, that the greater the number of available ports the r will be their safety. They come to the conclusion, therefore, he best system to adopt for *refuge* harbours is the improvement existing ports where such a course is practicable. But if wise, then that the sites for *life* harbours, of which facility of and sufficient shelter are the only essential requisites, must ıght at that spot on the coast, which is most generally acces- from every part of it. Thus, if the line of coast be straight, ıt its central point—and if a bay, then at its head.

s obvious that the annual loss of life on any line of coast is, ıllowing for deductions, the best test of the necessity of a life ur, and the Commissioners have been guided by casualties that ned in those districts, which have formed the subject of their ry between the years 1850-7. We subjoin

AN ABSTRACT OF CASUALTIES.

Casualties from 1850-7, excluding 1855.						DISTRICT.	Lives lost from 1850-7 excluding 1855.				
From Wrecks occasioned by		Vessels.		Approximate Value.							
Stress of Weather	All other causes	Total Lost	Annual Average.	Total	Annual Average.		From Foundering,	Stress of Wethr	All other causes	Total	Ann. Avrge
Loss of Ship "Tayleur" excluded.						N. & E. Coast	18	251	160	429	61
				£	£						
144	293	465	66	233,731	33,390	N. E. Coast	37	178	43	258	36
18	52	82	11	51,626	7,375	E. &W. Coast	12	21	45	78	11
242	389	673	96	901,291	128,755	N. & E. Coast	18	541	160	710	10
173	380	639	91	499,121	71,303	Bristol Chan	46	210	84	340	48
333	634	1053	150	609,238	87,034	N. E. Coast	94	330	69	493	70
910	1748	2912	415	2,295,007	327,858		207	1280	401	1789	255

* Loss of Ship "Tayleur" included

ew explanatory remarks are here necessary. The abstract of lties commences with the year 1850, from which period until

the year 1854 inclusive, the wrecks, and other disasters occurring to vessels in the seas, and on the shores of the United Kingdom, were recorded in a wreck register kept at the Admiralty. In the year 1854, however, the Merchant Shipping Act transferred this duty to the Board of Trade, conferring increased powers on that department for the purpose. It appears that the returns under the new management are now more numerically complete, although as respects the accuracy of the information contained, there is not any material difference between the later and the earlier returns.

The reader will have noticed that the year 1855 is altogether omitted in the tabular statement of casualties. The reason for this omission is stated to be, that the returns for that period are considered less accurate than those for the two following years, when the system established by the Board of Trade had got into full working order.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the importance of the above abstract of maritime casualties. We are indebted to it for much information upon the subject of harbours of life and refuge. A careful examination of its instructive figures will assist in guiding us to form tolerably correct notions as to the localities where havens of safety are most needed. Nor shall we hesitate to dwell upon the momentous question of saving life and property from shipwreck. Nothing, indeed, is more important in a national sense to an insular people like ourselves, possessing a maritime population, amounting to hundreds of thousands, than the safety and welfare of the vast shipping interest connected with these realms. It has, moreover, a further claim upon our attention, irrespective of the money value of ships and cargoes. We all of us have lately experienced what a valuable unit the British seaman may become. In times of national danger he has always been the van of our vanguard; for upon them as a body, the guardianship in war, and the prosperity in peace of these islands have for ages mainly relied.

A cursory inspection then of the abstract will show some facts connected with the loss of life that requires parliamentary inquiry. It will be observed that a large number of casualties do not bear upon the question of life and refuge harbours at all. They have arisen from causes independent of the want of harbours, any number of which would not have prevented them. It therefore became necessary to separate the casualties and loss of life, which appear to have arisen from the want of harbours, and the column headed *stress of weather* contains those casualties and loss of life which bear on the question under enquiry.

Again, on the north east coast of England the loss under the head of "*Foundering*" is a significant fact, because the tenor of the evidence received by the Royal Commissioners induced them to conclude that many vessels navigating that district (especially colliers) were sent to sea in a state more or less *unseaworthy*. It is presumed that many of these rotten craft, when caught in gales of wind, ran for harbour under circumstances, when a sound vessel would experience comparatively no danger in keeping the sea. The losses under the head of Foundering have also a very important bearing upon the

ion in other districts, though in a less degree than upon the east coast of England.

a general rule, the ratio which the losses from *stress of weather foundering* bear to those arising from all other causes, will ate the character of the coast, making proper allowances for tional cases where such exist.

e tabular statement above alluded to exhibits also the annual ges of casualties, as well as the annual average of loss of nd the high comparative value of the vessels lost in the Irish British Channel, and the large loss of life in the former, even ding that of the ship *Tayleur*,* will not fail to attract attention ay justify the improvements contemplated in that district, as as the construction of the harbour proposed by the Commis- rs at St. Ives, which it is hoped will be as useful to vessels g down the Irish as to those from the British Channel, by ing them in bad weather to make more free with the Cornish than they can at present venture to do.

ile bearing testimony to the zeal and skill of the Royal Com- ners in the performance of the difficult task allotted to them, nnot avoid noticing that with respect to the annual loss of life, appear to have rather overstated the case. They are particular icing a most disastrous year, viz., 1854, when no less than 1,549 ns perished on the seas and shores of the United Kingdom. They tate that the average loss of life during a period of six years, 1852 to 1857, amounted to 780 persons annually. And they the attention of the Legislature to these serious national ities. It is our pleasing duty to inform the general reader hese losses are decreasing. From the abstract of the returns to the Board of Trade, the number of lives lost on the shores United Kingdom in 1858, was only 340, and the average loss three years, 1856-8, was not 780, but only 464. We believe ation is mainly indebted to the National Lifeboat Institution is diminution in the annual loss of life from shipwreck. We old that this most excellent institution, unaided by public s from Parliament, has eighty-five lifeboat establishments in ction with it, on which it has expended upwards of £28,000. he most astonishing fact is, that since the first establishment society, it has, unaided by Parliament, rescued more than 11,000 recked persons from death by drowning. The majority of these e were of course taken from stranded ships, during hurricanes and s, for the lifeboat is intended for those particular occasions all ordinary means of rescue would be unavailable or useless. night exhaust the vocabulary of praise in doing honour to this lent institution, which has not only saved 11,000 seamen and s from a watery grave, but has also voted £10,000, besides gold ilver medals, to the gallant fellows who have manned their on those trying occasions when the saving of a fellow creature's mperilled their own.

ain, when the subject is further examined, we find that of the

* The Tayleur was lost January, 1854, on Lambay Island.

number of wrecks and casualties, including damage of all kinds (except collision) in 1858, only 467 are ascribed to *stress of weather*. These were cases in which Harbours of Refuge might have been useful in saving life and property. On the other hand, 402 casualties occurred in the same year, which were the result of *inattention, carelessness, neglect, not being well found*, and other avoidable causes. It is obvious that the loss of life under these last-named circumstances will not be materially altered if we spend millions in the formation of harbours of life refuge.

Improvements in shipping and seamen will be more likely to save life and property than is generally admitted, and it is to be feared that such shipmasters as send their vessels to sea under-manned and badly found, will be encouraged by harbours of refuge to be more inattentive to their duties. The losses amounting to 402 in 1858, are exclusive of losses by *collision* and *fire*, and other causes not connected with *stress of weather*. The majority, in all probability, might have been prevented, by greater care and skill; and with reference to the necessity that exists for *life* harbours, they must of course be deducted from the total loss of life, as not one of them could have been avoided if a life harbour had been close at hand.

The casualty returns also prove that by far the larger proportion of losses happen to coasters. We subjoin a table of wrecks and casualties of 266 vessels of all classes, arranged according to the rig, tonnage, and number of hands on board.

Rig.		Tonnage.		Hands.	
Barques	21	60 & under	38 vessels.	with 5 & under	88 vessels.
Brigs	121	100 „	55 „	„ 10 „	149 „
Brigantines	2	200 „	92 „	„ 15 „	20 „
Cobles	2	300 „	65 „	„ 20 „	4 „
Galliotts	6	400 „	7 „	„ 25 „	4 „
Ketches	1	500 „	5 „	Unknown	1 „
Luggers	2	600 „	1 „		
Schooners	76	700 „	2 „		
Sloops	18	Unknown	1 „		
Smacks	6				
Snows	2				
Steamers	8				
Unknown	1				
Total	266	Total	266	Total	266

It is to the class of vessels enumerated in the above list that life harbours are chiefly required. In confirmation of this statement, the Commissioners allude to a Glasgow Shipping Company, whose vessels have made 1,700 voyages during the last fifteen years, and have only lost thirteen vessels, and not one of these occurred on the coast of England. On the other hand, the same company was stated to have lost during the short space of six years last past, upwards of £20,000 by the desertion of seamen alone.

Now, although at first it may appear that the desertion of seamen may have little to do with the subject of refuge harbours, yet we nevertheless believe that the character of our sailors has very much to do with our losses at sea. It is unhappily too notorious that

ssels starting for their voyage are frequently exposed to great ils in consequence of the state of intoxication in which the men sent on board. The defect of character which has deteriorated r seamen has been fostered by the crimping system now we hope course of gradual abolition. Desertion, of which the Glasgow n complains, and most of the other evils, can be traced to causes which the men are by no means solely responsible. It often ppens that ships and smaller vessels go to sea with almost every n furnished by crimps, and more or less under the influence of nk. It also often happens that such vessels meet with bad wea- r soon after leaving port. Of course the usual consequences are ely to happen. One of the many perils to which ships are subject when under the best management overtakes her. It is not easy find a remedy for this, but it has been suggested that if ships re not permitted to go to sea until every man had been 24 hours board, it would assist in remedying this evil. We know, how- r, that the subject is beset with difficulties, but as drunkenness dmitted to be the fruitful source of many calamities at sea, some- ng ought to be attempted towards suppressing a vice that does so ch mischief.

We have made the above remarks upon the report of the Royal mmissioners not in any hostile spirit to the subject of refuge or harbours, but with the view of showing that a gross total of lives t at sea in any particular locality is not a fair criterion to judge of claims of such place for a harbour. Deductions must be made deaths by drowning, which occur from causes entirely indepen- nt of the want of shelter, and which deaths could not have been evented by any number of life harbours upon our coasts. Our inion upon the necessity of having good and convenient refuge rbours is, however, still unchanged. For after making every allow- ce for those casualties which we have pointed out as capable of evention, the annual loss of life and property from causes that are ten beyond man's control, is amply sufficient to justify a large out- y of the public money and to enlist both our judgment and our elings in the good cause.

With these preliminary remarks we will proceed to notice the rounds on which the Royal Commissioners selected the sites for e life and refuge harbours proposed by them. But as these details ill relate to the trade of the east coast of Scotland, the north-east ast of Ireland, the Bristol Channel, the Isle of Man, the north- st coast of England, and the loans to promote the construction and provement of harbours, we intend to postpone our remarks upon ese important questions until next month. The subject cannot be eated in an offhand manner. It is true we might briefly state that e traffic on the east coast of Scotland is considerable, that besides e coasting trade there is the Davis Straits and Greenland fish- es. The foreign trade with the Baltic and the north of Europe m the west coast of Great Britain, from Ireland, Canada, and the nited States. Then there are the fisheries (herring) with their eat interests employing thousands of hardy seamen. But even en we should fail to give an adequate notion of the traffic of this

small district of our shores, if we neglected to mention that 10,000 vessels pass annually along this strip of coast, while those that proceed through the Pentland firth amount to the like number.

Besides, we have much to say about the necessity of good harbourage to shelter the enormous traffic of the Bristol Channel, the trade of which comprises nearly one-sixth of the shipping, and one-tenth of the tonnage of the entire kingdom. Its export of coals amounts to 5,000,000 tons annually and is daily increasing; then its foreign trade employs some of the finest ships in the world. Indeed, harbourage in this locality is a national affair, for windbound vessels often accumulate in its principal anchorages in enormous fleets. For instance, at the Mumbles we hear of 300 vessels, in Penarth Roads of 500 vessels, off Lundy Island 100 vessels, and in Whitesand Bay 250 vessels anchoring at one time.

Nor must the Isle of Man be forgotten. Its central position in the Irish Channel, combined with the total absence of deep water harbours, and its being the focus of a large herring fishery, employing 600 sail and about 6,000 hands, are strong claims for consideration.

And lastly, the important district of the north-east coast of England extending from Flamborough Head to the Farn Islands, including all the coal ports of the eastern coast of England, will claim a large share of our attention. The traffic along this shore is not equalled in any part of the world, and it is as various as it is extensive; there is the coal trade, both home and foreign, a coasting trade to all parts of the kingdom, and a valuable foreign trade to every part of the globe. It is of acknowledged importance as a nursery for a race of seamen excelled by none and equalled by few. Then the activity of this coast is evinced in a very marked manner by the number of ships which seek shelter in its principal ports. Thus, at the Tyne, Sunderland, Hartlepool and Whitby we hear of 300, 350, and 370 respectively entering in one day. Again, in Bridlington Bay and under Speeton Cliffs we hear of 700 vessels and 150 vessels being at anchor, and at Yarmouth Roads from 1,000 to 1,700 vessels, the larger portion of which are from the north country. To these enormous fleets must be added a large passing trade to the Baltic and the north of Europe, both from this and foreign countries, so that owing to circumstances into which it will be necessary to enter more fully hereafter, from 300 to 500 vessels are not unfrequently seen from Flamborough Head at one time.

The Royal Commissioners have taken no notice of our southern shores, and consequently Dover, Alderney, and Portland are not included in their remarks. In the next number of this magazine we will supply this defect, for the magnitude of the interests represented by the vast amount of shipping so briefly described above, together with the annual losses to which shipowners are subject, has made the construction of refuge and life harbours a national policy, the steady prosecution of which cannot fail ultimately to produce beneficial results; and as it is our earnest desire to do justice to the labours of the Royal Commissioners, we, for want of space, are compelled to postpone our remarks upon the sites recommended by them for refuge and life harbours until the following number.

Portsmouth.

THE ARTS OF CAMP LIFE.

By Colonel Sir J. E. Alexander, K.C.L.S., 14th Regiment

The British soldier has in these days, usually, a very changeful existence, unlike the times when a regiment was "for ten years looking over the ramparts of Gibraltar." Corps are now moved hither and thither, often at very short notice—

> "One foot on sea, one foot on shore;
> To one thing constant never."

Therefore, the component parts of our army should be "handy men" at home, afloat, or ashore—ready to rough it uncomplainingly, should consider it disgraceful to grumble at their lot, but, like good soldiers of the Highest Commander, should rather be pleased to be "tried with hardness."

The school of the noble soldier Sir Charles Napier is one of the best to be brought up in—not one of the kid glove or silver fork description, but where *simplicity of living* is the rule, zeal in the performance of duty is constantly evinced, the study of one's profession in all its numerous details inculcated, and devotion to the service of one's sovereign and country is the predominating sentiment.

Camp life may be most miserable and unhappy, or it may be very comfortable and enjoyable. We have a painful recollection of marches with a regiment of cavalry and camping during the hot months of April, May, and June, in India—the dust, the stifling heat, the exhaustion, the thermometer being sometimes at 120 deg. under canvass, sleep interrupted at night by the horses drawing their pickets in rain and careering madly through the camp, cholera breaking out, even horses getting liver complaint from the heat, and three officers dying at the end of one of these terrible marches.

Again, the tent life in the Crimea in the winters of '54, '55, with all the wet, and cold, and mud, and want of fuel, is too recent to be now enlarged upon. Camp life in the woods of America, in the summer months, is not agreeable, by reason of the close heat; the black flies and mosquitoes, the fare of salt pork and biscuit would not suit an epicure, and sleeping in one's clothes on pine branches would not please those curious in clean sheets. But a good climate like the Cape of Good Hope, for instance, and with prudent arrangements for "camping out," one truly enjoys the liberty of the bush and the plains, and, if not too long stationary at one spot, may have those exuberant spirits attendant on sound health and useful and active employment.

Some men seem determined to be miserable when they are removed from the usual routine, to be utterly unable to adapt themselves to the circumstances in which they may be situated, never having the wisdom, like that noble apostle to the Gentiles, Saul of Tarsus, wherever placed "therewith to be content." A literary and scientific friend confessed that the moment he went to sea he lost all energy, and did nothing during the voyage, short or long, but look at the waves; a clever man, but a bad *voyageur*.

Now, your real traveller is cheerful and happy "blow high, blow low"—finds exhilaration whether he treads the deck, the elastic carpet of the woods, or scours the plain on a gallant steed; for, as that devoted and most valuable public officer, Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, said to some young officers who were unhappy in India, and always fancying that when their term of service was over they would enjoy themselves in England—"Make the most of your time and opportunities now, maybe you'll never see home again."*

Here we beg to direct especial attention to that highly accomplished and intelligent traveller, Francis Galton, Esq., F.R.G.S., who took up the track of the writer in Africa where he left off, beyond the tropic of Capricorn, and, advancing into the undescribed country of the Ovampos, gained that experience in the art of travel there and elsewhere, also by great reading and study, as to enable him to produce a most useful book, which should be in the hands of all wayfarers *per mare per terras*—"The Art of Travel," published by Murray—in it are also found most valuable helps and hints for campaigning; and to make the matter still more complete, Mr. Galton prepared a set of models to illustrate how fire can be made and employed, water searched for, purified, and economised. How rivers can be crossed without the assistance of boats; how to bivouac and encamp in various ways; how pack oxen are used, &c., &c. A set of these models was sent gratuitously to Woolwich, and the Government afterwards wisely ordered twelve more sets to be supplied to some of the principal garrisons, where, if an officer takes the trouble to study them, and lecture on them, he will not only convey valuable instruction to himself, but will also do a vast service to his companions in arms.

In former years, whilst exploring wild regions, and coming, for instance, to the banks of an unfordable river without either boat or bridge in its whole course, we thought how helpless a party of men, uninstructed in the art of travel or the arts of camp life, would find themselves, and sometimes, if detained there, how fatal might be the consequences, as we remember to have occurred to a party on the banks of the Great Fish River, in 1835, at the Cape, which was surprised and dispersed with loss by the Caffres. With an army, a pontoon train is usually at hand, though for detached parties there is seldom such provision; but an officer practised in various expedients to cross rivers will not be at a loss to get the party over without pontoons.

Thus, five logs, eight feet long, with double rows of augur holes near the ends, to peg batons to, binding them also with withes, was our mode of poling ourselves across American rivers. A string of dry gourds round the waist, or bundles of reeds or grass, enabled one to swim, though at some risk from alligators, rapid streams in India; a stout limb of a tree, with a peg in it to hold on by, formed a wooden horse for the tributaries of the Orange River—

"Where Afric's sunny fountains
Roll down their golden sands."

* The Life of Sir Thomas Munro, by the Chaplain-General, is one of the best books, after the Bible, to put into a young man's hands destined for the East.

Health.—In camp life, the first and most essential requisite is good health. On service a man is comparatively useless if he is even in feeble health. In hot and cold, in wet and dry climates, truly health should be a great study; and it is painful to see how men throw away their valuable health and strength, by which, if duly husbanded, at the same time without unmanly nursing, they might render most efficient service to their country and to themselves,

Our life and health are in the hands of the Almighty, and a traveller and campaigner, if he desire to do any good, should value his health as a great gift, and should try to find out how best to preserve it under all circumstances. Among the qualities of a good soldier is this, "seldom in hospital." A general who used to surprise his followers by his powers of endurance, when asked by his staff, after a long day's work, "you feel fatigued, my Lord?" "Not at all;" "thirsty?" "Not in the least." "You must be hungry by this time?" "Not at all, nor too hot, nor too cold, I am quite right, thank you." Descended from a long line of Scottish warriors, the late gallant Cathcart was a soldier of the right stuff.

In conversation with another distinguished general he remarked, "when I was first on service in the Peninsula I wished to be very hardy, and thought that a true soldier should 'rough it' on all occasions, even when there was no actual necessity for it, but I lost my strength and did not enjoy refreshing sleep by this system; I then found out and adopted a method for passing my nights with greater comfort, and thus rendered myself more efficient for emergencies. I worked with five horses, and after a hard day, if at 8 o'clock at night I had not had something good to eat and a tolerable cook, I must have knocked up like an overworked and underfed horse."

We have seen an officer on service sleep beside a bush and get himself drenched with dew, out of brag, and so as to be seen by the camp in the morning, when he might have had the shelter of a tent; this is absurd, and it brings its own punishment in the shape of rheumatism probably. Not aware of his danger the writer once caught fever and ague by sleeping on the ground, with others, at the ruins of Persepolis, in Persia, where there is malaria on the surface of the plain; a brother dragoon (the late Sir Keith Jackson) was spared the illness which terminated fatally, for two of the party in the suite of Sir John M'Donald Kinneir, by having an iron cot, which slightly raised him above the ground.

For health, between the tropics, the first thing to attend to is the head, to guard it well against the terrible sun; our people understand this better of latter years by dear bought experience. A hunting cap with a light cover sits more comfortably than any other head dress; in great heat some folds of linen wrapped round it protect well the temples. A light, well-balanced scull cap, with peak all round, is the true headpiece for soldiers.

Of late the moveable cape of the Dragoons is an admirable contrivance, and has saved many a stout fellow from a dangerous drenching. Infantry soldiers often seem to tempt Providence by rushing out in rain and then sitting wet in a public house. To prevent as much as possible their going out in rain, Infantry great coats

are not allowed to be worn in rain except by men on duty. It would be perhaps an advantage to enlarge and detach the cape of the Infantry great coat for occasional use.

There is no excuse for a soldier not having always ready a second pair of trousers and of boots to change after a wetting. A valuable man, the sergeant-major, depôt 42nd Royal Highlanders, the pride of his parents, lately lost his life at his native place by coming up from the drill field wet, and then getting a chill in unchanged clothes on the exposed ramparts of Stirling Castle.

In exploring in the forests of America one was sometimes wet from morning to night, with impunity, in the red flannel shirt, worsted socks, and Indian leggings, but we were moving, and at night a dry change and a tin "tot" of hot tea after a day of this sort was worth all the drams in the world; in fact spirits for long or short expeditions lead only to mischief. "But," said an admirable old commander, General Sir Benjamin D'Urban, "I would like to have a little rum with the spare ammunition to pass round a dram for a final effort against the enemy."

In garrison or camp if men adopt indolent habits, they will probably soon lose their health; exercise and temperance are the parents of health and cheerfulness, a lounging life is often a drinking and smoking one. Beginning well in the morning, when off duty, with a short ride, or half an hour's walk before breakfast, will be found a capital enlivener for the business of the day, coupled with a good rub down with a rough mitten and cold water.

There cannot be good health without pure air; at night this is not usually much attended to, but it is of the highest importance—men inhaling each others' breath for eight hours is poison. Tents should be as freely ventilated as good barrack rooms, but nothing is so exhilirating as the starry canopy over head, and the free air of heaven in the bivouac of a fine night. "Astra castra, numen, lumen, nunmen," is then the motto.

As to eating and drinking, as part of the art of campaigning, temperance in all things should of course be practised late and early. We all know that what agrees with one man will disagree with another, but as a general rule, it is best to eat clean, and not *gâter l'estomac*, to soil the interior. Surely well-done meat helps digestion, and must be better than that with the blood in it; also much fat and grease should be avoided, unless one is among the Esquimaux, with the mercury of the thermometer in the bulb, and one is constrained to put up with blubber or pemican.

In studying the wholesomes, besides under-done meat, *high* game cannot be good; trails of woodcocks, and other curiosities in gastronomy, may be fashionable, but we humbly think they are "a mistake." In the wilds of Africa, the forests of America, and in the trenches before Sevastopol, we could always easily practise abstinence from alcoholic drink with the assistance of good black tea. The tea leaves tied up in a gauze or muslin rag, and hung in the boiling water in the kettle. It must be apparent on the least reflection that drinking "brandy in disguise," in the shape of port, sherry, and Madeira, in hot climates is fatal to health; but in warm weather,

and when it is presented, who can resist a tankard of foaming beer, and a quart *per diem* can hurt no healthy man, though a pint at dinner time is perhaps the best mark in the long run. In the Opera of "Martha," Plunket sings:

"Chi mi dirà di che il bicchier
Col mato va per dar piacer
Nessun lo sà, nessun ?
E'la bevanda grata a ber,
Che il ciel ci manda nel bicchier,
E. che il Britanno rende al tier.
Ah ! ambrosia è questa viva il bicchier,
Viva la birra, mesciam ! da ber.
Hurrà !"

Who will tell me with what I must fill
This empty horn, dull care to kill ?
Does no one guess ? Not one ?
'Tis that most grateful beverage, beer,
Which heaven hath sent our hearts to cheer,
To all old England's sons so dear.
Ambrosia, nectar, is surely beer !
Long live malt, hops, long live beer.
Hurrah !

Bathing.—In camp life the free use of cold water for the skin is essential for hardening the system, and clearing the pores from all impurities; it is also a wonderful promoter of cheerfulness. It is true, abundance of water cannot always be procured, but a stable bucket full will enable one to perform ablutions with fair success, and in this wise. Stepping into the tent of a friend, newly arrived at the seat of war, he said, "I feel very miserable. I have not been able to 'tub,' and have only had a bucket of water allowed me a day since I arrived." "That will do," was the reply, "quite sufficient." An old piece of towelling was then folded, and made into a mitten, this was given to be used as a bath glove, and which, with the addition of a piece of sponge, gives perfect ablution, on an emergency, from a single bucket of water.

The addition of common salt to the bucket is very useful, and prevents many ailments, and induces healthy action of the skin. After excessive fatigue some tepid water is useful, but as a general practice, summer and winter, the cold bath is much more bracing than warm water, and the steam baths of the luxurious East; besides, the saving of trouble to domestics must be considered.

If water can be collected by a dam or otherwise, camps of instruction are not complete unless they have the means at hand for the men bathing, and being taught to swim. This is soon acquired in the deepest water, by suspending a man by a girth round the chest, and a rope passing through a ring at the end of a horizontal pole, rigged from the shore or from a boat. Thus he makes his strokes supported. Owing one's life, under Providence, to a knowledge of swimming, we cannot sufficiently insist on the great importance to be attached to it, for British soldiers especially, so liable to shipwrecks and disasters at sea.

We have tried, and seen utterly fail, inflated India rubber belts;

they are liable to injury from the prick of a pin, and the substance is apt to decay from what makes them waterproof in the first instance. Small squares of cork, sewn in stout calico, never fail; and if nothing else is to be had, empty bottles, corked, and put inside the Jersey shirt, will enable a man to pass buoyantly through the fiercest breakers.

Food.—The new system of the commissariat seems admirable; at least there is a wonderful improvement in the quality of the meat lately. The animal is seen alive before it is killed for the use of soldiers. Formerly there were many complaints against meat, as some contractors bought lean and diseased beasts—"good enough for the sodgers"—but the Government will not allow this nefarious system to continue. With recruits, quantity of food predominates over every other consideration; their appetites are usually so keen that unless allowed day after day to boil their meat, and make a good basin of soup, eating the meat and bread thereafter, and thus taking off "the fiery edge" of their hunger, they will not be satisfied. We have also known a recruit buy at the canteen a four pound loaf after his dinner, and return to a corner and consume it all by himself. Meat prepared in the oven is not so filling to recruits, yet if obliged to change their manner of cooking, and the stew is made savoury with pepper and onions, they soon desire to make this agreeable change in their diet.

But in camp life nothing is so relishing as the Cape Karbonatchi, or small squares of meat skewered on a forked stick, roasted over the wood fire, and eaten hot off the stick, with biscuits from the haversack, washed down with a "tot" of black tea. We found that the best way to deal with indifferent meat on service, was to chop it up small with a hatchet on a block of wood, and make Scotch collops of it; the fire acted on it better this way than boiling it, which, if not very slowly performed, only made the meat hard and unpalatable.

It is absurd to be fastidious about eating on service, still it shows carelessness and stupidity not to make the most of one's rations; and with indifferent means to produce a respectable "mess of pottage," is doubtless a proof of ability in the way of the *cuisine*.

Condemned for some time to a diet of salt pork and biscuit, we found the corrective to this sort of food in a bag of rice, the rice and rice water correcting the injurious effects of the pork. The way to make a good mess out of salt beef is to boil it for an hour, then throw away the first water, boil it again slowly, adding broken biscuit or whatever else is at hand, flour, for instance, the second boiling will produce a fair soup, and meat not at all bad.

The pet dish is thus produced: cut up fresh meat small, put it into a jar, peppering and salting it slightly, put the jar into a camp kettle, the water surrounding the jar, but not entering the mouth of it, let the water simmer for four or five hours, at the end of which time a stew will be turned out of the jar fit for a general to sit down to.

Good kneading will raise bread without the necessity for yeast on service, thus—a trick we learned on the American lakes. Take a frying pan full of flour, knead this till tired, adding a little salt, put the saucepan on the fire, and before long a tolerable loaf will appear

in it; or make a man wash his hands, sit down, and fill them with flour, let another pour water on this, knead well again, and stick the round moist ball up against the hot ashes, a good roll will soon be produced to accompany one's meat.

Commend me wild meat when it can be got, as easier of digestion, more health and strength-giving than any stall-fed ox whatever. But quantity of food is not at all required for strength and activity; thus one of the finest men for his years we know is Waterton, of Walton Hall, "wanderer and naturalist." He has always been a very moderate eater, he could walk, run, climb trees, and perform all sorts of athletes at sixty better than most men at twenty-five, and his leg was a picture for a statuary, having what he called a double calf, though he boasted at the same time that his stomach was "no bigger than his fist," he ate so moderately.

Drink.—To search for and find the "pure element" on service, is of the first consequence, and also to look to one's supply of water on occupying a post, should be considered of primary importance. The privations which the Oriental and African traveller experiences, and the dirty chocolate-resembling pools with which he is often obliged to try to assuage his thirst, teach the voyageur the great value of good water, and show the absurd fastidiousness of some of those "who have never slept out of sheets" about the crystal purity of the water they use.

The campaigner or traveller in wilderness regions should recollect that the converging footprints of wild animals, the flight of birds, and the fresh appearance of vegetation, at particular places on an arid plain, indicate water. The beds of rivers, apparently dry, have sometimes water at no great depth, and the elephant digging there with his tusks, and inserting his trunk into a hole, sucks up what will refresh his bulky and sun-burnt carcase.

The experienced campaigner will carry with him a piece of alum to precipitate the earthy particles in water; or throw into it charcoal, or boil it; if in a hurry to drink at a muddy pool, he will spread a handkerchief over it, put a bullet in the centre of the handkerchief, and thus collect the water clear. If a filter is required, he will sink a barrel, bored with holes, in a water-course, surround it with moss, or better, have one barrel within another, and moss between them. The simple and valuable mode of distilling fresh water from salt, in the event of shipwreck, should be remembered—place a kettle of salt water on two or three stones, so as to have a fire below it, introduce the muzzle of a gun barrel under the lid, support the breech horizontally, surround the barrel with a net cloth, or put it in a trough of water to act as a condenser of the steam, and the fresh water will run out at the touch-hole.

During a voyage of a month and more, troops might be trained to temperance, and made to feel its excellent effect, giving no spirit ration, but good tea, coffee, or cocoa. If beer and porter could be supplied, they would be preferred, doubtless, but they are bulky and expensive additions to the rations. When wounds are given, men are far better prepared for them, and will more rapidly recover from them on tea than on grog, when there is a taint of alcohol in the

system, as has been often witnessed; also there would be much less thirst if the very moderate use of tobacco were indulged in, and not that constant "blowing a cloud" indulged in by many, and of the strongest and nerve-destroying cavendish. "I regretted leaving the West Indies," said a slave of the glass and pipe. "Why?" "Because I had always a beautiful thirst there!"

Cooking.—It is of the first consequence that troops should early bestir themselves and cook a meal, particularly if they have hard work before them. It is alleged of the Scotch that they always take the precaution to eat a good breakfast to make sure of one meal, careless afterwards of food during the day. Previous to the battle of Solferino, the French, knowing what was before them, cooked and ate at 2 a.m.; the Austrians were bringing up their cooking apparatus when their pots and kettles were knocked about by the French and Sardinian balls; exhaustion was the result to the soldiers of the Kaiser, fighting, as the brave fellows did, on empty stomachs.

We first saw camp kitchens with the Russian army during the war of 1829, a long trench dug and square notches cut at one side of it for the fires and kettles. Captain Pont, R.A., has covered trenches sixteen feet long, for draught, and a chimney at the end. Colonel D. Lissons, C.B., made admirable kitchens, with long draughts, in the Crimea, for the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers. In a circular kitchen the earth is thrown towards the centre and notches cut in it for the kettles to rest upon—an iron pot and tea kettle may comprise the apparatus for cooking; in this way the tea is not made in the same kettle the meat is boiled in. For a hurried dinner, broil rib bones; also pieces of meat skewered on a ramrod afford much strength. We have seen Kaffir warriors with their meal of meat on their left arm in the form of a ring or two of flesh, worn like a bracelet, and thus trotting along with their light commissariat.

Hutting.—If troops are without tents they should cut out holes in the ground, parallelograms, to hold, say six men. In travelling in Armenia some years ago underground houses were first seen. The table-lands there are exposed to severe cold in winter, and men and cattle are sheltered under ground, under the same flat roof; the house being indicated by its chimney appearing above the snow. On the plateau of Sevastopol the officers of some regiments lived entirely under ground; they excavated to the depth of their shoulders, leaving steps to descend to the floor, and over all placed a roof, thatched or covered with boards or tarpaulin. The windows and door were at the gables. Doubtless the ancient Celts, as was indicated in exploring among the baths on the Curragh of Kildare, lived wholly, or in part, under ground.

It would be a useful practice for troops to construct a few underground huts with roofs of poles and branches, care being taken to carry off the water by means of small trenches outside. Planting sticks in the ground and bringing their tops together and fastening them, watling them with branches and heaping earth all round, make a tolerable den to live in.

In forests it is easy to hut oneself as we did on hunting parties in

America, by means of two forked sticks with a ridge pole six or more feet long between them, against this lean poles on one side, the front open, thatch the poles with branches, also close up the triangular ends, have a log fire in front, cover the floor with small pine branches, and after the evening meal is cooked and discussed, delicious repose may be had in one's blanket in this forest "camp." To "make camp," in the woodsman's phraseology, is to construct a screen of this description. In very wet and cold weather two of these facing each other make a complete hut, but the open "half hut" suffices for many months in the year. To save the trouble of thatching, the writer carried coverings for the poles (cut daily) of stout striped ticking with end pieces. Ticking to cover five men weighed 7 or 8 lbs., whilst a bell tent, dry, with its pegs and mallet, weighs 60 lbs., and wet, upwards of 100 lbs.

TENTS.—The inventor of the *tente d'abri* is deserving of a high premium. It is terrible, the waste of lives in armies which have no canvass covering for their soldiers, as was the case in former wars. In disembarking at Old Fort in the Crimea, for want of transport no bell tents could be landed, and the *tente d'abri* was then a novelty; there was a deluge of rain the first night, and the result was a ship load of sick; now *tentes d'abri* are introduced for practice, at the large camps, and six soldiers, each carrying a piece of canvass 5ft. 4½ in. square, with buttons on it, and short poles and guy ropes, a few pegs and a mallet, can set up their shelter in a few minutes, and sit or lie secure from harm below, particularly if there is a piece of tarpaulin or waterproof to cover the ground with.

The writer used on service to set up two rifles 6½ft. apart, with plugs in their muzzles, a ridge cord went from plug to plug, and was pegged down to the ground, a couple of blankets, provided with eylet holes (strengthened with canvass or leather), made a tent for four men, of which the rifles were the poles, and two rifles and two blankets remained for defence and cover inside.

The old bell tent, difficult to pitch, and with its numerous pegs, still maintains its ground in our camps; perhaps it is less difficult to blow down than tents of other shapes. Some prefer a pyramidical tent of 7ft. in the sides, and requiring four pegs at the angles, the floor of this sunk two or more feet, a young tree substituted for the usual pole, or, to give more space, a number of poles converging to a point—wigwam fashion, and covered with the tent and with a tarpaulin floor, make a capital canvass habitation.

In India and for fishing excursions in America, a two-poled tent was used 7ft. long, and roomy enough to dress in, fastened to the ground with pegs, or even stones, and a semi-circular part at one end for baggage; the canvass weighed 8 or 9lbs., and the cost was 50 shillings.

Bushing the guy ropes of tents with twigs or fastening the ends to stones and burying them, will enable a tent to resist the heaviest gales. A tent for a permanent abode should be dug out inside, leaving a mass of earth to support the pole with a flat stone below it, an earthen bed, a shelf all round, and for cold weather a fireplace contrived with a chimney running outside, and across the trench,

which is dug to keep the rain water from getting into the tent.

Captain Rhodes, with his book on tents, is the authority for canvass habitations; he collected most valuable information as to tents of every description and form; his principle seems to be to discard the use of the inconvenient tent pole, the covering being supported on pliable ribs of ashwood, the lower ends of which are fixed into the ground, and the tops meeting in a wooden head, which also answers the purpose of a ventilator.

A patrole tent used in South Africa is thus described, and earnestly recommended to the notice of the campaigner and huntsman as affording effectual protection from heat, cold, and wet, is portable, that one man can carry it, and it may be "built" for £3.



Two stout poles, outside the tent, are four and a half or five feet high, and are connected with a ridge rope eight feet long, secured with one or two guy or storm ropes. The tent is double, the outer tent is of striped ticking, the inner of blanket, the ticking and the blanketing are both sewn over a second ridge rope; this rope has loops at the ends for the pole heads, and is connected with the first ridge rope by ten or twelve loops of strong tape, the first ridge rope running through the loops. There is a curtain at the bottom, and an interval of two and a half inches between the ticking and the blanket tapes at the middle and ends connecting the blanket with the ticking. Width of tent at bottom about four and a half feet, with a trench all round; the doors of a triangular shape, fasten across each other at the ends of the tent. There may be twenty pegs to the tent, but fourteen usually suffice. Colonel Blenkinsop, 45th, and Captain Barnes, 14th regiment, were out for months in a tent of this description at the Cape, and with great comfort.

Fire.—Tell most civilized men to make a fire, without having lucifer matches at hand, and they would be quite at a loss. Savages use fire sticks, that is, they have a small block of wood which should not be too hard, and a drill stick hard and dry to rub into the block, twirling it between their palms till a quantity of black dust is collected, which is fanned into a flame. In Kaffir land, we saw a warrior painfully "raising fire" in this way. A doctor "to astonish the native," did so effectually, and himself at the same time, by

pulling out a match box, and incautiously using it, he blew up the whole in his face.

On service, carrying a tinder box is useful, with flint and steel, also a lump of sulphur, to make matches by dipping chips into the sulphur, melted in an old spoon. We have seen fire obtained from a rag, by firing it out of a gun with a small charge of powder. A burning glass is easily found in one's telescope. Tinder is prepared for a journey by lighting and smothering rags of cotton or linen. Punk is a natural tinder, which grows on the stems of old trees.

In Africa our usual practice was, to collect some dry grass and make it into a loose nest, ignite some touch paper (made by rubbing wet powder into it), with the flint and steel, and put it into the middle of the nest, *encourage* it with a pinch of dry powder, and swing the nest round the head, and backwards and forwards in the air; with a little practice a flame is thus quickly raised, small chips of wood previously collected and at hand begin a fire, and large pieces cook the kettle.

In the pine woods of America we had fires to last all night, by cutting and partly squaring a couple of great logs, one rested on the other; fire was raised by means of the chips, and then the logs were ignited; fire is made in the bottom of a boat in a box of clay. It will be remembered that fire is an admirable purifier of the air in damp situations.

Fascines, Gabions, &c.—Important arts of camp life are the making of fascines, gabions, and other means for conducting the practical operations of a siege, and for the construction of field works and batteries.

Some years ago, whilst the writer was studying at the Royal Engineer Establishment at Chatham under Colonel (now General Sir Charles) Pasley, this valuable officer was preparing a series of small books entitled.

"Rules, chiefly derived from experiment" on the above matters, and these are highly useful to refer to, though not easy to be obtained.

The axe is a tool of the greatest value, particularly in wooded countries, and soldiers should take every opportunity to use it. The Americans, as the United States General, Macomb, mentioned in conversation at Washington, saw our people in the war of 1812, using the billhook, and working with brushwood, whilst the Americans were felling trees with axes for breastworks.

In cutting brushwood for fascines, gabions, and pickets, the stroke of the billhook should be upward and backhanded, a pair of stout gloves is indispensable, also rubstones; fascines for revetting batteries are 18ft. long and 9in. in diameter, they are usually made of brushwood wherever it can be found.

Fascines are made in a cradle on tressles, or stakes fixed obliquely into the ground crossing each other, and found together in the form of a St. Andrew's Cross, the tressles are usually 4ft. apart. The branches properly trimmed are placed on the tressels.

The fascine is bound with withes, two men choke or compress the brushwood, and two bind. The fascine picket with its triangular point to penetrate and fix the fascine is about 4ft. long.

Gabions or cylindrical hampers open at top and bottom and filled with earth are most useful, like fascines, for revetting fieldworks. After many experiments it was found that 2 feet was the best diameter to use for gabions, and 2 feet 9 inches the best height. Gabions are usually made by driving pickets into the ground in a circle, the prepared rods for the web or watling are passed alternately round one picket and within the next, and from time to time the watling is beat down with the foot or a stout picket.

It requires considerable practice to make fascines and gabions neatly and strong, whereas pointing the branches of felled trees for abattis, planting stockades, digging pitfalls or *trous de loup* are easily taught.

Skill and judgment are necessary to make powder magazines in the trenches or in field works that will not be liable to be blown up by an enemy. At Sevastopol the British seemed more successful than the French in this matter. The magazine may be placed in a traverse or partly under ground, and may be constructed of fascines, gabions, &c., and the mouth covered with a splinter proof shelter of scantlings of 8 or 10 inches, and placed sloping over the mouth; 2 feet of earth usually cover the scantling.

The dimensions of a field powder magazine are usually 6 feet high by 4 feet 6 inches wide, and its length in proportion to the quantity of ammunition. There should be at least 3 feet of earth on the top, the floor to be quite dry, and of joists and boards, with a small ditch underneath.

Throwing up a Work.—This is a most useful part of the practice of the arts of camp life, though some soldiers imagined when they "listed," a pick and spade would never more be handled by them. But in these rifle days the value of these implements cannot be sufficiently inculcated. For the protection of artillery, besides mantlets of iron, the breastwork rapidly thrown up will be indispensable. The Romans with their nightly entrenchments in an enemy's country, their *vallum et fossa*, showed the value they put on earth works and the use of tools.

The engineers and their assistants will show by means of poles, pickets, and cords the height and size of a field work, and also the thickness of the parapet. The men are distributed and told off, two shovels to one pick, and they work at 5 or 6 feet apart; if working pay is given it should be appropriated to replace clothes fairly worn out at the work.

"Setting up" is a great matter in the British army, and it is doubtless very advisable to take the clown out of a man and convert the bumpkin into the smart clean soldier, proud of himself and of his corps, yet we must not sacrifice the practice of the pick and spade, the saw, axe, and augur, to white belts and polished pouches.

A pipe clay regiment was kept on a frontier, and not allowed to engage in an exciting campaign, because the commanding officer seemed reluctant to get his men's clothes soiled in a bivouac.

In America (a dangerous place for deserting) regiments employed on public works remained true to their colours, whilst mere drill

and barrack routine, made them first listless, and then ready to listen to an offer to be helped across the border. The colonel of a regiment in Canada, besides employing his men on useful fatigue duties rewarded his good conduct men by allowing them to work for wages in the gardens of civilians.

In summer, throwing up fifty yards of a parapet, or a sod fort, is useful practice; whilst in winter making a snow fort and attacking it, as was sometimes practised in Canada, is both amusing and instructive, combining also the use of scaling ladders.

The Burmans, in the war of 1825-1826, used to sink pits at night opposite a work occupied by our soldiers, and in the morning fire away from under cover. The Russian rifle pits, of a few stones for cover, with the ground hollowed out behind them, are in the lively recollection of those who took part in the siege of Sevastopol. Rifle screens are made by throwing up a few feet of parapet, and occupying the trench behind it.

We here beg to notice Colonel Lefroy's excellent handbook for field service, containing among a variety of most interesting and useful subjects, directions for field fortifications, military bridges, mechanical manœuvres, &c. The treatises of the American Professor Mahon, on field fortification, outpost duties, &c., are also highly to be commended for comprehensiveness and portability, whilst Colonel Jebb's attack and defence of posts should be in the portmanteau of every officer.

The Bivouac.—The true soldier will try to make himself as contented and happy by the bivouac fire as in the carpeted and curtained room "when battle's over." The imitation soldier grumbles and is "put out" with the least approach to discomfort. During a partial slave insurrection in the West Indies, we remember certain *valorosos*, at first seemingly inclined to do good service, but soon quite "bothered," and wishing to go home, because they did not get their coffee regularly of a morning.

It is wonderful how hardened the system becomes after a few months exposure; what would half kill a "barrack clerk," a night in the bush, is enjoyment and health to a seasoned campaigner. Still, as was said before, it is absurd to reject the appliances to guard against cold and damp, or he may sow the seeds of rheumatism, fever, or dysentery. A very valuable and intelligent officer, Colonel Michell, R.A., "Tarifa Michell," brought on a fatal fever, by thinking himself too hardy, and letting his wet clothes dry on him in Syria.

Unless the trunk of a tree is very large, it gives very indifferent shelter to sleep behind; much better turn up a broad turf as a screen against the night blast. Picking up stones, drawing bushes together, or scooping out a furrow in the sand, all help materially in the bivouac, the feet being kept covered, with an addition to the cloak or great coat, the pillow the butt of the rifle, and the barrel between one's legs, if danger is near.

If there is a pony to carry the portmanteaus, a pair of blankets in a large tarpaulin, or a waterproof bag, is a capital preparation for the bivouac, a flap covering the head in rain.

In connexion with this subject, we hope that the time will soon come when troops will be dressed in a more loose manner than the present European fashion of Prussian stiffness. We have worn on horseback the loose shulwas of the Persians, a sort of knickerbockers, in them a man of ordinary stamina, and with the addition of a broad shawl girdle, and a coffee and bread diet, should be "up to" 100 miles a day in the saddle for many days together; whilst in European cut garments, these fatigues might be inconvenient, and the bivouac might be reached with difficulty.

Again, for riflemen, or for any soldiers, a vest, with thin sleeves for hot climates, and thick sleeves for cold, and over it a loose jacket, *à la Zouave*, or after the old Highland fashion, will both look better, give the wearer more apparent size, and greater freedom to his chest and arms, than the fashion of buttoning up a soldier to the throat in a tunic, though that is a wonderful improvement on the old coatee. The outer garment should button over the vest on occasion, but in general it might be loosely confined at the upper part of the breast, and the belts worn over the vest, the waist belt running through loops to support the ammunition.

Equipped in this way, and well shod, and with changes on hunting expeditions, when the bivouac was reached, if the weather was fine, no tent was pitched for months. The jacket and ammunition could be thrown off, and after collecting firewood, the making fire, boiling and broiling operations commenced by some of the party, and clearing the sand of stones, and putting up some bushes, stones, and turf to the windward, would precede the turning into the blanket. The night air about which there is such absurd fear among dwellers in cities, gives health and not disease, unless we have the misfortune to repose near swamps and malaria; in this case a veil over the face and a fire may ward off the poison, and in the morning a little precautionary quinine in water may be used.

On Saturday nights music and dancing agreeably diversify camp life, or bouts at single stick, to prepare one for a rush, sword in hand, on riflemen.

In the bivouac the sabbath should be a day of rest, but not of idleness. The careful officer will then assemble his people, and with due reverence offer a tribute of praise and thanksgiving to the Lord of Hosts.

In the afternoon whilst clothes are repaired and washed, a reader may convey useful instruction from a pocket volume, one of which, in addition to the Scriptures, might be found in every pack, and thus form a portable field library of hundreds of volumes.

Stimulated by a sense of duty, and by the recital of heroic actions, the Christian soldier will be always ready, "with the light of battle beaming on his countenance," to advance with alacrity, to engage his country's foes, and, if need be, contentedly to lay down his life in her service.

The Curragh Camp, Sept., 1859.

A GERMAN VIEW OF THE ITALIAN WAR.

(Continued from page 41.)

CHAPTER IV.

The Battle of Magenta—The French and Austrian Returns of Killed and Wounded—Gyulai's Tactics—The Austrian Retreat—No Pursuit—Results of the Battle of Magenta—The Fight at Melegnano—The Evacuation of Lombardy—Political Results.

It was not till 4 p.m., that MacMahon's artillery was again audible on the battle-field at Ponte di Magenta, and at about the same hour a wing of Reischach's division had pushed on from Ponte di Magenta on Buffalora. It is very doubtful whether MacMahon would have carried the day at the decisive moment at Magenta, had not, at this juncture, all the French auxiliary troops come up on the other side from San Martino. This decided the day. Heaps of dead proved how hard the Austrians had fought against immense odds.* General Cler was killed, General Mellinet had two horses shot under him, General Wimpffen was wounded in the head, Commandants Desmé and Maudhurs were killed at Buffalora; the Zouaves lost 200 men, and the Imperial Guard was much cut up. Six Austrian Generals were wounded, Reischach in three places. Had the French not won the day, with the Tessin behind them, their army was lost.

In round numbers the French say they picked up 120,000 muskets on the field of battle, the official Austrian returns are 4,000 men missing (chiefly prisoners), 63 officers killed, 1,302 privates killed, 218 officers wounded, and 4,130 men, in all 9,713 men killed, wounded, and missing. Amongst the wounded were Generals Reischach, Bauer, Weigl, Lebzeltern, Gablentz, and Burdina, the last severely. Many of the missing afterwards rejoined their respective detachments. The Austrians took 700 French prisoners. The loss of the French, in killed and wounded, must have been very great.*

Was Gyulai justified in not renewing the battle on the next morning?

The Austrian writer enters into all the *pros* and *cons* at great length, but finally comes to the conclusion that the retreat was advisable. The first idea was to give a second battle, and some military

* The Austrian writer here enters into a long enumeration of the Austrian troops engaged, to show how inferior they were in numbers to the allied armies.

* The *Journal des Debats* has recently published a return of the losses of both sides in the various engagements, which return it states to have compiled from the most authentic sources. It gives the losses as follows :—

At Montebello (21st May) the Allies had 7,000 men engaged, of which 6,200 were French; they had 850 men put *hors de combat*, of which 625 were French. The Austrians were 13,000 strong; *hors de combat*, 1,150; prisoners, 150.

Palestro (30th and 31st May): Allies 21,000, of which only 2,500 were French; *hors de combat*, 1,400. Austrians also 21,000; 2,100 men *hors de combat*; 950 made prisoners.

Magenta (4th June, including Turbigo 3d June): French 55,000; 4,400 *hors de combat*; 208 made prisoners; lost one gun. Austrians 75,000; 13,000 *hors de combat*, 7,000 prisoners, and lost four guns.

(We give the French statement, wishing to be impartial. The Austrian returns are official.)

authorities are of the opinion that had a determined attack been made on the 5th, the French would have been driven back over the Tessin. It is impossible to say what the result might have been. The Austrians could have brought up 70,000 men, but the whole of the Sardinian army and Baraguey d'Hillier's corps, altogether 90,000 men, would have been opposed to them.

On the morning of the 5th, the Austrians opened fire to cover their retreat. The Regiment Prince of Hesse attacked Ponte di Magenta, and kept their ground until the retreat was assured. No pursuit was made.

Such was the battle of Magenta; it will be ever memorable in the annals of war for bad generalship and for the heroism of the officers and men; 75,000 Austrians held their ground against 110,000 Frenchmen, and would have gained the victory if a single fresh division had been brought up in time.

The results of the battle of Magenta were very important, but they did not imply the necessity for the evacuation of the whole of Lombardy. It is, however, true, that after Milan was somewhat hastily evacuated, "superior orders" commanded the evacuation of Pavia, Pizzighettone, and Piacenza, as the army was to take up a new position behind the Mincio.

On the evening of the 8th June, the only serious engagement in the retreat took place at Melegnano; the rest of the Austrian army crossed the Adda unopposed, as did also Urban's flying division near Cassano.

And these strongholds were allowed to be evacuated, and the fortifications destroyed by the Austrians, without opposition. This is the best reply to the bombastic announcements in the *Moniteur*.

The Emperor Napoleon III. ordered Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers, whose corps was not engaged at Magenta, to join MacMahon. He wished to show, at least, the appearance of a pursuit, and there was to be a fight at any price. The troops of the 1st corps were still far off, and MacMahon's corps, though one portion of it had advanced as far as St. Donato, one mile east of Milan, appeared to have suffered so much that the Marshal did not feel much inclination to push forward. Baraguey d'Hilliers, in his report to the Emperor, says:

"Time was required to carry out effectually the attack on Melegnano. But your Majesty has ordered me to commence operations on the very day I left San Pietro d'Olmo, which has rendered my task much more difficult, as the 3d division could not take up position till half-past three."

It arrived only at half-past four within 1,200 metres of Melegnano, whilst Marshal MacMahon crossed the Lambro at Carpaniello, and pushed forward his artillery on the Lodi road.

At the battle of Melegnano three divisions of the French, of 1st corps, were engaged, supported by MacMahon's artillery, whilst on the Austrian side there was Roden's single division engaged, supported by a second division in reserve.

Roden's brigade had to fight against the terrific odds of six to one. He had thrown up a barricade in front of the town, and placed a battery at the entrance close to the first houses. When the French

column of attack of the 3d division approached and opened their artillery on the Austrian battery, they suffered such severe loss that they had to fall back. The Austrians, however, were threatened on all sides; six guns were brought up in front on the high road, ten were placed on the left wing, and two on the right. General Forgeot, with two battalions and a detachment of sharpshooters, advanced from Mezzana on the French right wing, threatening to cut off the retreat on Lodi.

Nevertheless, Roden's brigade made a determined resistance, disputing every inch of ground, in the streets, at the castle, and behind the garden walls, until the 2d French division came up. The communication with the bridge over the Lambro was now threatened on two sides. The retreat was sounded and all the guns were safely carried across the bridge with the exception of one. Behind Melegnano, Roden's brigade was joined by that of Boer, and took up position at Castel-Bernardi, and held its ground there until the last wounded man had been removed. MacMahon's artillery now opened on the Lodi road, and it was high time for the Austrians to beat a hasty retreat. At nine o'clock at night a heavy storm of rain put a stop to the fighting, and the two brigades joined the rear-guard of the 8th corps (Benedekt) without pursuit. The Austrian returns of the affair are 369 men *hors de combat*; of which number 112 privates, 7 officers, and 1 general killed, 234 privates and 15 officers wounded. In addition, some officers and men of the Regiment Crown-Prince of Saxony missing or made prisoners. General Boer died of his wounds whilst being conveyed to Lodi.

Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers' report speaks of 1,200 wounded Austrians taken to the French ambulances, and of 800 to 900 prisoners! and of one gun captured. We must ask here (says the Austrian writer) who lies? The Austrian report is official, giving the names of the killed and wounded; the French account is cooked up for the Parisians. Baraguey d'Hilliers, nevertheless, admits the loss of 943 killed and wounded, including 13 officers killed, 56 wounded, amongst whom two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, and one general wounded.

We do not hesitate to say that the honour of the day was on the Austrian side. They had given the French a good lesson, and were allowed to retreat unmolested to the Adda.

But, was it necessary to evacuate the whole of Lombardy, and to retire behind the Mincio?

High Austrian military authorities maintain that Piacenza and, in communication with it, Pavia, ought to have held out.

After enumerating the recent additions to the fortifications of Piacenza, the Austrian writer continues:

"It is true, a successful defence of Piacenza would have required a whole *corps d'armée* of at least 20,000 or 30,000 men. But this implies, at least, employment before its walls to double that amount of the enemy. Would it then have been possible for the enemy to take up a sure position on the line of the Adda, with Piacenza in its flank and rear?

"We must (says the Austrian writer) unhesitatingly adopt this

opinion, the more so as by holding the line of the Po from Piacenza to Cremona, and of the Adda, the occupation of Milan by the Sardo-French would have been a very precarious one, and a single victory would have compelled them to evacuate it. The evacuation of Piacenza, and of the whole of Lombardy as far as the Mincio, was not only a most unexpected military advantage for the Franco-Sardinians, but, considering the revolutionary character of the war, an incalculable political success. The whole of Italy believed it to be the consequence of the battle of Magenta, and that Austria did not feel herself strong enough to meet her opponents once more in the field in Lombardy. On all sides Austria was deserted. The Valtellino, Bergamo, Brescia, gave in as soon as the Piedmontese and French appeared; Modena and Parma, when Austria had partizans, did the same; even the legations in the Papal States made political demonstrations in favour of the Protectorate of Sardinia. In short, wherever Austria's power failed to be felt, the whole of Italy beyond the Po and Mincio was lost to her.

CHAPTER V.

The Battle of Solferino.

On the 23d June, the armies of the Allies were on the river Chiese, and it was only when Napoleon was informed, by his numerous and trusty scouts, of the projected attack of the Austrians, that he issued orders for a general advance and to commence the attack before day-break on the 24th. The position of the Allies, on the night between the 23d and 24th, was as follows:—The Piedmontese army stood between Desenzano and Esenta, some detachments occupied the upper range of hills near Castel Venzago. This army was to advance against Pozzolengo and on the Peschiera road. The first French corps, under Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers, consisting of the Infantry divisions, Forey, Bazaine, and L'Admirault, was at Esenta, and was destined to act against Solferino. Of the Imperial Guard, under Marshal Regnauld de St. Jean d'Angely, the Infantry—namely, Mellinet's division of Grenadiers of the Guard and Camou's Voltigeurs—were encamped at Montechiaro. The eight batteries of the Artillery of the Guard and the three Cavalry brigades, under Morris, were at Castenedolo, half way between Montechiaro and Brescia. In this retired position, the Guard formed the main reserve. The second corps, under Marshal MacMahon, consisting of the divisions Lamotterouge and Decaen, was at Castiglione, thus nearest to the Austrian lines, and had orders to act against Cavriana. The fourth corps, under Niel, consisting of the divisions Vinoy, Failly, and Luzy, and strengthened by the two cavalry divisions Partouneaux and Desvaux, stood on the same line (elevation) as the second corps at Carpenedolo, and was to advance against Guidozzolo. The third corps, under Marshal Canrobert, consisting of the divisions Bourbaki, Trochu, and Renault, was stationed somewhat in the rear, at the other side of the Chiese, in Mezzane, and was destined to cover the right wing of the army and to support the fourth corps. The French army thus formed a half circle from Esenta, by Castiglione and Carpenedolo, to Messane, in the centre of which, Montechiaro, stood the

reserve. The position was a very concentrated one, and well selected for all eventualities. The cavalry and artillery of the Guard were alone somewhat too much in the rear, and had a trying march to get up to the field of battle.

The Austrian army had, as was known, abandoned its former strong positions of Lonato, Montechiaro, and Castiglione, and had withdrawn behind the Mincio, and it appeared as if its intention was there to await the attack of the Allies. This retreat across the Mincio did not please the Austrian troops, who were eager for battle, and the splendid Austrian cavalry was particularly annoyed as it found itself condemned to inactivity, as the plains of Medole and Montechiaro would have afforded it a rare opportunity of acting in large masses against the enemy. News came in that Prince Napoleon was advancing with 35,000 fresh troops, and that the enemy's fleet was preparing to attack Venice. All these circumstances and many others determined the Austrian General to take the offensive; the right wing of the Allies was to be the chief point of attack, with a view to drive them up against the mountains and impede their retreat. A reconnoissance had shown that the ridge of hills south of the Garda Lake was not occupied, and that a quick move in advance would secure the advantageous points and enable the Austrians to give battle to the enemy, who had his back to the Chiese, under very favourable circumstances.

It was on the 23rd June that the Austrian army crossed the Mincio; Reichlin's brigade of the 6th corps joined by Field-Marshal Benedek's at Peschiera and Salionze, the 5th at Valeggio, the 7th and Mensdorff's reserve cavalry division over a military bridge at Ferri; the 9th, 11th, and Zedwitz's cavalry division crossed over the bridge at Goito. On the evening of the 23rd the Austrian army stood in position as follows:—

Of the 2nd army of General Count Schlick, the 8th corps, with the brigades attached to it, was at Pozzolengo. The line of outposts stretched from Zapaglia to Madonna della Seoperta, a very dominating point. The 5th corps, under Lieut.-Field-Marshal Count Stadion, was at Solferino, and with Bils' avant garde brigade occupied the heights in front and the village of Grole. The 1st corps, under Count Clam, was at Cavriana; the 7th corps, under Lieut.-Field Marshal Zobel, at Foresto, below Volta, as a reserve. Lieut.-Field Marshal Mensdorff's cavalry division occupied Tezze in the plain between the 1st and 7th corps.

Of the 1st army Feld-Zeugmeister Count Wimpffen, Zedwitz's cavalry division, with some battalions of the 9th corps, had been pushed on to Medole; the 3rd and 9th corps were encamped in the junction road at Guidizzolo; the 11th stood as reserve at Castel Grimaldo almost on the same level as the 7th corps of the 1st army. The statement that the 11th corps was placed too much in the rear is incorrect; the assertion, however, holds as regards the division Jellachich, of the 2nd corps, which had gone forth from Mantua, and under the immediate orders of Lieut.-Field Marshal-Prince Edward Liechtenstein, had stationed itself at Marcavra, near the bridge over the Oglio. It had, however, orders to participate in the operations of the main army, and to operate against the right of the

French advancing by Castelgoffredo. Napoleon was also informed of this projected flank attack, which eventually would have perhaps been supported by the whole 2nd corps, and he had given the necessary instructions to Canrobert, in consequence. The position of the division Jellachich was not, however, without result, as it prevented Canrobert sending up to Niel the support he repeatedly sent to him for. Without this circumstance, the position taken by the division Jellachich would have had no influence whatever on the fortunes of the day. MacMahon, with the 3rd division of the 3rd French corps had boldly attacked, and thereby perhaps turned the Austrians' left wing—but we must not anticipate the course of the battle, but begin with the first fighting on the morning of the 24th June.

The first movements of the French army commenced at 2 o'clock in the morning, and at daybreak already they had commenced skirmishing with the Austrian outposts at Grole and Medole. They had thus anticipated the Austrian attack, and prevented them completing their arrangements for giving battle. That a battle was not expected till the 25th is scarcely probable. The outposts stood nearly opposite to each other on the evening of the 23rd, and it was not to be supposed that the French would quietly watch the movements of the Austrians to the 25th.

The French 1st corps advanced in two columns from Esenta against Solferino; L'Admirault's division, with four field pieces, took the mountain road, whilst the two other divisions, with the whole of the artillery and train, advanced in the plain. The avant-garde was formed in the plain and on the declivities, by Dieu's brigade, whose former commander, Beuret, fell at Montebello, and which was destined again on this day to lose its chief. Behind Fontane the 17th battalion of chasseurs of this brigade attacked the Austrian advanced posts on the Monte di Valscura, and dislodged them after a short fight. They made a more determined defence at Grole, which Forey attacked with two full battalions of the 74th of the line. The numerically inferior detachments of Bils's brigade retired fighting on Solferino. The Monte Fenile, which offers an advantageous position for artillery, was taken possession of by the 84th regiment of the same French brigade, whilst L'Admirault's division was following the mountain road on the same level. Some hours of fierce fighting now ensued for the possession of the houses scattered in front of Solferino. L'Admirault, twice wounded, was obliged to give up his command to General Negrier. He died afterwards of his wounds. The most determined resistance was expected by the French on the heights of Solferino itself, where the tower, so called "Spia d'Italia," stands, commanding the whole country beneath. The churchyard of Solferino, surrounded by a wall, had great capabilities for defence, and the whole position on the heights was strong and advantageous. That no field-works had been thrown up here is explained by the fact that the position was only occupied the night before. The capture was a tough piece of work, especially as it was defended as best he could by the brave Count Stadion. The defence was made with a determination and an obstinacy perhaps never equalled. Here the loss of the strong three French divisions was enormous; their repeated attempts to carry the heights by storm were continually defeated by

the brave regiments Kinsky, Archduke Leopold, Reischach, and the 19th, and battalions of the Kaizer-Jäger.

In such a defence it was impossible to avoid the capture of prisoners or of a gun; this very fact shows that the men stood their ground firmly. The French report of the number of guns captured is erroneous. They enumerate all the guns taken, without deducting those retaken from them.

The 1st Austrian corps, which in the forenoon was not hard pressed by Marshal MacMahon's corps, might have sent up some detachments to the brave 5th corps, especially when it became aware that Napoleon was bringing up the whole of the Imperial Guard to support the 1st French corps.

The Emperor Napoleon justly estimating the importance of Solferino, had sent orders to the Imperial Guard which had advanced from Montechiaro against Castiglione, to accelerate its march and to attack the heights of Solferino on the left, to support the 1st corps. At the right moment Camou's division of Voltigeurs (according to earlier returns thirteen battalions strong) arrived at the field of battle and stormed Solferino, which was defended by four Austrian brigades, followed by Mellinet's division of the Grenadier Guards, at the same moment with three divisions of the 1st corps. A French battery of the 10th regiment of Artillery firing at a distance of 300 metres, made a breach in the churchyard wall, thus getting rid of the last and so desperately defended position. Surrounded on all sides, attacked by three times superior numbers, Stadion had no choice left but to abandon the position at half past three o'clock, after ten hours' incessant fighting. This was done in good order in the direction of Mescolaro, a junction with the 1st corps at Cavriana being prevented by MacMahon's corps, which had now taken position between Solferino and Cavriana.

Solferino as the salient point of the whole Austrian position must naturally have been the chief point of attack. It was the bastion of the attacked front, and to maintain it sufficient and the most efficient troops should have been employed. This important point could not have been intrusted to braver troops than those who defended it, but how could the result be doubtful; four brigades against ten, and the artillery in relative proportion. Moreover the French brought up their picked men. As soon as Solferino was taken, the attack concentrated itself against Cavriana, and the overwhelming force now took that direction. The Austrian 1st and 7th corps had to meet the attack of three French corps, including the infantry of the Imperial Guard, and could not hold their ground. It is now time to take a closer view of the 2nd French corps under MacMahon. Its destination was, as already stated, to operate from Castiglione against Cavriana, but it was for some time prevented carrying this out, as the 4th French corps detained at Medole could not form a junction. MacMahon feared he should be cut off from Niel's corps by the Austrian corps advancing from Guidizzolo, and by the cavalry which had advanced from Tezze. MacMahon on this day gave proofs that he was not only a daring, but a very prudent and careful general. He advanced slowly, and for a long time remained in position between Solferino and Monte Medolano, from which

elevation he watched the battle and gave his orders. He was with his corps on the actual battle-field of 1798. On the left of the road leading to Guidizzolo he placed the 2nd division Lamotterouge, to its right a brigade of the first division Decaen, with the second brigade as reserve in the rear. The 7th regiment of *Chasseurs à cheval* covered his left flank, whilst the right was supported by the two cavalry divisions Partouneaux and Desvaux by General Niel's corps.

The combat commenced here by a heavy cannonade opened by the Austrians from a number of batteries of the 3rd and 9th corps, placed in position on the high road. MacMahon advanced four batteries of his own corps against them, under command of General Auger, whilst the guns of the regular cavalry opened on their flank. This artillery combat was very unequal, and resulted in the Austrian fire being silenced. It was here Auger lost his left arm, from which wound he afterwards died. Lieutenant Field-Marshal Mensdorff made some happy charges against MacMahon's left wing, cutting through some of the French squares of the 11th battalion of Chasseurs, and of the 72nd of the line, and put to flight some detachments of the 7th Chasseurs, but becoming exposed to the cross fire of the French batteries he had to sound a retreat. In this action the superiority of the French artillery decided the victory.

At eleven o'clock Niel sent to inform MacMahon that he might now advance. MacMahon advanced on Solferino, where meantime the voltigeurs of the guard were advancing to the attack. The second corps now became engaged with the first Austrian corps on the heights between Solferino, Cassiano, and Cavriana, and the fighting continued for some hours incessantly, until the capture of Solferino allowed a combined attack on Cavriana. Here again the fighting was very severe. More than once the French troops were driven back. The fort which connects Cassiano with Cavriana was stormed by the Turcos of Lefebre's brigade, who were repeatedly driven back, with the loss of their colonel (Laure), and lieut-colonel (Herment), and a number of staff officers and officers wounded. The dreaded Africans were here terribly cut up, and their ranks will have to be replenished. The attack was resumed by the 45th and 78th French regiments of the line, the last belonging to Decaen's division, and it was not until the combined and French corps attacked Cavriana that it gave in. Here again superiority of numbers carried the day.

To fill up the vacuum between the 2nd and 4th corps, the Emperor Napoleon had placed the whole cavalry of the Guard under Morris at MacMahon's disposal, who then saw his communications with Niel assured, and could thus bring his full strength to bear on Cavriana. When the 1st Austrian corps withdrew from the place, the 7th covered the retreat. It did this under the eyes of the Austrian Emperor, who was more than once in the thick of the fight, regardless of danger, the division of Lieut.-Field-Marshal Prince Alexander, of Hesse, consisting of the regiments Kaiser, Erzherzog Leopold, Grueber, the 19th and 3rd Kaizer-Jägers, and a battalion of Kaiser infantry especially distinguished themselves. The Prince repeatedly led his men in person against the enemy, displaying great military tact and

personal daring. The order of Maria-Theresa has been conferred upon him.

To add to the horrors of this sanguinary day, a terrible storm arose, accompanied by a gale of wind, which whipped the dust and hail and rain into the faces of the retreating Austrians. For half an hour it seemed as if the heavens wished to continue the terrible scene below. Did not the heart of the French fatalist leader quake when he heard heaven's thunder growl in the midst of the carnage on the field of battle? When the storm had spent its fury, the Austrians continued their retreat, fighting and in good order, on Volta, where a portion of Prince Hesse's division arrived at eight o'clock in the evening, and took possession of the heights so as to cover the retreat through the defile of Borghetto, and over the bridge to Valeggio. Gablenza's brigade of the same division remained till late in the night in the vicinity of Cavriana, and only retreated at daybreak through Volta to Jerri. No pursuit was attempted. Quite close to the Austrians, the French, worn out by fatigue, courted rest.

We must now turn to the battle on the French right wing, where Niel, with admirable skill, played the first part. Doubts have been expressed as to whether Niel fairly earned his marshal's staff on this day; we are of opinion that he contributed greatly to the victory, for it was by his determined defence of Casa Nova and Rebecco, which prevented the Austrian left wing in pushing farther on. Napoleon could not make Niel Duke of Solferino, at most Duc de Rebecco, which does not sound so well. Niel commenced his advance at three o'clock in the morning with his own three strong divisions of infantry, and the two often mentioned divisions of regular cavalry, and was thus enabled to attack with superior force the advanced detachments of the Austrian 9th corps of infantry, and Zedwitz's division of cavalry at Medole. Luzy's division took the lead, circumvented Medole in such manner as to compel two battalions of the regiment Franz-Carl to retreat. Zedwitz's cavalry, after a slight skirmish, also fell back before the superior force of the enemy. This retreat is natural, but that it should have extended to the 9th, 3rd, and 11th corps, requires explanation. The official *Vienna Gazette* expresses its regret that this cavalry division should have thought it necessary to retreat after an insignificant skirmish, and did not give that support to the Austrian left wing, which had been expected from it. Some lamentable misunderstanding must have occurred here; every one expected great things from the fine Austrian cavalry.

Niel now pushed on beyond Medole, but met with the most determined resistance at Rebecco and Casa Nova, and Peate. Despite all his endeavours, all that he could do was to maintain his position. Niel's plan was, according to his own avowal, to seize upon the junction road at Guidizzolo, to cut off the retreat of the Austrian troops operating in the plain. To carry out this plan, Canrobert was to send two of his divisions to support him, which, however, he did not deem advisable, as he feared an attack from Acqua-Fredda. Niel laments this circumstance, but without blaming Canrobert. There may have been a little jealousy at play here, and Napoleon is

said to have chided Canrobert for his hesitation, though it was he himself who informed Canrobert he must expect an attack on the Macavra side.

The fighting at Casa Nova and Rebecco continued fiercely throughout the day. Three French Colonels, three Lieut.-Colonels, and many *chefs de bataillon* were among the slain. The fields all around were strewn with corpses, without either party having gained any decided advantage. On the Austrian side the whole of the 3rd and 9th corps were engaged; Blomberg's division of the 11th, and General Baltin's brigade (both officers were afterwards wounded), joined during the day, but the French were still superior in number, for the whole of MacMahon's corps stood at first in the plain, and when Canrobert, later in the day, sent support, the superiority was re-established. Opposed to the five and a half divisions of the Austrian 3rd, 9th, and 11th corps, and the three brigades of Lieut.-Field-Marshal Mensdorff's cavalry, there stood in the plain at the commencement of the fight, two divisions of MacMahon, three divisions of General Niel, and one brigade of Canrobert, and seven brigades of cavalry of the guard and regulars. When, later in the day, two of MacMahon's divisions went to the left, Canrobert brought up two and a half divisions on to the battle ground. The assertion of the French reports that the Austrians outnumbered the French in the plain is false. Finally, at nightfall, long after the Austrian centre had been driven back, and the advance of the French threatened to separate the two Austrian armies, the first army retreated in good order. The 11th corps of Lieut.-Field-Marshal Weigl was ordered to cover the retreat of the left wing, a task ably performed, the whole of the French right wing being kept in check. The Hungarian regiment, Erzherzog Joseph, and the 10th battalion Jägers especially distinguished themselves.

Marshal Canrobert made his advance at half-past two o'clock from Mezzane, crossed a bridge made by the Piedmontese at Visano, over the Chiese, and stood at seven o'clock with Jannin's avant-garde brigade before Castelgoffredo, a place surrounded by an old wall, and which was occupied by cavalry detachments of Zedwitz's division.

Jannin circumvented the place with his brigade, whilst Commandant Renault attacked it in front, and forced the gates, which had been barricaded. The small garrison of cavalry beat a retreat. Canrobert now pushed on with his whole force, and placed himself on the same level as Medole, where meantime Niel was fighting. At the moment Niel sent to him for support Canrobert maintains that he received a written communication from the Emperor, that 28,000 to 30,000 Austrians were advancing against him from Marcavra, and Canrobert himself declares that he saw clouds of dust on the Acqua-Fredda road. He therefore only sent at first one brigade, and it was not till 1 p.m. that Renault's division joined Niel. At 4 p.m. Bataille's brigade of Trochu's division joined the 4th corps, and took part in the battle. The 93rd regiment here lost its Colonel (Brotta). Finally, at the urgent request of Niel, Bourbaki's division was sent to his aid, so that all that remained to watch the Acqua-Fredda road was Collineau's brigade of Trochu's division.

We have still to relate more in detail the events of the day at

Pozzolengo, where Benedek, with 25,000 men, defeated the whole Sardinian army.

According to the Sardinian report, early on the morning of the 24th, only three divisions (Mollard, Cucchiari, and Durando), advanced against Peschiera, Pozzolengo, and Madonna della Scoperta; but as lower down it alludes to the divisions Lamarmora and Fanti, and the French report speaks of all five divisons, it may be taken for granted that the whole Sardinian army was engaged against a single Austrian *armée corps*.

The Sardinian army advanced with its main body on the Rivotello road towards Pozzolengo, whilst another portion pushed forward from Castel Venzago against Madonna della Scoperta. The heights of St. Martino were not occupied by the Austrians, as the Sardinians in their advance left those heights to the right, and followed the road to Pozzolengo. At seven o'clock the hostile forces came in collision, when the Sardinian avant garde, commanded by Colonel Cardera, was routed and compelled to make a hasty retreat. Benedek now took the offensive with his whole corps, took possession of the heights of St. Domino and St. Martino, driving the Piedmontese before him on all points. Some attacks made by the 7th and 8th Sardinian regiments, supported by charges of the Montferrat cavalry, were successfully repulsed, with the loss of many Sardinian officers, including Colonel Beretta and Major Solara. Benedek continued to gain ground, and was already close upon the railway which leads from Desenzano to Peschiera, when his victorious progress was cut short by a superior order.

At five o'clock, exactly one hour and a half after Solferino had been abandoned, Benedek received the order to retreat, which command he obeyed with tears in his eyes. The Sardinian army hereupon made a show of taking the offensive, but Benedek, to show them that he was simply obeying superior orders, turned round, drove them from St. Martino, and took 1,500 prisoners. The Piedmontese reports do not mention these details. They say *l'ennemi commença à plier*, and perhaps they did really fancy Benedek was retreating before them. He retired slowly, fighting occasionally, to Pozzolengo, which he occupied during the night.

So ended the battle of Solferino. The Austrian writer gives the losses on all sides as follows:—Loss of the Sardinians, 6,000; of the French, 14,000; of the Austrians, 15,000. There were 35,000 men at least put *hors de combat* during the day.*

The battle of Solferino closed the campaign. Preliminaries of peace were signed shortly afterwards at Villafranca, between the two Emperors of France and Austria. It has still to be seen whether those preliminaries will eventually assume the form and shape of a treaty, and peace be assured.

* A writer in the *Journal des Débats* gives the following return:—
French engaged, 110,000; Sardinians 35,000; total, 145,000. The allied armies had 16,800 men *hors de combat*, of which number 11,500 French; 350 prisoners, of which 100 were French. Austrians engaged; 170,000; 21,000 *hors de combat*; loss in prisoners, 7,000, and 39 guns.

THE BRITISH NAVY DURING THE RUSSIAN WAR.

By Theseus. Late R.N.

Although England may possess a large steam fleet composed of ships well constructed, fitted with strong machinery, and armed with powerful guns, still, unless that fleet be manned by trained crews, and be commanded by officers fitted to lead them into action, it must not excite surprise if the superiority of our vessels over those of the enemy be not so apparent as we have always been led to expect. The whole of the system of promoting and appointing naval officers is radically wrong, for aristocratic and political interest possesses far greater influence at the Admiralty than merit.

Sir John Pakington quickly discerned the faults of the present system, and with his accustomed energy at once proceeded to draw up a scheme embracing extensive alterations in all departments of the service. Meeting with strong opposition from the senior Admirals, the proposed alterations were delayed for a short time, when the ejection of Lord Derby's government from office caused their further postponement; but we earnestly hope that the Duke of Somerset will urge their adoption by the present ministry. If there was any cause of regret in the minds of Englishmen that peace had been so soon concluded with Russia, it was the feeling that during the war the English Navy had performed hardly a single action worthy of being chronicled in history. For two years our ships blockaded the coasts of Russia, destroying the small trading vessels and ruining the poor fishermen, but never captured a single Russian man-of-war. In former times, we read of our gallant tars going in their boats and cutting out the enemy's vessels of war moored under the protection of strong batteries, but the only boat expedition recorded in the annals of the Baltic Fleet were the bombastic attack on the lighthouse at Baro Sound, and the miniature battle of the Nile. It may seem hard to rake up the shortcomings of the navy during the late war, but as three years have now passed since the conclusion of peace, and no alterations have been made in the management of our navy, we feel that the only way of preventing future mortification is by exposing the faults committed by the Admiralty and our naval officers, and so compel the Government by the force of public opinion to reform the many abuses now prevailing in the naval service.

The principal causes of the navy obtaining so little glory in the Russian war we believe to be as follows:—

1st.—The French Alliance. There can be no doubt that the great aim of the French during the war was to obtain all the glory for themselves and depreciate the English; and they accomplished their purpose. The French say they captured Sebastopol by taking the Malakoff, and that they took Bomarsund with their troops. The incomplete naval bombardment of Sebastopol was owing to the obstinacy of the French. A plan of attack was agreed upon by the English, French, and Turkish Admirals. The French General did

approve of this plan, and as he is always superior to the French
iral, he commanded him not to join in the proposed attack, but
arded a scheme of his own which he thought more likely of
ess. Notwithstanding the strong remonstrances of the English
irals, the French General persisted that his scheme was the
, and that the French fleet should only be employed if that was
oted. For the sake of unity the Admirals consented, and the
re of the bombardment was the result. As the real facts were
r properly known the Admirals have always had to bear the
ne. If Sir Charles Napier and Sir Richard Dundas were to
ess the truth, they would openly state that one of their chief
ieties was to get the French Admirals to agree with their plans.
y seemed to be incapable of aiding in the smallest attack with-
first consulting the Emperor. It is currently reported that the
h of Admiral Price was mainly caused by the opposition he met
h from the French Admiral, who refused to join in the attack
ss his own plan, which subsequently failed, was carried out. It
he fervent hope of most English naval officers that, in future
al wars, our fleets may not be fettered by foreign alliances.
at disgust was expressed by all our sailors in China, when they
rd that the French had been asked to co-operate in the attack
n Canton.

nd.—The mis-management of the English Government, espe-
ly of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. This cause is
wn by the following statements :—Certain members of the
ernment before the commencement of the war bragged most
digiously of what the British Navy could do, thereby leading the
ple to expect some great victories. The Government, by
lecting to obtain proper information, under-rated the resources
strength of Russia, as it was frequently stated that the enemy
ld be humbled in six months. Different departments of the
ernment sent different instructions to our Commanders-in-Chief.
Charles Napier received a letter from the Foreign Secretary
roving of his passage through the Great Belt, whilst the
niralty wrote and censured him for the same act.

The Admiralty did not furnish the Admirals and Captains with
in instructions as regards the capture of prizes, so that at the
mencement of the war a great number of neutral vessels were
wed to pass, which it was afterwards discovered would have been
ful prizes. The Admiralty interfered with the proper duties of
Admirals by sending out plans from home, instead of allowing
naval commanders to follow out their own ideas as to the best
y of injuring the enemy. During the summer of 1854 the
niralty instructed Sir C. Napier on no account to attack the
ssian forts, as stone-walls were stronger and sure to beat wooden-
lls. Yet, when the stormy season in the Baltic set in, the
niral received imperative orders to go and attack the forts of
aborg immediately. Sir C. Napier acted most wisely in
beying such a command, which was only given for the sake of
ting the blame of not having obtained any important victory
n the Admiralty to the Admiral.

The Admiralty did not provide the proper means, or sufficient materials for the Admirals to undertake any attack with the certainty of success. Witness the gunboats wanted by Sir C. Napier and Admiral Deans Dundas, and the imperfect bombardment of Sweaborg owing to the failure in the supply of shells, and the want of new mortars to replace those damaged by continuous firing. We have further a strong belief that certain instructions, prohibiting any very active operations against the enemy, were sent to the naval commanders. How else can be explained the following words addressed by one of our Admirals to a Captain about to be sent on detached service. "Now remember, Captain ———, any operations that you may undertake against the enemy, must be entirely on your own responsibility."

The Government instead of endeavouring to find out the cause of our ill-success have tried to hush up all inquiry by distributing honours and promotions with a most lavish hand. Medals have been awarded indiscriminately to any person attached to the fleets, no matter whether he saw an angry shot fired or not.

3rd.—The Humanity War System. By this is meant "Spare the property of the rich man, but destroy as much as you like of the goods of the poor man." We believe a greater curse to the real interests of the navy does not exist than the theories of the Peace Society. In the times of "Good Queen Bess," Sir Francis Drake and our sailors not only fought for the defence of their country, but also for the purpose of making fortunes for themselves. According to the Manchester ideas, our sailors are paid to fight and ought to have no claim for prize money, and it is the merchants who ought to gain fortunes by the war on account of their vast speculations. In plain words, a man who risks his goods in order to obtain a pecuniary benefit for himself, is deserving of greater reward than a man who stakes his life in defence of his country. The rich city of Odessa was not bombarded because of the vast amount of private property it contained. This place afterwards became the great depôt of supplies for the Russians besieged in Sebastopol. Revel, Riga, Helsingfors were all spared for the same reason. The town of Kola, the capital of Russian Lapland, was destroyed by us. True, it only consisted of wooden houses, had no wealthy merchants living there, and had no fortifications. How many Russian peasants died from exposure to the cold during the ensuing winter on account of having no habitations to live in? The small fishing boats, nets, &c., belonging to poor fishermen in the Sea of Azoff, in the Gulf of Finland, and in the Gulf of Bothnia, were ruthlessly burnt, and the poor villagers frequently deprived of their stores of firewood for the winter. A great outcry was raised against one of our Admirals because he destroyed numerous dockyards and stores of timber and tar in the Gulf of Bothnia, which all belonged to wealthy merchants, but no voice was raised on behalf of the poor Russian fisherman. We hope to be able to consider this "Humanity War System" more fully on a future occasion.

4thly.—Our Naval Officers. It is a very singular circumstance that all the Admirals who commanded-in-chief our fleets, employed

actively against the enemy at the commencement of the short Russian war, were recalled or superseded before its termination. With two or three exceptions, the Admirals chosen by the Government were not the right men in the right place. The majority of them were too old, and had lost all that daring by which English victories have generally been gained. We must acknowledge, however, that the system of naval promotion is more to be blamed than the Government, for we doubt very much if there were fitter officers in the list of Admirals than those that were appointed.

Sir Charles Napier was sent to the Baltic with a fleet of large ships, manned by newly-raised men, and commanded by officers who had never served in a large fleet before, and were consequently ignorant of naval tactics. The fleet was composed of screw ships, paddle-wheel steamers, and sailing ships. It was not known how steam-ships ought to be managed in a battle. None of the Admirals placed under Sir Charles Napier had ever commanded a steam-ship, and were, therefore, unable to advise him. He was pestered by Government to be sure and not want discretion; he was on no account to risk any chance of defeat; he was instructed to submit any plan of attack for the approval of the home authorities before proceeding to carry it out; when he asked for gunboats, he was sent four old paddle-wheel steam packets, and told that none others could be furnished him; and he was badgered by several of the Captains, who wanted to attack the forts, whilst the gunnery Admiral would not advise his giving them permission, on account of the success of the attack being doubtful, and the probable loss of ships and men that might ensue. With so much to worry and confuse the mind of a man nearly seventy years old, it is not at all to be wondered at that Sir Charles Napier did not fulfil the expectations of the public. He must, doubtless, have felt the stings of conscience, if he recollected the manner in which he bullied the late Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, who commanded the English fleet on the Coast of Syria, in 1840. Admiral Napier must have felt the full weight of responsibility that rested on his shoulders, as he was decidedly unequal to the task he had accepted. Suppose, however, that Sir Charles Napier had been twenty years younger, and had been despatched to the Baltic with the same fleet, but with these instructions: "We have provided as good a fleet, and manned it as well, as the short time allowed us would permit. Take the command of that fleet, go to the Baltic and endeavour to destroy the Russian ships and forts before the enemy have time to improve their defences. We have confidence in your skill and judgment, and will supply you, as quickly as possible, with all the materials you may require." We firmly believe the result would have been the destruction of Cronstadt and the Russian fleet, the capture of Sebastopol sooner, for the Russians would have been obliged to collect a large army to defend St. Petersburg instead of concentrating their whole strength in the Crimea, and, consequently, peace would have been sooner concluded. Sir Charles Napier would then have been permitted to appear in his proper character, that of a bold, dashing English sailor.

But, although there may be many excuses for Sir C. Napier

effecting so little in the Baltic, he is greatly to blame for his bragging propensities. Compare the signal made by Sir C. Napier with that celebrated one of Lord Nelson's. On hearing of the declaration of war, Sir C. Napier made the following signal to the British fleet, then lying at anchor in a neutral port, several hundred miles from the enemy: "Lads, war is declared; with a bold and numerous enemy to meet. Should they offer us battle, you know how to dispose of them; should they remain in port, we must try and get at them. Success depends on the quickness and precision of your firing. Lads, sharpen your cutlasses, and the day is our own." How was this piece of brag carried out? Did the enemy offer battle?—No. Did we try and get at them?—No. Was there any occasion to try the precision and quickness of our firing?—No. Did the lads even use their sharpened cutlasses?—No. Now let us take the famous signal made by Lord Nelson to the British fleet, then bearing down to engage the combined fleets: "England expects every man will do his duty." There was no boast in this signal, but the result of the Battle of Trafalgar was the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets.

Admiral Sir James Whitley Deans Dundas was appointed to the command of the Mediterranean fleet entirely from his political interest, as he had not served afloat for the previous twenty years. He also was in a most difficult position, for he received instructions from the Admiralty, from the Foreign Secretary, and from the English Ambassador at Constantinople. He had also to conciliate and please the English General, the French Admiral, and the Turkish Government. Considering all these anxieties, and having no great name to ensure his popularity, it is easily understood why he failed. He was afterwards made a G.C.B. by the Whig Government.

Lord Lyons, when second in command, thought Admiral Dundas might have done more, but when he himself became Commander-in-Chief, and encountered the same difficulties, he succeeded very little better, though, having very aristocratic relations, he got elevated to the peerage. Our opinion regarding Sir Charles Napier applies equally well to Admiral Lyons, "that, if he had been twenty years younger, he would have performed some great exploit, and would not have hindered the younger naval officers from distinguishing themselves."

Admiral Sir Henry Ducie Chads was well known during the French and American wars as a very brave officer, and when commanding the naval expedition in the first Burmese war, was called by the natives the "Fire-eater," from his daring exploits. But Time (he being seventy years old) had gradually extinguished the dashing spirit of his younger days. His superior knowledge of gunnery had taught him experience, and he was exceedingly cautious during the Baltic campaign. His discretion was rewarded by being made a K.C.B.

Admiral Sir J. Hanway Plumridge, during the short time that he held command of the Flying Squadron, showed that he still possessed activity, energy, and daring. Finding that this officer was

fast winning the confidence and popularity of the sailors, Sir Charles Napier removed him to the command of the fleet of sailing line-of-battle ships cruising at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. If the Government had been guided only by merit, this officer ought to have been selected as successor to Sir C. Napier; but, unfortunately, Admiral Plumridge's ideas of fighting were not in unison with the humanity-war system, and he was therefore placed in charge of a dockyard. Admiral Plumridge has the credit of having been one of the best officers in the navy, for the Magicienne frigate, when commanded by him in 1831, has since been known as the most efficient and most comfortable ship in the service.

Admiral Hon. Sir Richard Saunders Dundas was selected to command the Baltic Fleet from his being the son of a lord—from his being the youngest of the admirals—from his connection with the Admiralty he would understand the wishes of that department—from his having seen no former war services (except against the Chinese) it was thought he would adopt the modern art of war on the humanity system—and, lastly, his discretion could be trusted. He certainly fulfilled the desires of those who appointed him, for, with a larger fleet and more gunboats than Sir C. Napier had, he still effected much less. He was liked by both officers and men, for he was kind and considerate of their comforts, as he made arrangements that the crew of every ship should receive letters weekly from England, and supplies of fresh meat very frequently. Admiral Dundas is a good sailor, but on no occasion did he show himself fitted to command a large fleet employed against a powerful enemy. It is of no use disguising the fact, but the bombardment of Sweaborg was not more successful than the bombardment of Odessa or Sebastopol. The management of our steam-ships at Sweaborg gave rise to the suspicion that our officers did not like close fighting. It is the opinion of many naval officers present at the action that, had six of our screw line-of-battle ships with a few smaller vessels, and the gunboats followed up the bombardment by going close in and engaging the forts, that Sweaborg would have been quite destroyed. But Admiral Dundas had neglected to assemble the necessary ships, and so the opportunity was lost.

Admiral Sir Michael Seymour is a brave and discreet officer, and is universally liked throughout the navy. His incomplete bombardment of Narva, for the purpose of exercising his crew in gunnery, was very injudicious, as it gave the Russians an opportunity of saying that they had beaten off two English line-of-battle ships, one commanded by that fighting spirit, "Nemesis Hall." He has since commanded the fleet in China, and has conducted the operations against the Chinese most successfully, so that he must be considered as one of our best admirals.

Admiral Sir Houston Stewart supported Admiral Lyons very energetically in the successful attack upon Kinburn. He is too partial to his own countrymen to make a good Commander-in-Chief, and is also a strict disciplinarian.

Admiral Sir Montagu Stopford showed great activity and energy when Captain of the Fleet in the Black Sea, and it is a great pity

that he had not some more active command given him than the superintendence of Malta dockyard.

Admirals Hon. Sir Frederick W. Grey and Sir Charles Howe Fremantle had charge of naval stores at Constantinople and Balaklava, but having seen no active operations against the enemy, it is difficult to understand their being made K.C.B.'s. Their services during the war seem also to have entitled them to further rewards, as one is now Commander-in-Chief at the Cape of Good Hope, and the other of the Channel Fleet. Family connections and political interest will serve, however, to explain much that seems astonishing to men of common sense.

Admiral R. L. Baynes was certainly not fitted for the command of a flying squadron, and did nothing to recommend his subsequent appointment to the command of the Pacific squadron.

Admiral David Price had seen much service in the French war, and was considered one of the most gallant officers in the navy, but he was too old for such an active command as the Pacific, as was afterwards shown by his mind failing under the heavy responsibility he incurred in attacking Petropaulowski.

Admiral Henry William Bruce succeeded Admiral Price in the Pacific, but the Russians had evacuated their possessions before the English arrived to make a second attack. This officer is very popular with the sailors, as he is very considerate of their comforts.

Admiral Sir James Stirling was recalled from the East Indies by the Admiralty, on account, it was said, of his dilatory conduct when proceeding to attack a Russian squadron. It would have been more satisfactory had a court martial been held on this officer, for the whole narrative relating to the escape of the Russians is at present most mysterious. If the Admiral was to blame, we should like to know why the Admiralty accorded him the privileges of a flag-officer, hauling down his flag, by promoting his flag-lieutenant. Sir James Stirling is generally thought to be a follower of the Manchester school of politics, but we hope it was not a belief in the humanity-war system that led him into this scrape.

Commander Hon. G. J. B. Elliott had proved himself a dashing young officer in the operations on the coast of Syria, and to those who know him it is difficult to understand how he came to let a Russian squadron of nearly equal force slip through his fingers. A public enquiry ought certainly to have been made into this affair, as it might have shown that the Commodore had good reason, in the shape of private instructions, for the course he pursued. Public opinion was not strong enough to overcome powerful aristocratic influence, and the Commodore had the good luck to be made a C.B., and an Aide-de-Camp to the Queen for the operations in the Canton river

Commodore Rundle Burgess Watson, who had the command of the flying squadron, is a brave officer, but very cautious. Fearing the approach of the Russian fleet to attack his small squadron, he kept all his ships close together, and so permitted the British fleet, ler Admiral Dundas, to pass by him unseen, and how many other s broke the blockade likewise is not known.

The captains who particularly distinguished themselves during the war were L. Lushington, H. Keppel, Hon. F. Pelham, T. M. Symonds, H. R. Yelverton, W. H. Hall, C. H. M. Buckle, Sir W. Peel, A. C. Key, &c.

Captain Hall, who commanded the Hecla, in the first Baltic fleet, and got such praise for his gallantry, was removed to the Blenheim, old block ship, and kept with the fleet off Cronstadt, so that he was unable to distinguish himself during the second Baltic campaign.

Some of the captains were certainly not fit for their post. One captain who had the command of a small squadron on detached service in the Gulf of Finland, once sent a gun-boat up a creek to reconnoitre, and, observing a telegraph station surrounded by Cossacks, the lieutenant in command determined to destroy it. Opening fire with the long gun the enemy were soon dispersed, and the lieutenant then landed in his gig with four men, obtained the signal book of the Russians, cut down the post, and set fire to the house. On returning he mentioned what he had done to his superior officer, who asked him "How he dared to fire on the enemy without his orders." Not receiving a satisfactory reply he sent the gun-boat back to the Admiral, and represented the lieutenant as being a most disobedient officer. Admiral Dundas on learning the whole of the facts, told the lieutenant not to mind what Captain —— had said, as he considered he had done a very gallant action. The lieutenant, however, is not yet promoted, while the captain has lately obtained a most important command.

There was a great want of an efficient reporter to narrate all the actions of the Baltic fleet, as the only person corresponding with the newspapers, was an officer of the flag-ship, and for his own interest he was obliged to give flattering reports. The public will, therefore, be greatly astonished to learn that two English gun-boats declined to fight two Russian gun-boats that came out of Cronstadt to meet them. Our gunboats retreated in sight of the whole of our fleet, to the intense mortification of the crews, and to such a pitch did the excitement reach, that the officers of the ward room mess of a line of battle ship denounced one of the captains, but were compelled afterwards to retract their words, by order of the Admiral. Both the captains in command of these gunboats have held important appointments ever since; but what confidence can be placed in them after such an occurrence?

It is a most painful task for us to place such narratives before the public, but as we were present with the fleet, and have been informed of the foregoing accounts by most reliable officers, we consider it a duty to publish them. The appointment of several officers lately to important commands solely from political interest, has caused much disquietude in the minds of naval officers who know their precedents.

As we said before, we may have fine powerful ships and efficient crews; still, unless the officers in command are fitted for their posts, we may again have the mortification of being told that our ships cannot get at the enemy, and that our fleets are only useful for blockading.

It has been already announced in the ministerial papers that Sir Richard S. Dundas is to succeed Admiral Fanshawe as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, whilst Admiral Fanshawe is to take the vacant place at the Admiralty. This is only another of the numerous Whig jobs, and is very likely to take place. We at once denounce it, for, as we have already stated, Sir R. S. Dundas has shown no fitness to command a large fleet in case of war. If we were certain of peace for three years, he might get on very well, but inasmuch as peace is not secure for three months, we ought to appoint a fighting Admiral who has the confidence of the sailors.

Commission the Duke of Wellington, screw three decker, and make her the flag-ship of Rear-Admiral Hon. Sir Harry Keppel, and we will undertake to say that her crew of 1,100 men would be complete in a fortnight, much as sailors dislike large ships generally. This officer is in the prime of his life, and has already shown that he possesses all the dash and daring of a true British sailor. The sailors know his character well, and would follow him anywhere. But this admiral, whose merits are well known, is compelled to live on his half-pay, whilst other admirals, who bear unpopular characters, are appointed to command our fleet.

Having thus exposed some of the glaring faults of the English navy, we desire just to state that it is the opinion of many experienced officers that the French navy is also not free from serious errors in its management. The French admirals during the Russian war were not bright specimens of naval officers, and served greatly to clog the intentions of the English admirals. If the English navy obtained but little glory during the war, the French navy had certainly a much less share. We have no fear for the result, therefore, in case of war taking place between the two countries, so long as our fleets are commanded by good officers, in the prime of life, and who already possess the confidence of the crews and their country.

CAPTAIN BLAKELY AND THE ARMSTRONG GUN.

No invention of modern times has excited so much interest as the Armstrong gun, and this not solely because it stands high on the list, but as much on account of the object it achieves, and the crisis at which it was produced. For years all the powers of Europe have been endeavouring to give new attributes to their ordnance—to extend its range, increase its efficiency, and enable it to do the greatest amount of execution. It seemed that war was no longer to be influenced by human valour, but that some monster cannon or fearful projectile might render the weak and timid superior to the bravest, as if the days were indeed approaching when, as the prophet had foretold, one thousand should flee at the rebuke of one. h a field, and the prizes it promised, were sure to attract many

competitors; and, accordingly, the foundry, the laboratory, and the practice ground swarmed with inventors, from whom we were continually hearing mysterious whispers of some new infernal machine, which

> "—— made each particular hair to stand on end,
> Like quills upon the fretful porcupine."

There was Warner's long-range, the invisible shell, the steel cannon, and the mortar that threw a ball of we know not how many hundred weight from Dover heights to Calais Green. How often has Captain Norton made us quake? Now we have Mr. Warry's invention, which, extending the principle of the Emperor Napoleon's six-pounders, belches destruction from a pop-gun. But these are zealous, earnest workers. If they are on a wrong track, it is at least one they have opened for themselves, not the beaten path of a successful competitor. But the ground has been scoured by quacks, as well as by practical engineers and artillerists—by men intent on appropriating the labours of others, as well as by the harmless riders of hobbies. It has become the fate of every successful invention to conjure up, on its promulgation, a dozen pretenders, all asserting a prior claim to its discovery. Each of these geniuses declares that he had hit upon the very same thing—only it was different! They all belong to the tribe we have indicated—the camp followers, the Pindarees, the men who hover about the flanks of practical workers, watching for the ideas they drop, and the husks they throw away. Out of these they fashion some abortion of their own—an engine that won't work, or a gun that bursts at the first discharge. This they afterwards twist into something quite different, and, as we sometimes hear of attempts to legitimatize bastards by recording their birth a day or two before wedlock, these spurious fabrics are dated back to a period when they lose all form in an embryo—the rudimentary idea, which may be moulded into the shape of any successful invention from other hands, and which is itself, withal,—though registered as a novelty at the Patent Office—as old as the hills. We are not directing these remarks to any particular case; our readers know they have an application only too wide. But the cause of discovery is the cause of mankind; it enlists an advocate in every breast; and, in spite of three centuries and a half, America is the inheritance of Columbus, not of the pretender who labelled it with his name.

The Armstrong gun has been an object of attention beyond the circles it more especially addresses. Not only are we rejoiced to find, in a time of disquietude, of peril, and of great military development, that we possess the most powerful description of ordnance yet fabricated, enabling us to hear with indifference of the rumoured improvements of foreign armaments, but it is a subject of national gratulation to be in a position to furnish such a decisive proof of our manufacturing superiority. The effect has been the greater from coming upon us by surprise. No preliminary puffs or advanced paragraphs sounded the trumpet before this Cæsar of the forge. What need of such a flourish when it came, fired, and conquered? Not till the public became mystified with the conflict-

ing descriptions in circulation, did the inventor, in order to set them right, come forward with a modest account of his work, and the years of hard toil it had consumed. It was the same fine old story of genius wading through "a sea of troubles," that we had read in our youth, and that has had its example in so many ages. After day on day of persevering labour, after midnight experiments on the lonely sea-shore and the solitary mountain side, all obstacles were overcome, and the goal was reached. The Minister for War announced from his place in Parliament that the Armstrong gun must become the property of the nation, whatever the terms; and those terms, which might have been anything the inventor chose—were a free gift. Sir William Armstrong waived all recompense; the empty honour of knighthood was spontaneously conferred by the Queen; and the salary he receives from the War Department is merely a temporary compensation for the time he devotes to the fabrication of our armaments.

These considerations naturally lead us to look narrowly at any attempt to detract from his merits as the inventor of the gun. In such a case, it especially behoves us, as the oldest organ of the army, to show that we are uninfluenced by professional jealousy, and eager to acknowledge the service rendered by an eminent civilian to military science, and, at the same time, the obligation conferred on the country. How much more must we be guarded when the disputant of Sir William's honours is a military officer, who calls upon us to decide on his claim? We have before us a pamphlet entitled *A Letter from Captain Blakely, H.P., Royal Artillery, to the Secretary of State for War, Claiming the Original Invention of an Indisputable Feature of the Armstrong Gun.* This letter we have read with deep attention; we have looked back for facts bearing on its statements, scrutinised the evidence which the statements themselves advance, and sifted the mass of irrelevant details that form the appendix. At last, we come to the conclusion that a case more void of foundation was never presented to the public.

Many years ago, Professor Barlow, in his well-known work on the strength of timber and iron, treated of the bursting strain upon cylinders used as hydraulic presses, and demonstrated the necessity of having the external parts of the material in a state of tension, in order to obtain the greatest strength. The principle had been acted upon, though perhaps imperfectly understood, in the manufacture of ancient cannon, as we find in the case of the guns that accompanied the English army to the field of Cressy, and which Hume waggishly hints were not used, from a suspicion that they might prove more destructive to friends than to foes.

Captain Blakely may have stumbled on some such relic while on duty at the Tower, where specimens still remain, or he may have caught a new light from the principle laid down by Professor Barlow, which, though only directly specifying the cylinders used as hydraulic presses, is, of course, applicable to every kind of cylinder exposed to internal pressure, and it can hardly be deemed an omission on Barlow's part that he did not specially enumerate all the descriptions

of cylinders subject to this result. But let us see, by referring to the specification registered at the Patent Office, what it is that Captain Blakely claims. He says that his improvements relate to a method "for forming guns with an internal tube or cylinder of cast iron or steel, enclosed with a casing of wrought iron or steel." It is necessary, however, to know what the gallant officer *disclaims* as well as what he *claims*. For this purpose we quote from a document which Captain Blakely enrolled at the Patent Office so recently as March last, after having had nearly four years to digest the matter. He there says:—"I do not claim as my invention the method of forming guns or cannon by the application of collars or rings heated and shrunk upon a cylindrical inner tube, save and except when the internal diameters of such collars or rings are, previously to being heated, so much smaller than the external diameter of the inner tube on which they are shrunk, that after being cooled the outer casing formed by the rings or collars is in a state of tension." On reading this passage, we are first puzzled to make out what can be meant by rings shrunk on, and yet not in a state of tension. At the same time, after so full a disclaimer, we may ask what remains to be claimed? Not, certainly, rings in a state of tension, for rings shrunk on *must* be in a state of tension; and moreover, he will find at the Patent Office specifications prior to his own for the same thing. We will only refer to a patent granted to Mr. John Frith in November, 1843, twelve years before Captain Blakely made his appearance, and which specifies, amongst other things, that "the first reinforce is hooped with strong wrought iron, *driven on whilst hot*." We presume the gallant officer will admit that hoops so put on would, on cooling, remain in a *state of tension*. As to the "outer casing," the "application of collars or rings," the invention of which is here so fully disavowed, Captain Blakely furnishes a description of a cannon so fabricated "years ago" by General Thierry, which looked exactly like his own; but it was "a perfect failure;" and he tells us that the reason of this break-down is obvious, as it had "no *initial tension*, or, at most, only enough to give it a firm hold on the interior." Captain Blakely was equally unfortunate with his own gun, in which he ran to the opposite extreme, giving rather too much initial tension; and, as in the case of the French General, the gun burst. Thus, whether the tension be great or small, the result is the same—"a perfect failure." This brings Captain Blakely to the necessity of parting with the last shred of his patent, for while that document affirms that the collars or rings are to be "*shrunk*" on the external diameter of the inner tube, he here, at p. 31, abandons the process of "*shrinking*," and is determined "in future always to force the outer tube on cold."

On what ground Captain Blakely claims to participate in the invention of the Armstrong gun, we are wholly unable to conceive. With the view of showing that the guns now being made under the direction of Sir William Armstrong are in violation of his patent, he quotes provisional specifications never carried to maturity, newspaper accounts based on no authority, and documents which refer only to Sir William Armstrong's experimental gun. These, as Cap-

tain Blakely must be aware—or he alone is not—are not applicable to the Armstrong gun as now fabricated. Even if they were, Captain Blakely himself informs us that, "judging from dates," the first Armstrong gun must have been commenced long before his views were published, though he affirms that his patent had been taken out, and one or two guns made. But the dates in question—namely, those given in the letters and documents embraced by the pamphlet—really tell a different tale; for they show that, while Sir William Armstrong's first gun was commenced in December, 1854, the first step in Captain Blakely's patent was not taken till the 27th of February, 1855; and, further, that none of Captain Blakely's guns were made until after the date of his patent, nor, in fact, until after Sir William Armstrong's gun was in actual use. The inference is, that Sir William Armstrong, in the outset, was groping his way through details to a certain fixed object; and it was only when he found that others were besetting his steps—perhaps jumping into his footprints, that he judged it necessary to fence himself round as he advanced with provisional specifications, which were successively abandoned, as he moved on to other ground. Captain Blakely need not have gone to penny-a-line paragraphs for a description of the Armstrong gun. We all know that it was recently described by the inventor himself, at the dinner given to him at Newcastle; and, as Captain Blakely is fond of parallel statements, we give this description by the side of that of his own invention, as comprised in his patent:—

Sir W. Armstrong.	Captain Blakely.
"The gun is a built-up gun, made wholly of wrought iron, each separate piece being of such moderate size as to admit of being forged without risk of flaw or failure."	"The improvements relate to forming guns with an internal tube or cylinder of cast iron or steel, enclosed with a casing of wrought iron or steel. I prefer to form the outer surface of the inner tube somewhat conical, the greatest diameter being just in front of the trunnions and tapering both ways, and to apply the outer casing in the form of collars or rings driven thereon."

Look on this cannon and on this! Can anything be more unlike? putting aside Captain Blakely's subsequent disclaimer of invention, and his ultimate abandonment, point by point, of all the details of his patent! Captain Blakely professes to be actuated by perfect candour. He has published this pamphlet as a measure of justice to Sir William Armstrong as well as to himself, being desirous that "the exact truth should be made known." Then, why, we ask again, has he not described the gun as at present fabricated, instead of seeking to elicit ideal resemblances from an obsolete specification? He states, indeed, that two years after the first Armstrong gun was made, its identity with his own became so manifest to him, that he "wrote to inform Sir W. Armstrong, and obtained a reply, promising to negociate with me, before 'using' the invention 'commercially.'" It will hardly be credited that Sir William Armstrong's letter, which is given at the end of the appendix, where no one will

take the trouble to look for it, cannot be made to bear any such interpretation. It runs thus:—

"Your letter of the 19th has reached me here. At present I am making no guns except for experimental purposes. If you have a valid patent for any method of construction I may adopt, I shall, of course, on being satisfied of that, negociate with you before I use it commercially; until then the question may fairly stand over."

Here is no allusion to "*the invention*," which Captain Blakeley tells us was to be the subject of negotiation. He leads us to suppose that "the invention" was acknowledged by Sir William, and that the latter had entered into an unconditional engagement to buy it up. But from the letter itself we learn that Sir William was still only experimenting, though if results should lead him to any method of construction validly patented by Captain Blakely, he would, on this being proved, be prepared to come to an arrangement. Captain Blakely's attempt to establish such a claim has thoroughly broken down. His best friends will admit that it is wholly at variance with the facts, and must lament that it has ever been made. We are willing to give him credit for advocating a principle which is undoubtedly correct —namely, that to obtain the full strength of a cylinder in reference to bursting strain, it is necessary that the outward parts should be in a state of tension; but of this truth, as we have shown, he has no claim to be considered the discoverer. Nothing further can be said in favour of his pretensions. As a practical inventor or designer of guns he has certainly not been successful. The few he produced found little favour with the Committee to whom they were submitted, nor can we be surprised at such a result, considering the several instances of bursting he records. Such facts could not, of course, be ignored; and we only wish the pamphlet had thus presented throughout the "exact truth," which would have been more in harmony with the solemn and grandiloquent conclusion of Captain Blakely's letter to the Minister for War. "I thank my God that he has enabled me to do my duty." But then such a claim would never have been made, nor such a pamphlet published.

S. W. F.

CAMPAIGN OF 1848 IN LOMBARDY.

(Continued from page 85.)

Radetzky meanwhile was rapidly advancing in pursuit, but in a parallel line, so as to secure the heights on the right bank of the Mincio and the Brescia road, and outflank any position the King might take up on that river. For that purpose, Wratislaw was to lead his corps across the river at Mozambano, and move on Castiglione, while Aspré with his was to cross at Vallegio and advance to Volta on the southern edge of the plateau. Wocher, with his reserve corps, was to direct his course by Salionzi to Pozzolengo, so as to be

at hand to support either of the other two, and Thurn was to complete the investment of Peschiera. On the 23rd, when Charles Albert began to collect his forces towards Villafranca, the blockade of Mantua was so far raised that the Austrian corps at Legnago was able to communicate with the garrison, who consequently were ready to assume the offensive against the Piedmontese rear. When Leichtenstein's brigade, forming the advanced guard of Aspré's corps, came in sight of Volta, they beheld a Piedmontese column rapidly approaching the same place. This was the brigade Savoy, who were sent on by General Sonnaz to re-occupy it. Both parties pushed on with the utmost expedition, but the Austrians arrived first; they were however assailed by such superior numbers that their left flank was turned, and was falling back in disorder, when Kerpen's brigade came up at the double, and throwing themselves on with the bayonet, pushed the Piedmontese back over the edge of the heights and down into the plain. On the Austrian right, however, which held the town, a severe and close action continued, the Piedmontese who had been long quartered in the place knew the ground perfectly, and fought well; when darkness came on they broke in detached parties into it, and being aided by the inhabitants, got possession of most of the houses and the church tower, from which they kept up a heavy fire on their opponents in the streets. Here for the first time many of the townspeople used gun-cotton, and the Austrians particularly mention how "terrible it was to hear the whistling of the ball without the detonation." This severe struggle continued during the greater part of the night, the Austrian troops who were first engaged being relieved by others from the heights above. As it was one of the last so this was one of the most severe actions of the war. The officers and soldiers on both sides were excited to the highest pitch. Old Aspré was present in the thickest of the fire, heading his men like a subaltern of grenadiers. At several points encounters with the bayonet took place. During the night 10,000 fresh troops came up to Sonnaz's support, but nevertheless the two Austrian brigades were not discouraged, but having erected barricades continued the fight when morning broke; they were joined ere long by the brigades of Schwarzenberg and Guilay, and orders had been despatched during the night for Wratislaw and Wocher to wheel to their left and move with all haste to their assistance. It was mid-day ere they came up, but to Aspré's and his corps alone belongs the glory of the fight, for before the foremost of the supporting columns arrived, his men had repulsed the last attack of the enemy, made with a great superiority of force, and they were then in full retreat on Goito. During the retreat the first symptoms of a dangerous discouragement appeared amongst them, many of the privates throwing down their packs and accoutrements and disbanding. With Wratislaw and Wocher the Field-Marshal himself came up, and ere night proposals arrived from Charles Albert for an armistice. He offered to retire behind the Oglio. Radetzky, however, demanded the line of the Adda, the surrender of all the fortresses in rear of that river, and the release of the Austrian prisoners. Till an answer to this counter proposition was received, his army halted in its position crowning the heights above Volta. The loss of

Aspré's corps in the action at that town was 22 officers and 482 men killed, wounded, and missing.

Charles Albert rejected the Austrian proposals, and continued his retreat on the 27th to Marcavia and Canneto on the Oglio. Radetzky did not receive his answer until the following morning, but his army immediately moved in pursuit on Goito, and, on finding that town evacuated, wheeled to its right and set out in three columns for the Oglio. Culoz's corps from Legnago had now arrived at Mantua, to its command Count Thurn was transferred, his old corps and the siege of Peschiera being entrusted to Haynau. It was ordered to advance from Mantua along the great road to the Oglio, and thus became the left wing of Radetzky's army; it reached Marcavia on that river on the 29th, which was also approached on the same day, higher up, at Canneto and Casal Romana, by Aspré and Wratislaw. Charles Albert found that the line of the Oglio could not be defended, for when that river approaches the Po it flows for some distance in a course nearly parallel with it, and the Austrians by crossing it higher up might turn the Piedmontese left, and getting into their rear shut them up in the loop formed by the junction of the two rivers. By Bava's advice he therefore continued his retreat for the Adda, by the great road leading through Cremona. The Austrians crossed without opposition on the 30th, and continued their advance in two columns on Cremona. A position in front of that town the King wished temporarily to maintain, so as to avoid the appearance of a flight, and rouse the now drooping spirits of his men, and a sharp artillery skirmish between his rear and the Austrian advance guard in consequence took place. But finding, towards evening, that Radetzky had his whole army, numbering 60,000 men, in hand and ready to attack, that a general action was inevitable if he remained, and that his troops were in a state of the greatest despondency, he continued his retreat during the night, and crossed the Adda before morning. Cremona submitted to the Austrians the next day, who continued the pursuit in the direction of the Adda. As the fortress of Pizzighettone, where the main road crosses that river, was still held by the Piedmontese, they turned aside to their right, and approached it higher up at Formigara. There on the following day (31st of July), Aspré and Wratislaw crossed without opposition. Their passage formed a fine military spectacle. The day was beautiful, the old Field-Marshal was present in person, he was everywhere received with thundering shouts by the troops, who were in the highest spirits, and as they reached the stream the bands struck up the Austrian national air. Thurn led his corps across a little lower down; in effecting the passage they had a slight skirmish with the enemy. As soon as the whole of their army and baggage had passed, and when the march of the Austrians to the upper part of the river was ascertained, the Piedmontese blew up the bridge and powder magazine, and evacuated the fortress of Pizzighettone. On the evening of this day a fearful storm of wind and rain came on, which burst with full violence upon their already wearied and dispirited columns, and numbers of their men were killed by the fall of trees on the road side. During its advance the Austrian

army was flanked on its right by a most enterprising cavalry officer, Colonel Wyss, with a light column. He pushed on close up to Brescia, then crossed the Oglio at Pontevico, and sending his infantry back to the army, advanced with his cavalry and guns on Crema, which town he surprised, and then prepared to advance on Lodi on the Adda.

When the Piedmontese army passed the Adda, the crisis of their retreat had arrived. Two courses then lay before them, either (1) to retreat on Milan and give battle before that town, or (2) to cross the Po at Piacenza, and by assuming a position there on their flank, prevent the Austrians from advancing on the capital by menacing their communication. The latter was the movement most conformable to the rules of the military art, and would have been identical in principle with that on Goito in May, which had so completely foiled Radetzky's advance. But to this course two objections existed. First, the moral and physical force of their army was such that it could not prevent Radetzky's detaching a considerable body on Milan. Secondly, the want of any central fortifications rendered it impossible for that city to resist such an attack. The Piedmontese had suffered so much during their retreat from desertion, and the discouragement prevailing was so great, that Radetzky, after leaving a force sufficient to cope with them opposite Piacenza, could detach a strong body to march on Milan, where no fortifications or troops existed sufficient to repel them. These considerations determined Charles Albert to adopt the former course, and having, to ease his line of march, thrown his reserve artillery and ammunition into Piacenza, he continued his retreat by Lodi on Milan. Radetzky, imagining that he would retire on the former town, advanced at first in that direction, but as soon as he ascertained the true line of his retreat he wheeled round to the right, and directed his army in two columns on Lodi, Wratislaw's corps, followed by Wocher's, forming the right, Aspré's the left column. To protect his left flank and communication during their march, Thurn's corps advanced on the Pavia road to Pusterlengo, where its main body halted, detaching one brigade to its left to Guarda Miglio, opposite Piacenza, to observe the garrison of that place (who blew up the bridge over the river on their approach), and another to its front on the Pavia road to the Lambro Stream, a small river which, flowing past Milan, falls perpendicularly into the Po. When the Austrians approached Lodi, a skirmish with the Piedmontese rear guard took place, but it was abandoned on the night of the 2nd August, and occupied by their pursuers the following day, whose army lay that night in its front on the Milan road. At three o'clock on the morning of the 4th, Radetzky's army stood to arms, and commenced the final march on Milan.

Meanwhile, on the extreme right, Colonel Wyss, with his light cavalry, approached Lodi on the 1st; but, finding it occupied by the enemy, ascended the course of the Adda to Visnate, which he reached on the 3rd, encountering in his march a column of 3,000 Piedmontese, who fell back before him. Then crossing the river, he directed his course the following day on Milan, marching by his left, so as to

come into communication with, and flank the right of, the main army. On its left, Thurn advanced with his corps (with the exception of the brigade left to mask Piacenza) on the 3rd to Pavia, which he occupied without resistance, and where he took up a position on the road which leads to Milan, detaching parties to observe the course of the Ticino, the boundary between the Milanese and Piedmont. Before entering Lodi, a proposal was received by the Austrian commander from the English minister at Turin for an armistice; to which he replied, that "he would negotiate on the banks of the Ticino, when he had cleared the Imperial dominions of their invaders." When the Piedmontese reached Milan, they found the greatest discouragement prevailing, and they were received with coldness and distrust. Charles Albert, however, determined to make one more trial of the fate of arms, and drew up his army in a strong position, half a league in front of the town. His right rested on the canal of Pavia; his centre, on the Lodi road, was covered by the farmhouses at Gambaloita and Custegnedo; his left was held refused towards the eastern gate of the city. This position was one of considerable strength. The main road, along which the Austrians must advance, was flanked by broad, wet ditches, which could only be crossed by bridges; and the grounds on either side were covered by a complete network of gardens, all progress through which was impeded by boundary walls, and rows of trees and vines, while frequent detached houses formed so many redoubts.

As already mentioned, it was three on the morning of the 4th, when the Austrian army broke up for Milan. They advanced through Melegnano, which was deserted by its inhabitants, and soon came on the Piedmontese. Wartislaw's corps, which moved along the main road, first came into action; Aspré's was rather to the rear, on its left. Strassoldo's brigade, which was leading, was soon brought to a stand, by the fire of the enemies' guns. The Austrian field-pieces immediately galloped up, unlimbered, and opened fire, under cover of which the riflemen crossed the ditches on either side, and began to advance in extended order amongst the enclosures. As Aspré's corps had not yet come up, Strassoldo was obliged to detach two battalions to cover his left flank against a heavy column of the enemy, who had collected at the village of Rovedo, on their right, whilst Clam brought up his brigade on Strassoldo's right. As soon as these dispositions were complete the attack began. Clam, by a vigorous attack, carried the farmhouse of Castegnedo, but beyond that he was unable to advance, and was even assailed by the Piedmontese in the post he had won. Meanwhile, in the centre, Strassoldo could, for long, make no way. The Piedmontese brigade, Casal, was there posted at Gambaloita and the adjoining houses, which were surrounded by thick masses of trees, affording the best possible cover for their skirmishes. At last, putting his riflemen in front, and with the remainder of his brigade well closed up in rear, Strassoldo executed a decisive charge—the position was forced, and ten guns and 130 prisoners taken. This decided the combat on the Austrian centre and right; the Piedmontese fell back, and were vigorously pursued by Clam, and the remainder of Wratislaw's corps, to the very gates

of the town. Strassoldo, however, having exhausted all his ammunition in the long struggle in the centre, had to halt on the ground he had won, and, towards evening, the troops engaged were all relieved by Wocher's reserve corps, who came up comparatively fresh. Meanwhile, on the Austrian left, Aspré, as soon as he arrived, attacked and carried the village of Nosedo, but was long detained by the desperate defence of the Piedmontese extreme right, in the entrenched position of Vigetino. This post was not carried until many assaults had been repulsed; but, when it was, the fight was over, and the whole Piedmontese army took refuge within the walls of Milan. That night the Austrian patrols approached its gates on the eastern and southern sides. The times were changed, indeed, since the Piedmontese outposts hemmed in Radetzky beneath the ramparts of Verona. The Austrian loss amounted to twelve officers and 300 men, and their army lay around the city from the small stream of the Lambro, on the right, to the canal of Pavia, on the left.

Meanwhile, within the walls of the town all was tumult and confusion. The mob, in the highest state of excitement, filled the streets, and were engaged in throwing up barricades, and preparing for a hand-to-hand contest. But the defence of Milan after the defeat at Gambaloita had become impossible. It would have led but to the destruction of the town. No supply of ammunition sufficient for another contest remained, and the communication with Piedmont might be cut. Under these circumstances, it was determined in a council of war held by Charles Albert during the night that it should be evacuated. When this became known the following day, a violent tumult arose, and the mob of the city, amidst shouts of treason, surrounded the palace, threatening the king with instant death, if hostilities were not resumed. Nor did their wrath evaporate in words merely; he was detained a close prisoner, and several shots were fired at the windows of his apartments. Meanwhile, however, in pursuance of the resolution of the council of war, a negociation was going on between the Piedmontese Chief of the Staff, and the Austrian Quarter-Master General, which ended in a convention being signed before night, by which the former were to retire from Milan early on the following morning, the Austrian army to enter by mid-day, and the whole Milanese territory to be evacuated by the night of the 7th. During the night, a detachment of his guards rescued Charles Albert from his confinement, and escorted him, amidst the howls and execrations of the rabble, out of the town, and in a few hours the long columns of the army might be seen wending their way in deep dejection through the plain towards the Ticino. At the request of the municipal authorities, to prevent plunder on the part of the rabble, Aspré's corps at ten o'clock in the morning marched into the town. Amidst the strains of triumphal music, in the most superb order, they swept along; not a sound was heard from the vast crowd who witnessed their entrance; the dreams of Italian liberty had passed away, the iron had entered into the soul of the Milanese. As the old Field-Marshal rode by, many remembered the words he had addressed to them ere yet a shot was fired;

"The sword I have borne for fifty-six years with honour in the field yet remains firm in my grasp. May I not be compelled to unfurl the banner of the double eagle. Its strength of wing will be found unimpaired." They had proved prophetic.

On the previous day, Thurn had brought up his corps from Pavia, and a strong detachment had seized on Monza, and thus cut off from the capital Garibaldi's band, 6000 strong, which, having retired along the foot of the Alps, was now endeavouring to reach it. A truce for three days had been concluded between the Austrians and Piedmontese, on condition of an exchange of prisoners. Radetzky took advantage of it to countermarch Thurn's corps on Piacenza, so as to be in readiness to cross the Po there should hostilities be resumed. No such necessity, however, existed. On the 9th an armistice for six weeks was agreed to, to give time for negotiations for a general peace. Its conditions were, the Piedmontese were to evacuate entirely the Austrian territory, to withdraw from the duchies of Parma and Modena, and from the town of Piacenza, to surrender the fortress of Pesciera, Rocca d'Anfo and Osopo, and the town of Brescia, and to recal their troops and fleet from Venice. Radetzky concluded his order of the day to his victorious army with these words: "The Imperial flag is again waving from the walls of Milan, there is no longer an enemy on Lombard ground."

We have not interrupted the detail of the contest between the main armies by those of the events in the rear, nor are they of much consequence. Haynau carried on the investment and bombardment of Peschiera with great vigour and ability, and Welden on the Venetian main land not only maintained the blockade of Venice from the land side, and a cordon along the left bank of the Po, but when Radetzky began his final march on Milan, occupied Governolo and Borgoforte, and crossing over to the right bank with Perglas's division, marched on Bologna, which town he was preparing to bombard when intelligence of the armistice, accompanied by orders to retire, reached him. In compliance with its conditions, Peschiera and Rocca d'Anfo were surrendered immediately, and the duchies on the right bank of the Po occupied by the Austrians. All the Piedmontese detachments on the side of the Alps had been cut off by Radetzky's rapid advance, but it was agreed that they should withdraw unmolested. Many of the partizans, however, rejected the armistice. Garibaldi, with 4,000 of the Free Corps, retired into Piedmont, and Griffini, with 2,500, and twenty guns from Brescia, threw himself into the neutral territory of Switzerland. The greater difficulty occurred on the side of Osopo and Venice, the former being commanded by an Italian, who refused to acknowledge the armistice concluded by Charles Albert, held out till the 14th October, when it surrendered on good terms. With regard to the latter, although it was only stipulated that the Piedmontese troops should be withdrawn, yet the Austrians held this to mean that the detached forts, held by the Piedmontese alone, should be surrendered into their hands, whereas the Piedmontese contented themselves with making them over to the Venetians, and a conside-

rable delay arose in the embarkation of their troops from Venice. Radetzky was so enraged at these delays, that he seized hold of the park of siege artillery, numbering eighty guns, which had been deposited by Charles Albert, in Peschiera, and was now on its way through the Milanese to Piedmont, and declared that he would retain them until the provisions of the armistice were fully executed, and hence began a series of mutual recriminations, which (although the armistice was constantly renewed), ended seven months afterwards in a fresh war, but that belongs to the story of another year. The Italian campaign of 1848, with all its eventful changes, was over, and the wearied armies sought within their respective frontiers that repose which both now so much required.

To conduct a war without errors is impossible; but, probably, few have committed a smaller number than Radetzky. The caution with which he avoided disturbing Charles Albert during his false movements on Mantua; the skill with which he rendered that fault irreparable by his sudden attack upon Somma Campagna, and seizure of the hilly range through which the Mincio flows; the rapidity with which he concentrated his army, and directed it against the position the Piedmontese had won in his rear; in fine, the masterly movements by which he turned the successive positions taken up by them on the Oglio and the Adda, by constantly outflanking their left, are all deserving of the very highest praise, and are amongst the most brilliant examples of the military art which modern times can afford. But, perfection is given to no child of Adam; and the attack on Rivoli by Thurn, *before* that on Somma Campagna by his own army, as well as the too hurried advance of the bulk of his forces to the Mincio, and neglect of his left flank, which led to the destruction of Simbschen's brigade, seem to be decided errors. Had Thurn attacked the Piedmontese left at Rivoli at *the same time* that he himself drove their centre back on the Mincio, there cannot be a doubt that the former would have been cut off to a man, for his advance cut their only line of retreat to Peschiera. Again, had the *whole* of Wratislaw's corps been disposed on the southern side of the plateau facing the plain of Mantua, whilst Aspré's and Wocher's defiled behind it on the Mincio, to secure the possession of the heights on its opposite bank, Simbschen's brigade would not have been exposed alone, to be shivered by the mass of Charles Albert's forces, or would the latter have been able to win that position on the heights which it required the severe battle of the 25th to drive him from.

On the fatal and irremediable mistake made by Charles Albert, in concentrating the mass of his forces around the rampart of Mantua, whilst he retained the original line extending to the distant rocks of Rivoli, sufficient remarks have been made in the body of the narrative; but the readiness with which he conceived, and the vigour with which he executed, the plan of concentrating the bulk of the army on his own right, and throwing it on the rear and communications of his adversary, and, when that stroke had failed, the decided and masterly manner in which he gathered up his repulsed troops around Villafranca, and carried them off, during the night, in the most perfect order, to Goito, on the opposite bank of the Mincio, where

he recovered his natural line of retreat; and the good order in which the remainder of that retreat was conducted are worthy of all praise, and reflect the utmost credit on his firmness, and on the science of General Bava, his confidential adviser on all military matters. During the whole campaign the conduct of the Piedmontese troops was good; they uniformly behaved well under fire, and, in almost all cases, when compelled to retire, brought away with them both their colours and their guns. Had the Roman, Tuscan, and Milanese contingents been animated with a like spirit, and shown as much resolution, the issue of the campaign would, in all probability, have been different, and the Austrian colours been driven into the Tyrol at its commencement, instead of waving on the ramparts of Milan at its close.

The peculiar nature of the battles in this campaign must strike the most inattentive observer. They in no respect resemble those of Napoleon and Wellington, which were generally delivered in the midst of vast plains, or at least open ground, where manœuvres on a great scale were performed; they formed a succession of village fights, resembling those of Novi and Ligny. This was owing to the enclosed and peopled character of the part of Italy in which they took place. The whole country is covered with villages, villas, and farmhouses, and intersected with canals, vineyards, and rows of trees. In such a broken ground, the regular movement of lines and columns was impossible. Usually, the attacking party found their opponents posted strongly amidst these obstacles; they then pushed their columns along the road till the head was arrested by the fire of artillery, on which they brought up their own guns, and, under their cover, deployed a mass of skirmishers on each side, who, lining all the walls and hedges, endeavoured to force their way on by overpowering the fire of the enemy and turning their flanks; both parties reinforced their skirmishers, detached houses were frequently surrounded and stormed, villages had to be won by a desperate fight from house to house, mingled with occasional charges with the bayonet in the streets, and a complete route, or the cutting off of large bodies, was almost impossible. Both sides employed their reserves in feeding this broken and desultory combat amongst enclosures and villages, not in making great combined movements in mass, which in that confined ground was impossible. This explains at once the comparatively small loss sustained—for both sides fought much under cover—and the absence of those trophies in the shape of cannons, colours, and large bodies of prisoners, which usually result from great actions. Another consequence of this was the rare employment of cavalry; except a few charges in the plain of Villafranca, hardly any were used in the shock of battle. They were kept entirely for outpost duty. It was the light troops and artillery who were principally employed. Amongst the former, none distinguished themselves more than the Tyrolese Rifles in the Austrian, and the Basaglieri in the Piedmontese ranks. No armies in Europe could boast of finer or more highly-trained light corps.

During the continuance of the strife between the contending armies, the most marked difference was observed between the atti-

tude of the town and country population. The former were uniformly democratic in the highest degree, and animated with the most bitter feeling of hatred towards the Austrians. The inhabitants of Milan, Brescia, Padua, Venice, &c., all rose in arms at once against the Imperial Government. With the inhabitants of the country, however, the case was totally different. Though they took no active part in the strife, yet their sympathies went entirely along with the Austrian rule, under which they had enjoyed the protection of a strong, just, and mild government. Under it they reared their produce in peace, carried it to the markets in safety, and found perfect impartiality in the legal tribunals before which their disputes were tried. These, after all, are the essentials of a good government; and, provided they possessed them, they cared little that they had no political rights. They listened with indifference to the tirades of the democratic leaders, and, contrasting the pillage and license of the free corps with the strict discipline of the Austrian regulars, evinced no enthusiasm for that form of government, the first effects of which were insecurity of private property. Not only was this evinced by the joy with which they received the Imperial columns during the advance to Milan, but in several instances during the campaign they secreted the Austrian wounded, nursed them, and restored them, when recovered, to their comrades, and, ere its termination, the Piedmontese came to look upon every peasant as an enemy; for, whilst they could get neither supplies nor information, Radetzky was acquainted with all their movements, and supplied with every necessary. Such is the tale of the campaign of 1848 in Italy, fraught with many a lesson for the soldier, and, in its political causes and consequences, of much importance to the statesman.

PEEPS FROM THE LOOPHOLES OF RETREAT.

By Retired Major Marksman.

Before I touch upon any of the topics to which the month has given birth, I must recur to the evidence before the Military Organization Commission, taken in the last session of Parliament. The subjects which it embraces are of the liveliest interest to the army, and if their ventilation does not result in some very striking changes, I shall begin to think commissions of this kind are rather devised to stave off useful discussion than to promote an honest investigation into military abuses.

I think it will be readily admitted by every impartial man that it was *dies albo lapide notata* when the office of Secretary of State for War was separated from the Secretaryship for the Colonies, and centred in the person of an active member of the Senate. The boldness with which Lord Panmure grappled with the various branches of military administration, and set about vigorous reforms, relieved the army of the terrible nightmare which had pressed upon it for up-

wards of sixty years—an incubus which had cramped the energies of a Wellington in war, and allowed forty years of peace to glide by with scarcely a shade of improvement. We, whose hair has whitened in the service, and whose pulsation has slackened with time, can recal the days when all military authority was supposed to abide, and did practically abide, at the Horse Guards; when every proposed amelioration was politely found out by a Military Secretary, or rudely repulsed by an Adjutant-General. The Duke, by himself or his representatives, repudiated the right of an officer to appeal from the uncouth negatives with which his respectful applications were received; and all improvements requiring the preliminary sanction of the Horse Guards, were pooh-poohed before they could reach the threshold of the War Office, or the office of the Minister for War and the Colonies. We saw the consequences of the *vis inertiæ* of the veteran staff even before the army was received on the plateau of the Crimea. From the landing at Gallipoli and Scutari to the attack on the Redan in September, 1855, every day illustrated the sad consequences of upwards of half a century of official supineness. All true soldiers were, therefore, rejoiced when military administration became an active reality, and though there were a few croakers that the new Secretary of State was not a general officer, Lord Panmure soon satisfied the most sceptical that his short service in the army had excited in him military sympathies, which he was only too glad of an opportunity of exhibiting.

It is very doubtful whether, if the Duke of Wellington had lived, the patent under which the Secretary of State for War holds his appointment would have been made out; but it was precisely under his Grace's *régime* that it was most needed, and it is almost to be regretted that the change in the administrative department of the army should only have taken place just as the bâton of authority fell into the hands of such earnest friends of progress as Lord Hardinge and the Duke of Cambridge. Lord Hardinge, after as much delay as consisted with a decent consideration for the reputation of the Duke, and a regard for his own position and the expectations which the country had formed of him, began well, and augmented the artillery, which had fallen to a very low pitch of insufficiency; and we may be assured that the Duke of Cambridge would have set no limits to his own exertions in the cause of improvement. But the love of power grows by what it feeds on, and we now find that the successive Secretaries of State for War have contrived to monopolize every vestige of military authority, reducing the office of Commander-in-Chief to that of an Adjutant-General. "There has never been a regiment given away, I believe," says H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, "during the time that I have been at the Horse Guards, with regard to which there has not been personal communication with the Secretary of State, and no regiment has been given without his knowledge, and the reason why one officer was preferred to another." The Secretary of State is also apprised of the Duke's intention to promote a Major to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy, in command of a regiment. The standard of military education is settled by the Secretary of State; the armament of every fortress is determined by that

functionary; the Defence Committee reports to the Secretary of State; the duties of the Board of Ordnance are conducted in his department; in short, the Secretary is everybody, and the Commander-in-Chief little else than an adviser, or the agent for giving effect to certain arrangements dictated by the Secretary of State for War.

Nor is it only the minister who usurps, on the strength of his patent, a power that might be quite as efficiently exercised by the Commander-in-Chief. The Judge-Advocate General is the supreme authority next to the Queen in matters of military law. And what a beautiful piece of circumlocution is the *modus operandi* of the intercourse of the Judge-Advocate with her Majesty. "He is supposed" (I quote the Duke of Cambridge again) "to give her Majesty legal advice upon legal points, he is the legal officer attached to the army: he gives her Majesty legal advice in the case of a court-martial; therefore her Majesty is supposed to express her pleasure consequent upon that advice, and the *pleasure is notified to the Commander-in-Chief*, which the Commander-in-Chief *again submits to the Queen that such and such officer should be cashiered*, or as the case may be, *consequent upon the advice given her* by her legal military adviser!" "That," exclaims the Duke, "is the process:" and a very pretty roundabout undignified process it is. Surely, the Judge-Advocate might advise the Commander-in-Chief only, and that officer might take the Queen's pleasure upon the case and give it effect. Such would have been the arrangement under Napoleon the Great, for that mighty genius loved simplicity and knew the value of time. The Duke is evidently not at ease that the office of Commander-in-Chief should be reduced to such a cipher; but he is diffident to a fault. The same cannot be said of the Ministerial officers, who would concentrate all power in the War Office. They hold to the necessity of supremacy, and, unfortunately, past experience supplies arguments in their favour. When I read that Mr. Sidney Herbert had, of his own authority, directed experiments to be made by soldiers with the Berington knapsack, I could not help feeling it was an invasion of a prerogative which the late Duke of Wellington would have clung to with fierce energy; yet, as an old soldier, desiring the health and welfare of younger men, I could not but be sensible it was a good measure which *otherwise* would not have been adopted.

The evidence of Mr. Smith, the Commissary-General, to which I referred last month, is of much interest, for the facts it discloses and the suggestions which it embraces. The Commissary is a good practical man, who has not allowed the disasters of the Crimea to pass unheeded. He belongs to the school of progress, and keeps his eyes open to defects. We gather from his evidence that there would have been no harm in issuing green coffee to the troops if they had had fuel and roasting apparatus, and he thinks it would be a better and more economical plan to let the men have their coffee in this form, if they could be taught to help themselves in the way of roasting the coffee in the same manner as they now learn to cook their own provisions—"it should form part of a regimental system instead of a general staff system." A common pan

and small portable mills are the best implements for roasting and grinding Mr. Smith can suggest. Ground coffee, hermetically sealed, would render the soldier independent of all utensils—just as the Commissariat bakers at Aldershott and the Curragh, who, with the portable ovens, can bake for 20,000 men daily; but Mr. Smith very properly suggests that you may give the soldier too much facility—"you may provide him all resources, which will render him perfectly helpless if he is thrown upon his own hands at any particular time." An army always in camp upon the same spot may be fed, cooked for, baked for, brewed for, and so forth, but how are the outposts and detached bodies to act? You cannot send a commissariat and its appurtenances, with fifty men, and it is, therefore, of the last importance that every soldier should be rendered self-reliant.

The ration question has engaged no small portion of the attention of the Commission. It is one of singular complication. There are no less than five or six rates of stoppage now in vogue. A man in hospital suffers a stoppage of tenpence a day; a man at home in health, pays fourpence halfpenny per day for his bread and meat; abroad he is stopped threepence-halfpenny; on board ship the stoppage is sixpence, and this is reduced if a man does not take grog. All this occasions confusion, and makes it difficult for officers to render a soldier a clear and accurate, and intelligible account of his pay. Mr. Sidney Herbert is, it is said, engaged on a plan for giving a soldier a net rate of pay, and on excellent rations, which will simplify matters amazingly, besides providing him with a better description of food. The Commander-in-Chief, however, who is much in favour of the change, and who recommended it two years ago, as an aid to military discipline, has some "hesitation about the feeling of the men." His Royal Highness manifests a thorough acquaintance with the mental composition of the men, and the state of education among them, when he adds: "It is a very odd thing that the men will not understand these things; and even if they are better off by such an arrangement, I very much question in my mind whether you can convince them of it, and I think it is a very awkward thing, and might lead to very awkward questions arising with the men now in the army, if you made this new arrangement; that is, if you suddenly changed the whole thing, and told them that their rations were to be eightpence, that instead of getting one shilling, they would get only eightpence." The duke does not object to the stoppage, but to the proposal that everything be provided by the State. And certainly if we remember how many tricks are played by contractors, how difficult the surveillance, and how pertinacious the soldier is on the subject of his 'rights,' we may allow the duke to have some judgment in the matter.

The rations of the troops are perhaps the most important of all the considerations that can enter into the question of the administration of the army. A French surgeon, writing on this subject, says very justly. "We may run after, or to an enemy, without tents or beds, but never without a daily meal. The bellicose disposition of Ajax depended upon his *cuisine;* upon the nourishment of an army

on the field depends its health or sickness, its robustness or debility, the very life or death of the soldiers—in fact, of every one who is cast by the country into the struggle." The same writer proceeds to describe of what the camp provisions shall consist, but as these are, for the most part, inapplicable to British troops, it is needless to quote them. There is, however, one item deserving of particular attention. Whatever care is taken that the Englishman shall have plenty of beef and its indispensable accompaniment, bread, no pains are taken to supply him with vegetables. Our Commissary-General admits that they are necessary to health, but they are not included in the rations. They would only be supplied "in cases of emergency," and then of what would they consist? Why, of an amalgam of tasteless carrots, turnips, cabbages, &c., so prepared, that the sacrifice of all perishable matter carries with it every vestige of flavor. "Toutes les tables de Crimée," exclaims le Médecin Aide Major Cuignet, "ont eprouvé jusqu' à une *feroce repulsion* pour l'usage répété des conserves les mieux obtenues." At certain epochs, it appears, that the French soldiers, tormented by the obstinate presence of the English conserve, kicked it from them and fell sick. Cabbage is the only vegetable which will admit of preservation by pressure without becoming insipid. If more extensively used, without the accompaniment of the other vegetables, it would be found sapid and wholesome. It has a high reputation for its anti-scorbutic properties. "Il entre dans tous les bouillons et, seul aussi, il se marie au lard de maniére à en corriger le gout trop élevé et fatigant." Let this be remembered by our Commissariat, and a proper provision made in good time. Mr. Smith will not be obliged to reply to a War Commission, as he answered Colonel Herbert; "Vegetables would *certainly* be a *most desirable* part of the rations; but it is *very difficult during war operations to keep up a supply of vegetables;* and they can be only occasionally procured as circumstances will admit of it."

The whole subject of the Commissariat of the British Army has been well ventilated by the Military Organization Committee, and I think we shall see, as one result of the deliberations, that an office will be created in some measure corresponding with that of the Intendant General of the French Army. The Commissary-General is himself favourable to seeing the department placed on a more efficient footing, and its means of transport separated from the military train, so as to render it quite independent of the employment of that part of the army on other military duties. Sir John M'Neil, to whom we owe so much, for the manner in which he conducted the investigations in the Crimea, was examined on the matter, and in the course of his evidence, dwelt so eloquently upon the character of the Great Duke of Wellington, that I cannot forbear transcribing what he said:—

"I concur in much that the Commissary General-in-Chief has said as to the difficulty of delegating to a British officer, powers commensurate with those which are exercised by the French Intendant General; I doubt very much whether it would fit into our system, and I am clearly of opinion that it is of the utmost importance that the whole of this matter should be under the control and upon the

responsibility of some officer of high military rank, who should be at the elbow of the general commanding the forces. That opinion is founded partly on a consideration of what occurred during the Peninsular war: we had in command of the forces during the Peninsular war a man of consummate genius, who was capable, as we know from his published despatches, of attending to everything great or small; he not only directed what was to be done, but he directed also how it was to be done. When he wanted in the lines of Torres Vedras cattle from the parts of Portugal and Spain which were accessible by sea, he personally conducted the correspondence upon which the arrangements for those supplies were founded. In everything throughout those campaigns you trace his individual hand. If you could at all times command the services of such a man, I do not much care what your system is; he will make it suitable to the occasion. The Duke of Wellington was to us a system in himself, and when he left us he left us without a system. I think that you must be prepared to conduct your campaigns, if you should be engaged in them, with men who may be very competent men, although far inferior to him; that you must therefore establish your system on such a footing as will make it possible to conduct the business of the army under such a man as in ordinary times you are likely to find; he must, therefore, have around him men who will do the work—who will tell how a thing is to be done when he desires it to be done. The Duke of Wellington was, in a great measure, his own Quarter-master-General; he was, in a great measure, his own Adjutant-General; he was, in a still larger measure, his own Commissary-General. But if you cannot get a man who can conduct all these departments as he did, you must endeavour to put around him men who can do it for him. Upon that ground, as well as with reference to the individual authority of the Intendant General in the French Army, I have come to the conclusion, that for the management of the supplies and transport of your army, you require some officer who shall be constantly at head-quarters—a man of military rank, selected specially for the purpose, who, when he receives the orders of your Commander of the Forces for any operation to be carried out by the Commissariat, shall be responsible for their being carried out."

Englishmen, will never tire of the praises of the mighty Duke; it is a grateful theme, utterly without alloy. No one will gainsay a single thing that has been said by Sir John M'Neill, or any one else who speaks laudatory of that incomparable chief. I think, however, that we too often lose sight of the example, which he offered the army, in his general conduct. He is usually deemed beyond imitation—something too magnificent for ordinary human beings to approach. We praise him—we read of the praises bestowed upon him with unmitigated delight—but we seldom say to ourselves, "Let us try to copy him—albeit not gifted with his genius, we may, at least, imitate his system." And that system consisted in studying everything which related in the most remote degree to his profession. In that respect he resembled Napoleon the First, to whom Sir John M'Neill's description of the Duke would have applied *mutato nomine*—with this

vast difference, however, in the result: Napoleon was obliged to delegate military command to his Marshals, and from Paris, as a centre, dictate the course of operations. His correspondence thus embued the minds of his subordinates with his sentiments—inspired them with his spirit—forced upon them a desire to emulate the great leader. Wellington, on the other hand, had few generals under him to whom it was necessary to confide independent authority. Excepting Lord Hill, there was not one throughout the Peninsular war who had an opportunity of distinguishing himself, when left to his own resources. Picton, Craufurd, Hope, Graham, Beresford, Maitland, Dalhousie, &c., were simply employed as divisional generals; and, singularly enough, when engaged at some distance from the person of the Commander-in-Chief, they committed blunders; they were only successful when working under his eye. Witness San Sebastian, Albuera, Bayonne, &c.

It is very much to be regretted that the session of Parliament closed without receiving a Report from the Recruiting Commission. There is an urgent necessity for an immediate reform in the entire system of recruiting. It is quite appalling to hear and read of the number of deserters from our ranks, and all from no fault in the composition of the army but from the villainous character of the boys enlisted. That "bringing money" is the source of much of the evil. The people who "bring" seek for their objects among the worst classes of British society, and the people who are "brought," have no higher object in view than to get the bounty and spend it. Few are made acquainted with the real advantages of the service, and those who do happen to have them brought under their notice shrink from contact with the ruffians whom they every day see accepting the shilling. I do not like the conscript system, for the double reason that it is alien to our free constitution and brings into the ranks too many thousands of unwilling soldiers; but it possesses one recommendation of a very powerful character, which might, under another arrangement, be introduced into our service, and would go far to purify the ranks and render the profession of a soldier not unworthy the adoption of a superior class of young men. The authorities in France know to what parish every conscript belongs, and can obtain the fullest information as to his character and pursuits, and if he be a thoroughly bad fellow, the army is not contaminated by his presence, except in the shape of a Zouave, from whom nothing but reckless dare-devil conduct is ever expected. Now, what is to prevent our enlistment being conducted upon a principle which shall give the recruiting officer a clue to the antecedents of the youths who present themselves for the honour of serving her Majesty? A little correspondence with the parish or with the last employer of the candidate for military service would unravel as much of the recruit's history as would protect the officer from the responsibility of engaging a perfect vagabond. Of small peccadilloes in his career little account need be taken, for the discipline of the army will reform what is not irreclaimably bad. It is against positive vice that we need protection—the vice which plunders the State, and outrages, if it does not

contaminate, what is respectable in the ranks. A single communication with the parish of a candidate, and the record in the parish books of a youth's having entered in such and such a regiment, would be a safeguard against a double enlistment. If it did not prevent desertion altogether it would effectually check one of the leading inducements to desert—the chance of getting a second bounty—and might assist in recovering the stray sheep, if it were desirable. I have my doubts, however, if it is really worth while to reclaim a deserter. There can be no advantage in having a dissatisfied scamp in the ranks —all you want with him is to punish him, and by a process which, however it may be justified (and I am no enemy to corporal punishment), is unpopular with certain classes in the country. If he has robbed the service of any portion of his kit, you put him under stoppages and increase his discontent, thereby leading to a second desertion. Far better would it be to hold the parish responsible for the bounty advanced to a deserter, and any other monies he might have received. The process would induce caution in recommending him as a fit person to be received into the Queen's service.

The root of all the evil to which I have been adverting lies in the absence of proper inducements to respectable young men to enter the army. The army is treated rather as a refuge for the destitute in circumstances and bankrupt in character; it is not sufficiently held up to the eyes of the agricultural and manufacturing population, and the population which does not belong to either of these divisions, as a profession of a highly honourable and agreeable character. If every market place contained a black board, on which should be found inscribed in visible white characters that soldiers receive money and rations in greater abundance, and with more perfect regularity than the humbler classes, whose earnings are precarious; that they are clothed and housed by the State; have medical attendance and care in sickness; enjoy the advantages of education, which are extended to their children; and after an honest service of twenty-one years, while they are yet in the prime of life, receive pensions and other advantages, such as annuities, gratuities, and the chance of lucrative civil employment as clerks, *commissionaires*, porters, &c., my life on it, numbers would enter for the sake of the profession itself. Here would be a legitimate inducement to serve, far preferable in every way to the eternal pot-house persuasions, the tawdry ribbons, the ear-piercing fife, the large bounty, and other vulgar recommendations. We should not hear of desertions under such a system as I have ventured to sketch, nor should we be told every day that young men of good repute and correct feeling are deterred from enlisting by the dread of associating with the dregs and scum of the earth.

Although I have pretty freely expressed my concurrence in the opinions of those who look upon a volunteer force as an unreliable affair in the hour of need, I am exceedingly glad to find so many rifle corps forming in different parts of the country. From the calculation I have made, it appears very probable that we shall soon have two hundred thousand gentlemen and yeomen, apt marksmen, up in their drill, and appropriately costumed, and

when the fact comes to be known across the water, the *moral* effect it may produce will not be inoperative in prolonging the existence of peace. Still, I cannot divest my mind of the idea that we shall have to look to another description of force for our actual defence. Neither superior freedom, virtue, nor patriotism, are guarantees from security against the assaults of superior disciplined force. Philip, the Macedonian monarch, trampled upon the free states of Greece; the Parthians of Persia baffled the Roman legions. If our regulars failed in America, it was because of the smallness of the force sent, its great distance from its supplies, the sluggishness of the generals, and the co-operation of the natives with the Americans. Poland and the Belgic provinces did not find their patriotism a match for the disciplined troops employed in the subjugation; and 80,000 Russians were no match for the handful of Swedes who routed them at Narva. We must, as Sir Charles Paisley wrote in 1808, "whilst we glory in the freedom, the public spirit, and patriotism of this country, not give way to the empty delusion, that by them alone we are to be invincible. It is our duty to make preparations for fully meeting invasion, exactly such as any other government that had no confidence in the patriotism of its subjects would make. Then, when the day of invasion comes, the enthusiasm of the nation will be a useful aid, and may accelerate or contribute to the success of measures wisely planned." By the way, Sir Charles Paisley, in the very volume whence I have quoted, prognosticated the growth of the French navy, until it should be double the force of ours, manned by seamen equally or nearly as skilful, and he hinted that we are "likely eventually to lose the empire of the seas." He showed, by the example of the Dutch, the French, the Spaniards, the Danes, Americans, and Greeks, that superior seamanship is not "the exclusive privilege of Englishmen." Steam, and the lead we took in adapting it to our ships of war, has prevented the complete fulfilment of Sir Charles's prophecy, but the French have certainly put themselves on a par with us. All the ministries of the past fifty years have been supine upon the one great point of armament. It seems that the power of anticipating the decline of the prestige it took us twenty years to establish, has resided in the officers of our army and navy, while the faculty of preventing that decline has lodged in ministers, who have altogether disregarded the warnings of experience.

THE WAR OFFICE COMMITTEE AND THE TREVELYAN SCHEME.

When the Royal Commission of enquiry into the merits or demerits of the purchase system "closed their long labours" with a Report that, like the last chapter of Rasselas, was "a conclusion in which nothing was concluded," the most censorious of its readers could not have predicted, nor the most imaginative of them have received, the extent to which that character of it would be verified.

There are now before us Reports of War Office Committees and sub-committees, arithmetical statements, averages, actuaries' opinions, observations, counter-observations, and counter-opinions, calculations and counter-calculations, filling 222 foolscap pages of print, originating not in the Royal Commissioners' Report itself, for that would imply that it contained some decision satisfactory to one side or another, but in a "reference" made by it of a proposition which it virtually admitted it was incapable of estimating. To condense into one article, we might say into one number of this journal, such a mass of conjectural and controversial matter, such a complication of figures and intricacy of argument, would be to undertake a task that no labour would accomplish, and no hope of success would justify. Nevertheless, as the army is undoubtedly interested in the questions at issue, it is our duty to attempt such an account of them, as may at least enable officers to form some opinion of the two sides of the propositions put forth ostensibly for their advantage.

In our number of last January we brought the controversy to the point which it had then reached, namely, the publication of the Reports of the War Office Committee and of Sir Alexander Tullock on the financial scheme of Sir Charles Trevelyan for abolishing purchase, increasing the pay of officers, and diminishing the public expenditure. We stated, necessarily, in very general terms, that the results of these Reports, and of the Tables that accompanied them, was virtually a reversal of Sir Charles's hypothesis in almost all its parts—that is to say, that his scheme would diminish instead of increasing the income of officers, and would increase instead of diminishing the public expenditure; and it may be added, it would not abolish purchase. We are now to take into consideration his reply to the objections raised, the Committee's rejoinder, and what are called the "data" upon which each party has founded its conclusions. It is first necessary to give the reader a general idea of the points which are to be considered.

The pecuniary part of Sir Charles Trevelyan's scheme is comprised under the following nine heads:—1st. An increase of the daily pay of each regimental rank. 2nd. Exemption from the band subscriptions. 3rd. Abolition of non-effective allowance. 4th. Of wine allowance at home. 5th. Of rations and servant's allowance abroad. 6th. Of extra pay for length of service and Brevet rank. 7th. Of agency. 8th. Of pensions to widows and children. And lastly, "Not having to pay for their commissions."

There can be no doubt that, in making these propositions, Sir Charles contemplated improving the pecuniary position of officers. In his Statement of comparison between their proposed and present incomes, however, he inserts only the difference of rates of pay, without taking into account the relief from band subscriptions on the one hand, or the loss from deprivation of allowances on the other, although these heads are included in his Table of increase or decrease in the public expenditure; but in neither Statement is there any allusion to gain contemplated from not having to pay for commissions. In lieu of the present retirement by sale

of commissions, the prices of which are paid by the officers who succeed, he proposes a full pay retirement at the public expense, optional at certain ages, and compulsory five years later. At first sight nothing appears more simple than to institute a comparison between the state of things to be brought about by these propositions, and the existing condition of officers as to income; but when it is considered that it involves the interests of some five or six thousand men scattered over the globe, in continual transition, and in all the heterogeneous circumstances of military life, the difficulty of finding even a principle upon which a comparison can be instituted becomes apparent; and taking into account the variety of corps, rates of pay and allowances, diversified as they are by position and periods of service, correct computation is unattainable. The Committee seem to have been fully sensible of these difficulties, and, judging from the surface of their proceedings, they do not seem to have agreed upon the best mode of meeting them. They examine the whole scheme, financially only, under the following five questions:—

"I. What do the regimental officers gain or lose by the following proposed alterations (taking in the nine heads of Sir Charles's propositions above specified).

"II. What are the relative advantages (in a pecuniary sense), of the present and proposed systems, taking into consideration the following points—

"*a*. The result of the foregoing enquiry as to loss or gain of regimental officers.

"*b*. The officer's prospect of promotion under Sir Charles Trevelyan's scheme of voluntary and compulsory retirements, as compared with his prospects under the existing system.

"*c*. The estimated number of general officers.

"*d*. The establishment of Staff corps with new rates of pay and allowances in lieu of the present Staff system.

"*e*. The proposed scale of full pay retirements.

"III. What would be the maximum charge of full pay retirements and half pay, under Sir Charles Trevelyan's scheme, estimated by him at—

Full pay retirements	£210,622
Half Pay	80,000

"IV. What would be the probable cost of compensating officers now in the service who have purchased their commissions, and who may wish at any time to retire from the service?

"V. Would there be any, and if any, what expense thrown upon the War Office by the abolition of army agents."

The results of these inquiries being entirely adverse to the conclusions of Sir Charles Trevelyan, their truth and accuracy form the points of controversy between them. The solution of the FIRST question appears in a "Statement (Table I.) showing the annual gain or loss to regimental combatant officers who have not purchased any of their commissions, from the alterations in their pay, &c., proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan." Of course it must be only from minute examination of the Table itself that its details can be learnt;

ut careful perusal of the observations that accompany it is also ndispensable to a correct estimate of its conclusions. There can e no reasonable doubt that these conclusions exhibit great pecuniary isadvantages derivable to all ranks, except subaltern, from the doption of Sir Charles Trevelyan's scheme, and they show that with ll his knowledge, and with all the pains that he took to display it n his various calculations, he was either entirely ignorant of, or ntirely overlooked, effects which the most common observer must ave seen were inevitable from the practical application of them. ut we by no means admit that the Committee's statements show he extent of pecuniary loss that would be inflicted on officers, or lly represent the damage, moral and material, that would accrue o the army from the scheme. The Committee have adopted a prin- iple which, although possibly no other would have answered the urpose which they laid down to themselves, is, in our opinion, not nly insufficient for the attainment of the true result of the inquiry, ut, above all others, inapplicable to the peculiar case. It is that of *verage*. They take the whole body of the purchasing portion of the rmy, and under each of the Trevelyan alterations, they concentrate nto an abstract ideal officer of each rank, the *average* present com- uted gain or loss from each such head—a plan by which it is obvious hat, except of course under the head of pay, not one of the stated esults could occur in any one rank. Both gain and loss to one lass—the married officers abroad for example—are made to appear ess by being spread over the mass of officers, and more to another lass—the majority—who are not, and never will be, in the circum- tances under which only the gain or loss can be incurred. By what nduction or combination can it be assumed and shown that an Ensign n the line will lose £3 0s. 5d. a year by the discontinuance of pen- ions to widows and children? He must have been married some ight or ten years before his appointment, in order to its being *ossible* for him to leave a widow entitled to pension! And can that be correct principle of reckoning, which, in the case of a Lieutenant 'olonel, places the loss of pension to widow and children at 220. 10s. 10d. a year, when, upon the moderate supposition of his aving three children, it is in point of fact nearly six times that mount! Again, under the head of "discontinuance of rations broad," the amount of which depends upon the officer being married nd having children, the probabilities are surely greater for a Lieu- enant of upwards of seven years' service, being married and aving children, than for an Ensign, yet they are put down as qual losers of the value of two rations each; and this value is tated at the very lowest rate known, as if there were no stations here it exceeded (after deducting stoppages), the Committee's rate f threepence a ration! The same anomalies appear in other heads f the Table, and in other ranks of officers. All Captains are through- ut assumed to have a wife and one child under seven years of age, nd all field officers a wife, one child over, and one under seven years f age. By the combination of an arbitrary period of service with he amounts received and receivable by field officers as non-effective llowance, the average loss to a Lieutenant-Colonel from its discon-

tinuance (£20 a year) is stated at £13 10s. 9d.; to a Major, £10 0s. 11d. The gain from relief from the band subscription is by the same principle stated at £10 6s. for a Lieutenant-Colonel, and £10 14s. 1d. for a Major; the lesser sum in the case of the larger subscription! This pervading principle of average also necessarily assumes the body of the army, that is, each individual officer in it, as in some portion of his career in all the categories of position as to station and period of service, marriage and paternity, contemplated under the computations—an unwarrantable and improbable assumption. The point to be ascertained is not the general effect upon officers taken in their various ranks, as all going through a given career of service and circumstances, but the specific effect upon each officer as to income, when circumstances occur to take it out of the category of strict pay, which is at all times ascertainable, and place it in that of dependence on the part of the world to which he is ordered, and on his position as a husband and parent. If, as every officer must find upon trial, this effect is widely different from what is laid down for him on the average principle, it is a mockery to tell him that it is nevertheless the true rate of gain or loss which he incurs by new arrangements.*

Leaving the Committee's principle to have such weight as each reader may think it entitled to, and looking at the proposition of Sir Charles Trevelyan as applied to the existing officers of the army—the only view, we verily believe, in which it will be intelligible—the results will be in some degree attained by the following statement of the immediate changes which will be effected in the pecuniary position of some of the ranks. The income proposed for a Lieutenant Colonel is £1 a day, or a year, ... £365 0 0

Add relief from payment of subscription to the Band fund, present annual rate, ... 10 4 0

Total proposed income, *under all circumstances*, £375 4 0

The actual present pay of a Lieutenant Colonel at home is . . .	£310	5	0	
Non-effective allowance . . .	20	0	0	
Proportion of Prince Regent's allowance, estimated by War Office Committee at, per officer, . . .	7	6	4	
				£337 11 4

Annual gain of Lieut. Colonel, *at home*, by Trevelyan scheme, ... £37 12 8

* Sir Alexander Tulloch, in his judicious "Remarks" on the Tables of the Sub-Committee, when first laid before him, gives an apt enough illustration of the average principle. After showing, in two instances, the *true* effect of the proposed change in officers' incomes, he says, "Of what use will it be to tell them that others, who perhaps do not require it, will gain as much as they lose, and that on the average there may perhaps in some cases be a trifling advantage? As well might you tell a person on the point of starvation that he should not complain, because every person in the town had had on an average a fair allowance of food." *Proceedings of War Office Committee, p.* 19.

Thus far all is clear, but when the event which must happen to every Lieut.-Colonel, namely, service abroad, arrives, there is an end of computation. If he is ordered to India, in command, to a full batta station, his pay and allowances are at once quintupled; if not in command, quadrupled; if to a half batta station, in command, quadrupled; if not in command, trebled. If ordered to China, Ceylon, or Mauritius, pay is more than doubled in each case.* If to the other colonies, pay is augmented by the allowance of rations, varying in value according to the colony, and in each case their amount dependent on his being married or unmarried, with or without children, and more or fewer, according to the number and ages of such children. Rations, after deduction of the prescribed stoppages, may be valued in the West Indies at 8d., in the Mediterranean at 4d., and in the other colonies at 3d., a day. Assuming a Lieut.-Colonel in the first station, with a wife and four children, and two servants—no unusual or extraordinary numbers—this entitles him to nearly five rations a day, actual amount per annum, £56 15s. 6d. On the other hand, assuming the comparatively unusual circumstance of an unmarried Lieut.-Colonel, stationed at the Cape or New Zealand, this will entitle him to a ration for himself and one for his servant, at 3d. a day each, or annually £9 2s. 6d. The former officer is a loser by Sir Charles Trevelyan's scheme of £19 2s. 10d. a year, and the latter a gainer of £28 10s. 2d. This disproportion of course extends through the various ranks, and it will be noted that it is upon the instances where the allowance is most required that the heaviest loss is made to fall. In the case of Brevet Majors there is over and above the contingent losses of rations, &c., a *certain* fixed *pay* loss of £28 17s. 11d. a year, by the proposed reduction of pay from 13s. 7d. to 12s. a day, and Lieutenants of seven years standing are deprived of the 1s. a day additional, as compared with their junior comrades. The proposed advance in pay of the remaining subalterns covers the loss of all allowances, and they, consequently, are the only officers permanently benefited in income by the new rates of pay.

Such being the results, the indubitable and indisputable results of a comparison of the "proposed and present" rates of remuneration as applied to individuals, we would request any officer in any rank, quietly and carefully to examine them, and putting aside all references to average, apply them to his past, present, and prospective career, and say whether it is possible that, except in the unsupposable case of his whole service being at home, the proposed alteration could benefit him in a pecuniary or in any other sense. When he has answered this question in the only way that even Sir C. Trevelyan himself *thus far* must answer it, we would then ask him whether a slate or a scrap of paper, with some quarter of an hour's examination of each of the heads of change as they were taken down verbally from the proposer, would not have shown and satisfied any reasonable being that individually and collectively the nominal gain

* Sir Charles Trevelyan cannot have been ignorant of these immense pecuniary advantages, yet as he does not include them in any shape in his column of "present income," or allude to them in his evidence, the inference is that he understands them to be discontinued, and held as compensated by his all-saving scheme.

in pay was not only neutralized, but turned into positive loss throughout the army, by the withdrawal of allowances that had hitherto alleviated, in no inconsiderable degree, the privations consequent on the miserably inadequate pay as it stood. When our examining officer has answered these questions to his own satisfaction, let him turn his eyes or his reflections to the wife who has formed the solace of his otherwise monotonous existence, and the children whose future well-being is the constant wish and anxiety of his heart, and let him recollect the comparative consolation which he derived from the knowledge that, happen what might to him, they would be at least above destitution after his death. When this is done, let him be told that in addition to the abstraction from his scant pay and allowances during his life, these objects of his love and care are to be deprived before his eyes of all provision after his death, unless he is killed in battle, and then let him say whether he thinks such a proposition endurable, and whether any proposition emanating from such a source ought to be endured.

In the part of Sir Charles Trevelyan's evidence pre-arranged with Sir De Lacy Evans and Mr. Higgins (see question 4353), he vents a deal of misapplied reprobation of the bad economy of "giving less than the market rate of remuneration," as if the State went in to an officer market and cheapened them like beeves, yet here in his scheme, the fruit of so much cogitation and calculation, it is seen that he adds to the evil which he deprecates, by *reducing* the remuneration much below its existing standard! His friend, Mr. De Foublanque, might have shown him, as he afterwards did show him, that the outlay for the insurance which the abolition of the widow's pension would render indispensable, would alone more than absorb the whole presumed addition to the income.

The SECOND point of inquiry of the War Office Committee is the very important one of "the officer's prospect of promotion under Sir Charles Trevelyan's proposed scheme of voluntary and compulsory retirements, as compared with his prospects under the existing system;" and the result is, that he would attain the rank of Lieutenant at the age of 23 $\frac{1}{12}$ years, or 1$\frac{1}{2}$ *later* than the present average. Captain at 32 $\frac{10}{12}$, or 5 $\frac{6}{12}$ years later. Major at 45 $\frac{10}{12}$ or 8 $\frac{5}{12}$ years later; Lieutenant-Colonel at 50 $\frac{11}{12}$, or 8 $\frac{7}{12}$ years later. Major-General at 58 $\frac{6}{12}$, or $\frac{10}{12}$ years earlier. This great retardation of promotion, which is slower than that now reached even by non-purchasing officers, would be incalculably increased by the system of selection proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan and to the bitterness of disappointment and hope long deferred, that system would infallibly add a sense, in most cases well founded, of partiality and injustice. For our own parts, we believe that the retardation is much under-stated, and looking at the circumstances upon which promotion is to be dependent, the abolition of exchanges and half-pay retirement, we believe that in regiments long at home the result would be stagnation and inefficiency. The data upon which these computations are made are the rates of mortality,

the dates of arrival at Sir Charles Trevelyan's permissive and compulsory retirements and expected resignations, as compared with the effect of sales and commissions, exchanges, full and half-pay retirements, and augmentations, under the existing system. They are drawn from laborious examinations of various periods of 5, 15, 20, and 40 years of the line, the artillery, engineers, marines, and East India Company's army, and must be as accurate as any such estimates can possibly be. We of course can only refer to the Tables and observations of the Committee and of Sir Alexander Tulloch in his separate Report, exposing the utter baselessness of the whole Trevelyan scheme.

The THIRD head of examination of the scheme is that of the charge to the public of Sir Charles's full pay retirements, which he estimates at £210,622, but the Committee estimate at £512,271. This difference (£301,649) is shown to arise from the number of retirements provided being inadequate to meet the condition of retirement at the stated ages; that is to say, the numbers of the various ranks of and above Captain entitled to retire and retiring would, by calculation and experience of other branches of the service, be so much more than Sir Charles Trevelyan allows for, as to amount to more than double the expense estimated by him.

It being agreed on all sides that, in the event of the abolition of purchase, compensation, or rather re-payment, must be made to officers who have purchased, the Committee remark, in answer to the FOURTH head of enquiry, that the cost of this compensation has not been included in Sir Charles's financial Statement; but, computing that about one-third of the whole number would prefer retiring to remaining under his arrangements (in our opinion an absurdly low estimate), the amount would be £2,355,288, the gross actual regulation value of the commissions of officers serving in 1857 being £7,126,030.

To the LAST enquiry, "Would there be any, and if any, what expense thrown upon the War Office by the abolition of army agency?" the Committee answer, that "they are not prepared to say to what extent, but they believe that the additional expense would absorb a large portion of the saving estimated by Sir Charles under this head." We are enabled to give a much more conclusive and (with all respect) more authoritative and valuable answer to this question, from the Report of the House of Commons' Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure of 1850, in the following passage, at the conclusion of a comparative statement of the actual expense of army agency, and that which would be incurred were its duties performed by the public department:—"It thus appears that an expense of nearly £9,000 a-year beyond the present charge would probably be incurred by an alteration of the present system, and it is apprehended that a more extensive increase in the clerks of the public departments (with the prospective charge of superannuation) would result than is anticipated by the advocates of the abolition."

The general effect of the Committees' labours, which, it is to be remembered, were confined to the financial bearings of the question,

is to establish three distinct charges against the scheme:—1st. That instead of augmenting, as it professes to do, the incomes of officers, it would palpably diminish them, with the aggravation of destitution of their widows and orphans. 2nd. That, instead of improving officers' condition as to advancement in their profession, it would damage and retard it. And 3rd. That, instead of diminishing the annual public expenditure, it would largely increase it, over and above an enormous present outlay to lay the foundation of such increase. These three charges we deliberately assert are proved beyond the possibility of refutation, and we now come to Sir Charles's reply to the whole Report. Looking at the names and position of the individuals of whom the Committee consisted (Sir B. Hawes, Sir J. Ramsden, Sir Henry Storks, Sir Alexander Tulloch, Mr. Croomes, Mr. W. O. Marshall, and Captain Marvin), and at the enormous mass of calculations and argumentative discussion among themselves, and afterwards to the public, which they have produced, ordinary men might reasonably think that, as against one man who practically had no knowledge of the army or of army accounts, the conclusions of that Committee might have *a chance* of being the correct ones; but Sir Charles Trevelyan is no ordinary man, and it would be silly in us, recollecting his absolute ignoring and superseding of the opinions of the vast majority—we might say the whole—of the inquirers into the purchase system, from the Duke of Wellington downwards, it would, we say, be silly in us to suppose that he would give any weight at all to results differing from his (Sir Charles Trevelyan's) opinions, arrived at by the six individuals in the kingdom most competent to judge of the question at issue. Accordingly, he "entirely objects" to the whole Report; he "challenges the accuracy of statements contained in it founded upon figures unquestionable, and within everybody's reach, and he disputes conclusions drawn from data admitted by the Committee to be of an arbitrary nature." He commences this his "Statement of reasons for differing from the Report of the Committee" by a sort of introduction, which is little else than a series of misrepresentations and perversions. It would take too much time to particularize and refute them, but any reader previously acquainted with the state of the matters which are referred to, will easily discover *the truth*. They do not bear upon the immediate question at issue, but they are put forth in the view of misleading the reader into the belief of assumptions either totally untrue, or partially true only as he may concur in the absurd and extravagant opinions and contradictory conclusions of Sir Charles Trevelyan. The statement of the origin of the purchase system in a bankrupt Government's measures is an error of ignorance (somewhat contemptible in a man of Sir Charles's position and pretensions), but the *impression conveyed* that the State compelled officers to "provide their own pensions," that in the military service there are deductions similar to those which were made from salaries of the civil servants, and that the improvements in pay and position, effected in the medical and commissariat branches since 1857, have the relation to his proposals which he asserts they have; these are mere—Trevelyanisms.

His first objection to the Committee's Report that "it commences

by assuming that in the event of an officer being dissatisfied with the new conditions of service, he will be paid *the regulated price* of his commissions by the public," is really unworthy of notice, and should not have here received it, were it not afterwards magnified into a point. If the Committee had entirely ignored the existence of the extra prices, or had in their computation of values for or against Sir Charles's scheme, used the lesser sum to his disadvantage, or had in any way taken it preferentially into account, there might have been ground for complaint, although we entirely concur in the answer of the Committee that it would ill have become them in any stage of the discussion to have recognized as a basis of any computations, an illegal, variable, and uncertain estimate, "for which there was no authority beyond the assertion or supposition of an irresponsible individual, who adduced no facts or instances to support his assertion,"—but the Committee make no such use or any damaging use of the lower value, and it will be seen that one of Sir Charles's most violent charges against them is, that they do not take any value of commissions at all into their consideration in their estimates of gain and loss. But when in their Tables they compare purchasing officers' and non-purchasing officers' prospects, they always carefully note that they would be widely different, were the supposed current prices taken in lieu of the regulation. The objection is totally inapplicable to the statement, both in the position in which the Committee make it, and wherever else it occurs; they might have left it out altogether without affecting in the least degree the questions before them.

Sir Charles then complains that the mode of exhibiting his propositions is calculated to prejudice them, and he charges the Committee with an undue bias, and a spirit of partizanship, and attributes unfairness to their calculations. The charge of bias and partizanship can be founded only in Sir Charles's irritated feelings at the general explosion of his theories, and as to error or unfairness in the calculations, it will be found that the charge is applicable only to the Committee's conclusions, drawn from the principle of average; and therein the fallacy, we had almost said the folly, of that principle is conspicuous; it gives a shew of reason to Sir Charles's objections that Table I. is constructed upon the assumption of every officer being married and having children. Unfairness may be more justly charged against Sir Charles for suppressing, as he does, the explanatory observations of the Committee, stating that the losses to officers from the discontinuance of pensions to widows and orphans and of rations abroad, "*cannot* be accurately estimated," and that the sum named in their Statement represents rather the contribution that would be required from every officer of the rank, whether married or single, to make a fund whence pensions would be granted, than the amount of loss to individuals who had to provide deferred annuities for their widows and orphans. These observations neutralize the objections of Sir Charles to the deductions made by the Committee from computations upon the average principle; but in regard to the true loss sustainable by officers of all ranks and in all categories, the figures, as Sir Charles remarks, are (unluckily for him),

"unquestionable and within everybody's reach," and by adopting them we have shown that upon application to individual cases (the sole practical way of testing the point), the deductions of the Committee, so far from prejudicing the Trevelyan Scheme, fall enormously short of representing its true damage. Sir Alexander Tulloch's Report contains also similar specific statements, showing the ruin that would result to the poorer class of married officers from the scheme. In some remarks on the Report and Tables of the Sub-Committee submitted to him and afterwards adopted, he gives a Statement "to show how very fallacious is the doctrine of averages," in which it is placed beyond the possibility of question, that, under Sir Charles's scheme, a Brevet-major, with a wife and only two children, in a foreign station, where the ration is at only 5d. a day, would lose annually £80 1s. 10d.; a Captain, with the same family, £43 11s. 10d.; and a Lieutenant of seven years' standing, £23 8s. 4d. What would be their amounts at stations where the ration was 8d. a day, and with families of five or six children? Sir Charles, notwithstanding his challenge, does not meet the deductions drawn from these statements, and we defy him to overthrow a figure of them. He uses an argument in this branch of the subject that goes far to make us doubt whether he rightly understands the point to be ascertained. He says (besides contesting the correctness of the ration estimate on the strange grounds that officers often give them to the messman, and do not draw the number they are entitled to), the estimates cannot be correct because their amount gives a much larger sum than was actually disbursed for them by Government in a given year! "The Committee exhibit various sums, from £57 19s. 6d. for Lieutenant-Colonels of regiments in the tropics, to £9 2s. 6d. for Ensigns not in the tropics, as the average loss to officers from the discontinuance of rations. To test the accuracy of this calculation it is only necessary to apply these rates to the actual number of the officers of all the regiments of infantry of the line and of the colonial corps." And he gives a Statement in figures of the Committees' rates applied to the whole army (4,552 combatant officers), which shows that the amount required for these rates would be £56,768, whereas the actual cost was only £17,915; and, *therefore*, he says, the officers' loss would be less than a third part of that stated by the Committee. Now, in the name of Cocker and common-sense, does the officer the less lose his ration by the amount issued for it being spread over the whole army? And even on the average principle, how can the whole army be brought in as participators in a benefit when only about a fourth part of it is the recipient? Were this mode of reckoning correct, an officer's income in the colonies would vary with every augmentation or reduction of the army at home!—he would be poorer or richer according to the addition or reduction of a battalion! This may be exemplified in the other case, that of the "mess allowance" to which Sir Charles applies the principle. He says that the sum of £17,210, the expenditure under this head for the line, should have been divided as above, which would give £4 1s. 6d. as the loss to each officer, instead of upwards of £7, as stated by the Committee.

Now, in his Statement of saving to the public by the discontinuance, the sum of £21,110 is stated as the expenditure. In that year, therefore, the officers of regiments enjoying the allowance must have had proportionally better dinners than in the year now chosen, and would have lost proportionally more in money value had the allowance been discontinued!

But the cardinal point in this loss-and-gain part of the controversy is the taking into account or not as a gain to officers the "not having to pay for their commissions." Sir Charles says:—"As the chief advantage proposed for regimental combatant officers by the plan was the abolition of purchase, this ought to have been the principal element in the statement of gain or loss, whereas it has been entirely omitted. If ever there was a case of the play of Hamlet being acted with the part of Hamlet left out it is this;" and he afterwards shows how Hamlet ought to appear. The Committee reply in explanation that the Table (No. 1) in which Sir Charles says the Commission values ought to have been put, expressly refers only to officers now serving who had not purchased their commissions, and that, therefore, any reference to prices paid would have been entirely out of place. They further state that "a second Table had been prepared and printed" (and which they now produce), "showing what the result would have been by taking into account the saving of the regulated purchase-money; but as no allowance had been made for the extra pay and other advantages gained by the purchaser during the period by which he was enabled to anticipate his promotion, that Table was withdrawn, as the reasoning founded upon it would have been altogether fallacious, and the Tables A and B were substituted, showing the gain and loss by purchasing, after all these advantages were taken into account."

Restrained as the Committee considered themselves from entering into the question upon which the decision of this point must mainly depend, namely, the possibility of there being a gain attainable by the abolition of purchase, we think their reasoning, although weakened by that restraint, quite conclusive against Sir Charles's objection; and as in their original Report (page 5) they show not only that the item of the supposed money loss had been taken fully into their consideration, but state its average amount in figures, we think that on the mere technicality or arithmetical principle, Sir Charles's complaint is unfounded and unreasonable.

But this is by no means the only light in which the question is to be viewed, even in the commercial sense to which it is here confined. It is true that Sir Charles Trevelyan, throughout his evidence, and in this his answer, raves about the losses to officers, causing total ruin to themselves, and their families, and relations; but he at the same time shows that they are compensated by the general officer's pay and pensions, half pay, pensions to widows and children of all the military and naval bodies in the service—no small relief from losses—and he now makes the additional contradiction to loss being incurred, by showing that their outlay is a provision made by themselves for pensions on their retirement; still the question remains whether loss—definable money loss in a commercial, or in any sense

—is in point of fact incurred by officers in the purchase of their commissions, and, by consequence, whether its abolition would be a money gain. If a man buy a farm, or a shop, or a share in a mercantile adventure, or a living in the church, or a practice in a profession, or (*pace* Sir Charles Trevelyan) a civil situation, in the usual view of devoting his time and service to make a profit of it, upon which he may maintain himself and his family; if the property purchased, and the labour or service bestowed, do not make the expected return, there is a loss proportioned to the amount paid and the return expected; if the property fail to make any return at all, there is a loss not only of the capital—unless in so far as a re-sale may redeem it—but of the interest that the money invested would have produced in the funds, or on mortgage, or otherwise. But, on the other hand, if the property purchased produce the full expected return, and by the possession of it the possessor is put into a position to take advantage of some casualty that he could not have taken without having made such purchase, will any man in his senses say that he has sustained and continues to sustain a loss? And will the most acute quibbler that ever detected a flaw in a deed or an indictment show any, the slightest, difference between the latter case and that of an officer purchasing a commission? All incomes derived from labour or service, of which original capital is a necessary adjunct, may of course be held to be diminished by the interest which such capital would have produced without such labour or service; but this cannot be called a loss, for the plain reason that it is not lost, but kept with the addition to it of the increased rate of the new investment. It is never reckoned as a loss, and it is expressly disallowed in the Income Tax Act as a deduction from income. An officer, however, may most fairly point to the circumstance as a ground for claiming an increase of pay, or return for the service which he renders; and this was done in his behalf in 1833, by the Duke of Wellington, with whom the idea seems to have originated. We again refer to Sir Alexander Tulloch's Report, for further illustration of these arguments.

The War Office Committee have constructed two very laboured and ingenious, but in our opinion more curious than useful Tables, (A and B) shewing a comparison as to pay between the prospects of purchasing and non-purchasing officers, every item being reduced to its present value. They proceed, of course, upon the *average* of promotions and payments, and duration of lives, and shew that the purchasing officer, although gaining in every rank by a stated sum as over the non-purchasing officer, yet as he has had to pay a price for it, he loses by the difference between that sum gained and the price paid: thus, the present nominal value of the whole pay of an officer till he reaches General's rank, having purchased his captaincy only is £5,623
Of an officer who has purchased no step . . . 5,086

Difference in favor of the purchaser £537
But as to gain this advantage he has paid—deduct . 1,100
He is supposed to lose as compared with the non-purchasing officer £563

Sir Charles Trevelyan and his assistants seize with avidity upon this difference, as if it confirmed his absurd assumptions of the ruinous losses incurred by the whole army through the purchase system, entirely overlooking the gain of the £5,086 to the non-purchasing Captain for nothing; but independently of what has been said as to the impossibility of a purchase which pecuniarily gains its end being a loss, the contingent advantages gained by the purchasing officer, such as the probability of the higher scale of pay in India, Mauritius, and Ceylon, in the higher rank, staff employment assignable only to the higher rank, greater chance of honours, increased share of prize money, and increased pension to widow and family, are so obvious that they neutralize the whole of the so-called loss, and, still speaking commercially, turn the investment into a pecuniary gain by at least the £537 in the Captain's case, and still more in the higher ranks. In like manner, Sir Charles puts prominently forward the result of Table B, shewing upon the same *average* principle as in Table A, that an officer intending to purchase all his commissions would lose when arrived at General's rank £1,416, but he omits to state this is only *in comparison* with an officer who had determined to purchase none; and he takes care to avoid all mention not only of the above countervailing advantages (which of course would be increased by the more rapid rise in rank), but to what is more immediately to the purpose, the Committee's explanatory statement that in 1856 there were only twenty-four Lieut.-Colonels in the line who had purchased all their commissions (and there was probably an equal number who had purchased none); and that taking the *fact* of the actual total regulation prices paid, the sum paid by each purchasing officer was £942, "whence the proportion of the present value of average loss to each purchasing officer probably does not exceed £297."

Whatever may be thought of the correctness in principle or in detail of the calculations which give these results, whether they extinguish or do not extinguish the whole pyre raised by Sir Charles Trevelyan, and all its mighty emanations, they indisputably shew that the "not having to pay for their commissions," was a most prominent object of the consideration of the Committee. But although we concur with them in their answer that to have included it in the Table No. 1, as a specific gain would have been "entirely out of place," we think they might have bestowed a little more reasoning to show the impossibility of treating that portion of their enquiry otherwise than they have done. As we understand Sir Charles Trevelyan, and as he most undoubtedly means to be understood, the abolition of the purchase system, combined with his plan, will be a pecuniary boon equivalent in all respects to the relief from a compulsory annual tax, equal in amount to the interest of the money which the respective commissions of officers have or would have cost; that is to say, every regimental officer, intending and non-intending purchaser, from Ensign upwards, will have in his pocket the interest of the price of his first and every succeeding step and steps as they severally come to him. No doubt the cessation of any payment, or of any retention from income in the shape of interest

that would otherwise accrue, is an intelligible and legitimate gain, just as in the instance of the band subscriptions, their proposed withdrawal is properly put down under that head by the Committee, but is there any the most remote analogy between this withdrawal of a specific annual tax and the investment of money giving a return of more than 20 per cent., and are there two sane men in the world who look upon a voluntary, nay, an eagerly sought and competed for purchase, as a tax, an acquisition pecuniarily profitable and morally gratifying, as a loss; such acquisition retained, and always realizable at its original value by the possessor? Admitting all the farcical horrors imputed to it by the one man, will the other fail to see that it is still a gain, still money's worth for money? Sir Charles Trevelyan is no fool, and no man knows better than he that all this outcry about loss to officers from purchasing their commissions is (in the phrase of one of his Aides) "sheer nonsense." No man knows better than he that if, as is well remarked by Sir Alexander Tulloch, "the purchasing officer gave his money for nothing, the system would long ago have come to an end," and moreover, no man has more violently than he denounced it *as a profit* and an advantage, although he is pleased always to state it as such at the expense of the non-purchasing officer and the public.

Sir Charles, however, leaves no doubt of his meaning and intention with respect to the value of this "not having to pay for their commissions," for he takes the amount of the regulation prices actually paid at a given date by the whole purchasing portion of the army, viz., £4,742,280, and, "adding to it one half for the difference between regulation and current prices," he says that the annual interest of this sum (£7,113,520), at 5 per cent., together with the premium necessary to secure repayment of the amount to those interested in it, should have been divided among the officers of the different ranks. Verily, "the Table," as Sir Charles truly says, "would then have shewn a very different result, even if the other elements of the calculation had remained the same." Taking the average premium at the very moderate rate of 4 per cent, the annual credit from the whole would be £640,200, which, divided among 5000 officers, would give to each about £128 a year in addition to his pay, or if divided, as more probably is meant, in proportion to assumed payments from the different ranks, the Ensign would have £60 15s., and the Lieutenant-Colonel £607 10s. a year; and these sums, and proportionally for the other ranks, Sir Charles Trevelyan deliberately thinks ought to have been put in a column headed "Gain by not having to purchase their commissions," in a table composed strictly of solid, tangible sums of money, shewn to be actually gained and lost from his propositions, by officers "*who have not purchased any of their commissions!*"

Waiving the demonstration of the absurdity of such an idea, and assuming it to be applicable at all, it must be applied either to the present or to the succeeding generation of officers. If to the former, we persuade ourselves (not without hesitation) that even Sir Charles will admit that with regard to officers who have not purchased, and have not the intention or means of purchasing, human

ingenuity must fail in showing how *they* can be gainers by not having to purchase their commissions. To this class, consequently, probably two-fifths of the whole number, for whose benefit, almost exclusively, the new scheme is devised, there remain only the results of it without the assumed counterpoise. They are therefore doomed to deprivation, 1st.—Of their power of immediate realization of the value of the commissions which they hold, or may hold; that is, of receiving a large capital which they never invested, and absolute freedom from future service. 2nd.—Of all advantages from foreign service in the shape of higher pay and ration allowances; and 3rd.—Of the consoling knowledge that in the event of their deaths their widows and children will be provided for by the State. From their sufferings from these deprivations they have no relief in the prospect of early promotion, half-pay, exchange, or security against being passed over through interest or favoritism. They must stagnate to a stated age, when they will receive a life pension not exceeding what they, under the present system, obtain at any time by sale of their commissions. There will then, however, arrive a *solatium* which Sir Charles Trevelyan will be the last man in the world to admit, but which he and all the world with him cannot prevent, namely,—purchase. The poor defrauded officer will receive compensation by becoming a marketable article, as the period of his optional retirement arrives; wealth will easily find its way to accelerate promotion in a much more pernicious degree than under the existing system.*

But there is another class of officers to whom, if it were possible, the gain from not having to purchase commissions would be still less applicable, namely, those for whom there are no commissions to purchase, the Lieutenant-Colonels, purchasers or non-purchasers. Their power of "losing," and, consequently, their future exemption from obligation to lose is exhausted. They are to be allowed the option which they and all purchasers have at all times had (non-purchasers, also, at stated times) under the existing system, of retiring on repayment to them of their outlay for their commissions; but they must decide immediately to take it, otherwise their right is forfeited, and they are reduced to the diminished income and blighted prospects of the non-purchasing officer, with an unprovided for wife and family. There remain, therefore, of the whole body of regimental officers to be by possibility benefited by not having to purchase their commissions, the Majors, Captains, and Subalterns intending to purchase; and supposing their next steps immediately within their reach, or even within their reach equally early as at present, it is not to be denied that not having to pay for them would be a gain of the usual price; but it being allowed (with bitter unwillingness) by Sir Charles Trevelyan himself, that the purchase system accelerates promotion, its cessation must consequently retard it, and the Committee show that the scheme will have this effect in the degrees which we have already quoted. Our belief is, that these degrees are far within the limit of retardation which the absence of purchase would occa-

* See the unanswerable statements to this effect in the Committee's observations on Sir Charles's letter, pages 2 and 3.

sion; but, assuming them as they stand, they show an absolute pecuniary loss to purchasing officers, by prevention of profitable investment of their money—a Major of £34 per annum, a Captain of £38 12s. 1d., a Lieutenant of £59 15s. 5d., and an Ensign of £15 16s. 3d.,* to say nothing of postponed advancement in rank and position, loss of allowances, and chances of honours and preferences.

It is thus arithmetically proved, and we really do not think it will be disputed by Sir Charles Trevelyan himself, that the only officers who by possibility can be permanently affected by the abolition of purchase, namely, those who have money in their pockets to take advantage of it, will absolutely be losers by the deprivation of investment in their profession, and this without taking into account the many chances of getting the purchasable step without outlay, from death-vacancies, or augmentations.

Whence, then,—we ask both the Committee and Sir Charles Trevelyan—whence the gain to officers from not having to purchase their commissions? By what conceivable process of arithmetic or computation could a present value be calculated upon a non-existent quantity, the gain to a Lieutenant-Colonel from not having to acquire what did not exist to be acquired by him; to an inferior officer from not having to do what he never had and never would have the means of doing; or to another who with ample means, suffered a positive loss from not being able to invest these means in the advantageous way that his brother officers and he, to a certain extent, had already done.

Having shown the baselessness of the idea that not having to purchase their commissions can reasonably be imputed as a pecuniary gain to the existing officers, there remains the inquiry as to its feasibility as applied to a future generation of them. This requires a

* A Major purchasing a Lieutenant-Colonelcy receives additional pay and command money, at 4s. a day . . a year, £73 0 0
But pays £1,300, which at 3 per cent. is . . . 39 0 0

Purchasing Major gains, £34 0 0

A Captain purchasing Majority receives additional 4s. 5d. a day. . . . . a year, £80 12 1
But pays £1,400, which at 3 per cent. is . . . 42 0 0

Purchasing Captain gains, £38 12 1

A Lieutenant purchasing Captaincy receives, additional, 5s. 1d. a day. . . . . a year, £92 15 5
But pays £1,100, which at 3 per cent. is . . . 33 0 0

Purchasing Lieutenant gains, £59 15 5

An Ensign purchasing Lieutenancy receives, additional, 1s. 3d. a day. . . . . a year, £22 16 3
But pays £250, which at 3 per cent. is . . . 7 10 0

Purchasing Ensign gains, £15 6 3

considerable stretch of imagination. It implies the lapse of some twenty or thirty years, during which the Trevelyan scheme has been in full operation, and the army officered by the race of half paupers and half prigs that will have displaced the present gentlemen and soldiers. We do not know that this whole question of gain by not having to purchase their commissions could be better settled at a blow, as it were, than by putting it to a practical solution with the army in that state. If the alleged boon be not an out and out delusion, a fanciful something created out of nothing, it must have some rateable value at some period of an officer's career; it must in some way or other be convertible into pounds, shillings, and pence. Now could any mockery be more gross than to tell an officer in these non-purchasing, or in any times, that against his loss of non-effective and ration allowances, and his wife and children's prospects of maintenance before and after his death, he must put so much a year, added to his pay, by not having had to pay for his commissions! The whole idea is too absurd for argument; to put a negative quantity, a non-obligation to pay (what by the way there is no obligation to pay), as an offset against a positive abstraction, never before entered into the head of an accountant or a calculator, and in the sense in which Sir Charles Trevelyan now puts it, never entered into his own head till now that it has been discovered to him, that instead of adding to he has abstracted from the incomes of officers by his scheme.

But Sir Charles extends the idea still further in his disposal of the Committee's objection to the very inadequate amount which he fixes as the expense of the retiring pensions. He says, that "these retirements are intended to be substituted for those which at present take place by the sales of commissions. If, therefore, my plan is debited with this large annual amount as against the State, it ought also to be credited with it in favor of the officer. After deducting £60,000, the cost of the present full pay retirements, the average gain to each officer from the remaining £360,000 a-year, ought to have been shown in the Table!" That is to say, he is first to receive it as income during his service, besides having his annual quota of the seven millions which he has not had to pay for his commissions, and then to receive it a second time in the life pension paid to him on retirement! These are no strained or perverted deductions, but the palpable results, as any reader may satisfy himself by a moment's examination, of Sir Charles Trevelyan's postulates.

Among the sources of advancement of which the Trevelyan proposition will deprive officers is that of exchanges, which the Committee estimate as probably benefiting them to double the amount of death vacancies; and considering that in the latter casualty the steps are gained in one regiment only, while in the former they apply to two, we are inclined to think their estimate correct. Sir Charles and his assistants look upon this statement of the Committee as "sheer nonsense," an "evident confusion of ideas," "a completely fallacious argument, which cannot bear a moment's discussion;" and they state to their own entire satisfaction, as well as

to every reader's who knows anything of the matter, that all the exchanges in the world would not afford one single promotion. The Committee's answer is conclusive. "As regards the effect of exchanges in accelerating promotion, adverted to at page 14 of the letter, it is true that exchanges of themselves do not create promotion, *nor have the Committee asserted that they did so*;* but the mode in which these exchanges operated was clearly pointed out in the paragraph of their Report quoted in the letter, and to which they adhere." The singular part of the case is that Sir Charles, in stating it, absolutely gives the whole effect which the Committee claim for exchanges. "The only effect of the shifting process would be that promotions would fall on other individuals than it would have fallen upon if no change had taken place in the order of succession." Undoubtedly so; and is not this an enormous benefit? Its effect in the frequent case of the augmentation for India, the less frequent of death vacancy and general augmentation, may be extensive promotion in each rank to officers, who, without the exchange, would have remained unpromoted, possibly, to the end of their career. Sir Charles says that the Committee do not perceive that their remarks against his plan of selection apply equally to exchanges. Sir Charles "does not perceive" that the difference is literally extreme: the effect of selection is to keep down, and most probably unjustly, every officer above the selected; the effect of exchange is to raise up every officer under the exchanging. Sir Charles, not content with extinguishing exchanges as creating promotion, which nobody ever said they did, says further that they have the effect of retarding it; he means that by being an escape from misconduct, which would compel an officer's resignation or dismissal, they prevent the vacancy that would thereby be made. Exchanges are excellent provisions for very many cases, and we entirely concur with the Committee that to abrogate them would be a most unnecessary hardship and injustice; but, like charity and many other excellent things, they may be, and, no doubt, are, sometimes abused. To attribute this nefarious effect to them, however, is a simple assumption that two or rather four officers will separately declare a falsehood, for Sir Charles ought to know that previous to granting the required permission, the regulations prescribe that the officers commanding, as well as the exchanging officers, must sign and certify a declaration, "stating that the exchange recommended does not originate in any regimental proceeding of any kind, or in any cause affecting the honour and character of the officers, and that there are no grounds of personal objection which have in the smallest degree induced an application for such exchange." Moreover, Sir Charles ought to know, and we believe does know, that officers are not, as he says, "now *permitted* to purchase and exchange;" they are expressly *prohibited* so doing under penalty of cashiering and prosecution for misdemeanour.

In all these discussions, it suits Sir Charles Trevelyan's purpose,—and, alas, he thinks that sufficient justification,—always to represent

* Sir Alexander Tulloch expressly says "Promotion is also materially facilitated, *though not absolutely created*, by exchanges or removals."

urchase as a compulsory impost, instead of its being, as he well nows, an optional privilege. Regarded in this, its true light, all is abuse and denunciation of it as a robbery, an impoverishment nd the source of all sorts of possible and impossible damage to its ossessors, are ridiculously misplaced. It is silly to state as an nswer to this, even if the statement were true, that the privilege is ossessed at the expense of those who possess it not, that it im-edes advancement to all but those "who have large balances at heir bankers;" this confirms rather than confutes what is the point t present under consideration—the existence of the privilege; esides, the non-possessors of it enjoy its advantages. Even the rgument of its being an impediment to the advancement of merit s futile as against its value to officers who exercise it, however easonably it might be urged as a hardship on individuals. If the hallow declaimers against what they do not understand would livest themselves of the ignorant and vulgar prejudice with which hey start on their inquiry, and inquire a little more deeply, they would see that the purchase system, whether it be or be not, as they re pleased to call it, vicious in principle, opposed to the spirit of the ge, derogatory and prejudicial, is unquestionably a valuable some-hing attached to a certain position in the body politic, and as such, leprivation of it, as proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan, is a simple obbery of their professional and patrimonial rights. It is giving hem an option which they already possess at their own discretion, with the alternative of permanent forfeiture in case of refusal.

If, unfortunately for our readers, we were as unrestrained as the Committee and Sir Charles Trevelyan by consideration for their atience and our own space, we might extend our examination to the emaining points of the controversy, but they are of minor im-portance, and the limits necessarily assigned to our subject are ex-hausted. We cannot leave it, however, without protesting in the trongest manner against the waste of time, labour, and money en-ailed upon the country by these Parliamentary Military Com-missions of enquiry; they smother instead of promoting reforms, nd pre-eminently this upon the purchase system. The truly great Commission of 1840 so conclusively and so satisfactorily disposed of hat question, that re-opening it was as unnecessary as it has proved bortive. It was a mere continuation of the *system* of truckling nd evasion which we have so often reprobated and denounced as he substitute for real improvement, such improvement as, if it were truly intended, would be announced and acted upon under a General Order from the Horse Guards.

The agitation that brought about this nonentity of 1856 is said n certain circles, we know not how truly, to have originated in the wounded feelings of a notorious *anonyme* of the newspapers at his rejection by the officers of the Life Guards. The honourable and gallant member for Westminster took it up as a popularity bait, nd afterwards made it an election cry; Lord Palmerston in the same spirit, but with diametrically opposite convictions, granted the commission: the agitators procured the powerful and imposing aid of Sir C. Trevelyan, who pre-arranged with them and produced that

prodigy of arrogant assurance and absurdity called his Evidence and the financial scheme, which, after occupying the time and attention of some dozen of public servants for the best part of a twelve month, has broken down so miserably. After all, with all its assumed originality and factitious importance, it is an idea that must of necessity have occurred to any man who thought of the consequences of the abolition of purchase; a realization, with the addition of diminished income, of the alternatives which the Duke of Wellington said would be the "inevitable result" of such abolition, namely, "an enormous retired establishment at the public charge, to furnish a provision for the worn-out officers, or to leave the Commissions of the Army in the hands of those incompetent to discharge the duties attached to them."

ADMIRAL HOPE IN THE PEIHO RIVER.

It is always an easy and popular task to glorify a success and heap praise upon the victors, but interest and patriotism, no less than generosity, require us to be at least just to the defeated.

Merit and gallantry of the highest order must not be measured by the vulgar and often fallacious test of a single result, and if Admiral James Hope is so far "shelved" for the failure at the Peiho, why should not Nelson have been so for the equally disastrous and still more damaging defeat at Teneriffe? All that has been said about "rashness" in one case would equally apply to the other; yet England could better afford the loss of life (ninety-seven men sunk in the "Fox" tender, and forty-four killed in action) than the loss of those bright pages in her history which record Copenhagen, and the Nile, and Trafalgar.

Admiral Hope was not an untried man, whom we must judge, for want of antecedents, by this isolated affair. He had established a character for judgment and resources, as well as daring, years ago; and we must remember not only this gallant defeat of the Peiho, but the brilliant success due mainly to *his* skill and devotion at the Obligado.*

* Two anecdotes of Admiral Hope, well known to many naval men, throw light upon what may well be called a noble character. At the battle of the Obligado, in the Pasana, he commanded the Firebrand. The progress of the flotilla was arrested by a line of small vessels moored across the river, secured to each other by chains, and covered by the enemy's artillery and musketry. Hope, seeing that the small craft (English and French) were unable to force their way through, and had suffered much from the enemy's fire, took his own boat, and, carrying his armourer with him, proceeded to the line of vessels. Passing a small English vessel, commanded (I think) by Lieutenant Reginald Levinge, which, after gallant exertions, had drifted away disabled, Hope pulled alongside and took in a few of the crew, *that they might share the credit of his enterprise.* With these volunteers, grateful for his notice of their gallantry, he then reached the bridge or boom, and, undeterred by a heavy fire, coolly set about the work of severing the chains, spars, and lashings, which he at last effected. To this coolness on his part, and quickness of eye, the success of the day was owing. Some years afterwards Hope was offered the "Good Service Pension," which his standing on the list in services fairly entitled him to. He *declined it*, saying that other officers with equal claims needed it most. These are not the traits of an ordinary character. He gained the gold medal as cadet at Portsmouth College.

If he was too modest to claim his full share in the victory, let us not rob him of his well-earned reputation because he has been unfortunate. We have prudent chiefs enough, not likely to waste British blood or Chinese either; but we have few James Hopes—few men equal to him in natural abilities, acquired knowledge, or in the moral elevation of a character which may be truly called heroic. This may look like partiality, but the fact is, that no one personally intimate with Admiral Hope *can* speak or write of him without enthusiasm, because it is the nature of such a character to excite it. He is no ordinary man, either in respect of the courage and fortitude which none can deny him, or of those high mental endowments which the public will hardly associate with imprudent rashness. In the eyes of many he is now, perhaps, the desperately brave but thoughtless and not very judicious officer. How unlike the real James Hope—the patient, thoughtful, industrious man!—the only naval officer of his day, perhaps, who, bent upon improving his great natural abilities to the utmost, actually studied at Cambridge, and took his degree there, after acquiring all that was taught at the senior department of Portsmouth College.

Let us look, however, at the facts of this defeat, so far as they are known, and the strictures upon the chief assumed to be blameable for it.

As already said, Admiral Hope was no unknown or undistinguished man, but had won his C.B. not when orders fell in showers upon all who had been within certain geographical limits at a certain time, but for his individual merits upon a scene not unlike the Peiho. He had borne a distinguished part in the remarkable river expedition of the Pasana, and had learned what success may await a trifling British force when opposed to less warlike races.

Now, setting aside the first crude attacks made on Admiral Hope before any particulars were known, we come first to the charge that he thought very lightly of his enemy. Of course *this* is true, or he would have been mad to attack them, and so would all his successful predecessors, Sir W. Parker, Lord Gough, Sir W. Symonds, H. Keppel, and all others who made war in China. Nothing but a settled belief in the superiority of British prowess would rescue our attacks upon an empire of 300,000,000 souls from the imputation of frantic folly.

Admiral Hope, then, it may be conceded, assumed as certain the superior gunnery of his own flotilla, and further believed the Chinese to be what they had invariably proved on former occasions. He expected their gunnery to be bad, because it always had been so; it proved the reverse, as we all know now, and as Admiral Hope would have known had he been a prophet; but this sudden proficiency involves a mystery which possibly Russia might solve. To despise an enemy without reason is foolish, but the admiral who assumes the equality of a Chinese enemy ought, logically, to decline engaging them, except with an equal or superior force. How long should we tolerate such an admiral? In the second place it has been (very rashly) asserted that Admiral Hope did not sufficiently reconnoitre the enemy. From the only authentic evidence, the Admiral's

despatch, it would seem that every practicable reconnaissance had been made by sea, and, under the circumstances, none could be made by land. Now, does the sequel show any evidence of the "surprise" first reported?

Lastly, the *Times* affirms that the land attack should either have been made by proceeding up the river to "the upper end of the line of defences," or delayed until next morning.

Of the obstacles to the first proceeding, as well as its assumed advantages, we are at present equally ignorant, and it is charitable to suppose that the admiral on the spot, assisted by army and engineer officers, judged better than we can.

The reasons for not delaying the attack until morning was, probably, 1st. The sinking state of several vessels. 2nd. The chance of the enemy's receiving reinforcements, repairing his works, and recovering his confidence. 3rd. The danger of daylight revealing the smallness of the attacking force. Other reasons may have existed to over-rule the general objections to night attacks; and it must be further remembered that the gallant Admiral, when wounded and weak from loss of blood, had been forced to give up the more immediate command of the squadron at 4·20 p.m. to his second in command.

Much, however, of which we now know absolutely nothing, might no doubt, be alleged "pro and contra," if we knew all the facts. At present, one figure is proudly though painfully prominent in the scene—the figure of the wounded but still resolute Admiral, struggling to the last.

If the commander who fights gallantly is to be condemned because he fights unsuccessfully, we may have very *safe* admirals, but we shall have no Nelsons. *Bold* enterprises imply, of course, the possibility of a reverse, and the same "dash" which was so fatal at Teneriffe was crowned with glory at the Nile. Let us cherish high courage though defeated to-day, and we may have to salute it triumphant to-morrow. But the country does not deserve victory which is ungenerous to defeat.

We can spare the Chinese one victory—the hour of retribution cannot be far off; but rather let our defeat go for ever unavenged than that we should call upon foreigners to avenge us! Heaven forbid that, as suggested, we should only supply France with transport, and ask *her* troops to go out and avenge our disaster! It was bad enough to have our allies asking in Sebastopol, "Que font ces Anglais dans *notre* ville?" but to see our Ambassador escorted to Pekin by French troops, and perhaps assigned French sentries under the shadow of his French colleague's house, would be too much. No defeat could equal *that* humiliation. No doubt our allies will be ready to earn another "salvage medal," and only anxious that our usual official slowness may give them the opportunity. But we have troops in India, and ships, too, enough to manage our own battles. Our sailors know how to retrieve a defeat, and, in spite of home critics, would follow their gallant Admiral with unabated confidence and esteem.

THE SEIKHS FOR CHINA.

In times like these, when wars and rumours of wars are unfortunately too prevalent, when no country knows how soon its turn may come for being engaged in the horrid strife of nations; it behoves each nation and kingdom not only to be prepared, but to make the best use of the means at its disposal to render war if not impossible, of as little duration as possible; and thus to teach the aggressor, be he a potentate of European, Asiatic, or other Continental origin, that might neither makes right, nor that the weak can be oppressed with impunity.

One year ago who imagined that France and Austria would have met and measured their strength on the banks of the Ticino, or that in one summer's day fifty thousand men would have been victims to an Emperor's ambition? One year ago, who would have supposed that Austria and France would have concluded the war, and that Sardinia's king would be forced to refuse the sovereignty of kingdoms which, in the confusion of affairs, had become kingless? —not because the dream of liberty would be unaccomplished, but because his master willed it otherwise. One year ago, who would have prophesied war between Spain and Morocco, or our having to demand an explanation from Spain for insults offered at Tarifa? One year ago, who would have imagined that the possession of a small island commanding the entrance to Vancouver's Island, and thus to our newly-found gold mines, would lead to ill-feeling between us and America, and cause vessels of war belonging to both nations to assemble in that bay, and, for aught we know, have a trial of strength? Then, who would have believed that the result of the transfer of India to the Crown would deprive her of many thousand trained soldiers, that through the blundering obstinacy of an incompetent official, a question of justice and right should be misunderstood, and finances already breaking down under the enormous pressure, be still further weakened by the expenditure of half a million of money. Lastly, who would have thought even six short months ago, that nearly 500 of our countrymen would have fallen victims to Chinese treachery; and instead of having our Ambassador at Pekin, and the flag of England floating proudly high up in the waters of the Peiho, we should know that three of our gunboats had been sunk therein, and our ships, seamen, and soldiers routed and vanquished? Yet such it is, and to regain our name—to prove to the treacherous Chinaman that treaties are sacred, must be the duty of England, and in this short paper we will point out where the means may be found.

The *Times*, in a leading article written immediately after the news of the disaster had arrived, called attention to the use that a wise governor might make of those soldiers now taking their discharge from the Indian Army; and that by the offer of a bounty, many, if not all, would be induced to volunteer for China; but this we fear will not be done. We have seen enough of Lord Canning's management of the affairs of India, to know that at his hands nothing for that country's benefit will arise. Let India perish. Let every

soldier, sailor, or civilian in China be in peril of his life, and even then, would a determination once made by the Governor-General not be changed to avert the danger. We have seen the Governor-General of India prove himself unfit to cope with a difficulty close at hand. We shall find him utterly incompetent to manage a somewhat similar trouble further away.

Let England act entirely for herself in the present difficulty, not leaving anything to the decision of the governing powers in India, but issue such orders as she thinks fit, and make her Governor-General responsible for their being carried out in their integrity. The European force of the late Company cannot all have left India before orders regarding them may be sent, and let these orders be obeyed by Lord Canning. If bounty will induce the men to volunteer for China, then let bounty be given, and let them as regiments be at once added to her Majesty's line, their services to be available for every quarter of the globe. Such officers as may choose to give up advantages supposed to exist in the Indian army to be allowed to attach themselves to them. The necessary sergeants, corporals, &c., could be obtained partly from other regiments willing to go to China, and from among the men themselves, formerly holding such positions in the Company's "service," character rolls being easily obtainable from the Adjutant's office. "Where there is a will there is a way," and if the Secretary of State for India will insist on his orders being obeyed, there may, ere long, be a well-trained and useful body of English soldiers ready to avenge the treachery of a treacherous nation.

India is a land of soldiers, and can furnish more than sufficient to conquer the whole of China. With the numerous warlike tribes to be found from Caubul to Calcutta, surely an army can be raised large enough to put us independent of France. Surely our Seikhs, Pathans, and Goorkhas are better than Turkos, Algerian Zouaves, and hastily-collected conscripts; and yet we hear that France is to send the army and we find the ships; in fact, to play second fiddle to *the Empire*. Many would have supposed we had had enough of this in the Crimean war. That the laurels and glory robbed from us there, and the suddenly concluded peace with Russia, would make us wiser; or that Sardinia's treatment would forewarn us of the danger in trusting to such an ally; but no, it is cheaper, and though the quality of the article may be inferior, yet it matters not so long as some slight success attends the proceeding.

The Seikhs as a body have fought well for us. They once fought well against us, and without leaders, proved the hardest foe we had ever before encountered in India. The rebellion in India showed them generally friendly to us, and their behaviour in action at Delhi, Agra, Lucknow, &c., &c., proved incontestably, that, second to English, *i.e.*, British soldiers, there was none like them. Good leaders and discipline will make regiments composed of the Seikh element little, if at all, inferior to anything that can be brought against them.

Their prejudices are very slight, and these would, we believe, break down on the man's removal from India. The Cow would lose her sanctity were her worshippers free from the Brahminism of Hindostan.

That the Seikhs have no objection to crossing the seas has been often proved, latterly in taking charge of the Pandies, and at an earlier period in the Burmese war. They are, moreover, as a nation, nomadic, and few things are more agreeable to the Seikh than wandering over distant lands. This love for change might now be encouraged, and the riches of Pekin promised to regiments volunteering.

In the present state of Indian finances, when the expenditure exceeds the income by millions, such an opportunity of reducing expenses should not be lost sight of. The native army, more particularly the Punjaubee portion, is far too numerous, and yet its reduction is no easy matter, and cannot be entered into without some danger to the State. To turn adrift men inured to fighting, well disciplined, and brave soldiers, to seek employ in agricultural pursuits, is in any land hazardous, but in India, far beyond such a term. The soldier learning his profession and his power in such a school as before Delhi, or under such leaders as Nicholson and Hodgson, is not likely, on being paid up and discharged to turn Corydon, and be content with driving his bullocks at the well, whilst the rich Kafila passes by unguarded and untouched. The bands of discipline will and do hold these men, but nothing else will, and when not employed for us, they may seek employ in other ways.

Ten thousand of these men could be easily spared, and under such leaders as Renny, Rattray, or Lumsden, teach the Chinese a lesson as one thousand years should not obliterate. Their pay must come from China, thus relieving India from pressure and all incidental expenses, to be carried to the debtor's side of the Chinese account. Their absence from India would for the present be an advantage, and on their return in more peaceable times, they could tell of England's power in other worlds, and of English prowess. In leaving India they would leave their prejudices behind, and in visiting lands far away they would learn that other nations besides those in Hindostan own our sway. The experience thus acquired would tend much to consolidate our power, and the would-be rebel or sneaking coward of the north-west provinces and Bengal hear, from other lips besides those of his white conquerors, that the Queen who rules over him has a territory on which the sun never sets.

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;
OR,
NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

England and America in the Pacific.—The disaster at the Peiho presents one redeeming feature, in the benevolent aid afforded to our wounded countrymen by the American squadron. We welcome it as a new proof that the old animosities of the two kindred nations have all but disappeared. Such exhibitions of good feeling, on the part of one or the other, have been frequent of late years; and form the noblest presage of the age. That both England and America may put away all petty jealousies, and draw closer and more close the bonds of brotherhood, is, indeed, devoutly to be wished. What can be more flattering to our national pride than to see a people who share our origin, speak our language, and maintain an advanced form of our institutions—who, in fact, are an offshoot from ourselves—proceeding on a course of greatness and prosperity only comparable with our own? And, on the other hand, America should learn to feel the same pride in the untarnished honour of the parent country, and regard any reverse or humiliation she may sustain, as reflecting in a certain measure on herself. So many interests unite the two nations, that such, we may hope, is the sentiment that will gradually spring up, if the present generation persevere in maintaining a good understanding. But here lies the danger. The animosities which it has required half a century to suppress, may, without our interposing, all be revived by some untoward incident, and carry down their bitter spirit to our children. Certainly, the provocation is more likely to come from America than England. On the frontiers of our respective territories, brother Jonathan is disposed to be a little overbearing, and manifests a great liking for his neighbour's vineyard. Wherever there is the smallest opening, he is sure to break bounds, evidently clinging to the Saxon tradition, that possession is nine points of the law. The seizure of the island of San Juan is only a new version of an old story. Our treaties with the United States, which ought to be framed on the sharpest model, always have a flaw, and this invariably leads to further dispute. Jonathan makes a Gordian knot of the "difficulty," and cuts it through with a bowie knife. In this case nothing could have been easier than to use precise terms; for the territory itself furnished to each power natural limits, which the treaty had only to name. After it had been determined to make a deflection from

the 49th parallel at Vancouver's Island, the negotiators had their choice of two boundaries, the Canal de Haro which washes the shores of Vancouver, or an outer channel, cut off by a group of islands, of which San Juan is one. This is the Strait of Fuca, and laves the mainland. The wording of the treaty would imply that it is here the boundary line should be carried, especially mentioning the channel that divides Vancouver from the mainland; but it is contended that the inner channel, rather than the outer, effects this separation. If such were the boundary intended, would not the treaty have indicated the channel formed by the group of islands, instead of referring to the mainland? We shall, of course, adopt our usual policy of tamely surrendering our right; but it may be worth while for America to consider whether she has effected a settlement in a way consistent with her own dignity, or reconcileable with her obligations.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE PEIHO.—It is a novelty to sustain a defeat without disgrace, and to win a triumph without honour. The later accounts represent our disaster at the mouth of the Peiho as exactly fulfilling these conditions. Our repulse was not, as at first supposed, owing to a want of ordinary discretion in the Commander; and no one ever dreamt there was any flinching in our seamen. The most that can be laid to the charge of Admiral HOPE is, that he was a little too eager—a good fault in a sailor; and if our Admirals during the Russian war had been tarred with the same brush, the navy might have cut a better figure. It is true, Admiral HOPE was not successful; but the result, however lamentable, is nothing to be ashamed of. We fell into no trap; the strength of the forts, and the formidable character of the obstructions in the river, were clearly seen; and the resolution to force a passage was deliberately adopted. It is futile to say that the enterprise was attempted with an inadequate force; for, though this is literally true, our previous encounters with the Chinese had not prepared us for a stubborn resistance. We know what would have been said of Admiral HOPE if, after receiving from Her MAJESTY'S Ambassador a requisition to proceed, he had ignominiously turned his back on the enemy. Indeed, his despatch shows how near his force was to proving sufficient, and probably a couple of hundred marines would have turned the scale in our favour. The Admiral has been censured for making the attack late in the day, when his men were exhausted; but when we consider how dexterously the Chinese repaired during the night the damages they had sustained, it is by no means certain that any advantage would have been gained by waiting till morning. The truth is, our force proved too small for the object; but this was a contingency that could not be foreseen, and after rewarding so many Admirals for doing nothing, we may show indulgence to one who attempted a little too much.

At present, it is not known what steps the authorities are taking, or what plan has been formed, to retrieve our laurels, and, at the same time, inflict a signal retribution on the Chinese. Let us hope there is no truth in the report that we are to act in concert with a

large French force. Lord CANNING can afford to discharge 10,000 European soldiers, who almost alone held India against overwhelming odds; and surely, in this emergency, he may spare from the 400,000 that remain a sufficient force to read a severe lesson to the Chinese. It has been proposed to reorganize the European legion specially for this service; and though the objections to the arrangement are great—though the camel rather sticks in our throat—there seems no resource but to swallow it. A few line regiments, and a proportion of Sikh corps—not too large a number, would form an expedition sufficiently powerful to proceed to Pekin; and this might be dispatched without delay. If we are to wait for a powerful French force, we shall obtain small profit, and less glory; nor is it likely that our ally will leave the East till he has established, in too close proximity to our possessions, a permanent lodgement.

THE LAST ARCTIC SEARCH.—The fate of Sir JOHN FRANKLIN is known. The honour of this discovery is due as much to his noble widow, as to the hardy seamen by whom it was made. When Government abandoned the sacred duty, her affection and devotedness urged renewed efforts, and, with the last remains of her fortune, she fitted out this expedition. We boast of the great objects that are carried out in England by private enterprise, but history tells of no undertaking comparable with the equipment of the Fox yacht, and her daring and successful voyage. They unite in a sublime exploit the holiest instincts of woman and the highest aspirations of man. We record the success with which both has been crowned with peculiar satisfaction; for this journal stood almost alone in advocating the continuance of the search, and we pointed to the region yet unexplored as its obvious direction. A frail yacht bore twenty-three British seamen to this dreary spot. Their footprints through the snow, their course over the ice, their explorations of the last boundaries of nature—all are traced in the plain, unvarnished narrative Captain M'CLINTOCK has furnished to the Admiralty, and which will be found in another portion of our pages. The annals of navigation contain no chapter of equal interest, since the first voyage of COLUMBUS. That, indeed, was pursued over an unknown sea, but it was amidst summer waves, and with auspicious winds. Here what dangers, what terrors, beset every step! The elements in torpor or disruption, the ice packed in a field or broken into rocks, the treacherous floe and the rushing berg, in this awful region combine their horrors with a raging sea and the severest clime. But nothing could overcome the ardour of these brave men, who, uniting the limits of previous discovery, have, with surprising rapidity, completed the survey of the Arctic shores. Their gallant Commander pays a generous tribute to their exertions, especially mentioning Captain YOUNG and Lieutenant HOBSON, and we hope their meritorious services will not be left unrewarded by the Government. To Lieutenant HOBSON fell the enviable fortune of discovering the last vestiges of the lost expedition. What can be added to the thrilling account of his search? The emotion he must have felt at the lonely cairn, where he disinterred the evidence of FRANKLIN's death, has

been shared on every English hearth. We follow his footsteps with breathless interest till he unearths the last record, and comes upon the abandoned sledge-boat, and the frozen skeletons. How suggestive is everything here of the depths of despair, yet revealing, at the same time, the presence of human sympathy. We seem to see the drooping band part reluctantly with their exhausted comrade, but first secure him the best provision in their power. What a tale of anguish in that loaded gun, the heap of clothes, and the heap of bones beneath! Perhaps, a fate still more horrible befel the survivors, who, proceeding on their hopeless journey, dropped one by one on the way, with nothing to alleviate their last agonies, and none to bid them adieu.

THE AFRICAN SQUADRON.—Letters from the coast of Africa announce the death, by disease of the heart and lungs, of Captain SAUNDERSON, commanding H.M.S *Archer*. Commodore WYSE has given an order to Commander HEWETT, V.C., H.M. Steamer *Viper*, to take command of the *Archer*. This active officer, before leaving the *Viper*, captured a slaver under Spanish colours; and since he assumed the command of the *Archer* has effected the capture of two others. There were no slaves on board these vessels, but they were completely equipped, and a considerable sum in specie was obtained. Commodore WYSE has also captured a slaver. The *Viper* has gone to Ascension to repair her boilers.

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE AND GENERAL MACINTOSH.—The letters transmitted to us on the subject of the *Military Opinions* of Sir JOHN BURGOYNE, as compared with the prior reports of General MACINTOSH, cannot be inserted, unless they are authenticated with the name and address of the writers—which, however, are required only for our own information, and will not be published. The only letter that has conformed to this rule will be found under the head of *Correspondence*.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

ALMOST A HEROINE. By the Author of "Charles Auchester," 3 vols.

Almost a Heroine intimates that the standard is nearly reached, but not quite. Perhaps many will be better pleased with a character that, however good, is not better than themselves. Nature is never perfect, and the best dispositions have their blemishes. The author of the work before us seeks to hold up a mirror that will present the defects of the sex as well as their attractions. The story is rather involved, but its discursive character, carrying it out of the ordinary channel, gives it a charm. It exhibits a considerable knowledge of the world, fair powers of delineation, and on the whole, more than ordinary ability. Ernest Loftus is the son of a Roman lady, the widow of an Englishman; and finds himself under the authority of a stepfather, at an age when it is least supportable. His mother yields to his importunity to set him free, by dispatching him to an uncle in England who had offered to be his protector. Mr. Loftus, an English gen-

tleman of the old school, gives him a cordial reception, and after a time regards him with such evident favour, that he begins to look upon himself as his heir. At last, the uncle dies, and it is found that his property devolves on an old servant named John, while Ernest is left only twenty pounds. A mysterious box is ordered not to be opened for three years; and the faithful John, who belongs to a type of servants not, we fear, very common, wishes Ernest to remain in possession till the time expires. This, however, he declines, and quitting the ancestral roof, proceeds to seek his fortune. Chance brings him in contact with Lord Lyndfield, who appears to be an amateur physician—a novel pursuit for a nobleman, but which is very well supported, and gives a new aspect to the story. To him he makes a promise to shun a neighbouring cottage, and, of course, he is thrown in the way of its occupant, who proves to be a young lady of extraordinary beauty, and they form an attachment. He informs Lord Lyndfield of the fact, and too late discovers there is a fatal bar to their union. Other adventures follow, till, at length, the time has arrived for opening the iron box, when it is discovered that Ernest is the true heir, and that John only occupied his place till he reached a more sober age. Such are the outlines of this remarkable story, for which the reputation of its author will find many admirers.

Raised to the Peerage. By Mrs. Octavius Friere Owen. 3 vols.

The Peerage is still accounted the highest object of ambition. Walpole tells us it was made so cheap by George the Second, that it was impossible to spit out of window without spitting on a new peer, and, perhaps, we shall hereafter be told the same thing of Lord Palmerston. But, whether or not, there will be the same run on nobility. Here is a story illustrative of the national passion, or, as it would be more just to say, the fashionable weakness. The author makes it point a moral while it suggests a tale; and a light is thrown on the slippery steps by which the eminence is often attained. The story is well conceived, and pleasantly told, threading its way through a chain of incidents to the final scene. Some of the characters are powerfully drawn, and this may especially be said of Mrs. Sheffield, whose worldliness is the moving power of the tale. The wife of an opulent manufacturer, she still looks back on her aristocratic descent, and aspires to resume her connection with the peerage by obtaining its honours for her husband. In this object she succeeds, but, meanwhile, her only son has formed a *mesalliance* with a French singer, which for a time he conceals, though it comes to the knowledge of his mother, who, on his return home, takes means to prevent their meeting again. Darnley is prevailed upon to form an aristocratic alliance, but his heart is still with Estelle, and though fortune smiles, he becomes more and more unhappy. The same gloom surrounds his wife, whose death frustrates the views of Mrs. Sheffield, though, at the same time, relieving her son from the peril he had incurred by an illegal marriage. Darnley and Estelle again meet, when all is explained, and the future heir of the peerage, which Mrs. Sheffield was so desirous to ennoble, was traced to a foundling hospital. A story so full of action is sure to be a favourite; but this novel has higher merits, and may claim more than an ephemeral popularity. It appears to be the author's first work, and, as such, is a most creditable performance.

Wait and Hope. By John Edmund Reade. 3 vols.

Mr. Reade devoted the earlier portion of his literary career to the Muses, and some twenty years ago his poems were well known. He was the personal friend of the great poets of that period, whose names are a part of our literature. Great interest, therefore, was excited, some time since, by the announcement of a novel from his pen; not only because it gave us back

a familiar writer, but introduced him in a new field. Its publication was attended with such success, that it has encouraged the author to follow it up, and the result is another entertaining story. His diction and mode of treatment resemble those of James. The similitude, however, never suggests imitation; and we are always sensible of a picturesque colouring which is entirely his own. The present tale has some clever sea scenes, and they possess so much force and truthfulness, that they could only have been written by a close observer of nature. Mr. Reade's smugglers, indeed, are *bona fide* specimens who must have been photographed on the coast. As the class is now fortunately all but extinct, we may hope that the bold fellows who still follow such a lawless occupation, will be attracted to the Channel fleet, which, from all we hear, contains some worse characters. The author has turned to good account his knowledge of Italy and the Italians. Pearl, the heroine, is the daughter of an Italian lady, married to an English nobleman; and the fortunes of this family group, as unfolded in the tale, possess a romantic interest. The character of the mother is thoroughly Italian, and is most effectively brought out. The story embraces a fund of incident, and is at times powerfully sustained, leaving an impression rarely produced by ordinary works of fiction.

We have seen a very neat Writing Case, made by Parkins and Gotto, of 24, Oxford Street, to which has been awarded, by the Society of Arts, the Prize of £20 and a Silver Medal, for its weight, size, durability, and cheapness, over 62 competitors. To officers going on service, it will prove invaluable for its portability, while its cheapness, considering that it embraces every requisite for use, and is handsomely got up, is a marvel, the price being only 1s. 6d.; or, furnished, 2s.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

[With a view of promoting the interests of the Service, this department of the Magazine is open to all authentic communications, and, therefore, the Editor cannot hold himself responsible for the opinions expressed.—Ed. U. S. Mag.]

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

COAST DEFENCES.

To guard against the contingency of an attack upon our shores, the following suggestions are made:—

It is possible (considering the facilities which steam would afford to an enemy), that the Channel fleet might not arrive in time to prevent the landing of a hostile force. Military expeditions are now very quickly disembarked, and the delay of even a few hours might be almost fatal to us. Let 50,000 men be suddenly thrown upon our fertile shores, where foraging parties might easily find supplies, and the daring enemy might laugh at the floating armament arriving an hour or two after the disembarkation.

In these islands, there are many lines of railway which approach and skirt the sea coast. There are upwards of 100 towns and villages upon the coast accessible to these railways; and at or near most of these there are points along the line of railway where a long ranging gun might menace an approaching enemy.

Let the favourable points be selected. Three or four companies of engineers would erect several hundred earth-works at a small

expense, in the course of a few months. Upon these points, then, let a simple parapet without ditch be erected, and platforms laid. Then upon an alarm being given, a sufficient number of Armstrong's guns of largest calibre, with gunners and ammunition, might be whirled down from a depôt to the part of the coast threatened by the enemy.

To facilitate this arrangement, provide a number of trucks calculated for the transport of the new gun, constructed in such manner that the gun could be run on to the truck and shot off on to the platform of the battery. The line of rails might be laid down to the edge of the platform of the battery. By this means, with a little contrivance, the guns could be withdrawn from the battery and carried off with the utmost rapidity to another point. The following places might perhaps answer for the depôts of guns.

Woolwich	Liverpool	Dublin
Portsmouth	Newcastle	Belfast
Plymouth	Leith	Cork
Pembroke	Aberdeen	

The guns might be kept in readiness on the trucks, either in the sheds of the Railway Company or in others erected specially for the purpose.

In certain districts it might not be found impracticable to employ a kind of moving battery of light pieces. This might be constructed in the shape of a train of long carriages, containing each four or five breech-loading light guns, of which the recoil would not be considerable. The carriages might either be open or pierced with ports like the side of a ship. A locomotive battery of such a description, moving rapidly about, halting to load and fire, and darting off again, would in certain portions of our lines of railway prove an obstacle to the invader.

A rocket train might be formed upon the same principle.

Every possible advantage, it is evident, should be taken of the facilities of railway communication. For instance, it would be advantageous if a vast number of horse-boxes were constructed for the purpose of transporting horses suddenly to points menaced. A proper proportion of these, as well as trucks for the transport of field guns, should be kept at such stations as are nearest those places where Artillery and Cavalry are quartered.

On the alarm being given, guns might be sent to stations near menaced points by these means in any number.

Look-out posts might be established at intervals all along the coast, wherever telegraphic communication is possible.

Immediate notice of the sudden appearance of a hostile fleet would be given to the Horse Guards, and means of opposing a landing would be instantly despatched from the nearest depôts and stations.

Some distinct plan of resistance will, of course, be arranged— viz certain divisions to undertake the defence of certain portions of th coast, to be quickly reinforced by others when the *real* point of att ck becomes certain.

The facility of the above plans would, of course, depend upon the Government having the entire control of the railways and telegraphic wires of the United Kingdom, in the event of an invasion. If this

stipulation were not made, the railway stations would be besieged, and the trains loaded with countless numbers flying from the coast, and all hopes of offering prompt resistance to the invader would be at once annihilated. FITZGUNNE.

— —

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE AND GENERAL MACINTOSH.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

SIR,—In your number for July appears a letter from Lieutenant-General Macintosh, referring to his having first indicated the importance of the position of the Malakoff as the key to Sebastopol, and your August number contains a second letter from this officer, showing the identity of reports made to the authorities by him, with opinions afterwards furnished by Sir John Burgoyne, and just promulgated in Sir John's *Military Opinions*.

General Macintosh claims to have communicated to Lord Hardinge and Lord Raglan, the important information he had already laid before the Government respecting Sebastopol, prior to the despatch of the expedition; and, subsequently, to have again specifically called Lord Raglan's attention to the dominating situation of the Malakoff height at a critical period of the siege, when, in consequence, as may be inferred, of this communication, the attack of the allies was directed against it. The honour of indicating this attack has hitherto been attributed by common report to Sir John Burgoyne, on what ground does not appear; for it has never been claimed by himself; and as he has now permitted the claim of General Macintosh to pass unquestioned, we may presume that it is to this officer, and not to Sir John, that the merit really belongs. I must confess I am not dissatisfied with such a conclusion; for I have always considered it a reflection on the other officers of the Royal Engineers engaged at the siege, that none of them was able to make the discovery so patent to their chief, who had no better means of observation than themselves, not having seen the key of the position before it was concealed by the works.

With regard to Sir John Burgoyne's *Military Opinions*, as the book is composed chiefly of papers that have appeared in your pages, you may permit me to inquire whether the coincidences pointed out by General Macintosh, between his reports and Sir John's opinions, are to be regarded as accidental. Were such the case, the fact would constitute a curious incident in military science, testifying that our officers, instead of being the tyros they are usually described, possess an oracular accuracy; for here we find two General Officers of totally different arms struck in exactly the same manner, with all the varied characteristics of an entirely new country, and reporting the results of their survey to the authorities, if not in the same sequence, with the same particularity and minuteness. But, sir, we must not make a marvel of a very natural result. What are the facts? General Macintosh furnishes his reports to the authorities, and recommends that "scientific officers of engineers" should be sent out to Turkey to make a further inspection. His suggestion is adopted, and its execution is intrusted to Sir John Burgoyne. It is reasonable to suppose that, prior to setting out, Sir John would be put in possession of the information afforded to the General-Commanding-in-Chief and the Ordnance Department by General Macintosh; and certainly Sir John would be supplied with General Macintosh's Turkish reports on arriving at Constantinople, where they were in the possession of Lord Stratford, who knew the object of Sir John's mission, and would naturally afford him all the aid in his power.

As the subject is creating some talk, you may consider these speculations worthy of a place in your valuable journal. I inclose my card, and have the honour to be, &c.

September 22nd R. E.

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

FATE OF THE FRANKLIN EXPEDITION.

The following are the official reports concerning the long lost Franklin expedition, and the proceedings of the yacht Fox :—

"To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

"Yacht Fox, R.Y.S.

"Sir,—I beg you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the safe return to this country of Lady Franklin's final searching expedition, which I have had the honour to conduct.

"Their lordships will rejoice to hear that our endeavours to ascertain the fate of the 'Franklin Expedition' have met with complete success.

"At Point Victory, upon the north-west coast of King William's Island, a record has been found, dated the 25th of April, 1848, and signed by Captains Crozier and Fitzjames. By it we were informed that her Majesty's ships Erebus and Terror were abandoned on the 22nd of April, 1848, in the ice, five leagues NNW., and that the survivors—in all amounting to 105 souls, under the command of Captain Crozier—were proceeding to the Great Fish River. Sir John had died on the 11th of June, 1847.

"Many deeply interesting relics of our lost countrymen have been picked up upon the western shore of King William's Island, and others obtained from the Esquimaux, by whom we were informed that subsequent to their abandonment one ship was crushed and sunk by the ice, and the other forced on shore, where she has ever since been, affording them an almost inexhaustible mine of wealth.

"Being unable to penetrate beyond Bellot Strait, the Fox wintered in Brentford Bay, and the search, including the estuary of the Great Fish River and the discovery of 800 miles of coast line, by which we have united the explorations of the former searching expeditions to the north and west of our position with those of James Ross, Dease, and Simpson, and Rae to the south, has been performed by sledge journeys this spring, conducted by Lieut. Hobson, R.N., Captain Allen Young, and myself.

"As a somewhat detailed report of our proceedings will doubtless be interesting to their lordships, it is herewith enclosed, together with a chart of our discoveries and explorations, and at the earliest opportunity I will present myself at the Admiralty to afford further information, and lay before their lordships the record found at Port Victory.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"F. L. M'Clintock, Captain, R.N."

PROCEEDINGS OF THE YACHT FOX.

Continued from May, 1858.

It will be remembered that the Fox effected her escape out of the main pack in Davis' Straits, in lat. 63½ deg. N., on April 25, 1858, after a winter's ice drift of 1,194 geographical miles.

The small settlement of Holsteinborg was reached on the 28th, and such very scanty supplies obtained as the place afforded.

On May 8 our voyage was recommenced; Godhaven and Upernivik visited, Melville Bay entered early in June, and crossed to Cape York by the 26th; here some natives were communicated with; they immediately recognised Mr. Petersen, our interpreter, formerly known to them in the Grinell expedition under Dr. Kane. In reply to our inquiries for the

Esquimaux dog-driver "Hans," left behind from the Advance in 1858, they told us that he was residing at Whale Sound. Had he been there, I would most gladly have embarked him, as his longing to return to South Greenland continues unabated.

On 12th July communicated with the Cape Warrender natives, near Cape Horsborg; they had not seen any ships since the visit of the Phœnix in 1854, nor have any wrecks ever drifted upon their shores.

It was not until 27th July that we reached Point Inlet, owing to a most unusual prevalence of ice in the northern portion of Baffin's Bay, and which rendered our progress since leaving Holsteinborg one of increasing struggle. Without steam power we could have done nothing. Here only one old woman and a boy were found, but they served to pilot us up the inlet for twenty-five miles, when we arrived at their village. For about a week we were in constant and most interesting communication with these friendly people. Briefly, the information obtained from them was, that nothing whatever respecting the Franklin expedition had come to their knowledge, nor had any wrecks within the last twenty or thirty years reached their shores.

The remains of three wrecked ships are known to them; two of these appear to have been the whalers Dexterity and Aurora, wrecked in August, 1821, some seventy or eighty miles southward of Pond's Inlet. The third vessel, now almost buried in the sand, lies a few miles east of Cape Hay. This people communicate overland every winter with the tribes at Igloolik; they all knew of Parry's ships having wintered there in 1822-3, and had heard of late years of Dr. Rae's visit to Repulse Bay, describing his boats as similar to our whale boat, and his party as living in tents, within snow-houses, smoking pipes, shooting reindeer, &c. None died. They remained there only one winter.

No rumour of the lost expedition had reached them. Within Pond's Inlet the natives told us the ice decays away every year, but so long as any remains whales abound. Several large whales were seen by us, and we found amongst the natives a considerable quantity of whale-bone and many narwhals' horns, which they were anxious to barter for knives, files, saws, rifles, and wool; they drew us some rude charts of the inlet, showing that it expands into an extensive channel looking westward into Prince Regent's Inlet.

We could not but regret that none of our own whaling friends—from whom we had recently received so much kindness—were here to profit by so favorable an opportunity. Leaving Pond's Inlet on 6th August, we reached Beechy Island on the 11th, and landed a handsome marble tablet, sent on board for this purpose by Lady Franklin, bearing an appropriate inscription to the memory of our lost countrymen in the Erebus and Terror.

The provisions and stores seemed in perfect order; but a small boat was much damaged from having been turned over and rolled along the beach by a storm. The roof of the house received some necessary repairs. Having embarked some coals and stores we stood in need of, and touched at Cape Hotham on the 16th, we sailed down Peel Strait for 25 miles on 17th, but, finding the remainder of this channel covered by unbroken ice, I determined to make for Bellot Strait on 19th August, examined into supplies remaining at Port Leopold, and left there a whale boat which we brought away from Cape Hotham for the purpose, so as to aid us in our retreat should we be obliged eventually to abandon the Fox. The steam launch had been forced higher up on the beach, and somewhat damaged by the ice. Prince Regent's Inlet was unusually free from ice; but very little was seen during our run down to Brentford Bay, which we reached on the 20th of August. Bellot Strait, which communicates with the Western Sea, averages one mile in width by 17 or 18 miles in length. At this time it was filled with drift ice, but, as the season advanced, became perfectly clear; its shores are in many places faced with lofty granite cliffs, and some of the adjacent hills rise to

1600 feet; the tides are very strong, running six or seven knots at the springs. On the 6th of September we passed through Bellot Strait without obstruction, and secured the ship to fixed ice across its western outlet. From here, until the 27th, when I deemed it necessary to retreat into winter quarters, we constantly watched the movements of the ice in the Western Sea or channel. In mid-channel it was broken up and drifting about; gradually the proportion of water increased, until at length the ice which intervened was reduced to three or four miles in width. But this was firmly held fast by numerous islets, and withstood the violence of the autumn gales. It was tantalising beyond description thus to watch from day to day the free water which we could not reach, and which washed the rocky shore a few miles to the southward of us.

During the autumn, attempts were made to carry out depots of provisions towards the magnetic pole, but these almost entirely failed in consequence of the disruption of the ice to the southward. Lieutenant Hobson returned with his sledge parties in November, after much suffering from severe weather, and imminent peril on one occasion, when the ice upon which they were encamped became detached from the shore, and drifted off to leeward with them.

Our wintering position was at the east entrance to Bellot Strait, in a snug harbour, which I have named Port Kennedy, after my predecessor in these waters, the commander of one of Lady Franklin's former searching expeditions. Although vegetation was tolerably abundant, and our two Esquimaux hunters, Mr. Petersen, and several sportsmen constantly on the alert, yet the resources of the country during eleven months and a half only yielded us eight reindeer, two bears, eighteen seals, and a few water fowl and ptarmigan.

The winter was unusually cold and stormy. Arrangements were completed during the winter for carrying out our intended plan of search: I felt it to be my duty personally to visit Marshal Island, and in so doing purposed to complete the route of King William's Island.

To Lieutenant Hobson I allotted the search of the western shore of Boothia to the magnetic pole, and from Gateshead Island westward to Wyniatt's furthest. Captain Allan Young, our sailing master, was to trace the shore of Prince of Wales' Land, from Lieutenant Browne's furthest: and also to examine the coast from Bellot Strait northward, to Sir James Ross's furthest.

Early spring journeys were commenced on the 17th February, 1859, by Captain Young and myself, Captain Young carrying his depot across to Prince of Wales' Land, whilst I went southward, towards the magnetic pole, in the hope of communicating with the Esquimaux, and obtaining such information as might lead us at once to the object of our search.

I was accompanied by Mr. Peterson, our interpreter, and Alexander Thompson, quartermaster. We had with us two sledges drawn by dogs. On the 28th February, when near Cape Victoria, we had the good fortune to meet a small party of natives, and were subsequently visited by about 45 individuals.

For four days we remained in communication with them, obtaining many relics, and the information that several years ago a ship was crushed by the ice off the north shore of King's William Island, but that all her people landed safely, and went away to the Great Fish River, where they died. This tribe was well supplied with wood, obtained, they said, from a boat left by the white men on the great river.

We reached our vessel after 25 days' absence in good health, but somewhat reduced by sharp marching and the unusually severe weather to which we had been exposed. For several days after starting the mercury continued frozen.

On the 2d April our long-projected spring journeys were commenced. Lieutenant Hobson accompanied me as far as Cape Victoria. Each of us had a sledge, drawn by four men, and an auxiliary sledge drawn by six dogs. This was all the force we could muster.

Before separating we saw two Esquimaux families, living out upon the ice in snow huts. From them we learned that a second ship had been seen off King William's Island, and that she drifted ashore in the fall of the same year. From this ship they had obtained a vast deal of wood and iron.

I now gave Lieutenant Hobson directions to search for the wreck, and follow up any traces he might find upon King William's Island.

Accompanied by my own party and Mr. Petersen, I marched along the east shore of King William's Island, occasionally passing deserted snow huts, but without meeting natives till the 8th of May, when off Cape Norton we arrived at a snow village containing about thirty inhabitants. They gathered about us without the slightest appearance of fear or shyness, although none had ever seen living white people before. They were most willing to communicate all their knowledge, and barter all their goods, but would have stolen everything had they not been very closely watched. Many more relics of our countrymen were obtained—we could not carry away all we might have purchased. They pointed to the inlet we had crossed the day before, and told us that one day's march up it, and from thence four days overland, brought them to the wreck.

None of these people had been there since 1857-58, at which time they said but little remained, their countrymen having carried away almost everything.

Most of our information was received from an intelligent old woman: she said it was in the fall of the year that the ship was forced ashore; many of the white men dropped by the way, as they went towards the Great River, but this was only known to them in the winter following, when their bodies were discovered.

They all assured us that we would find natives upon the south shore, at the Great River, and some few at the wreck; but unfortunately this was not the case. Only one family was met with off Point Booth, and none at Montreal Island or any place subsequently visited.

Point Ogle, Montreal Island, and Barrow Island, were searched without finding anything except a few scraps of copper and iron in an Esquimaux hiding-place.

Re-crossing the Strait to King William's Island, we continued the examination of the southern shore without success until the 24th of May, when, abut ten miles eastward of Cape Herschel, a bleached skeleton was found, around which lay fragments of European clothing. Upon carefully removing the snow a small pocket-book was found containing a few letters—these, although much decayed, may yet be deciphered. Judging from the remains of his dress this unfortunate young man was a steward or officer's servant, and his position exactly verified the Esquimaux's assertion that they dropped as they walked along.

On reaching Cape Herschel next day we examined Simpson's Cairn, or rather what remains of it, which is only four feet high, and the central stones have been removed, as if by men seeking to find something within it. My impression at the time, and which I still retain, is that records were deposited there by the retreating crews, and subsequently removed by the natives.

After parting from me at Cape Victoria on the 28th April, Lieutenant Hobson made for Cape Felix; at a short distance westward of it he found a very large cairn, and close to it three small tents, with blankets, old clothes, and other relics of a shooting or a magnetic station; but although the cairn was dug under, and a trench dug all around it at a distance of ten

feet no record was discovered. A piece of blank paper folded up was found in the cairn, and two broken bottles, which may perhaps have contained records, lay beside it amongst some stones which had fallen from off the top. The most interesting of the articles discovered here, including a boat's ensign, were brought away by Mr. Hobson. About two miles further to the S.W. a small cairn was found, but neither records nor relics obtained. About three miles north of Point Victory a second small cairn was examined, but only a broken pickaxe and empty canister found.

On the 6th May Lieutenant Hobson pitched his tent beside a large cairn upon Point Victory. Lying amongst some loose stones which had fallen from the top of this cairn was found a small tin case containing a record, the substance of which is briefly as follows:—"This cairn was built by the Franklin Expedition upon the assumed site of James Ross's pillar, which had not been found. The Erebus and Terror spent their first winter at Beechy Island, after having ascended Wellington Channel to lat. 77 deg. N, and returned by the west side of Cornwallis Island. On the 12th of September, 1846, they were beset in lat. 70. 05 N, and long. 98. 23 W. Sir J. Franklin died on the 11th June, 1847. On the 22nd April, 1858, the ships were abandoned five leagues to the NNW of Port Victory, and the survivors, a hundred and five in number, landed here under the command of Captain Crozier." This paper was dated 25th April, 1848, and upon the following day they intended to start for the Great Fish River. The total loss by deaths, in the expedition up to this date was nine officers and 15 men. A vast quantity of clothing and stores of all sorts laid strewed about, as if here every article was thrown away which could be possibly dispensed with—pickaxes, shovels, boats, cooking utensils, iron work, rope, blocks, canvas, a dip circle, a sextant engraved "Frederick Hornby, R.N.," small medicine chest, oars, &c.

A few miles southward, across Back Bay, a second record was found, having been deposited by Lieutenant Gore and M. des Vœux in May, 1847. It afforded no additional information.

Lieutenant Hobson continued his search until within a few days' march of Cape Herschel, without finding any trace of the wreck or of natives. He left full information of his important discoveries for me; therefore, when returning northward by the west shore of King William Island, I had the advantage of knowing what had already been found.

Soon after leaving Cape Herschel the traces of natives became less numerous and less recent, and after rounding the west point of the island they ceased altogether. This shore is extremely low, and almost utterly destitute of vegetation. Numerous banks of shingle and low islets lie off it, and beyond these Victoria Strait is covered with heavy and impenetrable packed ice.

When in lat. 69 deg. 09 N, and long. 99 deg. 27 W, we came to a large boat, discovered by Lieutenant Hobson a few days previously, as his notice informed me. It appears that this boat had been intended for the ascent of the Fish River, but was abandoned apparently upon a return journey to the ships, the sledge upon which she was mounted being pointed in that direction. She measured 28 feet in length, by 7½ feet wide, was most carefully fitted, and made as light as possible, but the sledge was of solid oak, and almost as heavy as the boat.

A large quantity of clothing was found within her, also two human skeletons. One of these lay in the after-part of the boat, under a pile of clothing; the other, which was much more disturbed, probably by animals, was found in the bow. Five pocket watches, a quantity of silver spoons and forks, and a few religious books were also found, but no journals, pocket-books, or even names upon any article of clothing. Two double-barrelled guns stood upright against the boat's side, precisely as they had been placed

eleven years before. One barrel in each was loaded and cocked; there was ammunition in abundance, also 30lb. or 40lb. of chocolate, some tea and tobacco. Fuel was not wanting; a drift tree lay within 100 yards of the boat.

Many very interesting relics were brought away by Lieutenant Hobson, and some few by myself. On the 5th of June, I reached Point Victory, without having found anything further. The clothing, &c., was again examined for documents, note books, &c., without success, a record placed in the cairn, and another buried ten feet to the north of it.

Nothing worthy of remark occurred upon my return journey to the ship, which we reached on June 19, five days after Lieutenant Hobson.

The shore of King William Island between its north and west extremes, Capes Felix and Crozier, has not been visited by Esquimaux since the abandonment of the Erebus and Terror, as the cairns and articles lying strewed about, which are in their eyes of priceless value, remain untouched.

If the wreck still remains visible, it is probable she lies upon some of the off-lying islets to the southward between Capes Crozier and Herschel.

On the 28th of June Captain Young and his party returned, having completed their portion of the search, by which the insularity of Prince of Wales Land was determined, and the coast line intervening between the extreme points reached by Lieutenants Osborne and Browne discovered; also between Bellot Strait and Sir James Ross's furthest in 1849, at Four River Bay.

Fearing that his provisions might not last out the requisite period, Captain Young sent back four of his men, and for forty days journeyed on through fogs and gales with but one man and the dogs, building a snow hut each night; but few men could stand so long a continuance of labour and privation, and its effect upon Captain Young was painfully evident.

Lieutenant Hobson was unable to stand without assistance upon his return on board; he was not in good health when he commenced his long journey, and the sudden severe exposure brought on a serious attack of scurvy; yet he also most ably completed his work; and such facts will more clearly evince the unflinching spirit with which the object of our voyage has been pursued in these detached duties than any praise of mine.

We were now at length all on board again. As there were some slight cases of scurvy all our treasured resources of Burton ale, lemon juice, and fresh animal food were put into requisition, so that in a comparatively short time all were restored to sound health.

During our sojourn in Port Kennedy we were twice called upon to follow a shipmate to the grave. Mr. George Brands, engineer, died of apoplexy on the 6th of November, 1858; he had been out deer-shooting for several hours that day, and appeared in excellent health.

On the 14th of June, 1859, Thomas Blackwell, ship's steward, died of scurvy; this man had served in two of the former searching expeditions. The summer proved a warm one; we were able to start upon our homeward voyage on the 9th of August, and although the death of the engine-driver in 1857, and of the engineer in 1858, left us with only two stokers, yet with their assistance I was able to control the engines and steam the ship up to Fury Point.

For six days we lay there closely beset, when a change of wind removing the ice, our voyage was continued almost without further interruption to Godhaven, in Disco, where we arrived on the 27th of August, and were received with great kindness by Mr. Olick, inspector of North Greenland, and the local authorities, who obligingly supplied our few wants.

The two Esquimaux dog-drivers were now discharged, and on the 1st of September we sailed for England.

From all that can be gleaned from the record paper, and the evidence

afforded by the boat, and various articles of clothing and equipment discovered, it appears that the abandonment of the Erebus and Terror had been deliberately arranged, and every effort exerted during the third winter to render the travelling equipments complete.

It is much to be apprehended that disease had greatly reduced the strength of all on board—far more perhaps than they themselves were aware of.

The distance by sledge route, from the position of the ships when abandoned, to the boat, is 65 geographical miles, and from the ships to Montreal Island, 220 miles.

The most perfect order seems to have existed throughout.

In order to extend as much as possible the public utility of this voyage, magnetical, meteorological, and other observations, subservient to scientific purposes, and for which instruments were supplied through the liberality of the Royal Society, have been continually and carefully taken, and every opportunity has been embraced by the surgeon, D. Walker, M.D., of forming complete collections in all the various branches of natural history.

This report would be incomplete did I not mention the obligations I have been laid under to the companions of my voyage, both officers and men, by their zealous and unvarying support throughout.

A feeling of entire devotion to the cause, which Lady Franklin has so nobly sustained, and a firm determination to effect all that men could do, seems to have supported them through every difficulty. With less of this enthusiastic spirit, and cheerful obedience to every command, our small number—twenty-three in all—would not have sufficed for the successful performance of so great a work.

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Captain, R.N.,
Commanding the Final Searching Expedition.

The yacht Fox, R.Y.S., off the Isle of Wight,
Sept. 21, 1859.

RELICS BROUGHT FROM THE BOAT FOUND IN LAT. 69 DEG. 08·43 N., LONG. 69 DEG. 24·42 W., UPON THE WEST COAST OF KING WILLIAM'S ISLAND, MAY 30, 1859.

Two double barrelled guns, one barrel of each is loaded. Found standing up against the side in the after part of the boat.

In one parcel.—A small Prayer-book, cover of a small book of "Family Prayers;" "Christian Melodies," an inscription within the cover to "G. G." (Graham Gore); "Vicar of Wakefield;" a small Bible, interlined in many places, and with numerous references written in the margin; a New Testament, in the French language.

Tied together.—Two table knives, with white handles—one is marked "W. R.;" a gimlet, an awl, two iron stancheons, nine inches long, for supporting a weather cloth, which was round the boat.

Tied together.—26 pieces of silver plate—11 spoons, 11 forks, and 4 tea spoons, 3 pieces of thin elm board (tingles) for repairing the boat, and measuring 11 by 6 inches, and 3-10ths inch thick.

All wrapped up in a piece of canvas.—Bristles for shoemaker's use, bullets, short clay pipe, roll of waxed twine, a wooden button, small piece of a port fire, 2 charges of shot tied up in the finger of a kid glove, tied up in a fragment of a seaman's blue serge frock; covers of a small Testament and a Prayer-book, part of a grass cigar case, fragment of a silk handkerchief, thread case, piece of scented soap, 3 shot charges in kid glove fingers, a belted bullet (tied together in a piece of silk pocket handkerchief), 2 pair of goggles, made of stout leather, and wire gauze, instead of glass; a sailmaker's palm, 2 small brass pocket compasses, a sounding line rolled up on a piece of leather, a needle and thread case, a bayonet scabbard altered into a sheath for a knife, tin water bottle for the pocket, 2 shot pouches, full of shot.

In canvas.—Three spring hooks of sword belts, a gold lace band, a piece of thin gold twist or cord, a pair of leather goggles with crape instead of glass; a small green crape veil.

Wrapped together in canvas.—Two small packets of blank cartridge in green paper, part of a cherry-stick pipe stem, piece of a port fire, a few copper nails, a leather bootlace, a seaman's clasp knife, two small glass stoppered bottles (full) placed in medicine chest, three glasses of spectacles, part of a broken pair of silver spectacles, german silver pencil case, pair of silver (?) forceps, such as a naturalist might use for holding or seizing small insects, &c.; a small pair of scissors rolled up in blank paper and to which adheres a printed Government paper such as an officer's warrant or appointment, a spring hook of a sword belt, a brass charger for holding two charges of shot.

Wrapped together in canvas.—A small bead purse, piece of a red sealing-wax, stopper of a pocket flask, German silver top and ring, brass match-box, one of the glasses of a telescope, a small tin cylinder, probably made to hold lucifer matches, some of the loose grains of shot have been put into it; a linen bag of percussion caps of three sizes, a very large and old-fashioned kind, stamped "Smith's patent;" a cap with a flange similar to the present gunsket caps used by Government, but smaller; and ordinary sporting caps of the smallest size.

Five watches in a paper packet.

A pair of blue glass spectacles, or goggles, with steel frame, and wire gauze encircling the glasses, in a tin case.

A pemmican tin, painted lead colour, and marked "E" (Erebus) in black; from its size it must have contained 20lb. or 22lb.

Two yellow glass beads, a glass seal with symbol of Freemasonry.

A 4-inch block strapped, with copper hook and thimble, probably for the boat's sheet.

RELICS SEEN IN LAT. 09 DEG. 99 N., LONG. 99 DEG. 24 W, NOT BROUGHT AWAY.—MAY 30, 1859.

A large boat, measuring 28ft. in extreme length, 7ft. 3in. in breadth, 3ft. 4in. in depth. The markings on her stem were—XXII. W. Con. N.61, Pr. 18 4. It appears that the fore part of the stem has been cut away, probably to reduce weight, and part of the letters and figures removed. An oak sledge under the boat, 23ft. 4in. long, and 2ft. wide; six paddles, about sixty fathoms of deep-sea lead line, ammunition, four cakes of navy chocolate, shoemaker's box with implements complete, small quantities of tobacco, a small pair of very stout shooting boots, a pair of very heavy iron-shod knee boots, carpet boots, sea boots and shoes—in all seven or eight pairs, two rolls of sheet lead, elm tingles for repairing the boat, nails of various sizes for boat, and sledge irons, three small axes, a broken saw, leather cover of a sextant case, a chain cable punch, silk handkerchief (black, white, and coloured), towels, sponge, tooth-brush, hair comb, a mackintosh, gun cover (marked in paint "A. 12"), twine, files, knives, a small worsted work-stripper, lined with calfskin, bound with red ribbon; a great quantity of clothing, and a wolfskin robe; part of a boat's sail of No. 8 canvas, whale line rope with yellow mark, and white line with red mark; twenty-four iron stanchions 9¼in. high for supporting a weather cloth round the boat; a stanchion for supporting a ridge pole at a height of 3ft. 9,in, above the gunwale.

RELICS FOUND ABOUT ROSS CAIRN, ON POINT VICTORY, MAY AND JUNE, 1859, BROUGHT AWAY.

A 6-in. disc circle, by Robinson, marked I. 23. A case of medicines consisting of twenty-five small bottles, canister of pills, ointment, plaister, oiled silk, &c. A two-foot rule, two joints of the cleaning rod of a gun, and a

small copper spindle, probably for dog vanes of boats. The circular brass plate broken out of a wooden gun case, and engraved C. H. Ormer, R.N. The field glass and German silver top of a 2-ft. telescope, a coffee canister, a piece of a brass curtain rod. The record tin—the record dated 25th April, 1848, has been taken out. A 6-in. double frame sextant, on which the owner's name is engraved, Frederick Hornby, R. N.

FOUND IN A SMALL CAIRN ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF BACK BAY.

A tin record case and record. The latter has been taken out.

SEEN ABOUT ROSS CAIRN, POINT VICTORY, NOT BROUGHT AWAY.

Four sets of boat cooking apparatus complete, iron hoops, 4ft. of a copper lightning conductor. Hollow brass curtain rod, ¾ in. diameter, three pick-axes, one shovel, old canvas, a pile of warm clothing blankets, 2ft. high, two tin canteens stamped 89 Co., Wm. Hedge, 88 Co.; Wm. Heather, and a third one not marked. A small pannikin made on board out of a 2lb. preserved meat tin (and marked W. Mark), a small deal box for gun wadding. The heavy iron work of a large boat, part of a canvas tent, part of an oar sawed longitudinally, and a blanket nailed to its flat side, three boat-hook staves, strips of copper, a 9-in. single block strapped, a piece of rope and spunyarn. Amongst the clothing was found a stocking marked "W." green, and a fragment of one marked "W. S."

RELICS OBTAINED AT THE NORTHERN CAIRN NEAR CAPE FELIX, MAY, 1859.

Fragments of a boat's ensign in a bag, metal lid of a powder-case, two eye-pieces of sextant tubes, brass button (in small duck bag), worsted glove, colours, red, white, and blue, bung stay of a marine's water-keg or bottle, brass ornament to a marine's shako, brass screw for screwing down lid; also a copper hinge of the lid of powder case, a few patent wire cartridges containing large shot, part of a pair of steel spectacles, glass being replaced by wood, having a narrow slit in it; two small rib bones, probably out of salt pork, six or eight packets of needles, small flannel cartridge containing an ounce of damaged powder—these articles are in a small duck bag; a small, roughly made copper apparatus for cooking, some brimstone matches. All these articles included in this line are packed together in a copper cooking apparatus, and secured in a bag. Piece of white paper folded up found in the north cairn, two pike heads, narrow strip of white paper found under one of the tent places; their tent places were within a few yards of the cairn.

Beside a small cairn, about three miles north of Point Victory, a pickaxe with broken handle brought away, an empty tea or coffee canister.

ARTICLES NOTICED ABOUT THE NORTH CAIRN, NOT BROUGHT AWAY.

Fragments of two broken bottles, several pieces of broken basins or cups, blue and white delf ware, hoops of marine's water bottle, small iron hoops, fragments of white line, spun yarn, canvas and twine, three small canvas tents, under which lay bearskin, blankets, and fragments of blankets, two blanket frocks, several old mits, stockings, gloves, pilot cloths, and box cloth jackets and trousers, large shot, piece of tobacco and broken pipe, metal part of powder case, top of tin canister, marked cheese, preserved potato tin, feathers of ptarmigan, and salt meat bones.

SEEN NEAR CAPE MARIA LOUISA.

Part of a drift tree, white spruce fir, 18 feet long, ten inches in diameter. It appeared to have been but recently (i.e., since thrown on the coast) been sawed longtitudinally down the centre, and one half of it removed.

RELICS OBTAINED FROM THE BOOTHIAN ESQUIMAUX NEAR THE MAGNETIC POLE IN MARCH AND APRIL, 1859.

Seven knives made by the natives out of materials obtained from the last expedition, one knife without a handle, one spearhead and staff, (the latter as broken off), two files, a large spoon or scoop; the handle of pine or one, the bowl of musk ox horn, six silver spoons and forks, the property f Sir John Franklin, Lieutenants H. De Vescombe and Fairholme, A. I'Donald, assistant surgeon, and Lieutenant E. Couch (supposed from the itial letter T and crest a lion's head), a small portion of a gold watch ain, a broken piece of ornamental work apparently silver gilt, a few small val and other metal buttons, a silver medal obtained by Mr. M'Donald s a prize for superior attainments at a medical examination in Edinburgh, pril, 1838, some bows and arrows in which wood, iron, or copper has en used in the construction—of no other interest.

REMARKS UPON THESE ARTICLES.—The spear staff measured 3 feet 6 ches in length, and appears to have been part of a light boat's sail, it easured (before being partially rounded to adopt it to its present use) out $1\frac{1}{2}$ by $1\frac{3}{8}$ inches, is made of English oak, and upon the side has en painted white over green. The spear head is of steel, riveted to two ieces of hoop, with bone between and lashed on to the staff. The rivets re of copper nails. The native who sold it said he himself got it from the oat in the Fish River. Another spear of the same kind was seen. The nives are made either of iron or steel riveted to two strips of hoop, between hich the handle of the wood is inserted, and rivets passed through, securing em together. The rivets are almost all made out of copper nails, such as ould be found in a copper-fastened boat, but those which have been xamined do not bear the government mark. It is probable that most of the oats of the Erebus and Terror were built by contract, and therefore would ot have the broad arrow stamped upon their iron and copper work. One mall knife appears to have been a surgical instrument. A large knife btained in April bears some marking, such as a sword or a cutlass might ave. The man who sold it said he bought it from another, who picked it up n the land where the ship was driven ashore by the ice, and where the hite people had thrown it away; it was then about as long as his arm. This as the first information he received of one of the ships having drifted on hore. One knife and one file are stamped with the broad arrow. The andles are variously composed of oak, ash, pine, mahogany, elm, and bone. The spoons and forks were readily sold for a few needles each, also the uttons, which they wore as ornaments on their dresses. Bows and arrows ere readily exchanged for knives. Previously to the stranding on the eighbouring shore of the last expedition, these people must have been lmost destitute of wood or iron. Some of them had even got only bone nives and spear points. Some of their sledges were seen consisting of two olls of seal-skin flattened and frozen, to serve as runners, and connected together by cross bars of bones. Many more knives, bone, and buttons, similar to those brought away, might have been obtained, but no personal or important relics.

SEEN IN A SNOW HUT IN LAT 71 DEG. N., 20TH APRIL, 1859, NOT BROUGHT AWAY.

Two wooden shovels, one of them made of mahogany board, some spear handles and a bow of English wood, a deal case, which might have served for a telescope or barometer Its external dimensions were—length, 3 feet 1 inch; depth, $3\frac{1}{4}$ inches; width, 9 inches. Two brass hinges remained attached to it.

RELICS OBTAINED FROM THE ESQUIMAUX NEAR CAPE NORTON, UPON THE EAST COAST OF KING WILLIAM'S ISLAND, IN MAY, 1859.

Two table spoons; upon one is scratched WW, on the other WG; these bear the Franklin crest; two table forks, one bearing the Franklin crest, the other is also crested, probably Captain Crozier's, silversmith's name is I. West; two tea-spoons, one engraved A. M. D. (A. M'Donald), the other bears the Fairholme crest and motto; handle of a dessert knife, into which had been inserted a razor (since broken off) by Millikin, Strand; buttons, wood, and iron were here in abundance; bur as enough of these had already been obtained, no more were purchased.

Taken out of some deserted huts (snow) near here, some scraps of different kinds of wood, such as could not be obtained from a boat, teak or African oak.

Found lying about the skeleton, nine miles eastward of Cape Herschel, May, 1859.—The tie of a black silk handkerchief, fragments of a double-breasted blue cloth waistcoat, with covered silk buttons, and edged with braid; a scrap of a coloured cotton shirt, silk-covered buttons of blue, cloth great coat, a small clothes brush, a horn pocket comb, a leather pocket-book, which fell to pieces when thawed and dried; it contained nine or ten letters, a few leaves apparently blank. A sixpence, date 1831; and a half-sovereign, date 1844.

From beside an Esquimaux stone-mark, on the east side of Montreal Island.—Part of a preserved meat-tin, painted red. Part of the rim of some strong copper case or vessel; pieces of iron hoop, two pieces of flat iron, an iron hook bolt, a piece of sheet copper.

Articles seen amongst the natives at Cape Norton, not purchased.—Bows made of wood, knives, uniform and plain buttons, a sledge made of two long pieces of hard wood.

Articles seen about a snow hut, near Point Booth, not purchased—Eight or ten fir poles, varying from five feet to ten feet in length, the shortest being 2½ inches in diameter. Two wooden snow shovels about 3½ feet long, and made of pieces of plank painted white or pale yellow; it occurred to me that the pieces of plank might have been the bottom boards of a boat. There was abundance of wood fashioned into smaller articles.

CONTENTS OF BOAT'S MEDICINE CHEST.

One bottle labelled zinzib R. pulv., full; do. spirit rect., empty; do. mur. hydrarg, seven-eighths full; do. ol. caryphyll., one-fifth full; do. ipec. P. co., full; do. ol. menth. pip., empty; do. liq. ammon. fort., three-quarters full; do. ol. oliv., full; do. tinct. opii. camph., three quarters full; do. vin. sem. colch., full; do. do., quarter full; do. calomel, full (broken); do. hydrarg. nit. oxyd., full; do. pulv. Gregor, full (broken); do. magnes. carb., full; two bottles tinct. tolu. (each) quarter full; one bottle ipec. R. pulv., full; do. jalap R. pulv., full; do. scammon pulv., full; do. quina. bisulph., empty; do. (not labelled) tinct. opii., three-quarters full; one box (apparently) purgative pills, full; do. ointment, shrunk; do. emp. adhesiv., full; one probang, one pen wrapped up in lint, one lead pencil, one pewter syringe, two small tubes (test) wrapped up in lint, one farthing, bandages, oil silk, lint, thread.

(Signed) DAVID WALKER, M.D.,
Surgeon to Expedition.

Fox, Port Kennedy, June, 1859.

Enclosed are copies of original papers found by Captain M'Clintock on Prince of Wales Island:—

"— of May, 1847.

"Her Majesty's Ships Erebus and Terror wintered in the ice in lat. 70 deg. 5 min., long. 98 deg. 23 min., W.

"Having wintered in 1846-7 at Beechey Island, in lat. 74 deg. 43 min., 28 sec N, long. 91 deg. 39 min. 15 sec. W, after ascending Wellington Channel to lat. 77 deg., and returning by the west side of Cornwallis Island.

"SIR JOHN FRANKLIN,
Commanding the Expedition,

"All well.

"Whoever finds this paper is requested to forward it to the Secretary of the Admiralty, London, with a note of the time and place at which it was found, or, if more convenient, to deliver it for that purpose to the British consul at the nearest port."

The same in French.
The same in Spanish.
The same in Dutch
The same in Danish.
The same in German.

"Left the ships Monday, the 24th of May, 1847, the party consisting of two officers and six men.

"G. M. GORE, Lieutenant.
"CHAS. F. DES VŒUX, Mate."

The words "wintered in 1846-47 at Beechey Island," should be "in 1845-46," as in 1846-47 they were beset in the ice, and ships abandoned in April, 1848. The same mistake occurs in both papers.

Admiralty, Sept. 22.

THE PEIHO DISASTER.

OFFICIAL LISTS OF THE KILLED AND WOUNDED.

List of Killed and Missing in the Squadron and Naval and Marine Brigades employed during the attack on the Forts at the mouth of the Peiho, on the 25th June, and subsequent days.

Chesapeake—Theo. Mackenna, captain 1st Royals; T. H. Herbert, midshipman; John Mansell, leading seaman; Edward Mutton, A.B; Daniel Kennett, A.B.; Anthony Crampton, A.B.; John Casey, A.B.; George Bennet, A.B.; J. Neal, A.B.; W. Waddam, A.B.; J. Love, A.B.; J. Doughty, A.B.; O. Reed, A.B.; W. Lethbridge, ordinary; William Cooper, gunner, R.M.A.; David Bunce, private, R.M.; Thomas Kelly, private, R.M.; William Howell, private, R.M.

Highflyer—H. L. T. Inglis, 1st lieutenant, R.M.; Henry Nias, captain afterguard; George McLachlan, captain forecastle; George Dawson, A.B.; Christopher Irwin, A.B., missing; William Barrett, armourer's crew; John Powell, 1st class boy; Michael Malmsey, gunner, R.M.A.; Robert Moon, gunner, R.M.A; William Daw gunner, R.M.A.

Magicienne—Richard Abbott, private, R.M.; Edward Turner, gunner, R.M.A.

Fury—Jabez Brown, stoker, missing; John Holley, gunner, R.M.A, missing.

Assistance—Alfred Graves, lieutenant; James New, A.B.; Charles Millman, A.B.; James Chandler, ordinary.

Royal Marine Brigade—Hamilton Wolridge, 1st lieutenant; William Pike, private; George Wood, private; George Gibbs, private, missing; William Mariott, private; Henry Stevens, private; Richard Davis, private, missing; George Moxham, private, missing; James Smith, private, missing; Charles Adams, private, missing; Samuel Vicary, private, killed; Stephen Harper, colour sergeant, missing; Patrick Canovan, private, missing; Charles Batter, private, killed; Thomas Shears, private, missing; Josiah Greatorex, private, missing; William Memory, private, missing; Henry Oliver, private, missing; John Havekin, private; Charles Bull, sergeant, mis-

sing; William Heastie, private, missing; George Bryan, private, missing; James Gillegan, private; Ambrose Carroll, corporal, missiug; Benjamin Finch, private; Philip Dunn, private; Frederick Croft, private.

Cruiser—Peter Roberton, ordinary, missing.

Nimrod—George Fuller, sailmakers' mate.

Haughty—Henry Austin, A.B.; William Dixon, A.B., missing.

Forester—Charles Turner, stoker; John Thompson, stoker; John Rowe, ordinary.

Kestrel—Alum, officers' cook.

Plover—W. H. Rason, lieutenant and commander; J. Sullivan, stoker; C. Matthews, A.B.; E. Fillamore, A.B.; G. Sharpe, private; J. Thomas, private.

Royal Engineers—Joseph Pennington, corporal; John Andrews, corporal; Frederick Atkins, sapper.

List of Wounded in the Bombarding Squadron and Naval and Marine Brigades, employed during the attack on the Forts at the mouth of the Peiho, on the 25th June, and subsequent days.

Chesapeake—James Hope, Rear-Admiral and C.B., Commander-in-Chief, very severely; C. H. Clutterbuck, lieutenant, since dead; W. G. R. Masters, captain, Royal Marines, severely; N. Bowden Smith, acting mate, very severely; J. St. John Wagstaffe, assistant paymaster, slightly; Frederick Day, assistant engineer, 3rd class, slightly; Joseph Shackell, stoker, since dead; George Martin, coxswain of the launch, since dead; George Bennett, captain maintop, slightly; John Parfit, captain of the mast, dangerously; Peter Ferris, blacksmith, slightly; Fred. Dyer, A.B., since dead; James James, A.B., severely; George Symons, A.B., severely; John Davis, A.B., slightly; Barnd Killarney, A.B., slightly; Joseph Smart, A.B., slightly; John Frazer, A.B., severely; Thomas Grant, A.B., slightly; W. Wear, A.B., since dead; John Haines, ordinary, severely; John McLeod, ordinary, severely; James Hammond, ordinary, severely; Wm. Collett, ordinary, very severely; John Walsh, ordinary, dangerously; John Hirst, ordinary, dangerously; Wm. Dudley, ordinary, very severely; James M'Donald, ordinary, very severely; John Wells, ordinary, severely; Michael Shea, ordinary, severely; George Copus, ordinary, slightly; Cornelius Champ, boy, 1st class, since dead; George Pyne, boy, 1st class, dangerously; William Harding, sergeant, R.M., very severely; Joseph Clay, private, R.M., severely; George Bevan, private, R.M., very severely; George Avery, private, R.M., severely; George Pullen, stoker, severely; Charles Duce, ordinary, slightly; Wm. Sherman, A.B., slightly; Thomas Burgess, ordinary, slightly.

Highflyer.—C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., Captain, severely; F. R. Purvis, lieutenant slightly; John Jackson, boatswain's mate, slightly; James Fox, leading seaman, slightly; Luke Crawford, leading seaman, severely; John Ballard, A.B., severely; Joseph Jewitt, A.B., severely; William Alder, ordinary, severely; Richard Gardiner, ordinary, severely; Joseph Tyler, ordinary, severely; Joseph Gurney, ordinary, severely; James McArthy, ordinary, severely; Albert Baker, ordinary, severely; William Burrill, ordinary, slightly; Henry Hamsher, 1st class boy, severely; John Harman, 1st class boy, slightly; Peter Higson, gunner, R.M.A., severely; Fred. Richardson, 1st class boy, severely.

Magicienne.—Nich. Vansittart, Captain, C.B., severely; Claude E. Buckle acting lieutenant, severely; Nicholas Skelton, blacksmith, slightly; Francis Smith, boatswain's mate, severely; Florence Sullivan, Captain of the maintop, severely; George Mayne, carpenter's mate, severely; Richard Mitchell, Captain's coxswain, severely; Henry Croft, carpenter's crew, severely; John Davis, A.B., severely; Charles Collins, A.B., severely; James B. Mist, ordinary, severely; Wm. Hawkins, ordinary, severely; Wm. See, gunner, R.M.A., slightly; John Martin, gunner, R.M.A., severely; Emanuel Kellaway, gunner, R.M.A., severely; Thomas Buckley, gunner, R.M.A., severely; A. Taylor, gunner, R.M.A., severely; Charles Finney, drummer, severely; D. Downey, stoker, slightly; A. Clarke, carpenter's mate, slightly; John Jackson, gunner's mate, slightly; James Hopkins, A.B. slightly.

Fury.—Henry Legge Perceval, lieutenant, slightly; Armand T. Powlett, midshipman, dangerously; James Gibson, Captain of the maintop, badly; William Wark, captain, foretop, badly; Richard Barton, leading seaman, slightly; Howard

Thompson, leading seaman, slightly; Mark Cunningham, leading stoker, slightly; George Waller, engineers' steward, badly; William Fry, carpenter's crew, dangerously; Patrick Buckley, stoker, severely; Benjamin Thwaites, ordinary, slightly; Samuel Baker, ordinary, severely; William Payne, ordinary, slightly; John Hughes, ordinary, slightly; William Godwin, ordinary, slightly; Henry Water, 1st class boy, verydangerously; William Goodwin, corporal, Royal Marine Artillery, severely.

Royal Marine Artillery.—On board Fury.—Charles S. Williams, lieutenant, Royal Marine Artillery, slightly; John C. Crawford, lieutenant, Royal Marine Artillery, badly.

Assistance.—John T. Partridge, master's assistant, slightly; Alfred Jacobs, armourer, dangerously; John Clarke, captain's steward, slightly; Joseph Purchase, stoker, severely; William Churchill, stoker, dangerously; Charles Gillam, stoker, slightly; Jeffery Weston, A.B., severely; Robert Battlemore, ship's corporal, slightly.

Royal Marine Brigade.—On board Assistance.—Thomas Lemon, C.B., colonel commanding brigade, severely; the Rev. Hugh Hulcatt, chaplain to the forces, dangerously; Charles Slaughter, captain, slightly; T. E. A. Brenan, first lieutenant, slightly; R. J. H. D. Douglas, first lieutenant, slightly; C. W. Carrington, first lieutenant and quartermaster, slightly; M. A. H. J. Heriot, first lieutenant, slightly; Edward Willis, first lieutenant, slightly; R. L. Price, first lieutenant, slightly; Harry L. Evans, first lieutenant, slightly; Samuel T. Collins, first lieutenant, severely; John Straghan, second lieutenant, slightly; P. M. C. Croker, captain, brigade major, slightly; A. W. D. Smith, first lieutenant, severely; Charles F. Coppin, first lieutenant, slightly; Michael Sullivan, lance sergeant, slightly; Edward Moore, private, slightly; Thomas Askwith, private, slightly; John Stubbs, private, slightly; Willlam Archer, private, severely; George Mosley, private, slightly; Charles Fisher, sergeant, severely; John Littlechild, private, severely; John Mortimore, private, slightly; John Perry, private, severely; Thomas Firth, private, slightly: Robert Gradwell, private, severely; William Woods, private, dangerously; George Hamilton, private, slightly; Frdk. Coleman, private, slightly; Edward Hallsworth, private, slightly; Frederick Davis, private, slightly; William Cornfield, private, severely; William Johnson, private, dangerously; F. F. Morris, bugler, dangerously; George Melhuish, private, severely; William Blount, private, dangerously; William Coalt, private, severely; Charles Cavalier, private, dangerously; J. Donnell, lance sergeant, dangerously; George Bickmore, private, dangerously; James Martin, private, severely; James Johnson, private, dangerously; John Paterson, private, severely; William Brim, private, severely; Henry Smith, private, dangerously; John Doyle, private, severely; Luke Duffy, private, severely; Michael Carrighan, private, severely; Charles Wilkin, private, dangerously; Thomas Leaky, private, slightly; James Reid, private, slightly; George Lees, private, severely; John Bailey, private, severely; Stephen Arnett, private, severely; Charles Roberts, private, severely; Michael Hughes, private, severely; John Darling, corporal, severely; Henry Strutton, private, slightly; John Mansfield, lance corporal, severely; John Campbell, private, severely; William Howden, private, slightly; Thomas Gibbons, private, severely; James Cooper, private, severely; J. H. Bryan, private, slightly; Christopher Owens, private, severely; Henry Tippets, private, severely; Alfred Dowsett, private, dangerously; Edward Knowles, sergeant, slightly; Thomas Jones, privnte, slightly; J. Childs, private, severely; William Wyllie, private, slightly; Daniel Payne, private, severely; Elias Woodruffe, private, severely; James Webb, private, severely; John Bennett, sergeant, severely; John Scandrett, sergeant, slightly; John Gibbs, private, slightly; Thomas Frances, colour sergeant, severely; J. Fry, private; severely; Thomas Herbert, private, dangerously; William Evans, sergeant, severely; William Welsh, private, severely; Henry John Dyke, private, severely: Isaac Barnes, sergeant, severely; C. J. Churchfield, lance corporal, severely; Henry Jarvis, private, dangerously; Thomas Kitcheman, private, severely; John Handley, private, dangerously; James Hardacre, private, dangerously; William Walton, private, slightly; Henry Walter, private, severely; James Langley, private, dangerously; John London, private, dangerously; James Cliff, private, severely; Thomas Wyke, private, dangerously; John Bilby, private,

slightly; Henry Kent, private, severely; George Holmes, lance corpo
ously; Edmund Dean, lance corporal, dangerously; Edward Hulme, la
severely; William Foster, private, severely; W. J. Bailey, privat
Thomas Howard, private, severely; George Bowman, private, dangero
Baker, sergeant, severely; John Turner, private, severely; Samuel Cliss
slightly; Thomas Stacey, private, slightly; Frederick Mears, lan
severely; Michael Heritage, private, severely; William Robert Till
dangerously; Michael Donovan, private, severely; William Bac
severely; Thomas Perrins, private, severely; Charles Gatter, privat
Charles Gillam, private, severely; Thomas Francis, private, slightly
Weeks, private, severely; Henry Rollingson, private, severely; John
private, severely; Thomas Dale, private, severely; John Harvey, priv
William Taylor, private, severely; Patrick Carroll, private, severe
Howe, private, slightly; E. Pell, private, slightly; J. Cross, privat
T. Harrington, sergeant, severely; G. Tyler, private, slightly; J. Eva
severely; William Bentley, lance sergeant, slightly; William Ro
slightly; Charles McDonald, corporal, slightly; Thomas Law, privat
James Will, private, slightly; Edward Shrimptom, private, slightly
Angell, bugler, slightly; George Clarke, private, slightly; William Tom
slightly; James Hill, private, slightly; Henry Aldridge, private, slight

Cormorant—H. L. Ley, master; A. Watson, M.D., surgeon, slig
Peard, mate, slightly; James Hardy, quartermaster, since dead; W.
A.B., severely; J. Jolfrey, A.B., slightly; J. Knight, A.B., slightly; F
stoker, slightly; R. Elliott, ordinary, since dead; H. Mends, ordinary,
Sent, ordinary, severely; G. Ward, private, R.M., severely; W. Glov
severely.

Cruiser—G. J. Armytage, midshipman, severely; E. Hooker, captain
severely; W. Fairminger, ordinary, severely; J. Kelly, ordinary, severe
slightly; I. Berry, private, R.M.A., slightly; J. Mitchell, private, R.M.
G. Plumstead, drummer, slightly.

Nimrod—S. Winter Parker, paymaster, very slightly; George Fuller
mate, severely; James Goddard, A.B., severely; Thomas Alder, ordin
ously; William Lent, ordinary, dangerously; Edward North, ordinary,
George Hawes, private, R.M., severely.

Opossum—Jonathan Gale, A.B., very severely. John Weldon, ordin
Charles Dyer, private, R.M., slightly.

Haughty—George Brand, gunner, slightly; Charles Wolfe, leadi
slightly; James Gould, stoker, slightly; John Bryant, stoker, slight
Nevan, ordinary, slightly; Stephen Allen, private, R.M., slightly; G
private, R.M., slightly.

Lee—W. J. Southy, second master, slightly; John Fage, A.B.,
George Bridle, A.B., slightly; Charles Lockett, A.B., slightly; The
A.B., severely; George Duckan, A.B., slightly; James Woolridge, A.
James Ogden, ordinary, slightly; Charles Lee, ordinary, severely; Alfr
ordinary, slightly; William Moore, stoker, severely; Jonathan Brazier
M., slightly.

Banterer—A. J. Burniston, master, badly.

Forester—Thomas Stafford, boatswain, slightly; Wm. Painter, A.
John Rowe, private, severely.

Kestrel—Edward Brown, quartermaster, slightly; William Scott, A.
J. Chatterton, stoker, slightly; Richard Powers, ordinary, severely; J
ordinary, slightly; James Madeley, private, R.M., severely.

Starling—J. A. Wilson, assistant engineer, 2nd class, slightly; H.
assistant engineer, 3rd class, slightly; Michael Wilby, stoker, slightly; Jo
A.B., slightly.

Clover—J. Phillips, second master, slightly; W. Ryan, gunner, sever
quartermaster, slightly; W. Swanson, stoker, slightly; E. Too
ntly; J. Johns, A.B., severely; W. Dunn, A.B., severely; E. Ra
ntly; W. Taylor, carpenters' crew, slightly; G. Sweatman, 1s
ghtly; W. Padian, private, R.M., severely; C. Wood, private, R.M.,

Janus—John Morgan, 3rd class boatswain, slightly; David O'Brien, stoker, slightly; Arthur Townsend, ordinary, slightly.

Hesper—Richard White, A.B., severely; Thomas Button, ordinary, severely.

Royal Engineers—George Longley, lieutenant, dangerously; Andrew Greig, sergeant, slightly; John McQueen, corporal, dangerously; Henay Kirwan, corporal, severely; Thomas Chaplin, corporal, slightly; D. Thompson, corporal, slightly; John Palmer, sapper, dangerously; James Buchanan, sapper, severely; John Friggle, sapper, severely; Charles Daidge, sapper, severely; John Griffiths, sapper, slightly; F. Attwood, sapper, slightly; James Thompson, sapper, slightly; Thomas Hart, sapper, slightly.

(Signed) WALTER DICKSON, M.D.,
Staff Surgeon, Her Majesty's Ship, Chesapeake.

OFFICIAL DESPATCH OF ADMIRAL HOPE.

(From the *London Gazette*.)

Admiralty, September 16.

A despatch, of which the following is a copy, has been received by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty from Rear-Admiral James Hope, C.B., Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty's ships and vessels on the East India and China station:—

No. 77. Chesapeake, Gulf of Pechili, July 5, 1859.

Sir,—I request you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that having on the 17th ult. arrived off the Island of Shalui-tien, in the Gulf of Pechili, where I reported in my letter, No. 66, of the 11th ult., the squadron had been directed to rendezvous, I proceeded on the following day to the mouth of the Peiho river, with the object of intimating to the local authorities the intended arrival of the Hon. Frederick Bruce, her Majesty's Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, and Monsieur de Bourboulon, Minister of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French, and of reconnoitering the existing state of the defences of the river.

These last appeared to consist principally of the reconstruction, in earth, and in an improved form, of the works destroyed last year, strengthened by additional ditches and abattis, as well as an increased number of booms of very much more formidable nature, a description of all of which will be found on the annexed plan, furnished by Major Fisher, of the Royal Engineers. Very few guns were seen, but a considerable number of embrasures were masked with matting, evidently with a view of concealing others.

Having sent an officer on shore to communicate with the authorities, he was met by a guard, apparently of country people, who prevented him from landing, informed him that there were no officials nearer than Tien-tsin, and on his acquainting them with my wish that the obstructions at the mouth of the river should be removed, in order to enable the ministers to proceed to Tien-tsin, a promise was given that a commencement should be made for this purpose within the next forty-eight hours.

On the following day I moved the whole of the squadron up to the anchorage off the mouth of the river, placing the gunboats inside the bar. On proceeding to examine the entrance on the 20th, and finding that nothing had been done towards removing the obstructions before referred to, I addressed a letter to the Tantai, at Tien-tsin, acquainting him with the object of my arrival, and requesting free communication with the shore. To this an evasive answer was received two days subsequently.

On the 21st I received a letter from Mr. Bruce acquainting me that M. de

Bourboulon and himself had come to the conclusion to place the matter in my hands, and requesting me to take any measures I might deem expedient for clearing away the obstructions in the river, so as to allow them to proceed at once to Tien-tsin; in consequence of which I acquainted the Tantai that the ministers having arrived, and the obstructions still existing at the mouth of the river, I should proceed to remove them, using force if necessary, the responsibility of the consequences resting with those by whom I might be opposed. To this communication no reply was received, and consequently on the 24th I took the force inside the bar to prepare for operations, and gave further intimation that after eight o'clock in the evening, if I received no satisfactory reply, I should feel myself at liberty to take my own course.

On the same night the parties named in the margin, under the direction of Captain G. O. Willes, cut one of the cables of the boom, marked D in the plan, and blew two away with powder. These last, however, were found re-united on the following day, the supporting logs of wood to which they were cross-lashed being probably moored head and stern. Captain Willes availed himself of this opportunity to examine closely the construction of the inner boom (plan E), and he found it to consist of large baulks, well crossed-lashed together, forming a mass of timber not less than 120 feet wide, and about three feet in depth. The opening shown in the plan might have admitted of the passage of a gunboat, but the strength of the current would at any time have rendered such a passage a matter of exceeding difficulty and doubt. Under these circumstances it was clear that no other mode of attack was left open to me, except that on the front of the works, and a subsequent endeavour to carry them by storm, should I succeed in silencing their fire.

The morning of the 25th was occupied in placing the vessels in position) (see plan), the Starling, Janus, Plover (flag), Cormorant, Lee, Kestrel, and Banterer being on a line parallel to the works on the south fort, and the Nimrod in the rear of the line, with her fire bearing on the north fort. The Opossum, under Captain Willes, was placed in advance, close up to the stakes, and the Forester and Haughty in reserve, in rear of the line, the former having directions to move up into the Plover's position, should that vessel advance in support of the Opossum.

The vessels on the right were under the direction of Captain C. F. A. Shadwell; those on the left under Captain N. Vansittart. The strength of the tide and narrowness of the channel (about 200 yards) had rendered it a matter of extreme difficulty to take up the position above detailed; and the Banterer and Starling, the vessels on the extreme right and left of the line, had both taken the ground, the former, however, in a good position, the latter in one which incapacitated her from taking much share in the action.

At 2 p.m. I directed the Opossum to open a passage through the first barrier, which being effected by 2.30, she moved up to the second barrier, supported by the Plover, closely followed by the Lee and Haughty, which vessels I ordered in for that purpose.

On the arrival of the Opossum at the second barrier, the fort opened a simultaneous fire of not less than between 30 and 40 guns of calibres from 32-pounders to 8-inch, on which I directed the ships to engage. The Plover took up a position close to the barrier. The Opossum, Lee, and Haughty, in succession, astern of her.

At 3 p.m., finding that the ships inside the barrier, especially the Plover and Opossum, were becoming disabled by the enemy's fire, they were dropped out into fresh positions outside of it, where, having received assistance in men, they renewed the action.

In consequence of the Plover's disabled state, I shifted my flag to the

Cormorant, and at 4.20 a severe wound I had received about an hour previously compelled me to call Captain Shadwell on board the Cormorant, and entrust to him the more immediate command of the squadron.

At 5.40 the Kestrel sunk in her position; and it became necessary to put the Lee on the ground to avoid the like result.

At 6.30 the fire from the north forts ceased altogether, and half an hour later, that on the south side was silenced, with the exception of that proceeding from one gun in the outer or south bastion, one in the curtain on each side of it, and one in the flank of the centre bastion, also one in the detached fort to the south.

At 7.20 a landing was effected opposite the outer bastion of the south fort, the position which appeared most injured by the fire of the squadron, and where the attack could be best supported by the guns of the vessels.

The force consisted of a detachment of Sappers and Miners, under Major Fisher, Royal Engineers; a brigade of Marines, under Colonel Thomas Lemon; a division of seamen, under Captain Vansittart, assisted by Commanders John E. Commerell, and W. A. J. Heath, the whole under Captain Shadwell's direction, accompanied by a small detachment of French Seamen, under the command of Commandant Tricault.

They were encountered by a heavy fire proceeding from those guns I have already named as not completely silenced, as well as from gingalls and rifles; but, nothwithstanding these and other serious obstacles presented by the character of the ground to be crossed, and the nature of the defences, 150 officers and men having reached the second ditch, and about 50 having arrived close under the walls, had the opposition they experienced been that usual in Chinese warfare, there is little doubt that the place would have been successfully carried at the point of the bayonet.

Captains Shadwell and Vansittart and Colonel Lemon, R.M., having been disabled in the advance, the command in front devolved on Commander Commerell, who, after consultation with Majors Fisher, R.E., and Richard Parke, R.M., and Commandant Tricault having reported to Captain Shadwell that they could hold their present position, but that it was impossible to storm without reinforcements, received from that officer the order to retire.

This operation was effected with a deliberation and coolness equal to the gallantry of the advance, under cover of the night, which had now closed in, the force sent down to the boats by detachments, carrying the wounded with them, and eventually the whole were brought off by 1.30 a.m., of the 26th, Commanders Commerell and Heath being the last on shore.

I have already stated that the Lee and Kestrel had sunk in their positions from the effect of the enemy's fire; and I regret to add that, in proceeding down the river, after the termination of the action, the Plover was grounded within range of the forts, and the Cormorant, in endeavouring to remove, was also found to have taken the ground. Under these circumstances I desired the officers and men to be removed from them for the time, in order to obviate the loss which might occur, should the enemy be enabled to re-open the fire.

The Kestrel, I am happy to say, has since been recovered; but, notwithstanding every exertion which was subsequently made, under the direction of Captain Willes, to recover the other vessels, the Plover and Lee proved to be so hopelessly aground, that it was impossible to move them; while the Cormorant, which got afloat comparatively uninjured on the night of the 27th, was again unfortunately grounded, within range of the forts, on moving down; and on the following day such a heavy fire was opened on her that, although again afloat, she sank at her anchors, and the officers and men employed in removing her were withdrawn as she went down.

The fire of the enemy being remarkably well directed and sustained, occasioned the squadron considerable loss, amounting to twenty-five officers and men killed, and ninety-three wounded, of which fifty-four are slight. Among the former I have to regret the loss of Lieutenant W. H. Eason, commanding the Plover, a very promising young officer, and Captain Theo. M'Kenna, of the 1st Royals, who was attached to me by the Major-General commanding the Forces in China.

In the subsequent attack on shore sixty-four officers and men were killed, and 252 wounded, of which ninety are slight. Amongst the former I have to regret the loss of Lieutenant A. Graves, of the Assistance; Lieutenant C. H. Clutterbuck, and Mr. T. H. Herbert, midshipman, both of this ship; of Lieutenaut Hamilton Wolrige, of the Royal Marine Brigade; and Lieutenant H. L. T. Inglis, Royal Marines, both of the Highflyer, attached to the 2nd Battalion.

Amongst the severely wounded are—Captain Shadwell, C.B., of H.M.S. Highflyer; Captain Vansittart, C.B., of H.M.S. Magicienne; Acting Lieutenant C. E. Buckle, of H.M.S. Magicienne; Mr. A. J. Burniston, master of the Banterer; Mr. N. B. Smith, acting mate of the Chesapeake; Mr. A. Powlett, midshipman of the Fury; Mr. George Armytage, midshipman of the Cruiser; Mr. W. Ryan, gunner of the Plover; Lieutenant G. Longley, Royal Engineers; Colonel Lemon, Royal Marines; Captain W. G. R. Masters, Royal Marines, H.M.S. Chesapeake; Lieutenant J. C. Crawford, Royal Marine Artillery, and the Rev. H. Huleatt, Chaplain to the Forces.

The loss on the part of the French amounted to four men killed and ten wounded, including two officers, one of the latter, I regret to state, being Commandant Tricault.

My warmest thanks are due to Staff Surgeon Walter Dickson, of this ship Dr. John Little, of the Royal Marine Brigade, and the medical officers of the force generally, to whose unwearied exertions I have to attribute the present satisfactory state of our wounded, and I avail myself of this opportunity of bringing under their lordships' special notice the very high terms in which Col. Lemon speaks of the services of Dr. W. J. Baird, senior Assistant-Surgeon of the Brigade.

It is a more grateful duty to request you will bring under their lordships' notice the valuable assistance I received from Captains Shadwell and Vansittart, in command of the respective divisions of gunboats. Lieut. John Jenkins is highly recommended by Captain Shadwell for the way in which he fought the Banterer.

Captain Vansittart speaks highly of Acting-Commander R. J. Wynniatt, of the Nimrod; Lieutenant A. J. James, of the Forester; Lieutenant J. D. Bevan, of the Kestrel, and Lieutenant W. H. Jones, of the Lee, whose able conduct in covering the landing, after he had been obliged to put his vessel on the ground to prevent her sinking had also attracted my notice.

To Commander A. Wodehouse, of the Cormorant; Lieut. C. J. Balfour, of the Opossum; J. D. Broad, of the Haughty; and H. P. Knevit, of the Janus, my thanks are also due for the manner in which their vessels were fought and handled.

My thanks are also due to Major Fisher, Royal Engineers, whose men being distributed as riflemen in the gun vessels and gunboats, was himself on board the Plover.

The Nozagavy, French gunboat, not being armed in a manner which enabled her to share in the attack, Monsieur Tricault, Commandant of the Duchayla, did me the honour to attach himself to me from the commencement of the action until he landed.

Mr. J. W. M. Ashby, my secretary, besides being on duty with me, took charge of the signal duty when my Flag Lieutenant took command of the Plover.

To Commander J. E. Commerell and W. A. J. Heath, for their conduct during the operation on shore, my warmest acknowledgments are due. Commander Commerell brings under my notice Lieutenants George Parsons and John C. Wilson, of the Chesapeake, and C. E. Buckle, Acting, of the Magicienne, Messrs. George S. Peard, John Shortt, and Viscount Kilcoursie, Mates, and Messrs. George Armytage and C. L. Oxley, Midshipmen.

To Colonel Lemon my warmest acknowledgments are also due for the way in which he led the brigade. That officer strongly recommends Major Parke, who commanded the first, and Captain Masters, who commanded the second battalion, and brings under my notice the assistance he received from Cap P. M. C. Croker, Brigade Major, Lieutenant L. Rokeby, acting as his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenants and Adjutants John F. Hawkey and H. L. Evans, and Lieutenant John Straghan. The conspicuous gallantry of Sergeant Major Wood and Quartermaster Sergeant Halling also attracted his notice.

Major Fisher, Royal Engineers, speaks highly of the gallantry of Lieut. J. N. Maitland, R.E., in endeavouring to get the scaling ladders up, a service in which Lieutenant Longly, R.E., was also engaged, and unfortunately wounded.

To Captain J. O. Willes my warmest thanks are due, for his exertions in re embarking the force when it became evident that the attack had failed, on which services he remained till Commander Commerell reported to him that the last man was re-embarked.

He speaks highly of Lieutenant J. C. Wilson and M. John St. John Wagstaffe, Assistant Paymaster, on that occasion (the latter of whom accompanied him throughout the day). Upon Captain Willis also devolved the arduous duty of directing the gallant attempts which were subsequently made to recover the Plover, Lee, and Cormorant, and when that became hopeless, to effect their destruction, and to his unwearied zeal I am indebted for carrying out the repairs of the gunboats, all of which have been placed on the ground for that purpose.

He speaks highly of all the officers and men employed on this service, and especially of the gallantry of Lieutenant N. P. Knevitt, of the Janus, in laying out an anchor for the recovery of the Cormorant, under a heavy fire, and of that of Mr. Oscar Samson, Second Master of the Starling, who recovered that vessel under a sharp fire from the enemy, on her floating: of the efforts made by Lieutenant Wilson and Mr. S. R. Broome, gunner of the Chesapeake, to destroy the vessels which were no longer recoverable: and of the energy displayed by Mr. W. D, Strong, Master of the Cruiser, in raising the Haughty, which had sunk.

He further calls my attention to the exertion of the carpenters of the Assistance, Cruiser, and Magicienne, under the direction of Mr. R. Pickard, of this ship, who, in effecting the repairs of the gunboats, with the artificers of the squadron, had many difficulties to surmount.

From what has preceded, their lordships will be well able to appreciate the devoted gallantry displayed by the officers and men on this occasion; and although it has not pleased God to crown our efforts in the execution of our duty with success, I yet feel entire confidence that those efforts will obtain from their lordships that full measure of approbation they have so well deserved.—I have, &c., (Signed) J. HOPE.

Rear Admiral and Commander-in-Chief.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

ABSTRACT OF KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Ships, &c.	Killed and Missing	Wounded.			Total No. Wounded.	Total No. Killed and Wounded.	Died since.
		Dangerous.	Severe.	Slight.			
Plover	8	6	6	12	21	32	1
Cormorant	1	5	1	7	13	14	2
Nimrod	1	4	3	2	9	10	1
Opossum	2	2	1	7	11	13	1
Haughty	2	...	..	7	7	9	...
Lee	...	2	2	8	12	12	...
Banterer	...	...	1	...	1	1	...
Forester	3	...	2	1	3	6	...
Kestrel	1	3	...	3	6	7	...
Starling	..	...	...	4	4	4	...
Janus	...	...	...	3	3	3	...
Total	18	23	16	54	93	111	5
Chesapeake	17	17	6	9	32	49	3
Highflyer	10	...	13	5	18	28	...
Magicienne	2	...	13	5	18	20	...
Fury	2	3	6	7	16	18	...
Assistance	1	2	2	4	8	12	...
Cruizer	1	...	5	3	8	9	...
Hesper	...	...	2	...	2	2	...
Royal Marine Brigade	27	23	66	53	142	169	..
Royal Engineers	...	2	2	4	8	8	...
Total	63	47	115	90	252	315	3
Total	18	23	16	54	93	111	5
Grand Total	81	70	131	144	345	426	8

French force: 4 men killed, and 2 officers and 8 men wounded.

(Signed) WALTER DICKSON, M.D.,
Staff Surgeon, H.M.S Chesapeake.

RETURN OF THE STATE OF THE WOUNDED ON BOARD HER MAJESTY'S SHIPS CHESAPEAKE AND ASSISTANCE, TO WHICH SHIPS THE MORE SERIOUS CASES WERE REMOVED, THOSE LEFT ON BOARD THEIR OWN SHIPS BEING PRINCIPALLY SLIGHTLY WOUNDED.

Off Chinhæ, July 26.

James Hope, C.B., Admiral, splinter wound of thigh; very severe, doing well. Michael Shea, ordinary, musket ball wound of hip; convalescent. B. Killarney, A.B., splinter wound of leg; severe, doing well. John Wells, ordinary, wound of finger; amputation; convalescent. George Bevan, gunner R.M.A., musket ball wound of knee; severe, doing well. John Avery, private R.M., splinter wound of leg; severe, doing well. John Fraser, A.B., musket ball wound of leg; severe, doing well. William Dudley, ordinary, musket ball wound of thigh; very severe, ball not extracted. William Moore, late Lee, stoker, wound of eye (left); severe, recovery of vision doubtful. William Tookey, late Plover, A.B., musket ball wound of hip; severe, doing well. Peter Ferris, blacksmith, contusion of elbow; severe, doing well. Thomas Burgess, ordinary, musket ball wound of arm; convalescent. Henry Dunn, ordinary, arrow wound of foot; doing well. John Davis, A.B. fracture of radius; convalescent. William Collett, ordinary, musket ball wound of shoulder; very severe, ball still lodged. James James, A.B., musket ball wound

of thigh; very severe, ball still lodged. William Painter, A.B. (Forester), musket ball wound of back; severe, doing well. John Donald, sergeant, R.M., musket ball wound of shoulder; severe, doing well. Isaac Barnes, sergeant R.M., musket ball wound of buttocks; severe, doing well, John Darling, corporal R.M., musket ball wound of shoulder; severe, going on favourably. W. Briern, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe, doing well. Henry Kent, private R.M, musket ball wound of jaw; severe, doing well. Charles Wilkins, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe, doing well. John Littlechild, private R.M., musket ball wound of arm; severe, doing well. Thomas Wyke, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe, doing well. John Patterson, private R.M., arrow wound of thigh; slight, doing well. John Lendon, private R.M, musket ball wound of shoulder; very severe, ball lodged. Charles Gillam, private R.M,, musket ball wound of arm; severe, doing well. Henry Dyke, private R.M., musket ball wound of knee; severe, doing well. Christopher Owen, private R.M., musket ball wound of buttock; severe, doing well. Michael Heritage, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe, doing well. Michæl Donovan, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe, doing well. Thomas Perrins, private R.M., gunshot wound of hand: severe, doing well. Emanuel Weeks, private R.M., musket ball wound of arm; severe, doing well. George Morley, private R.M., musket ball wound of arm; slight, doing well. John Stubbs, private R.M., musket ball wound of buttock; severe, doing well, ball still lodged. T. Kitcherman, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe. W. Blount, privace R.M., musket ball wound of neck and abdomen; severe, ball in abdomen still lodged, doing well. W. Colt, private R.M., musket ball wound of perinæum; severe, doing well. R. Grandwell, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe, doing well. W. Forster, private R.M.. musket ball wound of arm; severe, doing well. G. Bowman, private R.M., musket ball wound of shoulder; severe, ball lodged. John Perry, private R.M., musket ball wound of thigh; severe, doing well. James Martin, private R.M., musket ball wound of groin; severe, doing well. Michael Carrigan, private R.M., musket ball wound of elbow; severe; nearly well. James Mitchell, gunner R.M.A., musket ball wound of buttocks; severe, going on favourably. James Buchanan, sapper, wounds of face; slight. convalescent.

WALTER DICKSON, M.D., Staff Surgeon,
Her Majesty's Ship Chesapeake.

ON BOARD THE ASSISTANCE.

Thomas Lemon, Colonel R.M., musket ball wound of left side of head; ball extracted, doing well. W. G. R. Masters, Captain R.M., musket ball wound of right arm, and right side of chest; almost well. N. Bowden Smith, Lieutenant R.N., fracture of left arm by gingal ball; ball extracted, convalescent. A. R. Burniston, Master R.N., contusion of left leg by round shot; going on favourably. A. P. Powlett, midshipman, gingal ball through right thigh; wound unfavourable. A. W. D Smith, First Lieutenant R.M., musket ball wound of left side of head; bullet extracted, convalescent. P. T. Collins, First Lieutenant R.M., musket ball wound of left thigh; bullet extracted, convalescent. William Ryan, gunner, R.N., musket ball wound of right arm; amputation, convalescent. William Archer, private R.N., musket ball wound of left arm; ball extracted, progressing favourably. Charles Fisher, sergeant R.M., musket ball of right fore arm; ball not extracted, doing well. William Woods, private R.M., musket ball wound of right shoulder; ball not extracted, going on favourably. William Cornfield, private R.M., compound fracture of right hand by gingal ball; doing well. William Johnson, private R.M., musket ball wound through left shoulder; progressing favourably. Robert T. Morris, bugler, laceration of left thigh by round shot; convalescent. George Melhuish, private R.M., musket ball wound of left shoulder; ball not extracted, going on well. Charles Cavalier, private R.M., musket ball through right knee; progressing favourably. George Bickmore, private R.M., musket ball through both thighs; going on well. James Johnson, private R.M., musket ball wound of left thigh; amputation, doing well. Henry Smith, private R.M., musket ball through left lung, penetrating abdomen; not expected to recover. John Doyle, private R.M., musket ball through left leg, tibia and fibula both broken; progressing favourably. Luke Duffey, private R.M., musket ball wound of left leg; secondary amputation expected. George Lees, private R.M., musket ball wound of left fore arm; ball not found, secondary amputation expected. John Bailey, private R.M., musket ball wound of

left thigh; doing well. Stepen Arnett, private R.M., musket ball wound of left thigh; convalescent. Chas. Roberts, private R.M., musket ball wound of left shoulder; progressing favourably. John Mansfield, lance-corporal, musket ball wound of right arm; convalescent. John Campbell, private, musket ball wound of right arm; convalescent. Jas. Cooper, private, musket ball wound through right arm; doing well. Henry Tippets, private, musket ball wound of left fore-arm; extensive sloughing, and amputation expected. Alfred Dowsett, private, compound fracture of humerus and scapula by round shot; doing well. Daniel Payne, private, musket ball wound of right breast; extensive sloughing and going on unfavourably. Elias Woodruffe, private, musket ball wound in back; convalescent. James Webb, private, arrow wound of left knee, gunshot wound of left foot; going on well. John Bennett, sergeant R.M., musket ball wound through right thigh; convalescent. Thomas Francis, colour-sergeant, right ankle broken by gingal ball; doing well. Jacob Fry, private, musket ball wound of left arm; doing well. William Evans, serjeant, musket ball wound of left thigh; progressing favourably. Charles J. Churchfield, corporal, musket ball wound through both thighs, not going on favourably. John Handey, private, musket ball wound of left knee; going on well. James Hardacre, private, musket ball wounds through left arm and left thigh; doing well. James Langley, private, musket ball wound in right shoulder and right thigh; doing well. James Clift, private, musket ball wound in right shoulder; ball not extracted, doing unfavourably. George Holmes, lance-corporal, musket ball wound of abdomen and pelvis; doing well. Edmund Dean, lance-corporal, musket ball wound of right thigh and ankle; doing well. Edward Hulme, corporal, musket ball wound of right thigh; wound sloughing, not progressing favourably. W. J. Bailey, private, musket ball wound of left thigh; going on well. Samuel Baker, serjeant, musket ball wound through right arm; progressing favourably. John Turner, private, musket ball wound in right arm; progressing favourably. Frederick Mears, lance-corporal, musket ball wound in back; convalescent. Wm. R. Tilley, serjeant, musket ball wound in right thigh; progressing favourably. Charles Gatter, private, musket ball wound in right fore-arm; doing well. Henry Rollingson, private, musket ball wound in fore-arm; doing well. John Goodchild, private, musket ball wound in abdomen and left knee; doing well. T. Barrington, serjeant, musket ball wound of left thigh; convalescent. Mark Cunningham, leading stoker, musket ball through right heel; amputation expected. H. Waters, B.I.C. musket ball through left side of head; paralysis of lower extremities, doing well. William Fry, carpenter's crew, musket ball through left arm; amputation; convalescent. Samuel Baker, ordinary, musket ball through right hand; doing well. William Goodwin, bombadier Royal Marine Artillery, musket ball through left side of abdomen; ball extracted; doing well. William Sent, ordinary, musket ball through right arm; amputation; convalescent. William Groombridge, A.B., fracture of right leg by musket ball; doing well. William Glover, ordinary, splintered wound, right shoulder; doing well. George Ward, private, R. M., right leg amputated; doing well. James Madeley, private, R.M., left thigh amputated; doing well. Richard Power, ordinary, left thigh amputated; going on favourably. William Scott, A.B., left thigh amputated; going on favourably. William Lee, ordinary, amputation of right great toe; going on well. Thomas Jones, A.B., musket ball wound of thigh; going on well. James Fuze, A.B., musket ball wound fracture of humerus; extensive sloughing, but going on favourably. George Pullen, stoker, amputation of right thigh; going on favourably. James Hammond, A.B., amputation of left leg; doing well. John Haines, ordinary, amputation of left arm; doing well. Joseph Clay, private R.M., left thigh amputated; convalescent. John Welsh, ordinary, musket ball wound of right side of head; doing well. Geo. Pyne, B.I.C.L., gunshot wound of shoulder; doing well. John Hurst, A.B., musket ball wound of right side of head, partial paralysis; not going on well. John M'Leod, ordinary, right leg amputated; doing well. John Parfitt, cap. mat, musket ball wound of abdomen; doing well. Matt. Nevin, A.B., burn from explosion, extensive sloughing; doing well. William Padien, private, R.M. musket ball wound of right arm; amputation; convalescent. John Jolins, A.B., musket ball wound of thigh; extensive sloughing; doing well. John Gale, A.B., musket ball wound of foot; convalescent. John Kelly, ordinary, musket ball wound of abdomen; some sloughing; going on well. Luke Crawford, comminuted fracture of left ancle from musket ball; doing well. Henry Hamshet, ordinary, left leg amputated; convalescent. Josh. Tyler, ordinary, extensive laceration of

left foot; going on well. John Davis, A.B., flesh wound of left arm and left side of orbit; doing well. Charles Collins, A.B., fracture of right leg above ancle; doing well. Francis Smith, boats' mate, musket ball wound of right leg; doing well. Hor. Sullivan, captain of maintop, musket ball wound of right thigh, sloughing and fever; not going on well. George Mayne, captains' mate, amputation of left thigh; convalescent. Richard Mitchell, captain's coxswain, musket ball wound of left foot; ball extracted; doing well. John Martin, gunner, R.M.A., flesh wound from musket ball; going on well. Andrew Greig, sergeant, R.E. musket ball wound through left arm; convalescent. Charles Doige, sapper, musket ball wound through left thigh; going on well. John M'Queen, corporal, R.E., musket ball wound through right shoulder; going on well. John Triggle, sapper, musket ball through right arm; going on well. James Reid, private, R.M, musket ball wound of right arm; doing well. James Well, private, R.M., musket ball wound of right leg; going on well. Thomas Firk, private, R.M., musket ball wound of left arm; doing well. Thomas Dale, private, R.M., musket ball wound of right arm; doing well.

JOHN LITTLE,
Surgeon Royal Marine Brigade, in charge of wounded on board Assistance.

HER MAJESTY'S SHIP ASSISTANCE, JULY 27.

RETURN SHOWING THE NUMBER OF MEN WHO HAVE DIED ON BOARD THIS SHIP OF WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION WITH THE ENEMY SINCE THE 3RD. OF JULY.

July 3.—Henry Jarvis, private, R.M., 1st Battalion.
July 7.—William Harding, sergeant, R.M., Chesapeake.
July 7.—William Churchill, stoker, Assistance.
July 8.—William Welsh, private, R.M., 1st Battalion.
July 18.—Michael Hughes, private, R.M., 1st Battalion.
July 18.—William Furminger, ordinary, Cruizer.
July 21.—Frederick Richardson, ordinary, Highflyer.
July 25.—Thomas Alder, ordinary, Nimrod.
July 25.—Thomas Herbert, private, R.M., 1st Battalion.
July 27.—John Palmer, sapper, Royal Engineers.

W. A. G. HEATH, Commander.

On Tuesday, September 27th, two of the large mortar vessels, Nos. 31 and 48, which are intended for operations in China, were removed from that portion of the harbour in which they have been lying and taken into the first dock at Chatham for the purpose of being overhauled, and, in case any defects may be discovered, to be put into a state of thorough repair. They are also to be examined by a board of officers, in order to discover whether the marine worm has effected any ravages in the timbers at the bottom during the time they have been lying up. Should this destructive insect be found to have taken possession of any of the timbers, these will be removed and new ones substituted, after which the bottom will be recovered with the composition which has been introduced into the navy. As soon as these mortar-boats have been completed they will be undocked, and others take their place to undergo a similar overhauling,

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

The following is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to 1st of August last.

HER MAJESTY'S HOME TROOPS.

3rd (The Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards	Mhow
Squadron	Ahmednuggur
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Kirkee
8th Hussars	Nusserabad
Left Wing	Neemuch
14th Light Dragoons	Kirkee
17th Lancers	Jhansi

ROYAL REGIMENT OF BRITISH ARTILLERY.

D Troop Horse Artillery	Mhow
2nd Company, 3rd Battalion	Poona
2nd Company, 11th Battalion	Aden
7th Company, 11th Battalion	Sehore
2nd Company, 13th Battalion	Baroda
5th Company, 14th Battalion	Calpee
8th Company, 14th Battalion	Dharwar

ROYAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

11th Company	Poona
21st Company	Gwalior

ROYAL REGIMENTS OF BRITISH INFANTRY.

4th (The King's own Regt.)	Ahmedabad
Detachment	Surat
Do.	Baroda
28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment	Bombay
31st Huntingdonshire Regiment	Poona
33rd (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment)	Deesa
86th West Essex Regiment	Belgaum
57th Regiment	Ahmednuggur
Wing	Aden
64th Regiment Foot	Kurrachee
72nd Highlanders	Mhow
83rd Regiment Foot	Nusserabad
92nd Highlanders	Central India
Detachment	Indore
95th Regiment Wing	Neemuch
Depot	Deesa
German Jager Battalion Head Quarters	Poona
Wing	Sholapore
Detachment	Sattara

HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN BRITISH TROOPS

REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Horse Brigade, Head quarters	Poona
1st (or Leslie's) Troop, Head Quarters	Deesa
2nd Troop	Kurrachee
3rd Troop	Nusserabad
4th Troop	Poona
1st Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmedabad
2nd Company	Belgaum
3rd Company	Hydrabad
4th Company	Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters	Bombay
1st Company	Neemuch
2nd Do.	Sattara
3rd Do.	Sholapore
4th Do.	Mhow

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Kurrachee
2nd Do.	Jaulna
3rd Do.	Kolapoor
4th Do.	Kurrachee

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

Head Quarters	Poona

INFANTRY.

1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters	Kurrachee
European Regiment L. I.	Belgaum
	Kolapore
European Regiment	Mhow

HER MAJESTY'S NATIVE TROOPS

ARTILLERY.

3rd Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmedabad
1st Company	Ahmedabad and Rajcote
2nd Do.	Ahmedabad
3rd Do.	Deesa
4th Company	Nusserabad
5th Do.	Ahmedabad
6th Do.	Aden
4th Battalion, Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmednuggur
Detachment	Neemuch
2nd Company	Ahmednuggur
4th Do.	Ahmednuggur
6th Do.	Khandeish

CORPS OF SAPPERS AND MINERS.

Head Quarters (Bombay)	Poona
1st Company	Poona
2nd Do.	Aden
Detachment	Jhansi
3rd Company	Augur
4th Do.	Poona
5th Do.	Poona
Detachment	Jhansi

LIGHT CAVALRY.

1st Regiment (Lancers)	Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry	Neemuch
Detachment	Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	Jhansi
Wing	Sholapore

INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N. I. (Grenadiers)	Kurrachee
2nd do. do	Bombay
3rd Regiment N. I.	Malligaum
4th do. do. (Rifles)	Sehore
Wing	Indore
5th do. N. I. I.	Kulladghee
6th do. N. I.	Poona
7th do. do.	Bombay
8th do. do.	Sattara
9th do. do.	Behora Central India
10th do. do.	Seronge Central India
11th do. do.	Ahmedabad
12th do. do.	Nusseratad
13th do. do.	Neemuch
14th do. do.	Ahmedabad
15th do. do.	Kolapore
16th do. do.	Surat
Detachment	Broach
17th do. do.	Rajkote
18th do. do.	Belgaum
19th do. do.	Mhow
20th do. do.	Dharwar
22nd do. do.	Ahmednuggur
23rd do. N. I. I.	Mhow
24th Regiment N. I.	Jhansi
Depot	Mhow
25th do. N. I. I.	Poona
26th do. N. I.	Seerpore
28th do. do.	Sholapore
29th do. do.	Aden
30th do. do.	Dholia
31st do. do.	Deesa
1st Extra Battalion	Kurrachee
2nd Extra Battalion	Baroda
3rd Extra Battalion	Belgaum
1st Belooch Regiment	Hydrabad
2nd Do. Do.	Dhera Ghazee Khan
Depot	Shikarpoor
3rd Belooch Regiment	Nuggur Parkur Districts
Wing	Hydrabad

IRREGULAR AND LOCAL CORPS.

Military.

regular Horse -	Seroor
nent Scinde Irregular	
e - - -	Jacobabad
ment Do. -	Jacobabad
ment Do. -	Jacobabad
ment Southern Mah-	
Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
ment Southern Mah-	
Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
attalion - -	Bombay
nent Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
ment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie

Civil

Guzerat Irregular Horse -	Ahmedabad
Kutch Irregular Horse -	Bhooj
Kutch Legion - - -	Kutch
Guzerat Police Corps -	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps - -	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps -	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers -	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Police Troop - -	Mhow

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

lowing is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

CAVALRY.

on the Governor's Body
.....Madras
t Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
th Royal Lancers Head
rs and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's
n
Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
do.....Sholapore
nder orders to Secunderabad.
Native Light Cavalry,
uarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Wing .....Bellary
. Native Light Cavalry..Bengal Field Force
do.....Bellary
do.....Bengal Field Service
do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

ARTILLERY.

s Royal Horse Artillery. St.Thos.' Mount
uarters Madras Horse
ry .....Bangalore
, Field Service Gen. White'ock's Division
.....Secunderabad
.....Bangalore
.....Kamptee
.....Bengal Field Service
.....Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
mp.1st Bat. Royal Artil-
nd No. 1 Field Battery...St.Thos.' Mount
mp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artil.
nd No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
mp. 14th Bat. Royal Ar-
& No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
.9th Bat. Ryl. Artillery.Secunderabad

T BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

arters .....St.Thos.'Mount
any { Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore / Half Company ...Penang / Detachment .....Masulipatan
any .....Moulmein
o. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellary
(No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

ID BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

arters .....Kamptee
(No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
ead quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo
Half Company ...Shuaygheen
. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery)
Head quarters and half .....Kamptee
Half Company.....Seetabuldee

THIRD BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY

Head quarters .....Rangoon
A Company (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service
B. Company (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tongho
C. Company (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmew
D. Company (No. 5 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division

FOURTH BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Secunderabad
A. Company (No. 1 Horse Bat)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
B. Company (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
C. Company (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
... Company Head quarters and two-thirds .....Rangoon
One-third .....Bassein

FIFTH OR GOLUNDAUZE (NATIVE) BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....St,Thos.' Mount
A. Company Head quarters and two-thirds Company .....Penang
One-third Company .....Malacca
B. Company.....Singapore
C. Company (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
D. Company (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
E. Company (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sumbulpore
F. Company .....Meeaday
1st Supplemental Company .....St.Thos.' Mount
2d do. do. .....Vizianagram
Details of several Companies ...Labuan

MADRAS ENGINEERS.

Head quarters .. ..Fort St. George

MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS—NATIVE.

Head quarters .....Dowlaishweram
A. Company.....Ditto
One Section with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
B. Company .....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
C. Company .....Bengal Service
D. Company .....Rangoon
E. Company ... .Dowlaishweram
One Section with Gen. Whitelock's Division
F. Company .....Secunderabad
One Section .....Pamnbum
G. Company .....Padoungmyo
H. Company .....Thayetmew
I .Company .....Tongho
K. Company .....Dowlaishweram
L. Company .....Field Division Gen. Whitelock
M, Company .....Dowlaishweram

INFANTRY.

EUROPEAN.

H.M. 1st Royal Regt. (1st Bat.),..Secunderabad
H.M. 43rd Light Infantry .....Gen. Whitelock's Division Field Service
H.M. 44th Regiment . .. . . . Fort St. George
H.M. 60th Royal Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
3 Companies.... .....Bellary
1 do. .....Mysore
1 do. .....Hurryhur
H.M. 66th Regiment ..... Cannanore
1 Company .....Mangalore
1 do. .....Sircee
H.M. 68th Regiment .....Rangoon
H.M. 69th Regiment .....Tonghoo
H.M. 74th Highlanders .....Berhampore
1 Company ..... Sholapore
3 Companies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
The Madras Fusiliers .....Bengal on Field Service
2nd European Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
3rd Madras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock

NATIVE INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N.I. (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
2nd Regiment N. I.....Quilon
3rd N. I. or Palamcottah Light Infantry.....Cannanore
4th N. I. .....Thayetmew
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Mangalore
Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secundorabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoo
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Bellary
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N. I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmew
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N. I..... .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Gen., Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N. I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N. I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzedah
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. I. .....Kamptee
27th N. I... .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. ....Hoosingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacole Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
35th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnool
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters .....Shuaygheen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38 h N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmew
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I. .....Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Raichoor Field Service
43rd N.I. .....Russelcondah
44th N. I .....Thayetmew
45th N I .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. .....Moulmein
49th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitlock's Divid
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Samulcottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, Regiments N. I, and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.

EUROPEAN VETERANS

Artillery Company .....Palaveram
Infantry Company ..... Vizagapatam

NATIVE VETERANS

1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. .Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. .Arcot

DEPÔTS.

For H.M Regiments .....Poonamallee
European Infantry .....Arcot
Native Infantry .....Palaveram

NATIVE INFANTRY RECRUITING DEPOTS.

No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dindigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Kilore

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(Corrected up to 27th September, 1859, inclusive.)

here two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depot is stationed.]

Guards—Aldershot.
—Regent's Park.
lorse Guards—Hyde Park.
goon Guards—Madras: Canterbury.
—Bengal: Canterbury.
—Bombay: Canterbury.
—Brighton.
—Aldershot.
—Bengal: Maidstone.
—Bengal: Canterbury.
goons—Curragh.
—Newbridge.
—Dublin.
—Manchester.
—Newbridge.
—Bombay: Maidstone.
sars—Bengal: Canterbury.
—Bombay: Canterbury.
ers—Emb. for England: Maidstone.
ssars—Hounslow.
ssars—Birmingham.
acers—Madras: Maidstone.
ht Dragoons—Dublin.
—Bombay: Maidstone.
sars—Dublin.
acers—Edinburgh.
—Bengal: Canterbury.
goons—Aldershot.
Train [1st bat.]—Shorncliffee.
bat.]—On passage home.
Bat.]—Woolwich
bat.]—Aldershott. } Depot at Aldershot
bat.]—Curragh. }
bat.] | Woolwich. }
r Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
bat.]—Windsor.
bat.]—St. George's Barracks.
m Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
bat.]—Tower.
s. Guards [1st bat.]—Portsmouth.
bat.]—Dublin.
[1st.]—Madras: Colchester.
bat.]—China: Birr.
st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
bat.]—Corfu: Walmer.
bat.]—Bengal: Limerick.
o. Malta: Limerick.
1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
bat.]—Corfu: Chichester.
st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
st. bat.]—Aldershott: Limerick.
bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
1st bat.—Plymouth.
bat.]—Curragh.
1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.
bat.]—Aldershott.
1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
bat.]—Aldershot.
st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
bat.]—Cape of Gd. Hope and Fermoy.
1st bat.]—Cephalonia: Fermoy.
bat.]—Curragh.
-Jersey: Pembroke
bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
- Aldershot: Templemore.
bat.]—Curragh.
-Canada: Limerick.

Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
18th do.—Bombay: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
22nd do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta: Parkhurst.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Walmer; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
25th do.—Gibraltar: Athlone.
26th do.—Bermuda: Belfast.
27th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Embarked for England: Chatham.
30th do.—Curragh. Parkhurst.
31st do—Bombay: Chatham.
32nd do.—Devonport: Dover.
33rd do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
34th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
35th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
36th do.—Plymouth: Athlone.
37th do.—Bengal: Colchhster.
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
39th do.—Canada: Templemore.
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Devonport.
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham.
44th do.—Madras: Colchester.
45th do.—Preston: Parkhurst.
46th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
47th do.—Shorncliffe: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bengal: Chichester.
52nd do.—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do.—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Curragh: Devonport.
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Aldershott: Birr.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal. Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Winchester.
61st do.—Mauritius: Pembroke
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bombay: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: Athlone
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bengal; Perth.
72nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Devonport.
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Dublin: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
78th do.—Fort George: Aberdeen
79th do.—Bengal: Stirling.
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.

81st do.—Bengal: Chatham
82nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury
83rd do.—Bombay: Chichester.
84th do.—Sheffield: Pembroke
85th do.—Cape: Pembroke
86th do.—Gosport: Templemore
87th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
88th do.—Bengal: Colchester
89th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
90th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
91st do.—Madras: Chatham.
92nd do.—Bombay; Stirling
93rd do.—Bengal; Aberdeen
94th do.—ditto: Chatham
95th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
96th do.—Manchester: Parkhurst.
97th do.—Bengal: Colchester
98th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
99th do.—Bengal: Cork
100th do.—Gibraltar [Parkhust.
Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Portsmouth.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
2nd do—Jamaica
3rd do.—Barbadoes
Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (18).

Bedford—Weymouth.
2nd Cheshire—Shorncliffe
Durham Artillery—Gosport
Hampshire Artillery—Pembroke
East Kent—Portsmouth
Lancashire Artillery—Kinsale.
Norfolk Artillery—Sheerness.
North Lincoln—Curragh
5th Middlesex—Dublin
Northumberland Artillery—Tynemouth.
Oxford—Dover.
1st Stafford—Portsmouth
2nd Stafford—Curragh.
Suffolk Artillery—Portsmouth
Sussex—Glasgow
1st Tower Hamlets—Cork
2nd Warwick—Newport
Wilts—Dover.
1st York, (W. R.)—Edinburgh
3rd York—Newcastle on Tyne

SCOTLAND (3).

Edinburgh Artillery: Edinburgh
Forfar Artillery—Sheerness
Fife Artillery—Pendennis
2nd Lanark—Dublin
Stirling—Shorncliffe

IRELAND (12).

Antrim Rifles—Aldershot
Antrim Artillery—Curragh.
North Cork—Aldershot
Donegal—Yarmouth and Deptford
Dublin (city)—Plymouth
Dublin City Artillery—Colchester
Fermanagh—Chester
Kerry—Bradford
Limerick (County) Plymouth
Louth (Rifles)—Crisle & Bury
Tipperary Artil.—Gosport
Waterford Artillery—Pith

TIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th September).

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

90, sc., Capt. C. F. Schomberg, 1851, nel Fleet.
, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
6, Com. J. Ward (b), 1858, E. Indies.
, sc. troop-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856, Indies.
ion, 91, sc., Capt. T. Hope, 1852, nel Fleet.
screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846, Guard.
sc., Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific
sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. Arthur, East Indies.
1, screw, Capt. G. W D. O'Callaghan, Channel Fleet.
, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
36, sc., Capt. T. Cochran, 1857, ness.
3, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Pike, Coast of Africa.
18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855, America and West Indies.
3, screw, Capt. J. Sanderson, 1855, of Africa.
st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram, Mediterranean.
47. screw, Capt. W. Edmonstone, Portsmouth.
Capt. G. T. Gordon, 1846, Portsmouth.
, screw troop-ship, Com. W. A. J. , 1856, East Indies.
, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856, erranean.
16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North ica and West Indies.
Com. E. Wilson, 1845, Greenock.
2, st.-vessel, Com. C. A. Campbell, Mediterranean.
sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins. East Indies.
, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854, America and West Indies.
sc., Com. E. Hay, 1858, Portsmouth.
ender to Calcutta, East Indies.
gle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley, particular service.
, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848, Guard.
, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F. rey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B., Cape of Good Hope.
, sc., Capt. A. F. R. D'Horsey, 1857, of Good Hope.
, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris, Portsmouth.
.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854, of Africa.
k, 80, sc , Captain E. Ommanney, 1846, terranean.
crew, Mas.-Com. A. Brown, 1854, par- ar service.
2, sc -gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes East Indies.
6, st.-vessel, Com. F. Peel, 1855, S.E. of America.
21, sc., Capt. H. S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854, terranean.
, screw, Capt T. H. Mason, 1849, Chan- fleet.
18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
, 40, Captain J. J. M'Cleverty, C.B., East Indies.
ge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jerning- , 1851, Devonport.

Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, E. Indies.
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle, 1847, Mediterranean.
Centaur, 6, st,-vessel, Com. E. D'o. D'a, Aplin, 1853, Devenport.
Centurion. 80, sc., Capt. C. G. E. Patey, 1846, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Rear-Admiral J. Hope, C.B., Capt. G. O. Willis, 1856, East Indies.
Clio, 21, sc., Capt. F. Miller, 1855, Portsmouth.
Clown, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855, 1842, East Indies.
Cockchafer, 2, sc.-gunbt. Lieut.-Com. H. L. Holder, 1854, Devonport.
Conflict, 8, sc., Com. R. W. Courtenay, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Conqueror, 101, screw. Capt. W. J. C. Clifford, C.B., 1847, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc.. Com. the Hon. F. A. Foley, 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, sc., Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Coromandel, st.-vessel, Second Master W. H. Vine (acting, East Indies.
Cossack, 20, sc., Capt. R. Moorman, 1857, North America and West Indies.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. the Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, Mediterranean.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com W. Greet, 1854, off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com, J. Bythesea, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. A. Philtimere, 1855, particular service.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, Portsmouth.
Dauntless, 31, sc., Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B 1854, Coast Guard.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast-Com. T C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Devastation, 6, st.-ves, Com. J. R. E. Baird, 1857, North America, and West Indies.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. P. W. Moorsom, C.B., Channel Fleet.
Donegal, 101, sc., Capt., W. F. Glanville, 1846 Liverpool.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Mediterranean.
Dove, screw gunbt., Lieut. C. J. Bullock, 1855, East Indies.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. R. Blane, 1856, East Indies
Eagle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard.
Edgar, 91, sc., Rear-Adm. J. E. Erskine, Capt. J. E. Katon, 1856, Gibraltar.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. E. C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H, Campion, 1855, Australia.
Emerald, 51, sc. Capt. A. Cumming, 1854 Channel Fleet.
Encounter, 14, screw, Capt. R. Dew, 1858, Devonport.
Esk, 20, sc., Sir. R. J. Le M. M'Clure, K.C.B., 1850, East Indies.
Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852 Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett, C.B., 1850, Portsmouth.

Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. J. J. Stopford, 1841, Mediterranean.
Fairy, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Albert yacht, Portsmouth.
Falcon, 17, sc., Com. A. G. Fitz Roy, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Ferret, 8, Com. W. E. Fisher, 1856, part. serv.,
Firebrand, 6, st.-vessel, Com. J. Dayman, 1858, Mediterranean.
Firm, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton, 1854, East Indies.
Firefly, 4, st.-vessel, Mast.-Com. Taylor, particular service.
Fisguard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drummond, C.B., Woolwich
Flying Fish, 6, c., Com. C. W. Hope, 1854, Channel Fleet.
Forester, 2, sc. gunbt, Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes, 1853, East Indies.
Formidable, 84, J. C. Fitzgerald, 1840, Sheerness
Forward, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. C. R. Robson, 1851, Pacific.
Furious, 16, st.-ves., Capt. O. J. Jones, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Fury, 6, st.-ves., Com. J.E. Commerell, 1855, E. Indies.
Ganges, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B., Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
Gannett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854, Mediterranean.
Gladiator, 6, st.-vessel, Commander H. D. Hickley (1858), N. America and W. Indies.
Gorgon, 6, st.-ves. Com. B. C. T. Pim, 1858, North America and West Indies.
Growler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
Grapler, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. A. P. H. Helby, 1849, Pacific.
Hannibal, 91, sc., Rear-Admiral G. R. Mundy, Capt. M. Connolly, 1858, Mediterranean.
Hardy, 2, sc.-gbt. Lieut.-Com. A. G. Bogle, 1855.
Hastings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Mends, C.B., 1852, Coast Guard.
Haughty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Broad, 1851, East Indies.
Havannah, 19, Capt. T. Harvey, 1848, Pacific.
Havock, 2, sc.-gunbt, Lieut.-Com. C. Fairholme, 1851.
Hawke, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast G.
Herald, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846, Feejee Islands.
Hermes, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854 Cape of Good Hope.
Hero, 91, screw, Capt. G. H. Seymour, C.B., 1844, Channel Fleet.
Hesper, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846, East Indies.
Hibernia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Codrington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B., 1845, Malta.
Highflyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Himalaya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe, 1855, particular service
Hogue, 60, screw, Capt. R. J. J. G. Macdonald, 1854, Coast Guard
Hydra, 6, st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857, Devonport.
Illustrious, 72, Com. H. C. Harston, 1845, Portsmouth.
Imaum, 72, Commodore H. Dunlop, Com. H. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
Impregnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds, K.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Impereuse, 51, screw, Rear-Adm. L. T. Jones, C.B., Capt. R. Magnire, 1854, Devonport.
Indus, 78, Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B. Capt. W. R. Hall, C.B., 1853, North Americ, and West Indies.
Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841. South America.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brooke 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Com. J. H. Marryat, 1855, Mediterranean.
Iris, 26, Commander W. Loring, C.B., Australia.
Jackal, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. G. E. Murray, 1846, particular service.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1851, Channel Fleet
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Keppel, 1855, East Indies.
Jasper, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Fyn, 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat Lieut.-Com. G. D Bosa, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1854, Mediterranean.
Lee, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. H. Jones, 1852, East Indies.
Leopard, 18, st.-ves., Rear-Admiral Sir S. Lushington, C.B., Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Leven, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. S. Hulme, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, C.B., 1851, Mediterranean.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1846, particular service.
London, 90, screw, Capt. H. Chads, 1848, Mediterranean.
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, receiving ship, Capt. R. D. White, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Mæander, 44, Com. Sir M. MacGregor, Bart., 1854, Portsmouth.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. N. Vansittart, C.B., 1854, E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Fanshawe, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Mars, 80, sc., Capt. J. N. Strange, 1854, Devonport.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B. 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Melpomene, 50, screw, Capt. C. J. F. Ewart, 1855, Channel Fleet.
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, Channel Fleet.
Minotaur, Capt. E. P. Halsted 1842, Sheerness
Mohawk, 4, screw, Com. P. C. C. McDougall, 1856, Portsmouth.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Syndercombe, (acting), Woolwich.
Nalad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. Dillon, 1843, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B Grant, 1851 apprentice ship.
Neptune, 91, screw, Capt. Sir W. Hoste, Bart., 1848, Gibraltar.
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. C. P. Mends, 1851 East Indies.
Nile, 90, sc., Rear-Adm. C. Talbot, Capt. A. T. E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, Channel Fleet.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com. R. J. Wynniatt, 1854, East Indies.
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Pigot, 1852, South Coast of America.
Odin, 16, steam-vessel, Capt. Lord J. Hay, C.B., 1854, Portsmouth.
Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. J. R. E. Fraser 1848 Mediterranean.
Osborne, st.-vessel, Mas. Com. G. H. K. Dowell, 1842, particular service.

, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1855, editerranean
21, screw, (Capt. J. Borlase, C.B., 1855, rtsmouth.
, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1854, st Indies.
oke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, ast Guard.
erance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 50, Portsmouth.
, 12, CommanderE. Hardinge 1856, pe of Good Hope.
r, 6, sc., Com. C. H. May, 1854, E. Indies
2, sc. gunboat, Lieut. ——— East dies.
er, 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, cific.
4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 48, Coast of Africa
pine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1854, rticular service.
ss Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G nmsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
ss Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, editerranean
s, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, cific
2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. Osborn 56, Mediterranean.
Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, pt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
11, screw, Com. the Hon. T.A. Pakenham 56, North America and West Indies.
n, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1854, editerranean.
t, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Medi- rranean.
l, 4, screw, Com. J. G. Goodenough, 58, Sheerness.
n, 31, sc Capt. A. Forbes, 1846 Mediter.
ution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. lgell, East Indias.
manthus, 4, st.-ves., Master-Com. F. R rdee, 1843, particular service.
ove, 4, sc., Com. R. G. Craigie, 1856, rtsmouth.
ck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, East dies.
6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Ports- outh.
Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley. t.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport.
Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. remantle. K.C.B., Capt. E. B. Rice (1855), annel Fleet.
l, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast ard.
n D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thomp- n, 1847, Mediterranean.
icent, 102, Rear Admiral G. Grey, Capt. Wilson, 1853, Portsmouth.
on, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, S.E. ast of America.
n, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, E. Ind.
te, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856, cific.
, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, mbroke.
e, 6, sc., Com. Prince of Langenberg 57, Mediterranean.
21, sc., Capt. J. Corbett, 1857, E. Indies.
21, sc., Capt. R. Lambert, 1855, Sheer- ss.
l, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 50, particular service.
hooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 48, Coast of Africa.
72, st.-ves., Capt. R. B. Crawford, 1856, cific.
n, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1852, rtsmouth.

Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South East Coast of America.
Skipjack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, West Indies.
Slaney, 2, sc. gunbt., Lt.-Com. H. R. Leet, 1855, East Indies.
Snake, 4, sc., Com. H. Harvey, 1857, Sheerness.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Byng, 1856, East Indies.
Sphinx, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. F. Day, V.C., 1855, Portsmouth.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lieut.-Com. W. C. Chapman, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut.-Com. T. B. Collinson, 1850, South East Coast of America.
Starling, sc.-gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Whitshed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2, sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pollard, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Balliston, 1845, Woolwich.
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, C. of Africa.
Tartar, 20, sc., Capt. ——— West Indies and N. America.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1855, South East Coast of America.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse, C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Topaze, 51, sc., Capt. the Hon. J. W. S. Spencer, 1854, Channel Fleet.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Burnett, C.B., 1854, Ascension.
Trafalgar, 91, sc., Capt. E. G. Fanshawe, 1845, Channel Fleet.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby, 1846, Pacific.
Trident, 6, st.-v. Com. F. A. Close, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Burton, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc. troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, particular service.
Valorous, 16, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B. 1853, West Indies.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, Commodore C. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B., 1850, Mediterranean.
Victoria and Albert, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt. A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com. W. N. W. Hewett, V.C. L.H., 1858, Coast of Africa.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B. Dunn, 1856 particular service.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858, Pacific.
Vulcan, 6, screw troop-ship, Com. A. C. Strode, 1856, particular service.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., Captain F. A. Campbell, 1856, Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1854, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc.-gunbt. st. East Indies.
Weazel, 2, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Howorth, 1856.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Wellington, 72, Capt. R. S. Robinson, 1840, Devonport.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Bousanquet, 1855, East Indies.

LIST OF H. M. INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to the 23rd June, 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command.

Acbar, 22, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wellesley, C.B., R.N. Commander-in-Chief I. N.; Capt. J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, Bombay; Mas.-Com. H. W. Grounds, 1856, Gunnery Officer.

Auckland, 6, paddle, Com. J. Stephens, 1848, Red Sea.

Assyria, 2, paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies, 1858, River Indus.

Assaye, 10, paddle, Commander J. N. Adams, 1857, Bombay.

Augusta, 6, sch.-yacht, tender to Acbar, Bombay.

Australian, screw troop ship, Master-Com. — Boon, 1858, Bengal.

Berenice, 2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com. A. W. Chitty, 1847, Bombay.

Becas, 6, flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1851, River Indus.

Charlotte, 4, Lieut.-Com. W. Collingwood, 1855, Persian Gulf.

Clive, 12, Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, Trauzibar.

Constance, 3, Lieut.-Com. J. B. Dickson, 1851, Red Sea.

Comet, 5, paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby, 1855, River Euphrates.

Conqueror, 2, paddle, Master-Commander T. Linton, 1849, River Indus.

Coromandel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. H. A. Fraser, 1846, Bay of Bengal.

Chenaub, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. Gourley, 1858, River Indus.

Cursetjee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, Indus.

Clyde, 4, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon, 1847, Bombay.

Dalhousie, screw troop ship, Com. F. W. Hopkins, 1858, Bay of Bengal.

Dromedary, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.

Elphinstone, 12, Lieut.-Com. C. E. Brooman, 1848, Bombay.

Euphrates, Flat, Master-Com. W. Walton, 1858, River Indus.

Ethersey, Flat, Master-Com. T. Jones, 1858, River Indus.

Ferooz, 10, paddle, Commander C. J. Cruttenden, 1855, Bombay.

Freere, 2, paddle, Master Commander J. McNeil, 1852, River Indus.

Falkland, 12, Commodore G. Jenkins, C.B., Persian Gulf.

Goolanair, paddle yacht, Master-Commander T. Kennelly, 1850, Bombay

Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. F. Warden, 1846, Andamans.

Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. A. S. Neale, 1853, River Indus.

Jhelum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. R. L. Lawson, 1856, River Indus.

Keddywarree, guard ship, Lieut. E. Giles, 1847, Port Officer, Kurrachee.

Lady Falkland, paddle tender to Acbar.

Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Perry, 1846, Red Sea.

Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whish, 1849, Persian Gulf.

Marié, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Constable, 1845, Surveying Vessel, Persian Gulf.

Mootree, 1, pendant ves., Capt. E. W. Duthoit, 1857, Kotree.

Napier, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. Forster, 1851, River Indus.

Nimrod, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. P. Butter, 1856, River Indus.

Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. A. Harrison, 1856, River Indus.

Outram, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Tivey, 1858, River Indus.

Planet, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. E. Fletcher, 1853, River Indus.

Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Fowlerton, 1857, Calcutta

Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, Bombay.

Pleiad, 2, screw, Mas.-Com. D. White, 1856, Bombay.

Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.

Sutledge, Flat, Master-Com.——, River Indus.

Satellite, 2, paddle, Master-Com. A. Wilkins, 1852, River Indus.

Semiramis, 10, paddle, Com. W. Balfour, 1853, Bombay.

Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.

Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. D. Morrison, 1858, River Indus.

Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1845, River Indus.

Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com. ———, Bay of Bengal

Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Persian Gulf.

Victoria, 5, paddle, Lieut.-Com. T. S. H. Twynham, 1845, Bombay.

Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. F. E. Mannera, 1857, Persian Gulf.

BENGAL NAVAL BRIGADE.

Head Quarters, Calcutta, Capt. C. D. Campbell, 1857.

1st Company, Fort William, Lieut.-Com. J. Huclock, 1858.

2nd Company, Mootyhary, Lieut-Com. J. H. B. Bavon, 1859.

3rd Company, Chuprall, Lieut.-Com. C. R. Templer, 1857.

4th Company, Allipore, Lieut.-Com. R. Carey, 1856.

5th Company, Dumdum, Lieut. Com. H. W. H. Barnes, 1857.

6th Company, Dacca, Lieut.-Com. H. W. Etheridge, 1847.

7th Company Sasseram, Lieut.-Com. G. O. E. Carew, 1855.

8th do. Barackpore, Lieut.-Com. W. H. M. Davis, 1849.

9th Company, Patna, Lieut.-Com. D. S. Durell, 1854.

10th Company, Jeypore, Lieut.-Com. A. T. Windus, 1851.

11th Company, Andaman Islands, Lieut.-Com. H. Jackson, 1855.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

Commander to be Captain—John Stephens, 1848.

Lieutenant to be Commander—R. A. Straddling, 1844.

Mates to be Lieutenants—R. B. Leefe, 1854 H. J. Edwardes, 1856.

APPOINTMENTS.

Captain—J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, to Acbar, Flag-ship.

Lieutenants—L. G. Lewis, acting, 1856; C. E. Beddome, acting, 1859; C. Forster, 1856; A. D. Taylor, 1847; R. Williams, acting, 1855, to Acbar; J. G. Nixon, 1847, to command sc. gunbt. Clyde; C. E. Brooman, 1848, to command Elphinstone; F. W. Shottowe, 1856, to Semiramis; J. Brebner, acting, 1859, to Semiramis; C. V. D'Arcy, acting, 1858, to Elphinstone; B. Ch. S. Clarke, acting, 1859, to Elphinstone; F. L. Seaton, acting, 1857, to Ferooz; J. Clarke, 1857, to Aukland; J. B. Dickson, 1851, to to command Constance; C. E. Beddome, acting 1859, to be Inspector of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company; R. B. Leefe, to be Superintendent of Pattimars.

Acting Masters—D. Whit e, 1858, to command Pleiad.

Midshipmen—J. D. Budd; H. W. Estridge; H. Hewer to Acbar; W. Marshall; J. A. Kettley to Elphinstone; C. Williams; R. Richmond to Semiramis; A. Cambell to Assaye.

Clerks—F. W. Daniell, to Indus Flotilla; H. Barrett to Assaye; A. T. Shuttleworth, 1855, to Clyde, in charge; A. S. Finlinson to Semiramis, in charge.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

NAVY.

ADMIRALTY, AUG. 26.

Corps of Royal Marines—Mr. Robert Bedford Hitchcock, gent., to be Second Lieutenant.

ADMIRALTY, SEPT. 20.

Corps of Royal Marines—Second Lieutenant William Davis Welch to be First Lieutenant, vice Inglis, deceased; Second Lieutenant William Stewart to be First Lieutenant, vice H. Wolrige, deceased.

PROMOTIONS.

Commander to be Captain—Richard James Viscount Gilford, 1858.

Lieutenant to be Commander—Warren H. Anderson, 1849, from the Royal yacht.

Second Master to be Master—Daniel J. May, 1854.

APPOINTMENTS.

Rear Admiral—Lewis Tobias Jones, C.B., to be Second in Command on the *East India and China Station.*

Captains.—Lord John Hay, C.B., 1854, to *Odin*; Roderick Dew, 1858, to *Encounter*; R. D. White, 1856, to *Madagascar*, vice Commander Leycester, superseded at his own request; E. S. Sotheby, C.B., extra Aide-de-Camp, to be Naval Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, vice Captain Robb, deceased; H. Dunlop to be Commodore of the West India Station, vice Kellet, service expired.

Commanders — Sir Malcolm Mac Gregor, Bart., 1856, to *Arrogant*, for service in *Meander*; E. D'O. D'A. Aplin, 1853, to *Centaur*; George F. Day, V.C., 1855, to *Sphinx*; R. G. Craigie, 1856, to *Ringdove*; Henry Harvey, 1857, to *Snake*; J. G. Goodenough, 1858, to *Renard*; Edward Hay, 1858, to *Beagle*; Patrick C. C. McDougall, 1856, to *Mohawk*; Richard Studdert, 1849, to *Wellesley.*

Lieutenants to Command Gunboats—Charles Fairholme, 1851, to *Havock*; H. L. Holder, 1854, to *Cockchafer*; A. G. Bogle, 1855, to *Hardy*; William Howorth, 1856, to *Weazel.*

Lieutenants—E. F. Weld, 1855, and W. B. H. M. Heron, 1859, to *Encounter*; F. W. Prosser, 1859, to *Centaur*; C. R. F. Boxer, 1855, and R. FitzRoy, 1859, to *Odin*; J. F. L. P. Maclear, 1859, to *Sphinx*; C. A. Watts, 1859, to *Renard*; H. C. Streeten, 1859, to *Ringdove*; H. P. Denniston, 1859, and W. A. K. Craven, 1859, to *Pearl*; G. W. Carter, 1855, to *Melpomene*; Hon. M. R. Wingfield, 1859, to *Nile*; Hon. A. K. H. Legge, 1858, to *Edgar*; C. H. Wilkinson, 1855, to *Odin*; W. R. Hobson, 1855, additional, to *Victory*; W. H. Royse, 1859, to *Snake*; Loftus T. Jones, 1857, to be Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral L. T. Jones; R. J. St. Auby, 1841, (additional) to *Pembroke*; W. A. Smyth, 1854, to *Clio*; S. P. Townsend, 1852, commanding the *Boxer*, to the Royal yacht *Victoria and Albert*, vice Anderson; H. L. Holder, 1854, to *Edgar*; W. T. W. Hambly, 1854, to *Pearl*; A. W. Ingles, 1858, to *Mersey*; W. H. Annesley, 1855 to *Royal Albert*; Louis Geneste, 1859 to *Topaze.*

Surgeons—W. H. Clarke, 1856, to *Tortoise*; J. B. Ricards, 1854, to *Simoom*; W. McK. Saunders, M.D., 1850, to *Renown*; James G. Risk, 1846, to *Conqueror*; L. C. Urquhart, M.D., 1846, to *Renown.*

Assistant Surgeons—F. D. Graham, 1856, additional, to *Victory*; H. S. Smart, M.D., 1857, to *Pearl*; C. R. Lamb, 1856, additional, to *Victory*; S. Little, M.D. (Acting), to *Vulcan.*

Masters—James O. Jones, 1859, to *Urgent*; J. M. Hockly, 1855, to *Odin*; W. H. Fawckner, 1856, to *Encounter*; J. D. Switzer, 1859, to *Renard*; Francis Taylor, 1855, to *Sphinx*; Daniel J. May, 1859, to *Ringdove*; J. H. Lawrence, 1859, to *Centaur.*

Mates—H. H. Boys, 1858, to *Pearl*; S. R. Huntley, 1859, acting, to *Arrogant*; Henry Salmond, 1859, to *Trafalgar*; W. L. Martin, 1859, to *Cæsar*; J. V. D. Butler, 1859, to *Royal Albert*; J. G. F. Leacock, to *Algiers*; H. B. Hamersley, 1857, to *Mersey.*

Chief Engineer—Charles A. O'Dwyer, 1857, to *Mersey.*

Paymaster—G. P. Rickcord, 1842, to be Secretary to Rear Admiral Elliott; H. W. Death, 1853, to *Odin*; J. B. Jackson, 1854 to *Encounter*; John Wotton, 1859, to *Renard*; J. H. S. Hooper, 1856 (additional), to *Victory*; H. C. Pool, 1852, to *Pearl*; Richard Curgenven, 1852, to be Secretary to Rear

al L. T. Jones ; C. W. Harris, o *Sphinx* ; F. C. Fleuley, 1859, *taur* ; William Thom, 1854, to .

stant Paymasters-in-Charge—C. apcote, 1851, to *Snake* ; J. K. , 1854, to *Ringdove* ; J. B. Raw- 1854, to *Beagle* ; G. F. Slaughter, o *Hastings* ; G. F. Norman, 1851, ge to *Dasher* ; J. Bright to *Done-*

d Masters—W. L. Dodds, 1858, *dy* ; Edward Colburne, 1857, to ; Thomas Steel to *Cockchafer-hipmen*—Hon. Victor A. Mon. *Algiers*, C. B. Charlewood to Perceval Briggs to *Imperieuse* ; Wilmot to *Aboukir* ; P. B. Nind *erieuse* ; H. H. A'Court to *Hero* ; Harford to *Arrogant* ; A. B. to *Marlborough* ; R. F. Ham- *Melpomene* ; Hon. A. F. Hood *falgar*.

ks—F. H. Chown, to be Secre- Clerk to the Captain of the Chan- et ; C. W. Watson to *Trafalgar* ; d Tisdall to *Donegal* ; Clarence to *Mars* ; G. M. O. Higginson to ; J. T. Syme to *Queen Charlotte* ; od to *Pembroke*.

stant Clerk—R. Olivey to *St.* .

d Cadets—H. F. P. Popham, A. sley, Thomas Suckling, A. W. E. T. Piper, E. Rooke, and W. T. Morgan (additional), to *Marlborough*, for disposal ; Hon. E. A. T. Pery to *Agamemnon* ; C. R. Pelly to *Trafalgar* ; F. W. E. Kuper to *Terrible* ; H. F. H. Hallett and A. de C. Crawford to *Melpomene* ; F. J. Rendell, H. P. Wylly, and E. I. N. Taylor to Mars ; W. F. Murray to *Amphion* ; G. T. Burn, E. B. Boyle, and J. H. Bainbridge to *Imperieuse* ; T. H. Broughton to *Edgar* ; and G. R. Green to *Aboukir*, to complete their complements.

Masters' Assistants—G. E. G. Jackson to *Pearl* ; J. N. Compton to *Arrogant* ; W. M. Savage to *Imperieuse* ; R. H. Warren to *Agamemnon* ; W. J. Strong to *Trafalgar* ; W. B. P. Thompson to *Donegal* ; Albert Giles to *Topaze* ; W. D. Rust to *Mars*.

COAST GUARD.

APPOINTMENTS—*Chief Officer*—Lieut. Robert J. St. Aubyn to Shoeburyness Station.

Commander — George B. Jeffreys, 1852, re-appointed to the Leath Station as Inspecting Commander for one year.

REMOVALS—*Chief Officers*—Lieutenant Thos. Coppinger, from Crosshaven to Ardmore. Mr. George Stovin, from Whitegate to Crosshaven. Mr. J. Spracklin, Acting Chief Officer Elmly Ferry to the Reculvers Station, vice Wrake, previously removed.

ARMY.

WAR OFFICE, Aug. 30.

llowing Commissions to bear date August 30.)

Life Guards—Capt. the Hon. D. gerald De Ros to be Major and Col., by purchase, vice Hogg, tires ; Lieut. Lord Charles W. ice to be Capt. by purchase, vice s ; Cornet and Sub-Lieut. J. H. d Earlsfort to be Lieut. by pur- vice Bruce ; H. J. R. Osborne to be Cornet and Sub-Lieut. by se, vice Lord Earlsfort.

Dragoon Guards — Brevet Col. Bentinck, from the 7th Dragoon s, to be Lieut. Col., vice Forrest, echanges.

Dragoon Guards — Lieut. Col. Forrest, from the 4th Dragoon Guards, to be Lieut. Col., vice Brevet Col. Bentinck, who exchanges.

11th Light Dragoons—Lieut. A. C. Tempest to be Capt. by purchase, vice Shells, who retires ; Cornet F. De Burgh to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Tempest.

10th Foot—Capt. A. C. Bogle, from the 13th Foot, to be Capt., vice Robertson, who exchanges.

13th—Capt. T. C. Robertson, from the 10th Foot, to be Capt., vice Bogle, who exchanges.

18th— Lieut. W. T. Le Brun has been permitted to retire from the Service by the sale of his Commission.

20th—R. N. Bird, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Bowlby, promoted.

21st—Lieut. A. Holt to be Capt., by purchase, vice Lee, who retires ; Ensign

S. H. Hayes. to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Blennerhasset, who retires; Ensign E. Bussell, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Holt, promoted.

24th—C. J. Bromhead, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Bland, appointed to the 62nd Foot.

33rd—Lieut. J. Trent to be Capt., without purchase, vice Brevet Major Quayle, deceased; Ensign H. G. Boyd to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Trent, May 28.

48th—Lieut. W. Cumming to be Capt. by purchase, vice Welby, who retires; Ensign C. H. Chauncy to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Cumming.

49th—Ensign A. D. Fordyce to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Blackmore, who retires.

56th—J. P. Burnett, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice M'Dowall, who retires.

61st—Ensign E. W. Rumsey to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Daly, who retires.

69th—A. Irvine, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice M. Innes, appointed to the Rifle Brigade.

71st—E. G. Lillingston. gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Cane, promoted.

99th—Lieut. W. J. Kempson to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Molson, who has retired, Aug. 7.

Depot Battalion—Captain W. A. Cairnes, 48th Foot, to be Instructor of Musketry, Aug. 9. Quartermaster A. M. Gregor, from the 42nd Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Simpson, appointed Paymaster, 41st Foot.

BREVET.—Capt. H. Francis, of the 64th Foot, to be Major in the Army, March 24, 1858.

The Commissions of the undermentioned Officers of Her Majesty's Indian Forces to bear date as follow, viz. :—Major Gen. C. Wahab, Madras Infantry, May 6. Major Gen. J. Manson, Bengal Infantry, May 15. Major Gen. G. Twemlow, Bengal Artillery, May 17. Major Gen. T. A. Duke, Madras Infantry, May 26.

The undermentioned promotions to take place in Her Majesty's Indian Forces consequent on the death of Major Gen. L. W. Watson, Madras Infantry, May 5. Major Gen. J. Stuart, C.B., Bengal Infantry, July 19.

To be Major Generals—Col. N. Jones, Bengal Infantry, May 30. Col. J. C. C. Gray, Bengal Infantry, July 20.

The second Christian name of Capt. Tennant, Bengal Engineers, promoted to the Brevet rank of Major, in the *London Gazette* of the 11th March last is Francis, and not Frederick, as therein stated.

The Commission of Brevet Major Thomas Raikes, 1st Madras European Fusiliers to be dated 24th March, 1858 instead of 20th July, 1858, as previously stated.

The undermentioned Officers of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, retired on Full Pay, to have a step of honorary rank as follows, viz :—

To be Major Generals—Col. Blood, Bombay Artillery; Col. T. Chalon, Madras Infantry; Col. Sir Seaton, K.C.B., Bengal Infantry.

To be Colonels—Lieut. Col. R. Ba say, Bengal Infantry; Lieut. Col. Graham, Bombay Engineers.

To be Lieut. Cols.—Major C. Burt, Bengal Infantry; Major Haines, Madras Infantry; Major T. Steuart, Bombay Infantry; Major Hillyard, Madras Infantry; Maj. F. Hawkins, Madras Infantry.

To be Majors—Capt. F. Gray, Madras Infantry; Capt. E. Magnay, Bengal Infantry.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

2nd West Yorkshire Yeomanry Cavalry—W. F. Kennedy, gent., to be Cornet, vice Sir W. R. C. Cooke, Bart. promoted.

Brecknock Volunteer Rifles—Capt. H. G. Lindsay, late Rifle Brigade, to be Captain of the 1st Company.

Brecknock Royal Rifles—E. T. Lewis, gent., to be Lieut., vice M. L. Fredericks, resigned.

Royal Lancashire Artillery—Second Lieut. W. F. Fosbery to be First Lieut. vice T. Gawne, resigned.

Ilford Volunteer Rifles—J. C. Davis, Esq., to be Captain.

Kent Artillery—J. C. A. Bones to be Second Lieut., vice Elliston, promoted.

1st Company of Dorsetshire Volunteer Rifles—H. A. Templer, Esq., to be Captain; H. S. Edwards, gent., to be Lieut.; W. Hounsell, gent., to be Ensign.

Northumberland and Newcastle Regiment of Volunteer Yeomanry Cavalry—Lieut. C. E. Cookson to be Captain, vice Butler, resigned; Cornet M. Woods to be Lieut., vice Cookson, promoted; T. S. Bramwell, gent., to be Cornet, vice Woods, promoted.

Worcestershire—W. P. Howell, Esq., to be Capt., vice Hawkins, promoted; Lieut. R. Davies to be Capt., vice J. Oldham, resigned.

Northumberland Artillery—Alterations in the dates of Commissions—W. Gethrin to be Second Lieut.; dated June 3, 1859, instead of June 7, 1859, as formerly gazetted. P. C. Stanhope to be Capt.; dated June 7, 1859, instead of July 1, 1859, as formerly gazetted.

Warwickshire Yeomanry Cavalry—B. Winthrop, gent., to be Cornet, vice Muntz, promoted; Sir C. Mordaunt, Bart., M.P., to be Cornet, vice Sheldon, resigned; the Hon. H. Somerville to be Cornet, vice Chamberlayne, resigned.

Warwickshire—1st Regiment—Lieut W. A. Norton, resigned. 2nd Regiment—Ensign J. Franklyn, resigned.

4th Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles—S. Aitken, gent., to be Lieut.

6th Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles—F. Ashton, Esq., to be Captain.

8th Company of Lancashire Volunteer Rifles—J. Hutchinson, Esq., to be Captain; W. H. Price, gent., to be Lieut.; O. O. Walker the younger, gent., to be Ensign.

Hampshire Artillery—G. S. Lynch to be Second Lieut., vice Mansel, promoted.

North York Rifles—W. Watson, gent., to be Lieut.

2nd Royal Lanarkshire—A. Roger, gent., to be Ensign, vice Grier, resigned; T. A. Ogle, gent., to be Ensign, vice W. H. Bower, promoted.

Shropshire—Ensign G. A. Patten to be Lieut., vice Powell, resigned.

WAR-OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 9.

(*The following commissions to bear date September 9.*)

1st Regiment of Life Guards—The surname of the Cornet and Sub-Lieut., appointed in the *Gazette* of 30th ult., is Osborn, and not Osborne, as therein stated.

14th Light Dragoons—Lieut. J. Giles to be Adjutant, vice Clements, promoted to the 6th Dragoons.

1st Regiment of Foot—L. F. Scott, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Palliser, promoted; J. Hammond, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Gilmour, promoted in the 21st Foot, Sept. 10.

9th—Capt. the Hon. F. Le Poer Trench, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Captain, vice Daunt, promoted without purchase to an Unattached Majority.

12th—Capt. S. H. Harford, from the 56th Foot, to be Captain, vice Colt, who exchanges.

16th—L. B. A. Poynter, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Freeman, promoted.

22nd—A. G. Richards, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice French, promoted.

36th—Lieut. A. F. Stewart to be Captain by purchase, vice Dashwood, who retires; Ensign C. Wilson to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Stewart; E. S. Bond, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Wilson.

45th—Ensign R. J. Callwell to be Instructor of Musketry, July 26.

56th—Capt. C. R. Colt, from the 12th Foot, to be Capt., vice Harford, who exchanges.

78th—Ensign H. A. Ingles to be Lieut. by purchase, vice W. W. Young, who retires.

2nd West India Regiment—Assistant Staff Surgeon G. H. Harris to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Frazer, appointed to the Staff.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Assistant Surg. W. P. Frazer, from the 2nd West India Regiment, to be Assistant Surg., vice Griffith, appointed to the Royal Artillery.

BREVET.—Captain and Brevet Maj. J. R. J. Coles, of the 9th Light Dragoons, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army; Captain E. N. Molesworth, of the 27th Foot, to be Major in the Army, June 3.

The following Paymasters, who retired upon Half Pay prior to the declaration of war with Russia, and who had completed in all a service of thirty years, twenty-five of which as Paymasters, to have the honorary rank of Maj., viz.:—L. M. M. Prior, on Half Pay of the 12th Light Dragoons; S. Rofe, on Half Pay of the 14th Light Dragoons; V. Raymond, on Half Pay of the 27th Foot; G. Moore, on Half Pay of the 32nd Foot; G. A. Durnford, on Half Pay of the 39th Foot; J. M. Pe[illegible]ington, on Half Pay of the 48th Foot; F. Dickson, on Half Pay of the 52nd Foot; G. A. Thompson, on Half Pay of the 85th Foot; E. Fugion, on Half Pay of a Depôt Battalion.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Shropshire—R. Phillips, gent., to be Ensign, vice H. M. Coyno, resigned.

6th Royal Lancashire—Lieut. W. Singleton to be Captain, vice W. Buchanan, resigned.

Yorkshire Hussar Yeomanry Cavalry (West Riding)—Capt. the Right Hon. H. Thynne, Earl of Harewood, to be Lieut. Col. Commandant, vice Colonel the Earl de Grey, who retires; Major the Right Hon. B. R. Baron Wenlock, to be Lieut. Colonel, vice Sir J. V. B. Johnstone, Bart., who retires.

3rd Surrey Company of Volunteer Rifle Corps—Lieut. R. Rouse to be Captain.

1st Surrey Company of Volunteer Rifle Corps—A. L. Irvine, Esq., to be Ensign.

Kent Volunteer Rifles, 1st Company —E. Scott, Esq., Major Unattached, to be Captain; W. Moore, Esq., to be Lieutenant; L. D. Wigan, gent., to be Ensign.

Royal Wilts—W. B. Pearse, gent., to be Adjutant, from the 8th of July, 1859, vice Bellers, resigned. C. C. Hurrell, gent., late Ensign in Cambridgeshire Militia, to be Ensign, vice Holman, promoted.

[The foregoing appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 23rd. Aug. last.]

Inverness-shire, &c., Highland Light Infantry—A. H. M'Nab, Esq., to be Lieutenant, vice Cameron, promoted.

The City of Edinburgh Rifle Volunteer Corps—The Lord Provost of Edinburgh for the time being to be Honorary Colonel; J. Moncrieff, Esq., M.P., to be Lieut. Colonel; Major D. Davidson to be Major. To be Captains—E. S. Gordon, Esq., J. A. Macrae, Esq., J. Anstruther, Esq., A. Dalzell, Esq., J. Webster, Esq., J. Maitland, Esq., S. Hay, Esq., D. McCallum, Esq., J. Gorrie, Esq., C. F. Shand, Esq. To be Lieutenants—A. T. Boyle, gent., A. W. Black, gent., T. G. Murray, gent., D. N. Coulson, gent., J. Carment, gent., T. G. Dickson, gent., G. M. Tytler, gent., J. Grant, gent., W. Blackwood, gent., A. Fullarton, gent. To be Ensigns—F. L. M. Heriot, gent., J. Ballantyne, gent., T. Mackenzie, gent., W. Turner, gent., D. T. Lees, gent., J. Howden, gent., J. Reid, gent., C. Scott, gent., R. R. Paterson, gent. To be Surgeon—D. Maclagan, M.D. To be Assistant Surgeon—P. H. Watson, M.D.

Bedfordshire—John Robert Grayson, Esq., to be Paymaster, May 14, 1858.

City of Edinburgh Artillery—F. Murdoch, gent., to be Quartermaster from 12th July, 1859; July 28.

1st or Western Norfolk—Adjutant H. P. L'Estrange to be Captain.

2nd or Eastern Norfolk—Major E. H. K. Lacon, Bart., to be Lieut. Colonel vice Mason, resigned; Captain J. Marcon, to be Major, vice Lacon, promoted, Aug. 31.

Warwickshire—2nd Regiment—Ensign J. S. Rudd, to be Lieutenant, vice Miller, resigned Sept. 1.

2nd King's Own Staffordshire—W. B. Powell, gent., to be Ensign, vice Martin, promoted; R. T. Atkins, gent., to be Ensign, vice Ripley, resigned, Sept. 1.

Queen's Own Staffordshire Yeomanry Cavalry—G. Lock, Esq., to be Captain, vice Alderley, resigned, Aug. 29; Cornet W. D. Sneyd, to be Lieutenant, vice Challinor, resigned; Earnest A. Worthington, gent., to be Cornet, vice Sneyd, promoted, Aug. 18; F. R. Spry, gent., to be Cornet, vice Dicken, resigned, Aug. 25.

2nd Duke of Lancaster's Own—Captain E. M. Seel, Lieutenant E. A. Lucas, and Ensign E. E. Bromilow, having been absent without leave, from two trainings, to be severally struck off the strength of the Regiment.

VOLUNTEER RIFLE CORPS.

Ilford—3rd. W. H Clifton, Esq., to be Lieut.; P. M. Harvey, to be Ensign, Aug. 27.

Monmouthshire—1st Company.—J. L. Balwyn, Esq., to be Captain; J. Evans, gent., to be Lieut.; J. P. Carruthers, gent., to be Ensign.

Cheshire—1st Company.—J. Cadell, Esq. to be Captain; H. J. Ward, gent. to be Lieut.; J. J. Conway, Esq., to be Ensign, Aug. 25.

Cheshire—2nd Company—V. A. King, Esq., to be Captain; W. Horner, gent., to be Lieut., Aug. 30.

Gloucestershire—4th Company—H. D. Cholmeley, Esq., to be Captain, Sept. 5; W. A. Freston, gent., to be Lieutenant; J. T. Woolwright, gent., to be Ensign. 5th Company—J. W. Hallewell, Esq., to be Captain; S. S. Dickinson, gent., to be Lieutenant; S. Biddell, gent., to be Ensign, Sept. 6. 6th Company—J. D. Hunt, Esq., to be Captain; A. T. Playne, gent., to be Ensign, Sept. 7.

fordshire—1st Sub-division—W. arvey, Esq., to be Lieutenant; rk, gent., to be Ensign, Sept. 1.

WAR OFFICE, SEPT. 16.

following Commissions to bear date September 16.)

Dragoon Guards—Cornet Joseph ion Persse FitzPatrick to be Lieu-, by purchase, vice Hay, promoted. t 26.

Light Dragoons—Cornet Hamlyn gdon Harris to be Lieutenant, by se, vice Orde, who retires.

al Artillery—Lieutenant Ernest nay Vaughan to be Second Cap-ice Boulton, who resigns. Sep-5.

tleman Cadet Henry Metcalfe to utenant. September 3.

eant-Major John Barnett, of the Horse Brigade, to be Riding r. August 27.

eant-Major G. Dunn of the Riding ishment, to be Riding Master. 27.

s Fusilier Guards—Lieutenant ptain Raymond Herbert White aptain and Lieutenant Colonel, chase, vice Loyd Lindsay, who

gn and Lieutenant Christopher Pemberton to be Lieutenant and a, by purchase, vice White.

James Hugh Henry, Marquis of rdine, to be Ensign and Lieut., chase, vice Pemberton.

tenant and Captain G. H. Mon-o be Adjutant, vice White, pro-

Foot—Lieutenant C. J. R. Tyler Captain, by purchase, vice Gore, ed.

gn T. Jones to be Lieut., by pur-ice Tyler.

J. H. Gordon, Esq., late Capt. yal Lancashire Militia to be Pay-vice Treve, who has resigned.

—Lieut. and Adjutant F. W. e has been permitted to resign the ncy only.

—Quartermaster T. Argent, from pe Mounted Riflemen, to be master, vice Landry, who ex-

—Captain J. Owens, from the ot, to be Captain, vice McKenzie, changes.

—Lieut. Col. A. A. Chapman, e 48th Foot, to be Lieut. Col., npbell, who exchanges.

20th—Ensign C. H. Webster to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Hoblyn, who retires.

33rd—Captain J. McKay McKenzie, from the 14th Foot, to be Captain, vice Owens, who exchanges.

34th—Quartermaster T. Rowan to be Paymaster, vice Percy, deceased.

35th—Brevet Lieut. Col. C. Beamish to be Lieut. Col., without purchase, vice Brevet Colonel E. H. Hutchinson, who retires on full pay; Captain and Brevet Major T. Teulon to be Major, without purchase, vice Beamish; Lieutenant J. Davis to be Captain, without purchase, vice Teulon.

48th—Lieut. Col. A. N. Campbell, from the 18th Foot, to be Lieut. Col., vice Chapman, who exchanges.

49th—E. G. Fenn, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Shirley, promoted. The restoration of Captain G. K. Chatfield to Full Pay to be dated the 10th, and not 9th Jan., 1857, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 17th Feb., 1857.

60th—Captain J. H. Archer, from the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment, to be Captain, vice McGill, who exchanges.

64th—Major and Brevet Lieut. Col. N. H. Shute, to be Lieutenant Colonel without purchase, vice Sibley, deceased, Sept. 2; Captain and Brevet Major Robert Mockler, to be Major without purchase, vice Shute, Sept. 2; Lieut. David M. Murray, to be Captain without purchase, vice Mockler, Sept. 2; Ensign W. Ash, to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Murray, Sept. 2; T. A. B. Wright, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Ash, promoted.

78th—W. C. Smith, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Ingles, promoted.

86th—Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet Colonel J. Creagh has been permitted to retire on Full Pay, under the provisions of the 37th clause of the Royal Warrant of 14th October, 1858.

92nd—Lieut. T. Gordon to be Capt. by purchase, vice Brevet Major Rethune, who retires.

94th—Ensign F. French to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Paley, deceased, July 12.

100th—G. J. Skinner, gent., to be Ensign without purchase.

2nd West India Regiment—Ensign F. L. Mathews to be Inspector of Musketry, vice Franklin, appointed to the 45th Foot, July 27.

Cape Mounted Riflemen—Quarter-

master J. Landrey, from the 13th Foot, to be Quartermaster, vice Argent, who exchanges.

Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Captain J. S. D. McGill, from the 60th Foot, to be Captain, vice Archer, who exchanges.

HOSPITAL STAFF—Surgeon Major J. Savage, M.D., of the Royal Artillery, who retires on Half Pay, to have the honorary rank of Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, in accordance with Article 24 of Royal Warrant of 1st October, 1858.

ROYAL MILITARY ASYLUM—Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, W. Lucas, upon Half Pay, to be Surgeon, vice Dr. Balfour, promoted to be Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals on the Staff at Head Quarters.

BREVET—Major General Sir J. L. Pennefather, K.C.B., to have the local rank of Lieutenant General in Great Britain while commanding the Troops in the Northern District, Oct. 1; Major General Sir J. Gaspard Le Marchant to have the local rank of Lieut. General in Malta, Oct. 1; Brevet Colonel E. H. Hutchinson, Retired Full Pay 35th Foot, to be Major General, the rank being honorary only. The commission of Captain E. Palmer, of the Royal Artillery, to be Major in the Army, to be ante-dated to 20th July, 1858. The undermentioned Officers of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, retired on Full Pay since the 14th October, 1858, to have a step of honorary rank, as follows:

To be Major Generals—Brevet Col. J. Ramsay, Bengal Infantry, January 18; Brevet Colonel T. J. Nuthall, Bengal Infantry, March 18; Brevet Colonel A. Cuppage, Madras Infantry, March 18; Brevet Colonel F. C. Cotton, Madras Engineers, April 22; Captain C. C. G. Ross, of the 66th Ghoorka Light Infantry, to be Major in the Army, March 24, 1858.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Royal Sherwood Foresters, or Nottinghamshire—Lieut. W. F. Scully to be Captain, vice Stanhope, resigned; Ensign W. Ainsworth to be Lieutenant, vice Jameson, resigned; Ensign J. Burne, to be Lieutenant, vice Scully, promoted; Aug. 22. The Queen has accepted the resignation of the Commission held by Ensign R. F. B. S. Clair, Aug. 5.

Durham Artillery—Lieut. Col. H. Stobart to be Honorary Colonel; Major G. Hall, late of the Lancashire Artillery Militia, to be Lieut. Col. Commandant, vice Stobart, Sept. 6.

North Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry—Assistant Surgeon Boodle to be Surgeon, vice Crang, resigned, Aug. 31.

Warwickshire Yeomanry Cavalry—J. D. W. Digby, gent., to be Cornet, vice Wilson, resigned, Sept. 9.

VOLUNTEER RIFLES GAZETTE.

Althorp Company—The Right Hon. J. P. Earl Spencer to be Captain, Aug. 29.

Reigate—4th Surrey Company—The Hon. W. J. Monson to be Captain; F. H. Beaumont, Esq., to be Lieutenant; H. Lainson, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 2.

Richmond—1st Surrey Subdivision—M. Yeatman, Esq., to be Lieutenant; O. Ommaney, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 2.

The following appointments are substituted for those which appeared in the *Gazette* of 23rd August.

Northumberland—1st Company—E. Potter, Esq., to be Captain; J. Fawcus, gent., to be Ensign, Aug 16.

WAR OFFICE, SEPT. 23.

(*The following Commissions to bear date September* 23.)

8th Light Dragoons—Cornet J. G. Stopford, from the 18th Light Dragoons, to be Cornet, vice W. N. Franklyn, who has been superseded, being absent without leave.

12th Light Dragoons—Lieut. W. L. Browne, from the 7th Foot, to be Lieutenant, paying the difference between Infantry and Cavalry, vice Stoddart, who exchanges, June 11.

15th Light Dragoons—Brevet Colonel H. Shipwith, from half pay 44th Foot, to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Brevet Col. G. W. Key, who exchanges, receiving the difference between Infantry and Cavalry; Major T. R. Crawley to be Lieutenant Colonel, by purchase, vice Brevet Colonel Skipwith, who retires; Captain H. Lee to be Major, by purchase, vice Crawley; Lieutenant E. Walker to be Captain, by purchase, vice Lee; Cornet B. Burrell to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Walker.

1st Foot—Assistant Surgeon M. L. White, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surgeon, vice O'Grady, cashiered, June 1.

6th—Captain J. A. Brockman, from the 28th Foot, to be Captain, vice Preston, who exchanges; Ensign D. B. Moriarty to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice James, deceased, July 30.

7th—Lieutenant J. H. R. Stoddart,

he 12th Light Dragoons, to be
nant, vice Browne, who exchanges,
1.
—Captain W. E. Newall, from the
oot, to be Captain, vice McGrigor,
changes, July 19; Serjeant Major
tinge to be Quartermaster, vice
ton, deceased.
—Captain J. J. Gordon, from the
oot, to be Captain, vice Branfill,
changes.
—Lieut. F. A. Macreight to be
n, by purchase, vice Brevet Major
or, promoted; Ensign R. F. Bros
Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Mac-

—Lieut. R. Cook to be Adjutant,
. H. Sherwood, who resigns the
ncy only.
—Captain J. W. Preston, from
Foot, to be Captain, vice Brock-
who exchanges.
—Ensign L. Nunn, from the 66th
o be Ensign, vice Addison, who
ges.
—Ensign W. L. Knowles, to be
nant without purchase, vice Twis-
ceased, Aug. 25.
—Ensign A. C. Addison, from
th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Nunn,
changes.
—Captain G. J. A. Oakley, from
h Foot, to be Captain, vice Sparke,
changes.
—Ensign C. Rogers to be Lieu-
by purchase, vice Wigham, pro-

—Ensign T. B. Dougal to be
nant without purchase, vice How-
eceased, Sept. 9.
—Captain J. F. Sparke, from the
oot, to be Captain, vice Oakley,
changes.
—Captain B. A. Branfill, from the
oot, to be Captain, vice Gordon,
changes.
—Captain R. L. G. McGrigor,
he 8th Foot, to be Captain, vice
l, who exchanges, July 19.
—Captain C. W. A. T. Kenny,
Half Pay Gold Coast Artillery
to be Captain, vice Drew, ap-
d Adjutant of a Depot Battalion.
—Major L. W. Dewar, from a
Battalion, to be Major, vice Chi-
, who exchanges.
West India Regiment—Lieut. H.
ter to be Adjutant, vice Edmunds,
signs the Adjutancy only.
West India Regiment—Capt. W.
gent, from Half Pay 33rd Foot,
Captain, vice O'Flanaghan, who
ges; Lieut. F. W. J. Dugmore,
Captain, by purchase, vice Nugent,
tires.

Cape Mounted Riflemen—Ensign J. H. Randell to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Crossman, who retires.

Hospital Staff.—Staff Surgeon John Donald, having completed twenty years' Full Pay service, to be Surgeon Major, under the Royal Warrant of the 1st October, 1858, Aug. 23; Assistant Surgeon C. H. Browne, from the 86th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces, vice White, appointed to the 1st Foot.

Depot Battalion.—Major C. R. Chichester, from the 97th Foot, to be Major, vice Dewar, who exchanges.

Unattached.—Lieut. and Adjutant J. M'Queen, from the 9th Foot, to be Captain without purchase.

Brevet.—The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent upon the death of Major General Sir W. Eyre, K.C.B., on the 8th September, 1859:—Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B., Lieut. Colonel Half Pay Unattached, to be Major General, Sept. 9; Lieut. Col. R. C. Lloyd, of the 68th Foot, to be Colonel, Sept. 9; Brevet Major G. W. Meehan, Captain Half Pay Unattached, Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Lieut. Colonel, Sept. 9; Capt. R. Burnaby, of the Royal Engineers, to be Major, Sept. 9.

Lieut. Colonel H. R. Benson, of the 17th Light Dragoons, to be Colonel in the Army; Capt. D. S. Greene, of the Royal Artillery, to be Major in the Army, March 24, 1858.

Memorandum.—The exchange between Lieut. G. Herrick, 5th Foot, and Lieut. F. Bolger, 13th Foot, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 8th July, has been cancelled, Sept. 13.

WAR OFFICE, Sept. 23.

Memorandum.—Lieut. T. E. Pinkett having obtained a First Class Certificate at the School of Musketry at Hythe, has been appointed by the General Commanding-in-Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, to act as Instructor of Musketry to the Royal Wiltshire Militia, Aug. 1.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Repton and Gresley Troop of Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet R. Smith to be Lieut., vice Mousley, resigned; H. Boden, Esq., jun., to be Cornet, vice Smith, promoted.

1st Derbyshire—J. G. Robinson, Esq., to be Lieutenant, vice Peach, promoted; W. L. Coke, Esq., to be Lieutenant, vice Hallewell, resigned.

4th or Duke of Lancaster's Own (Light Infantry) Royal Lancashire—

Assist. Surgeon T. B. Eccleston to be Surgeon, vice T. B. Whitehead, resigned; C. White, gent., to be Assistant Surgeon, vice T. B. Eccleston, promoted.

2nd or Eastern Norfolk—Lieut. C. F. Allen to be Captain, vice Marcon, promoted.

1st Devon—J. Tyrrell to be Lieut., vice Byles, resigned; G. A. Pollard to be Lieutenant.

Argyll and Bute—J. Hoyle, Esq., to be Captain.

76th or Highland Light Infantry—J. Grant, Esq., to be Lieutenant, vice Young, resigned; T. Scott, Esq., to be Ensign, vice Grant, promoted.

Yorkshire Hussar Yeomanry Cavalry (West Riding)—Capt. F. H. Wood to be Major, vice Lord Wenlock, promoted; Lieut. the Hon. G. E. Lascelles to be Captain, vice the Earl of Harewood, promoted; Lieut. E. C. Taylor to be Captain, vice Wood, promoted; Lieut. T. G. Teale to be Captain, vice Calverly, who retires; Cornet R. H. Bower to be Lieutenant, vice Lascelles, promoted; Cornet H. F. C. Vyner to be Lieutenant, vice Taylor, promoted; W. Ingilby, gent, to be Cornet, vice Bower, promoted.

Royal Sherwood Foresters or Nottingham—The Queen has accepted the resignation of the Commission held by Ensign G. Wood.

King's Own Light Infantry—Capt. C. Adams to be Major, vice Kitson, who retires.

Norfolk Artillery—First Lieut. E. H. Rust D'Eye to be Capt., vice North, resigned; Second Lieut. Count Melchior Gurowski de Wezle to be First Lieut., vice D'Eye, promoted.

Warwickshire 2nd Regiment — C. Bunbury, gent., to be Ensign, vice H. Bathurst, resigned; J. J. Howard, gent., to be Ensign, vice J. Franklyn, resigned.

Royal Carnarvonshire—C. A. Delmar, (late a Lieut. in Her Majesty's 9th Regiment of Lancers), to be Capt., vice F. M. Allen, appointed to the 3rd West York Regiment of Militia.

3rd Royal Surrey—Lieut. S. Leo Schuster to be Capt.

Royal Sherwood Foresters or Nottinghamshire—The Queen has accepted the resignation of the Commission held by Ensign G. Wood.

VOLUNTEER RIFLE CORPS.

GAZETTE.

1st Company of Leicester Rifle Volunteers—M. Turner, Esq., to be Capt.; Brewin, gent., to be Lieut.; S. [illegible], gent., to be Ensign.

1st Company of Berkshire Volunteer Rifles—Sir C. S. P. Hunter, Bart., to be Capt. Commandant.

Colchester and East Essex, or 1st Volunteer Rifle Sub-division—Sir C.W. Champion de Crespigny, Bart., to be Lieut.; J. F. Bishop, Esq., to be Ensign.

Devonshire Volunteer Artillery—R. Brent, D.M., to be Capt. of the 1st Company; H. Adney, to be Lieut. of the 1st Company; J. Holman, jun., to be Second Lieut. of the 1st Company.

3rd Company of Cheshire Volunteer Rifles—W. Chambers, Esq., to be Capt.; J. Harrison, gent., to be Lieut.; G. S. Lance, gent., to be Ensign.

4th Company of Cheshire Volunteer Rifles—F. P Jones, late Capt. 4th Dragoon Guards, to be Capt.; A. Walford, gent., to be Lieut.; W. S. Bower gent., to be Ensign.

Renfrewshire Volunteer Rifles—1st Company—D. M. Latham, gent., late Capt. Prince of Wales Renfrew Militia, to be Capt,; D. F. Dempster, gent., to be Lieut.; S. Neill, gent. to be Ensign. 2nd Company—F. R. Reid, gent., late Capt. Prince of Wales Royal Regiment of Renfrew Militia, to be Capt.; J. Stewart, gent., to be Lieut.; W. Ross, gent. to be Ensign.

1st Company—West Riding of Yorkshire Volunteer Rifles—Major G. Briggs, late of the 1st King's Dragoon Guards, to be Capt.; E. Lloyd, gent., to be Lieut.; T. H. Severne, gent., to be Ensign.

Bristol Regiment of Rifle Volunteers—The Mayor of Bristol for the time being to be Honorary Col.; Major R. Bush to be Lieut. Col.; Capt. H. B. O. Savile to be Major; J. Bates, Esq., to be Capt.; W. Wright, Esq., to be Capt.; C. Lucas, Esq., to be Capt.; A. Lighton, Esq., to be Capt.; Charles Ringer, Esq., to be Capt.; J. E. Pattenson, Esq., to be Capt.; H. Goodeve, Esq., to be Capt.; S. E. Taylor, Esq., to be Capt.; W. Fuidge, gent., to be Lieut.; P Hammonds, gent., to be Lieut.; P. D. Alexander, gent., to be Lieut.; A. R. Miller, gent., to be Lieut.; C. H. Prichard, gent., to be Lieut.; W. Brittan, gent., to be Lieut.; F. F. Fox, gent., to be Lieut.; E. Poole, gent., to be Lieut.; J. C. Aiken, gent., to be Ensign; G. L. King, gent.. to be Ensign; E. M. Harwood, gent., to be Ensign; M. Whitwill, gent., to be Ensign; J. Gibbs, gent., to be Ensign; C. Bevan, gent., to be Ensign; F. Pinney, gent., to be Ensign; R. W. R. Hassell, gent., to be Ensign; H. A. Hore, gent., to be Surgeon; C. Leonard, gent., to be Assist. Surgeon; D. Burges, gent., to be Quartermaster.

MANNING THE NAVY.

In order to arrive at the source from whence springs the difficulty experienced in obtaining men for the navy, it is necessary to revert to the past treatment which naval seamen have been subjected to. Irrespective of corporal punishment, sometimes needless, inflicted by officers who had no other cure for misconduct than the lash, or heavy secondary punishment, the men have suffered from mistaken indulgence. With a view to render them a service, the Admiralty some years ago permitted seamen to allot the half of their wages to any one whom they pleased to name. One consequence of this freedom was the organization of a system of plunder. Naval seamen became food for the seaport harpies, who flourished and fattened upon the pecuniary vitals of these thoughtless fellows. Captain Johnston, the Manager of the Sailors' Home at Portsmouth, stated to the Manning Commissioners that he had known instances of publicans holding as many as fifty allotments of half pay from sailors, and that women of the town, under the appellation of "sisters," enjoyed numerous allotments from their several good-natured dupes. And he quoted one striking instance in which a man who had acted as steward of the Sailors' Home, had received £46 upon a seaman's allotment, which, as the man lived to return, was recovered with difficulty, and, had he died, would have remained in possession of the allottee.

The practice was to advance small sums of money to sailors to be repaid by allotment of half pay, as a matter of course at cent. per cent. interest; so that men, on returning after four or five years' absence, found only a very small balance due to them.

This was a revival of the method of plunder practised during the French war, by the Jews, when men were induced, for "a mess of pottage," to sell their prospective claim to prize money. The "boon," as the Admiralty intended it should be, was therefore turned into a great injury, and many of the victims have in all probability visited upon the Naval Service sins due only to their own folly. The Commissioners reported strongly against this practice, and the regulation has since been rescinded, so that men will in future only be able to grant half pay allotments to a parent or a wife.

The hulk system has also operated most injuriously for the service. Merchant seamen do not, as a general rule, embark on board their ships until the vessel is loaded and ready to sail. He then leaves the "Home" in which, if a sensible man, he has been comfortably located, and, on signing articles, receives his advance note, and is away to sea. The naval seaman, on the other hand, joins the "Flirt" or "Frolic," just as her pendant is hoisted. The ship is in dock, or fitting for sea in the basin, and the crew are "hulked" on board an old line-of-battle ship, or frigate, until the "Flirt" or "Frolic," as the case may be, is ready to take them on board—a period, it may be, of months. Here he experiences much discomfort, and, if he wishes to go on shore, has to submit to all the annoyances of liberty boats, going and coming, or pay for waterage. This evil might be obviated by having a commodious building in, or im-

mediately adjacent to, the Royal Dockyards. Strange to say, however, this project was not favourably entertained by the Royal Commissioners, and the hulk nuisance, owing to the leaning towards it on the part of a certain influential Commissioner, bids fair to be perpetuated. One of the Commissioners was known to be a staunch advocate for hulks, another for barracks. The latter put the case in a very strong light when questioning Captain Preedy, one of the witnesses who, it was evident, was strongly imbued with the old hulk principle.

"Suppose," asked Admiral Shepherd, "that upon your being appointed to the command of one of Her Majesty's ships, you went down to Portsmouth, and found established on the Common Hard, a barrack, with one door communicating with the dockyard, and another gate with the street; that upon going round this barrack, you saw a comfortable mess-room and sleeping-place, all arranged; that on going outside, you saw a place for fitting and rigging, and another for painting; and in another place you saw a washing ground, and a drying ground; and, added to all this, guns mounted, with the necessary gear for exercise whenever the men could spare half an hour. When you saw all these things, and everything else that was requisite, and you were asked, Which do you prefer, the barrack or the hulk? which would you select?" "I consider," said the partizan of the hulk commissioner, "that the *settling down* duties begin at once on board a hulk," &c.

"But," again asked Admiral Shepherd, "suppose that you have done your work in the dockyard, and all the people have returned to the barrack, would it not be very agreeable to you to say to the officer, 'Let the men have a run?' You would not have to send them in boats in bad weather, but the gates would be open for them to go out and come in again, and afterwards, instead of being cut off from the hulk for a whole night, they would be able to return to the barrack at about ten or eleven o'clock, instead of sleeping on shore, or spending their money for beds." The strong argument conveyed in the question failed to elicit a favourable reply from the officer to whom it was addressed, but it must approve itself, nevertheless, to every unbiassed mind.

If we would have the navy well manned, matters of this kind must not be lost sight of. The seamen's natural wants should experience a due amount of consideration; his feelings of self-respect and vanity should rather be cultivated, but without yielding too much to his follies, or encouraging thoughtlessness. The plan at one time pursued towards sailors was alike debasing and destructive. Men were kept from their friends until they almost ceased to remember that they had any; they were cooped up in ships until they lost all but the most gross of their animal propensities. They received no money until their return home after an absence of many years. As soon as the anchor was let go in Plymouth Sound, or at Spithead, the ship was filled with the vilest characters. Females, in their most degraded condition, outnumbered the males; and a few days, or weeks at most, after the ship was paid off, the men were fleeced of every penny of their hard earnings, and glad to re-enter for another three years' term.

A far different principle must be adopted if we would have our navy well manned. Education has made rapid strides amongst our seafaring population as well as amongst other classes; and in order to give it a fair chance, the Admiralty must strive to eradicate the old leaven, and introduce a healthy stimulus to honourable, gallant, and steady conduct. And among the civilisers and improvers of the service, naval barracks must not be forgotten.

If, however, we would excise the mischief past and present, we must go much deeper into the question. The abolition of severe punishments, self-inflicted robberies, and the adoption of harbour comforts, will go far towards improving the Naval Service; but we must take the early spring of a sailor's training into our care if we would have a goodly harvest of sailors.

Manning the navy is a subject of such vast importance to this country, that it should be elevated to the rank of a science. Every branch of the service has its established and distinct department. Paying, victualling, doctoring, steaming, and shipbuilding, constitute each a department under the Board of Admiralty; but the most important branch of the navy is left almost to chance. The First Sea Lord of the Admiralty is entrusted with the management and culture of this vital branch; but only as a component part of a voluminous whole. What makes this arrangement still more objectionable is, that the same sea lord is, as it were, a bird of passage. The Surveyor of the Navy, the Medical Director-General, Comptroller of Victualling, &c., and the Accountant-General, hold permanent offices. These heads of departments, although nominally under the control of certain Lords of the Admiralty, are so much fixtures, that they, generally speaking, instruct instead of being instructed. But providing men for the navy is left very much to accident, or to the care of irresponsible officials. During the last ten years there have been six changes in this particular office. Some naval lords have taken one view, some another, and hardly two have been agreed upon the best method of securing a supply of men for the navy. One has favoured continuous service, another has thought so poorly of that plan as to allow the men entered under that engagement to be dispersed. The First Lord for the time being receives instructions from the Premier, and "cut down" or "fill up," becomes the order of the day. The senior Sea Lord, that is, the Manning Lord, must shut his mouth or resign; the Premier is not to be dictated to by a Lord of the Admiralty.

So long as this practice is tolerated, the navy cannot possibly be well manned. The country requires the services of a "Comptroller-General of the Manning Department," who should be charged with providing men for the active and reserved services. Captain Denman has argued this point most closely, and the navy owns few more intelligent or far-seeing officers than he. No one has studied the requirements of the service more narrowly, and it is much to be regretted that the proposition which is found in his evidence before the Manning Commissioners did not receive the attention it deserved.

Captain Denman suggested that manning the navy should consti-

tute a department of the Admiralty, and cited the following examples showing the necessity for it. "It will be remembered," he said, "that during the Russian war the crews of ships coming home from foreign stations, expecting to be paid off after, in some instances, as much as four years' service abroad, on arriving at Spithead were informed of the Russian war, and told that they would have immediately to join the Baltic fleet. The crews of those ships were broken up and divided amongst a number of other ships. They were kept serving during the Russian war, finding alongside of them men not at all equal to themselves, receiving nearly double wages—the Coast Guard Men. When the war was over, they were discharged, and having spent their money they came back to join the navy, but found that there were no vacancies; the continuous service men, in general, or very often, inferior, having filled up the peace establishment. These men having served their country under circumstances of considerable private hardship to themselves, but having shown the best possible spirit, were thus cast adrift. A great number of them went to America, and a very bitter feeling existed upon their part that they had been hardly dealt with."

Had there been an officer of rank at the head of a manning department, he would have felt it his duty to point out the danger and inexpediency of the course then pursued. His duty would have been to stand between the seamen and the Government, and to represent firmly that men thus treated could not be expected to return to the service, if wanted. He would have urged the advisability of entering the men upon a supernumerary list, supposing there were no vacancies, and so have saved the Government from committing an act injurious alike to the public service and to the parties immediately concerned. Thousands of these men left England. They had not the means of living in their own country, and could not wait an indefinite period for employment. They could not or would not beg, and so availed themselves of the option, and shipped for New York, Australia, or California, with a firm determination never to place themselves again under a British pendant.

And not only did we then lose the services of these fine fellows, but they all left with an angry and bitter feeling rankling in their breasts, and wherever they have gone they have not scrupled to complain of the treatment received from the British Admiralty, thereby increasing the spirit of animosity engendered by old feuds and grudges. Had there been a Comptroller-General of the manning department, it would have been the province of that officer to advocate the sailor's cause, and also to urge upon the Government the claim to some gratuity for war services upon peace wages. Had such a functionary held authority in 1815, he might have averted the never-to-be-forgotten and lamentable scenes of distress which were witnessed in that and subsequent years in the streets of the country the sufferers had fought and bled to save from disgrace and pillage. "In one year," said Captain Denman, "56,000 men who had been fighting our battles during the war, who had been impressed and taken from much higher wages, were all paid off, a great number of whom are supposed to have *starved in our streets.*"

It seems clear that a department of this kind must be created. The navy is now greatly in want of an earnest, right-minded, far-seeing officer to look after the bone and muscle, the life and soul of the service. Extensive powers have been afforded to the Admiralty for the purpose of forming a reserve of seamen. The present board of Admiralty take one view, a favourable one, of the scheme, and so collect a body of men liable to serve, and ready to come forward in an emergency; but next session, Lord Palmerston may find himself in a minority, and a Bright ministry be formed, the Admiralty branch of which would probably pooh pooh, the design, and upset the arrangement. If, however, there happened to be a Comptroller-General of the manning department, who did not vacate his office with the ministry, there would be some one in a position to point out the perilous consequences of any wrong policy, and the chances would be in favour of his succeeding, to some extent at least, in averting the threatened danger.

But we must not forget that we have now to deal with a mercantile navy, which is a free service, owning only a shadow of allegiance to our beloved sovereign, and in some degree composed of aliens. The adoption of a broad plan of training up boys for the sea service generally is therefore more than ever necessary. The alterations in our marine code have had a most damning effect upon the whole body of seamen. The bands of discipline have been unloosed by ignorant quacks knowing nothing of the matter in hand; and the commander of a merchant ship is now more dependent than any of his crew. The safe conduct of our merchant ships is a mystery. Lazy, mutinous skulks are now the staple of the crews of British merchant ships. Dirty in their persons, and grossly foul in their habits, insolent in their demeanour, they bear not the smallest resemblance to the well-conducted seamen of twenty years ago. The greater part have never known what it is to have a master. If they have ever been apprenticed their terms of servitude has been so short as to rather puff them up with the belief that they are sailors, than to make them acquainted with their duty. Thousands have never been apprenticed at all, but have picked up a smattering of knowledge by hook and crook, and acquired a very moderate degree of proficiency by bits; but all are destitute of the greatest of all seamen's virtues—ready obedience. They fear nothing but "the handspike," and that they know full well cannot be used against them in a British merchant ship.

A worthless fellow will pretend that he is sick, or complain that he has had too much work, and requires a day's rest. He then deliberately tells the captain or the chief officer to "log" him, as he means to have "all day in." He goes below, and his example may be followed by a dozen others, leaving the captain no greater satisfaction than that of stopping a day's pay. How is it possible that the navy can look to such a source for assistance under present circumstances? If such men joined a man-of-war they could only be kept in subjection by a resort to the hateful lash. The necessity, therefore, of reforming not only the navy, but the merchant service, must be apparent to the least reflective mind.

The aprentices are fewer in number, and of classes too proud or too worthless for them to volunteer for, or to be received into, the royal service. There is, in a word, an imperative necessity for sowing our own seed, and raising our own crop of mariners. If we would rescue our mercantile marine from being swamped and overrun by foreigners, and altogether denationalized, we must take care to keep up a stock of our own John Bull breed—brought up, and encouraged to remain under the British flag. Great Britain was not always a first-rate power on the ocean. When her sea-borne commerce was managed for her by foreigners she cut a miserable figure among European nations; and, by adopting the creed of our political economists, we are going the straight road towards a similar condition. Already our transatlantic cousins talk of the probability of England being reduced to a third-rate maritime power, and truly, if our legislators do not take some bold steps, their unwelcome insinuation bids fair to be realised.

In order to lay a good foundation the Admiralty should, without a month's further delay, set about establishing school ships upon the plan of Mr. Cardwell, and the Registrar-General of Seamen, taking especial care to avoid the fearful dangers which some well-meaning, perhaps, but evil advisers, have been insinuating, and even openly proposing—we refer to the introduction of reformatory boys into the navy. This proposition is so fraught with peril, that we feel we cannot too strongly deprecate it. Those who have watched over the progress of reformatory institutions, are best aware of the extremely vicious and even horrid propensities of the youthful, but too often hardened, inmates. Tales are rife respecting some of these establishments, involving crimes so detestable that no one dare bring the details of them before the public; yet although it is known to some of the reverend heads of these institutions that such vices have existed, and for aught they know to the contrary do still exist, although in a latent form, they would not scruple to risk the destruction of the British navy, in order to indulge their darling theory of reformation. Theft is a venial offence compared with the iniquities occasionally developed in these seminaries.

The report of the Royal Commissioners contains certain suggestions as to school ships for boys, both for the Royal Navy and Merchant Service. They recommend that school ships should be established in the principal commercial ports, capable of accommodating from one hundred to two hundred boys, a moiety of whom should be supported wholly by the State. They recommend that these boys should be of respectable origin, strong, and healthy. Nothing can be more unfounded than the supposed difficulty of finding a sufficiency of the class of boys required. There is not a town or village of the three kingdoms which would not furnish a goodly supply of the raw material, if means were taken to make the service known. A well-dressed sailor lad in a village church would draw away half the boys in the congregation. The experiment has been partly tried at Liverpool on board the Conway. Although the lads received on board that ship all pay a rather heavy sum for learning to be sailors, there is already an abundance of candidates. But the Manning Commissioners advise that a moiety only of the lads to be

trained for the sea service should be remunerative. It is intended that these boys should receive instruction for both mercantile and naval services. At the expiration of the time of training agreed upon—with reference to which there is some diversity of opinion—the Manning Commissioners recommend that the lads should be inspected, and that those placed first by the inspectors should have the option of entering the navy, contingent upon the number of vacancies. But there would be no compulsion; the boys would be left free to choose whom they would serve. There would, however, be strenuous efforts made to induce these trained lads to enrol themselves in the Royal Naval Reserve, if they did not elect to join the navy.

Captain Brown, the Registrar General of Merchant Seamen, but whose regard for his own service has never relaxed, is particularly strong upon the boy question. "I propose," he says in his paper printed in the appendix to the Manning Commissioners' report and evidence, "an organized system for rearing boys for the sea service generally. In each of the twelve principal ports of the United Kingdom one or more instruction ships should be established, under some such regulations as to *training* as now exist in the Marine Society's ship at Woolwich. But instead of taking boys from off the streets of seaport towns, or from reformatories, or unions, they should be selected from inland as well as seaboard districts, and be of honest parentage, robust habits, and healthy promise. Thousands of such, every way eligible, with ties to home and kindred, can be obtained; and in most cases with security from their parents or guardians that they will adhere to their engagements, either under indenture or otherwise.

"The education to comprise knotting, splicing, reefing, furling, heaving the lead, rowing, swimming, gun and sword exercise, &c., &c., such a schooling, in fact, as will fit the boys for *common seamen*."

There is something peculiarly striking in Captain Brown's allusion to the ties of home and kindred. It has been too much the custom to look only to the very lowest grade of society for sailor boys. The guardians of overcrowded unions have selected their gruel-bloated oafs, and packed them off to the receiving ships of the navy, by scores at a time, as fit subjects for the navy. As a general rule these union-bred pauper boys have not an idea beyond food (and plenty of it) and clothing. They have no tie to home or kindred, not a spark of love of country, but are ready to barter their services to the highest bidder, whatever the colour of the flag under which they are asked to serve. Assuredly this is not the stock from whence we may expect to derive fine sailors, possessing a regard for their native land.

Neither is the plan pursued on board the Marine Society's ship calculated to raise respectable man-of-war or merchant seamen. The majority of these boys are drawn from the purlieus of Wapping and Whitechapel, and they are taken at an age—fifteen or sixteen—when their habits are formed, more often for evil than good. They are received on board the Venus, the dirt and sharp edges rubbed off, and after some little drilling, and an endeavour to teach them to read, they are sent into merchant ships or colliers.

Captain Brown, in his evidence before the Commission, advised that the boys for the training ships should be thirteen years of age, and that they should be retained one year under instruction. Thus tested and approved, shipowners would have no hesitation in taking as many of these boys as were desirous of going in their ships, as apprentices, for four or five years, and together with the demand for the navy, there would be no difficulty in disposing of any number the training of which the Government is likely to undertake. There are about six thousand boys apprenticed annually to the merchant service, and supposing the Government plan of training to include from two to three thousand, or even more, they would only form a half of the number annually absorbed by the merchant service alone. The great advantage attending the adoption of this scheme would be the leavening of the whole mass. Lads of respectful manners and regular habits, who had been taught to cleave to good and shun evil, would in the course of time be the instruments for reforming the whole mass. They would have a character to lose, and a prospect of continued respectable employment as the reward of their steady conduct.

The question, however, which now more immediately presses is the completion of the regulations for carrying into operation the Reserve of Seamen Bill. In the *United Service Magazine* for September, this subject was dwelt upon, and the necessity for offering liberal inducements strongly urged. Since the rising of Parliament, however, the Admiralty have had their hands full. What with the claims of the several classes of officers passed over by the late administration, and the yet more important business of increasing the navy both in ships and men, the time of the First Lord and the Board of Admiralty has been thoroughly engrossed. But notwithstanding all these demands upon the time of the new board, the Naval Reserve has had a share of their deliberations; and we believe the principal details of the scheme have been committed to the Board of Trade officers, and are on the eve of publication. Pay, pension, and the manner and duration of the training, as well as the period during which reserve men are to be liable to serve, have all been under consideration, and a few weeks at most will bring the whole scheme to light.

The Reserve question is one of vital importance. If liberally put before the seafaring population the success of the measure seems very probable; but if there is a shade of parsimony observable, men will shrink from it abhorrently. It should be remembered that the Reserve about to be formed is intended as a substitute for the crying injustice so long unwillingly endured of impressment. The British sailor is to be emancipated from the slavery which necessity subjected him to. Skill in seamanship is no longer to be held as a sort of crime rendering the possessor liable to be seized and conveyed on board a man-of-war to be shot at. Henceforth service in the navy is to be voluntary. The market price is to be paid for the seaman's labour, and the man is to be treated, to a certain limit, as a free agent. He is to be offered such inducements as will render service under the Crown to be sufficiently acceptable if not absolutely desirable. He will be entitled to receive an addition to his wages in the merchant service equal to

about ten shillings a month, a portion only of which will be retained to go towards establishing a pension fund. He will not be called upon to join a man-of-war until it would be his duty, if not his natural inclination to do so, in order to protect all that he holds valuable in the world. When our shores are threatened by an unscrupulous and blood-thirsty foe, and our existence as a free and independent nation is jeopardised, few there are among Briton's true born sons who would hesitate to rally round the standard of Old England, and fight for home and kindred.

But as whenever that emergency arises there will be a trained and disciplined enemy to meet and beat back, so it is essential that those who come to the rescue should be trained and disciplined also. The hardy Northumbrian who works in the coal brigs, and the coasting seaman who navigates his sloop, or "billy boy" along our shores, the active young fellow who makes his two or three voyages a year to the Mediterranean, the sturdy bargeman, and the agile waterman "the pride of all Wapping," must be taught to see in the Naval Reserve their defence, as well as a ready means of providing for old age or premature decay.

Greenwich Hospital, designed as a home for the worn out naval defenders of the country, must be thoroughly renovated, and its benefits made patent to every man whose business is found upon the waters. The pensioner of Greenwich Hospital must be raised from a position of pauperism—or something closely allied to it—and rescued from the degraded condition of what is now termed "an old collegeman." The Government have shown that they are in earnest with regard to the reform of this establishment. A commission comprising two members of Parliament and a captain in the navy have been appointed to examine narrowly into its working, and into the causes of its being 1100 men short. These are Captain John Charles Dalrymple Hay, R.N., lately returned from being Flag-Captain to Vice-Admiral Sir Houston Stewart in the West Indies, William Hutt, Esq., M.P. for Gateshead, and Robert Ingham, Esq., M.P. for South Shields. Captain Hay has the character of being a most intelligent, liberal-minded officer, and a good man of business; and the members of Parliament are men of independent opinions, well calculated to conduct a searching investigation. The pensions to be offered to the Reserve men should be first a retaining fee, and afterwards a retirement; and the claims of the widow and orphan must not be lost sight of. Are the Admiralty willing to make all these concessions? We have no fear as to the country objecting to any amount of liberality in moderation which might be proposed; and we owe it to ourselves to repair, as much as possible, the wrong done by our forefathers—albeit in ignorance and from sheer necessity—to the merchant seaman.

The expediency, also, of preserving our mercantile marine from rapid deterioration should be taken into consideration. Already, as we have elsewhere stated, bitter complaints are made of the decay of British seamen, and of the rapid supplantation of foreigners; and who is to remedy the mischief? The hands of the Government are tied up by the clamours of political economists. There must be no more preference or protection for British shipping. Free trade and

money making are to be paramount to every other consideration, and British shipowners, in order to show a balance in their favour on their ledgers, must follow the example of their Yankee competitors, and employ cheap sailors. But the British Admiralty, notwithstanding all this, must look to the naval defences of the country, and take good heed that enough of British seamen remain to complete the crews of war ships. Service in the mercantile navy, supposing that service to be well conducted, is calculated to keep men up to their work; and if the Admiralty can ensure a supply of 20,000 or 30,000 in time of need, their value will be incalculable.

We cannot overrate the good which will be conferred upon the merchant service by the adoption of the Reserve scheme now in preparation. If well-trained, respectable boys can be introduced as apprentices, and encouraged to remain under the British flag by liberal pay and other advantages, we may hope for a vast change in the habits and characters of merchant seamen. It will be their interest to sail in British ships, instead of becoming cosmopolitans and rovers—now in the diggings of San Francisco—next a maimed or disfigured unfortunate, a victim to some brutal Yankee mate, or an impoverished sickly wretch, fit only to become an inmate of a union. They will possibly discover the advantages of becoming protégés of the Crown of Great Britain, and having a tie to bind them to their own country, will refrain from forfeiting their allegiance or regular employment.

Before we have the ability to man the navy in peace, and to be prepared to man it in war, certain radical reforms must be consented to. The naval Articles of War must be revised, and the power of corporal punishment duly restricted. We know that to a certain extent this latter condition is already fulfilled; but the fact is not generally known. Civilians, writers in the daily press, and merchant seamen, are accustomed to look upon a ship of war as a correctional establishment, in which the Captain has supreme power, which he mercilessly uses. The restraints, now almost amounting to prohibition, imposed upon Captains are not understood out of the navy; and it is due to the service, if only for the purpose of its vindication, to place all these points before the public in the clearest manner. The present generation of naval officers must not be confounded with some of the "Tartars" of old; and we feel convinced that were a well-defined system of routine and discipline laid down, and explained to merchant seamen and others, they would arrive at the conviction that there is more tyranny carried on in the manufactory and in civil life than in the Royal Navy.

Those who now preside over the destinies of our navy have a tremendous responsibility. A deep plot seems to thicken around us. Foreign nations, known to entertain the most hostile feelings towards "proud Old England," all of whom have, or think they have, cause for bitter animosity against her, are using their best endeavours to eclipse her on the ocean. France, Russia, and America are conspiring, as if by mutual arrangement, to humble Great Britain. France, though claiming to be our faithful ally, who fought with us in order to prevent the aggressions of Russia, is known to entertain the most rancorous hatred of our free institutions, and to be burning

with desire to wipe out the remembrance of certain unsuccessful contests. Never will France forget or forgive our successes at Trafalgar and Waterloo. A hundred victories gained over other nations would not obliterate the recollection of those memorable defeats. It has been seen that wherever our fleets and armies have been acting together, France has invariably endeavoured to wound our national pride, by assuming all the credit. No, the time will come, and is not far distant probably, when another appeal will be made to the cannon, and when we shall have again to contest the sovereignty of the seas with France.

And is Russia pacifically disposed? Will the Muscovite forgive the destruction of the Black Sea fleet, the demolition of Sebastopol, and the blight of the fair prospect which promised to Russia the country of "the sick man?" Why all this spying and prying of Russian princes and engineers in the vicinity of our sea-ports? Why this anxiety to possess a large fleet of screw ships? Russia does not require a navy for self-defence; that was proved during the Russian war. The Allied fleets were defied in the Baltic, when not a Russian pendant appeared; and in the Black Sea, Russia might, to this day, have held Sebastopol, had not the Sea of Azoff been thoughtlessly left unguarded. Russia, also, has a bone to pick with us. Her navy is presided over by one of the cleverest men in Europe, who attends to the minutest details of the fleet, and who, with sovereign power to carry out what is needful, is determined to place it on a high level. Does the Grand Duke Constantine love England? Would it not, on the contrary, afford his highness most profound delight to see the prime cause of the defeat of the object of Russian ambition—the possession of Constantinople—humbled in the dust?

And what love has brother Jonathan for us? Now and then our kinsman condescends to patronise us, and to sympathise with the "old country;" but do not his actions generally show a deliberate determination to quarrel with, and insult us? Look, for example, at the seizure of San Juan, in defiance of all principles of right and decency. And why are we tamely submitting to insult, but because our navy is not what it should be.

All around, we say again, the plot thickens. Great Britain will have to succumb, as other rich and powerful States have done before her, unless our rulers are aroused from the fatal apathy which for a long time has dulled the edge of the once most powerful weapon in the world, and which her sons wielded. The navy has been suffered to fall into the hands of the aristocracy; emulation and hope have drooped and died in it; the best of Britain's seamen have been enticed, or driven, out of her service; heroic conduct, which, in England's palmy days, would have placed the humble seaman upon the quarter-deck, in the fair road to an admiral's flag, has been rewarded with an approving smile, a bit of bronze, or *a five pound note*, while at the same time the lordly commander, lieutenant, or mate, has been advanced rapidly for deeds which bore no comparison with the exploits of the young and friendless seaman. The one has done his duty, with the certainty of being liberally rewarded, while the poor man has risked life and limb, under the assurance that his gain will only be, at best, requited by a cross, or a good-conduct stripe.

Let the noble duke who now holds the post of first Lord of the Admiralty look well to the present condition of the navy. The ambitious lad who takes the shilling of the recruiting serjeant, and enters the army, may have his dreams of becoming an officer of rank realised; not so the naval apprentice. The one is cheered by the hope of one day gaining an honourable position in society; the other knows full well that the summit of his glory is a boatswain's or gunner's warrant. Reform the navy, my Lord Duke. Now is the time—it may be now or never. Your Grace is listening week after week to various plans for improving the service. Now you are troubled with a growl from the old Admirals—again, the claims of the Commanders and neglected Lieutenants are pressed. The Masters have sought to be emancipated, and other officers have had their grievances brought before you for redress. But while attending to these, do not forget the claims of the *active serving officers*, who will have to oppose their shoulders to the enemy; and more than all, open the gate of promotion to the highest rank to *the humblest possessor of merit*. When weighing the claims of the different aspirants for rank, turn not to the peerage, nor to the list of illustrious commoners. Listen not to the suggestions of political supporters, but let rugged merit plead her honest cause, and have justice. Then, and then only, will schemes for manning the navy, and for the establishment of a naval reserve, gain the ear and heart of those whom we should encourage to serve in the British Marine.

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF FRANCE AND GERMANY.

A series of articles have recently appeared in the *German Quarterly Review*, from the pen of a Prussian Artillery Officer, to show the relative strength of France and Germany in the eventuality of a great European war. These articles have created considerable sensation in all military circles on the Continent, and have just been reprinted in the shape of a pamphlet by Cotta, the eminent publisher at Stuttgart.

In our opinion the Prussian writer underrates the efficiency of the French army. His statements are open to challenge. We give them in that spirit of fairness and impartiality to which we have always endeavoured to adhere. We give these articles in a condensed form, without, however, omitting any important particle.

The Emperor of the French is warlike inclined. He fancies that laurels may be gathered in Germany. Only recently a war between France and Germany hung upon a thread.

France, naturally, in the eventuality of such a war would like to be victorious. What are her chances of victory? This is a point worthy of consideration.

The French under-estimate the strength of Germany in like manner as many Germans over-estimate that of France. This is chiefly to be attributed to tradition. Because Napoleon I. often beat our armies, many fancy that a bold commander at the head of a French army *might* renew those wonderful triumphs in Europe.

The French themselves are, nevertheless, aware that the *combined* power of Germany is no contemptible one. During the last fifty years many changes have taken place. A comparative statement of the relative strength of France and Germany at the present moment, may be interesting to Europe.

In this comparison we assume Austria, Prussia, and the rest of Germany to be one body; and in case of a war with France this unity would be manifest.

No portion of Germany can be attacked by a foreign state without the rest of Germany coming forward in its defence.

Let us compare the strength of both nations.

THE FRENCH ARMY.

INFANTRY.—*Cent Gardes* Grenadier of 4 battalions of 6 companies. *Voltigeurs:* 4 regiments of 4 battalions of 6 companies. *Chasseurs-à-Piéd:* 1 battalion of 10 companies. *Zouaves:* 1 regiment of 2 battalions of 14 companies. Altogether 8 regiments and 1 battalion, 18,700 men (peace footing), or 31,000 men (war footing).

TROOPS OF THE LINE.—*Infantry of the Line:* 100 regiments of 3 battalions of 8 companies. *Chasseurs-à-Piéd:* 20 battalions of 10 companies. *Zouaves:* 3 regiments of the 3 battalions of 9 companies. *African Light Infantry:* 3 battalions of 7 companies. *Algerian Rifles:* 3 regiments (5 battalions), of 18 companies. *Cadets:* of 9 battalions and 8 companies. *Veterans*: 2 companies. Altogether 108 regiments, 32 battalions, of 2 companies; or 234,700 men (peace footing), or 346,000 men (war footing).

Total of the whole infantry—116 regiments, 33 battalions, and 10 companies=253,400 men (peace footing), or 377,000 men (war footing).*

CAVALRY.—*Garde: Cent-Gardes.* 1 squadron. *Cuirassiers:* 2 regiments. *Dragoons:* 1 regiment. *Uhlans* (Hussars): 1 regiment. *Chasseurs:* 1 regiment. *Guides:* 1 regiment.

Altogether 6 regiments (of 6 squadrons) and 1 squadron: 6,600 men (peace footing), or 9000 men (war footing).

LINE.—*Carabineers:* 2 regiments. *Cuirassiers:* 10 regiments. *Dragoons:* 12 regiments. *Uhlans:* 8 regiments. *Chasseurs:* 12 regiments. *Hussars:* 8 regiments. *Chasseurs d'Afrique:* 3 regiments. *Spahis:* 3 regiments. *Remounts:* 10 companies.

Altogether 58 regiments (of 6 squadrons) and 10 companies; or 58,000 men (peace-footing), or 83,000 men (war-footing).

Total of the whole Cavalry 64 regiments—1 squadron, 10 companies: 65,400 men (peace footing), or 92,000 men (war footing).

ARTILLERY.—*Garde: Foot Artillery.* 1 regiment of 12 batteries, and 1 company. *Horse Artillery:* 1 regiment of 6 batteries, and 1 company. Altogether, 2 regiments (18 batteries and 2 companies), or 2,500 men (peace footing), 5,000 men (war footing).

LINE.—*Foot Artillery:* 5 regiments of 18 batteries, and 1 company. *Horse Artillery:* 7 regiments of 15 batteries and 1 company. *Sappers:* 1 regiment of 17 companies. *Workmen, smiths, veterinary:*

* The formation of a 4th battalion of the 100 regiments of the line, would give an increase of 80,000 men.

17 companies. Altogether, 17 regiments (227 batteries and 50 companies), or 31,800 men (peace footing), or 58,000 men (war footing). *Total of the whole Artillery:* 19 regiments (245 batteries and 32 companies), 34,000 men (peace footing), or 73,000 men (war footing).

ENGINEERS.—*Garde: Troops.* 1 division of 2 companies. Total: 250 men (peace footing), or 300 men (war footing).

LINE.—*Troops:* 3 regiments of 2 battalions (51 companies), 2 working companies. Total: 3 regiments (53 companies), 7,400 men (peace footing), or 8,200 men (war footing). *Total of Engineers:* 3 regiments and 2 companies, 7,700 men (peace footing), or 8,500 men (war footing).

GENSDARMERIE.—*Garde: Foot.* 1 regiment of 2 battalions of 8 companies. *Horse:* 1 squadron. Altogether, 1 regiment and 2 companies=1,100 men.

LINE.—In the departments, 26 regiments (93 companies). In the colonies, 4½ companies. At Paris, 2 battalions of 8 companies. Fire Brigade, 1 battalion of 7 companies. Veterans, 1 company. Altogether, 26 regiments, 3 battalions and 5½ companies. Total 24,000 men. *Total of the whole Gensdarmerie:* 28 regiments, 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and 5½ companies=25,100 men.

Total strength of the French army, including 4,700 men military train, and 12,000 men commissariat and others=400,000 men (peace footing), or 575,000 men (war footing), with about 1,200 field pieces. Of the above 45,000 belong to the *garde.* As a reserve, in addition to the above, must be counted 60,000 gensdarmerie, of seven years service, liable to be called out. The National Guard is about 100,000 strong, but does not belong to the army.

If we take the average, the French army consists of 660,000 fighting men.

The French army is doubtless one of the best in Europe. The men are brave, well disciplined, and have efficient officers. The army, moreover, has seen service.

The French army has now become a political power. The present Emperor has said so. Let us see what fruits it will bear.

All the troops are well armed. Most regiments of the line are provided with rifles.

The "line" and the engineer take the highest rank in the French army. The discipline of the infantry is admirable; the efficiency of the engineers is beyond praise. The French sharpshooters (*tirailleurs*) are first-rate. The *Chasseurs-de-Vincennes* are not excelled by any other troops in the world. They are not, however, such steady shots as the Austrian and Prussian riflemen. The cavalry is the weakest point of the French army. The French are not good horsemen. They do not govern their horses well, and on a march lose many of their mounts.

As regards the French artillery, there is a great diversity of opinion. It is over-estimated. Rifled cannon send a ball a further distance, but they require more skill, more attention, and do not fire grape. The French army possesses many most distinguished scientific officers; but it is far behind hand, in this respect, when compared with the armies of Germany.

French army has had a good school of practice in Algeria, but
cesses have been over-rated.
a correct estimate of the *offensive* power of France, statistical
s are important. For many years the population has not
ed but *decreased*.

The Armies of Germany.

The Austrian Army.

NTRY.—62 regiments of infantry of the line of 4 field, 1 grena-
nd 1 depot—battalion. Altogether 175,000 men (peace
), or 243,000 men (war footing).
egiments—Grenzer and the Titler-battalion, each regiment of
and 1 reserve—battalion. Altogether 40,000 men (peace
), or 56,000 men (war footing).
ger-battalion of 7 field and 1 depot battalion, 25 Jäger-bat-
. Altogether 20,300 men (peace footing), or 33,000 men (war
).
ospital companies (*Sanitäts companies*). Altogether 2,700 men
footing), or 3,500 men (war footing).
l of infantry in 77 regiments—25 battalions and 15 companies.
0 men (peace footing), or 335,000 (war footing).
CAVALRY.—8 regiments Cuirassiers of 6 field and 1 depot,
ons. 8 regiments Dragoons, idem. 12 regiments Hussars, 8
id 1 depot, squadrons. 12 regiments Uhlans, idem.
l of cavalry in 40 regiments, 61,000 men (peace footing), or
men (war footing), with 56,000 to 67,000 horses.
ARTILLERY.—16 regiments field artillery (144 or 168 batteries)
152 or 1,334 guns. 1 regiment coast artillery of 3 battalions,
nent rocket batteries (18 or 20 batteries).
l of the Artillery 18 regiments (162 or 188 batteries), and 3
ons—28,000 men (peace footing), or 54,000 men (war
).
ENGINEERS.—12 battalions Engineers. 6 battalions Pioneers.
l of 18 battalions; 11,000 men (peace footing), or 21,000
00 horses (war footing).
Military Train.—Total in 7 Train-commandos, 24 conveyance
ons, and 21 baggage departments, 2,390 men (peace footing),
0 men (war footing), with 1,900 or 5,600 horses.
serve in time of war, besides 19 regiments of Gensdarmes,
ting to 19,000 men, there must be counted 7 divisions of light
cavalry, the staff infantry, the staff dragoons, the free batta-
nd the irregular light cavalry.
l of the whole Austrian army, 400,000 men (peace footing),
0,000 to 800,000 men, with 1,344 guns (war footing), includ-
erves.

The Prussian Army.

STANDING ARMY.

NFANTRY.—*Garde:* 4 regiments of 3 battalions; 1 reserve
nt of 2 battalions; 1 battalion Jägers; 1 battalion sharp-
s. *Line.* 32 regiments of 3 battalions; 8 reserve regiments
attalions; 8 combined reserved battalions; 8 Jäger batta-

Total of the whole infantry, 48 regiments and 15 battalions; 75,000 men (peace footing), or 147,500 men (war footing).

II. CAVALRY:—*Garde:* 6 regiments (garde du corps, Cuirassier, Dragoons, Hussars, 2 Uhlans) of 4 squadrons.

Line: 8 Cuirassier regiments, 4 regiments Dragoons, 12 regiments Hussars, 8 regiments Uhlans (each of 4 squadrons).

Total of the whole cavalry, 38 regiments; 23,000 men (peace-footing) or 24,000 (war-footing).

III. ARTILLERY:—*Garde*: 1 regiment of 12 batteries. *Line:* 8 regiments of 12 batteries.

Total of the artillery 9 regiments (108 batteries) 16,000 men, (peace-footing), or 23,600 men, with 1004 guns (war-footing) (1-9th horse artillery).

IV. PIONEERS:—*Garde:* 1 division of 2 companies. *Line:* 8 divisions, and 1 reserve division of 2 companies.

Total of Pioneers, 20 companies—4,600 men (peace-footing, or 8,300 men (war-footing).

Total of the standing army:—140,000 men, without officers (in peace) or 225,000 men (war-footing).

LANDWEHR (MILITIA) FIRST CALLING.—1. *Infantry*: 4 regiments—garde-militia, 32 regiments regular militia, and 8 reserve battalions (116 battalions). 2. *Cavalry*: 2 garde militia regiments, and 32 regular regiments, with 8 reserve, squadrons (144 squadrons).

MILITIA—2*d. Calling.* Together: 116 battalions of infantry, and 104 squadrons of cavalry.

Total of the *Landwehr* (militia) 1st and 2nd calling in time of war, 325,000 men.

Total of the whole Prussian army—168,000 men (peace-footing) and 541,000 men, with 1004 guns (war footing).

ARMY OF THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION.

No. of the Corps d'armée.	States.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Pioneers.	Total of Troops.
		Men.				
7.	Bavaria . . .	64,700	11,500	11,500	2,490	90,200
8.	Wurtemberg . .	15,00	2,600	3,200	390	22,000
	Baden . . .	11,100	1,870	1,760	180	16,600
	Crokberg, Hessen .	8,070	1,300	1,100	100	10,600
9.	Saxony . . .	19,700	3,200	2,000	500	25,400
	Electorate of Hesse	—	—	—	—	15,000
	Luvemburg . .	—	—	—	—	2,400
10.	Hanover . .	20,400	3,000	2,600	500	26,500
	Braunschweig .	3,200	600	500	—	5,300
	Holstein-Lauenburg	—	—	—	—	5,400
	Mecklenburg-Schwerin . . .	3,700	570	350	80	5,200
	Mecklenburg-Strelitz	680	80	70	—	830
	Oldenburg . .	2,900	460	370		3,730
	Hamburg, Lubeck and Bremen .	2,390	180	—	100	2,670
Reserve Division.	Nassau . . .	4,900	—	480	70	6,000
	Saxe-Weimar .	3,000	—	—	—	3,000
	Remaining 14 States of the Confederation	13,400	—	—	—	13,400

Without counting Austria and Prussia, the rest of Germany has then at its command, with the reserves, an army of more than 350,000 men.

According to the regulations of 1842, every state of the Confederation must send to the army of the Confederation—1st, the simple contingent of 1 per cent. of the population; 2dly., the reserve of one-third per cent. 10 weeks after the mobilization; 3rd., the complement of one-third per cent. The cavalry forms one-seventh of the contingent, and the artillery two guns to each 1,000 men of which one-fourth 12-pounders, one-sixth 6-pounders, and one-fourth mortars, one-fifth horse artillery. The siege artillery consists of 200 guns. The engineers are provided exclusively by Austria and Prussia. The strength of the pioneers is a proportion of $\frac{1}{100}$ per cent. Every contingent which is larger than an armeé corps provides a pontoon train for crossing large rivers, every other corps d' armée one sufficient to cross a river 200 feet in width. One-twentieth of the infantry consists of Jägers and riflemen.

According to the most recent regulations, the normal strength of the army of the Confederation is 470,000 men; but in 1855 it had already increased to larger proportions. The statistical returns of that year make it 525,000 men, and 1,122 guns. Of this, in round numbers, 153,300 men belonged to the 1st to 3rd armée corps (Austria); 170,500 to the 4th to 6th corps (Prussia); 50,200 to the 7th corps (Bavaria); 47,500 to the 8th corps; 35,300 to the 9th corps; and 49,900 to the 10th corps. The reserve infantry division was 18,200 strong. The different arms were thus disposed: 404,500 men, infantry (of which 28,600 were Jägers and riflemen); 71,150 cavalry, with 72,000 service horses; 40,200 artillery, with 7,400 horses; 5,700 engineers; 16,800 military train. The park of siege-artillery consisted of 250 pieces, of which 122 were cannon, 31 howitzers, and 97 mortars.

Austria, Prussia, and the rest of Germany can therefore, without any great exertion, bring the enormous force of 1,500,000 men into the field. This is three times the strength of the French army.

However good the ground may be for admitting the efficiency of the French army, if we draw a parallel with the armies of Germany, the advantage is decidedly with the latter. It is true there is one great fault in the German army—"it is wanting in complete military unity." In all other respects the defensive strength of Germany may be regarded as most satisfactory. Germany is the central point of science and civilization. As a natural consequence, the army participates in the advantages emanating therefrom. The head-quarters of military science must be sought for in Germany. In no country is so much done for the cultivation of every branch of military science. This may be boldly asserted. A German officer is expected to be competent in every branch of his profession. In Austria and Prussia, and in most of the other German states, promotion from the ranks, with more or less restriction, is possible. But this promotion from the ranks to the grade of officer is always dependent upon proofs of scientific knowledge. Most German officers have been

educated in military academies. In France, on the contrary, many officers have never enjoyed this now indispensable privilege. The *regular* promotion of sub-officers in time of peace is the chief cause of this. The consequence is, that the French army possesses a number of young staff-officers, which does not imply capacity, and a great number of old captains.

The scientific spirit prevails so strong in the armies of Germany that even apparently insignificant improvements, either in weapons or tactics, are generally first discussed and elucidated in all the military papers and magazines before they are adopted. Such a sudden and complete reformation as has just taken place in the French artillery, and which cannot in any manner be justified, never happened in Germany.

We lay great stress upon this cultivation of the scientific element in the armies of Germany. It is true that this alone would not make them efficient troops; but the days are long gone by when "strong blows" were the essential, nay, the only condition of victory.

The German soldier has not the facility of learning and quickness of the Frenchman. French recruits are drilled with wonderful celerity. On the other hand, under all circumstances, more reliance can be placed on German troops. If they are not so easily aroused to enthusiasm, they do not despair so easily should fortune be against them. The German armies have been reproached for allowing themselves to be beaten so often by Napoleon I. Men who utter such reproaches do not understand what they are saying. It is precisely *because* those armies so often went to encounter defeat that a proof is given of the good grain within them. The endurance of the Austrian troops is wonderful. It is only in defeat that troops show their good qualities. France and French armies would never have rallied as Germany did in 1813.

When substitutes are required in Germany, the government takes the matter in hand. The substitutes are chiefly soldiers, who have served their time. In France this is managed by agents, who naturally care very little whether the substitutes are efficient men or ragamuffins.

In all the armies of Germany every improvement in warfare is carefully considered. The weapons provided to the troops are excellent. The whole of the light infantry is armed with rifles, and also a great portion of the line.

On the whole, the infantry cannot be said to be inferior to the French. The latter may excel in *Tirailleurs*, but the German riflemen are more certain shots. There are at least 80,000 first-rate shots in the armies of Germany.

The German cavalry is, in every respect, superior to that of France. The latter cannot provide sufficient horses at home, and is obliged to purchase abroad for its cavalry and artillery. Napoleon I. always calculated upon what cavalry he should have opposed to him, and selected his battle-ground accordingly. There are few examples where German cavalry has been worsted by French cavalry of the same strength.

As regards the artillery, great reforms are going on in France and

elsewhere. Hitherto, the German artillery has been most efficient in the field.

The technical troops of the German armies may, at least, as regards the great contingents, be placed upon the same footing as those of France. The fortifications erected by German engineers are master works of art.

Owing to the numerous inspections which are held in times of peace, the whole army of the German Confederation can be placed on a war-footing in an incredible short space of time. These inspections are not simply formal reviews, but inspections in the real meaning of the word. We doubt if the French army, dispersed as it is, is under such control as the army of the Confederation.

The Austrian army possesses, perhaps, more experience in warfare than the French. The wars in which she has been engaged since 1848 have all been on a great scale, and her generals are practical men. It is true, the want of unity and uniformity in the armies of Germany, especially in that of the Confederation, is a great fault, but it has been overrated.

The formation of all the Contingents is based on the division of the troops into battalions, regiments, and batteries. This is the ground-plan. Here the *personal* command suffices; that is to say, so many different commanders of an army consisting of so many different contingents, has not that detrimental effect in face of an enemy as might be expected. It little matters, for instance, whether in the 8th *corps d'armée*, a Wurtemberg battalion fires side by side with one from Baden. They are each respectively commanded by their own officers.

Even in a great, well-organized, united army the commander of a division cannot pay much attention to the details of the arrangements. The Commander-in-Chief must have his glance on all the arrangements to insure success.

A more serious disadvantage is the want of uniformity in the calibre of the contingents. Each contingent, however, brings its own supply of ammunition, and need seldom exhaust it.

It must also be taken into consideration that the smaller contingents of the army of the German Confederation are placed as garrisons in the fortresses. The whole reserve division is thus employed, consisting chiefly of contingents under 2,000 men.

In case of war, Prussia employs a great portion of her militia (Landwehr), to man the fortresses.

When the Germans threw off the French yoke their armies were not so well organized as they are now. They nevertheless fought well. In his later campaigns Napoleon I. never had a uniform army. At the Barodino, with 120,000 men, he beat the Russians, nearly his own strength, although his army consisted of twenty different contingents. In Schleswig and Holstein, in 1848, many small contingents fought on the German side. They always acted well together. And this will be the case again when the hour strikes for Germany to arm in her defence against France.

(To be continued.)

HARBOURS OF REFUGE.

East Coast of Scotland, Wick and Peterhead—North and East Coasts of Ireland, Carlingford Bay and Waterford—The Isle of Man, Douglas, Peel, and Port Erin—The Bristol Channel, Padstow, Lundy Island, and Saint Ives.

Second Article.

By the aid of a few figures in the last impression of this Magazine we gave the public to understand that our annual losses by wrecks and other casualties, upon the seas and coasts of the United Kingdom, are so great as barely to be within the range of belief, and consequently that the necessity of deep water harbours, at various points upon our shores, has become a state policy. It is our intention now to continue our remarks upon this important subject, and to draw the attention of our readers to the sites selected by the Royal Commissioners for harbours of life and refuge, in order, as they state, to alleviate the deplorable calamities that annually occur in British waters.

In the construction of artificial places of refuge we are behind the requirements of commercial activity; indeed harbours of refuge are become the great question of the day in all the leading maritime states, but more particularly in England, where we are especially reminded that naval architects have so suddenly expanded the size of our ships that but few of our natural harbours are capable of floating them. The Great Eastern is not the only "big ship" that reminds us how much nature has left for art to accomplish in forming deep water harbours on our shores, a task which, however necessary for our expanding marine, is admitted to be one of the most difficult branches of civil engineering.

We confess we approach this subject with considerable hesitation, for perhaps upon no other topic are there so many differences of opinion, even amongst professional men. What with the conflicting interests, and the jealousy of rival and local claims, and the natural obstacles to be surmounted, we are beset with bewildering and opposing statements. The difficulty we have to contend with is to get at the truth. However, we intend to hold a course of our own, regardless of the consequences, and unbiassed by party or local interests. We are upheld in our intention by the knowledge that, where a mistake has been made by the Commissioners in the selection of a site for refuge purposes, or in the construction of a breakwater, no permanency can be expected, and that notwithstanding any amount of national expenditure, or engineering skill, the fault will sooner or later be detected, as it has been at Dover and Alderney, for nature's destructive agents are always at work, exacting heavy penalties for every blunder.

With these preliminary remarks we shall now proceed to visit the different districts in which harbours of refuge have been recommended by the Royal Commissioners, commencing with the

East Coast of Scotland.

The traffic in this locality is considerable. There is the Davis Srait and Greenland fishery, a large foreign trade with the Baltic

and the German ports, besides Canada and the United States; a home trade with the west coast of Great Britain and Ireland, the total of which is roughly estimated as bringing 10,000 vessels annually through the Pentland Firth. Between this celebrated strait and the Farn Islands the coast is naturally divided into two districts for refuge purposes: the northern portion comprising the Moray Firth, and the southern the coast between Rattray Head and the Farn Islands.

The Bay of Cromarty supplies a good life harbour in the northern district, but it lies so deep in the bight, and so far removed from the passing trade as to be of little use for refuge purposes; while in the southern district there is ample refuge afforded by the Firth of Forth, capable, however, of improvement; and further north there is the Tay, which also is capable of amendment, it being not easy of access.

Between the Tay and Peterhead no point on the coast admits of the construction of a life harbour, the expense of which would be warranted by the returns of casualties arising from *stress of weather*. With respect to a refuge harbour the case is different, and the importance of Peterhead is at once recognized, as it constitutes on this coast a turning point to the greater part of the trade frequenting the Moray and Pentland Firths. At present it is resorted to by wind-bound vessels. It is a good "land fall," and point of departure—a favourite port of call for orders, a port of the Scotch whalers, and a considerable station of the herring fishery. It also presents a fitting point for the collection of convoys, and for a naval station.

As will be seen hereafter, the Commissioners have recommended the sum of £300,000 to be expended at Peterhead, for harbour purposes.

In addition to Peterhead, the port of Fraserburgh is well calculated for a refuge harbour, but the expenditure of £300,000 at Peterhead, in its immediate vicinity, precludes the possibility of expending the public funds at Fraserburgh for refuge purposes.

In addition to the trade in shipping a very important feature on this coast is the herring fishery, which, existing along the east coast of Scotland, gathers itself into a focus on the Caithness coast. Upwards of 1,700 boats, manned by 8,000 men, have been employed in the district of Wick in the past year; and in the eighty miles of coast in which they fish, that is, from Cromarty to the Pentland, there is not one harbour that these boats can enter at low water, nor, if loaded, can they venture near them until half tide. A refuge harbour at Wick, especially during the winter, when the days are short, the nights long, and the weather severe, will prove a great boon to many a toiling mariner. The Commissioners accordingly have recommended a refuge harbour at

WICK.

A return of the shipping, foreign and coastwise, for the year 1857, for the ports of Wick and Peterhead, gives 2,076 vessels, of the tonnage of 240,774 for Wick, and 97,177 for Peterhead. As further evidence of the traffic upon this coast, from Tarbetness to the Pentland Firth, Capt. Washington, in his summary report for 1846, states that in that year the traffic amounted to 4,864 vessels loaded, of 706,866 tons. And it also appears that in 1846 there passed through

the Pentland Firth 4,178 vessels, carrying cargo of 664,064 tons. This fleet of merchantmen is exclusive of vessels in ballast, passenger steamers, ships of war, revenue cruizers, and all craft under fifteen tons burthen.

In addition to the above reasons for a harbour at Wick, it is stated that there has been a great increase in the Pentland Firth traffic since 1846, when the above returns were made. The statement is corroborated by the returns of 1857, which shows that although the increase in the trade of Wick is great, yet that it is by no means stationary. Since 1846 the coasting trade of Wick has also been greatly augmented. In that year only two steamers per week left during eight months in the year, but now there are six weekly during the whole year, and it is supposed that upwards of 10,000 passengers are landed and shipped at Wick almost entirely by means of small boats.

Again, the returns of 1857 show that from 1050 to 1100 vessels found refuge in Scrabster Roads in 1856, and also that along the Caithness side of the Firth there are fifteen pilot boats of full crews of seven men each engaged in piloting vessels through the Pentland.

Nor must the herring fishery be forgotten, for that at Wick is the greatest in the kingdom. It draws fishermen from the whole northern counties of Scotland,—viz., from Argyle, Ross, Sutherland, Orkney, Shetland, Nairn, Moray, Banff, and Fife, and fish curers gather together there from various ports in Ireland, and from Liverpool, Rothesay, Leith, Dundee, and other places, and to these must be added the fishing vessels from home and foreign ports.

The number of persons employed in the fisheries at Wick and its neighbourhood is estimated at 18,712, at Peterhead 4,597, and 3,865 at Fraserburgh.

The above statements show what an important place Wick and its neighbourhood is, as a nursery for a hardy race of seamen, and of the necessity of a harbour of refuge in the locality. Yet, along the whole coast, from Helmsdale to Duncansby head, there is no refuge, nor any place to which, with a gale from the north eastward to south, any vessel or boat can run for shelter. In consequence of the exposed nature of the coast the great fishery is carried on at a very serious disadvantage. Steamers as well as other craft for Wick dare not attempt to approach the shore when there is an appearance of a gale from the eastward. The fishing boats are prevented from going to sea from the same reason, not because of any storm at the moment, but from having no place of safety to run to in the event of any of those sudden gales which are prevalent on that coast; consequently the best fishing nights of the season are frequently lost from this cause, and the fishermen are getting disheartened.

The Royal Commissioners state that the only effective remedy to meet the case would be the construction of a breakwater across Wick Bay, which would afford shelter to the large and increasing trade of the place, as well as to all passing vessels, and, further, it would allow the fishing of the district to be carried on in safety.

In addition to the above remarks, it should be stated that the

herring fishery of Caithness is national, as most of the men and boats engaged in it come from a distance. It circulates an immense sum of money amongst the industrious classes in the manufacturing districts, and, further, all the materials required in the prosecution of the fishery, viz.,—wood, salt, iron, hemp, twine, tar, &c., are imported.

Again, the importance of Wick fishery cannot be well overestimated as a nursery for seamen; in short, it is the best in the kingdom, and for this reason claims our especial attention and support. As a proof of this it may be mentioned that when the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers were first enrolled the district under consideration contributed one-seventh of the whole force raised in Scotland, although the enrolment did not take place during the fishing season.

On this unsheltered coast the losses that sometimes occur are very calamitous. Captain Tudor, R.N., stated that on one occasion thirty-seven men were drowned, and that every soul and every boat would have been saved if there had been a breakwater. And it was further stated by another witness before the Commissioners, that the losses on this coast, and the serious inconvenience under which the fishing is prosecuted, are fast destroying the confidence of those engaged in it, and that unless some shelter is afforded, a calamity more sad than any yet will sooner or later appal the country and drive the fishermen from the coast.

A harbour of refuge at Wick would also be a port for ships of the navy, as well as merchantmen, coming from the Baltic and Archangel, and the Commissioners therefore recommend the construction of harbours at Wick and Peterhead.

The nature of the works to be constructed in Wick Bay will consist of two piers, one proceeding from the south side of the Bay to the extent of 1600 feet from low water mark, with a slight curve to seaward, and reaching into seven fathoms at time of low water.

In like manner the north pier will convex seaward, extending across the bay to the extent of 1000 feet from low water, terminating in about eight fathoms, leaving a clear entrance of 500 feet between the pier heads, the depth of the entrance being from seven to eight fathoms.

The structure of the piers is proposed to be of rubble stone, discharged from stagings into the sea, and so carried up to twelve feet below low water level, thence upwards, by upright walls, to the top of the platform and parapet.

The estimated cost of the work is stated to be about £250,000.

The space of sheltered water thus enclosed will amount to—

From low water and upwards	. .	160 acres.
„ the one fathom line, do.	. .	126 „
„ „ two fathom, do. do.	. .	103 „
„ „ three fathom do. do.	. .	87 „
„ „ five fathom, do. do.	. .	59 „

The rise and fall of the tides range from seven and a half to ten feet.

There are many other places that put in their claims for preference on this coast, but as we intend to confine our remarks to those

sites recommended by the Commissioners for Harbours of Refuge, we shall now proceed to notice

PETERHEAD.

This Scottish port has been considered of importance for a long series of years. As early as 1661, in the first Parliament of Charles II., an act was passed "for a contribution for repairing the harbours of Peterhead." Again, in 1729 and 1739 the royal burghs authorized a voluntary contribution for the same purpose; and since 1797 upwards of £105,000 has been expended for harbourage at this place.

The geographical position of Peterhead has been long regarded by many seamen as one of the most fitting places on the east coast of Scotland for affording them protection. It is the most generally frequented anchorage on the east coast of Scotland between the Pentland and the Firth of Forth. It has good holding ground. The Buchan-ness light, and the adjoining highland, so mark its position that it is easily got hold of; and these objects, forming as they do landmarks for vessels passing in either direction, naturally draw them thither, so that refuge is often sought there; and if breakwaters were constructed to ensure protection from certain winds it would become a place of safety. Even in its present unprotected state large fleets of ships bound northward or westward obtain shelter in the south bay in the spring, summer, and autumn months. As many as ninety-six ships had taken shelter there at one time.

Again, the trade of the Moray Firth is very much dependent on the harbours and bays of Peterhead for the refuge afforded to it there when its vessels are overtaken by gales or contrary winds. Also, many vessels from Archangel, the Baltic, and North America, call at Peterhead for orders, the average number being not less than 150.*

Peterhead is a station for the herring fishery, only second in importance to Wick the number of boats engaged annually being from 230 to 400; and within a range of fourteen miles north and south the white fishing is largely carried on, more particularly in the winter months.

Owing to the unprotected state of the coast, the loss of life and property at Peterhead is sometimes very great. Since 1847 the number of vessels lost amounts to sixty-four, causing the destruction of eighty-seven lives. These losses are exclusive of loss of life in the herring and white fisheries—the amount of which has not been ascertained with certainty, though the fact is sufficiently obvious. So that were a harbour of refuge constructed at Peterhead, it would possess all the advantages which the trade of the North Sea passing or nearing the east coast of Scotland required, and would afford protection to a class of fishermen that very much need it.

* The *Peterhead Sentinel*, alluding to the fishing for this year, says,—"The following calculation will show the aggregate result of the fishing for 1859. The number of the boats at the different Scotch ports from Orkney to Northumberland was 4780. The value of these, including nets, would be about £400,000. The number of men employed may be stated at 24,000, and the wages they have received about £296,000. The result of the fishing altogether is 296,000 crans, the value of which will not be under £370,000. The 'catch,' however, is most unsatisfactory, and represents a deficiency of nearly £140,000 as compared with 1858."

There seems to have been a design for a harbour of refuge at Peterhead put in by Mr. David Stevenson, civil engineer, which did not meet with the approbation of the Royal Commissioners. The plan adopted by them contemplates a pier from the south shore at "Salter's Point," running towards the north-east for a distance of 720ft. with a depth of four fathoms at the outer end. Opposite to the centre of the bay it is proposed to construct a detached breakwater, 2,300ft. long, the north and south end of this work would be in about 8½ fathoms at low water of spring tide. Between the north end of this breakwater and the line of four fathoms off the north shore of the bay, there would be a distance of 700ft., forming an entrance under the shelter of "Keith Inch," in northerly and north-easterly gales.

The materials used in any works at Peterhead would be of the granite of the surrounding district, and the time occupied in the execution of the works recommended should not exceed eight years. And the commissioners consider that the design can be executed for the sum of £300,000.

The water space thus enclosed at the time of low water would be:—

From the low water line	.	.	.	.	240	acres.
„ 1 fathom line and upwards	.	.	206	„
„ 2 „ „ „	.	.	181	„
„ 3 „ „ „	.	.	162	„
„ 4 „ „ „	.	.	142	„
„ 5 „ „ „	.	.	116	„

With respect to the harbours of Wick and Peterhead, it appeared to be the opinion of the witnesses examined before the Commission, that a harbour at Wick would be beneficial only to the trade of Wick, but that Peterhead is the best place for a harbour of refuge on the north-east coast of Scotland.

The ports of Wick and Peterhead are the only places in Scotland recommended as suitable for refuge purposes. The Commissioners visited Aberdeen, Dundee, Leith, and Glasgow, and received deputations from Lossiemouth, Montrose, and Stonehaven, in order to obtain evidence free from the partiality evinced at those places at which the formation of harbours had been the subject of expectation. At many of these places large sums had been expended in adapting the convenience of their respective localities to the passing or local trade. But the Commissioners did not consider that they had any claim upon the public funds for assistance. The places above mentioned evinced in various degrees the spirit of enterprise, and had expended large sums of money in proportion to their resources for refuge purposes; but in their cases the question resolved itself into one of local harbour improvement, into the investigation of which the Commissioners did not enter, and on which they offered no opinion.

North and East Coasts of Ireland.

In this important district the attention of the Commissioners was especially drawn to the "Skerries" of Antrim. This outlying nest of islands forms almost a natural breakwater, and many persons have

been struck by the capabilities of the site. There are, however, excellent harbours in the vicinity of the Skerries, and a reference to the "wreck chart," shows but a small amount of casualties arising from *stress of weather* in the north channel, and the Commissioners concluded, therefore, that there was no necessity for constructing a harbour in that locality either for life or refuge purposes.

On the east coast of Ireland, however, a life harbour would be very desirable, particularly if placed in the track of Liverpool vessels bound through the north channel, and of ships from the Clyde, bound south through the Irish Sea. Lough Carlingford offers a spacious natural harbour in the position indicated—the advantages of which we intend to notice hereafter.

Ardlass, a few miles to the north of Carlingford, and the Dublin Skerries a few miles to the south, were mentioned as places adapted for refuge harbours. But the Bay of Ardglass is too limited, nor is any refuge required within so short a distance from Carlingford. The position, too, of the Dublin Skerries, about half way between the contemplated harbour at Carlingford and Kingston, renders such a work unnecessary there.

Wexford would be an available position for a life harbour, but the extreme difficulty of the engineering problem connected with the improvement of its entrance precludes the possibility of the expenditure of the public funds for that purpose. The Commissioners recommend that a "light" be placed near the south entrance of Ballygeary Bay, which will have the effect of rendering Wexford South Bay a useful refuge for vessels passing along this part of the Irish Coast.

Waterford, on the south coast, in many respects resembles Carlingford. The approach is free; it has a bold shore and a clean bottom, a wide entrance, and the harbour offers a large area of sheltered anchorage within. But, like Carlingford, there is a difficult "flat," having only 13 ft. of water at its entrance. However, its position at the south eastern angle of Ireland, and near the entrance of St. George's Channel, possesses so many advantages, that it is desirable the locality should be turned to account.

The conversion of Carlingford into a refuge harbour, combined with the existence of Kingstown, the improvement of Waterford, and the natural harbour of Cork, will, in the opinion of the Commissioners, provide ample shelter between Lough Strangford and Wicklow, and between Carnsore Point and the old Head of Kinsale.

We have no desire to disturb this opinion by any schemes of our own. We hope the anticipations of the Commissioners may be verified. Indeed, we believe that their suggestions will tend to diminish the casualties unhappily too frequent amongst the numerous ships and small craft frequenting this overcrowded channel. We will now notice the works recommended by the Commissioners at

CARLINGFORD BAY.

This locality has been long considered desirable as a site for a harbour of refuge. Its position, with reference to the enormous trade of Liverpool and the Irish Sea generally, and looking at the long list of casualties to shipping, with the loss of life and property, as shown by the wreck returns, has proved it to be so.

The difficulty here is the bar at the entrance of the bay, the practicability of removing which claimed the attention of the Commissioners. It appears to be a natural formation that never was deepened by any artificial means. Its formation is not attributed to deposit such as usually forms on bars. Borings have been made without any difficulty, which show that no rocks exist. Engineers are quite satisfied that the bottom soil consists of clay.

To render this important position of use to the trade of the Irish channel, the Commissioners propose to dredge a deep-water entrance through the bar, the length of which is to be 3,700 and the breadth at bottom 600 feet. The depth of this channel is to be, when completed, 21 feet at low water of spring tides. The side slopes to be 4 to 1.

From the borings of the bar made by Mr. Hoskyn, R.N., under the superintendance of Mr. B. Gibbons, C.E., and Engineer to the Board of Works in Ireland, it appears that fully four-fifths of the bed of the proposed channel consists of clay, the remaining one-fifth seems to be covered with boulder stones or rock *in suti*. If these stones are loose, and merely lie upon the surface, as the report of the diver states them to be, then the sum of £50,000 will be ample to dredge the proposed channel; but, if it should prove on further examination that a portion of this channel is crossed by a ridge of rock, the Commissioners recommend that an additional sum of £25,000 be granted to meet the increase of expenses necessary for its removal.

It is presumed that these works will convert Lough Carlingford into a valuable harbour of refuge, which would be a considerable boon to the traffic of these seas, should it turn out as predicted; for ships do not shelter there at present to any extent. Ship-masters are very naturally afraid of the bar; but, perhaps, if they were convinced that the channel was deepened, vessels bound down channel from Liverpool, and meeting with heavy south-west gales, would bear up for Carlingford, having such good landmarks as the mountains on each side.

It seems that the channel could be dredged in three years, and the holding ground is considered good. But if it is intended to convert Lough Carlingford into a harbour of refuge, the Harbour Master stated that the channel ought to be 1,000 feet wide; and as there is no place in the vicinity where a better harbour of refuge might be made at so small a cost, we consdier that the capabilities of the locality have not received the consideration they deserve.

Waterford.

The present harbour at Waterford is sufficient for the local trade, but it is very desirable that it should be deepened, so as to render it a subsidiary harbour of refuge for the trade bound south of the Irish Channel. If the harbour is deepened, large ships might make use of it, but at present vessels are often lost here for want of shelter. The locality is very desirable as a "refuge" from south-westerly gales.

The difficulty at Waterford is a bar, which it is proposed to cut through; borings have been made, and no rock found. The bottom is composed of oysters, shells, sand, gravel, and stiff mud. By removing the bank, there would be in places 20 feet at low water all the way to the sea. The proposed cut will produce a greater scour by increasing the "ebb," and may deepen the harbour.

The Commissioners, in this case, propose to dredge through the "Duncannon bar" for a distance of 8,000 feet, the channel having an average breadth at bottom of 600 feet, with a depth of not less than 22 feet at low water spring tides.

The side slopes to be 4 to 1. The estimated cost is £50,000.

The dredging operations at Carlingford Bay and Waterford are the only works recommended by the Commissioners for refuge purposes in Ireland.

Isle of Man.

The central position of this island in the Irish Sea, the general rocky nature of its shores, the absence of deep water harbours, and its large herring fishery, give it strong claims for consideration for refuge purposes.

From the evidence, however, brought before the Commissioners in the locality in question, as well as at Liverpool, they do not think it expedient to propose the formation of refuge harbours either in Douglas or Ramsay Bay. They are, however, of opinion that it will be highly beneficial to provide shelter for the passing trade, and to afford security to the inhabitants, who are exposed to great risks in embarking and landing in open boats. The danger is greatest at Douglas, which is the place of greatest importance, as between that port and Liverpool lies the line of communication for passengers and mails.

Taking into view the benefits, both national and local, which will be conferred by constructing a refuge harbour in the small bay outside the port at Douglas, it appears that the required protection can be afforded for about £100,000, and the Commissioners submit that the public should furnish one half of this sum, on condition that the other half is provided by the public funds of the island.

There is also a great demand for increased shelter and accommodation for the fishery fleets at Peel and Port Erin. The former port is the chief fishing harbour. It is inaccessible to the boats at low water, which are exposed to much danger in an on-shore gale; besides it is too small for the increasing fleet, and will not contain more than two-thirds of the boats. From these circumstances, and the frequent overcrowded state of the harbour, the fishermen are often prevented from putting to sea in the evening when the weather threatens; and in one night, it has been computed, that a "catch" valued at £2,000 has been lost for want of a secure place to run to in case of need.

Port Erin serves as an auxiliary refuge both to Peel and Port St. Mary, and as its little bay is deep, clean, and sheltered on three sides, a pier running out from its south shore will be a valuable addition to its natural advantage, and afford good shelter to a large fleet of boats.

To meet the construction of the proposed works at Peel and Port Erin, in both cases chiefly of local benefit, the Commissioners recommended a loan of £15,000 for each place, on condition that in each case an additional sum of £10,000 shall be granted from the funds of the island.

Douglas.

Various representations have been made by the local commis-

sioners to the Treasury at different times as to the bad state of this harbour. Plans were sent up to the Admiralty, and approved in many respects, but in many others approbation has been withheld. The works that might have been constructed with the money available would not have satisfied the wants of the port, and consequently all improvements were suspended till the result of the present commission was known.

The substance of the evidence before the Commissioners may be summed up as follows:—It appears that as far back as 1835, Sir J. Rennie submitted a plan which would have given a sheltered space of forty-five acres, at a cost of £216,652. It was never carried into effect. One witness stated that the plan was a very bad one. A pier 850 feet long from the "two gun battery" would protect the *harbour* sufficiently, but not the *roadstead*. A pier from the "two gun battery," of 550 feet, would be too small, although steamers might land passengers at it. To make Douglas a harbour of refuge, a breakwater is required from "Douglas head," 600 or 700 yards in length.

There was much more evidence of the same character, all agreeing that a pier from the "two gun battery" would be too small, and would be of no use for large ships, and would only afford protection to steamers and accommodation for passengers. We feel that a deep water harbour is much needed at Douglas. Indeed, it has long been a serious inconvenience and loss to the shipping of this country. There ought to be, if possible, a refuge somewhere in the mid channel of the Irish sea, of such a depth of water that the largest ship out of Liverpool could take shelter in from gales of wind.

In the opposite ports of Lancashire, Cumberland, and the south ports of Scotland, there is not a harbour north of Holyhead to the Clyde which can afford shelter to a vessel in distress at low water, or even at half tide, except Liverpool, and that port can only be taken by certain winds.

Now Douglas is a dry harbour, but notwithstanding this draw back, it has become a resort for a large and increasing amount of shipping in tempestuous weather. The bay is capable of much improvement, and it might be made a secure place of shelter. And placed as the Isle of Man is in the centre of the three kingdoms, the importance of its relative situation in a naval point of view appears to have been lost sight of by the Royal Commissioners. It is worthy the consideration of the Government to anticipate the possibility of the Isle of Man being made use of by the enemy in the event of war. The establishment of a harbour of refuge in Douglas Bay, in which a fleet might lie in safety, ready at any time of the tide to repel an attack of the enemy on the coasts of the island itself, or on the coasts of Ireland, England, or Scotland, would prevent such occurrences as took place in former wars, when the enterprising French commander "Thurot," and the daring adventurer "Paul Jones," caused much alarm in these seas. And be it also remembered that during the revolutionary war in which we lost the United States of America, their cruisers captured several vessels not many miles distant from the coast of Man.

In making these observations, it must not be forgotten that steam has added an auxiliary motive power to ships of war, while the

majority of our merchant vessels still rely upon the wind and canvas only. So that this is an additional reason for a harbour of refuge on the coast of the Isle of Man. It would thus become not only as the Tidal Harbour Commissioners term it "the beacon of the Irish sea," but it might also become the citadel of the Irish sea.

There are many eminent naval engineer authorities that advocate a Harbour of Refuge at Douglas Bay. So long ago as 1835, Capt. H. M. Denham reported to the Secretary of the Liverpool Dock Trustees, "that in point of capacity of water, surface, area, natural features, and freedom from contiguous danger, Douglas Bay is a fit position for forming a safety harbour as a *central* refuge for vessels navigating the Irish Sea.

Sir John Rennie, F.R.S., in his report on an asylum harbour in Douglas Bay, says, "there is no low water harbour of any magnitude between Holyhead and the Firth of Clyde, except the packet harbour of Whitehaven and Port Patrick, a distance of upwards of 300 miles on the east side of the Channel, from whence it arises that vessels outward bound from Liverpool, when prevented from continuing their voyage by strong westerly winds, are driven back, and are compelled to beat about the Channel during long nights and stormy weather, at the imminent risk of wreck.

Again, Captain Head, the Harbour Master of the port of Fleetwood, stated in 1840, when on his examination at that port, that "a Harbour of Refuge at Douglas Bay would be the best. Great Ormshead would be objectionable, because vessels could not get out at all during N. and N.W. winds. Douglas Bay would be better than any part of the coast of Ireland. Had often talked the subject over with pilots in Liverpool, and they were of the same opinion."

And, further, Sir Charles Lushington, Judge of the Admiralty Court at a banquet at the Trinity House, presided over by his Royal Highness the Prince Consort, on the 3rd of July, 1858, stated that "our ports, especially the port of *Liverpool*, are so thronged with vessels, that within the last two months half of my time has been engaged upon foreign vessels. *From* the mouth of the *Mersey down to the coast of Ireland*—there it is, I regret to say, that we have had some of the most unfortunate collisions, and the greatest loss of life."

Again, Mr. Hugh Tennant, who had been for twenty years accustomed to yachting, said in his evidence taken before the Commissioners at Glasgow, that "he thought there should be a Harbour of Refuge at the Isle of Man. For large ships, the north-east coast of Ireland and the Isle of Man were the most desirable for Harbours of Refuge."

And, lastly, Captain Crawford, who has been twenty years in command of steamers plying between Glasgow and Liverpool, stated that "he had been from 2,000 to 3,000 times along the Liverpool and Glasgow course, and he thought that a harbour at the Isle of Man would be a safe refuge for many vessels to Liverpool in adverse winds, but it would be most useful to outward bound vessels."

Upon a careful consideration, therefore, of the above evidence, particularly in respect to the shipping at Liverpool, it appears that

the Isle of Man occupies the most central position, and lies in the main track of vessels proceeding from, and returning to that port by the north entrance to the Irish Channel. To this great and increasing traffic must be added the immense intercourse by steam between Scotland, Ireland, and England, and of the extensive fleet of colliers from Whitehaven, Workington, Allonby, Maryport, and of the towns of Solway Firth to Dublin, Drogheda, Newry, Belfast, and the adjacent coasts. And Douglas being the centre and most populous part of the island, and possessing great advantages in other respects, appears on the whole well adapted for an asylum harbour. And viewed in the light above described, and taking into consideration the whole shipping interest of the Irish Channel, it is the opinion of many eminent authorities that accommodation for less than 200 vessels of all classes at low water, would not fully meet the wants of the locality.

And yet, notwithstanding the above statements, the works proposed to be constructed in Douglas Bay are of a very limited character. It will consist of two piers, viz., one proceeding from the Little Head (or Two Gun Battery) on the south side, *retired* 250 *yards within the shelter* of "Douglas Head," and carried across the bay in a northerly direction to a distance of 1,000ft. from low water mark, with a slight cant at the north end, where it terminates with a pier head in a depth of five fathoms at low water. *Secondly*, a north pier, proceeding from the low water mark of "Conister Rock," directed in a line towards the south pier heads already mentioned, 350ft. in length, and terminating in five fathoms at low water, leaving an entrance of 500ft. in the clear between the two pier heads, where the depth is five fathoms at low water.

The space of water thus enclosed of low water area, will be as follows:—

Of low water area	46½ acres.
One fathom and upwards . . .	35 „
Two „ „ „ . . .	27 „
Three „ „ „ . . .	16 „

The Commissioners, indeed, appear to have thought that the enclosed water space is too confined, for they state "that the area being *small* in amount, it is important that the *upright* form of structure should be carried out to the greatest possible extent, in order that the space for shipping be preserved entire.

They estimate the cost of the work at £100,000, and express a desire that it should be executed in a period of time not exceeding five years.

Now, when we remember that the whole of the evidence went to prove that a pier run out from the "Two Gun Battery" would be of no use for refuge purposes, we cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that the sheltered area is indeed too small. It may be of utility in protecting steam boats, and afford accommodation for passengers. It may shelter the harbour sufficiently, but not the roadstead; but that as a refuge harbour upon a useful scale for the vessels navigating the adjoining seas, the recommendation of the

Royal Commissioners at Douglas will not relieve the enormous traffic in the Irish seas in the slightest degree.

PEEL.

A harbour of refuge, in a comprehensive sense, is not required at Peel, but a necessity for a harbour of protection for the fishing fleet has long been felt. The fishing boats belonging to Peel amount to about 150, and to other parts of the island about 100. But boats come from Cornwall to fish at the Isle of Man, and these vessels are reckoned at 150. Then 150 come from the Irish ports, about fifty from Scotch ports, and twenty from Cumberland, making a total of about 600 sail. These boats are manned by about seven men each, making about 4,200 hands, and it is supposed that that there are at least 2,000 people employed in bringing fish and carrying it from the fishing stations to the different markets.

It was stated and not denied before the Commissioners, that the harbour space at Peel is insufficient to afford shelter to this fleet of boats. Frequently 400 sail are jammed together in the present inconvenient harbour at one time, and a great loss is sustained by the proprietors of the boats in consequence. A breakwater would remedy this entirely, by enabling the boats to sail in and out at all times of the tide. The advantages of a pier are obvious, therefore, not so much in saving the lives of the fishermen, for few lives are lost at Peel, but in preventing damage to the boats when they are obliged to run for the present confined harbour in bad weather. But in addition to the damage thus sustained by the fishermen must be added the loss by detention, if the weather is unfavourable. In foul weather it is the custom of the crews of the boats to consult, whether they think it safer to run into the harbour than to put to sea. If they do so, and the weather moderates, it often happens that most of the vessels are aground, for at half ebb there is not sufficient water to float them all. In this way, they often lose a night's fishing, whereas, if the boats could lie at anchor in safety, they would be able to put to sea at all hours of the tide. So that a harbour of refuge at Peel is required more on account of the great benefit it will be to the fishermen, than for the protection to life. And taking this view of the case, the Commissioners recommend a single pier to be constructed in Peel Bay, proceeding from the "Horse Rock," near the sally port of Peel Castle, and extending in an east by south direction 500ft., and terminating in 22ft. at time of low water.

The structure of the pier to be of an upright form from the bed of the sea. The cost of the work is estimated at £25,000.

The shelter afforded by the work in north-westerly gales is as follows—

Of low water area	28	acres
„ 1 fathom and upwards . .	14	„
„ 2 ditto ditto . . .	5	„

The work ought to be executed in three years.

PORT ERIN.

Port Erin is also a fishing station in the Isle of Man, it is situated between St. Mary and Peel, and is the best port for fishing. There is no shelter, but an open bay, and the erection of a breakwater

will afford much protection to the fishermen. These poor men stated that they are willing to pay £2 a boat every season until such a sum as the Government may advance for harbourage is reimbursed.

Port Erin, like Peel, does not require a breakwater harbour so much for saving life as saving property, and giving greater facilities for the fishermen. They lose a great deal by being kept in port. One witness stated that for three weeks his boat had been only two nights out, as owing to the state of the weather the crew were afraid to go round the "Calf." Whereas if they had had a harbour, they would have "shot" every night, for then they would not have been afraid to put to sea, as they should have known where to run to.

To meet the requirements of the fishermen the Commissioners propose to construct a single pier 400 feet long in a north direction from the south shore, and terminating in twenty-six feet at low water.

The structure to be of the upright form, similar to that recommended at Peel Bay.

The cost of the work is estimated at £25,000. The shelter afforded by the pier in westerly gales will be as follows—

Of low water area	.	.	.	17	acres
„ 1 fathom and upwards	.	.	.	11	„
„ 2 ditto ditto	.	.	.	6	„
„ 3 ditto ditto	.	.	.	3	„

The work above described will prove most useful to this locality; it will afford great protection to the fishery, as well as a certain class of carrying vessels. The Commissioners appear to be sensible of the importance of a good refuge here, for they recommend, that in the event of funds being available at any future time, that it would be desirable to extend the south pier, and to carry out a pier from the north shore of the bay to meet it, leaving an opening of 500 feet between them. Thus a very complete and serviceable harbour of refuge would be provided for coasters under any emergency.

They recommend the proposed work to be executed in three years.

The sittings at the Isle of Man then closed, and the Commissioners resumed their labours at Liverpool on the 18th of September. They heard evidence respecting the advantage of having a harbour of refuge on the north coast of Ireland, which many shipowners and pilots warmly advocated. But a new feature in the evidence was given by the Chairman of the Shipowners' Association at this great commercial port. It is the opinion of that influential body that harbours of refuge ought to be considered as national works, and that shipowners object to contribute towards their formation. They consider them not so much a commercial as a national question. It was stated that wrecks in the Irish Channel do not arise from the want of harbours, but from imperfect knowledge of tides and currents, neglect of "lead," and bad "look out." One of the greatest advantages of refuge harbours would be the prevention of collision, as many masters rather than risk "fouling," would run for

harbours of refuge (without any expense of going in) until the gale was over, to avoid the possibility of collision.

It was further stated by the Chairman of the "Association," that a "fairway" light thirty or forty miles off land would be a most valuable light. The present practice is to place lights where there is danger, but the Shipowners' Association think it best to light the "fairway" instead of the "danger."

There can be no doubt that a great advantage would result from a better mode of "buoying" harbours, and if a greater uniformity of "lights" was adopted. At present there is one system in the Baltic, which is quite opposite to ours, and other maritime powers, such as the Americans, for example, have a system of their own. These different plans, all meeting in our "narrow seas," lead to great confusion in different ships. Again, there are many "natural" harbours neither buoyed or lit, consequently ships in distress are afraid to run for them. Buoying and lighting these harbours would make them accessible and valuable, especially to all small craft.

The views taken by the Shipowners' Association and underwriters of Liverpool touching this question appear to be as follows. They consider harbours of refuge rather desirable than necessary, and object to be taxed for their construction. That prevention of wrecks by harbours of refuge would reduce premiums of insurance, but the public would gain by the reduction, not the shipowners, therefore harbours of refuge and lights should be paid for by the community at large. That all passing tolls are obnoxious, and they would rather pay the "underwriters" instead. That harbours of refuge tend in some degree to the saving of life, but not to the same extent to the preservation of property. That they would prefer not having harbours of refuge, if at the expense of the shipping interest. That in a national point of view the seafaring population have a greater claim for the protection of life and property than the rest of the community, and that they would rather encourage a moderate expenditure generally diffused, than large works for particular localities.

Bristol Channel.

The consideration of harbours of refuge in this important estuary is naturally divided into two districts—one, the Bristol Channel proper, lying to the eastward of Lundy Island; the other, comprising the dangerous and unprotected coast from Hartland Point to the Land's End.

The trade in this district comprises one-sixth of the shipping, and one-tenth of the tonnage of the United Kingdom. To protect this vast interest becomes a national consideration. It seems from the returns that no wrecks from *stress of weather* occur above the "Holms," so that no life harbour is required in the upper part of the Channel lying to the eastward of Lundy Island.

But it is unquestionable that a refuge at the entrance of this Channel would confer a great benefit on the trade at all the ports from Cardiff and Bridgewater upwards; and it is at "Lundy Island" that a noble position is found for such a purpose, but we fear it is

impossible at present to take advantage of it, owing to the great expense required to adopt its excellent site for harbour purposes.

This is to be regretted, because the general trade bound to the westward, and unable to make head against heavy contrary winds, would shelter with less risk at Lundy Island refuge harbour, if one could be constructed there, than at the "Mumbles," and with less loss of distance, than by running back to "Penarth" or "Kingroad."

Again, it is well suited for the collection of convoys, and for a naval station to watch the Channel, and being well sheltered from the eastward any breakwater that might be hereafter erected might be of the cheapest description. A mere rubble mound, requiring little skilled labour, and well adapted for the amusement of convicts, would suffice, and for their safe custody the island affords every facility.

All the evidence heard at Bristol and elsewhere was in favour of a "refuge" at Lundy Island. Solicitors for different corporate bodies, haven masters, merchants, shipowners, pilots, and master mariners were loud in their praises of the position of this spot. It was better than the Mumbles, Milford Haven, Clovelly, Oxwich Bay, or indeed anywhere else in the Bristol Channel. But with all its advantages as a position, the depth of water in which a breakwater must be constructed is so great as to occasion a cost of construction not to be thought of (so say the Commissioners), until those harbours which are of more urgent necessity shall have been completed, and practical proofs of the benefit which is expected from them shall have been obtained. Or unless, as we before remarked, a capital field for convict occupation is required.

The trade of Swansea is fast increasing, and will soon become important. In 1857 its tonnage reached a total of 537,000 tons. The annual revenue of its harbour now reaches £26,000. This trade is exposed to the great inconvenience of the unsheltered state of the "Mumbles." It is not of a character, however, to occasion loss of life or property, and forms no reasonable ground for the construction of a life harbour. But the increasing trade of Swansea requires, to a certain extent, refuge at this spot, and the Commissioners recommend that a loan, not exceeding one-half of the amount required for the construction of a harbour, should be favourably entertained.

Having disposed of the British Channel proper we will now proceed to consider the long iron-bound coast between Hartland Point and the Land's End. On this dead lee shore, during the heaviest and most dangerous gales, no shelter can be found except at Padstow. This place would be a valuable position for a life harbour, were it not for the peculiarly dangerous character of its entrance in heavy weather.

Unfortunately the returns of the wreck-chart show wrecks from *stress of weather* in its immediate vicinity, amply sufficient in number to prove the necessity of a harbour, yet the most that the Commissioners feel warranted in recommending is a grant not exceeding £40,000 for cutting down "Stepper Point." As, however, the success of this operation, limited as it is, may not be considered entirely free from doubt, they recommend that half this sum be expended in

cutting down the outer portion of the "Point," to test the value of the whole operation for its intended purpose.

The magnitude of the trade proceeding round the Land's End, on voyages to and from the north coast of Cornwall and the British Channel, renders a harbour of refuge in St. Ives Bay very desirable. This Cornish port lies in the track of all ships entering or leaving either the English, Irish, or Bristol Channel. To vessels from Liverpool and the Irish ports, bound southwards, in distress, a harbour at St. Ives will prove a real asylum—it will be most valuable; while to vessels bound either up or down the Bristol Channel, caught with a north-west gale on a lee shore, as is often the case, a harbour here will be of the greatest advantage.

But if a harbour at this site will prove of the highest importance to the shipping of the United Kingdom, it will be also of inestimable value to the navigation of the world, as it is near to the route taken by vessels of all nations, not actually visiting our ports, but bound northward or westward. Consequently, if a harbour of refuge is needed in the Bristol Channel, or at the Land's End, the claims of St. Ives are paramount to all others.

In 1847 a report made by Capt. Vetch to the Admiralty states that in twenty-four years, from 1823 to 1846, on a line of coast twelve miles south-west of St. Ives, and twenty-four miles north-east of it, 131 vessels, besides boats, were wrecked, with a loss of 200 lives.

The construction of a harbour at this place is a purely national affair, arising entirely from the wants of the passing trade, and the Commissioners taking this view of the case, recommend a grant of £400,000 for that purpose; and in making this remark we do not forget that the fisheries are entitled to consideration, as it appears that there are 400 boats, in which a capital of £150,000 is embarked, belonging to the port.

Padstow.

This is a site which we have shown is incapable of being converted into a "refuge," on account of natural obstructions. If Padstow could be made available it would be a great relief to the passing trade. But the difficulties are too great, and the result too doubtful, to warrant a heavy draught upon the public purse, and there are no local funds forthcoming for improving the harbour, except from vessels using it for shelter.

A great benefit will probably result in lowering "the Stepper Point," as this elevated piece of land creates baffling winds inside, and causes many casualties. Cutting down this point will be the greatest improvement that can be made at Padstow at present.

The Commissioners therefore proposed to lower the end of Stepper Point at the entrance of the harbour, in order to obviate the danger that now arises to vessels, which are frequently thrown on the northern point of the "Doom Bar," an extensive and dangerous sand bank, lying on the eastern side of the Channel. Vessels attempting to get into Padstow harbour during north-westerly gales, which are the most destructive on this coast, experience great difficulty in clearing the Doom Bar, in consequence of the eddying winds which are caused by the peculiar form of the hill at Stepper Point. In or-

der to create a true wind at the entrance of the harbour a very small portion of this point has been cut down by the Padstow association, and has proved beneficial.

The form and extent of the cuttings proposed can be accomplished, it is supposed, for £20,000; and should the result be as the evidence would warrant, the lowering of the hill should be carried so much further towards the south-west as can be accomplished for the further sum of £20,000.

ST. IVES.

This Cornish port, as we have shown in our general remarks alluding to the trade of the Bristol Channel, is a most valuable site for a harbour of refuge for vessels going down the Bristol as well as the English Channel. There is good holding ground. St. Ives, moreover, has claims of its own, for the registered vessels belonging to the port amount to 13,118 tons, and there are also fifty-four registered drift boats, from 15 to 30 tons each. There were seventy-six under that tonnage, and 250 pilchard seine boats, while a large number of drift boats resort there from other places during the pilchard, herring, and mackerel seasons.

It is, however, not so much for its local trade that a harbour of refuge is wanted here, as for the passing shipping. For instance, on the 27th of May, 1857, upwards of 100 vessels came for shelter there from a south-east gale, but only thirty-three entered the harbour. The remainder dared not venture in. Had the wind shifted to north or north-west, very great damage and loss of life must have occurred.

This port might be made available for the passing trade of Bristol, Newport, Cardiff, Swansea, Neath, and all the Welsh ports, the tonnage of which is roughly estimated at 4,707,000 tons. The greatest portion of this trade must pass the Land's End. Now no site in this locality is better adapted for a harbour of refuge than St. Ives. For vessels coming from the Welsh ports often come down off the point of the Land's End, but in consequence of the weather cannot get round. The wind, if from south and west, blows them back; but if there was a harbour of refuge at St. Ives, it is presumed they would take shelter there.

The work proposed to be constructed at St. Ives' Bay to meet the pressing demands of the shipping passing there, will consist of a pier proceeding from the west shore of the bay at "Bamaloose Point," about 700ft. south of St. Ives' Head, which will furnish a useful protection to the work.

The first cant of the proposed pier will extend in a south by east direction, 2,750ft. from low water mark, thence in a south-easterly direction, 750ft., and there it will terminate in 8½ fathom water with a pier head.

The great depth of water at this place, although very favourable for refuge purposes, has the effect of increasing the cost of the work, but which to some extent will be compensated for by the abundance and cheapness of materials close at hand.

Total length of works, 3,500ft., and which is estimated to cost £400,000.

The portion of the bay thus enclosed by a line drawn from the pier head to the Carrack rocks, in a south-west direction, will enclose a space—

At time of low water of	.	.	180 acres.
„ „ 1 fathom and upwards		.	158 „
„ „ 3 do.	„	.	130 „
„ „ 5 do.	„	.	103 „

The works to be executed within a period of ten years.

The extreme difficulty of dealing with the mass of evidence, petitions, memorials, abstracts, estimates, statements, and opinions, emanating from the various individuals highly interested in the formation of Refuge and Life Harbours, in the different localities upon the import district of the north-east coast of England, as well as want of space, compel us to postpone our observations upon that section of our shores until the ensuing number of the *United Service Magazine*.

Portsmouth.

COLONIZATION OF INDIA.

That India, those vast alluvial plains directly within the tropics or even extending as far as 34° N., would ever become a land in which the hard working and intelligent operative of Great Britain would be certain to find not only employ, but success, we do not think; nor do we for one moment imagine that Hindostan, either in hill or plain, will ever be able to compete with the better climates of America, Australia, and New Zealand. The intense heat of the plains for at least eight months out of the twelve preclude the possibility of the white man performing hard manual labour, or indeed, manual labour of any description. The remaining four months, cool for the tropics, yet hot as compared with Britain, might certainly be turned to advantage; still the European, even in the cool air and chilly nights of these four months, would knock up, and learn, perhaps too late, that his constitution can at no time withstand lengthened exposure.

The man strong in muscle only, would have no chance against the dark skinned, thin, rice, or attah-eating native. The first hot wind would reduce this strong man to the level of the native, and his labour fetch but little more in the market.

In a country like India, where labour can be obtained at three pence a day, the inhabitant of Europe consuming meat and strong drinks can have no chance, and the result of any attempt at colonization in the sense of such as is carried out in Canada or elsewhere would be loss to the Government and disappointment to the colonist; but for skilled labour, for the man whose education has been practical, and who possesses a fair knowledge of engineering, even the plains of India offer a living. Here his skill would be valuable, not only to the government and railway companies, but to *himself* should he at any time become a landed proprietor.

The mountainous regions, from the Neilgherries in Madras, the Mahabaleswur in Bombay, to the snowy Hymalayah in Bengal, offer a climate and advantages little, if at all, inferior to many parts of America and Australia. To the man with capital, the advantages are probably superior. Before the rebellion, India, both hill and plain, was little if at all known to the people in England. It took a frightful massacre to call attention to the resources of this land. All England knew or cared to know was, that a certain portion of her army were well paid for services performed in that part of the world, and that the system of discipline and chronic warfare going on there was advantageous. She also was aware that there was a large native army, possessing many first-rate officers, some of whom at times returned to Europe, whilst others settled in the "hills," but whether these hills possessed capabilities in themselves of saving the continual drain on the home population by restoring the invalid to health, or whether the progeny of the white man deteriorated in such a climate, was until lately far too useful a thing to be looked into. Things are now changed, and the most ignorant are aware that the best chance we have of retaining India is by the location of ourselves in that country.

An army far larger than before the rebellion must of necessity be kept up, but, neither the finances of India nor the population of Great Britain can on the one side support, and on the other stand the drain of an army of one hundred thousand men. In colonizing the hills and more healthy portions of the continent of India is, we truly believe, the only remedy against another outbreak, supposing the European force reduced. The influence of the white man is boundless, and the fear of him considerable, and were more of these scattered in bodies of even twenty or thirty about the country, the natives would never again try to throw off the British yoke. Two years' opposition has taught the treacherous Asiatic that no dangers or difficulties appal their white conquerors, and experience proves that a small body of resolute Englishmen, well commanded, can hold their own against unlimited numbers of effeminate natives. The late war has shewn what we can do, even with all supplies, both of men and material, ten thousand miles away; but let a race claiming kindred with ourselves be planted on the mountain slopes, and to them the future safety of our Indian empire may be entrusted.

These mountainous regions, as we before said, offer many advantages, more especially to the retiring officer and soldier. Here, after completing his term of service, both could live in comparative affluence, and by a judicious application of any little capital not only find amusement but profit. Here, to the first, would be retained the ways of a society which he had learned to love, and there would be no necessity for practising that economy and selfishness which he sees is almost essential to a residence at home. To the pensioner, even greater advantages present themselves. The position in the social scale he will find superior to that of his class elsewhere, and his means sufficiently good to allow of many a comfort in England unknown. Education and steadiness would stand him a friend, and, eventually, a competence, such as he never dreamed of obtaining,

might be secured, either for his return to Europe, or to provide for the healthy offspring owning the acres surrounding his house.

This is no fancy picture. On the mountains of India it may be daily seen. Many an officer of the invalid establishment lives there, enjoying comforts, and in that climate luxuries, on an income barely sufficient in this country to support respectability; and there also lives many a pensioned sergeant on his rupee a day, increased to two by industry, in perfect peace and contentment.

A large body both of officers and men might be induced to colonize these hills, and thus would be formed a militia, available at any moment to crush rebellion. Good roads should be made through them, and the civil officers instructed to aid settlers.

In southern India, the climate of the Western Ghats, extending as they do through fifteen degrees of latitude, affords various degrees of temperature to the debilitated European—from the sharp, frosty air of Switzerland, to a heat greater, if possible, than the vast plains around. Though in no parts so cold as the Hymalayah, still throughout the year the temperature is more equal, and probably better suited to the European constitution. Besides this, the proximity of the sea and good harbours give further advantages.

Mysore, bordered as it is by the Western and Eastern Ghats, is of all parts of India the best adapted for colonization, and in its undulating soil, rising from a few feet above the sea in some parts to vast mountains in another, offers climates not only adapted to all constitutions, but for the growth of every kind of fruit or vegetable. Here will flourish the produce of the temperate or torrid zone.

Scattered over its surface are already small colonies, in which all are doing well. There is one drawback: the country is not our own, and thus the tenure of land might at any time be disputed. To the north of Mysore is the mountainous region of Coorg, and here a most inviting field is presented to British enterprise and capital. Here the land belongs to the English government, and thousands of acres are to be had for the asking.

In the Neilgherries the climate is magnificent, and in it Europeans are capable of working. The different elevations allow a man with a particular disease to choose such a climate as best suits his constitution, and were facilities offered to European settlers there would ere long be large and thriving colonies planted in these regions. At present, thousands upon thousands of acres remain as they were, probably since the creation—uncultivated and waste, but, possessing a soil second to none in the world for richness and productiveness. In such parts as have been redeemed, wheat, barley, oats, hops, potatoes, and all vegetables flourish, whilst in the warmer parts, oranges, grapes, peaches, and apricots grow almost without culture. To the man with capital settling in the Neilgherries a certain fortune may be made; the railroad once opened, and the road to it traversing the mountains rendered at all seasons passable, there would be an outlet to the abundance which the commonest cultivation had given him. The coffee, which in former years had been left to rot on the trees, would now find its way to the coast, and in the English market realize a price beyond the best mocha, and the beer made

from the barley and hops grown around compete successfully in the markets of Madras and Calcutta with the high-priced and excellent products of Burton on Trent.

Turn we now to the Bengal Presidency, and for a moment stop to inquire into its capabilities and climates. We have said enough to prove the advantages offered to the capitalist or pensioner in the Western Ghats, or Neilgherry mountains; and now will show that there are large tracts of mountainous lands running from north to south in Bengal, on which European colonies could be planted advantageously to themselves, and most usefully to the government. To induce the Englishman, either civilian, officer, or soldier, to take lands, the law of settlement must however be altered, and the settler be free from the petty annoyance and interference of every small minded member of the civil service. Justice must be obtainable within easy reach, and a system of magistracy introduced, approaching to that found in our own land. The ancient laws of an ancient company, enforced by men wedded to one system, will not apply to the English settler. Neither Mahomedan nor Hindoo codes will do for these. The law must be simple, and the law-giver dependant on himself for knowledge, and not trusting to Molvis, Amlahs, Nazirs, et hoc genus omne.

In Assam as in the Neilgherries the ground is undulating, and offers equal advantages for the growth of both tropical and temperate plants. The climate is equable and well adapted to European constitutions. The mountain ranges by which Assam is bordered offer all variations of temperature, whilst they serve to make the air cool and pleasant. In the Khassia hills a bracing climate is to be had, and here many an Englishman is already located.

Tea plantations cover the hills, and it needs no eulogium from our pen to draw attention to the quality of Assam tea. The cultivation of this shrub requires no great knowledge of agriculture or any large capital. The making of the leaf into a marketable commodity is, however, another thing, and does demand both money and skill, and could only be carried out successfully by those possessing the necessary plant and outbuildings. These the retired soldier or first settlers could not be expected to possess, and for them would remain the cultivating the plant and transporting the leaf to the nearest factory.

The export of tea has been steadily increasing, and has already reached the enormous amount of 1,600,000 pounds in one year, and this in a country where the planters scarcely number a score, and where but one small company are at work. There is room on the hill sides and in the valleys for thousands of settlers; employment for the same, and with common industry and prudence, every prospect of wealth. Of all the agricultural employments perhaps tea growing is the cleanest, easiest, and most luxurious. It beats potatoe growing, which must have struck any one wandering through the hills of India as about the nearest approach to doing nothing that was known; and as a consequence much resorted to by the dark skinned races around. The shrubs are planted in rows about a yard apart, and occasionally irrigated by turning the waters of some streams of

water upon their roots. The leaf is fit for the manufacture of tea after the third year, and the tree continues yearly to improve in quantity and quality.

At Darjeeling, distant from Calcutta but three hundred miles, and within a few hours' ride of many of the larger civil stations in Bengal, such as Behar, Rungpore, Purneah, &c., there is a climate truly good, and in every way suitable to the Anglo-Indian. In latitude 27 deg. north, and situated at an elevation above the sea of 7000 feet, the air is sufficiently bracing to restore to comparative health the man debilitated by a lengthened residence in the horrible plains above which it towers. In winter snow falls, but owing to the latitude and proximity of the vast plains of India the cold is never severe, or such as to render out door work or amusement otherwise than enjoyable. In the words of Dr Hooker, "It is incredible what a few weeks of that mountain air will do for the India-born children of European parents. They are taken there sickly, pallid, or yellow, soft and flabby, to become transformed into models of rude health and activity."

At Darjeeling is a depot for English soldiers, and the appearance of both officers and men attached to this depot prove how well adapted these hills are to European constitutions. At Darjeeling, the tea plant has been long since introduced, and answers well. The hills around are covered with timber, most of it well grown, close grained, and valuable in the home market—with the railroad completed, and the navigation of the Cossi and other streams finding their way from the foot of the hills to the Ganges; improved, there can be little doubt that a tract of country so admirably adapted for our countrymen as the Sikim territories will not long remain unoccupied.

Following the course of the Hymalayah, and passing over the rich valley of Nepaul, with its magnificent scenery and mountains covered with everlasting snow from Kunchanginga to Dewalghiri, we come to Kemaon and Gurhwhal. Here again, as at Darjeeling, Gowahti, the Neilgherries, and Mysore, are millions of acres lying waste, and only wanting to be tried to prove their productiveness. Yet, little is known of this Kemaon, and still less of the neighbouring state, Gurhwhal. For years has the beautiful scenery, the lead and iron mines, the lakes and the exquisite climate been concealed. From the conclusion of the Nepaulese war when the territory was annexed, and Almorah added to our possessions, until within a very few years has this favoured land been a terra incognita to even the English in India. A few favoured civilians revelled in the cold climate, and kept the district hermetically sealed. The military restricted to Almorah, knew not that across the tall blue mountain distinctly visible from their cantonment, nestled a lake, deep, clear, and large, possessing many valuable building sites, and an English climate. This was a secret, and guides could not be found who knew the way from the point of the Gogra range. The Huzoor wanted not the European to settle. Well kept was this secret, and the bears and goorool wandered round the cliffs of Nynee Tal, unmolested except by the Commissioners' rifle. Then whispers arose and a *pilgrim* found the way.

In Kemaon, the tea plant was first introduced, and from the gardens of Howelbagh and Almorah almost all the other hills have been supplied.

The hills of Kemaon and Gurhwhal are generally densely wooded, and possess a soil capable of growing any European production. The climate is in no part really unhealthy, but in some, such as in the higher valleys under the snowy range, superior to anything we know. The scenery is sublime. Mountain thrown upon mountain, and the horizon bounded by the snowy range towering up in undescribable grandeur. The roads are tolerably good, but few and far between, and built with the engineering skill usual to amateurs. Owing to this and the want of either tram-roads or the commonest kind of highway through the rich district of Rohilcund, bordering the foot of these Kemaon hills, much of the produce of the villages, and from Bhootan on the Chinese frontier, is lost to us. Dr. Jameson says:—

"Let British capital and enterprise be embarked in proportion to the importance of the cultivation and the support of its merits, and thus give employment to thousands of poor, but able-bodied and excellent workmen, when their labours are properly directed, and these hills will soon become important to the state as any province of the plains. Labour is cheap, the climate is admirably adapted to the European constitution, the people are docile and easily guided, provided that they are properly treated and their prejudices respected. In some districts the population is wretchedly poor and scanty, caused by the malarious jungles and the ravages of wild animals. But in the hands of Europeans, backed by capital, these districts in a few years would be reclaimed, the jungles would disappear, and with them malaria and wild animals."

It is thus seen that labour is cheap, tolerably abundant, and the climate of Kemaon well "adapted to the European constitution," and as a very small stock of either knowledge or capital is necessary towards producing tea, it may not be out of place to mention the terms on which the land is granted to applicants.

"Government Notification,

"*Revenue Department*, 26*th September*, 1855.

"1st.—Grants of land for tea cultivation in the Kemaon and Gurhwhal districts of the Kemaon province will be made on the following conditions on application to the senior assistant commissioner of the district.

"2nd.—Each grant will be of not less than two hundred, or more than 2,000 acres. More than one grant can be taken by one person or company, on the applicant's satisfying the local authorities acting under the usual control of the revenue department, of their possessing sufficient means and capital to undertake an extended cultivation and manufacture of tea.

"3rd.—One fourth of the land in the grant will be given free from assessment, in perpetuity, on fulfilment of the conditions below stated.

"4th.—The term of first lease will be for twenty years. For the first four years the grant will be rent free; in the fifth year over

anna (1½d.) per acre will be charged on three-fourths of the assessable portion of the grant; two annas (3d.) per acre in the sixth year; three annas in the seventh year, and so on, one more anna being added in each year, till in the last year the maximum rate is reached of one rupee per acre. The full assessment on a grant of two thousand acres will thus not exceed one thousand five hundred rupees (£150) per annum.

"5th.—The following are the prescribed conditions of clearance:—At the close of the fifth year from the date of the grant, a twentieth part of the assessable area, at the close of the tenth year one-fifth of the assessable area, at the close of the fifteenth year one half of the assessable area, and at the close of the last year three-fourths of the assessable area is to be cleared and well stocked with tea plants.

"6th.—In the twenty-first year, on fulfilment of the above conditions, the proprietary right in the grant, and the right of engagement with Government, shall vest in the grantee, his heirs, executors or assignees, under the conditions generally applicable to the owners of estates in Kemaon; and the rate of assessment on the lands in the grant, in whatever manner cultivated, shall never exceed the average rate on grain sown lands in the same locality.

"7th.—On failure of payment of the prescribed assessment in any year or any of the above conditions (the fact of which failure shall, after local inquiry conducted by the Senior Assistant Commissioner, be finally determined by the Sudder Board of Revenue), the entire grant shall be liable to resumption, at the discretion of the government, with exception to the portion of assessable area which may be bona-fide under tea cultivation, and to a further portion of land which shall be allowed in perpetuity, free of assessment, to the extent of one fourth such cultivated area. The portion so exempted will remain in the possession of the grantee, subject to the usual rates and rules of assessment in the district.

"8th.—Grantees will be bound to erect boundary pillars at convenient points round the circuit of a grant, &c., &c.

"9th.—No claim to the right and interest in a grant, or any transfer by the original grantee, will be recognized as valid unless on registry of the name of the transferee in the office of the Senior Assistant Commissioner.

"10th.—So long as government establishments for the experimental growth and manufacture of tea shall be maintained in the province, supplies of seeds and grants will be given gratis to grantees on application to the Superintendent, Botanical Gardens, North-Western Provinces, as far as may be in his power.

"By order of the Lieut.-Governor, North Western Provinces,

"W. MUIR, Secretary to Government, N. W. P."

Probably the power that the government retain by these rules of at any time resuming the land on the failure of the grantee to pay the assessment, added to the uncertainty of such sentences as "subject to the usual rates and rules of assessment in the district," deter many a pensioner from investing his savings in or cultivating ground held on so precarious a tenure. The Senior Assistant Com-

missioner could not always judge correctly as to the quantity or quality of the cultivation, and his civil court is not the place in which the English settler would be likely to find the greatest amount of justice. It would probably induce more to settle were the grants made smaller and sold out and out to the settler, liable to an assessment at the end of five years. This assessment to be *much* less than one rupee per acre, and to be recovered in some better method than resumption of the land. A failure of the crops or the loss of ready money would by these rules be the ruin of the grantee, and he would find that all his labour and capital had been wasted, and he himself reduced to that dead-level,—that dependance on the mercy of the civil courts, which is the bane of our rule in India.

Proceeding through the district of Kemaon, rich in soil, population, and climate, crossing the Holy Ganges at Sereenugger into the Teree Rajah's territory, we come to the depôt and sanitarium of Landour, overlooking the beautiful valley of the Dhoon. The medical statistics prove what the climate of Landour and Mussouri is, and Dr. Jameson's report tells us of the wonderful capabilities of the soil for growing tea and every European fruit or shrub. The medical statistics regarding the health of the soldiers in the depôt at Landour are hardly fair criterion, inasmuch as none of the soldiers there stationed are at the time of arrival in vigorous health, and the situation of the barracks, ill built and worse ventilated, on the top of a stony ridge, exposed to continued changes of temperature, is not such as even a healthy man would keep well in. Besides this, there is not the smallest particle of level ground near, and thus the man unable to read and write, and who in the plains or elsewhere able to play cricket, bowls, &c., &c., is thrown entirely upon his own resources, which will probably, in this land of precipice, lead him to the Bazaar, and the evils found therein.

The climate of the Dhoon is pleasant enough for six months in the year, and its soil is capable of producing endless varieties of fruit, cereal crops, timber, and tea, still it is not healthy, and is ill adapted to the European constitution. Grants of land were years ago given to settlers in the Dhoon, and the result has been the erection of good houses, and the reclamation from the forest of several thousand acres; but now, few Europeans possess much property there. The original settlers, mostly officers connected with the government, were ordered to dispose of their lands, and in obeying this order many were ruined.

Proceeding onwards we find the Simla hills, offering the usual advantages of climate, soil, and water. Again, following the lower ranges of the Hymalayah, we come to Kote Kangra, with its valleys teeming with rice, and its mountain sides concealed with dense forest of deodar, cypress, saul, bamboo, and oak. At Dhrumsala, already, many an Englishman has settled, and their healthy looks and prosperous condition speak well for the trans-Sutlege mountains. In the Chumba district is Dalhousie, wanting but a decent road to make it *the* station of the Hymalayah, more especially as it possesses the advantage of water carriage. The Ravee River, foaming over its rocky bed, has even now its surface dotted with loose timber

floated down to its entrance into the plains, where this timber is in high estimation for building purposes.

On yet again through the territories of the Maharajah Runbeer Sing, King of Jamoo and Cashmere, we come to Murree, with its beautiful climate and short distance from the military stations of Rawul Pindee, Attock, and Peshawur. Water carriage is now close at hand, and ere long the railroad from Peshawur to Kurachee will help the settler to disperse the products of a land bountiful beyond belief.

Yet once again we turn north, and in the elevated and more undulating land of Hazareh point out a home and abundance to the willing worker. Here in latitude 34 deg. N. the intense heat of the sun's rays are modified, and here the climate in the more elevated part is such as to allow of exposure with impunity. We have in thus bringing forward the various productions, and shewing the capabilities and climates of the Indian peninsula, proved that it can be advantageously colonized, but not to the same extent as Australia, Canada, or New Zealand. In these latter places the strong arm and willing heart are needed, and the possessor may be sure of success. In the mountains of India strength will little avail unaccompanied by prudence, intellect, and capital. In India the settler must have capital, not only sufficient to transport him from the coast to the climates, in which alone he can live, but must also have money enough to give him the means of living until his grant of land gives a return. The pensioner possesses his pension, and from a previous knowledge of the country, climate, and language, has but few difficulties to contend with. To him each child is a positive advantage, and the habits of discipline and obedience learned in the army would ensure such colonists being loyal and useful. Their presence, even though in small bodies, would prove our permanent occupation of the country, and their services as militia being at any time available, would tend more to make the natives look upon us as rulers and conquerors, than all the local or line armies that ever drained an empty exchequer.

The climate is good; medical opinion says, "admirably adapted to the European constitution." Barracks are building, and to be built. Timber of the sorts most valuable for house building and furniture. Stone from the slate for roofing to the hardest granite, is everywhere. Lime abundant, and a soil to cover all, equal in fertility to any in the world; and yet how little advantage have any taken of all these bounties. Surely the Government must know that it would be cheaper for them to employ the European convict in these mountains, than to lose his labour in the fort at Agra, or still further waste it by forwarding his wishes, and transporting him to Australia. The expense alone of carriage to the port, passage money and escort, must be great, and the punishment not such as is likely to conduce to the convict's good, or instil him with fear of future offence. Indeed, to the European convict from India transportation is his goal, the ultima-thule of his desires, and the bad soldier or villain cares not what crime he commits, so long as he escapes hanging, and is transported from India.

The constitution that can work on the fortifications of Gibraltar and stand exposure there, that can work hard at Sydney on the Swan River, or build barracks in the Bermudas, can do the same in the mountains of India. Let the experiment be tried. Let your sergeant-striker, your would be deserter, be transported to the hills nearest to the division in which his crime is committed, and there let his strength be employed, and if needs be, his health destroyed in cutting and fashioning timber, in drawing and quarrying stone, and in building decent barracks for an army of which he has proved an unworthy member. Rest assured, that when John Smith finds transportation does not consist in leaving "the beastly country," but in working harder in it than ever he did in his life before, then will he pause in his career of crime, and his presence as a convict, hard worked and looked down upon, will not be lost upon those who, under the present system of removal from the country, almost envy his lot.

But little guarding would be necessary to prevent the escape of such convicts. To escape would be starvation. Moreover, the construction of the mountain ranges in India is such, as to preclude the possibility of anything human passing through, or over them, unless by beaten paths. To endeavour to find a way "out" through those dark, misty glens, is impossible. Through these the torrent rushes, and the huge rocks, piled upon each other in masses, are the abode of tigers, bears, and snakes. Let the convict once try, and his state of horror would serve to show that liberty can be too dearly purchased.

THE LAST CHINESE WAR.

From the Attack, Capture, and Occupation of Canton, 1857, 1858-9, by the Allied Forces of England and France, to the Departure of the Plenipotentiaries.

The seizure of the crew of the Lorcha Arrow by the mandarins on the 8th October, 1856, the original cause of the dispute with Yeh, the Governor and Viceroy of Canton, quickly merged into the more serious claim that the provisions of the treaty of 1842 should be complied with, by acknowledgment of the right of entry of Europeans into Canton.

To this demand Yeh would by no means assent, and the consequence was the destruction of the Bogue and other forts in the river by the small squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, K.C.B., destruction of the factories by the Chinese, and final retirement of the British force from before Canton.

This ended the year 1856, and now the Admiral Commander-in-Chief was obliged to lay on his oars at Hong-Kong, and in simple occupation of one of the Bogue forts half-way up the Canton river, and a smaller one higher up, called Macao Fort, to await the arrival of reinforcements, for which he had applied.

Any accommodation of the matter with Yeh was now out of the question, for the retirement from the factories, and the vessels dropping down the river, gave him confidence in his own prowess, and assurance of the weakness of his foes.

The Cantonese were left to themselves to erect defences and make what preparation they chose towards a future attack that to any civilized European state would have appeared inevitable, but which to the self-sufficiency and arrogance of Yeh and his people was sufficiently distant to enable them to rest in security within their wall, which in their idea was barrier enough to keep out any force the barbarians might bring against it.

The representations made by Sir M. Seymour of his want of strength to carry out his plans and bring Yeh to terms, induced the Government to detail a force of about 10,000 men to sail for China, under Lieutenant-General Ashburnham, with two Major-Generals and a competent staff, to undertake at least the subjugation of Canton, and ensure the provisions of the treaty of 1842 being carried out.

In this the French wished to participate, and it was accordingly arranged that the two nations should act in concert, and a combined allied attack made whenever it was felt we were sufficiently strong to undertake it.

In March, 1857, the first part of the newly-appointed reinforcement sailed from England, quickly followed by others in ships of the navy and troop ships, as well as by a musquito fleet of gun-boats.

In the meantime the action at Fatshan took place, resulting in the destruction of a large fleet of junks in the river above Fatshan, with some loss on our side.

At this moment the revolt in India stepped in, rendering it necessary that all available British troops should be concentrated there without delay, so that vessels were despatched to Singapore, Straits of Sunda, and the Cape, to intercept the Chinese expedition and order them to Calcutta; thus was the Commander-in-Chief again doomed to wait an indefinite period in inaction, for not only were the expected arrivals diverted from their original destination, but his own immediate force was weakened by the loss of the Raleigh, fifty gun frigate, and the departure from Hong-Kong of the Shannon and Pearl, with the Earl of Elgin and 300 marines for Calcutta.

The Earl of Elgin only remained a few weeks in India, but the marines did not return to China till the beginning of the following December.

The general officers and staff had all arrived at Hong-Kong, as well as a reinforcement of 1,500 marines and marine-artillery, the whole of which, however, falling so far short of the originally intended attacking force, that Lieutenant-General Ashburnham returned to England, Major-General Garrett went to India, and the command of the land forces in China devolved upon Major-General Van Straubenzee, C.B., originally third in command.

In the beginning of December the ships and gun-boats commenced moving up the river, and anchoring, some above North Wantung and others higher up towards Macao Fort and in Whampoa Reach, daily increasing in numbers until the 11th of the month, when the Impe-

roop ship, moved up from the Bogue, having on board the 2d
n of Royal Marines, destined to be the first occupants of the
f Honan.

battalion landed on the 12th without opposition, and
ossession of a long line of tea stores on the north side of the
ecame a nucleus upon which the remainder of the force could

ie 19th two more battalions of the Royal Marine Brigade,
olonel Holloway, were landed, as also a company of Royal
rs, Royal Marine Artillery, commissariat, military train, and
ench seamen and marines, followed a few days after by the
Naval Brigade under Captain Key, C.B.

all occupied the stores lining the bank of the river, each
ntaining about 400 men. On our first taking possession,
re full of tea, ready packed in chests, but the Chinese mer-
were permitted to remove the whole of it to Canton, under
f truce.

ont of the position flowed the river, separating it from
about 300 yards to the opposite bank on which the suburb
and 400 more from that to the city wall, so that, had the
any energy, they might have bombarded the stock houses
ng heavy guns on the wall, or even among the ruins of the
n Fort, which was close to the water's edge. In the rear was
line of houses separated from the stores only by a very
lane, and beyond them an extent of deep and wet paddy
The houses were pulled down by working parties, as well to
r into the occupied buildings as to guard against fire. The
w until the 27th was fully occupied in collecting ammunition,
ariat, and other stores; and by the engineers and marine
in preparing a mortar battery on the ruins of Dutch Folly
the middle of the stream, higher up the river.

Coolies of the military train, 600 of whom had been enlisted
ned at Hong Kong under Captain Temple, an officer in the
service, were brought up and landed on the island; and the
giment and royal artillery remained on board vessels in the
The Earl of Elgin, Sir Michael Seymour, and General
nzee, also kept to their respective vessels off the position;
e at Honan being commanded by Colonel Holloway.

ie 23rd and 24th reconnoisances were made by the Admiral
neral on the west and east sides of the city, these officers and
aff landing from gun boats, and proceeding some distance
country on each occasion.

naval branch of the service leant towards the west as the
which to commence operations, from whence the heights
the city were stormed in 1841; but the General urged
ding to take place on the east, as more favourable for
vement of troops, and also that the enemy appeared less
d for an attack on that side. This was eventually decided upon.
days now passed on in busy preparation, and without any
until the morning of the 27th, when shortly before four a.m.,
f fire soon had the whole of the men under arms.

The fire proceeded from the river where the Hesper, store ship, was at anchor. A junk was lashed alongside of her, on board of which Coolies had been at work all night, preparing her to receive engineers' stores from the Hesper, when one of them carelessly taking a naked light, set fire to an old bag on which were some grains of gunpowder. It instantly exploded, and the flames rapidly spread, rising above the decks and quickly firing the rigging and mizen mast of the Hesper, for which great fears were now entertained, as she was full of ammunition, shell, and other combustible stores. Fortunately, however, the junk was cut adrift and towed to the beach above the position, while the flames on board the Hesper were subdued. From the proximity to the stores occupied by the troops it was also feared that they might be destroyed, in the event of which the approaching attack must inevitably be postponed, but a strong fatigue party, to cut off the communications from any building that might catch, was marched to the spot, and remained there until all danger was over, and the junk burnt to the water's edge.

By this evening all preparations were completed for the commencement of active operations on the following morning, a party of sappers being sent up to the intended landing place, about three quarters of a mile eastward of the French Folly fort, to erect a temporary pier, which would facilitate the landing both of men and guns. These were covered by two companies of the 59th regiment under Major Burmester, who threw out picquets for the night.

The force was divided into two brigades of infantry, under Colonels Holloway and Graham; two batteries of royal artillery, under Colonel Dunlop: one battery of royal marine artillery, under Major Schomberg; a company of royal engineers, under Captain Mann; one brigade of British seamen, under Commodore Elliott; one brigade of French seamen and marines; military train under Captain Temple.

The following is the strength:—

	Officers.	Men.	
Royal Artillery	16	230	
Royal Marine Artillery	8	211	Of these a great part with mortars, at Dutch Folly.
Royal Engineers	7	46	
Provisional Battalion of Royal Marines, L. I.	28	690	
1st Battalion Ditto	25	631	
2nd Battalion Ditto	26	570	
59th Regiment	24	390	
38th Madras N. I. (Rifles)	2	51	
British Naval Brigade		1450	Including Officers.
Medical Staff and Military Train	6	106	and 830 Lascars and Chinese Coolies.
Total British	142	4375	
French Force		940	Including Officers.
Grand Total	142	5315	

All the available vessels of the British and French navy, whose draught of water would admit, were along the whole of the south side of the city, principally concentrating towards the eastern end, to enfilade the eastern wall and gates, and shell the heights.

The Actæon, English frigate, and Phlegethon, French, with gunboats, were stationed to the westward, to open fire on the south-west angle of the city wall, to check communication along the ramparts.

The Mitraille, and Fusée (French), and Cruizer, and Hornet (British), with gunboats, were continued along the face of the south walls; and the Niger and Avalanche, with the mortars on Dutch Folly, shelled Gough's Heights and the Magazine Heights, within the city wall.

Beyond Dutch Folly were ranged the English ships Nimrod and Surprise, with French Dragonne and Marceau, and gunboats, to clear the south-east angle and eastern walls.

Before daylight on the morning of the 28th the whole of the troops at Honan fell in, ready equipped for the field, and at 7 a.m. the first boom of a heavy gun told that the bombardment had commenced from the ships. At the same moment the boats began to embark the men to the gunboats, which lay off in the stream, as soon as they were full, to await the turn of the tide.

In the meantime the French 59th and Royal Artillery, who had gone up the river earlier, were landing at the point of debarkation, and soon took possession of some rising ground, after a slight skirmish in a village to the left, from whence the Chinese had fired a few gingalls and arrow-rockets, without doing much injury.

As the tide rose the gunboats weighed, and passed along the line of bombarding vessels, which were sending into the city streams of shot, shell, and rockets, the latter having already caused four or five large conflagrations, which were blazing away with great fury.

One or two gunboats took the ground on the passage up, but were got off again as the water deepened, and before noon all were landed.

The first point of attack was to be Fort Lin, a small round fort on an eminence, about two miles from the landing place, eighteen or twenty feet high, and mounting twelve guns of different calibre.

The 59th regiment and French were already in advance as attacking party, when the provisional battalion of Royal Marines, which was to form the support, disembarked. They therefore pushed on without loss of time, over grave hills and paddy fields, until they came within sight of the 59th, resting on a hill of graves, about 800 yards from Fort Lin.

Immediately the support appeared, the 59th moved on to the attack, the support proceeding to occupy their former resting place.

The 59th attacked on the right, the French on the left, each throwing out skirmishers, and steadily advancing and firing at the embrasures, from which a return fire of round shot, gingalls, and rockets was kept up.

In little more than an hour the enemy were observed stealing away from the Fort and down the opposite side of the hill, when a simultaneous rush was made on both sides, a French marine being the first to enter by a few seconds, through one of the embrasures.

No prisoners were taken, as the Fort was entirely evacuated. The great difficulties experienced in getting artillery over the broken ground and paddy-fields prevented the guns arriving in time to participate in this attack. A battery came on the ground, and wound round the base of the hill as the last shot was fired.

While this was taking place the Naval Brigade were advancing to take up ground to the right, between Fort Lin and Gough's Fort, and the first and second battalions of Royal Marines, having disembarked, formed the reserve at the landing place.

Shortly before this Lieut. Hackett, 59th regiment, A.D.C. to Colonel Graham, while carrying a message from his brigadier, was cut off in one of the villages. He foolishly went alone, without even an orderly, was suddenly attacked, dragged into a house and decapitated, where his body was afterwards discovered. The village, of course, was burnt, and a Chinese being found with Lieut. Hackett's boots in his possession was immediately hanged.

A few straggling shots were fired at the city walls by some of the French, who were still extended on the left, but the capture of Fort Lin ended the active operations for the first day.

The 59th regiment and 38th Madras Native Infantry retained their ground on the hill; the provisional battalion of Royal Marines bivouacked behind a wood across a valley on their right; and to the right of them were the Naval Brigade, who during the evening had had some skirmishing with the enemy, and met with slight loss. Gough's Fort, too, had been firing round shot all day at the fort, and any parties they could see moving across the country, evidently expecting a combined attack.

The French occupied the hills to the left and in front of Fort Lin. The first battalion of Royal Marines occupied the hill on which the support had rested during the attack on Fort Lin, covering the rear, and keeping open communication with the landing place where the second battalion were stationed to protect the stores, &c., which had not yet been brought to the front.

The artillery were at the head quarter Joss House, and around Fort Lin.

Thus were the troops disposed of for the night, with outlying picquets, and connected line of sentries along their front. The fire from the ships had raged without intermission throughout the day, and still continued as fierce as ever. The moon rose at its full, and lighted up the scene of destruction, aided by the blaze of a dozen fires that shot up their flames in various parts of the city and suburbs, throwing out the embrasures and the dark line of the city wall, and rendering objects on it as clear to view as in the day; while the shell could be seen taking their graceful curves in the air, twinkling and whistling as they went, occasionally bursting on their course, but oftener reaching their intended destination on Magazine Hill or Gough's Heights.

The rockets, too, carried their long line of fire close over the housetops, until making their final plunge either to burn or to destroy whatever was inflammable near them.

Long before daylight of the 29th the whole of the attacking

force was under arms and commenced taking up an advanced position for the assault.

Commencing with the left, the 59th with Madras Native Infantry and French advanced to their front to attack the eastern wall; the French guns on the left, and the Royal Marine Artillery with nine-pounders, taking a position in front of Fort Lin, within 400 yards of the city wall, and firing over the heads of the 59th. Another battery of 12lb. howitzers, Royal Artillery, were on the left; a third of four two-fifths inch howitzers to the right of Fort Lin, and a fourth to the right of them, sheltered by a Joss house from the fire from Gough's fort. These fired over the heads of two companies of the provisional battalion Royal Marines who were extended in their front.

The Naval Brigade were formed on a small rise close to the right. The remainder of provisional battalion prepared to advance, and the first battalion of Royal Marines held in support.

The fire from artillery and skirmishers, as soon as objects could be distinguished, opened upon the walls, from whence it was immediately returned with various description of missiles.

Shortly before eight a.m. a strong body of the enemy made their appearance on the right of our position, evidently with the intention of turning our flank, but they were met by the right wing of the provisional, and the first battalion of Royal Marines under Colonel Holloway, who opened so smart a fire, in conjunction with a few well-thrown rockets from the Royal Marine Artillery, that they were quickly compelled to retreat. In this skirmish Colonel Holloway, Lieutenant Dadson, and several men were wounded.

The whole of this time the firing from the shipping was unremitted, and some of our skirmishers were so far in advance towards the walls that our own shell from the vessels in the river fell among them.

Captain Bate, R.N., accompanied by Captain Mann, R.E., going near the walls to reconnoitre and decide upon a place for fixing the ladders for escalade, was killed by a gingall ball fired from an embrasure; and a midshipman, Thompson, of the Naval Brigade was mortally wounded near the Joss House by one of the barbed rockets.

The resistance from the walls was now gradually becoming more feeble, and it was evident that they were taken off their guard by the attack being made there, instead of against Gough's Fort.

The escalade was to have taken place at nine a.m., at which hour the firing from the river was to cease; but the French prematurely took the advance on the left, and stormed before the time that had been arranged.

A general assault consequently took place immediately, the 59th, some Royal Artillery, and Royal Engineers mounting close to the French; and provisional battalion of Royal Marines and a portion of the Naval Brigade some distance to the right.

The walls were now soon cleared, the 59th advancing along the wall to the left quickly took and held the east gate, and afterwards the south-east angle and south gate; a few men and two officers

being wounded, Lieut. Skinkwin slightly, Ensign Bowen mortally.

The French, Artillery, Engineers, Marines, and Naval Brigade, pushed on to the right, capturing first the north-east gate, which was broken open and held by a company of the provisional battalion, R.M.; then the five-storied pagoda, after that Magazine Heights, on which was a strong battery, but which the Chinese deserted on our approach; then what has since been called Mud Fort, and, lastly, the north gate, where the most determined stand was made, and where Lord Guildford and several men were wounded in a hand-to-hand encounter with the Mandarin braves.

It was not until the north-east gate was taken, and a flag hoisted on the top of it which could be seen from the river, that the fire from Dutch Folly and the shipping ceased.

The ramparts of the walls were strewn with the enemy who had been shot, most of them dreadfully burnt, from their own powder, which they carried loosely round the waist, having been exploded by the slow match of their matchlock. The walls being thus secured, the north-east gate was kept open to admit the Royal Artillery with their guns, those of the Naval Brigade, and the 1st battalion R.M.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, Commodore Elliott, with the Naval Brigade, marched out of the north-east gate to take Gough's Fort, which it was supposed had been abandoned, from the fire having ceased soon after the escalade, although their flags were still waving from its summit.

One or two shots were fired at the fort from Magazine Hill without being returned, when the Brigade ascended the heights and quietly took possession, throwing the guns over the hill, and then returned to within the walls of the city.

It is unaccountable why the Chinese so quickly abandoned Gough's Fort and Heights, and Magazine Hill, for they commanded the whole of the lines we had taken. They might have done us much mischief at the very least, and, in the hands of good gunners, would have prevented any force remaining on the walls. That our unexpected *coup d'escalade* struck them with a desperate panic is the only excuse to arrive at. The evening now approached, and the troops were disposed along the lines for the night, from the north to the east gate. Two companies of the provisional battalion were left at Fort Lin to guard some stores, and the second battalion remained at the landing place.

The night passed quietly, several fires still burning in the city, but no attack on the lines, with the exception of a few shot and rockets fired at the north gate, from whence a sortie was made, and some of the adjoining houses destroyed. The following day a battery of Royal Artillery, the 1st battalion R.M., a portion of the Naval Brigade, and some French, proceeded along the lines to the west gate, of which they took possession, and then made a demonstration by marching completely round the city.

The total loss in all branches of the service on our side, during the two days of attack, amounted to thirteen killed and eighty-five wounded.

That of the French to two killed and thirty wounded.

The weather having changed to continuous rain, means were taken for placing the troops under shelter. Several large Joss houses around Magazine Heights held most of the corps stationed there; and along the lines the gates, and small buildings or sheds, against the wall and on the spurs, together with magazines that had been cleared, accommodated nearly all the others.

On the 1st January, the Earl of Elgin landed to make his first entry into Canton. He was received by a guard of honour at the landing place, and conducted to the lines, along which he proceeded to head-quarters, on Magazine Heights, the troops falling in and cheering him as he passed.

Several days had now elapsed in attempted negociations with Yeh without avail, and some further steps must consequently be taken to force a result.

It would be thought that Yeh and the Cantonese would have had a wholesome idea of the irresistible power of the barbarians, if they only cast an eye at the condition of their once proud and massive granite forts, from Canton to the river's mouth, not one of which remains, but all are a mass of ruins, and scarcely one stone upon another.

There are the Bogue, consisting of Chu-en-pee, An-an-hoi, Ty-cock-tow, and North and South Wantung. Then one on Tiger Island, two at Blenheim Reach; and Macao Fort in our occupation. Then directly in front of Canton are the Shameen Fort, the Dutch and French Folly Forts, and farther down the river the large forts at Whampoa Reach, recently destroyed by the Americans.

But, in spite of all this, our recent easy capture of the city, and present power in holding it, Yeh would not deign a reply.

Therefore, on the morning of the 5th, three bodies of men were marched into the city, to meet with greater good fortune than even the most sanguine could have expected.

The rain came down in torrents, and as the troops marched through the narrow streets, the shops were quickly closed, evidently showing that such a movement on our part was quite unexpected by the inhabitants, or they would not have opened them at first.

Two of these parties, under command of Colonel Graham, marched by different routes to the treasury, situated half way up the street of Benevolence and Love, which runs direct from the east to the west gate. This was soon reached, and on our troops approaching the entrance, the mandarin guard laid down their arms and fled, leaving the gates open. A guard was now set off from each corps and marched into the building, the main body of the force remaining outside.

A short search discovered the treasure, both in dollars and silver bars, amounting to about £70,000, which was immediately seized and conveyed to a place of safety within the lines by Chinese who were pressed upon the spot for the purpose, and who were paid pretty liberally from the copper coins in the treasury, which it was not worth while to remove.

In some of the rooms were immense quantities of silks, furred gar-

ments, crapes, &c., which were not carried away, but which were soon looted by the mob who rushed into the building as the troops marched off.

While this was taking place, the other part of the expedition, under Colonel Holloway and Captain Key, R.N., met with similar success in capturing Yeh, the Governor, Peh Quei, the Lieutenant-Governor, and Muh (or Mhow)-ki-tenar, the Tartar general, at their yamuns.

At Yeh's yamun, several individuals came forward when the troops entered, apparently as if Yeh was among them, but a tall and stout Chinese, loosely dressed, and answering the description of the governor, being observed to steal away towards the rear, he was immediately suspected and followed by Captain Key, R.N., who threw his arms around him and captured him.

They were all conducted to the head-quarters of the Major-General on Magazine Heights, Yeh at first appearing in great fright, but finding it was not intended to take his life, put on an insolent and off-hand bearing.

He was the same afternoon removed under escort to the landing place, and embarked on board Her Majesty's ship Inflexible, in which ship he was soon afterwards sent to Calcutta.

The other two functionaries succumbing to the present state of their affairs, were sent back to their yamuns; Peh-quei being installed as acting-governor in conjunction with a provisional government formed by three commissioners, viz:—

Colonel Holloway, Royal Marines,
Mr. Consul Parkes,
Captain Martineau de Cheney, of the Imperial French Navy.

The former also to have chief military command in the city. These immediately took up their quarters in Peh-quei's yamun, with a guard of half a battalion of Royal Marines and some artillery, the former afterwards increased to a battalion.

At the installation of this new form of government Lord Elgin presided in state, salutes being fired in his honour and that of the new government.

Soon afterwards placards were posted by the Chinese on the walls of the city, calling upon the people not to lose heart; that the city had been sold to the English by Yeh, and that it should be soon freed from the barbarians; but no results followed.

Nothing of moment occurred after this for some time beyond occasional excursions to different villages without the walls, to look for troops, magazines, or arms, that were confidentially reported to be there, by pretended spies who expected a reward, but in no instance beyond a few straggling gingalls, discovered. Our promptitude in acting, however, showed that we were always on the alert.

On the 18th January a police force was formed to patrol the city and watch the several gates. It was selected from each corps, and consisted of a captain, a lieutenant, and 150 men. This force, throughout the occupation, was found particularly useful.

The blowing up of Gough's Fort, Marine, and Blue Jacket Forts (so named in the last war), and Fort Lin, by the royal engineers

towards the end of January, must have been a severe blow to the Chinese. One or two previous explosions had been made on the three first named forts, without entirely demolishing them, but this time they were left a heap of rubbish, without shape, on their respective hills.

It was a question whether for military purposes, Gough's Fort should not have been retained and garrisoned by our troops, but it was considered it would have a greater moral effect in the city and suburbs, if totally destroyed.

For Fort Gough thirty-six mines were made, and sixty bags of powder employed. For Fort Lin, seventeen mines and 2,000 lbs. of powder.

The destruction of the forts was followed by denuding the government establishments in the city of their arms. The Tartar general's depot was first visited and despoiled of piles of gingals, matchlocks, swords, spears, and bows and arrows, besides a few cannon.

The Mandarin in charge stood in the entrance as the first load was being carried out, and spread out his arms as if to stop them, but seeing the inutility of attempting it, he stepped on one side and shed tears, probably thinking it might cost him his head.

Next came the Governor's depot, where, in addition to an abundant store of arms of all kinds, about forty infernal machines were found, and destroyed on the spot. They were fitted in large tubs, lined with tin, and were ingeniously contrived, some with locks that went off by clock work at any moment to which they might be set; others by concussion; and some few by a glass tube containing sulphuric acid, which ignited as the tube broke. In this depot also were a few hundred flint muskets, with well fitted bayonets, which had been supplied by some European nation or the Americans, eaten out with rust from laying in heaps in the store; for although the Chinese had purchased them, their pride and prejudice kept them to the old matchlock in preference.

Several other depots were cleared, and the whole of the arms taken, lodged in a magazine within the lines.

The erection of defences of the position held by the head quarters and main body of the occupying force was getting towards completion.

They ranged from the north gate to midway between the bend, east of the five-storied Pagoda and north-east gate; enclosing the north gate, mud fort, magazine heights, Pagoda, several Joss houses and magazines occupied as quarters, and the crest of the hill commanding the whole city.

The north gate was held by the French, and defended on the west by a palisade and two guns, one enfilading the ramparts of the wall, the other looking southwards on the city. A third was also placed on the rise just above the gate, commanding a gully in rear of it. From this gate a palisade was carried to the rise of a conical hill within the lines called mud fort, on which was a battery of four nine-pounders, *en barbette*, with two cohorns, and one eighteen-pounder a little below. From this the line of defence was continued by the wall of Joss houses occupied by the royal engineers, royal marine

artillery, and 2nd battalion royal marines, and from thence to the adjoining cliffs of Magazine Heights by another palisade.

A small space of steep and rocky ground intervening, the seven Joss houses occupied by provisional battalion royal marines, royal artillery, head quarters of the Major-General commanding, and royal marine hospital, filled up that part of the slope of the hill, the exterior walls of the buildings being loopholed.

The defence was again continued from the eastern wall of these Joss houses by a palisading, behind which, on a rise of the hill, was a small irregular earthwork, with three four two-fifths inch howitzers. This palisading indented towards some magazines and buildings in the hollow below the five-storied Pagoda, and ended at the steep of the hill, on which was erected a battery of four thirty-two pounders, and two cohorns, called Mann's Battery.

From the base of this hill a covered way ran up the slope to the north, terminating on the ramparts of the city wall. A second line ran between it and the crest of the hill.

Another battery of five guns and two cohorns commanding the whole Eastern Rampart, and that part of the city south of the N.E. gate, was erected between Mann's Battery and the city wall; and lastly, one by the French, mounting two small brass guns, below the five-storied Pagoda.

Signal staffs, or alarm posts, were erected on Mud Fort, Mann's Battery, the East Gate, and the Commissioners' Yamun in the city, on which, in the event of alarm or a sudden attack, two red flags should be hoisted during the day, and two red lanterns at night, accompanied by two guns in quick succession from the post at which the alarm signal was first made.

The whole front of the position was cleared of houses, round the North Gate, and from the lines to the N.E. Gate, over the ruins of which a good road was made, for the easier transit of stores, &c., from the landing place to the different barracks.

The whole of the city gates also, which were held either by troops or a body of police, were fortified with palisading and loopholed walls, and the pricipal ones, the West, North-East, and East Gates, strengthened by the addition of cannon.

About this time the general state of the Chinese prisons was examined into by Lord Elgin and the Commissioners, who visited the principal of them.

As might have been expected, the most revolting sights were exposed. A corpse partially eaten by rats was allowed to remain in a room where some were confined: many prisoners were suffering from severe punishment and torture; some who had attempted to escape had had their ancles dislocated to prevent another attempt, and more or less all were in a miserable state.

One prisoner came forward and said he had been in the prison on a charge of theft for *seven years* awaiting trial; although on this being represented to Peh-Quei, he expressed astonishment, and said, it must have been an oversight, and was altogether contrary to their laws of government.

It was also ascertained that several were undergoing punishment

for having aided, or been in the service of the Allies; these were of course immediately liberated, as well as a Portuguese found in the prison, and those who were in the most wretched condition.

At the beginning of February the force was increased by the arrival of the 70th Bengal Native Infantry from Calcutta. The day prior to their landing an alarm was created by the assemblage of a large body of Chinese in the city. The troops stood to their arms, and the Tartar General was immediately communicated with on the subject of the assembly. He returned a reply that it was merely a muster of the people in order to ascertain the loss that had been sustained in the recent bombardment and attack, which they had not before been able to do. The troops from the Commissioners' Yamun and the police turned out and marched to the spot, taking some bows and arrows from the mob, who then dispersed.

Although the blockade still continued, and the gates of the city were kept closed, a great number of shops were opened in the principal streets; many of them by the original owners with their goods, but the greater number by people who had hired shops for the occasion, which they fitted up with such curiosities as they thought would find the readiest sale among the officers of the English and French Services.

Shops for provisions, tea, sweets, and groceries, were opened too in numbers, and many Chinese Compradors came up from Hong Kong to attach themselves to the different messes who would employ them.

On the 10th February the blockade was raised by the following notification appearing in the *Hong Kong Gazette*:—

"GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION.

"*Diplomatic Department.*

"His Excellency Sir John Bowring, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, Chief Superintendent of Trade, &c., &c., &c., has received from His Excellency, Sir Michael Seymour, K.C.B., Rear Admiral, and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces, the Regulations which have been adopted by the Naval and Military Authorities of the Allied Powers, in connexion with the removal of the Blockade and the entrance into the City and Suburbs of Canton, which Regulations are hereby published for general information.

"By order,

"(Signed) GEORGE S. MORRISON.

"Superintendency of Trade, Victoria, Hong Kong, 6th February, 1858."

(To be continued.)

PEEPS FROM THE LOOPHOLES OF RETREAT.

BY RETIRED MAJOR MARKSMAN.

A FEW days ago, while walking in the little strip of garden which fronts my humble domicile ("Demi-solde Cottage, Ragglehurst,"—I don't think you have had my address before), I was surprised to see

a horseman ride up to my gate, and call out, "Hallo, Marksman, what, are you alive still?" I looked up from my occupation of turning up the earth—(they call me, in the neighbourhood, Cincinnatus, because I am always ready to convert my spade into a sword)—and who should my eyes behold but Jim Stiffstock, with whom I served in the —th Leapers (so termed from their going over the country at a hop, skip, or a jump,) at Vittoria, the Pyrenees, Toulouse, New Orleans, and the Deccan. I need not tell you that I was in ecstacies to find my *vieux camarade* looking so well—so like himself. His hair, as you may assume, is white as snow, and he has never descended to the puppyism of dyeing his moustache. He adheres religiously to the cravat of George the Fourth, of gentleman-like memory, and the blue frock and buff waistcoat, which were always, in my day, the distinguishing costume of an officer and a gentleman.

Of course I made my friend dismount, and put his feet under my mahogany, and he soon ran over the topics of the day. The "shop" then came on the tapis. Jim Stiffstock belongs to the "Senior United," and does not let one atom of gossip escape him; he is notoriously a good listener, and a very discreet retailer, so he gets treated to rather more than the ordinary run of club *gobemouches*. I found him very full of mystery, and not altogether in a very good humour. We talked of the extraordinary changes that had been wrought in the service since we were on full pay, and I could not restrain my exultation that the army was every day approaching nearer to perfection, in its *matériel* and administration. "Administration!" ejaculated Jim, "I hate the very word; it is un-military—un-English—inapplicable; in short, it has no kind of reference to army matters, and ought never to be used." I could not help smiling at my friend's hostility to a term of such obvious significance. He had been so much accustomed all his life to one routine of regimental existence, that he could scarcely estimate the importance of a system of military government which embraced those services which tended to satisfy all the wants of an army. "Administration! it just means," said my old chum, "that the House of Commons is gradually grasping at all the official control of the army, and in a few months we shall have no such thing as a Commander-in-Chief." "You mean," said I, "that his power will be reduced to a shadow of authority—that he will become the mere instrument of the Secretary of State."

"I mean," answered the Major, "exactly what I say. We shall have no Commander-in-Chief whatever. I had it from ——, of the Guards, who knows all that is going on behind the scenes. I say deliberately it is in contemplation to throw all the business into the hands of the War Office—into the hands of a private gentleman in fact, giving him a Chef-d'état Major, or something of the sort, to look after discipline; in a word, my dear Marksman, they are going to Frenchify the army."

It is needless to detail what passed beyond this in our morning's chat. Let it suffice that I made it my business to institute further

enquiries on my next visit to town, and all that I heard confirmed the sinister rumour that had so sorely afflicted Stiffstock.

Assuming, then, that it really is in contemplation to derange and alter our present system, I take leave, through the pages of the *United Service Magazine*, to enter my protest against the measure in the name of that British army of which I was once a proud and active member. I do not, for one moment, object to the French military system. It is as near to perfection as any known scheme can possibly be, if we may judge from the extraordinary rapidity with which a vast army can be thrown into the field, complete in all equipments, admirably armed, well horsed, its Commissariat abundantly supplied, and always at hand, its hospital ambulances and establishment thoroughly organized. And it needs no special Commander-in-Chief, for the head of the Government is himself a practical as well as a theoretical soldier, who can lead successfully in the field, and give the tone to the army at home. But the British army is otherwise circumstanced. The military sentiment is not predominant in the highest places. The Field-Marshal nearest the throne is a prince, a gentleman, and a scholar, but science and civil polity are more to his taste than the management of a military force, and he is scrupulous of interfering in any department over which he is not vested with special control. We want one recognized chief who shall be at once the channel through which all honours flow from the fountain head, and the exponent of our feelings and views. We have always been commanded by such a personage, and we cannot do without him. I ask any British officer whether he would feel the same pride in his profession, the same confidence that his merits would be fitly presented to his sovereign, and his services rewarded, if the medium of communication were simply a general officer, sprung from the same condition as ourselves? We have been accustomed to Commanders-in-Chief of rare personal merit, or of exalted rank won by their genius and extraordinary talents. It was by such men the army was really made. Of what high feeling and organization could we boast when commanded by a Dundas whose reputation rested on what Sir John Moore called his "damned eighteen manœuvres?" It was not until that noble prince, the Duke of York, who was a model of chivalry, high spirit, and good breeding, assumed the command, that we began to feel we were gentlemen from whom much was expected, and to whom much was awarded, as the guerdon of devoted gallantry. The prince was followed by the hero, the mightiest warrior of the age. If the men differed in their personal bearing and qualities, they did not differ in the *idea* they represented. Each was pre-eminently worthy of the sacred trust; each was fitted to govern an army so peculiarly constituted as our own. Not less suited to the high task were such soldiers as Lords Hill and Hardinge; men who had enjoyed the confidence of the great Duke, had fought with him and under him, caught the inspiration of his genius, and in all their relations with the service observed that delicate courtesy and loftiness of tone which is so peculiarly acceptable to officers who cultivate self-respect. The bâton of Lord Hardinge, in the absence of another graceful soldier of the Peninsula, appropriately fell into

the hands of a prince of the blood royal, the Duke of Cambridge, who is in no respect inferior to his great predecessors. Brave as a lion, accomplished, frank, polite, independent, honest, and impartial, generously alive to the true interests of the army, he is looked up to with an affectionate regard and profound confidence, which cannot be transferred to the best "Chief of the Staff" a Secretary of State for War could create. My life on it, the army will morally deteriorate under any form which robs it of a Commander-in-Chief.

I see that the men engaged at Delhi and Lucknow are asking for their prize money. It is high time they received it, if there be any to distribute among men who fought not against a foreign enemy, but endeavoured to secure to the East India Company what was theirs beforehand. Into the particular claims it is not my purpose to enter, but the opportunity seems a good one for suggesting that the whole matter of booty captured in war should be placed upon an improved footing. By law, all the booty captured in war belongs to the Crown, and the Crown formally surrenders it to the force engaged in its capture, to whom it is paid in due proportion of shares by the prize agents, certain officers appointed to realise the proceeds of the property. The principle is simple—the details are often complicated, a source of dispute, litigation, and discontent. I have personal reasons for remembering the Deccan prize. What between the conflicting claims of Sir T. Pritzler, Sir Thomas Hislop, and the Marquis of Hastings, many years elapsed before a distribution was made, and, in the meanwhile, hundreds had sold their prize certificates for a mere song—hundreds had died, making no provision for the reception, by heirs, of what they were entitled to. The Scinde prize money was the source of a most unseemly dispute—Sir Charles Napier claiming one-eighth instead of one-sixteenth, as commanding the force at Meanee and Hydrabad. When the Punjaub was brought under subjection after the battle of Goojerat, Lord Dalhousie confiscated the Koh-i-noor to the Crown—a pretty compliment to Queen Victoria, and a decided act of injustice towards the army. Lord Wellesley did not wait for the formal sanction of the Crown to the distribution of the booty captured from Tippoo Sahib, but gave it to the troops at once—and very properly too. But these occurrences and discrepancies all tend to prove the non-existence of a regularity of practice and the necessity for a decided change in the laws regarding prize. Lord Wellesley's proceeding supplied a good precedent. If the booty is meant for the troops who capture it, nothing but financial meanness or individual cupidity can explain—I will not say justify—the delay which ordinarily takes place in its award. *Bis dat qui cito dat* is a maxim the Government should pardon and apply, or upon the next occasion of warfare in an enemy's country we may expect to see the renewal of the pillage which distinguished the proceedings of the troops under Marlborough, and in the earlier portion of the Peninsula campaign.

So we are in for another war with China! Disastrous as the events are which have provoked it, I doubt if we shall find more than pecuniary compensation in the retributive measures to be adopted. The glory of our wars with the Celestials is represented

gots of Sycee silver. With all their intense vanity they have
ned but poor warriors, because, believing in their own perfec-
hey have opposed themselves to every kind of improvement, and
alousy and exclusiveness which have characterised their govern-
time out of mind, forbid their accepting the service of the
an or any other nation. They have their own system of making
nd to that they will adhere. It differs from our ideas of a fair
-up fight, but it is clever and effective, and we all admit that
thing is fair in war. It is fair to use rifled cannon, conical
s, and sword bayonets in European armies; the Chinese, there-
cannot be blamed if they resort to pit-falls, stakes, masked
ries, and other clever artifices, to resist the "Devils of the
," who advance into their country. What the course of opera-
may be will not, of course, be disclosed at present, but I, for
ope most devoutly that we shall be content with nothing less
a march to Pekin, and the occupation of that capital in the
f every opposition. We have tried the effect of capturing out-
and dictating treaties at Nankin and Tien-tsin—utter failure
he result. If we would force China to obey the laws of society
ccept the equality of those with whom the vast and oppressive
se of her population has compelled her to trade, we must place
rmies *vis-à-vis* the Emperor—he must be made an eye-witness of
material strength, that he may hereafter recognise our moral
macy.

sting in this effective scheme of operations, I would take leave
d a few hints to those which Colonel Sir James Alexander has
unded in this Magazine, for the benefit of troops in the field.
sume it is not to be doubted that the expedition will be sup-
with all that improved *matériel* which has been subjected to so
experimental tests. The tents of Major Rhodes, the ambu-
kitchens of Captain Grant, the litters recently devised for
nd wounded men, a better kind of knapsacks, and such unde-
rations as Mr. Commissary Crookshank speaks of in a recent
ssional paper, will, I presume, be furnished to the troops. But
all they may find themselves moving through countries in which
will have to do without some of these accessories, and they will
be in climates and situations which will render certain com-
indispensable to them. In their clothing, flannel next the skin
d on no account be forgotten, and it would be wise to supply
man with a good sponge, that he may moisten his body with it
day, if a plunge into a stream is unattainable or unadvisable.
tents will supply good covering, but they are no preventive
st the evils of sleeping on the ground. Let every commanding
r halt his battalion when he gets to a meadow or a corn-field,
wood, and compel each man to cut as much grass, or straw, or as
leaves as he can carry. The bed is of vast importance to the
r; on its quality depends his repose, and on his repose depends
pability of enduring great fatigue, and fighting desperate bat-
If the softness of the bed be necessary to his comfort, its
tion, however slight, above the vapoury earth is indispensable to
ealth. How many precocious infirmities and mortal diseases are

to be placed to the account of sleeping on the bare ground! It may be objected that the grass or straw bed would be too heavy to carry suspended to the musket. Make the experiment at home, and remember this—cut grass and gathered leaves soon lose their moisture, and under such a sun as we have in China, rapidly part with much of their weight when exposed to the air. Cleverly piled over the knapsack, they form a kind of bower for the protection of the head. And after all, if the additional weight be too much for the men, let each company hire a couple of horses or mules—they will carry stuff enough to make a dry bed for them all. Should it be difficult to get enough vegetable matter for a bed, at least collect a sufficiency for a soft pillow. Every old soldier knows that too much importance cannot be attached to these accessories to rest and health. The pillow carries my thoughts to the head. Is the horrible shako to be the soldier's protection from the sun, or will a halt be made at Singapore to take in a supply of the caps now worn in India, and which may be sent to that port? Rely upon it, there is nothing of so much consequence on a prolonged march as light head gear. If the Government fail, let every soldier provide himself—or let his captain provide him—with the means of purchasing one of these *sola topees*, which cost little, weigh nothing, and admit of ventilation by perforations at the sides. They will save many a life.

As to food, the soldier may fancy that there will be no difficulty in getting a "comfortable cup of tea" in a country which produces hundreds of millions of pounds annually, and which the people drink five times a day. He may get directly, or from the commissariat, a collection of dry leaves and sticks, which are dignified by the name of tea, but have really but small affinity to that article. Adulteration is easy and habitual with the article which cheers old women, and should therefore be eschewed by the soldier. Infinitely to be preferred is *coffee*. It *cannot* be adulterated carried in the berry, and if served out roasted, supplies an immediate relief, sustenance, and vigour to the soldier. "Le café!" exclaims Dr. Givet, "la bonne invention, qui a et qui aura toujours faveur, malgré Madame de Sevigné!" I do not know what that respectable writer had to say against it, but I do know that the French troops owe much of their *dash* and capability of endurance to the nourishing qualities of coffee. *Le café est au fureur.* But let us write English—"It is the sustenance and the amusement of the soldier; he wakes up from a leaden sleep to make his coffee; he can do without sleep if he has his coffee; he cannot behold a fire but 'coffee' suggests itself. It pleases the taste, stimulates the stomach, enlivens the spirits, clears the body, is a substitute for broths and soups, soaks biscuit, moistens the driest throats, softens the disposition even towards one's enemy, provokes mirth, and is as welcome in the deserts of Sahara as in the plains of Europe; graces the tables of the wealthy, and is acceptable on the modest grass plot. Coffee has entered largely into the alimentations of the soldier, so much so indeed, that if you were now to discontinue its supply to our (the French) troops, you would remove one-quarter of their bodily enjoyments, their resources, their good health, and the pleasures of a camp life."

Your readers will probably say, that in the suggestions I offer I risk the overloading the soldier. It is wonderful how much a soldier can and will bear *when he likes*—when it suits his own purposes. I remember at Vittoria that the battle was fought with heavy packs, bill hooks, great coats, and lots of ammunition, but it didn't prevent the men from adding a large amount of dollars, dressing cases, clothes, and other heavy plunder taken out of the carriages of King Joseph's court! Nor, taking the matter nearer to our present purpose, did the ordinary weight offer an obstacle to the addition of silk dresses, rugs, quilts, and Chinese hats, when we sent an expedition against Chusan and Shanghai in 1840.

THE FOREIGN TROOPS OF FRANCE.

As there is a prevailing impression, in spite of the patched-up peace between France and Austria, that a general European war may still be impending over the civilized world, it may be to the purpose to call attention to one of the most remarkable features of the wars in which the first French republic and the great emperor Napoleon were engaged—we mean the hire of foreign soldiers as supplementary to a native force, which in these wars furnished a very large quota to the republican and imperial armies. But before we do this we will just throw a rapid glance over the past history in many nations of this species of military service. There is a moral connected with a part at least of the retrospect we are about to take, which will appear at the close of this article.

The employment of foreign troops in the most ancient states of which we have any record, seems, though not quite unknown, to have been very rare. There is mention in the Bible of the Assyrians sending to Egypt for aid when Egypt was not at war with Israel. Egyptian mercenaries were therefore probably taken into the service of Assyria; but, with this exception, the Biblical nations seem to have fought their own battles with native soldiers. We hear of confederacies, but not of hireling stipendiaries. The same may be said with respect to the Grecian republics. Up to the invasion of Persia by Alexander the Great, or thereabouts, the Greek armies appear to have been composed entirely of Greeks. Rome in its best republican days too owed all its military glory to Romans. It was only in proportion as it grew from a nation into an empire that it placed dependance on foreign troops, by whom at last—that is, from about the period from which Gibbon dates its decline and fall—it was supported entirely. This was no doubt owing to the almost universal dominion acquired by Roman arms. The subdued countries remaining still foreign in all but subjection, and vastly outnumbering the Italian population, furnished perpetually abundant supplies of soldiers, which luxurious Italy had become both incapable and unwilling to afford. The Prætorian guards, who so often sold the empire to the

highest bidder were all foreigners. Romans by nativity considered it a high privilege to be exempt from military service. They were, in truth, as supine and degraded, when they could inscribe over the gates of the eternal city "*urbis et orbis*," as they have ever been since, perhaps more so. As for the Byzantine empire, which cannot be said ever to have had any original country, being made up from the beginning of people the most diverse and heterogeneous, its very existence depended on a soldiery of a hybrid description, which could neither be called native nor foreign in the simple sense of either word. Afterwards, when Europe assumed well nigh its present geographical partition, continuing still as martial as before, we find states—no longer empires—seeking less and less exterior aid for their defence and aggrandizement. Nevertheless, from the time of the crusades downwards foreign mercenaries have been always more or less engaged in the armies of all nations. The heroic hirelings of Switzerland, so patriotic, yet so willing to sell their services, and the wild and ruthless Lansknechts of Germany were the soldiers of this kind most in request in the middle ages. Italian historians and Scott and Schiller have made us familiar with the picturesque lives and exploits of these bands, or rather sand ropes—so easily were they dispersed—of adventurers. But the Scotch guards of the French monarchs of about the same period, and the Irish brigade somewhat later, to whom Marshal Saxe's victory of Fontenoy has been attributed, have a nearer interest for us. Brief sketches of all these, which will make a grotesque and amusing picture, we intend, on some future occasion, to set in the frame of one article. At present we confine ourselves to the foreign troops of France from the revolution of '89 up to the restoration.

That revolution appealing for support to the populace of all countries, whilst it provoked universal war, invited universal adhesion, and, in both senses, had the need and the hope of effective external aid. We find, therefore, the National Assembly, as early as 1792, decreeing the organization of a new legion, to be called the Foreign Free Legion, into which no Frenchman could enter; and all foreigners who had received naturalization subsequent to 1789 were accounted Frenchmen. This legion, composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, consisted principally of Dutchmen, and among its recruits who afterwards became generals in the French army was Chassé, who defended so stoutly the citadel of Antwerp, against the French in 1832. Belgium being, at the time referred to, united to France, Belgians were admitted into all French regiments, and formed no separate corps; but there were two legions formed of Batavians, one of Bavarians, and, besides a German legion, which did not totally exclude Frenchmen, as Augereau, afterwards Marshal of France, was one of its officers. Anacharsis Cloots, "the orator of the human race," was the originator of this legion. There were besides two other corps for the reception of Germans organized in 1793, the one called the Battalion of the Chasseurs of Cassel, and the other the Legion of the Franks of the North, which shortly grew into two legions.

The Sardinians, Piedmontese, and Savoyards, furnished also several brigades to the republic. There was the Allobrogian Legion, and

two demi-brigades of Piedmontese infantry, a battalion of Light Piedmontese, a Rifle Battalion of the Po, and a regiment of Piedmontese Hussars. Then followed, as war and French victories encroached upon Italy, Italian contingents to the military force of France to a very considerable amount. The Cisalpines, the Ligurians, Neapolitans, Romans, Tuscans, &c., driven from their own territory by Austrian occupation, fled for refuge to him, who was even then humbling Austria, and offered their services as soldiers. So numerous were they, that they were formed into four Cisalpine and Italian brigades, two regiments of Hussars, and a battalion of Artillery. The Swiss republic, too, in 1798, raised by capitulation 18,000 men for the service of France, and there were besides two Helvetic Legions, an Helvetic company of mounted Chasseurs, and one company of Artillery.

Of the Polish contribution to the military resources of the French Directory, a little more particular mention may be interesting.

Poland, so great and flourishing at the time of John Sobieski, retained, after many dismemberments, but the shadow of its former renown at the close of the eighteenth century. Despite the heroic efforts of Kosciusko to re-establish its ancient independence, it was finally effaced from the map of Europe in 1795, and Russia, Prussia, and Austria divided it, as their prey, among themselves.

From this epoch a life of exile and of misery was the lot of all patriotic Poles who could escape from their own subjugated land. They sought everywhere a country to replace the one they had lost, and everywhere demanded arms to attempt its reconquest. One of their generals, who had long served under Kosciusko, Dabrowski by name, afterwards much distinguished in the French service, came to Paris, whilst Napoleon was in Italy, with the object of creating a Polish force, which, under French auspices, might deliver his country from the foreign yoke it was groaning under. He proposed for this purpose the formation of Polish legions in the service of France. He presented a memoir on the subject to the Directory. "The Polish Legion," said he, "will serve as a nursery for an army for Poland; they will, by the simple fact of their existence, draw into their ranks all emigrants, and all Polish deserters from the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies; and, by their contact with French troops, will imbibe sound republican principles, for the benefit of their native land."

This memoir was well received by the Directory, the project was warmly adopted by Napoleon, and the result was the organization first, of two Polish legions, which were so terribly thinned by the Italian campaigns, that only a relict of them remained, from which was formed another Polish legion, which, in infantry and artillery, was 6,500 men strong. Subsequently, there was a legion of the Danube composed entirely of Poles; and finally two demi-Polish brigades.

To those who can recollect the ardent but sterile sensibility and enthusiasm the cause of Poland excited all over Europe, when men old and oldening now were young; and when her exiles sang as they went to battle under French colours:—

"Non tu n'est pas sans defenseurs,
O Pologne cherie,"

the extinction of their hopes, and the indifference with which they are at present regarded, is somewhat saddening.

Maltese, Turks, Greeks, Copts and Syrians, Ethiopians, Georgians, Armenians, Circassians, all swelled the ranks of the French army during the Egyptian expedition. Napoleon, foreseeing the difficulty in this expedition, of receiving reinforcements from France, very skilfully pressed natives into his service, whenever he could do so; and in this he found little difficulty in countries where patriotism is unknown, and every man is willing to hire himself out to the highest bidder. He had hardly arrived at Malta, when he organized a Maltese legion, consisting of 1,500 men, who fought at the battle of the Pyramids. The Turkish prisoners taken in that battle were also formed into companies of guides, and shortly afterwards a Copt and a Greek legion were conspicuous in the army of the East. Negroes likewise made part of it. The caravans of Ethiopia having brought many black slaves into Egypt, Napoleon bought a great number of them, and gave these swarthy companions to a demi-brigade of Infantry which wanted completion. These poor blacks, having no Mussulman prejudices, soon adopted the ways and manners of the French sodiers, and were remarked as having fought very bravely at Heliopolis.

In mentioning the Mamelukes, at this time earning the last ray of glory belonging to their name under French banners, we regret that our limits will not permit us to give even a brief sketch of their most singular and romantic history. We cannot, however, forbear recording the opinion of Napoleon expressed of them at St. Helena. "Throughout all the East," said he, "the Mamelukes were the objects of veneration and of terror; they were regarded up to our time as invincible. Two Mamelukes were equal to three Frenchmen, because they were better armed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs of pistols, a tromblon, a carabine, a helmet with a vizor, a coat of mail, several horses, and several men on foot to attend them. But a hundred French cavaliers did not fear a hundred Mamelukes; three hundred were conquerors of an equal number, and a thousand could beat fifteen hundred—so great is the influence of tactics, of order, and of evolutions!"

Ten squadrons of Mamelukes raised by Bonaparte in Egypt came to France with the army of the East after the entire evacuation of Egypt, and formed part of the consular guard. But as their number sensibly diminished, and Napoleon wished to keep up a corps which recalled the memory of his first brilliant exploits, and flattered the chivalric vanity of the French people, it was reinforced from time to time, by Frenchmen; and in 1814, when Mamelukes served in the Imperial Guard, there were as many of them from the banks of the Seine as from the banks of the Nile. Their gaudy uniform had a fine effect, and contributed no doubt much to the favour they had so long enjoyed. It varied according to the caprice or taste of their commandant, but consisted usually of a blue turban turned up with red, and surmounted by a crest of polished brass, of a sky-blue

jacket, decorated with a great deal of lace work, and silver tags and tassels, of a plain red waistcoat, of a green and red woollen sash, of red pantaloons extremely wide, and of yellow boots; but, in the summer they wore white pantaloons, and a turban of white muslin.

There were, besides the foreign contingents we have named, two corps for the reception of deserters; one called the battalion of Foreign Deserters, and another consisting only of four companies.

Most of these foreign troops in the employment of the French republic, found their graves—many more of them from pestilence than by the sword—in St. Domingo, which was then in revolt against France. The Helvetic Brigades, the German Battalions, the Piedmontese Legions, and the splendid demi-brigades of infantry formed by Polish troops, all perished in a disastrous enterprise, in which even success would have brought no glory, and which Frenchmen were glad, in order to escape it themselves, to hand over, as soon as the peace of Amiens allowed them to do so, to foreigners, who had fought and reaped laurels with them on so many glorious fields. This certainty was poor gratitude for valiant services.

Victory had now greatly enlarged the frontiers of the ancient French monarchy, and at the time when the conqueror of Marengo assumed the Imperial crown, Austrian Flanders, and a part of Germany and of Italy, belonged to the new empire, which for ten subsequent years continued still to extend its boundaries in Italy as far as Garigliano; in Germany to the mouth of the Elbe; in Illyria to the Save and to Cattaro; and in Spain to the Ebro. The departments of France amounted during this brief but splendid period of its history to 134, and she had for vassals the kingdoms of Naples, of Spain, of Westphalia, of Bavaria, and of Saxony.

The foreign contingents of the French army were of course, therefore, greatly increased. Genoese, Tuscans, Parmesans, and Romans, independent of the Italian corps admitted into the service of France during the Republic, constituted a large force. By an imperial decree of the 1st of April, 1809, the departments of the Po, of La Stura, of Sessia, of the Doire, of Montenotte, of the Appennines, of Genoa, of Marengo, and of the Taro, were called upon to furnish men to form the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth divisions, with a company of mounted guards of honour, to attend on the person of Prince Borghese, the Governor-General of those departments. A decree of the same date, ordered the formation of two battalions from the districts of the Arno and of the Mediterranean, and of two others from Turin and Florence. The 32nd Regiment of the French light infantry was also entirely composed of Ligurian troops, that is, of soldiers from the Roman States, from Naples, from Montenotte, and from the Taro. In addition to these, there were a Mediterranean regiment, a Tuscan regiment of light infantry, a regiment (the 13th) of Hussars of the Alps, a regiment of Hussars of Jerome Bonaparte raised at Turin, the Genoa Auxiliary Chasseurs, a company of Roman Coastguards, and a battalion of Roman veterans.

Switzerland, by a new capitulation, furnished at this time 16,000 men to the French army; the Valois, which went under the name of

the department of the Simplon, a battalion; and the principality of Neufchatel, which was given in 1806 to Marshal Berthier, an infantry corps, with the title of the regiment of the Prince of Neufchatel; whilst in Germany, Westphalia contributed the Westphalian regiment, and Hanover the Hanoverian Legion, to the military resources of France; but in this legion there were many Austrians and Prussians.

A legion of the North, a second legion of the North; a legion of the Vistula, a second legion of the Vistula; a regiment of the Vistula; three regiments (4th, 9th, and 9th) of infantry, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; a regiment of the Lithuanian infantry; a regiment of Lancers of the Legion of the Vistula; a second regiment of Light Horse Polish Lancers; a regiment of Light Horse raised by Prince John Sulkowiski; a regiment of Light Horse Lancers of the Imperial Guard; two regiments of Lancers; four companies of Polish Guards of Honour; a battery of Polish Horse Artillery; one of Foot Artillery; and a company of sappers, formed the magnificent quota furnished by Poland to the Imperial army.

Portugal also, at this time, contributed six regiments of the line and two regiments of cavalry; and Spain eight regiments; most of which, under the command of the Marquis de la Romana, deserted to the English; yet there remained, till up to the battle of Vittoria, a large Spanish force in the service of France, composed chiefly of prisoners of war, and of natives of Catalonia, which province continued to be held by Suchet, till the French were driven finally out of the Peninsula.

Ionians, Greeks, Albanians, Illyrians, Dalmatians, and Croatians, though the three last people, whilst submitting to French influence, and to French rule under Marmont, did not properly belong to the Empire, supplied Napoleon, the former with 6,000 men, forming two auxiliary corps, and the latter with six regiments, amounting to about the same contingent.

A few words about the Croatians may interest our readers. That people, or rather tribe, inhabiting nearly the whole of one of the six provinces of Illyria, live entirely under a military government. Their country resembles a vast camp. Even agricultural pursuits among them are regulated by martial law. Their domestic manners, like those of the Circassians, though in a much tamer degree, furnish the grotesque and pleasing picture of a war pastoral. They are, in fact, a horde of Tartars, living in barracks instead of tents, and supporting themselves on the produce of their farms and flocks.

The Croatians hold all their possessions in land on a military tenure, both for themselves and for their descendants. Ground for cultivation is allotted to them, in proportion to the number and to the wants of each family. When a family prospers and increases, it receives from the government new tracts, bought generally from those who have fallen into poverty, though none are allowed to sell that which is barely necessary for their subsistence; and as many families hold their possessions collectively, land does not change hands very frequently. As for individuals, their existence is totally ignored; they possess nothing.

A family is composed of many households, which amount often to more than sixty persons. The chief of the family, either by seniority or by election, is its administrator, and is obliged to give in his account of receipts and expenditure yearly. He provides for the wants of all, presides over the culture of the farms, and equips the soldiers who form his own company. He is assisted in these functions by his wife, or, should he be a widower, by another woman elected to be his coadjutor. At the expiration of each year, a division of the net products of the common labour takes place, and every individual, absent or present, male or female, receives an equal share, with the exception of the head, and of the mistress of the family, who have two shares.

Thus the communal system, the rudest and most elementary mode of social rule, prevails among these simple barbarians to such an extent, as to make them a model people to Paris Communists.

To return from this digression.

The States of the Confederation of the Rhine, the Grand Duchy of Berg and of Holland, which were united to France in 1810, increased the military strength of the empire to the amount of 0,000 or 50,000 men. Of these, Holland alone gave 27,110, whilst he fourteen princes of the Confederation were always ready, at the eck of their Protector, with their auxiliary corps; and from the ree new northern departments, the Upper Ems, the mouths of the Weser, and the mouths of the Elbe, which included the free cities, ubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, three regiments of two battalions ere raised, and took an active part in the German campaigns.

Finally, the Irish Legion, and three battalions of prisoners of ar of all nations remain to be mentioned. The former was raised 1803, and had two battalions, which were afterwards increased to ree by the admission into it of stray soldiers from all countries. larke, Duc de Feltre, an Irishman by descent, its colonel, represented is corps as "the Terror of England," though we do not recollect at it ever particularly distinguished itself in any of the great campaigns of the period, or that any man of any remarkable merit ever longed to it. The battalions of prisoners of war were employed ostly in and road-making and repairing fortifications. They were rely taken into action.

On the whole, the foreign troops in the service of France under e Empire, did not certainly amount to less than 100,000 men. me of the authorities we have consulted in order to lay the information contained in this paper before our readers, name a higher mber; but none a lower. This variation may be perhaps accounted r, by remarking that, during the last years of the career of Napon I., foreigners were admitted very freely into the strictly French giments, from which they had been previously excluded; and ese being added to the entire strength of the foreign corps might sily give the figure 120,000, which some statistical accounts set wn as the right number: whilst the author of an interesting rk called *Troupes Etrangeres*, from which we have drawn most our details, names the total we have, to avoid exaggeration, lopted, and of the correctness of which, separating it from a partial

A GLANCE AT OUR CHINESE POLICY.

with individuals, so with nations; the future is but too often ficed to the present, and whilst laying up for themselves a large of what they conceive at the time to be indispensable advan-, they are in reality doing neither more nor less than ac-ulating difficulties to be found, at some not very distant day, all nsurmountable.

'e are at the best but poor, weak, short-sighted mortals, taking ry narrow and circumscribed view of what may be going on nd us, and politicians, it is to be feared, are not always more eeing than other people; indeed, we are sometimes led to ect that they are less so, judging from the strange errors they mit; errors which the uninitiated can only excuse by falling upon the charitable but mistaken supposition, that there must been some weighty hidden reasons in the back-ground, for ns that would otherwise admit of no palliation.

would indeed almost seem as if the great object of our states- in the present day were to complicate, and confuse every ter with which they have to deal, for nothing could be more y to facilitate such a result than the system which appears to been adopted by them within the last few years,—a system h substitutes deliberation for decision—parsimony for economy wasteful expenditure for organization and good-management— rastination and delay for prompt and vigorous action, and desire o that which is profitable and expedient rather than that which uitable and just. We might prove the truth of this by num-ess instances, but we shall content ourselves by instancing two: recent treatment of our European Indian troops, and the very liar policy which we have adopted towards the Chinese. This r subject is the one we now propose to take into consideration.

Ve shall find, on looking into the matter, that our relations with na were, in the first place, purely commercial; and that they inued to be so for many years. The trade was a profitable one ar as it went, but from its being in the hands of a monopoly, its nt was limited. No very general interest was entertained with ect to Chinese affairs; it was known that we got our tea from na, and that we had a factory at Canton; beyond this, few ple cared to enquire.

ut monopolies went out of fashion in later free-trade times, and as suddenly remembered that in the far east were some three dred millions of people, who, it was thought, might be induced a little management, and a proper degree of pressure from out, to clothe themselves in British broadcloths, and Manchester oes and cottons. Unfortunately, before this grand discovery ld be fairly taken advantage of, some astute and enterprising enturers found out, that amongst the vices of the Chinese was which might be turned to good account, and that a contraband le in opium was far more likely to yield large profits and quick

returns, than an endeavour to open out the Chinese market by the introduction of a legitimate traffic in British manufactured goods.

The cultivation of the poppy on a very large scale in various parts of India—an extensive and admirably organized smuggling trade on the coast of China—and a very large accession of rupees to the East India Company's exchequer—were the immediate and most prominent consequences.

We were simply traders dealing in a certain drug, we did not hold ourselves responsible for the demoralization which the immoderate use of that drug was known to produce; and whilst we congratulated ourselves on the improved state of our Indian finances, we did not forget to talk largely of our duties as a Christian nation, and of the increased opportunities which were likely to present themselves for our extending the right hand of fellowship and the blessings of Christianity to the poor benighted inhabitants of idolatrous China!

Up to this period, our trade had been confined to the Canton waters, where it had been carried on under restrictions, which could not well have permitted the Chinese to entertain very exalted notions of our national greatness, and which led them to profess a contempt for the European character they were at no pains to conceal, though such sentiments were probably often more affected than real.

The sudden and rapid extension of the opium trade created an immense sensation in China; it was obnoxious to the government on financial as well as on moral grounds, though the latter were the ones upon which it was usually assailed. An attempt to put a stop to it with a high hand, signally failed, and ended in the war, which is considered by many to have been the first step towards the destruction of the unity and independence of the empire.

It is not necessary for us to enumerate one by one, all the circumstances which led to this war, or to describe the various operations which finally compelled the Emperor to give his unwilling assent to the stipulations contained in the treaty, concluded at Nanking in 1842; but we would observe, that had it not been for the "opium question," we should have stood before the Chinese nation with clean hands, and might have appealed with some show of consistency to the laws of nations, and the principles of right and wrong.

In the treaty itself there was not much to find fault with, it was framed in a liberal spirit, and we obtained many substantial advantages, but, no sooner had it been duly signed and ratified, the ports thrown open to trade, and the indemnity paid, than we proceed to undo much that we had done, by a blunder.

Amongst the stipulations of the treaty was one, which provided for the European residents at the several ports opened to trade, having perfect liberty of movement, not only in the towns, but within certain reasonable limits in their vicinity. This claim was strictly enforced in every case but one, and that exceptional case was most singularly injudicious, for, if there were one place more than another in which it was advisable that our new relations with China should have been fully recognized, that place was Canton.

Mr. Bruce in one of his late despatches, most justly observes that, 'through many generations of our intercourse with China, we postponed considerations of national dignity to commercial considerations." It was more peculiarly at Canton, the scene of so many humiliations, that generation after generation had become familiarized with their undignified compromise, and from it as a centre so much that was prejudicial to the European character had been disseminated throughout the empire.

For some time after the treaty of Nanking had been concluded, matters went on smoothly enough, and there seemed little reason to doubt the bona fide intentions of Keying and other distinguished members of what may be called the Chinese liberal party; but on the death of the Emperor, Taou-Kwang, his successor surrendered himself to the influence of those whose prejudices rendered them adverse to every measure calculated to facilitate or encourage European intercourse. Still, although occasional complications ensued, no very decided hostile aspect was exhibited towards foreigners, and matters as they then stood would probably have continued for some years longer, had not the affair of the Arrow brought them to a crisis, and caused us, against the wishes of a large section of the thinking community in Great Britain, to enter upon hostilities, which seemed to be more directed against the local authorities of Canton than against the responsible head of the Chinese Government. No very great time, however, elapsed before we flattered ourselves that we had arrived at a satisfactory settlement, thanks to the diplomatic skill of Lord Elgin, backed by the weighty arguments advanced by our gallant soldiers, sailors, and marines, at Canton and the Peiho.

But we forgot that although a proud and prejudiced government ruling over some hundred millions of people, may be compelled to give way before a well-applied pressure from without, it soon returns to its former impassive normal condition, when that pressure is withdrawn; and that in order to reap all the advantages of such concessions as it may be forced to make, it becomes necessary to insist upon the fulfilment of each and all of the stipulations contained in any treaty before a single step is taken, which may add to a supposition, that a resumption of hostilities cannot easily take place. An attempt at evasion is the natural consequence of any delay, however short; and it is much to be regretted that not only have we permitted the Chinese Government to evade some portion of almost every engagement that we have entered into with it, but we have appeared to regard it as quite a matter of course that it should do so; not that the evasion of treaties is a weakness peculiar to that of the Chinese, for history shews us that as a rule, treaties are far more rarely kept than broken.

Surely it would be very easy for us to say in a few simple sentences, our interests and a sense of justice demand that such and such things should be done by you, we give you the choice; do them, and a profitable peace; leave them undone, and a devastating war; but remember not one jot or tittle will we allow you to deviate from that which is agreed upon between us. This would be reducing

diplomacy to its simplest form, and none other ought to be allowed to exist between Great Britain and China.

But here we have a great difficulty to contend with; we want to eat our cake and to have it at the same time; we want to carry on war with the one hand, whilst we trade with the other; and whilst we are endeavouring to convince the Chinese that we are a nation of warriors, we do not wish them to forget, what they are naturally so much more inclined to remember, that we are a nation of shopkeepers.

If we indeed wish to occupy that position in eastern Asia, which is our due as a nation, do not let us for the future descend to such pitiful acts as have hitherto so often marked our policy in China; do not let it be for the future a Superintendent of Trade or Governor of Hong Kong making war upon Canton, or an Envoy Extraordinary to make a forcible entry into Pekin; but let us appear in the more dignified character of a nation demanding, and insisting upon, a universal and genuine recognition of its just rights, instead of a partial and evasive one.

We shall be laughed at as chimerical—for every one is chimerical who predicts that which seems to be far from probable, but we are convinced that the germ of that which will prove most dangerous to our supremacy in the East, is to be found in China. China, as it was, unapproachable, incomprehensible, formed a barrier which effectually protected the right flank of our Indian possessions; whilst China remained intact, and shut up in all the exclusiveness of semi-barbarism, Russia, her natural enemy, had but small chance of succeeding in gaining influence or aggrandizement beyond the limits of her Siberian frontier. We opened out China to the world—and mark the result! Russia has already not only extended her frontier to the Amoor, but has advanced considerably beyond it. She has established ports in the Pacific, and is evidently endeavouring with good prospect of success to enter into relations with the Tartar Government of Pekin, which must in the end greatly tend to our embarrassment, for the day will come when we shall find to our cost that a war with China is nothing more nor less than a war with Russia in disguise.

Our French alliance, too, can but have the effect of lessening our prestige, and of weakening the effect of every hostile demonstration that we make in common. What community of interests can there possibly be between us in any part of Asia? There can be none, and it is a great error to imagine that we can derive any benefit from our combined action. With our vast Asiatic dominion we must possess political views and considerations that France cannot sympathize with; and there can be as little identity of feeling in commercial matters, considering the wonderful disproportion existing between the eastern trade of the two countries.

Recent events, including a sad disaster, have once more turned the attention of the public to China. Opinions are as yet divided as to whether we were authorized in attempting to force the passage of the Peiho or not. We must confess to being of those who are inclined to decide in the negative, and we will endeavour to explain

our reasons for having arrived at such a conclusion by a simple illustration of the case as it seems to stand.

We will suppose that the friends of an eccentric and crotchety old gentleman, living upon his estates in great retirement, send to inform him that they intend to pay him a visit, and beg to remind him of a promise (wrung from him at a weak moment), that they should be politely received and escorted through the estate to his house. The old gentleman has certain substantial reasons for not receding from his promise, but he is determined that if the visit must take place, it shall not be by a certain road which he has a great dread of being trespassed upon, so he locks the gate and gives his lodge-keeper directions that no one is to pass through it. The friends come to this identical gate at an early hour, and are greatly disappointed and annoyed at finding no one waiting to receive them, but they are told that an escort is on its way, and will meet them some little distance off. They will not, however, hear of this, but get into a great rage, and proceed to break down the gate, when the lodge-keeper with his assistants come out and give them a good thrashing.

But some will object, and say the friends were quite right in trying to pull down the gate, for the old gentleman was a notoriously dishonest old fellow, and it is more than probable that he never intended that they should travel through his park. Granted that it might have been so; a very little patience would have exposed his duplicity, and then they might have set to work with a clear conscience and right goodwill, not only pulling down one, but all his gates, and, if necessary, his house into the bargain.

Calmness and discretion do indeed seem to have deserted us at the Peiho. All honour to the brave—all honour to the bold and daring! But ten thousand times greater honour to those brave and aspiring spirits who know when to curb their impetuous feelings, and who as leaders gain the day, not less by the courage and devotion of their followers, than by the exercise of that judicious discrimination which best overcomes obstacles at the least expense of human life.

FROM CAMP TO QUARTERS.

Or, Life in an Indian Cantonment after Field Service.

Part V.

Cricket and Clergy—Improvement of Soldiers—Theatricals—Maun Singh—Jung and his Goorkhas—10th Seikhs—Mock humanity—Government scholars—Hostile feelings—Jeddah—Rebels and Officers—War tax—Tantia Topee and other leaders.

We have endeavoured to sketch the daily routine of life of both officers and soldiers in an Indian military station. The former have themselves the power to choose and follow that most in accordance with their own tastes. If studious, the station library and book

clubs of the regiments are capable of furnishing them with an ample supply of literary food. If anxious to acquire a knowledge of the languages of the country, Moonchees in abundance are in daily and hourly attendance to render them assistance. If, as often happens, the tastes of the officers lead them to seek out-door amusements, there are few stations in India where they cannot be fully indulged in this respect. At Dandgunge excellent boating was readily available; good shooting ground was within a convenient distance; an excellent race-course had been laid out on a large open plain in the vicinity of the barracks, and the civilians had one all to themselves not more than five miles off. A racket court was very much at their service. Cricket is a game not adapted for the hot or rainy seasons, but during the very few months over which what is called the cold season extends in India, this old English game is as zealously prosecuted throughout that country as it is on the downs of Kent, and matches as eagerly contested.

Perhaps, indeed, the attractions of this most excellent game are so overpowering that its votaries are led captive by them, even from avocations of the most sacred nature. For a military officer to spend six and eight hours a day at cricket, or any other game for which he has a fancy, is nothing very particular—nothing to be either applauded or condemned; but for clergymen to thus spend their time, and to occupy themselves, even on Saturdays, when they would be more appropriately engaged in preparing for the sacred duties of the succeeding day, does seem to all but the very "highest" church party as objectionable in the extreme; neither can it be in accordance with the tenets of the professed Roman Catholic, inasmuch as the priests of that religion do not indulge in recreations of this description.

We will suppose a clergyman thus occupied suddenly receive a summons to attend beside the death-bed of a fellow being, prostrated by sickness, and sinking into eternity; we will suppose the cricket-bat thrown pettishly down, as the unwelcome call is received; the features composed after having been but just convulsed with laughter at jokes, not conspicuous for their propriety, that had been exchanged among the party on the play ground. Or let us suppose—what not unfrequently happens—that, as the hour of sunset approaches, a minister of the Christian religion, whose periods of relaxation are passed as is now being described, finds he has just time to finish his "innings," and reach the grave-yard sufficiently early to throw on the surplice ere the funeral procession, now at slow and melancholy pace, progressing forwards, has reached the portals of man's final resting place. There may be nothing objectionable in cricket and similar games, yet it may be questioned if the jests, the thoughtless talk, and the occasional more than thoughtless remarks that make up the conversation on the ground, or in the tent in the vicinity, where bitter ale, brandy, and soda water, cheroots and pipes, are in chief request, constitute the most favourable circumstances under which a clergyman can prepare himself for the sacred duties of his calling.

While these remarks are applicable to some of the chaplains in India, it is matter of satisfaction that they are not to all. There are some of these gentlemen whose conduct and bearing are most ex-

emplary and admirable; but the fact is not the less unquestionable that there are others, and especially amongst those whose appointments date only within the last few years, whose style and manner approach what in fashionable slang is known as "fast."

As regards the private soldiers, one of the greatest difficulties in their management is in finding salutary amusement and recreation for them during the hours they are unoccupied with regimental duties. The long dreary day is spent by them in listless idleness, unless, as too often happens, the attractions of the bazaar prove too great for them, in which case disease and crime speedily bring them to the hospital or to the guard-room. From time to time various devices have been proposed for the amelioration of the condition of the soldier in this respect, but from various causes they have not been brought into operation. At one of the stations in Upper India a few officers some years ago exerted themselves in establishing a society, for the purpose of affording soldiers an opportunity of self-improvement in various branches of education, and in the rudiments of science. In a room in barracks, appropriated for the purpose, lectures were given from time to time upon such subjects as were deemed best adapted to the capabilities and tastes of the men, and the result was that an interest in the society was evidently established among them. The audience gradually increased, and the originators of the scheme had soon the satisfaction to see not a few soldiers, who had hitherto been constant frequenters of the canteen and the bazaar, cease their visits to these places, and become amongst the most regular attendants at the classes that had been formed for mutual instruction.

This was, however, prior to the Crimean war. Public interest did not then extend to the private soldier; he was looked upon as a person beyond the pale of morality. To enlist was deemed the acme of degradation to which a young man could, by his own acts, bring himself. His relations from that moment looked upon the son who had "gone for a soldier" as lost for ever, and society at large scarcely used any exertion to render more tolerable the position which must, from the very nature of military service, ever continue to be more or less one of constraint.

The Russian war and the Indian mutiny have within the last five years drawn the sympathy and the interest of the English people, more than ever they had been, to the position of the military defenders of their country, and the gratifying result now is, that the claims of the soldiers begin to obtain some slight degree of recognition. He is no longer denied recognition as a member of the great fraternity of the United Kingdom; his bodily wants are more carefully attended to than ever they have previously been; much is now being done to meet his spiritual requirements; when prostrated by wounds or disease, his circumstances are now rendered very much more tolerable than they were; and when in barracks, healthful amusements and means of self-improvement are amply provided for him.

Such, however, was by no means the case at the time to which I now allude. Then, the soldier was to all intents and purposes looked upon as a mere part of a machine—an atom, a thing—but most un-

fortunately, too often a thing to be worked and bullied, until either destroyed by disease, or rendered a fit subject for an invaliding board.

"What? Teach soldiers anything but their drill. Give lectures upon ologies to them! Why, good heavens! the army is going to the dogs, now-a-days."

Such was the remark of a gentleman who obtained command of the regiment referred to, shortly after the society for the improvement of the men had been established, and his remark would not now have been worth the value of the ink required to chronicle it, were it not for the fact that it contains the opinions entertained by not a few old officers, themselves probably not over-burthened by scholastic acquirements.

It is useless to convince a man of such a stamp that the mere elevation of a soldier is an object to be desired, or, indeed, that it is other than downright objectionable.

"I tell you what it is, sir." This is the language of the old martinet. "None of your lectures and your recreation of soldiers for me. Why, at this rate, they will soon know more than their officers, and what earthly use can education be to them? Give me a man who knows his drill well, and will do it; and hang all your learned fellows, who read books, and all that sort of thing."

Entertaining these opinions, it would have been easy for the officer in command to have at once put a stop to the further proceedings of the society, but then such a proceeding might possibly attach some degree of odium to him. While, therefore, in his opinion the further improvement of the soldier was a matter to be resolutely guarded against, it was no less necessary that this should be effected indirectly. What think you were the means by which the wished for consummation was to be got about?

A report having been made to superior authority of the existence in the Onety-Onth of a "repeal association," a general officer was, very much to the surprise of those more immediately concerned, sent to the regiment with orders to instantly dissolve the most dangerous society that had sprung up in it. And so ended the first attempt at elevating the moral position of the soldier. Now, however, similar associations are recognised and encouraged at the principal military stations in England, and I wish them every success.

Perhaps the most harmless of all amusements open to the soldier in India is that afforded by theatrical performances. At Dandgung, the corps of performers was at least as good as are to be found in any one regiment, and the barrack room that had been made to serve the purpose of a theatre was usually well filled.

"Susan Hopley," or, according to the pronunciation of the actors, "Susan Opley," was a decided favourite; so also "Box and Cox;" but the comic songs in character, the Highland flings, by some would-be Caledonian performer; and, finally, the wonderful contortions of —not the Corsican, but "India-rubber" brothers, invariably elicited plaudits of approbation from the audience, and afforded them subject of conversation during the intervening days between that and the succeeding performance.

As already seen, our life at Dandgunge was by no means one of uninterrupted ease and quiet. Continued alarms were being raised, and we remained in a constant state of readiness to take the field at an hour's notice. The Sepoys, taking advantage of the rainy season, continued in marauding parties to traverse the country in various directions, committing robberies, murders, and depredations upon villages who had not the power or the courage to beat them off.

The subject came to be discussed, whether under all circumstances, it was the more desirable plan to dispatch a force of British against them, or to permit them for a time to indulge their passion, until on the setting in of the cold season our troops could act with more effect. The last determination was about being adopted, when the increasing boldness of the rebels rendered the dispatch of a small force against them imperative. As usual, no sooner did our troops approach the cowardly Sepoys, than the latter fled, to collect again at some distant rendezvous, and recommence their depredations.

Among the more powerful bands of rebels was one from Oude, that made a descent upon Gorruckpore, where our so-called *ally*, Maun Singh, had secured himself. The Sepoys, less patient than our Government, had become tired with his continued vacillation—now declaring as he did for them when temporary success seemed to attend their proceedings—now for us when success was on our side—again to revert to the rebels, and again to return, according to the altering prospects of the campaign. On the present occasion, surrounded as he was by people who cared not much about using *conciliatory* measures towards him, it was wonderful indeed how mightily attached he became all of a sudden to a Government, the subversion of which he had but shortly before lent his assistance to effect. It is wonderful how very small an amount of attachment to our cause was in these days deemed subject for acknowledgment. We need not wonder, therefore, that a force was speedily dispatched for the purpose of repelling the besiegers of this most slippery ally.

Early in August, 1858, a report reached us that Sir Jung Bahadoor, G.C.B., had offered no fewer than twenty regiments of the Nepaulese troops to the Begum of Lucknow, and that he was making preparations to make a descent against us so soon as the season should admit of his doing so. The report, whether true or not, was by no means unlikely to have some foundation, for the fact was notorious to all at the station of Dandgunge, and indeed to all throughout India, with the exception of a few Government officials, that throughout the operations connected with the mutiny, the entire sympathies of the Ghoorkha troops and their commanders were with the Sepoys.

It is true that they nominally assisted us. It is indisputable that their presence with our forces was at all times a source of annoyance, inconvenience, and anxiety. To fight they had ever a strong objection, except, Asiatic like, they could catch their adversary at a disadvantage. To loot, their propensity was irresistible, and to this one end seemed to be directed their whole desires; the only other object they apparently had in view having been to watch the chances

of war, and in the event of our troops meeting with a reverse, to join the victorious Sepoy army in the good work of extermination of the infidel—the white, foul infidel, the dog of a Feringhee!

All these matters were notorious at the time. They had been notorious for months, and yet, here was a man whose present position had been attained through treachery, bloodshed, and murder—whose private habits were those of a debauchee of the worst class—whose public acts were characterized by crimes too black to repeat or to allude to, further than to mention that some of them have been chronicled in the pages of "Blackwood." And yet, here was a man whose name has been permitted to occupy a place among those of men who have obtained similar honours to his by a long lifetime of virtue, of exertion for the public good, or for personal talents of so pre-eminent a nature as of themselves to entitle their possessor to the highest rank of nobility.

The report obtained the more probability from a circumstance that transpired at this time. The recall of our Resident at the court of Nepaul was demanded by that Government, apparently for no other reason than that Jung had contracted some violent personal dislike to the then incumbent. For once in a way our executive manifested some firmness when opposed to what they call the prejudices of the natives. Time rolled on, but the dictum of the Mongol Grand Cross of the Bath was only partially supreme. That chief being pleased to compromise the matter by tolerating the return of the Resident for a brief period, but on condition that he should then be withdrawn!

While the events now narrated were taking place, not a little surprise was created by the circumstance of some Sepoys, who have hitherto acted in a manner to lead themselves to be looked upon as "staunch," having broken out in mutiny. The 10th Seikh Infantry at Dera Ishmael Khan, in the Punjaub, now displayed signs of open mutiny, and had, it was said, entered into an arrangement with the 39th Sepoy regiment to unite with them, and make a descent upon Mooltan. The 39th, it will be remembered, had been disarmed at Meean Meer shortly after the first outburst of mutiny there had been smothered by the energetic measures adopted by Sir John Laurence. After a time they had been re-armed, and if the present report was true—and there is no reason to question its correctness—the first use they were about to make of their arms was to turn them against that Government which had continued to manifest towards them so strangely infatuated, so misplaced, and ill-requited a confidence.

Dandgunge being one of the largest military stations in Bengal, rebels were from time to time brought into it for trial. In the early stages of the mutiny, those who were fairly convicted of murders and other horrors, in which their diabolical passions had led them to indulge, on the persons of our countrymen and women who had fallen into their hands, were condemned to expiate their crimes at the hand of the executioner. By-and-bye, however, public sympathy ceased to be with the unhappy victims of Asiatic hate and Asiatic treachery. The cry for vengeance gave place to a whine of mock

humanity. The throes and pangs of dishonoured ladies—the screams of dismembered children—and the unflinching bravery in death of noble and gallant men, were in a few short weeks all forgotten. Pseudo philanthropists from England found their way to scenes desecrated by deeds of horror, such as prior to the days of Robespierre the world had never witnessed; and over the last resting-places of the murdered and the dishonoured, these mock ministers of religion and peace muttered, or pretended to mutter, soliloquies which proved but too clearly how much more their own sympathies leant to the side of the murderers and ravishers, than to that of their victims.

Articles appeared in the English papers, breathing sympathy, if not actual applause, of the deeds of blood perpetrated by our too well-treated mercenaries. Fiends who had torn helpless infants limb from limb, or played battledoor and shuttlecock with them on bayonet-points—who had committed upon Englishwomen atrocities, the very name of which to mention would be polluting this page—were characterised in the language of their partizans as "poor, misguided men," while the sacred volume was ransacked, and texts of Scripture most egregiously misapplied to prove that the season of trial through which all of us were then passing, was but a righteous judgment sent by Heaven as a punishment for some imaginary sins which these self-elected judges were pleased to attribute to us.

Fie, fie, upon such false sentimentality! It speedily effected its work, however; certain partizans of the rebels in India were not long in following the example set them in England; letters were published in some of the local papers, with the evident intention of throwing doubt upon the narratives of particular atrocities, communicated from time to time by eye-witnesses, and by others whose sources of correct information were above doubt. It was even endeavoured to be shown that the King of Delhi, the Nawab of Furruckabad, the Nana, Tantia Topee, and other chief leaders, were, in fact, not leaders at all, but mere tools in the hands of the people. It was even endeavoured to be shown that the Nana was not at Cawnpore at all while the tragedies at that place were being enacted. It was further attempted to be proved that the extent of the murders and other crimes committed by the Sepoys had been much magnified, and from the published despatches of certain military commanders, a not unsuccessful attempt was made to present an appalling list of victims of British revenge among the Sepoys.

The evil result was now apparent of the absurdly exaggerated accounts of killed and wounded among the enemy that had at times been given in official despatches; were we to believe them, the whole original strength of the Sepoy army had been destroyed at least three times over, notwithstanding that the actual numbers opposed to us in the field have not yet shown any evident diminution.

The effect of this sudden change in opinion was, that instructions from Government were received at Dandgunge, so hampering the powers of courts, and affording murderers so many loopholes to

escape the just doom to which their crimes would otherwise consign them, that officers appointed for the trial of murderers, scarcely ever ventured to convict; nor was conviction upon the clearest and most unmistakeable evidence always sufficient to ensure the execution of a criminal, the sentence of death awarded being, in not a few instances, commuted to imprisonment or transportation.

Among the comparatively few whose life was actually forfeited in expiation of their crimes, was a native doctor, a miserable, thin, decrepid wretch, who met his death like a coward as he was. I mention him, not so much for his own sake as with a view to observe in connection with the fact, that people of his class, men educated at Government schools, and necessarily possessing some degree of knowledge of English arts and sciences, were nevertheless foremost in the ranks of the rebels when the Sepoys rose with a view to subvert our rule; and it is matter for sad reflection, that in some instances these native licentiates in medicine turned to account their knowledge and their position, in order to wreak the more completely their real feelings of hatred towards a race, by the aid of whose institutions they had been educated and placed in independence, if not actual affluence.

There seems to be a moral derivable from this brief narration. It is this: The native Hindoo, be his opportunities for obtaining scientific knowledge what they may, cannot in one generation overcome the prejudices which, engrafted in his race for generations, have grown with his growth, and strengthened with his strength. In fact, no more than is the leopard capable of changing his spots is the Ethiopian of parting with his sable hue. Numerous examples might be adduced to illustrate this, did it need any such, but it does not. Let us, however, in future beware of men of this class, who may possibly still be in the public service. To turn and rend the hand that feeds them, or, asp-like, to sting the bosom in which they are nurtured, may yet, when too late, be discovered to be the recompense given by some of our much-belauded Indian public servants, whose present boast and ours is, that they are alumni of our government colleges.

As forming a strange commentary upon the policy of conciliation adopted towards the Mahomedan and Hindoo rebels, the receipt of the intelligence already mentioned as coming from Nepaul was shortly afterwards succeeded by further reports of the continued spread of disaffection towards us. At Lahore, the strength of the guard of British troops in the citadel had to be increased in consequence of the increased ill feeling that had become manifest throughout the city, and the aspect of affairs in the province generally was considered as unsatisfactory in the extreme.

The return of a detachment of our force to Dandgunge afforded us an opportunity to question its officers regarding the state of feeling of the people throughout the neighbouring districts towards us, nor were we surprised to learn from them that far from an improvement having taken place in this respect, the masses were, if anything, more hostile towards us than they had hitherto been.

But not along the length and breadth of the vast peninsula of

India alone did the followers of the false prophet enter into their diabolical machinations against the Christian. Newspapers received contained accounts of atrocities perpetrated upon French and English subjects at Jeddah, by Mahomedans, only less terrible than those enacted at some military stations in the north western provinces, because the number of victims were fewer. We had on a former occasion heard of the murders perpetrated upon French subjects off the coast of Algeria, and had good reason to believe that emissaries from Delhi had commenced their westward journey shortly before, or immediately after the outbreak of the mutiny at Meerut, and at that place.

With the first accounts from Jeddah came loud resolves of vengeance and punishment to be inflicted upon the murderers. We remembered that similar resolves had been equally loudly expressed under the influence of the first tales of horror from many stations in our own vicinity, and had too palpable evidence of how speedily these resolves became dispelled. As it so happened, some degree of punishment was on the spur of the moment inflicted upon the western murderers, but ere a few weeks had elapsed, we received the most astounding information that England had hastened to apologise, and offer indemnification to those very persons whose bloody acts had subjected them to righteous punishment.

Most truly did some of the more intelligent natives with whom we at times entered into conversation, express their surprise at the extraordinary, and to them inexplicable motives which ruled the conduct of our Government officials.

"There is no understanding you English," they would say. "So long as your subjects remain peacable and quiet, no notice is taken of them, but no sooner do they commence to murder and destroy, than instead of punishing them, you invite them to accept forgiveness and pardon. Verily, it would seem that the sure way to obtain favors from the English Government is to commit crimes that, under any other rulers would subject their perpetrators to the death of a criminal."

And such, indeed, the conduct adopted towards the disaffected in India might well have led any person to believe was our invariable custom. Instances were recorded in the local newspapers where men clearly convicted of rebellion, and of having been accessory to the destruction of British life, were not only not executed, but were permitted to take up their abode at some of the healthiest places in India, to draw a pension from the Indian treasury sufficient to provide them with every necessary, and not a few of the comforts of life. While British officers, whose health or limbs had been lost in nobly performing their duty against these very rebels, were, as if cast off with a mere pittance, totally inadequate to supply to them the ordinary necessaries of life, and far inferior in amount to the pecuniary rewards bestowed upon traitors, rebels, and murderers.

These circumstances were a matter of notoriety at the time. They were grievously felt by the men whose blood had been freely given in defence of that Government which now so strangely rewarded them; they were discussed at every mess table, and at every meeting of

officers in the station, and indeed all over the country. They were taken up by some of the newspapers, but by none in so spirited and eloquent a manner as by the "Delhi Gazette," in which are chronicled at length instances that can be barely alluded to in a rapid sketch like the present.

Early in the month of September our hopes were for a time raised, by a report which led us to believe that the executive had at last resolved that the natives themselves should be made to pay part at least of the expenses of the rebellion. According to the newspapers, a war tax was about to be levied upon all men in Oude, whose income exceeded 200 rupees per month, and who had not actively assisted us during the late operations in that country.

It will be in the recollection of the readers of this magazine that with the single exception of the Punjaub, no measures had up to this time been taken with a view to make the natives of India suffer in their pockets for the excesses and the terrible devastations in which they had been more or less directly concerned during a period of upwards of a year.

Sir John Laurence, fortunately for the province over which he presided, fortunately indeed for India, was no "white Sepoy," no partizan of or sympathiser with the rebels. While the "Calcutta Gazette" weekly contained minutes "notifications" and "proclamations," breathing forgiveness, conciliation, and personal security towards wretches whose crimes equalled in diabolical atrocities what the wildest imagination could picture to itself, could form the wildest pastime of infuriated demons in the lowest depths of perdition, this most able and energetic officer was acting towards the rebels in the north-west in a manner directly opposite to the measures prescribed in the emanations from the Calcutta council chamber.

The results are before the world, and need therefore not be here discussed at length. Quietness reigned almost uninterruptedly throughout the Punjaub, and a powerful contingent was furnished by its warlike races to aid our own British forces, although each succeeding day produced fresh evidence that in their hearts the Sikhs and Punjaubees entertained towards us as a nation a degree of hatred and animosity not a whit less than that which animated the Poorbeahs, or natives of the eastern portion of Bengal.

It will be remembered that very early in the insurrection, the mutineers and rebels destroyed much public as well as private property at Loodianah; and among others, some buildings and other valuables belonging to the American Presbyterian Mission. No sooner did the spread of rebellion in the neighbouring districts receive its first check by the able measures taken by the Punjaub commissioner, than he resolved that the native inhabitants of that city should be made to pay the full pecuniary value of the property they had either destroyed or permitted others to destroy. This was accordingly carried into effect, and the natural result followed. The natives learnt by experience that arson was after all a somewhat expensive pastime, and that, therefore, upon grounds of economy, if for no other reason, it might be advisable for them to devise some other species of amusement.

But the example so resolutely set by Sir John Laurence found no favour "down east." There, the traditionary policy ruled pre-eminent. The "feelings" and prejudices of the natives must be respected. To subject a high-caste Brahmin to the indignity of being hanged for the murder of a mere Christian; to fine him for indulging for a little his peculiar tastes in robbery, in fire, and devastation; the very idea is monstrous in the extreme. It can only be entertained by persons who are ignorant of the manners and customs of the natives. Why, it would, in fact, be bringing them down to a level with ourselves.

So sad a consummation must, indeed, be averted; so, at least, would seem to reason the parties whom John Lang describes as the "Daddledays,"* and the Leadons of Calcutta. Not so, however, did Sir John Laurence, yet strange to say, the example set by him in the Punjaub has not been generally adopted, and the result is that rebellion and dissatisfaction are still rampant over the vast extent of territory presided over by the Bengal Government. Small bodies of marauders traverse the country in various directions, committing robberies of property, and rendering unsafe the lives of single travellers.

Day after day reports reached the station of the intended submission or immediate capture of the leaders of the rebellion. According to these reports the Ranee of Lucknow had sent in messengers to sue for terms, making her own personal security the only required condition of surrender. At one time the Nana was said to be *about* to be captured in Oude; next day he would according to report be in Rohilcund—then far away in Central India—then again in Nepaul; yet, although his capture was ever described as inevitable and imminent, it has not even yet been effected; but it was of Tantia Topee, the ubiquitous, that reports were most interesting, and consequently most looked for.

It had often been remarked that throughout the rebellion scarcely a leader whose talents were above the merest mediocrity had appeared among the rebels. Most unquestionably, the two most talented and energetic of the leaders of the Sepoys were of the fair sex—the Lucknow Ranee, and the Ranee of Jhansi. Of the men, Tantia Topee was the only one who deserves the name of a leader. Had matters been different—had a Wallace, a Bruce, or a Tell appeared in the rebel ranks, it is extremely improbable that India would have remained in the possession of the English. Fortunately for us, therefore, this did not happen. The rebel commanders proved in the great majority of instances to be destitute of the talents necessary for carrying on the extensive operations in which they were engaged. This remark, however, is scarcely applicable to Tantia Topee, whose sudden and erratic movements were the constant cause of anxiety and utter confusion of our authorities.

A perfect will-o'-the-wisp was this Mahratta chief; at one time, if we might believe reports, so completely surrounded that his escape was utterly hopeless and impossible; the next day, supposed to be with his followers some fifty miles away; turning up in the most unexpected places, and devastating a track of country whose

*See his Novel "Will He Marry Her."

security was believed to have been insured by the presence of British troops.

For months subsequent to the time alluded to, Tantia Topee continued to puzzle and harass our authorities, and at last was taken, not in fair and open fight, but by means of treachery and bribery—by foul play, such as the Englishman loves to condemn in the people of other nations. The fate which awaited him calls forth so many sentiments, some of surprise, some of indignation, that it is impossible to dismiss his case without a few brief remarks.

At no time had Tantia Topee been accused of having been an accessory to the murders, the rapes, the mutilations, and other atrocities and indignities perpetrated upon our fellow countrymen by the rebels under other leaders. Unlike the execrable wretch, the traitor of Bithoor, who rewarded the British Government for its annual grant of £80,000 to the ex-Peishwah, his uncle, from 1818 till the time of his death, by the deeds that have rendered the very name of Cawnpore accursed; Tantia Topee is not stated to have indulged in wholesale massacre, neither to have celebrated the event with such debauchery as now sickens the heart to think of. Unlike the aged king of Delhi, who, rather than utter one syllable to save the honour and lives of fair British ladies, told the infuriated rabble to "take them away and do with them what you like," Tantia Topee had never been accused of insulting, maltreating, far less of giving over to cruel death any of our ladies who might have fallen into his hands during the terrible days of May and June, 1857. Unlike the Nawab of Furruckabad, he had stripped no Englishwoman naked, and then after unutterable indignities had them tied to the muzzle of a gun, and thus sent their quivering flesh in atoms over the plain; neither had he, like the Nawab of Bandah, or that especial pet of the Bengal Government, and an ex-commissioner of Patna, Narain Row, left Englishmen to perish at the hands of his followers; and yet, let us for a moment compare his fate with that of these men, the Nana alone excepted, he having not yet come in to claim the reward of murder and rebellion so liberally bestowed upon other and not more deserving objects than himself.

The hoary-headed villain of Delhi, is for his crimes *punished* by being permitted to live. Some of his nearest relations are permitted the privilege of remaining with him. He himself is amply provided with the means of personal comforts during the few months he in all probability will be allowed by nature to pollute the earth; while, greatest happiness of all to him, he is removed from scenes of turmoil and intrigue.

The Nawab of Furruckabad has obtained for his crimes a similar reward to that granted to the great Mogul.

The Nawab of Bandah, and Narain Row, are each *punished* with a pecuniary pension, a retinue of servants, and a residence in a most salubrious locality.

Tantia Topee has been hanged!

THE DEFENCES OF TURKEY.

NEITHER the Government nor people of England seem to be alive to the present position and prospects of Turkey, to preserve the integrity of which, as a portion of the European system, we so recently sacrificed an army and expended incalculable treasure. It is now too late to inquire whether that war might not have been averted, or what good object it achieved; but, certainly, it would appear to have but slightly retarded the fate of the "sick man." The world is convinced that the Emperor Napoleon did not engage in the struggle with the same motives as ourselves. A potentate who seeks military success to consolidate his dynasty, and wins the friendship of great powers at the sword's point, can have no settled policy, but must vary his programme with the course of events. Thus it is that the French Emperor has glided out of the armed league with England into a secret compact with Russia, and dropped from the bosom of Italy into the close embrace of Austria. We may apprehend that such a revolution has not been effected without an object. Austria, we are told, is about to make concessions to Russia, and two Emperors are to meet at Breslau, as two met before at Villafranca. What passes at these interviews none can unfold, but it bodes no good to other powers when monarchs keep such close counsel. We know, indeed, that where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together; and when we see three of these ravenous birds in such close fellowship, it is reasonable to conclude they will not spare their prey. Foreign influence is evidently fomenting the internal disorders of the Turkish empire; and now that Italy has furnished a precedent, they may ere long be made a pretext for foreign intervention. Perhaps the "concessions" of Austria include a Russian occupation of Constantinople, while the Principalities may afford compensation for Lombardy, and the friendship of France be rewarded with Egypt. At any rate, the time has arrived when, unless we are to give up all the slender fruits of the last war, England should see that Turkey is placed in a position to resist a sudden attack: for the blow, when the hour is ripe, will be as rapid as the march over Mount Cenis. From communications that have lately appeared in our pages, we know that a scheme for the defence of Turkey was, on the eve of the late war, drawn up by an English officer, Lieut.-General Macintosh, and approved by both the British and Turkish Governments. The plan, however, was only partially carried out by the construction of the works at Gallipoli, for the defence of the Dardanelles; and the line of the Balkan, and positions of the Checkmedjees, remain, we believe, without those defensive works which General Macintosh considered essential. It should be borne in mind that the gallant General did not aim at a mere temporary object. The scope of his plan clearly indicates that he designed to surround the Turkish capital with permanent barriers, in which the Sultan might, with comparatively little aid from England, meet the shock of an invasion with his own forces. This is the end we should

keep steadily in view. As England is the only power interested in the preservation of Turkey, we must not look for co-operation from any quarter, in the approaching crisis; and the British authorities while urging forward the social and political reforms which Turkey so much needs, should exert itself with the Sultan to have the plan of defence which has received the approval of both Governments effectively carried out.

That plan of defence is so much connected with the question of who was its original projector, that at the risk of being thought to re-open a subject which has been thoroughly disposed of, by the unanimous declaration of the professional press in favour of General Macintosh, we proceed, without pausing, to give place to what follows. We have already shown that on receiving General Macintosh's suggestions in July, 1853, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe lost no time, to use his own words, "in putting them in a way to be useful," and communicated them at once to the Turkish Government; for the new levies were then constantly passing Constantinople in crowded transports from Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor, to concentrate behind the right bank of the Danube; and the measures adopted so effectually by Omar Pacha, who soon took command of these troops, evidently had for their initiative these very suggestions. At the same time there can be little doubt that the Ambassador would, at such a crisis, convey the details he had received to the head of the foreign department at home; and we know that the military departments, and the future commander of our forces in Turkey and the Crimea, were put directly in possession of them.

It is well understood that General Macintosh's services at this moment would have been valued in Turkey by the Ambassador there, but war was not yet declared between that power and Russia, and being called to the command of the troops in Corfu, he could not then remain in the East. This also prevented his services from becoming available at the seat of active operations, when war was afterwards declared by England, although it has been stated that he repeatedly expressed at head quarters his wish to exchange the peaceable command of the Ionian Islands for one with the army. Leaving therefore Constantinople, where he chanced to be at the period alluded to, it is known, from what has appeared in our pages, that on reaching England General Macintosh repeated his suggestions to the heads of different departments of the Government, and it may be considered that the result of this was the dispatch of a military commission, which included Sir John Burgoyne, and the late Colonel Ardente, of the French Corps de Génie, to report more particularly upon the localities described by the gallant General, at the future seat of war. It was then, we believe, contemplated to send to the East only a small corps of some seven or eight thousand men of each of the allied nations, to give a certain degree of strength and confidence to the Turks.

The commission we have mentioned proceeded about the beginning of 1854 direct to the spots pointed out by General Macintosh as important and available for defence. They could not have done so more unhesitatingly and unerringly if they had carried a Guide-Book with them. It would seem that Murray himself could

not in treating of localities in general have put his readers in the way of finding out particular spots more exactly, or have enabled them to be more economical of their time—then more than usually precious to the commission—than the General had done. These officers disembarked accordingly at Gallipoli and marched straight to the narrowest part of the isthmus. The day is said to have been unpropitious, as might be expected at such a season on the shores of the storm-tossed Hellespont, and snow is even said to have been on the ground, but, like Leander, they were not to be deterred by the weather from carrying out their object, and after a hurried scrutiny (as we have been told in the columns of the *Times*) these able engineers re-embarked and steamed off for the Checkmedjees, carrying the defensive position of the Dardanelles in their pockets.

Those who have rode about in the vicinity of Constantinople in December and January know what a slough-encumbered neighbourhood it is at that season, and at the distance of from a dozen to twenty miles on the roads towards Adrianople it is still worse; and our reconnoitring commission had great merit in going, as we believe they did, thoroughly over the country, on the banks of the Karasoo, which empties itself into the large lake called the Checkmedjee, close to the sea of Marmora, where rests the left flank of the great position covering Constantinople, and which, if properly fortified, we venture to predict, may one day save that capital from Russian plunder.

The commission having given full time for the examination of this locality, must be supposed to have brought away with it the most accurate sketches of that neighbourhood, and considering the scientific knowledge of the officers who composed it, it is not too much to surmise, almost in a tone of certainty, that an extensive plan upon paper of defensive works, suited to the natural configuration of the ground, must have resulted from their scrutiny, and be now in existence. This then is the time to give their labours effect by the construction of such a bulwark there as the Turks have always shown themselves eminently calculated to defend, and where, there can be no doubt, that this brave but fanatical people would fight to desperation to prevent the "Muscovite Giaour" from driving the descendant of Othman from ground which would form his last footing in Europe, and which more than 400 years ago was the first conquered by his ancestor. The commission, we think, merely landed afterwards in Bulgaria, and took a hurried glance of that locality, and forthwith returned to England and France.

It must be borne in mind that General Macintosh's suggestions were made at a time when there was no expectation of the vast allied force proceeding to assist the Turks which afterwards went there. At most no one then anticipated the dispatch of more than the small auxiliary force to which we have referred as being at one time all that was in contemplation to send to Turkey, and if any delay was occasioned by what has been called the "pause at Gallipoli," when nearly the whole allied forces were employed for some months in fortifying the isthmus there, he is not responsible for it, nor for any

moral effect of a disadvantageous nature possibly produced on the enemy's mind by the apparently exaggerated respect for his strength and prowess, which so over-cautious a line of tactics may seem to have implied. It is, however, well to observe, whoever may have recommended their construction at that period, that the works which were then thrown up at Gallipoli, constitute an important feature in the defence of Turkey. The question of who first discovered and pointed out these important facts bearing on the defence of Turkey has already attracted some attention, and we think it fair to both parties impartially to allot to each of the two officers whose names have been most prominent in its discussion, what appears to us their due share of respective merit. From the documents to which we have given publicity, we think that there can be no hesitation in assigning to General Macintosh the original development of a plan of defence which resulted from long and laborious personal examination of the countries, the future necessity of defending which he even in the course of these investigations anticipated.

Sir John Burgoyne may from some circumstances which we cannot account for, not have been aware how much he was beholden to General Macintosh for information and suggestions which formed the basis of all his own proceedings, for he makes no allusion to him, and he may have received the suggestions from Government, without positively knowing with whom they originated. On the other hand, Sir John and his colleagues appear to have executed in a very able manner the professional duties which General Macintosh had recommended, should be without delay allotted to officers appertaining to that branch of the military service of which they are such distinguished members.

RUSSIAN OFFICIAL DESCRIPTION OF THE RIVER AMOOR.

The Russian Government, which till 1847 had limited its hydrographical researches to the seas of Okhotsk and Kamtschatka, commenced at that period to extend them to the south of the latter sea and to the mouth of the Amoor. Mr. Poplonski, captain in the navy, and Mr. Savin, lieutenant in the pilot corps, both belonging to the brig Okhotsk, have described the southern coast opposite Chantar, and Lieutenant Pilot Orloff, in the service of the Russo-American Company, pushed his researches in a baidare more to the east. The brig Grand Duke Constantine, of the Russo-American Company, commanded by Mr. Gavriloff, sub-lieutenant pilot, was the first to explore the northern part of the Gulf of Tartary. In 1849, Captain, now Rear-Admiral Newlski, surveyed the Liman (grand bay) and the mouth of the Amoor, on board the transport Baikal. During the following years the Liman of the Amoor was examined to the north and south, and a survey was made of the Chilka, and of the Amoor itself.

Finally, in 1851, the former of these two rivers was explored by Lieutenant-Captain Kazakewitsch (now Rear-Admiral) and Lieut. Popoff, of the Topographical Corps, undertook the first survey of the Amoor in the steamer Vostock, commanded by Lieutenant-Captain Kimski-Vorsakoff; they were the first Russians that sailed up that river.

The Amoor, the finest river which flows through the eastern part of Asia, had, in more remote times, attracted the attention of the conquerors of Siberia. It was the high road followed by that band of intrepid Cossacks, who accompanied Chataroff to the frontiers of Asiatic Russia, where their adventurous spirits hoped to discover the riches with which they had endowed the country of their predilection. It is to those energetic men who embarked with rare intrepidity on the sea of Okhotsk, that the first notions of the existence of Kamtschatka are due.

In 1854 Russia was obliged to undertake an expedition for the purpose of fortifying her colonies in the East. This expedition descended the Amoor under the orders of Adjutant-General Mouravieff, and arrived at its mouth in the middle of July. The result of this undertaking was the publication of the first chart of the Amoor, by Lieutenant Popoff. The rapidity with which the expedition took place, and the insufficient means placed at this officer's disposal, did not permit him to determine with exactitude the astronomical position of the most important points. But the information which he collected and classified with care, has been of great use in completing the chart of the above river.

In 1855, when Count Putiatine returned from Japan, the screw steamer Madeschda, of eight horse power, with a vessel which she towed, was placed at the disposition of the expedition, which then made its first voyage on the Amoor. The steamer took her departure from the port of Marunsk, on the 4th of July, 1855, and the expedition left her on the 4th of September, when 400 versts from Ust-Strelotschnaja, and by towing along the banks of the river reached that place on the 18th.

During this long voyage, some additions were made to Lieutenant Popoff's map, with the assistance of two of Dent's chronometers, a sextant, an artificial horizon, and two small compasses. The present map of the Amoor was made with these additions; a river, which, by its extent, length, and depth, the fertility of its islands, the number of its tributaries, and the width of its mouths, ranks among the largest rivers of the world.

The Amoor is fed at its birth by the junction (near Staniza, where the military post of Ust-Strelotschnaja is stationed) of two rapid rivers, the Chilka and the Argun, and flows at first through a mountainous and woody country. It then forces a passage at the base of the steep mountains which surround it, making numerous and irregular windings, during which it receives several streams from the mountains it traverses. The banks of the upper Amoor are wild and savage as far as the ruins of Albasin; vegetation is comparatively meagre, and pines, larch trees, willows, and ferns, are the only produce of the soil.

The rocks, which here compose the perpendicular banks, are covered with a slight coating of moss, as well during the cold of winter as the short but ardent heats of summer. Along the banks may be seen at times prairies and valleys, watered by rivulets abounding in fish, and which discharge into the Amoor such large quantities of water that in two or three days it rises 3m 6 (9ft. English). Islands, some of them isolated, and others in groups, are often met with. But the greatest numbers are chiefly situated along the jagged banks, and are only separated from them at high tide. The inundations of the river fertilize these islands and produce the vegetable food of the inhabitants.

The ruins of Albasin vary for a moment the unattractive aspect of the shores. Near the Albasin the mountains retire, and between them and the edge of the streams are some beautiful plains watered by the Emuri or Albasicha. The richness of the pastures, and the situation sheltered from the north winds, explain the choice of the old Cossacks in selecting that spot for the site of their principal settlement. It would have been difficult, in fact, to have hit upon a better site to found a town upon. It is placed on a commanding height, and protected from the cold winds, and whilst in its neighbourhood are plenty of woods and water, the river Albasicha abounds with fish, which are caught with a great deal of trouble in the Amoor, on account of its rapidity and depth. Opposite Albasin the islands increase in number, and form an archipelago similar to those often met in the middle of the river. This large number of scattered isles without order, give the Amoor a singular and picturesque aspect, but they are a hindrance to navigation. At this spot the mountains retreat and permit the banks to describe graceful curves; they then approach again, form cliffs overhanging the magnificent bed of the stream, again retire, gradually become lower, and lastly separate into isolated peaks. This alteration in the direction of the principal mountains becomes still more striking after passing the rock of Malaga Nadeschda (that is to say, from the point where the Amoor turns southward), and is apparent as far as the river Kamara, where the banks of the Amoor are still bordered on both sides by almost uninterrupted chains of mountains. At the spot where the mountains separate an equally remarkable change occurs in the appearance of the country; with the pines and larch trees other evergreens are seen covered with leaves, amongst which the birch tree is the most common. These trees no longer form impenetrable groves; they are stunted in growth, and so little cared for by the wandering tribes, that at every verst may be seen dozens of them despoiled of their evergreen foliage. On the other side of the rock Malaga Nadeschda, between the rivers Albasicha and Kamara, some less considerable mountains and hillocks are perceived, the most important of which are the peninsulas Kazakawitch and Korsakoff. The rock Malaga Nadeschda is situated below a sandbank, where at low tide there is 0m 9 (3 in. English) water, and its round form similar to a bastion, projects far into the river.

It was chosen on this account to shelter the steamer Nadeschda,

whilst the expedition ascended the Amoor, and the name of Malaga Nadeschda (Feeble Hope) was given to it.

The mountain of Lagajan is a continuation of the steep cliffs which form a crescent round one of the bends of the river. These cliffs are about 75 metres (82 yards English) high, and about half way up them there is a crevice with some craters, from which may be seen issuing a blackish smoke. The Manchou, who, in those places prepare timber and planks, assured us that these rocks continually emit smoke, sometimes in large volumes.

The Cape Kazakawitch at 52° 1′ N., and that of Korsakoff, 8 miles to the south of the former, are nearly of the same height, about 90 metres (98 yards English). Both are formed of masses of a reddish sort of brown free-stone, with a very rugged surface. The first of these two capes is rendered remarkable by a rock situated on the S.W. side, separated from the mountain which forms the cape; it has the form of a helmeted colossus, sitting on one of the ridges of the cliffs, and inclining towards the mainland. The second cape is remarkable on account of the regularity of the half-circular cliffs which form the shore of the river, and are separated from each other by the deep fissures. That side of the cape displays a perfectly rounded surface, covered with magnificent plants. On account of the slightness of the curvature, a depôt for alluvium has consolidated itself, and is now thickly covered with heath and sallow trees.

From Cape Korsakoff to the mouth of the River Kamara, the Amoor makes a rather considerable bend, whilst the mountains run principally along its right bank. On the left bank they approach the river at the Cape of Bibikoff.

The River Kamara occupies one of the most important positions in the geography of the Amoor. During the winter, the wandering tribes unite on its banks; there also are found the most northern military posts of the Manchous, established to watch the tribes conquered by the Chinese.

The River Kamara takes its source in the same mountain which gives birth to the Rivers Girel and Gan; the first flows on the same side as the Kamara, and discharges itself into the Argun at Songari. The Gan rises on the opposite side, turns to the N.W., and throws itself into the Argun at Zurachaife. The Kamara is of considerable length; at one time it traverses mountains, at another, plains; and according to the testimony of the Manegrian tribes, which wander about these places, it can be ascended under sail for ten days (which is equivalent to about 250 versts), from its mouth, with a depth of 1m. 8 (3 feet English). The surrounding parts of the river abound in deer, wild goats, sables, squirrels, &c., which attract to its banks numbers of Manegrians, who pitch their tents in groups of twos or threes, along its most navigable parts.

When we again speak of the River Amoor, we shall have occasion to speak of the Kamara. We shall now describe the banks of the Amoor. Cape Bibikoff is the first object to be seen in that place; it resembles the Capes Kazakawitch and Korsakoff, but is more detached from the bank, being surrounded by plains. It forms a perpendicular wall, sixty metres (65½ yards Eng.) high, running behind

a narrow strip of alluvium, and descends by degrees as it approaches the river, then gradually rising again, forms a curious continuation of arid hills, connected with a low chain of mountains on the left bank of the river. On the right bank of the Amoor, the mountains commence near a stream to the south of the military post, and extend further than the Manchou village Dagige (written Dagigo on the chart), losing themselves in the plains of Aiguntian.

In the part of the Amoor which has been surveyed, between the Rivers Kamara and Sija, the islands are isolated, as in the upper Amoor; but in the vicinity of the Manchou Station, Uluss-Samodou, the river makes two considerable convex curves, so that the little peninsula which separates them is only three-quarters of a verst broad at one part. Vegetation here is the same, excepting that the pines are of more vigorous growth. At 50° 26′ N., we found on some banks of alluvium, and in the islands on the right of the river, pieces of coal, but of an inferior quality. This discovery is nevertheless important, because there are reasons to suppose that depôts of minerals exist further up the river. With the exception of some boats (made with the bark of the birch tree), and the two military posts of Kamarusk and Uluss-Samodo, nothing but a few scattered log-houses were to be seen between the Kamara and the village of Dagige. At the time of our expedition, these huts were uninhabited; they are most probably used by the semi-nomade tribes, which hunt and fish in those regions during summer.

The mountainous country ends at the River Sija; after it begin the plains bordering the two banks of the Amoor. On the right they are slightly interrupted by some isolated mountains, and on the left as far as the eye can reach, they are quite level with a few trees on the river shores, behind which are the villages of the Manchous. Wood is not found in all this wide space; and although the population is comparatively great, the herds of cattle immense, and the fields cultivated, one cannot but regret the country he has just left, where at every step was met a rock or valley, through which flowed some murmuring stream. The Manchou villages commence at the River Sija; they extend over the whole of the left bank, and at a short distance from the town of Aigunt, are on the right bank. On the map, Aigunt is sometimes called Sachalin-ula-Choton.

The reader may suppose that Aigunt is not composed of streets lined with mansions. It has none of the attributes of a European town, being a small place surrounded by palisades, with a citadel and some houses built of clay, which are, however, regularly placed. To the north of the town and south of the river, some long sheds are seen, and it is in their neighbourhood that vessels anchor, after being towed along the bank. Probably this place is the port and winter quarters of almost the whole Chinese flotilla of the Amoor. This force is composed, according to our calculations, of twelve large one-masted vessels, perfectly adapted for this kind of navigation, of which we met six whilst sailing to Kilo or Marunsk. Eight vessels of the fleet had no masts, and seventeen which had been condemned were stranded.

There are also villages below Aigunt, but at fifty versts further

they become scarce, and disappear entirely at the point where the river takes an easterly direction, off which there is another cluster of islands. This archipelago, which is a real labyrinth, begins at the turning of the river, and occupies a space of nearly 200 versts (132 miles English). The banks are generally low, and on them are perceived some insignificant hillocks, covered with pines, oaks, and young elms; they are often met with in large numbers, on some of the loftiest islands, and sometimes of considerable thickness, furnishing excellent material for ship-building.

In approaching the river Bourija, the hills become more frequent; it discharges itself into the Amoor, by the left bank, through two mouths in 49° 23′ lat. N., and 6h 22′ 24″ long. E., and seems to be little frequented by the inhabitants living on the latter river; at least we were unable to gather any information concerning it from the Daurians and Manchous we met. Situated half-way up the river Amoor, the length of which is 1,500 miles, and in one of the best localities, the River Bourija ought particularly to attract attention, for it is just the spot to found a colony in, and most probably the first town built will be placed near its two principal mouths.

From the river Bourija to Cape Sverbiegeff, where the Amoor flows rapidly over a rocky bed, the banks become loftier, and the trees disappear. On all sides are to be seen—at a less or greater distance—mountains, the smaller ones sometimes touching the shore, and forming sandy declivities. The highest are covered with a rich vegetation, and offer such advantages for cultivation, that even the Dauriens, whose principal occupation is the chase, have established small farmhouses on them.

At Cape Sverbiegeff, a high dark coloured hill, projecting into the river, the Amoor suddenly turns to the south, and flows for about 200 versts in that direction through a valley, formed by a chain of elevated mountains not far off. Above the river Oou, which runs through the right bank of the Amoor, the latter by its serpentine course forms here and there small plains; but after passing the Manchou port, which is near the river Oou, the Amoor is enclosed between two overhanging stone walls, apparently surrounding it on all sides. It is evidently on account of the rapidity of the current, which sometimes attains a velocity of five knots, and the ruggedness of its banks, that the river is uninhabited at this part. Everything, however, indicates that the soil is good; fine black and white birch trees, oaks, and young elms, cover all the accessible ledges; and firs, larch trees, and pines, are also common.

Notwithstanding the rapidity of the Amoor in the part just described, and the constant dashing of its waters against the rocky banks, it does not carry any earth; and only two small islands, here invariably broad and long, are visible at the end of the rapids. They differ greatly from each other, and lie on opposite sides of the river, across which at this part, there is an invariable depth of 7m. 8 (4 fathoms English). The island on the right is one-sixth of a mile long; narrow, high, and covered with a thick foliage of birches, oaks, and elms. The leaves of these trees shelter the soil from the burning rays of the sun, and it is in consequence covered with long

grass sometimes the height of a man, in the midst of which twine the stems of the wild vine. The grapes, which were already very large on the arrival of the Nadeschda, fixed the attention of the travellers, and gave them an idea of the richness of the vegetation which was to be found in the plains. The second island is as sterile as its companion is fertile; it is scarcely larger, more elevated, and very jagged in its contour. Here the sides of the river, resembling red brick walls, sadden the eye with their uniform and undecided colour; and the thickets and trees, picturesquely grouped on the brink of the rocky ledges, may be seen scattered in confusion.

The nature of the two banks of the river is the same as that of the two islands. On the right, the soil is low and covered with a rich vegetation; on the left, it is elevated, of sombre aspect, and altogether wild; but some miles further to the south this contrast disappears; the woods of the one gradually disappear, and are replaced by a fertile but monotonous plain, whilst the rocks vanish on the other bank, which becomes flat and bare like the first.

After this change in the appearance of those two shores, the Amoor continues to flow to the south for some distance; it then turns suddenly to the east, where an endless archipelago begins. This vast group of isles reaches as far as the river Sougari, within a short distance of the island Sanof-Kirile. The islands comprised between the upper extremity of the archipelago and the Sougari do not obstruct navigation, because they are grouped now on one side of the river, then on the other, without being too close, always leaving a sufficient space between them and the opposite bank. The elm is the only tree which grows on these islands; and it is also seen along the most verdant parts of the river. The country is quite a desert, and the excellent herbs with which it abounds are left to perish. It is only at the mouth of the Sougari that three or four small huts, surrounded by palisades made of hurdles, are seen; they serve as lodgings for the commander of the Manchou military post, which is on the lower Amoor, and known to the timid inhabitants of the lower country by the name of Dschang-Dschu.

The river Sougari flows into the Amoor at the point where it turns to the north east. It is difficult to discover the junction of those two important streams, because the Sougari makes a circuit of several miles on leaving its source, which is hidden by several low islands on the left bank of the river. The Sougari is formed by two rivers, Giren and Naun, which meet in the vicinity of the town of Giren-Chotun. The first takes its source, as we have already said, in the same chain of mountains as the Kamara and the Gan. The last comes from the interior of the Manchou territory. The Manegrians we met with, assured us that the valley of the Sougari was the most populous of all the countries bathed by the Amoor, on account of the great fertility of its banks, the easy communication permitted by its feeble current, almost always at high tide, and without impeding rocks.

Besides a number of insignificant villages on the shores of the Sougari, there are several towns built near that river and the Naun, in the following order, reckoning from its embouchure: Itschai,

Altschuka, Kolon, Tschitschigar, and Mangar. At the junction of the Giren and Mann is Giren-Chotun, where almost all the vessels which trade on the Amoor are constructed, and which, like Tschitschigar and Mangar, is three times larger than Aigunt. The Manchous and Manegrians (a nomade tribe subject to the Chinese, and which has the right to trade beyond the limits of its pasture grounds), go to Itschai in eight days and load their boats, with which they ascend against the current by towing and punting. The voyage to Tschitschigar always takes a month at least. The distance from Sougari to the mouth of the Giren is about 1,000 versts (661 miles English). Three or four days are required to go direct from Aigunt to Tschitschigar.

The low rocks and litle islands above the embouchure of the Sougari extend further down, but it is observed that these latter are being gradually carried away by the Amoor, the waters of which become very muddy. Cape Gradin, an off-shoot of the chain of mountains seen to the south, approaches the banks of the Amoor, and retiring leaves between it and the river an immense plain watered by several streams. It is above all, at two days' distance up the river Chorolog (Chorolak in the map) that the absence of mountains and a multitude of islands are remarked. This river debouches on the right bank of the Amoor, almost in the centre of a complete labyrinth of islands, and during the summer months numbers of Manchous frequent its borders to fish. The net buoys are sometimes an obstacle to navigation, and on each island may be seen numerous "jurtres" (boats of a conical form made of birch).

It is evident, however, that the large quantity of fish caught in the Sougari, as well as in the Ussuri, does not suffice to attract the Manchous to its shores; for in the entire space comprised between these rivers, scarcely an establishment was visible. The few miserable huts to be met with, are not even built within the shade of the islands, but on the advanced points of the shore. The Ussuri forms the limits of this desert and uninhabited country, discharging itself into the Amoor, through the right bank of that river, a little to the north of the spot, where it makes a considerable detour, and separates the vast plains from a lofty and abruptly rising country, which although leaving the islands a large space, and the branches of the river an extensive bed to flow through, never cease to dispute the ground with them, the mountains sometimes coming down to the very shores of the stream. Encampments of Goldiens are often met with in this region; first of all two or three habitations present themselves grouped together, and then in clusters, by dozens. The natives are gentle and very useful to travellers on account of their perfect knowledge of the river and its mouths. With the aid of their pilots the "Nadeschda" was able to continue her route, night and day, during forty-eight hours, between the Ussuri and the village of Sawaga, by threading difficult branches of the stream only 128 to 60 yards broad, and sometimes less. The different villages supplied the steamer with wood, which was difficult to procure, the only trees growing on the shores of the river being willows, and, therefore, not adapted for fuel.

first generally extends from the furthest point of the island to the nearest one on the bank, and the latter in the centre of the stream, with a great depth of water on each side of it. Shores of sand and shingle are met with more frequently down the river Burja, between the Eparses isles, of which they are sometimes a continuation, or, if not, they compose the lowest points stretching into the water. It is difficult to determine their forms and limits, on account of frequent changes in the depth of the water, and their own instability. It is to be remarked, that in general between the shallows of the river and its muddy bottom there are no sand banks or shingle; but between the perpendicular shores these banks become hard, and pointed rocks are sometimes seen. The two principal rapids of the river are found near the Malaga Nadeschda; one has three feet, and the other three inches of elevation. After passing over them, care must be taken not to run upon the shallows which surround them, because it is very difficult to get afloat again after doing so.

Besides the money of the country, which is composed of small bits of silver, the traveller on the Amoor should furnish himself with pieces of "daba," a woollen stuff of inferior quality, common Russian tobacco, which the population of the river prefer on account of its inebriating effects, Chinese and even American tobacco, gunpowder, lead, articles of glass, and metal copper plated, amber, and some black and blue rugs. The tribes living towards the centre of the Amoor know the value of money, and of the stuffs which they make use of in bartering with the Manchous.

The population of the Amoor unequally distributed along its immense course, may be divided into ten fixed, semi-fixed, and wandering tribes. The fixed tribes are the Manchous, the Nechaniens, and Dauriens; these last, however, only live near the Amoor, in little solitary huts, which serve them as places of repose when hunting in the neighbouring mountains. In the towns and villages near the Sougari, the number of Dauriens and Nechaniens is almost equal to that of the Manchous, who constitute the military force of the country, and are doubtless paid with the taxes which they levy on the other tribes. These three tribes differ but little from each other in exterior. The men are of middling height; they have round faces with flat brows, and skins of the hue of dark bronze, and hair of a sombre brown (dunkel blonde) dressed in a tail. The lower orders never cut their hair, which, piled on the head in a coarse and entangled mass, resembles a truss of hay. Their dress consists of the Chinese blouse, very broad cotton breeches, turned up and tied near the knee with a string, and peaked Chinese shoes, or a sort of sandal of leather without form. Besides the blouse, they wear a sort of caften, made of the skins of wild animals or of fish, confined round the waist by a leather belt, in which is stuck a little knife, a copper pipe case, a box of matches, and a tobacco pouch, the *vade mecum* of all orientals.

The hardy Manega-Selgenii, who had visited all parts of the Amoor, and whom we met at a later period, had not a good opinion of the Dauriens; nevertheless, to judge by our own experience, they merit at least a preference over the Manchous. The isolated habita-

tions of the Dauriens are scattered between the rapid part of the Amoor above the Sougari, and the town of Aigunt, and are not to be met with either above or below the neighbourhood of the borders of the river.

The Manchous, masters of the rich plains situated towards the centre of the Amoor, occupy about 100 miles of country below Sija. Their solitary habitations are built along the two fertile shores of this stream, and are hid by little sand hills, and the few trees, which are only to be found in that vicinity. On the right bank of the Amoor, within the hamlets, in the interior of the country and gentle declivities, well-cultivated fields are to be seen, and to judge from the comfortable appearance of the houses, nature richly remunerates the cultivator for his toil. The scarcity of wood in the neighbourhood of dwellings of the Manchous, compels them to undertake expeditions into the dense forests of the Upper Amoor above the Sija, and in the vicinity of the Kamara, and the material thus acquired is floated down to the villages and to Aigunt, without any interference on the part of the inhabitants of the Russian posts.

One of the principal occupations of the Manchous, besides agriculture and collecting wood, is fishing in the labyrinth of islands near the river Chorolog; but the inhabitants of Aigunt and the adjacent villages cannot do so, the rapids being a grand obstacle to all communication by water. The Manchous and Nekaniens of the Sougari meet in their fishing excursions at the mouth of the Chorolog. The Dauriens do not participate in this traffic; they are expert hunters, and prefer chasing the *isubr*, a species of elk, but smaller, in the horns of which is found a marrow, much esteemed as a remedy by the Chinese.

Although the settlements of the Manchous are of small importance, these people are distributed over all the space comprised between the Kamara and the Chorolog, and even lower down almost to the mouth of the Amoor. The reason why this race of traders is thus scattered and timid, may be partly traced to their piscatory occupation, and desire to barter with their neighbours, as well as to the establishment of military posts to watch the tribes tributary to the Manchous. The principal posts are near the mouths of the rivers Sougari, Kamara, and Ussuri. The less important ones merely stationed for the purpose of facilitating the communications are placed half way between the former. Each post is composed of twenty or twenty-five Manchou soldiers, under the command of one or two "boschkos," or corporals, and their principal duty is the collection of the taxes. The uniform tribute paid by each tribe under the Chinese dominion, is a "sable" per man from the age of sixteen to sixty years; it is paid twice a year, in March and October, periods at which the tribes meet and disperse again. The Manegrians, Kaplarians, and Balariens, or Goldiens, who cannot pay the tribute in kind, go to Aigunt or to Sougari, where by trafficking they gain enough to liquidate the liability, but they are often robbed by the Russian merchants. The domination of the Manchous over the tribes of the lower Amoor is very oppressive. They are even forbidden, under pain of death, to ascend the river higher than the

Sougari, a measure which seems to have been especially taken for the benefit of the Manchou traders.

The Goldiens, the Manguntriens, the Samagirens, and the Gilkakians, may be classed among the fixed tribes, but as they scarcely cultivate the soil, and frequently leave their habitations during winter, we will place them among the semi-fixed ones. As the habits and customs of these people are nearly similar, we have not sufficient data to establish their limits in a positive manner; and shall, therefore, confine ourselves to giving a simple sketch of their mode of life. They occupy all the length of the Amoor above Ussuri, and the Gilkakians may even be found on the sea coast to the north and south of the embouchure of the Amoor, and on the island of Saghalien. They live separate from other tribes, who are more or less mixed. The Goldiens are the most numerous; the Samagiriens are almost all settled near the river Goryn; the Manguntriens, between the Goldes and the Gilkakians; they live principally by fishing. Their winter quarters in the villages are low square buildings with wooden benches round the four walls, in the centre of which is placed the stove upon a mud floor. All the members of a family, from the grandfather to the granddaughters, live in one house, and number sometimes thirty to forty individuals of both sexes. Round the houses and over the benches, are places for drying fish and keeping the nets.

At some distance from the river, in the interior, cages containing bears are to be seen. These tribes, the Gilkakians in particular, have a great veneration for the bear—every village has one; he occupies the first place in their religious ceremonies, which always terminate in a tragic manner for him, as he is killed and roasted for the concluding festive banquet. The higher we ascended the Amoor the more rare became this ancient custom. Each village possesses a number of fishing boats, they are composed of three planks turned up at the extremities, one serves for the bottom, the other two compose the sides, and are attached to the former by bands of wood. Their size varies from ten to two oars. Little boats made of birch bark are used for short trips called "omorosstches."

In winter, goods and merchandise are transported in light sledges, drawn by dogs. This mode of travelling is very useful to the Russians when they explore the country. It may be said that with the exception of the rude Gilkakians, who live upon the Island of Saghalien, all the other tribes, even the Gilkakians of the river, have contributed to furnish the Russian establishments situated among them, with all they required. The wandering tribes which frequent the Upper Amoor, are the Oratchiens, the Manegrians, the Gantriens (Singul-Ganet), and the Kapliariens. The Oratchiens, a branch of the Tongouses, under the protection of Russia, live in the Russian districts on the borders of China, and occupy themselves in hunting and fishing during winter. The Manegrians are the most numerous among the wandering tribes subject to China. They live in the vicinity of the Kamara and its valley, fishing and hunting, and are divided into obedient clans, under particular chiefs, from whence soldiers are drawn and sent to Sougari.

During the last troubles in the Celestial Empire, a militia was raised in the countries of the Amoor, and the Manegrians furnished 1,000 men. The other tribes mentioned above belong to the Tongous race. They live on the left bank of the river, and appear to take their names from the streams on which they reside. The Beliariens live on the left, and the Kapliariens and Gantriens on the right bank of the Amoor. All these tribes pay a tribute in "sable" to the Chinese, but are so poor, that for weeks together they often live upon the dried fruit of the lolies (Alinier), and go half naked, notwithstanding the rigour of the climate.

In the present day, half of the Manchous are living as serfs in the Russian possessions. These last have constructed two fortresses; that of Strelotschnaza at the confluence of the Chilka and Argun, which by their union form the Amoor; and another at the mouths of the river at Nikolajewsk. Cossack posts have been established along the borders of the river, and a military road to connect them has been commenced.

In 1856, the American ship Europa landed at Nikolajewsk, the engines and hulls of two little steamers, destined to navigate the Upper Amoor. The largest, called the "Amoor," is of seventy horse power, and the other, "Lena," of thirty-five. The latter only draws three feet of water, which enables her to ascend the river as far as Strelotschnaïa.

Two steamers were also built at the same time in the Chilka, at the Government factory of Nertchinsk.

The "Lena" made her first trial voyage in 1857, carrying passengers and merchandise from Nicolajewsk to Strelotschnaïa in thirty days, with the certainty of reducing the voyage to twenty in the next trip. The "Amoor" could not at first pass the confluence of the Seka, on account of its shallownesss; but the melting of the snows soon swelled the stream, and enabled her to continue the voyage.

In 1857, ships from Hong-Kong, San Francisco, and Hamburg arrived at Nikolajewsk, with cargoes valued at two millions, as well as a large number of Japanese vessels. All the merchandise there immediately became three times as cheap as at Irkourk, and the importers proceeding onwards into Eastern Siberia, on board the "Amoor," the "Lena" realized great profits. On their return, the steamers brought back rich cargoes, so that the elements of a regular and lucrative trade were at once acquired.

THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF BALAKLAVA.

I LANDED in the Crimea on the 16th of April, 1855, six months after the battle of Balaklava; yet the appearance at this time of that field would have led anyone to imagine at first sight, that as many weeks, I might even say days, had not elapsed since

the combat. The skeletons of horses still lay all around, as they fell, in their harness. Not far from these was the body of one of our dragoons, the 1st Royals, I think, and in advance of that lay the remains of a Rusaian soldier; both of these last, I suspect, must have been overlooked when the dead were buried. The Russian vidette (a Cossack) at this time, was posted on Canrobert's hill, close to our lines, in fact, overlooking the harbour. Our own solitary vidette was posted on an eminence to our left, commanding a view of the plain behind the enemy's outpost.

This state of affairs will not be surprising when it is known that the English force of cavalry did not exceed twenty-five or from that to thirty file. This was all that the Balaklava charge and the severe winter had left of the heavy and light brigades, all that remained of nine regiments, viz.:—First Royal Dragoons, Second, or Scots Greys, Fourth Royal Irish Dragoons, Fifth Dragoon Guards, Sixth Enniskillen Dragoons, Eighth and Eleventh Hussars, Thirteenth Light Dragoons, and Seventeenth Lancers. The men were not scarce, but horses; as an instance, the Hussars could only mount four men; they had certainly seven horses, but three were sick.

Consequently, when we landed in the Crimea, numbering over seven hundred sabres, we did not get there before we were absolutely wanted. Other regiments and drafts soon followed, and by the month of June, we had a force of cavalry numbering over ten thousand.

The first and unsuccessful assault, the affair of Tchourgoum, the battle of the Tchernaya, and the last assault and fall of Sebastopol, followed rapidly in succession, and the twenty-fifth of October was again drawing near. The anniversary of this disastrous charge, disastrous as to the results, but adding fresh glory to that name the British cavalry had already earned for obstinate and determined courage.

It was the morning of the 25th, and as I looked from the entrance of my tent, I could not prevent my thoughts from reverting to that eventful day, twelvemonths back; for before me lay (to so many) the valley of death. And as I gazed and gazed on, my imagination re-peopled the valley with the actors in the tragic strife. In fancy I saw the cavalry standing at their pickets; to their front were the four redoubts occupied by the Turks, laying lazily smoking around the guns; all seemed so quiet—too quiet—it was only the lull before the storm, which speedily burst. Dark masses can be seen suddenly debouching from my right, but far in front, who, covered by a cloud of skirmishers and the fire of artillery, advance upon the first redoubt, the defenders of which, after a feeble and short defence, desert their guns and fly. The garrisons of the three remaining redoubts scarcely fire a shot, but panic-struck, run for their lives, save a solitary English artilleryman in each of the redoubts; these preferring their duty to their lives, remain and spike the guns.

But onward still come the Russians, with an overwhelming force of all arms; artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The fire of artillery waxes loud and fierce; the roll of the musketry draws nearer, and

becomes more dangerous; and then from among them dashes forward their cavalry at speed, able apparently to annihilate all that may come before them. To my right are the 93rd Highlanders on the crest of a hill, formed in line, with a few invalids behind them as a support. On their flanks are the runaway Turks. To my left our cavalry is formed up, awaiting the Russian horse, who are advancing. Presently the trumpet sounds the charge, and onward go the heavies, 'gainst terrible odds. The Greys and Enniskillens are in front, "Scotland and Ireland" (they charged together last at Waterloo), covered by the Fifth Green Horse, and having the Fourth Royal Irish on the flank. They meet, but the smoke hides all from view, and the fate of our dragoons is uncertain for a few minutes, but an English cheer is heard above all, which sends a thrill through the heart. The combat has been short and sharp, but decisive; the enemy retire, beaten back behind their guns. While this has been going on, the infantry have not been idle; for a party of about four hundred horse had detached themselves from the enemy's column, and charged up the hill on what seemed the doomed ninety-third, who were in line; not a move was in their ranks, not an attempt made to form square.* Calm, cool, and determined they stand, and when the advancing foe came within range, fire in a destructive volley, which shook the squadron to the centre. But they yet advance, and as nearer they come, anxiety is felt by all for the brave Sir Colin and his men; but again, when but thirty yards apart, the glittering barrels are seen to drop to the present, and a steady stream of withering fire proceeds from right to left of that small band. The work is done; backward they go; yet again try to turn the tide, they wheel, and attempt to turn the right flank (the Turks ran again at the commencement), but are forestalled by Capt. Ross, who, wheeling his grenadiers, gives them a volley which drives them back in confusion.

The enemy, now beaten at every point of his attack, is preparing to return. Now is the time for a charge of the light brigade, who have not as yet been engaged; and in the confusion there will be an opportunity of retaking the guns lost by the Turks. This is all observed by a staff-officer,† who points it out to the Generals; but they cannot see the advantage; time, valuable time is now lost, riding from one to another, and considering the matter; they delay and hesitate for minutes which seem hours. At last the word "Forward" is given, but it is too late—too late; the favourable moment has passed from them; the enemy's confusion is over, and his formation is recovered, and as the light brigade gallops along, it can be seen that they are sweeping to destruction. Cannon open on them in front and on both flanks, but they waver not, halt not; the word is still "*Forward*," and driving through the battery, cut the gunners down at their guns. But behind are the enemy's supports of cavalry and infantry. What chance has the surviving few, with their horses blown, against numbers with

* Sir Colin, on being remonstrated with for giving such an opportunity, said, "I would not even form them four deep."

† Capt. Nolan.

fresh horses and men? None at all! these bold hearts can do no more to retrieve the day; all that are left must fight their way through again. So back they come, scarce fifty out of six hundred.

My dream was nearly over, but I could see where lay the fault; it was delay. No mis-conception, as has been said, only delay. And even when it could be plainly seen that the move was a bad one, why was not that movement supported by all the available force they had? for in military affairs everything depends on decision and promptitude.

My reverie was here brought to a close by a hearty shout of my name. On turning round, I found it was Jack Blythe, of the ——th brigade commissariat. He was quite blown by his walk up hill, but on recovering his wind, he said that a few of the survivors of the eventful charge were going to give a supper to the remainder, and a few particular friends besides, that evening, and he had brought me an invitation—I having the honour of being one of the latter.

Thanking him, of course, for the compliment, in being one of the chosen, I still could not help saying to him, by what in the name of all that was great and wonderful, had he to do with the charge of Balaklava; adding that he was only at that time, and now, an issuer of the good things of this life, and not one of those whose calling made them dealers around of death and destruction.

"Softly, softly," was his reply, "you forget where the cavalry were picketed at that time, and so I must remind you that it was in the valley — in the very centre — and the Commissariat rather in advance of them; not the most enviable situation that day, for the shot and shell pitched among us, and over and through our casks and stores, just anyhow. Affairs got so warm at last, that we were obliged to levant, with scarcely half the stores, considering as discretion was the better part of valour, that it was more advisable to move off with half, than stay and lose all, lives included perhaps. And deuced glad was I to get clear with a whole skin. And between you and I and the gatepost, I am as much entitled to my Balaklava clasp, as some who wear it for being at Scutari at the time; or some of the staff serjeants, who get medals for distinguished conduct in the field, and never saw a shot fired, or drew a sword in action."

"Well, well," I rejoined, "I've no doubt you went through all you state, and probably a deal more, if your extreme modesty would only allow you to relate it; but I feel rather diffident in sitting down among so many warriors—I who, as the Indians would say, have never as yet taken a scalp. May I not run the chance of a roasting for my presumption?"

"Ne'er fash your thum," says he, "there will be none there who will take such a liberty with a friend of the givers of the feast; and we ask no one's permission who we will invite. Are you satisfied?"

"Perfectly," was my reply; "and as I am more than anxious to come, weaker reasons would have been sufficient. But you did not mention the time you heroes meet."

"At seven o'clock to-night, precisely; but I can stay here no

longer; for although you are not the first I have called on this morning, there is still a score or better to see yet. So do not be late; for if all come that are invited, there will not be much room to spare. Good morning."

When the commissariat was organized afresh, and sent to the seat of war, a staff of clerks was appointed by Government at a salary of 10s. 6d. per diem, for the purpose of doing the extra writing and correspondence required in the department. Those men were chiefly taken from the constabulary of the three kingdoms, the greater part being from the sister isle. They had evidently been selected without reference as to their capabilities or fitness for the berths to which they were about to be appointed. All was done, I believe, through interest, and what was the consequence? It was this—that when the army landed at Varna, and proceeded to Devna and Sina-Barar, it was then, and only then, discovered, that not one in six (and I am speaking within bounds) were fit for their situation. Doubtless they could all read and write, but a great deal more than this was required.

Clerks were wanted, who, acquainted with the routine of public office business, would be able to write as well as answer letters, make out returns both of and for supplies, &c; and these men—clever constables enough, I dare say—were now found to be utterly incapable of doing what they were intended for.

In this strait, the authorities naturally fell back on the ranks of the army, and there easily found the material they required. Serjeants, corporals, and privates were now engaged, and paid 2s. extra daily, to do the duty of the ten shillings and sixpenny men; for all that the latter did was to go from the stores to Varna or Balaklava, and give in the requisitions for what might be required. All the writing and correspondence was done by the former. To this class pertained Jack Blythe, Tom O——, and Mc——, who all belonged to different regiments. They joined the commissariat at Varna, and did duty there until the peace; they, of course, then rejoined their regiments. I do not intend to cast any reflections on any of those commissariat clerks individually; I only wish the neglect of Government to be brought to notice, for not seeing that qualified persons were selected. With respect to the men themselves, they were as jolly a set of fellows as ever I would wish to meet.

I'll return to my tale, and may mention, in continuation, that there was very little necessity for the last reminder of Blythe's; as the company I should meet would be inducement alone of itself, without taking into consideration the opportunity of having a good supper—an affair about as scarce in the Crimea as can be well imagined, and safe of itself "to draw a good house;" likewise bearing in mind where this was to be held—the *commissariat*, the headquarters of all things eatable and drinkable—the place where plenty always reigns. When one pondered on all this, it must have been the gout in its worst form, a broken leg, or the certainty of meeting the man there who had run away with your wife, that would have kept any one away.

As none of these accidents, luckily, had befallen me, I was there

at the time appointed, and was then introduced to about forty of all ranks and regiments, from the private to the serjeant-major—from the 1st Royals to the 17th Lancers. All had met here on an equality, when all military distinctions were waived or laid aside; the greeting being from Tom to Jack, from Harry to Bill—all had come with the purpose of being themselves happy, and doing all in their power to make others so.

A hut, where the stores had been cleared out for the occasion, was ready for our reception, and, as far as time and circumstances would allow, had undergone a rude kind of furnishing. Tables and forms had been erected on a rough principle certainly; but, then, consider we were on a campaign, and in such a case empty barrels for table legs are not a bad substitute, and deal beams for tops were thought to be first-rate. For a table cloth, some large bran sacks had been ripped, washed, and stitched together lengthways, making a cloth not to be despised. The forms were made in the same primitive manner, having candle-boxes for legs instead of barrels. The lighting part was got up in a superior style—in fact, the place was illuminated. From every beam was suspended ten or a dozen candles fixed in large round wooden sockets, grand to see; but the chandelier *par excellence* was in the centre; it had formed part of the plunder of Sebastopol, having been purchased of a rollicking Zouave, who, not finding a purchaser nearer, had brought it from the town nearly to Kadakoi, when Jack Blythe, with an eye to what was coming off, had bought it and a teapot for ten francs and a drop of grog.

By very little after seven all were assembled; and, first having a jorum of grog each, as a stomach settler and tonic, we sat down between fifty and sixty in number to supper, all of whom, with the exception of myself and a few others, had formed part of the six hundred. And I was informed now that what with those who were invalided, and others who had fallen victims to the severe winter, this small band comprised nearly all the survivors in the Crimea.

Yet, all here had distinguished themselves in one way or other, and in a manner which, although not probably known to the powers that be, or mentioned in official despatches, was well known—patent, if I may use the word, to all those here assembled; for, like the truly brave, they were the last to speak of what they themselves had done. And what I learnt was always from the mouths of others, who, when relating what had been done, would jealously keep their own light from shining—for never did they mention themselves. And thus numbers have been passed over in silence (the principal fault lying with captains of troops and commanding officers), as the spirit of the men themselves would not allow them to supplicate for what they considered ought to have been given as a matter of right.

But I must return to the supper—and what a supper it was, that we sat down to! Roast beef and roast mutton, ducks and geese, pork and giblet pies, and tarts and fruit from Kadakoi. It was such a feast, that my mouth even waters now at the bare recollection of it, and it may be easily conjectured how much more so then. What a relief it was to our daily fare of beef or pork, biscuits or bread, as the case might be, and no superfluity of either. Then there were

the drinkables—rum, of course, galore, a strong sprinkling of the mountain dew, bottled ale and porter in dozens, wine, and even champagne in cases. What a contrast this plenty must have been to those who, recalling the last 25th of October to their memory, the scarcity of everything that day (shot and shell excepted), to the abundance here now laid out. But if any had such thoughts they kept them secret.

Serjeant Mag——, of the 11th Hussars, took the chair, faced by our worthy friend Mac——, of the commissariat department. Everything being ready, it required but little persuasion to begin, and it was followed up with a zest and will that campaigning can alone impart. Beef, pork, mutton, giblet pies, &c., all visibly and rapidly disappeared under the united efforts of that forty and odd good men and true there assembled. But all this did not prevent the jovial laugh and joke from going round, or the kindly inquiries after those who were, either from duty or sickness, unavoidably absent from the gathering.

Supper over and cleared away, the materials were placed on the table for the preparation of a large bowl of whisky punch. A looker-on at this moment might have observed a humorous, well-pleased twinkle of the eye pass round the table, a shifting in their seats to place themselves more comfortable, a squaring of the elbows to get as much available room as possible; in short, a desire seemed to possess all of making themselves as cozy as lay in their power. Honest old Mac——, being deemed to have most knowledge, was requested to brew the first bowl of his native drink, and from the silence observed during this proceeding, one might have imagined that all the company were "frae the land o' cakes," where, while the toddy is brewing not a word is spoken, in case it might distract the mixer's attention from the *great* object in front of him. When all was finished—such as the lemon being sliced into it, and the whole set "*low*" to for a few seconds, just by way of giving it a flavour, a glass or two was ladled, and the opinions of a few asked as to its flavour, &c. All declared it excellent, although Jack O—— added, "that a thocht mair whisky wadna hurt it." This, however, was overruled; and when the glass passed round, it drew forth commendations from all present—Celt and Saxon being alike loud in the praise of this bowl.

The first toast proposed as a matter of course was her Gracious Majesty the Queen; then followed the other members of the Royal Family, including the Duke of Cambridge, then the Navy, and our Allies the French; all of which followed each other in succession.

The chairman then rose, and after reminding the company to fill their glasses, and calling their attention to the day, proceeded to say, "that there was but little necessity for his so doing, as we had one and all met this night to commemorate the conflict at Balaklava." He continued—"I will not attempt to recapitulate the proceedings of that day, which to those present is unnecessary; but will simply recal to their mind that out of so many that advanced, but few returned. Each of us lost there, not only one or two comrades whom we prized and loved, but I might say twenty, and some of us

more (for a regiment is only a large family). And it is while thinking of those, while bearing in remembrance all their honesty and sterling worth; it is, I repeat, while thinking this, I am confident that every one present, at the recollection feels as I do myself—'too much for words.' Comrades, I will conclude, and beg to propose The memory of those that fell that day." This was drunk standing, and in solemn silence.

After a pause of some duration, the chairman rose again, saying—"With the remembrance of Balaklava—I beg to give the health of our leaders. I am aware that more than one has stated, Lord Cardigan never charged with us at all, others that he returned after going half way. As regards the first statement, I can contradict that, his lordship being in advance of us when we started. All of my own regiment are aware of this fact as well as I am, so I'll say no more on that head. With reference to what else is said, we soldiers know, that any tremor (I'll not say fear, for it is nothing akin to that; it is more of an over anxiety that is felt) or nervousness we feel, is always before an advance, it is never after; then our whole thoughts are occupied with the enemy in front, and how to get to them. So it is as unlikely as improbable for any one to return at such a moment, far less a general. And those who say they saw him, must have been differently situated from us, whose attention was taken up solely with what was in advance of us, not with what was in 'rear,' in which latter direction *their* eyes must have been.

"I'll say no more on this unlikely topic, but proceed at once to propose the health of Lord Lucan, coupled with the names of Lord Cardigan and Sir J. Y. Scarlett." This was drunk with three times three.

Several songs followed after the toasts, our worthy vice-chairman being the first called upon, to which he responded nobly, giving us "The Muckle big priest D'Kilbogie," in the real Doric Scotch. Serjeant R——, of the First Royals, then gave us "The price of my pig," in capital style. Others followed those, being intermixed with yarns, queer stories, and adventures by "flood and field." Grieved am I to think I can recollect so little of what was said by those assembled, the witty remarks and sayings that passed between each other; between those who determined to be pleasant and companionable, were exerting themselves to make all the others feel so likewise, and kept our gaiety and good humour continually on the stretch, and in this lay the secret of our happiness, and it was this which made the hours fly so fast, but of all which I cannot relate one tithe, nor describe the style and easy manner in which it was given; and I feel sorry that I can render but a meagre description of what was the happiest night I ever spent.

One of the first that spoke was a corporal of the Royals, of upwards of thirty years service. When the regiment came out, he would not stay behind in the depôt, but insisted on coming with his comrades; he was as fine an old soldier as ever it was my lot to see. Some one had asked him how he came by his medal, for distinguished conduct in the field, inquiring at the same time if he had taken a Russian general prisoner, or anything of that sort.

"Nothing of the kind," was old Bob's reply. "I think they wanted some excuse to give it me, for bless you, I did nothing deserving of it. You see I had my horse killed under me, and then managed to get another, which I mounted; this also had the bad luck to be shot, which our colonel happening to see at the time, ordered me off home; and as there was a good saddle on the last horse, I took it off, put it on my head, and came away; they made a bit of work about this, so I got the medal, that's just the truth of it, and I don't wish any one to imagine I did more."

"I only wish," struck in a sergeant of the fourth light, "that all those who wear them Bob, had earned them as well; but when they are given to hospital and staff serjeants, it causes us chaps to lay but little store by them. I say, eighth," he continued, (turning to one of the eighth Hussars) how was that affair of your serjeant major's brother settled?'"

"Oh! they hushed it up," was the reply.

"What was that, W——?" asked several at once.

"Why I thought nearly everybody knew about it" was the answer; "but as it seems not, I'll tell what I know of the matter. After the eighth had formed up in the plain that morning, the major, I believe, placed Serjeant ——— under arrest for some trifling affair or other, and as a consequence his belts and arms were taken from him. Instead of being sent to the rear, the place for a prisoner, he was still kept in the ranks; and when we advanced on the guns, he went along with us unarmed. As might be expected, he fell, but whether by the sword or bullet of the enemy, none knew; if by the sword, he was an easy victim for them, as he could not defend himself.

"There was a deal of bother about the matter at first, and I fully expected that his brother would have reported it, but I suppose he thought better of it, and it could not bring the dead to life again; and might have injured his prospects, as he had a family, and was an old soldier. Second thoughts were probably best."

"Yes," remarked one of the Royals, "it is very little use reporting any of those over us to a still higher authority; because the report itself must go through what is termed the proper channel; that is probably the very man's hands whom you are reporting. He takes care then of course to send a counter statement, and if he cannot refute what is said, he will cast reflections on your character; that will cause your communication to be—if not actually disbelieved, at least looked upon with suspicion."

"Ah," says another, "it's very little use going to law with the devil, when the court is held in hell."

"You are just right," chimes in one of the seventeenth, "there is but little law or justice for any of us, in more respects than one. Now here is Serjeant ———, who with another serjeant, and under a heavy fire, went back and carried a wounded officer off the field. This was done at the risk of their lives, for while doing so, a round shot carried his helmet off his head. And what has Jack got for doing this one will naturally inquire? Why nothing, absolutely nothing, unless, being passed over for his promotion twice, be con-

sidered as such. And this is not the only hard case in our corps. Corporal ——, for instance, charged along with his squadron, passed the batteries, said that nothing more could be done; but being a cool fellow, he rallied fifteen men together of all regiments, and briefly explained the case to them, ordered them to follow him, and fighting their way through again, got all safe back except three. Now neither of these I've mentioned have been recommended either for the French medal, or the one for distinguished conduct."

"There is little of what may be termed fair play in the service," says one of the Green Horse; "I could tell of something equally as glaring as that, but it does no good; only had an officer performed these deeds what a hero he would have become. The only thing like justice I have seen done has been for our friend Q—— of the Forty-seventh, who from a corporal has been promoted to a commission; but what was it after all, pray? Why, only an ensigncy in the land transport corps—just putting a brave lad like that out of the way, in a manner buried, and where he would not have another chance of distinguishing himself."

"Or more probably getting extinguished," drily remarks one of the Fourth Royal Irish.

"Well, for my part," said one of the bonnie Greys, but whose accent betrayed him to be from 'the other side of the bridge,' "I cannot imagine what yees all have to complain and grumble about. By yer talk yees ought to have this medal, and the other medal; the divil tie you up with medals, say I. Why, here sits Phil Hanigan, who kilt and druv afore him more Roosians that day than all on ye put together, and niver a word have ye heard him spake about rewards of merit, and crosses of the legion of honour."

"Were you then at Balaklava charge Phil?" asked one of the Thirteenth; "I had no idea of you being there."

"Troth, then, I did not suppose you had," was the indignant answer, followed by, "it's aisy seen you did'nt belong to the heavy brigade, or you would'nt had the laste occasion in life to ax that question."

"There are several of us similarly placed," said one of the Fourth Light, "and if you have no objection, we should much like to hear the particulars."

"Objection! not a bit of it, but with the greatest pleasure in life, my boy; though faith not liking to blow my own trumpet, I should have preferred if it had been towld by some one else, but still here goes. I dare say yees all remember the first charge of the hevies, and that was the Greys and Inniskillings in front—Scotland and Ireland for iver, my boys! But sure its dhry work this talking, so just fill this tumbler with a dhrop of nate potheen—nate, mind yees, for wather niver did agree with me, and sartain sure am I that good whisky doesn't want it. Ah! (smacking his lips) that's something like! Well, as I was saying, the thistle and shamrock went hand in hand, slap into the cinter of the Roosians; ivery one fowt well, but I like a divil, my blood was up, and at them I wint. I thowt at one time that Donnybrook wor a fine place for a scrimmage, but ifecks it

SOME ACCOUNT OF CANNIBALISM AND OTHER ATROCITIES IN WESTERN AFRICA.

By Consul Thomas J. Hutchinson, F.R.G.S.

Membre Titulaire de l'Institut d'Afrique, &c., &c., &c.

The features which characterise the existence of the native tribes in Western Africa at the present time constitute interesting objects of study for the psychologist. We have nothing recorded in ancient history comparable to the brutalities, linked with the superstitions, of these people.

In the first volume of Baron Von Humboldt's Cosmos,* an extract is given from a work of his brother Wilhelm, in which the following passage occurs:—

"If we would indicate an idea, which throughout the whole course of history has ever more and more widely extended its empire, or which, more than any other, testifies to the much contested and still more decidedly misunderstood perfectibility of the whole human race, it is that of establishing our common humanity, of striving to remove the barriers which prejudice and limited views of every kind have erected amongst men, and to treat all mankind, without reference to religion, nation, or *colour*, as one fraternity, one great community fitted for the attainment of one object—the unrestrained development of the phychical powers."

Bearing upon these observations, the Baron likewise remarks†—"The principle of individual and political freedom is implanted in the ineradicable conviction of the equal rights of one sole human race."

This philosophy puzzles one who contemplates such scenes as I am about to record. There may be allowed a palliation for the deeds of the American Indians, in scalping those who fell into their hands by the fortunes of war or the chances of raid and foray. A plea may, perhaps, be advanced for the atrocities committed by the Sepoys in the recent Indian rebellion, urged on, as they were, by the despotic creed of Islamism. But the thirst for blood which marks the lives of many of the Negro races seems to me very incompatible with the foregoing, as well as with another Humboldt idea‡—

"Whilst we maintain the unity of the human species, we at the same time repel the depressing assumption of superior and inferior races of men. There are nations more susceptible of cultivation, more highly civilized, more ennobled by mental cultivation, than others, but none in themselves nobler than others."

I fear that "mental cultivation" can have little effect on individuals, who cannot be classed as humanized. Although not denying that a few, very few—the *rari nantes in gurgite vasto*—have manifested an intellectual capacity equal to that of white men, still, even those who for scores of years have been intermixing with European

* Page 368. † Idem, vol. II, p. 568. ‡ Idem, vol. I, p 368.

traders, mostly Englishmen, cling to their gri gris, ju jus, fetishes, and cannibalism with as much pertinacity as they did a hundred years ago.

It may be assumed that their languages, assimilating the practices of their daily lives to their natural organization, may have something to do with this adherence to old practices. No doubt, arguments can be advanced to prove that they, with all their thirst for their fellow creatures' blood, are entirely innocent and unconscious of many abominable crimes which are of daily occurrence amongst civilized communities of Europe. There are Caligulas and Neros amongst these tribes, although they have not yet arrived at the civilization of a Robson or Redpath.

People in England who imagine Africa to be a land of palms and of gold, elephants and lions, even those less romantic and more commercial folk, who look to the growing development of that country's industrial resources in the increased production of palm oil and ivory, would scarcely credit that in the month of August last, in the year of grace 1858, four men and a boy were cooked and eaten by the men, women, and children of New Kalabar town, a district over which a King, named Amakee, is ruler, and which is only about twenty miles from the river Bonny, that has been for many years the most prolific palm oil market on the whole coast of Western Africa. The affair came off thus:—

"It seems that some few weeks previous to this occurrence (27th August, 1858) two natives of New Kalabar were on their way to the Aboh palm oil market, when they were caught by the natives of a district called Acreeka—killed and eaten! On hearing of this, the New Kalabarese determined on reprisal. Accordingly a palaver was held, and a message sent, demanding that the murderers should be given up, and intimating that if this request were not granted, a war, with no mercy to young or old, would be commenced forthwith. The men, four in number, were delivered over, along with a boy, who had turned king's evidence, in the hopes of not being included in the punishment. They were tried before the ju-ju king, as well as the chiefs in the ju-ju house, and condemned to the same fate as they had inflicted on the others. They were then brought into the market place, which is hard by a sheet of water, opposite King Amakree's residence,* and the boy informer was compelled to perform the most disgusting mutilations on his unfortunate countrymen, whilst they stood in the water. Worse than tiger-like, the spectators drank the water in which was mingled the blood of the victims. They were then dragged out, hacked, and cut limb from limb, by the Kalabarese executioners, whilst pieces of their flesh were distributed amongst the natives of the town, some of whom roasted, some boiled, and others made soup, rendered pungent, no doubt, by palm oil and red peppers."

The foregoing statement is an extract from the journal of Mr. W. J. Oates, a gentleman who was a supercargo, in the employment of Messrs. Horsfall and Sons, of Liverpool, and who was stationed on

* Vide "Impressions of Western Africa," p. 101. Longman, Brown, & Co. 1858.

board a trading hulk in the river. The idea of men who had committed a murder "being condemned to the same fate they had bestowed upon another," is carried out in imitation of the very mode in which the butchery has been consummated, as thus further recorded by Mr. Oates:—

"On the 4th of January, 1859, as Dr. Saunders and I were leaving the beach, a great commotion was raised through the town, in consequence of the ju-ju king having been attacked and severely wounded in the ju-ju house. We returned; and on going up to the place, found it full of natives. On a table in the centre was stretched the unfortunate ju-ju potentate, suffering from a severe stab in the abdomen, and a fearful gash in the wrist. With such appliances as the natives could furnish, Dr. Saunders stitched and dressed the wounds. It was then related to us, that a head man of the ju-ju king's establishment had been mad for a few days; that while he (the king) was making ju-ju, with many of the people attending at the ceremonial—the lunatic had rushed into the temple, and inflicted the wounds on him, and that before the madman could be seized, he had rushed away again, supposed to have gone into the bush (as the thick wood around is termed).

"Dr. Saunders wished the king's bed to be made up in the ju-ju house, that the wounds might not be disturbed; but all those around objected, giving as a reason their dread of the assassin's coming back and doing something worse. Preparations being then made to take him on a door to his dwelling house, we proceeded to accompany the bearers, when, on going outside, we saw no less than 300 men armed with guns, daggers, spears, and knives. Such is the respect shewn to white men, that over a hundred of these armed people formed a body guard around us to conduct us in safety to the beach, where our boats were—as it was then getting dark, and the madman might be roaming about. For in his flight he had stabbed two women, though not mortally wounded them. Some of this escort carried torches, and the flashing light in darkness, revealing the blades of weapons, with the moving ebony of their nearly naked bodies, and the glistering savagery of their eyes was a picture not often seen even in Africa.

"January 5th.—The ju-ju king died this morning. After the ceremonies of his funeral were over, he was buried in his own temple, a number of armed men afterwards going in pursuit of the murderer. They found him in a tree, and shot him. Although he fell down dead, they inflicted upon him like wounds to those he had given to the king, namely, a stab in the belly, and a gash across the wrist. His body was then cut in two, and thrown into the river for sharks' food.

"In a very few days afterwards upwards of fifty persons belonging to this family were put to death in a similar manner—of wounds in the belly and across the wrist. Indeed there was not a single one of his kith or kin left in the town that was not sacrificed, in exactly the same manner as he had butchered the king."

Although the natives of New Kalabar had a great faith in this ju-ju king, ranking him on all state occasions before King Amakree,

they hold, in worship, a supreme spirit in a country some three months' travel from New Kalabar, and in a direction tending towards Aboh, up the river Niger. I believe it to be in some part of Ora; and it is entitled by them, when they speak of it in English, the "long ju-ju country." Parties are sent there to undergo an ordeal for serious crimes. It is believed that the ju-ju at that place (who is supposed to be a woman) knows everything—the names of all the ships trading in the river, of the merchants to whom they belong, and of the super-cargoes. The country in which this delphic oracle resides is described as a species of amphitheatre, surrounded by hills. As soon as the accused arrives near a certain bush—only one person being allowed to approach at a time—his accuser makes the charge against him in a loud voice. He is then called on to say if he be guilty or not guilty. Of course the charge is invariably denied. Upon this he is told to return. The simple people of New Kalabar, who never have been there, believe that if the accused be innocent he can go back, but that, if he be really guilty, his feet become fastened to the ground; water springs up which rises—rises—rises gradually, till it mounts over his head, when he is drowned, and that as soon as the water subsides after his death the victim is fastened in the earth, with nothing of his body visible except his head.

Mr. Oates informed me that on one occasion a hundred men were sent away by the authorities, accused of some witchcraft, the particulars whereof he is ignorant. Of these, thirty-nine returned, bringing with them an accusation against twenty other persons who had not previously been suspected, and who thus, by the revelation of the long ju-ju, were declared guilty. These were executed, having been first made drunk—a privilege which is likewise granted to all condemned to die by Egbo authority in Old Kalabar. The mode of execution at New Kalabar is by hacking the convicted with swords, knives, and cutlasses.

Sacrificing twin children, as well as those who cast their upper teeth first, is carried on at New Kalabar as in Aboh and Old Kalabar. Even as late as 1856, an Albino child was sacrificed at the bar to the shark, who was, up to a late period, the ju-ju of this country. Some of the natives up the creeks having, however, been devoured by these carnivorous fish, the family of the shark species got into disfavour, and now goats and fowls are their favorite protecting deities.

In Brass (or the Nimbi country) cannibalism often occurs. Even within the last year a chief of that district, named Imamy, killed two of the Acreeka people before mentioned, who were sacrificed to the *manes* of his father and eaten. In Brass, as formerly in Bonny, they eat all enemies taken in war, and they put forth, as a justification for this, that devouring the flesh of their enemies makes them brave.

At the mouth of Brass river, when an Albino girl is sacrificed, the officiator at this ceremony is an old man named Onteroo. He has got an enormous tuberosity on the back of his head, but whether his divinity is believed to exist in this or not, my informant cannot say. Several canoes accompany him, and the victim, who, it seems, is quite satisfied with her fate, as she is indoctrinated with the idea that her future destiny is to be married to a white man. As soon as

they reach the bar, the canoes are all turned with their heads homewards; the word is given, and the girl is thrown into the water, with a weight round her neck to prevent her floating, and therefore obviate the possibility of an escape.

The Brass people have likewise an interior to their country territory of reference for oracular purposes, which they entitle the "God country." Keya, the King of the Obullum Abry side of Brass, is known to have recently paid a visit there to ascertain if he, or a powerful chief named Amanga, were to be head man.

On his return, a number of the "God country" people came with him, and lived at this place on the fat of the land, whilst they were deliberating. Amanga, of course, was now and then present at their festivals; but on one morning he became very sick, and was dead in a few hours afterwards.

In parts of Benin, it is the custom to sacrifice two men at the appearance of a new moon. They, however, are not eaten.

Cannibalism exists in the Omun country, up the Cross river; and I am informed that the Boola tribe, who reside far interior to Corisco Bay, come down the Mooney river to get some of the sea-shore dwelling people to make "chop" of them, because they are reputed to have a saltish, therefore a relishable flavour.

My late colleague at Lagos (B. Campbell, Esq.), giving me some information about the Ejoemen, or Iomen, a tribe spread over the countries adjacent to many creeks in the Delta of the Niger, observes:—

"When I wrote to you about the Ejoemen, I forgot to tell you that they are generally considered to be cannibals. Some Kruboys, who had been badly treated on board a Liverpool ship, a few years since, took one of the boats and went off. Hunger and thirst compelled them to enter one of the rivers between Benin and the Nun. The Ejoemen fell in with them, and after a desperate struggle, captured the Krumen, first killing two of their number. The survivors of the Kruboys were eventually sold at Warree town, and redeemed by Mr. Henry. They declared to Mr. Henry that the Ejoemen had eaten those boys who were killed.

"When Captain Denham was surveying this part of the coast, he sent up one of the rivers a boat in which were two young officers. They were attacked by the Ejoemen, overpowered, and killed; and, if the surviving Krumen's story be true, were no doubt eaten also.

"Mr. Carr, of the model farm (second Niger Expedition) was most probably killed by these people, King Boy, who was an Ejoeman."

The authorities cause twins to be buried alive at Old Kalabar, and the mother is banished from society, by being obliged to subsist in a place erected for her outside her native town. When a mother dies in childbed her infant is buried alive with her. Brutality of this kind seems to be indigenous to the African nature, everywhere, save amongst the Krumen. In Rev. Mr. Crowther's journal of his last ascent of the Niger, he records:—"After the inspection of the lands, at Idda, as we were returning to the ship, Kasumo, the

Arabic interpreter, who had fallen in with a brother mallam here, and also with a Yoruba slave, was privately informed, that about three months ago, an Albino slave boy, whom we saw here in 1854, about nine years of age, was offered in sacrifice as a peace-offering in the settlement of their political disputes; that the hands and feet of the poor boy were dislocated, after which he was put alive into a pit prepared for him, over which a large pot was placed; so the poor creature had to linger the remaining days of his miserable existence in torture and agony. He was there three or four days before he expired, when the pit was covered up."

Something similar to this brutality, but of a more aggravated nature, is the mode in which punishment for murder is inflicted by the Aborigines of Fernando Po. When the murderer is discovered, his crime is proved before a meeting of the magnates of his district, not by any form of trial by jury, or of ordeal test, but simply by the deposition of evidence, be it confirmatory or circumstantial. The body of this victim is then carried to some distance in the bush, and he is tied to it by withes plucked from trees. He is left in that horrid position, without even getting a bit to eat or drop to drink, until death puts an end to his sufferings. The prolongation of a man's life under the circumstances of his being bound night and day to a dead body, advancing to rottenness, makes one shudder to think of!

It may be considered a strange coincidence that amongst the tribes of the interior who can have no communication with those on the coast, brutalities are in existence, as if such things were indigenous to the African soil. Dr. Livingstone records,* that—"In several tribes, a child which is said to "tlola" (transgress) is put to death. "Tlola," or transgression, is ascribed to several curious cases. A child, who cuts the upper front teeth before the under, was always put to death among the Bakaa, and, I believe, also among the Bakwains. (A practice similar to this exists at Aboh, New and Old Kalabar.) In some tribes a case of twins renders one of them liable to death—(a modification of the Old Kalabar custom in burying twins alive), and an ox, which, while lying in the pen, beats the ground with its tail, is treated in the same way. It is thought to be calling death to visit the tribe."

On the occasion of a civil war at Bonny in this year (1859), the following incident occurred:—

A canoe, paddled by four young boys—the eldest not more than seven years of age—and steered with a paddle by a man in the stern, was observed crossing the river amongst the shipping. It was pursued by another canoe, in which were eight men propelling, and a man standing up in its fore-part with a rifle in his hand. As soon as the latter had reached to within fifteen or twenty yards of the former, the armed man fired at and killed one of the boys. He coolly reloaded his rifle, and shot the three other boys in succession. The murderer's canoe having soon arrived at that which had now but one occupant, he (the last named) jumped into the water, from which he was soon

* Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, p. 577. Murray, London.

dragged out by his pursuers, to be stabbed to death with knives in his own canoe.

The most appalling consideration of incidents like these seems that we cannot suppose them to be isolated, if for no other reason, from the fact of their being in the most part perpetrated in the sight of our fellow-countrymen. It pains me very much to have it in my power to add, that savageries more inhuman than any I have recorded here—trucculent and indecent enough to create a shudder in the nerves of the most depraved—are of more frequent occurrence amongst the tribes within my jurisdiction. To attempt civilizing such a race before they are humanized appears to be beginning at the wrong end. I have passed many a serious hour in cogitating, and endeavouring to suggest some sort of education to root out this fell spirit; but I fear that ages must elapse before this, in its simplest form, can produce an impression of advantage on temperaments such as they possess. The few British stations on the coast, and the paucity of missionaries amongst the immense population (150,000,000) of Africa's continent, although producing beneficial results within their limited spheres, are but as drops in the ocean of Ethiopian darkness and barbarism, whose continuance or abolition is in the hands of Him to whom alone the book of futurity lies open.

Defence of Great Yarmouth.—It was stated some months since that the local authorities of Great Yarmouth had called the attention of the War Office to the defenceless state of the coast at that point. A reply was received to the effect that the erection of a work at Gorleston was "under consideration," but this did not satisfy the Mayor, who replied that such a promise had been made for years without any result. This remonstrance has elicited a second letter from the Earl of Ripon, Under Secretary at War, who states that the erection of the work will be proceeded with as soon as terms can be come to with the proprietor of the site required. His Lordship adds: "In consideration of the importance of the roadstead to the general trade of the country in the North Sea, two batteries, powerfully armed, have recently been provided at Yarmouth, north and south of the anchorage, the centre or town battery being postponed as of less pressing importance than other places in the United Kingdom, at present totally unprotected. I am to add that the construction of the Gorleston battery at the mouth of the harbour will take precedence of that on the vacant site at the centre of the anchorage."

Monument to the late Lord Francis Gordon.—A handsome marble monument is about to be erected in the Military Chapel, Windsor, to the memory of the late Lord Francis Gordon. The monument, which is of white Carrara marble, is surmounted by an elaborately carved helmet and sword, and bears the following inscription:—"Sacred to the memory of Lord Francis Gordon, sixth son of George, ninth Marquis of Huntley, late Lieut.-Colonel of Her Majesty's 1st Regiment of Life Guards; this tablet is erected by his brother Officers as a testimony of the great regard which they all felt for him, and of their deep regret for the premature death of one who was endeared to all who knew him, as well by his frank and manly character as by his amiable qualities and kindness of heart. He was born January, 1808, and died at Paris, the 26th of June, 1857."

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;
OR,
NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

THE ARMED PEACE.—Poor Count COLLOREDO has paid with his life for the treaty of Zurich, and it will be well for all the parties concerned if it exact no other victim. Considering, however, how different are the conditions from what each must have designed, when they referred the quarrel to the sword, the issue declares on its face that none can be satisfied. It is true, Sardinia obtains an addition of territory, but it is for the stipulated price of twelve millions and a half sterling, besides three millions and a half spent in the war, making altogether sixteen millions. France has won a military reputation for her EMPEROR, but she may probably regard it as dearly bought, even after reckoning the subsidy of two millions and a half exacted from Sardinia. Austria receives from her conqueror such considerate treatment as creates universal wonder, since one half of this courtesy, at the proper time, would have prevented any rupture; but, on the other hand, she has lost the *prestige* of a great power, and the richest of her provinces. Finally, Italy, which had raised her hopes so high, is coolly ignored, and, as far as her fate can be fixed by the treaty, is thrown back to the position she occupied before the war.

All this would be inexplicable, if the bearing of Austria and France towards each other, and their mutual *rapprochement* to Russia, did not furnish some clue to the mystery. The peace is evidently to make no difference in the military establishments of these powers. The Austrian army in Italy is, on the contrary, at its full war strength, though its area of occupation is reduced one half. France and Russia are increasing their armaments, and, with larger fleets than they have possessed for forty years, are particularly making gigantic efforts to augment their navy. Sardinia, on the other hand, has been seized with a sudden apathy, which the presence of a French army in her territory may explain, but hardly seems to excuse. Meanwhile, the Duchies have given us a foretaste of what we may expect, in the brutal assassination of Count ANVITI; and GARABALDI, the last hope of poor Italy, finds himself confronted in the Romagna by the Papal army, with the French and Neapolitans as a reserve. Such is the situation into which Italy has been brought by a war, which, inaugurated by *fêtes* and illuminations, and carried on by sanguinary battles, has, instead of effecting her deliverance,

more firmly rivetted her thraldom. The statesmen of Sardinia, who would listen to no warning, and despised the friendly counsel of England, may now see they have been overreached; and, like the frontier Bishop of old, opened the gate of their country to ATTILA. For the present, they maintain their hold on the Duchies, but it is dangerous to play dice with a certain personage; and we may safely predict that the horse will not carry off the lion's share of the spoil. As for debating in a Congress a question that from what has transpired, we may conclude to be already settled in the secret counsels of France, Russia, and Austria, the proposal is a simple imposture. At any rate, England can take no part in such a settlement. Our ruling policy declares that every nation should be left to settle their own affairs; and the minister who departed from this course, in an emergency so grave as the present, would deserve to be impeached. Let us rather enter a solemn protest against the intervention of others; and reserve our weight as a power, while we develope all our resources, for the not remote struggle before us.

THE FRANCO-SPANISH INVASION OF MOROCCO.—Modern history would seem to be only a repetition of itself—with variations. If the second, or, according to his own reckoning, the third NAPOLEON be a new edition of the first, his antagonists and dupes also preserve the hereditary type, keeping steadily in the old channels. England alone has adopted a new policy, with what judgment remains to be seen; but we have ourselves always expressed a belief that there was less peril in the enmity of the uncle than the friendship of the nephew. Spain is only following her traditions in giving herself over to his devices. The first little gush of prosperity, after her exhausting civil dissensions, burns in her pocket; and, at the suggestion of France, she hastens to squander it in a military expedition. With the example of Sardinia under her eyes—with experiences yet fresh in her own disastrous history, she has again formed a warlike league with France; and has made her preparations through so long a period, and with so much concealment and disguise, that we can hardly believe the real object is avowed. Certainly we think the dispatch of Admiral FANSHAWE'S squadron to Gibraltar was by no means an unnecessary precaution. As regards Morocco, the Spanish Government has shown a determination to go to war, even when all its grounds of complaint were removed; and the more the SULTAN has conceded, the further Marshal O'DONNELL has pushed his demands. His *ultimatum* comprises a cession of territory equal to a province, and the payment of the expenses of an expedition which has not yet left the Spanish shores. General O'DONNELL, from the fact of his personally taking the command of the expedition, may be unwilling to relinquish an opportunity of obtaining military renown; but little glory is to be reaped from a war in which victory can bring neither honour nor profit, while, on the other hand, defeat will be disgrace. From the preparations for the enterprise the Spanish Government evidently anticipates a stout resistance, and trusts to ensure success, if not by strategy and valour, at least by numbers. The Moorish Sultan, however, is at

the head of no mean force; and though it can hardly be expected to cope on equal terms with a disciplined European army, we may believe, from the successes it has just achieved over the rebel hordes, that it will make a good fight. Whatever the result, England will not allow Spain, whether singly, or in conjunction with France, to occupy the other side of the Strait; and this petty conflict may lead to great troubles. Spain might have waited for a better occasion to prove that she is still a power, but she has cast the die, and the responsibility lies on her own head.

THE ORDER OF THE BATH.—Whoever may be the General Officer in chief command of the British army, the patronage appertaining to his office must be great, and it is most important for the interests of the country that this should be administered not only without caprice, but without being biassed by feelings of friendship, or by persons of influence in society. It may be said that in the British service no reward is conferred by the sovereign on any officer of her army, which does not result from the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, but this is especially the case in respect to orders of knighthood. On several occasions, however, when the cases of officers, invidiously passed over, have been brought forward in Parliament as deserving of such distinction, they have immediately been met by a protest from the ministerial benches, as an invasion of the royal prerogative, while, in fact, the selection for such honours rests entirely with the Commander-in-Chief. Her MAJESTY is believed to receive these recommendations without comment, and rarely, if ever, to take the initiative. In reality, therefore, the prerogative called in question, pertains not to the sovereign, but to the Commander-in-Chief. The judgment of a General Officer on such points is not rendered infallible by his being intrusted with the command of the army; for we know that it is frequently as much at variance with the opinion of old officers of high rank and character as of the public. Nor is he assisted by any established rules, or by the tenor of the statutes, as to the qualifications or precise merits of those who are to be admitted into the order, although a certain standard is often urged, which is merely a tradition of the authorities for the time being, and is, at their own convenience, openly set aside by themselves. Officers who have seen service in the field, combined with important general services of a professional character, are sometimes repulsed by this alleged difficulty, while there are notorious cases of military Knights of the Bath created for services of a purely non-combative character. In a service where the colonel of a regiment is a mere sequence to seniority in commissions most frequently purchased, the only very gratifying recognition that can fall to a General Officer, is thus left at the disposal of a single functionary, and is awarded by him according to the view he may chance to take of the aspirant's claims, or the disposition by which he may be actuated; so that he can use a perfectly arbitrary and unquestioned discretion on a point, which, in the issue, either exalts an officer to a rank in society that no professional grade, however high, can bestow, or leaves him with something very like a *stigma* on his reputation. The circumstance, indeed, of a General

Officer not possessing this honour frequently leads to a suspicion that his career presents some obstacle which has led to his being passed over, since, as already observed, it is conferred for very slight services in the field; and even medical and commissariat officers, by their elevation to the order of the Bath, every day take precedence in society of the oldest General Officers who have not been admitted to this distinction. The discretionary selection thus vested, without responsibility, in one functionary, is, therefore, no light trust, and in no other country is it thus diverted from the positive dispensation of the SOVEREIGN. It is true, that in France we find by the statutes of the Legion of Honour, and also in some other military states of the Continent, a chapter or committee of Knights investigates the merits of those coming next in seniority who may aspire to election into the order; and the recommendation of this knightly chapter is always held in the utmost respect by the Sovereign. This mode of initiation was originated, we believe, by FREDERICK the Great, in his celebrated order of *Pour le Mérite;* it was afterwards adopted by the first NAPOLEON; and there can be no doubt that its introduction into the Order of the Bath would do away with the existing discontent, and, at the same time, restore to the order that *prestige* which its invidious distribution has so much impaired. The arrangement might well be accompanied by an extension of the order, the present limit of which has long been acknowledged as miserably inadequate to the claims of the two services, so constantly employed in every part of the globe, while it wholly puts aside officers whose service, though admitted to be meritorious, have not been rendered at a recent date. We shall have more to say on this subject in our next number.

THE ARTILLERY COMMAND AT PORTSMOUTH.—It is said that the important command of the Royal Artillery at Portsmouth has been conferred on Colonel FITZMAYER, C.B., at present commanding the Artillery in North Britain. Such an appointment will be especially creditable to the authorities at this juncture, when so much anxiety is felt in all that concerns the defence of our principal naval port. Colonel FITZMAYER served through the whole of the Russian war, from the first embarkation of the troops till their return; and he has obtained the Crimean medal with four clasps, the Order of the Bath, the officers' grade of the Legion of Honour, and the Sardinian and Turkish orders. It will be gratifying to find that his meritorious service has at last been remembered.

GREENWICH HOSPITAL.—The interesting articles that have appeared in our pages on the subject of this institution have, we are glad to see, had due effect, and a commission has been appointed by the Admiralty to inquire into the alleged abuses.

MILITARY HISTORY.—The *United Service Gazette* of October 8, referring to M. LAVALLEE'S forthcoming *Golden Book of St. Cyr*, suggests the production of a similar record of the great exploits of the English army. Her MAJESTY'S State Paper Office contains a mass of papers illustrative of our earlier military history, which would greatly enrich *such a work*; but we observe with regret the an-

nouncement in a literary journal that the most important portion of these documents, comprising our transactions with France, have been placed by the Master of the Rolls in the hands of a person unsuited, in our opinion, to reduce them to a satisfactory calender. When the keeper of these records ventured to ignore the principle now established in our public departments, of confining the promotion to those who have served in them, he might surely have selected some more eligible recipient of his favours than a gentleman who is remarkable only for what, in the general opinion, disqualifies him for the post—namely, his strong religious bias, as a Roman Catholic proselyte. Such an appointment is not only unfair to the corps of the department, but is a public wrong; and as there is now a possibility of these papers contributing to our military history, we trust that some of our professional members may consider the matter worthy of a little ventilation on the meeting of Parliament.

THE AMERICAN COMMODORE'S DESPATCH.—Commodore TATTNALL has borne a handsome testimony to the gallantry of our brave seamen in the attack on the Peiho forts, and the despatch given in another portion of our pages, will, we trust, soothe the timid conscience of the British Officer who lately did penance for his country at Bishop Auckland. The Commodore speaks out like a sailor—we would have said like an Englishman, if our ears were not still tingling with the lecture of Captain LONGLEY. We could, indeed, wish that all our dealings with the Chinese had been as free from reproach as this action. Here they met us with an ambuscade, when we were proceeding to carry out the stipulations of a treaty, which, though only too familiar with their crooked policy, we had accepted in good faith, and which embraced no condition that one nation might not reasonably ask from another. The perfidy of the Chinese functionaries was so transparent, that even the American Minister considered that it warranted him in departing, to a certain extent, from the neutral attitude he had hitherto maintained, and lending to the allies all the assistance he could, short of engaging in the conflict. Commodore TATTNALL quickly saw that this must end in our repulse, the allied force being wholly unequal to the object. The Chinese will soon receive a different impression of our power. It is understood that the military portion of our new expedition will be under the command of a Lieutenant-General, which indicates that it is to comprise an important force; and we believe that Sir HOPE GRANT, whose reputation deservedly stands high, is the officer selected for the post. The precise strength of the force is not yet fixed, but we have good authority for stating that it will be sufficient to overcome all obstacles to our entry into Pekin.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

THE QUEEN OF HEARTS. By Wilkie Collins. 3 vols.

Here is a title which ought to make the fortune of any novel. Suggesting

of course, of beauty, if not of wit, amiability, and the other graces of the sex, it will no doubt exercise a magnetic influence over the readers of fiction. The author is also a favourite, and his name gives presage of ability. Whatever expectations we may form, the book will certainly not disappoint them; for it is one of mark and interest. The "Queen of Hearts" is one Jessie Gelverton, who is no lackadaisical, fashionable miss, but a natural, practical, half romp, half prude, and being withal a little romantic, and very good looking, she finds none to dispute her sovereignty. This young lady is bequeathed by her father to two guardians, one of whom resides in Wales, and we are presented with a graphic sketch of himself and his household, including an old housekeeper, and two bachelor brothers. The whole form, indeed, a most quaint group, each individual being strongly marked and brought out with effect. The little circle is thrown into consternation by the announcement that the young beauty, whom they have not previously seen, is about to pay them a visit, and great preparations are made for her reception. Before, however, these can be completed, she unexpectedly arrives, falling in the midst as if she had dropped from the clouds; but she proves no such object of terror; the brothers are won by her hearty, simple ways, and it soon comes out that she has already made a conquest of Roland, her guardian's son. Roland is at Sebastopol, but intelligence arrives that he is on his way home; and, in order to detain Jessie till his arrival, the brothers resort to the device of the Eastern Sultana, in the "Arabian Nights," each relating a tale. It is not our part to tell what was the issue. For this our readers must refer to the book, and its perusal will both explain Jessie's ascendancy, and reveal her fate. The reputation of Wilkie Collins will be increased by this clever production.

BENTLEY PRIORY. By Mrs. Hastings Parker. 3 vols.

This is not, as the title would suggest, a semi-religious novel, but one dealing with the things of the day, though it preserves a high moral tone. Fashionable society and manners are described in its pages with great fidelity. The author has caught at some passing incidents, which give the narrative additional *vraisemblance*, and serve to heighten the interest. The characters, though not striking, are well delineated, and carry on the action with spirit. Such a story is sure to be popular, for it gives a picture of life in its most attractive circles, presenting their varied features in the most agreeable colours. The plot is not very intricate, but it is skilfully constructed, and effectively worked out. The author particularly excels in dialogue, and nothing could better show her intimate acquaintance with the society represented in the story, than its spirited and truthful conversations. The heroine, Emily Morton, is a life-like sketch, and the character is sustained throughout with delicacy and tact. She forms an early attachment for Mandeville, a young man of fashion, whose prospects, however, are not very brilliant; and by the command of her mother she gives the preference to his cousin, Lord Errington. The match is decided on, but Emily's heart still clings to Mandeville, and she records her disappointment in a diary, which, falling into the hands of her maid, is surreptitiously forwarded to Lord Errington. Meanwhile, Emily has learned to admire the character of her betrothed, so superior to that of Mandeville; her affection for the latter, great as it had formerly been, is scarcely remembered; but the evidence of her diary estranges Lord Errington, and the match is for the time broken off. Eventually there is an explanation; Emily's sincerity is established, and the lovers are happily united. Mandeville falls in love with Gertrude, the sister of Emily; and several minor characters, who contribute to the action of the story, are similarly disposed of. This brief outline gives but an imperfect notion of a tale as interesting as it is fresh and truthful.

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

THE AMERICAN COMMODORE'S ACCOUNT OF THE AFFAIR ON THE PEIHO.

The following is Commodore Tattnall's despatch to the Secretary of the Navy at Washington :—

"United States' Steam-frigate Powhattan, Flagship, East India Squadron, off Peiho River, July 4, 1859.

"Sir,—The last despatch which I had the honour to send you reported this ship, in company with the chartered steamer Toeywan, at sea, off the Yangtse, on her way to the Peiho, with our Minister to China, Mr. Ward and suite on board.

"That gentleman has reported to the Government the result of his interview and correspondence with the Chinese commissioners at Shanghai. I shall only refer, therefore, to that subject so far as is necessary to your understanding the circumstances which placed us in a very unexpected position on our arrival at the Peiho, and produced as unexpected results.

"The Chinese commissioners were those with whom our late Minister, Mr. Reed, concluded the treaty last year at Tien-tsin, and with whom he subsequently arranged the tariff at Shanghai, where they have remained ever since.

"In the interchange of visits between these commissioners and Mr. Ward, the latter was escorted by a number of officers and sixty marines of our squadron; this being not only suited to the dignity of Mr. Ward, but intended as a compliment to the Chinese commissioners, to whom Mr. Ward wished to extend the greatest consideration.

"Mr. Ward informed them that he was on his way to Pekin to exchange the treaties, which it was obligatory on both parties to do on or before the 18th of June, now near at hand.

"They replied that having signed the treaties, they must themselves exchange them; that they could not reach Pekin from Shanghai in less than sixty days; and that by agreement with Lord Elgin, the late British Ambassador, they were expected to remain at Shanghai until the arrival of the present British Minister, Mr. Bruce.

"Mr. Ward then offered to exchange our treaty at Shanghai, which they evaded on the ground that the treaty was at Pekin, and they proposed to Mr. Ward that he should remain at Shanghai until the arrival of the British Minister.

"Mr. Ward, although doubting their sincerity, in a spirit of consideration and forbearance accepted the proposition, thus waiving the specified time of exchange.

"The British Minister, on his arrival a day or two after, refused to hold official intercourse with the commissioners, on the ground (as I understood it) that Pekin was the place specified in the British treaty for the exchange, and that he was on the way there for that purpose.

"Unsuccessful in their endeavour to detain the British, and to re-open negotiations at Shanghai, the commissioners apparently yielded, and despatched couriers (who they asserted would arrive in a week) to Pekin, to prepare (as they said) the authorities for the arrival and reception of all the Ministers, and their conveyance to Pekin, where the treaties would be exchanged by a special commissioner on the 25th of June, the day specified in the British treaty.

"The commissioners notified Mr. Ward of this arrangement, and re-

quested him to accompany the British and French to the Peiho. To this he consented, thereby to a certain extent assuming the same platform with the latter.

"I will here remark that the sincerity of the Chinese commissioners was much doubted at the time, some of their countrymen at Shanghai declaring that delay was their object, as they were fortifying the Peiho very strongly, and had placed in command a Mongol Prince of high military reputation, who was known to be very hostile to the treaties.

"We reached the anchorage off the Peiho on the 21st of June, where we found the British and French Ministers and their fleet.

"On my first interview with the British Admiral, James Hope, I learned that the Ministers (English and French) had announced to the authorities on the shore the object of their visit, and that they should proceed by the river to Tien-tsin, on their way to Pekin, conformably with their treaties.

"The Chinese had positively refused them the ascent of the river, the entrance to which they found very strongly fortified, and across which several lines of barricades had been constructed.

"The Chinese declared that this river, which we had all navigated as the Peiho a year ago, was only one mouth of the Tien-tsin river, and that there was another entrance ten miles to the north, which entrance was called the Peiho, and was the point referred to in the treaties.

"They insisted that the Ministers should remain off this northern entrance until the arrival of the commissioners from Shanghai (which could not be short of two months), when arrangements would be made to convey them to Pekin by this route.

"The British and French Ministers, considering this an evasion with a view to gaining time to strengthen their defences, had referred the matter to their respective naval commanders, who notified the Chinese that if the obstructions in the channel of the river were not removed by the 25th of June, the day for the exchange of treaties, they would themselves proceed to remove them.

"I will here remark that in the Chinese charts there is a small river emptying into the sea ten miles to the north of this, and which, diverging gradually from the course of the Peiho as you ascend it, has its source far in the interior; some twenty miles from its mouth it is connected with the river we know as the Peiho by a narrow creek, said to be dry at low, and having but five feet at high water.

"After due deliberation Mr. Ward and I decided to enter the river we had known as the Peiho in the steamer Toeywan as far as the barricades, as though ignorant of access having been refused the English and French. If the forts should fire across our bows to bring us to we would anchor and communicate; if into us, having no guns, we would retire and act accordingly.

"Twelve British and one French steamer, all small, had previously concentrated within the bar, at the mouth of the river, just out of gunshot of the batteries.

"We entered the river in execution of our plan at eleven a.m., on the 24th ult., and passing through the British squadron, without communicating, pushed up towards the barriers.

"At this time not a man was to be seen at the forts, nor a gun in an embrasure, nor, although flagstaffs were on the parapets, was a flag displayed. There was nothing to indicate that the forts were armed or manned.

"Subsequent events show this to have been a deception and ambuscade, intended, I do not doubt (in the confidence of their own strength and the small force of the English), to invite a conflict in order to annul the treaties of last year.

"We had approached to within 300 yards of the first barrier, at which point, should we not be fired on, I had proposed anchoring, when we grounded, and failed in all our efforts to back off. The tide was falling fast, and our situation was critical, not only from the facility with which the batteries might demolish us, but, as we were on the edge of a steep bank, from the probability of the steamer falling over and filling.

"At this moment I received from Admiral James Hope an attention and kindness which must place me under lasting obligations to him.

"Although he had reason to think that she would be fired upon by the forts he sent a gunboat to my aid, with the message that had he known my intention to pass up he would have furnished me a pilot, and that he expected to see me fired on.

"The gunboat failed in her efforts to extricate me, and there being, as I have said, a probability of the Toeywan falling over and filling, the admiral despatched a second gunboat to me, placing her entirely at my disposition, with the handsome and generous offer that I should hoist on board of her the American ensign and my own personal flag.

"I declined the offer, with a just appreciation, however, of the personal kindness to myself and the delicate compliment to our service.

"The Toeywan was more fortunate than I expected, and a favourable wind having sprung up we got her off at high water.

"About two hours after grounding we sent a boat to the nearest fort with my Flag Lieutenant, Mr. Trenchard, and the interpreters, to inform the commanding officer that the American Minister was on board the Toeywan, on his way to Tien-tsin and Pekin, in accordance with our treaty and an understanding with the Chinese commissioners at Shanghai.

"They were met at the landing by an officer professing to be of low rank, who said that his orders were not to permit the removal of the barriers, and to fire on those attempting it; that he believed that a high officer had been appointed to meet the Ministers at the north. He also asserted, most falsely, as subsequently shown, that there were no troops and only a few country militia in the forts.

"Although the interpreters were allowed to get out of the boat for greater facility of conversation, they were not permitted to approach the forts.

"The Toeywan floated late in the evening, when I observed that the British were arranging themselves apparently for action. I therefore dropped down to the mouth of the harbour, and below them, so that my lights might not interfere with their signals, or my position with their operations.

"The British in the night removed with their boats a portion of the lower barrier, but the Chinese restored it in the morning.

"At 2.45 p.m. on the 25th, the day specified for the exchange of treaties, the British stood up for the river for the barriers, Admiral Hope leading in one of the gunboats.

"Their whole force consisted of ten gunboats, including one French and three larger steamers, of a class denominated despatch vessels, carrying in all about fifty guns. They also had on board of some Chinese junks, at the mouth of the river, a reserve of boats with seamen and marines.

"On the Admiral's reaching the first barrier the forts suddenly swarmed with men, and a terrible fire from very heavy guns was opened on him from all the forts on both sides of the river.

"Two of his vessels at this moment grounded near the spot where the Toeywan had grounded the day before.

"The British and French fought with the most determined valour, but fifteen minutes sufficed to show me, without a hope of success.

"The fire of the Chinese was directed with fatal skill, and was chiefly concentrated on the Admiral and the vessels nearest to him. His flag-vessel being disabled and her crew cut up, he shifted his flag to a second, and, on her meeting the fate of the first, he again shifted it to the Cormorant, one of

the larger (despatch) steamers. Here again the fire was concentrated on the flag of the gallant Admiral.

"By this time, 4 p.m., several of his vessels had been sunk, and it was evident to me that nothing could enable him to extricate himself and retire from the hopeless conflict but the reserve of boats and men at the junks; but at the time the tide was running too strong for the crowded boats to stem.

"The officer in charge of these boats now visited me. He said nothing of aid, but his silent appeal was powerful indeed. In the few moments he was on board he would look anxiously, alternately at his Admiral and at the boats.

"After he left I held a consultation with Mr. Ward, and he agreed with me perfectly that, under all the circumstances of our position with the English, and the aid the Admiral had tendered me the day before, I could do no less than tow the boats to his relief.

"I made the offer, which was thankfully and promptly accepted.

"While the boats were making fast to hawsers, which I veered astern, I insisted on Mr. Ward and his suite leaving the Toey-wan, and going on board one of the junks, for reasons that will be obvious.

"He at first reluctantly yielded, and left us, but soon returned in one of the English boats, declaring that, as the Toey-wan was his home, and was going under fire with his approbation and concurrence, he would remain in her. I reluctantly yielded to his gallant impulse.

"At this time a young British officer came to me from the vessels engaged, to say that the gallant Admiral was dangerously wounded, and had but six men left. He (the officer) had two boats sunk in reaching me.

"I towed the boats through the British line to within a short distance of the Admiral, whose flag was flying on the Cormorant, when, casting them off, I retired to the rear of the line, near the French gunboat, and anchored for the night.

"I took up this position as it might enable me to aid the wounded, and, should boats be sunk, to rescue their crews.

"After anchoring, I thought of the Admiral and of his chivalrous kindness to me the day before, which, from an unwillingness to intrude on him when he was preparing for action, I had in no way yet acknowledged.

"I, therefore, with my Flag Lieutenant, Mr. Trenchard, went in my barge to visit him. When within a few feet of the Cormorant, a round shot struck the boat, killed my coxswain, and slightly bruised my Flag Lieutenant. We fortunately reached the Cormorant before the boat entirely filled.

"I found the Admiral lying on his quarter deck, badly wounded. I informed him that I had called to pay him my respects, and to express my regret at his condition. After remaining on board the Cormorant about ten minutes, I took advantage of an English boat that was passing to return to the Toey-wan.

"The Cormorant, after this, was sunk, and the Admiral shifted his flag to a fourth vessel (a thing, I believe unprecedented), thus evincing an indomitable valour under very disheartening and almost hopeless circumstances.

"At dusk, about eight p.m., a desperate attempt was made, by landing from boats, to storm the forts, but they stood in an impassable morass, and the assailants were repelled with heavy loss.

"On the morning following this day and night of slaughter—the action still continuing, but the fire more feeble and distant—I found that six of the English vessels were sunk, and that the remainder had withdrawn to a more distant and safer position, from which they could easily retire out of gunshot.

"I now prepared to return to the Powhattan with Mr. Ward, but first called on board the Coromandel to take leave of the Admiral, and also on board the French gunboat to inquire after the French Commodore (Tricault),

rounds ball per man, 120 rounds blank per man, 352 percussion caps per man, and 40 percussion caps per man for snapping practice.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, you obedient servant,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

NAVAL PRIZE MONEY.

"SAPPHO."—Notice has been given that the distribution of the tonnage bounty awarded for the vessel, *name unknown*, captured on the 18th of September, 1857, by her Majesty's ship Sappho, will commence on Monday, the 24th instant, at Somerset House. The following are the shares due to an individual in the several classes:—

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
Flag share	252	3	8	Sixth class	57	8	8
Commander	598	19	0	Seventh class	38	5	9
Third class	178	13	8	Eighth class	19	2	11
Fourth class	114	17	4	Ninth class	12	15	3
Fifth class	63	16	3	Tenth class	6	7	7

HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN FORCES.

NATIVE SOLDIERS SERVING EAST OF THE SUTLEJ.—It having been brought to the Commander-in-Chief that due regard has not been paid to G. O. C. C., 10th June, 1858, prohibiting native soldiers serving at stations east of the Sutlej bearing arms of any kind when absent from their corps otherwise than on duty, his Excellency again enjoins the strictest attention thereto. 2. At the same time Lord Clyde is pleased to direct that the above order shall not for the present be considered applicable to the soldiers of the Pathan and Mooltan Cavalry who are now, or may hereafter be, serving in Hindustan. These men may be permitted to carry their private arms to their homes, on the condition that the weapons so carried shall be described in a pass under the signature of their commanding officers, whose duties it will be to explain to the men that such weapons must be brought back on their rejoining from leave, and to see that his injunctions on that head are rigidly obeyed. The number of arms permitted to be carried under this proviso should be restricted to one, or at most two, for each Sowar.

A GRIEVANCE.—The *Mofussilite* calls attention to a grievance of some of the late Company's officers. A short time before the mutiny, an order was passed making messes compulsory in all regiments. To meet its requirements many corps involved themselves in debt for supplies which were shortly after destroyed in the rebellion. Owing to the numerous casualties, surviving officers are now called upon to pay double the amount for which they were at first liable. One officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, has succeeded in getting Lord Clyde to pass a claim for compensation as for losses sustained on actual service, and officers of other regiments are advised to follow his example under the usual regulations.

EUROPEAN SUBORDINATES.—The attention of officers in all departments, subject to the Punjaub Government, is directed to the following order:—Officers requiring European subordinates are instructed to place themselves in communication with the commanding officers of Her Majesty's regiments serving in India, with the view of obtaining the services of men certified to possess the general and special qualifications proper to the department in which it is intended to employ them. The Lieutenant-Governor believes there are many posts in which steady, intelligent Europeans could be advantageously employed.

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

The *Gazette*, of the 21st October, announces that Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to signify her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned officers and private soldiers of Her Majesty's Indian Military Forces, whose claims to the same have been submitted for Her Majesty's approval, on account of acts of bravery performed by them in India. The following are their names.—Major Charles John Stanley Gough, 5th Bengal European cavalry; Brevet Captain Robert Haydon Shebbeare, 60th Bengal native infantry; Captain Herbert Mackworth Clogstoun, 19th Madras native infantry; Lieutenant Harry Hammon Lyster, 72nd Bengal native infantry; Lieutenant Harry North Dalrymple Prendergast, Madras engineers; private Frederick Whirlpool, 3rd Bombay European regiment.

The Delhi correspondent of the *Calcutta Englishman*, states that the passport system has been discontinued, and that natives are now allowed to come into the city and to go away from it unquestioned. The writer adds:—"The Palace of the Timours is now wearing a very Anglicised garb. All that was unsightly or disagreeable has been either blown up or knocked down, and all the gilt and tinsel-domed (doomed?) 'Halls' of audience, justice, &c., have been converted into very neat airy dwellings for the European troops. Selimgurh, the old fort, has been made over to the railway authorities as a store yard. A new road and gateway has been opened out near the 'water gate.' In a couple of years we may begin to look out for the 'snort of the iron horse' in the neighbourhood of the Imperial City, and if that don't astonish the natives nothing will."

Staff Salary of Regimental Instructors of Musketry.—A letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, to the Adjutant General H.M.'s Forces in India, says that:—"In consideration of the importance of this office, and of the severe duties which it entails in India, Her Majesty's Government approves of the Staff salary being fixed at sixty rupees a month, in addition to horse allowance."

Aides-de-Camp. The Commander-in-Chief in India has announced that the decision of the Governor-General in Council, with regard to the qualifications in the languages to be acquired by Officers to render them eligible for Staff employ, is to be held applicable to all future appointments of Aides-de-Camp on personal Staffs, whether Officers of the Line or of the Indian Forces.

China Promotions.- The following is a complete list of the promotions and changes consequent upon the death of Captain Nicholas Vansittart, C.B.:—Commander John E. Commerell promoted to Captain, and appointed to command *Magicienne*; Commander William A. J. Heath from *Assistance* to *Fury*, vice Commerell; Lieutenant R. J. Wynniatt to be Commander; Lieutenant C. J. Balfour to be Acting Commander, and appointed to *Assistance*, vice Heath; Lieutenant G. D. Bevan appointed from *Kestrel* to *Opossum*, vice Balfour, promoted; Lieutenant C. D. Robinson, from *Highflyer* to command *Kestrel*; Lord Viscount Kilcoursie, Acting Mate, to be Acting Lieutenant, vice Balfour; Mr. Herbert F. Campbell, late of *Cormorant*, has also been promoted to an Acting Lieutenancy in *Furious*, vice G. T. Peard, ordered home by the Admiralty.

The Expedition for China.—In consequence of the recent numerous arrivals of vessels from foreign and colonial ports, and the limited demand for seamen in the merchant service, a large number of able and ordinary seamen offered themselves on Monday, at the Royal Naval Rendezvous, Tower-hill, which was besieged with applicants, several of whom were accepted, and sent on board the Crocodile, receiving-ship. There is still a very great dearth of stokers, who are much required for the steam gunboat flotilla fitting for service in China. Scarcely a day passes that volunteers for the

navy do not arrive from the northern ports by railway. These are borne on the books of the Crocodile for provisions until they are drafted to their respective ships.

Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Oct. 16.—Two new wings are about to be added to the Academy, for the accommodation of an additional number of gentlemen cadets, a sum of 35,000*l.* having been granted for that purpose. It has also been decided to erect at Woolwich a new General Military Hospital, on a most eligible site near Dundas-terrace, the Army Sanitary Commission being of opinion that the present Royal Ordnance Hospital is unfit for the purposes for which it is intended. The new hospital will be erected upon Government land, now used by the gentlemen cadets for practical instruction in engineering and fortifications.

A return moved for by Sir John Trelawney, showing the number of General and other officers holding staff appointments in Great Britain and Ireland, specifying the number who belong, or who being now on half-pay, have belonged to her Majesty's foot guards and infantry of the line, was delivered on Monday, from which it appears that the total for foot guards, is 2 General Officers, 1 Colonel, 3 Lieutenant-Colonels, 2 Majors, and 4 Captains. The total for the infantry of the line is 16 General Officers, 20 Colonels, 8 Lieutenant-Colonels, 12 Majors, 19 Captains, and 1 Subaltern Officer. Upon half-pay, formerly of foot guards and also of infantry of the line, there are 3 General Officers and 4 Colonels.

The Late "Eastern Monarch."—The Secretary of State for War has given directions that all the soldiers who lost their kits and clothing at the explosion of the above vessel, shall receive as a remuneration for their losses, 6*l.* 17s. for serjeants, and 5*l.* 2s. 6d. for the privates.

Commander Armine Wodehouse, late of the *Cormorant*, arrived on Monday, having come home by the overland mail from Shanghai. Courts-Martial had been held on Commander Wodehouse, and upon Lieutenants Jones and Douglas, for the loss of their respective ships, which terminated in their acquittal.

The Late War.—All traces of the late war are fast disappearing. On the plains of Majenta a luxurious vegetation is all that meets the view. One house near the station riddled with shot is still conspicuous, and a few tumuli beside the railway, where several hundreds are buried. A dog of African breed, which belonged to General Espinasse, still lurks about the spot where his master shed his blood, and though often taken away even to some distance, constantly returns.

New Battery on the Clyde.—Government have resolved to erect a new battery on the Clyde, on the shores of Roseneath, nearly opposite to Gourock; and last week some officers of the Engineers inspected the grounds, and held a consultation with the Duke of Argyle, who is lord of the manor. With this battery at Roseneath, and the other one already erected at Gourock, both sides of the Clyde will be completely protected.

Leather Leggings for Soldiers.—Leather leggings are to become an article of clothing for the troops. A Circular from the Secretary of State for War is issued to all General Officers and Officers commanding corps of infantry to the effect that each non-commissioned officer and soldier of the Foot Guards and regiments of infantry of the line serving at home and in the colonies, is to be supplied with them. His Royal Highness, the General Commanding-in-Chief, desires the commanding officers may be apprised that the leather leggings are to be worn over the trowsers, which are to be pulled up to the boot, neatly folded round the leg. The leggings are to be only worn in muddy weather, and at guard mounting, when necessary.

The Late Arctic Expedition.—We have much pleasure in stating that the noble-hearted Lady Franklin has presented the steamer Fox to Captain McClintock, her late gallant and successful commander, as a reward for his

meritorious services. Such an act of generosity on the part of Lady Franklin needs no comment of ours.

CONTINUOUS SERVICE SEAMEN.—With reference to Circular, No. 364, of the 28th April, 1859, directing the issue of clothing gratuitously to Continuous Service Seamen, the Lords of the Admiralty are pleased to direct that, from the date of the receipt of this Circular, (dated 26th September, 1859), on board of Her Majesty's ships, the issues of gratuitous clothing in kind are to be discontinued, and that, in lieu thereof, all men, on their first entering the navy for ten years' continuous service, and all boys (except ships' stewards' boys) on being advanced to men's ratings, be respectively credited with the sum of £2 9s. 4d. This credit is to be inserted in the Record Book, against the names of the individuals entitled to it, in the first column of credits, as "Clothing Money," or in the Complete Book, Muster Book, and in all Pay documents; and all issues of clothing made to them in kind are to be charged against them in the Charge Book, in the usual manner, and at rates specified in Circular No. 321. The cost (if any) of making up the articles is to be charged to the individuals, in accordance with Circular No. 342.

SEAMEN GUNNERS.—RETURNS OF NUMBERS BORNE.—The following Admiralty Circular, dated the 3rd inst., has just been issued:- The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty being desirous of knowing the number of men borne on board Her Majesty's ships who may be qualified as 1st and 2nd Class Seamen Gunners, distinguishing those still employed as Seamen Gunners from such as may have declined to continue to serve in that capacity, are pleased to direct that this information may be inserted in red ink, after pensioners, in the monthly returns of the numbers of men borne, in Form No. 101, established by Circular No. 301, thus:—

Seamen Gunners included above ...	1st Class, No. 2nd Classs, No.
Men qualified as Seamen Gunners, but not now so employed, included above	1st Class, No. 2nd Class, No.

The numbers of each class are also to be inserted in the several columns for Ship's Complement and Supernumeraries, and for continuous service, and non-continuous service.

INAUGURATION OF THE STATUE OF THE LATE GENERAL NEILL AT AYR.—The ceremony of inaugurating the statue of the late General Neill was performed at Ayr in a very imposing manner, and under highly favourable circumstances. The statue has been erected in Wellington-square, in which Brigadier General Neill was born, on May 27th, 1810, and is in commemoration of his services to his country, and chiefly of the gallant and noble part which he enacted in the late rebellion in India.

ROYAL ARSENAL.—Two complete 6-pounder batteries are now being prepared at the Royal Arsenal, to be forwarded to China. The carriages, constructed on an improved principle, which has been fully tested before the select committee for experiments, will be mounted with Sir W. Armstrong's guns, several of which are now ready for service.

TURKISH NAVY.—The Turkish line-of-battle ship Shadia, sailed from Plymouth Sound on Friday se'nnight, for Constantinople, and saluted the national flag, and the flag of the Commander-in-Chief with 21 guns, just previous to her departure, which was duly acknowledged.

BOYS FOR THE NAVY.—The Admiralty have restricted the admission of boys for the navy to 20 weekly, the result of which is that numerous candidates are daily rejected, and returned to their friends at considerable inconvenience.

LETTERS OF CONDOLENCE.—Several Masters and Officers of British ships lying in the port of Shanghai have addressed a letter to Admiral Hope and the Commanders and Officers of the recent expedition to the Peiho, expres-

sing their high sense of the zeal and indomitable courage displayed by him on that occasion, and tendering their sympathies to the wounded, and to the wives and relations of those who were killed.

Royal Naval Benevolent Society.—The quarterly court of this society was held at the Thatched House, St. James's-street; Rear Admiral Lord Colchester in the chair. This society affords relief to families of those Naval Officers who, having subscribed to this institution, leave their relations badly provided for at their death. From the statement of accounts presented it appeared that for the quarter ending 30th September, the receipts of the society amounted to 967*l.* 7s. 9d., and the expenditure for the same period to 587*l.* 5s. 4d. The court having gone through several memorials for assistance, granted various sums of money, amounting in all to 367*l.*

The Batteries at Tarifa.—A cannon ball (28lb.) has been exhibited at the Liverpool Underwriters' Rooms, which, fired from the Batteries, had lodged in the hull of the *Gem of the Sea*, on her voyage from Ancona to Liverpool. Doubtless some inquiry will be made into the matter by the British Government.

The Dominica Militia.—A West India paper gives the following from the Dominica Legislative report:—"His Excellency is most anxious that the expense to which the militia must be put for this object shall be as small as is consistent with their equipment in a neat and soldier-like manner, and he hardly thinks this can be done for less than £3, and at the same time if it be found on enquiry that such a sum as this cannot be paid without any inconvenience by any member of the force, the Lieutenant Governor will feel bound to consult the circumstances and convenience of these men, and to establish a uniform in accordance with their means. Before deciding upon the point, however, his Excellency thinks it but right to make your honourable bodies acquainted with these facts in case you should deem it expedient to authorise the extension of partial assistance towards defraying the cost of their uniform to such members of the force as upon due inquiry may be considered to stand in need of such aid."

Death of Sir Thomas Grant.—We have to record the death of Sir Thomas Grant, K.C.B. and F.R.S., late Comptroller of the Victualling and Transport Service in the Admiralty. He entered the public service at the Admiralty forty-seven years ago, and after passing through several grades was in 1828 appointed storekeeper at the Clarence Victualling-yard, Gosport. In 1829 he devised the well-known steam machinery for the manufacture of biscuit, which effects a saving to the country amounting annually to 30,000*l.* Afterwards he constructed a new life-buoy, a feathering paddle-wheel, so contrived as to get rid of the action of the back-water on the floats; and about the year 1839 the patent fuel which bore his name, and which is largely used in the steam marine. Lastly, he applied his mind to achieving the long-desired object of distilling fresh water from the sea. By the invention which he made the sanitary and moral condition of the navy has been greatly advanced. The papers laid before Parliament on the subject of the distilling apparatus, contain a report from the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic fleet, stating that "in three months eleven ships distilled upwards of 4,700 tons of water, and that it was impossible to speak too highly of so useful an invention;" and the *Wye* was expressly fitted up with the distilling apparatus, and sent to the Crimea to assist in supplying fresh water to our transports and troops. This vessel alone was capable of producing upwards of 40,000 gallons of fresh water daily. It was under the unexampled pressure then cast upon his department that his health gave way, and early last year he was obliged to relinquish his post. He expired at Chesterterrace, Regent's-park, at the comparatively early age of sixty-four. The funeral of Sir Thomas Grant took place yesterday at Alverstoke, his remains being interred in the family vault.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

The following is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to 1st of August last.

HER MAJESTY'S HOME TROOPS.

3rd (The Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards	Mhow
Squadron	Ahmednuggur
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Kirkee
8th Hussars	Nusserabad
Left Wing	Neemuch
14th Light Dragoons	Kirkee
17th Lancers	Jhansi

ROYAL REGIMENT OF BRITISH ARTILLERY.

D Troop Horse Artillery	Mhow
2nd Company, 3rd Battalion	Poona
2nd Company, 11th Battalion	Aden
7th Company, 11th Battalion	Sehore
2nd Company, 13th Battalion	Baroda
5th Company, 14th Battalion	Calpee
8th Company, 14th Battalion	Dharwar

ROYAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

11th Company	Poona
21st Company	Gwalior

ROYAL REGIMENTS OF BRITISH INFANTRY.

4th (The King's own Regt.)	Ahmedabad
Detachment	Surat
Do.	Baroda
28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment	Bombay
31st Huntingdonshire Regiment	Poona
33rd (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment)	Deesa
56th West Essex Regiment	Belgaum
57th Regiment	Ahmednuggur
Wing	Aden
64th Regiment Foot	Kurrachee
72nd Highlanders	Mhow
83rd Regiment Foot	Nusserabad
92nd Highlanders	Central India
Detachment	Indore
95th Regiment Wing	Neemuch
Depot	Deesa
German Jager Batallion Head Quarters	Poona
Wing	Sholapore
Detachment	Sattara

HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN BRITISH TROOPS

REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Horse Brigade, Head quarters	Poona
1st (or Leslie's) Troop, Head Quarters	Deesa
2nd Troop	Kurrachee
3rd Troop	Nusserabad
4th Troop	Poona
1st Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmedabad
2nd Company	Belgaum
3rd Company	Hydrabad
4th Company	Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters	Bombay
1st Company	Neemuch
2nd Do.	Sattara
3rd Do.	Sholapore
4th Do.	Mhow

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Kurrachee
2nd Do.	Jaulna
3rd Do.	Kolapoor
4th Do.	Kurrachee

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

Head Quarters	Poona

INFANTRY.

1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters	Kurrachee
3rd European Regiment L. I.	Belgaum
Wing	Kolapore
2nd European Regiment	Mhow

HER MAJESTY'S NATIVE TROOPS

ARTILLERY.

3rd Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmedabad
1st Company	Ahmedabad and Rajcote
2nd Do.	Ahmedabad
3rd Do.	Deesa
4th Company	Nusserabad
5th Do.	Ahmedabad
6th Do.	Aden
4th Battalion, Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmednuggur
Detachment	Neemuch
2nd Company	Ahmednuggur
4th Do.	Ahmednuggur
6th Do.	Khandeish

CORPS OF SAPPERS AND MINERS.

Head Quarters (Bombay)	Poona
1st Company	Poona
2nd Do.	Aden
Detachment	Jhansi
3rd Company	Augur
4th Do.	Poona
5th Do.	Poona
Detachment	Jhansi

LIGHT CAVALRY.

1st Regiment (Lancers)	Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry	Neemuch
Detachment	Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	Jhansi
Wing	Sholapore

INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N. I. (Grenadiers)	Kurrachee
2nd do. do	Bombay
3rd Regiment N. I.	Malligaum
4th do. do. (Rifles)	Sehore
Wing	Indore
5th do. N. L. I.	Kullaighee
6th do. N. I.	Poona
7th do. do.	Bombay
8th do. do.	Sattara
9th do. do.	Behora Central India
10th do. do.	Serongo Central India
11th do. do.	Ahmedabad
12th do. do.	Nusserabad
13th do. do.	Neemuch
14th do. do.	Ahmedabad
15th do. do.	Kolapore
16th do. do.	Surat
Detachment	Broach
17th do. do.	Rajkote
18th do. do.	Belgaum
19th do. do.	Mhow
20th do. do.	Dharwar
22nd do. do.	Ahmednuggur
23rd do. N. L. I.	Mhow
24th Regiment N. I.	Jhansi
Depot	Mhow
25th do. N. L. I.	Poona
26th do. N. I.	Scerpore
28th do. do.	Sholapore
29th do. do.	Aden
30th do. do.	Dhulia
31st do. do.	Deesa
1st Extra Battalion	Kurrachee
2nd Extra Battalion	Baroda
3rd Extra Battalion	Belgaum
1st Belooch Regiment	Hydrabad
2nd Do. Do.	Ishera Ghazee Khan
Depot	Shikarpoor
3rd Belooch Regiment	Nuggur Parkur Districts
Wing	Hydrabad

IRREGULAR AND LOCAL CORPS.

Military.

regular Horse -	Seroor
ment Scinde Irregular	
se - - -	Jacobabad
iment Do. -	Jacobabad
iment Do. -	Jacobabad
ment Southern Mah-	
a Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
iment Southern Mah-	
a Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Battalion - -	Bombay
ment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
iment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie

Civil.

Guzerat Irregular Horse -	Ahmedabad
Kutch Irregular Horse -	Bhooj
Kutch Legion - - -	Kutch
Guzerat Police Corps -	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps - -	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps -	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers -	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Police Troop - -	Mhow

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

llowing is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

CAVALRY.

lon the Governor's Body
.....Madras
st Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
2th Royal Lancers Head
ers and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's
on
. Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
do.....Sholapore
(under orders to Secunderabad.
t. Native Light Cavalry,
quarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Wing .....Bellary
t. Native Light Cavalry..Bengal Field Force
do.....Bellary
do.....Bengal Field Service
do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

ARTILLERY.

ps Royal Horse Artillery. St.Thos.' Mount
uarters Madras Horse
ery .....Bangalore
p. Field Service Gen. White'ock's Division
p .....Secunderabad
p .....Bangalore
p .....Kamptee
p .....Bengal Field Service
p .....Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
omp.1st Bat. Royal Artil-
and No. 1 Field Battery...St.Thos.' Mount
omp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artil.
and No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
omp. 14th Bat. Royal Ar-
y, & No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
by.9th Bat. Ryl. Artillery.Secunderabad

ST BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

uarters .....St.Thos. 'Mount
pany { Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore; Half Company ...Penang; Detachment .....Masulipatan
pany .....Moulmein
No. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellary
. (No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

ND BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

uarters .....Kamptee
(No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
Head quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo
Half Company ...Shuaygheen
p. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery)
Head quarters and half .....Kamptee
Half Company.....Seetabuldee

THIRD BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Rangoon
A Company (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service
B. Company (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tongho
C. Company (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmew
D. Company (No. 5 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division

FOURTH BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Secunderabad
. Company (No. 1 Horse Bat.)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
B. Company (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
C. Company (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
... Company Head quarters and two-thirds .....Rangoon
One-third .....Bassein

FIFTH OR GOLUNDAUZE (NATIVE) BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....St,Thos.' Mount
A. Company Head quarters and two-thirds Company .....Penang
One-third Company .....Malacca
B. Company.....Singapore
C. Company (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
D. Company (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
E. Company (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sumbulpore
F. Company.....Meeaday
1st Supplemental Company .....St.Thos.' Mount
2d do. do. .....Vizianagrum
Details of several Companies ...Labuan

MADRAS ENGINEERS.

Head quarters .....Fort St. George

MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS—NATIVE.

Head quarters .....Dowlaishweram
A. Company.....Ditto
One Section with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
B. Company .....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
C. Company .....Bengal Service
D. Company .....Rangoon
E. Company ... .Dowlaishweram
One Section with Gen. Whitelock's Division
F. Company .....Secunderabad
One Section .....Paumbum
G. Company .....Padoungmyo
H. Company .....Thayetmew
I .Company .....Tongho
K. Company .....Dowlaishweram
L. Company .....Field Division Gen. Whitelock
M, Company .....Dowlaishweram

INFANTRY.

EUROPEAN.

H.M, 1st Royal Regt. (1st Bat.),..Secunderabad
H.M. 43rd Light Infantry.....Gen. Whitelock's Division; Field Serzice
H.M. 44th Regiment.....Fort St. George
H.M. 60th Roya Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
3 Companies.....Bellary
1 do. .....Mysore
1 do. .....Hurryhur
H.M. 66th Regiment.....Cannanore
1 Company .....Mangalore
1 do. .....Sircee
H.M. 68th Regiment .....Rangoon
H.M. 69th Regiment.....Tonghoo
H.M. 74th Highlanders .....Berhampore
1 Company .....Sholapore
3 Companies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
The Madras Fusiliers .....Bengal on Field Service
2nd European Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
3rd Madras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock

NATIVE INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N.I (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
2nd Regiment N. I.....Quilon
3rd N. I. or Palamcottah Light Infantry.....Cannanore
4th N. I. .....Thayetmew
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Mangalore
Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secunderabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoo
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Bellary
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N. I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmew
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N, I..... .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Gen., Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N, I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N. I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzedah
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. I. .....Kamptee
27th N. I... .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. ....Hoosingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacole Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
5th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnool
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters . .....Shuaygheen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmew
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I, ...Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Kaichoor Field Service
43rdN.I. .....Russelcondah
44th N, I .....Thayetmew
45th NI .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. ... .Moulmein
49th N. I (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitlock's Divis
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Samulcottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 2d, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, Regiments N. I, and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.

EUROPEAN VETERANS.

Artillery Company .....Palaveram
Infantry Company .....Vizagapatam

NATIVE VETERANS.

1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. .Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. .Arcot

DEPÔTS.

For H.M Regiments .....Poonamallee
European Infantry .....Arcot
Native Infantry .....Palaveram

NATIVE INFANTRY RECRUITING DEPOTS.

No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dindigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Ellora

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(Corrected up to 25th October, 1859, inclusive.)

here two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depot is stationed]

Guards—Windsor.
—Regent's Park.
Horse Guards—Hyde Park.
goon Guards—Madras: Canterbury.
—Bengal: Canterbury.
—Bombay: Canterbury.
—Brighton.
—Aldershot.
—Bengal: Maidstone.
—Bengal: Canterbury.
goons—Dublin.
—Newbridge.
—Dublin.
—Manchester.
—Newbridge.
—Bombay: Maidstone.
ssars—Bengal: Canterbury
—Bombay: Canterbury.
ncers—Portsmouth.
ussars—Hounslow.
nssars—Birmingham.
ancers—Madras: Maidstone.
ght Dragoons—Piershill.
.—Bombay: Maidstone.
ussars—Dublin.
ancers—York.
.—Bengal: Canterbury.
ragoons—Aldershott.
y Train [1st bat.]—Aldershot.
d bat.]—Aldershot.
d Bat.]—Woolwich
h bat.]—Aldershott.
h bat.]—Curragh. } Depot at Aldershot
h bat.]—Woolwich.
lier Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
d bat.]—Windsor.
d bat.]—Dublin.
ream Guards [1st bat.]—Portman St. Bar.
d bat.]—Tower.
Fus. Guards [1st bat.]—St. George's Bar.
nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
t [1st.] —Madras: Colchester.
d bat.]—China: Birr.
. 1st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
d bat.]—Corfu: Walmer.
t [bat.]—Bengal: Limerick.
do. Malta: Limerick.
. [1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
d bat.]—Corfu: Chichester.
. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
nd bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
d bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
. [1st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
d bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
d bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
. [1st. bat.]—Shorncliff: Limerick.
d bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
e. [1st bat.—Devonport.
d bat.]—Curragh.
o. [1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.
d bat.]—Aldershott.
o. [1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
d bat.]—Aldershot.
o [1st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
nd bat.]—Cape of Gd. Hope: Fermoy.
o. [1st bat.]—Cephalonia: Fermoy.
nd bat.]—Mullingar.
o.—Jersey: Pembroke
nd bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
o.— Aldershot: Templemore.
nd bat.]—Clonmel.
o.—Canada: Limerick.

Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
18th do.—Madras: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
22nd do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta: Parkhurst.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Walmer; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
25th do.—Gibraltar: Athlone.
26th do.—On passage home: Belfast.
27th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Preston: Devonport.
30th do.—Curragh: Parkhurst.
31st do —Bombay: Chatham.
32nd do.—Devonport: Dover.
33rd do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
34th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
35th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
36th do.—Devonport: Athlone.
37th do.—Bengal: Colchhster.
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
39th do.—Bermuda: Templemore.
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Devonport.
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham.
44th do.—Madras: Colchester.
45th do.—Preston: Parkhurst.
46th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
47th do.—Shorncliffe: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bengal: Chichester.
52nd do.—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do.—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Curragh: Devonport.
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Aldershott: Birr.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Waterford: Winchester.
61st do.—Mauritius: Pembroke
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bombay: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: Athlone
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bengal; Perth
72nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Devonport.
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Dublin: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
78th do.—Fort George.
79th do.—Bengal: Stirling.
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.

81st do.—Bengal: Chatham
82nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury
83rd do.—Bombay: Chichester.
84th do.—Sheffield: Pembroke
85th do.—Cape: Pembroke
86th do.—Gosport: Templemore
87th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
88th do.—Bengal: Colchester
89th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
90th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
91st do.—Madras: Chatham.
92nd do.—Bengal; Stirling
93rd do.—Bengal; Aberdeen
94th do.—ditto: Chatham
95th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
96th do.—Manchester: Parkhurst.
97th do.—Bengal: Colchester
98th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
99th do.—Bengal: Cork
100th do.—Gibraltar [Parkhurst.
Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Portsmouth: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
2nd do—Jamaica
3rd do.—Barbadoes
Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

DEPOT BATTALIONS.

1st Depot Battalion—Chatham.
2nd do.—Chatham.
3rd do.—Chatham.
4th do.—Canterbury
5th do.—Parkhurst.
6th do.—Walmer.
7th do.—Winchester.
8th do.—Pembroke.
9th do.—Colchester.
10th do.—Colchester.
11th do.—Devonport.
12th do.—Athlone.
13th do.—Birr.
14th Depot Battalion—Belfast.
15th do.—Buttevant.
16th do.—Templemore.
17th do.—Limerick.
18th do.—Fermoy.
19th do.—Fermoy.
20th do.—Cork.
21st do.—Chichester.
22nd do.—Stirling.
23rd do.—Aberdeen.
Cavalry Depot—Maidstone.
do.—Canterbury.

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (20).

Bedford—Weymouth.
2nd Cheshire—Shorncliffe
Durham Artillery—Gosport
Hampshire Artillery—Pembroke
East Kent—Portsmouth
Lancashire Artillery—Kinsale.
Norfolk Artillery—Sheerness.
North Lincoln—Curragh
5th Middlesex—Dublin
Northumberland Artillery—Tynemouth.
Oxford—Dover.
1st Stafford—Portsmouth
2nd Stafford—Curragh.
Suffolk Artillery—Gosport.
Sussex—Glasgow
King's own Light Infantry—Cork*
2nd Warwick—Newport
Wilts—Dover.
1st York, (W. R.)—Edinburgh
3rd York—Newcastle on Tyne

SCOTLAND (5).

Edinburgh Artillery: Edinburgh
Forfar Artillery—Sheerness
Fife Artillery—Pendennis
2nd Lanark—Dublin
Stirling—Shorncliffe

IRELAND (12).

Antrim Rifles—Aldershot
Antrim Artillery—Shorncliff.
North Cork—Ayr & Hamilton
Donegal—Yarmouth & Deptford
Dublin (city)—Plymouth
Dublin City Artillery—Colchester
Fermanagh—Chester
Kerry—Dublin.
Limerick (County) Plymouth
Louth (Rifles)—Crisle & Bury
Tipperary Artil.—Gosport
Waterford Artillery—Hasler

* The 1st Tower Hamlets is called the "King's own Light Infantry."

TATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th October).

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

ir, 90, sc., Capt. C. F. Schomberg, 1851
annel Fleet.
12, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
, sury.-v., Com. J. Ward (b), 1858, E. Ind.
ture, sc. store-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856,
st Indies.
mnon, 91, sc., Capt. T. Hope, 1852,
diterranean.
0, screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846
ast Guard.
17, sc., Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific
ne, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. Arthur,
54, East Indies.
, 91, screw, Capt. G. W D. O'Callaghan,
46, Channel Fleet.
yst, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
on, 36, sc., Capt. T. Cochran, 1857,
annel Fleet.
ne, 18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855,
rth America and West Indies.
, 13, screw, Capt. W. N. W. Hewelt, V.C.,
ting), Coast of Africa.
, 3, steam-vessel, Com. J. E. Parish, 1857,
olwich.
6, st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram,
56, Mediterranean.
nt, 47. screw, Capt. W. Edmonstone,
53, Portsmouth.
, Capt. G. T. Gordon, 1846, Portsmouth.
nce, screw store-ship, East Indies.
nce, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856,
diterranean.
a, 16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North
erica and West Indies.
4, Com. E. Wilson, 1845, Greenock.
e, 2, st.-vessel, Com. C. A. Campbell,
58, Mediterranean.
r, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins.
9, East Indies.
, 6, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854,
rth America and West Indies.
4, sc., Com. E. Hay, 1858, Portsmouth.
agle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley,
4, particular service.
m, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848,
ast Guard.
en, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F.
Grey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B.,
5, Cape of Good Hope.
r, 2, sc.-gunbt., Lieut. Com. A. R. Owen,
2, Devonport.
16, sc., Capt. A. F. R. D'Horsey, 1857,
pe of Good Hope.
dia, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris,
9, Portsmouth.
st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854,
ast of Africa.
ick, 80, sc, Captain E. Ommanney, 1846,
diterranean.
, screw, Mas.-Com. A. Brown, 1854, par-
ular service.
, 2, sc.-gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes
6, East Indies.
d, 6, st.-vessel, Com. F. Peel, 1855, S.E.
ast of America.
s, 21, sc., Capt. H. S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854,
diterranean.
90, screw, Capt T. H. Mason, 1849,
diterranean.
, 18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
an, 40, Captain J. J. M'Cleverty, C.B.,
8 East Indies.
dge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jerning-
n, 1851, Devonport.

Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, E. Indies.
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle, 1847, Mediterranean.
Centaur, 6, st.-vessel, Com. E. D'o. D'a, Aplin, 1853, Devonport.
Centurion. 80, sc., Capt. G. E. Patey, 1846, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Rear-Admiral J. Hope, C.B., Capt. G. O. Willes, 1856, East Indies.
Clio, 22, sc., Capt. F. Miller, 1855, Devonport.
Clown, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855, 1842, East Indies.
Cockchafer, 2, sc.-gunbt. Lieut.-Com. H. L. Holder, 1854, Devonport.
Conflict, 8, sc., Com. R. W. Courtenay, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Conqueror, 101, screw. Capt. W. J. C. Clifford, C.B., 1847, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc.. Com. the Hon. F. A. Foley, 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, sc., Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Cossack, 20, sc., Capt. R. Moorman, 1857, North America and West Indies.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. the Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, Mediterranean.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com W. Greet, 1854, off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com, J. Bythesea, 1856, East Indies.
Cumberland, 70, Capt. E. B. Rice, 1855, Sheernes
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. A. Phillimore, 1855, S. E. Coast of America.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, Portsmouth.
Dauntless, 31, sc., Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B. 1854, Coast Guard.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast-Com. T C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Devastation, 6, st.-ves, Com. J. K. E. Baird, 1857, North America, and West Indies.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. J. H. Cockburn, 1850, Channel Fleet.
Donegal, 101, sc., Capt., W. F. Glanville, 1846, Devonport.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Mediterranean.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. R. Blane, 1856, East Indies.
Eagle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard.
Edgar, 91, sc., Rear-Adm. J. E. Erskine, Capt. J. E. Katon, 1856, Gibraltar.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. E. C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H. Campion, 1855, Australia.
Emerald, 51, sc. Capt. A. Cumming, 1854 Channel Fleet.
Encounter, 14, screw, Capt. R. Dew, 1858, Devonport.
Esk, 20, sc., Sir. R. J. Le M. M'Clure, C.B., 1850, East Indies.
Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852, Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett, C.B., 1850, Portsmouth.
Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. J. J. Stopford, 1841, Mediterranean.

Fairy, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Albert yacht, Portsmouth.
Falcon, 17, sc., Com. A. G. Fitzroy, 1857, Coast of Africa.
Ferret, 8, Com. W. E. Fisher, 1856, part. serv.,
Firebrand, 6, st.-vessel, Com. J. Dayman, 1858, particular service.
Firm, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton, 1854, East Indies.
Fisguard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drummond, C.B., Woolwich
Flamer, sc. gunboat, Lieut. Com. H. M. Bingham, 1851, Portsmouth.
Flying Fish, 6, c., Com. C. W. Hope, 1854, Particular Service.
Forester, 2, sc. gunbt, Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes, 1853, East Indies.
Formidable, 84, Capt. R. B. Watson. C.B., 1842, Sheerness.
Forward, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. C. R. Robson, 1851, South America.
Furious, 16, st.-ves., Capt. O. J. Jones, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Fury, 6, st.-ves., Com. W. A. J. Heath, 1856, E. Indies.
Ganges, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B., Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
Gannett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854, Mediterranean.
Gladiator, 6, st.-vessel, Commander H. D. Hickley (1858), N. America and W. Indies.
Gorgon, 6, st.-ves. Com. B. C. T. Pim, 1858, North America and West Indies.
Grapler, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. A. P. H. Helby, 1849, Pacific.
Grasshopper, sc gunboat, Lt.-Com. J. C. Tucker, 1855, Portsmouth.
Growler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E. Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
Hannibal, 91, sc., Rear-Admiral G. R. Mundy, Capt. M. Connolly, 1858, Mediterranean.
Hardy, 2, sc.-gbt. Lieut.-Com. A. G. Bogle, 1855, Portsmouth.
Hastings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Mends, C.B., 1852, Coast Guard.
Haughty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Broad, 1851, East Indies.
Havannah, 19, Capt. T. Harvey, 1848, Pacific.
Havock, 2, sc.-gunbt, Lieut.-Com. C. Fairholme, 1851, Portsmouth.
Hawke, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast G.
Herald, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846, Feejee Islands.
Hermes, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854 Cape of Cood Hope.
Hero, 91, screw, Capt. G. H. Seymour, C.B., 1844, Channel Fleet.
Hesper, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846, East Indies.
Hibernia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Codrington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B., 1845, Malta.
Highflyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Himalaya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe, 1855, particular service
Hogue, 60, screw, Capt. R. J. J. G. Macdonald, 1854, Coast Guard
Hydra, 6, st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857, Devonport.
Illustrious, 72, Com. H. C. Harston, 1845, Portsmouth.
Imaum, 72, Commodore H. Kellett, C.B., Com. H. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
Impregnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds, K.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Impereuse, 51, screw, Rear-Adm. L. T. Jones, C.B., Capt. R. Maguire, 1854, East Indies.
Indus, 78, Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B. Capt. W. K. Hall, C.B., 1853, North Americ, and West Indies.
Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841, South America.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brooke 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Com. J. H. Marryat, 1855, Mediterranean.
Iris, 26, Commodore W. Loring, C.B., Australia.
Jackal, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. G. E. Murray, 1846, particular service.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1841, Mediterranean.
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Knevitt, 1855, East Indies.
Jasper, 1, sc. gun-vessel, Lt.-Com. W. H. Fyn 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat. Lieut.-Com. G. D Bevan, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1856, Mediterranean.
Lee, 1, screw gun-vessel, Lieut.-Com. ——, East Indies.
Leopard, 18, st.-ves., Rear-Admiral Sir S. Lushington, K.C.B., Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Leven, 1, sc. gun-vessel, Lt.-Com. J. S. Hudson, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, CB., 1858, Mediterranean.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1848, particular service.
London, 90, screw, Capt. H. Chads, 1848, Mediterranean.
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, store ship, Capt. R. D. White, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Mæander, 44, Capt. Sir M. Mac'Gregor, 1856, Portsmouth.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. J. E. Commerell (acting), E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Fanshawe, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Mars, 80, sc., Capt. J. N. Strange, 1854, Plymth.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B. 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Melpomene, 50, screw, Capt. C. J. F. Ewart, 1855, Channel Fleet.
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, Channel Fleet.
Minotaur, Capt. E. P. Halsted 1842, Sheerness
Mohawk, 4, screw. Com. P. C. C. Mc'Dougall, 1856, Portsmouth.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Syndercomb, (acting), Woolwich.
Naiad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. Dillon, 1843, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B Grant, 1851 apprentice ship.
Neptune, 91, screw, Capt. Sir W. Hoste, Bart., 1848, particular service.
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. G. P. Mends, 1858, Australia.
Nile, 90, sc., Capt. A. P. E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, North America and West Indies.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com. R. J. Wynniatt, acting, East Indies.
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Page, 1852, South Coast of America.
Odin, 16, steam-vessel, Capt. Lord J. Hay, C.B., 1854, Portsmouth.
Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. J. J. B. E. Frere, 1854 Mediterranean.
Osborne, st.-vessel, Mas. Com. G. H. K. Bowe, 1842, particular service.

Osprey, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1855, Mediterranean
Pearl, 21, screw, Capt. J. Borlase, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Pelorus, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1851, Australia.
Pembroke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, Coast Guard.
Perseverance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 1850, particular service.
Persian, 12, CommanderE. Hardinge 1856, Cape of Good Hope.
Pioneer, 6, sc, Com. H. A. Reilly, 1858, E.Indies.
Plover, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. B. Smith (acting), East Indies.
Plumper, 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, Pacific.
Pluto, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 1848, Coast of Africa
Porcupine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1851, particular service.
Princess Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G. Thomsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
Princess Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, Mediterranean
Prometheus, 3, st.-ves., Com. G. Skipwith, 1842, Woolwich.
Pylades, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, Pacific
Qua'l, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. Osborn 1856, Mediterranean.
Queen Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, Capt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
Racer, 11, screw, Com. the Hon. T. A. Pakenham 1856, North America and West Indies.
Racoon, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1851, Mediterranean.
Recruit, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Mediterranean.
Renard, 4, screw, Com. J. G. Goodenough, 1858, East Indies.
Renown, 91, sc Capt. A. Forbes, 1846 Mediter.
Retribution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. Edgell, East Indias.
Rhadamanthus, 4, st. ves., Master-Com. F. R Sturdee, 1843, particular service.
Ringdove, 4, sc., Com. R. G. Craigie, 1856, Portsmouth.
Roebuck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, East Indies.
Rolla, 6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Portsmouth.
Royal Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley, Bt.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport.
Royal Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. Freemantle, K.C.B., Capt. H. J. Lacon, 1856, Channel Fleet.
Russell, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast Guard.
St. Jean D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thompson, 1847, Mediterranean.
St Vincent, 102, Rear Admiral the Hon. G. Grey, Capt. T. Wilson, 1852, Portsmouth.
Sampson, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, East Indies.
Saracen, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, E. Ind.
Satellite, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856, Pacific.
Saturn, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, Pembroke.
Scourge, 6, sc., Com. Prince of Langenberg 1857, Mediterranean.
Scout, 21, sc., Capt. J. Corbett, 1857, E. Indies.
Scylla, 21, sc., Capt. R. Lambert, 1855, particular service.
Seagull, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 1850, particular service.
Sharpshooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Sidon, 22, st.-ves., Capt. R. B. Crawford, 1856, Cape of Good Hope.
Simoom, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1852, particular service.
Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South East Coast of America.
Skipjack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, West Indies.
Slaney, 2, sc. gunbt., Lt.-Com. H. R. Leet, 1855, East Indies.
Snake, 4, sc., Com. H. Harvey, 1857, E. Indies.
Snap, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. O. Butler, 1855, Devonport.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Byng, 1856, East Indies.
Sphinx, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. F. Day, V.C., 1855, Portsmouth.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lt.-Com. ——, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut.-Com. J. Hanmer, 1848, South East Coast of America.
Starling, sc.-gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Whitshed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2, sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pollard, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Balliston, 1845, Woolwich.
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, C. of Africa.
Tartar, 20, sc., Capt. H. Dunlop, 1850, W. Indies and N. America.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1855, South East Coast of America.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse, C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Topaze, 51, sc., Capt. the Hon. J. W. S. Spencer, 1854, Pacific.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Burnett, C.B., 1851, Ascension.
Trafalgar, 91, sc., Capt. E. G. Fanshawe, 1845, Channel Fleet.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby, 1846, Pacific.
Trident, 6, st.-v. Com. F. A. Close, 1854, Portsmouth.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Burton, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc. troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, particular service.
Valorous, 16, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B. 1853, West Indies.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, Commodore C. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B., 1850, Mediterranean.
Victoria and Albert, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J. Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt. A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com. ———, Coast of Africa.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B. Dunn, 1856 particular service.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858, Pacific.
Vulcan, 6, screw troop-ship, Com. A. C. Stroke 1856, particular service.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., Captain F. A. Campbell, 1856, Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1851, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc. gunbt. st. East Indies.
Weasel, 2, sc gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Howorth, 1855, Devonport.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Wellington, 72, Capt. R. S. Robinson, 1840, Devonport.
Weser, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. J. Raby, 1855, V.C Woolwich.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Nosanquet, 1855, East Indies.

LIST OF H. M. INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to the 23rd June, 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command.

Acbar, 22, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wellesley, C.B., R.N. Commander-in-Chief I. N.; Capt. J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, Bombay; Mas.-Com. H. W. Grounds, 1856, Gunnery Officer.

Auckland, 6, paddle, Com. J. Stephens, 1848, Red Sea.

Assyria, 2, paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies, 1858, River Indus.

Assaye, 10, paddle, Commander J. N. dams, 1857, Bombay.

Augusta, 6, sch.-yacht, tender to Acbar, Bombay.

Australian, screw troop ship, Master-Com. — Boon, 1858, Bengal.

Berenice, 2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com. A. W. Chitty, 1847, Bombay.

Becas, 6, flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1851, River Indus.

Charlotte, 4, Lieut.-Com. W. Collingwood, 1855, Persian Gulf.

Clive, 12, Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, Trauzibar.

Constance, 3, Lieut.-Com. J. B. Dickson, 1851, Red Sea.

Comet, 5, paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby, 1855, River Euphrates.

Conqueror, 2, paddle, Master-Commander T. Linton, 1849, River Indus.

Coromandel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. H. A. Fraser, 1846, Bay of Bengal.

Chenaub, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. Gourley, 1858, River Indus.

Cursetjee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, Indus.

Clyde, 4, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon, 1847, Bombay.

Dalhousie, screw troop ship, Com. F. W. Hopkins, 1858, Bay of Bengal.

Dromedary, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.

Elphinstone, 12, Lieut.-Com. C. E. Brooman, 1848, Bombay.

Euphrates, Flat, Master-Com. W. Walton, 1858, River Indus.

Ethersey, Flat, Master-Com. T. Jones, 1858, River Indus.

Feroox, 10, paddle, Commander C. J. Cruttenden, 1855, Bombay.

Freere, 2, paddle, Master Commander J. McNeil, 1852, River Indus.

Falkland, 12, Commodore G. Jenkins, C.B., Persian Gulf.

Goolanair, paddle yacht, Master-Commander T. Kennelly, 1850, Bombay

Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. F. Warden, 1858, Andamans.

Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. A. F. Neale, 1853, River Indus.

Jhelum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. R. L. Lawson, 1856, River Indus.

Keddywarree, guard ship, Lieut. E. Giles, 1847, Port Officer. Kurrachee.

Lady Falkland, paddle tender to Acbar.

Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Fryer, 1846, Red Sea.

Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whish, 1842, Persian Gulf.

Marié, 3, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Constable, 1845, Surveying Vessel, Persian Gulf.

Mootree, 1, pendant ves., Capt. E. W. Daniell, 1857, Kotree.

Napier, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. Forster, 1851, River Indus.

Nimrod, 2, paddle, Master-Commander J. B. Butler, 1856, River Indus.

Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. A. Harrison, 1858, River Indus.

Outram, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Fivey, 1858, River Indus.

Planet, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. K. Fletcher, 1853, River Indus.

Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Fouleston, 1857, Calcutta

Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, Bombay.

Pleiad, 2, screw, Mas.-Com. D. White, 1858, Bombay.

Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. ———, River Indus.

Sutledge, Flat, Master-Com.——, River Indus.

Satellite, 2, paddle, Master-Com. A. Wilkins, 1852, River Indus.

Semiramis, 10, paddle, Com. W. Balfour, 1855, Bombay.

Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.

Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. D. Morrison, 1858, River Indus.

Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1845, River Indus.

Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com. ———, Bay of Bengal

Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Persian Gulf.

Victoria, 5, paddle, Lieut.-Com. T. S. H. Twynham, 1845, Bombay.

Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. F. E. Mannes, — 1857, Persian Gulf.

BENGAL NAVAL BRIGADE.

Head Quarters, Calcutta, Capt. C. D. Campbell, 1857.

1st Company, Fort William, Lieut.-Com. J. Huclock, 1858.

2nd Company, Mootyhary, Lieut-Com. J. H. B. Bavon, 1859.

3rd Company, Chuprall, Lieut.-Com. C. B. Templer, 1857.

4th Company, Allipore, Lieut.-Com. R. Carey, 1856.

5th Company, Dumdum, Lieut. Com. H. W. H. Barnes, 1857.

6th Company, Dacca, Lieut.-Com. H. W. Eldridge, 1847.

7th Company Sasseram, Lieut.-Com. G. O. B. Carew, 1853.

8th do. Barackpore, Lieut.-Com. W. H. M. Davis, 1849.

9th Company, Patna, Lieut.-Com. D. S. Duval, 1854.

10th Company, Jeypore, Lieut.-Com. A. T. Windus, 1851.

11th Company, Andaman Islands, Lieut.-Com. H. Jackson, 1855.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

Commander to be Captain—John Stephens, 1848.

Lieutenant to be Commander—R. A. Straddling, 1844.

Mates to be Lieutenants—R. B. Leefe, 1854 H. J. Edwardes, 1856.

APPOINTMENTS.

Captain—J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, to Acbar, Flag-ship.

Lieutenants—L. G. Lewis, acting, 1856; C. E. Beddome, acting, 1859; C. Forster, 1856; A. D. Taylor, 1847; R. Williams, acting, 1855, to Acbar; J. G. Nixon, 1847, to command sc. gunbt. Clyde; C. E. Brooman, 1848, to command Elphinstone; F. W. Shottowe, 1856, to Semiramis; J. Brebner, acting, 1859, to Semiramis; C. V. D'Arcy, acting, 1858, to Elphinstone; B. Ch. S. Clarke, acting, 1859, to Elphinstone; F. L. Seaton, acting, 1857, to Feroox; J. Clarke, 1857, to Aukland; J. B. Dickson, 1851, to to command Constance; C. E. Beddome, acting 1859, to be Inspector of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company; R. B. Leefe, to be Superintendent of Pattimars.

Acting Masters—D. White, 1858, to command Pleiad.

Midshipmen—J. D. Budd; H. W. Estridge H. Hewer to Acbar; W. Marshall; J. A. Kettley to Elphinstone; C. Williams; R. Richmond to Semiramis; A. Cambell to Assaye.

Clerks—F. W. Daniell, to Indus Flotilla; H. Barrett to Assaye; A. T. Shuttleworth, 1855, to Clyde, in charge; A. S. Finlinson to Semiramis, in charge.

855, to *Renard*; Thomas Coghlan, 1853, to *Beagle*; James Martin, to *Ringdove;* J. C. Eastcott, 1855, *ke* ; J. W. S. Meiklejohn, M.D., to *Royal Albert*; W. J. Shone, (additional), to *Impregnable*; Wal- Bluett, 1855, to *Hastings* ; C. R. y, 1855 (additional), to *Britannia*; rd Evans, 1851, to *Weser*; J. B. y, 1855, to *Formidable* ; Robert ton, 1850 (additional), to *Fis-*

ing Assistant Surgeons—D. A. , M.D. 1859, to *Asia*; E. J. But- l James Clarkson (additional), to *y*; J. M. Bateson and M. Coates ional), to *Impregnable*; J. A. Yule ional), to *Arrogant*; J. M. Hunter *n*; F. J. Withers to *Encounter*; McInnes to *Centaur;* James John- d.D., to *Sphinx*; C. J. Fennell to *im*; G. Goodman to *Aboukir.*

es—H. B. Hamersley, 1858, and Seymour, 1859, to *Imperieuse* ; J. Leacock, 1859, to *Encounter*; C. acdonald, 1859, to *Encounter*; F. Broughton (acting) to *Mars.*

nd Masters—J. S. Watts, 1854, to *ove*; Philip Syvret (additional), to *nia*; A. F. Gibbons to *Cæsar*; G. son, 1856, to *Weazel*; Charles W. o *Weser*; J. W. M. Burnett, 1849 onal), to *Cumberland*; Thomas G. to *Snap*; William Haydon, 1856, *ncer*; Silas Vicary, 1857, to *Grass-* ; G. D. Rickards to *Flamer.*

masters—William Rogers, 1857, *metheus* ; T. W. Spear to *Ardent* ; P. Foord, 1855 (additional), to *Adelaide* ; Isaac Hearnden, 1857, *nard* ; John Wotton, 1859, to *rland.* John Donald, 1853, to *n* ; J. M. Sweatman, 1854 (addi- to *Cumberland.*

stant Paymasters-in-Charge—H. st, 1855, to *Snake.*

stant Paymasters—J. T. Farwell, to *Sphinx* ; C. L. Brockman, 1857, *phion* ; Henry E. Kitchen, 1857 *rge*) to *Weser*; Charles K. Harvey, to *Hastings* ; C. P. Fielon, 1851, *ounter* ; J. W. R. Galsworthy, to *Odin.*

f Engineers—George Green, 1851, *ounter*; James Eyres, 1847, to *Cen-* J. T. Williams, 1855, to *Galatea* ; Layland to *Forte.*

al Instructors (acting)—R. Wink- d T. Barnes to *Britannia.*

stant Engineers—J. H. Taegilgas *ass*), W. Castle (2nd Class), and Whitting (3rd Class), to *Weser*; C. J. Martin (2nd Class) to *Clio* ; Perte Murray (Acting 3rd Class) to *Asia*, to take temporary charge of *Rainbow*; Jas. Orchard (2nd Class) to *Prometheus* : John Bell (2nd Class) to *Clio* ; J. A. Kitt (Acting 2nd Class) to *Nile* ; H. W. Tregilgas (3rd Class) to *Cockchafer.* *3rd Class*—Andrew Templeton (Acting) to *Biter* ; Thomas Wilson to *Lizard* ; A. H. Hersee and G. T. Crook to *Wellington* ; T. P. Potts to *Princess Royal.* *Acting 3rd Class*—W. Walker and J. Robertson to *Wellington* ; D. Dunn to *Asia* ; J. Finlay to *Diadem* ; G. Boyd to *Urgent* ; W. Barclay and W. Landells to *Perseverance* ; J. McLaren to *Amphion.* *2nd Class*—W. Holland and J. Ferguson to *Encounter* ; F. Julian and J. Henley to *Centaur*; R. J. Serjeant to *Cockchafer*; John West to *Snap.* *3rd Class*—J. Derbyshire to *Encounter* : J. McGough to *Royal Albert.*

Second Class Assistant Engineers—F. W. Sutton (b), to *Redwing;* Thomas Bower to *Bouncer.*

Acting Third Class Assistant Engineers—G. Patterson and J. King to *Simoom.*

Midshipmen—H. J. Fairlie to *Mars*; R. Evans and E. F. Keppel to *Donegal*; C. Wodehouse and H. H. Rawson to *Encounter;* R. E. Stopford to *Odin;* H. McHardy, R. S. Byng, and W. G. P. O'Callaghan, to *Aboukir*; F. H. S. O'Brien to *Imperieuse* ; A. T. Dale to *Nile;* A. L. Douglas to *Arrogant;* A. K. Wilson to *Amphion*; C. R. T. Russell, F. T. Holdsworth, and H. B. S. Cobb to *Agamemnon;* R. F. Britten to *Topaze*; G. A. W. Birch and H. J. Hesketh to *James Watt*; T. S. Jackson to *Melpomene*; James Buchanan to *Pearl*; Hugh S. Baillie to *Sphinx*; A. D. Douglas to *Centaur*; P. B. Nind to *Mersey*; D. D. Freemantle to *Odin.*

Masters' Assistants—S. M. Spry to *Beagle*; G. K. Whitehead to *Perseverance*; G. H. Downing to *Nautilus*; S. S. Swan to *Royal Albert*; T. Robinson to *Simoom*; G. K. Whitehead (acting) to *Beagle*; H. E. Wood to *Odin.*

Clerks—Russell Hill to *Topaze*; Theodore A. W. Smyth to *Diadem*; G. A. Rowe to *Impregnable*; J. P. Dore to *Centaur*; John Ashton to *Encounter*; Albert Allen and D. P. Sambell to *Pearl*; J. A. P. Williams to *Chesapeake*; John Chambers to *Blenheim.*

Assistant Clerks—H. Ellis to *Ajax* ; A. S. Binslow to *Cornwallis*; G. L. Miller to *Hogue* ; C. P. Walker to *Eagle* ; G. J. Vaux to *Urgent* ; James Cox and

..o be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice ..er, who retires.

..h—Lieut. T. W. Sheppard to be ..in, by purchase, vice Layton, who ..s; Ensign H. M. C. Legh to be ..enant, by purchase, vice Sheppard.

..d—Lieut. E. Lakin to be Instruc- Musketry.

..d—Ensign E. Jarvis, from the 14th to be Ensign, vice Boyd, promoted.

..h—H. W. Estridge, gent., to be ..n by purchase, vice Speke, pro- ..t.

..h—Capt. W. H. Rowland, from 2nd Foot, to be Capt., vice Trevor, ..xchanges.

..h—Ensign J. Lovell, to be Lieut. ..urchase, vice King-Harman, who ..s.

..d—J. Thacker, gent., to be En- vice Knowles, promoted.

..h—Lieut. Col. and Brevet Col. Ewart, C.B., from the 93rd Foot, Lieut. Col., vice Brevet Colonel ..d, C.B., who exchanges.

..h—Ensign C. H. Jackson to be ..uctor of Musketry.

..d—Ensign J. R. S. Carruthers to ..ieut. by purchase, vice Gordon, ..oted.

..d—Lieut. Col. and Brevet Col. ..Stisted, C.B., from the 78th Foot, Lieut. Col., vice Brevet Colonel ..t, C.B., who exchanges.

..h—W. G. Buller, gent. to be En- without purchase, vice French, ..oted.

West India Regiment—Lieut. W. ..ss to be Captain without purchase, Brevet Major Pratt, deceased; ..n W. Ormsby to be Lieut. with- ..urchase, vice Ross, July 30; En- W. P. Gilborne to be Lieutenant ..ut purchase, vice Molony, deceased, 21; Serjeant Major J. Atkinson, the 2nd West India Regiment, to ..sign without purchase, vice Orms- ..F. Barry, gent., to be Ensign ..ut purchase, vice Gilborne.

West India Regiment—Captain Davies, from Half Pay 51st Foot, Captain, vice D. A. Patterson, ap- ..d Paymaster Royal Artillery; W. Cooke O'Shaughnessy to be by purchase, vice Davies, who ..s.

..SPITAL STAFF—Surg. R. McNab, from the 5th Foot, to be Surgeon, ..eid, appointed to the 5th Foot; ..ant Surgeon W. L. Baker, from ..th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon, ..aylor, deceased.

To be Assistant Surgeons—J. A. B. Horton, M.D., vice Abbot, promoted on the Staff, Sept. 5; W. B. Davies, M.D.

BREVET—Capt. C. A. Baines, 16th Foot, to be Major in the Army, Nov. 11th, 1851; Brevet Major C. A. Baines, 16th Foot, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army, Oct. 28, 1858. The undermentioned Gentleman Cadet of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, at present doing duty at the Royal Engineer Establishment at Chatham, to have the local and temporary rank of Lieut. while employed on that Establishment:—R. P. Pennefather.

Memorandum—The Christian names of Brevet Lieut. Peel, Major on Half Pay Unattached, are Edmund Yates.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Westmoreland—G. P. R. Jones, gent., to be Lieut., Sept. 12.

Lancashire Artillery—Second Lieut. R. Hall to be First Lieut., vice W. Walker, promoted, Sept. 20.

Oxfordshire—C. F. King, gent., to be Ensign, vice Ramsay, promoted Sept. 22.

Prince of Wales Renfrew—Lieut. C. B. Thomson to be Capt., vice Latham, resigned; Ensign A. W. Bridge to be Lieut., vice Thomson, promoted; Ensign H. B. Dunlop to be Lieut., vice Cameron, removed in consequence of long absence without leave, Sept. 22.

Edinburgh City Artillery—First Lt. G.C. Finlay to be Capt., from 8th Sept., 1859, vice Nicol, resigned; Second Lt. J. G. Davidson to be First Lieut., from 8th Sept., 1859, vice Finlay, promoted, Sept. 22.

Northumberland Artillery—A. L. Gracey, Esq., A.M., M.D., late Senior Surgeon to the Turkish Contingent, to be Surgeon, vice Nettlefold, resigned, Sept. 21.

5th Middlesex—R. H. Bolton, gent., to be Assist. Surgeon, vice Gibson, resigned, Sept. 17.

Memorandum—3rd Middlesex—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission in this Regiment held by Lieut. W J. Ralfs.

5th Middlesex—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission in this Regiment held by Assist. Surgeon J. E. Gibson.

Leicestershire Yeomanry Cavalry—Lieut. W. E. Welby to be Captain, vice Hon. H. D. Curzon, resigned; Cornet G. H. Littledale to be Lieutenant, vice Sir

F. Heygate, resigned, Sept. 19; Cornet G. H. Finch to be Lieutenant, vice Welby, promoted, Sept. 22; C. Phillips, gent., to be Cornet, vice Finch, promoted, Sept. 19.

VOLUNTEER RIFLES GAZETTE.

7th Company Lancashire—J. Hargreaves, jun., Esq., to be Capt., Sept. 10.

9th Company Lancashire—J. F. Greenall, Esq., to be Captain, Sept. 16.

10th Company Lancashire—W. A. F. Saunders, Esq., to be Captain; H. Gregson, gent., to be Lieutenant, Sept. 20.

2nd Company Kent—G. A. Young, Esq., late Capt. East Kent Regiment of Militia, to be Captain; G. Burgess, gent., to be Lieutenant; O. F. Daniel, gent., to be Ensign, Sept. 18.

7th Company Gloucestershire—Capt. R. D. Gibney to be Captain, Sept. 20.

[Erratum in the *Gazette* of the 16th Sept.] For the "Bristol Regiment of Rifle Volunteers," read the "City of Bristol Rifle Volunteer Corps."

5th Company Cheshire—Sir C. W. Shakerley, Bart., to be Captain, F. H. R. Wilbraham, Esq., to be Lieutenant, A. I. Solly, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 15.

1st Company Norfolk—G. Middleton, Esq., to be Captain, R. Seaman, Esq., to be Lieutenant, A. J. Creswell to be Ensign, Aug. 31. 2nd Company—H. S. Patteson, Esq., to be Captain, H. Morgan, Esq., to be Lieutenant, C. Foster, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 1. 3rd Company—F. H. Gurney, Esq., to be Capt., J. M. Croker, Esq., to be Lieutenant, C. H. Gurney, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 2. 4th Company—J. H. Orde, Esq., to be Captain, E. P. Youell, Esq., to be Lieutenant, J. Tomlinson, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 3. 5th Company—Brevet Col. W. Swatman, to be Captain, F. J. Creswell, Esq., to be Lieutenant, Sept. 5.

2nd Royal Lanarkshire—W. Porter, gent., to be Ensign, vice Blake, resigned, Sept. 20.

Memorandum—Under the title "Commissions signed by the Lord Lieutenant of the City and County of the City of Edinburgh, and Liberties thereof," in the *Gazette* of the 6th inst., for the City of Edinburgh Volunteer Rifle Corps, read the City of Edinburgh Rifle Volunteer Corps; for James Moncrieff, Esq., M.P., read James Moncrieff, M.P., to be Lieutenant for Colonel; Charles Farquhar, Shand, Esq., read Charles Farquhar Shand, Esq.; for Thomas Graham, Murray, gent., read Thomas Graham Murray, gent.

1st Company Pembrokeshire—G. S. Clarke, Esq., to be Lieut., Sept. 21.

7th Company Lancashire—R. E. Green, gent., to be Lieut., W. Watson, gent., to be Ensign, Sept. 20.

1st Company Cornwall—Major Gen. G. B. Tremenhere to be Captain, Sept. 10. H. Dobree, Esq., to be Lieutenant, T. Cornish, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 10.

1st Company Cornwall Artillery—C. G. P. Brune, Esq., to be Captain; J. Tredwen, gent., to be First Lieutenant.

3rd Company Renfrewshire—A. Fullerton, gent., to be Captain; W. Carlile, gent., to be Lieutenant; J. A. MacEwan, gent., to be Ensign, Sept. 22. 4th Company—A. Crum, gent., to be Captain, R. G. Lowndes, gent., to be Lieutenant, Sept. 22.

Wooton or 2nd Surrey Subdivision—H. W. Kerrich, Esq., to be Lieut., R. Barclay, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 9.

Brixton or 4th Surrey Company—T. Eman, Esq., to be Captain; E. G. Syms, Esq., to be Lieut., Sept. 10.

[The following appointments are substituted for those which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 13th inst.]

Reigate or 5th (and not the 4th) Surrey Company—The Hon. W. J. Monson to be Captain; F. H. Beaumont, Esq., to be Lieut.; H. Lainson, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 2.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 13th inst.]

1st Company Northamptonshire—The Right Hon. J. Poyntz, Earl Spencer, to be Captain, Aug. 29.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of 26th Aug. last.]

3rd Company Essex—J. C. Davis, Esq., to be Captain, Aug. 12.

[The following appointments are substituted for those which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 9th inst.]

3rd Company Essex—W. H. Chilton, Esq., to be Lieut.; H. M. Harvey, Esq., to be Ensign, Aug. 27.

WAR OFFICE, Oct. 7.

(*The following Commissions to bear date Oct. 7.*)

3rd Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Cornet E. Brett to be Instructor of Musketry, Sept. 7.

7th Light Dragoons—Cornet L. Metcalfe to be Instructor of Musketry, Sept. 13.

16th Light Dragoons—W. J. Wa-

gent., to be Cornet by purchase
Harmar, promoted.
ral Artillery—Brevet Col. C. J.
n to be Col., vice Bloomfield, re-
l as a General Officer; Brevet
A. Thompson to be Lieut. Col.,
Dalton; Brevet Major C. E. Older-
o be Capt., vice Thompson; Lieut.
Maude to be Second Captain, vice
Shaw, Sept. 25; Lieut. R. H. D.
n has been permitted to resign his
ission, Nov. 15; Lieut. J. H.
has been permitted to resign his
ission, Sept. 24; Surgeon J. R. M.
M.D., from the 60th Foot, to be
on, vice Savage, placed upon Half

ral Engineers—Lieut. G. Longley
Second Captain, vice Bailey,
on the Seconded List, Sept. 19.
Regiment of Foot—Ensign A. T.
to be Instructor of Musketry, Aug.

—Ensign J. C. Wadling to be
by purchase, vice Mason, pro-

—Lieut. C. J. Borton to be Ad-
, vice M'Queen, promoted without
ase, to an Unattached Company.
h—Ensign A. M. Rowan to be
by purchase, vice Moffet, whose
tion by purchase on the 4th March,
has been cancelled; J. A. P. K.
ood, gent., to be Ensign without
ase, vice Rowan.
h—For Capt. A. B. White, from
7th Light Dragoons, to be Capt.,
Allen, who exchanges, receiving the
nce between Infantry and Cavalry,
ted in the *Gazette* of 30th ult.,
vice Allen, who exchanges, paying
difference between Infantry and
ry.
h—For Capt. A. Grammell, from
h Light Dragoons, to be Capt.,
. K. Rendall, who exchanges, re-
g the difference between Infantry
avalry, as stated in the *Gazette* of
lt., read, vice J. K. Rendall, who
nges, paying the difference between
try and Cavalry.
d—Ensign E. A. Carey to be
by purchase, vice O. P. Leigh,
etires.
h—Major F. Fane, from Half Pay
ached, to be Major, vice S. M.
, who exchanges; A. B. Chisholm,
to be Ensign by purchase, vice
, promoted.
d—Ensign M. Lynch to be In-
or of Musketry, vice Aylmer, pro-
in the 8th Foot, Sept. 2.

42nd — Quartermaster Serjeant J. Simpson to be Quartermaster, vice A. M'Gregor, appointed to a Depot Battalion.

60th—Ensign R. R. Gubbins to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Wigg, who retires; J. W. Rhodes, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Lovell, promoted; Surgeon J. Crerar, from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Lewis, appointed to the Royal Artillery.

75th—Brevet Lieut. Col. L. C. Bourchier, to be Lieut. Col. without purchase, vice Brevet Col. Jardine, who retires upon Full Pay; Brevet Lieut. Col. W. C. Mollan, C.B., to be Major without purchase, vice Bourchier.

78th—Lieut. H. B. Savory, from the 90th Foot, to be Lieut., vice C. H. Bindon, who exchanges.

82nd—Ensign W. R. Bunbury, to be Instructor of Musketry, Sept. 3.

90th—Lieut. C. H. Bindon, from the 78th Foot, to be Lieut., vice H. B. Savory, who exchanges.

96th—Lieut. E. J. Scovell, to be Capt. by purchase, vice Barron, who retires; Ensign E. Hogg, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Browning who retires; Ensign F. Reid, to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Scovell.

1st West India Regiment—Lieut. J. D. Mackenzie to be Capt. by purchase, vice Brown, who retires.

3rd West India Regiment—The surname of the Quartermaster appointed on the 16th October, 1855, is spelt "Doorly" instead of "Doorley," as then stated.

Hospital Staff.—To be Assistant Surgeons—Assist. Surg. P. Davidson, M.D., from Half Pay, vice Harris, appointed to the 2nd West India Regiment; Assist. Surg. R. W. Jackson, from the 84th Foot, vice Grant, appointed to the Royal Artillery.

Chaplains' Department.—The Rev. A. West to be Chaplain to the Forces of the Fourth Class, vice the Rev. J. D'A. Sirr, resigned; Sept. 20.

Brevet.—Lieut. Gen. F. Campbell to be gent., vice Evelegh, deceased; Sept. 25.

Lieut. Gen. R. Douglas, C.B., on Retired Full Pay, to be Gen., in consequence of the promotion of Lieut. Gen. F. Campbell, who stood next below him on the Effective List of the Royal Artillery at the date of his retirement; Sept. 25.

Major General W. Cator to be Lieut. Gen., vice Campbell; Sept. 25.

Col. J. Bloomfield, of the Royal Artillery, to be Major Gen., vice Cator; Sept. 25.

The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent on the promotion of Col. Bloomfield, Royal Artillery, to be Major General, in succession to Gen. Evelegh, Royal Artillery, deceased :—

Lieut. Col. M. G. Sparks, 10th Foot, to be Col., Sept. 25.

Brevet Major J. Travers, 3rd West India Regiment, to be Lieut. Col., Sept. 25.

Capt. S. W. H. Hawker, 21st Foot, to be Major, Sept. 25.

Lieut. Col. and Brevet Col. A. Jardine, having retired upon Full Pay, 75th Foot, to have the honorary rank of Major General.

Capt. C. Rice, of the 72nd Foot, to be Major in the Army.

Capt. G. C. Clowes, 8th Light Dragoons, to be Major in the Army.

Major J. E. Hughes, 47th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army.

Capt. W. M. Leckie, 13th Bombay Native Infantry, to be Major in the Army.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Hussar Regiment of Yorkshire (West Riding) Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet Reginald D. Marshall to be Lieut., vice Teale, promoted; William W. Wickham, gent., to be Cornet, vice Marshall, promoted; the Hon. C. Maxwele to be Cornet, vice Vyner, promoted, Sept. 23.

Royal Wiltshire—Adjutant W. Blakeny Persse, late Capt. 22nd Regiment, to serve with the rank of Captain, Sept. 22.

Royal Sussex Artillery—E. Hennicker, gent., to be Second Lieutenant, vice Skinner, resigned, Sept. 16.

West Essex Yeomanry Cavalry—E. Disney, Esq., to be Capt., vice Bramstone, resigned, Sept. 27.

West Essex—Lieut. W. M. Wynch to be Captain, vice Way, resigned, Sept. 22.

Royal Lancashire Artillery—First Lieut. W. Walker, to be Capt., vice J. Sothern, resigned.

VOLUNTEER RIFLES GAZETTE.

Norfolk Rifles (5th Company)—S. A. Gurney, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 23.

Norfolk Rifles (1st Sub-division)—W. H. Scott, Esq., to be Lieutenant; H. Augustus Ernuin, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 23.

Essex Rifles (1st Sub-division)—Sir Claude William C. De Crespigny, Bart., to be Lieutenant; J. F. Bishop, Esq., to be Ensign, Sept. 8.

[The foregoing appointments are substituted for those which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 20th ultimo.]

West Riding of Yorkshire 1st Company (York)—T. C. Payley, gent., to be Honorary Surgeon.

Bradford (5th Company)—S. C. Lister, Esq., to be Capt.; W. H. Salt, gent., to be Lieut.; S. M. Smith, gent., to be Ensign; J. Farrar, gent., to be Supernumerary Lieut., on the strength of the Company; J. L. M'Michan, gent., to be Honorary Surg. 6th Company (Bradford)—W. Brayshay, Esq., to be Capt.; A. B. Foster, gent., to be Lieut.; H. S. Hirst, gent., to be Ensign.

Norfolk (1st Company)—S. C. Marsh, Esq., to be Capt.; W. J. Foreman, Esq., to be First Lieut.

Norfolk (2nd Sub-division)—C. Mortlock, Esq., to be Lieut., B. C. Chaston, Esq., to be Ensign.

Wiltshire Rifles—J. Pickney, Esq., to be Ensign of the 1st Company.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Montgomeryshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Richard Robert Wingfield, gent., to be Cornet, vice George William Adair, promoted; Thomas Bulkeley (late Capt. 1st Life Guards) to be Cornet, vice Tripp, promoted, Oct. 7.

Exeter and South Devon Volunteer Rifle Battalion—James Thorne George to be Captain; Frederick Cooke to be Lieutenant; Berkeley Craven St. John to be Ensign; Sept. 23.

Royal Flintshire Militia—Charles W. Shackle, gent., to be Ensign.

1st Sub-division of Suffolk Rifle Volunteers—Charles Foote Gower, gent., to be Lieut.; Henry Howard, gent., to be Ensign.

5th, or Royal Elthorne Light Infantry Regiment of Middlesex Militia—Ensign Octavius Weld to be Lieut., vice Hitchcock, resigned; Arthur Bristow, gent., to be Ensign, vice Weld, promoted; Sept. 30. Memorandum — The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the commission held in this regiment by Lieut. Robert B. Hitchcock.

2nd Company of Lancashire Rifle Volunteers—Thomas Lund, Esq., to be

Arthur Ingram Robinson, gent., ieut. ; James Johnson, gent., to ign ; Oct. 4. 3rd Company—J. l Potter, Esq., to be Capt.; Wm. n, gent., to be Lieut.; J. Eccles, o be Ensign; Oct. 4. 11th Com- Henry Newsham Pedder, Esq., apt. in the 3rd regiment of the f Lancaster's Own Militia, to be James Catterall, gent., to be Lt.; Dawson the younger, gent., to be ; Oct. 4.

of Edinburgh Rifle Volunteer —Joseph Noel Paton, gent., to be ; Oct. 6. The Hon. Bouverie s Primrose to be Capt.; John Cay, to be Lieut.; William Arthur in, to be Ensign; Oct. 7.

norandum — Argyll and Bute —Lieut. George Campbell and Alexander Sinclair have, res- ly, resigned the Commissions held m in this regiment.

HE MILITIA GAZETTE.

nty of Buckingham—The Hon. Cavendish to be Deputy Lieut.; ackwell Tyringham, Esq., to be y Lieut.

nty of Middlesex—T. Critchley, o be Deputy Lieut. ; Oct. 4.

or Royal Elthorne Light Infantry ent of Middlesex Militia—Her- Henry Ducsbury, gent., to be En- ice Boom, resigned ; Oct. 5.

Company Stirlingshire Volunteer Corps—R. Graham Moir, Esq., Captain ; R. Sconce, gent., to be ; Alexander Wilson, jun., to be n.

folk Rifle Volunteers—3rd Sub- n—G. E. Frere, Esq., to be Lieut.; Salmon, Esq., to be Ensign ; Oct. h Subdivision—T. W. Brograve r Beauchamp, Esq., to be Lieut.; Gilbert, Esq., to be Ensign ; Oct.

or Eastern Regiment of Norfolk a—W. F. Windham, gent., to be ; Oct. 19.

ntingdonshire Militia — Edmund r, gent., to be Surgeon ; J. Eden ombe Shafto, Esq., to be Ensign ; .

der of the Lord Lieut. of Wigtown.

MORANDUM.—Her Majesty has pleased to direct that so much of emorandum in the *London Gazette* e 6th February, 1857, as applies displacing of Captain E. H. Max- rom his Commission in "The Gal- Rifles," shall be cancelled, and that the following be inserted in lieu thereof:—G. Augustus Westphal Barry to be Captain, vice Maxwell, resigned ; Jan. 30, 1857.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 20th Sept. last.]

1st Company of Berkshire Volunteer Rifles—Sir Claudius Stephen Paul Hunter, Bart, to be Captain ; Sept. 10.

WAR OFFICE, Oct. 18.

1st Regiment of Dragoon Guards—James Greatorex, gent., to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Crewe, promoted; Oct. 18.

18th Light Dragoons—Capt. John Peyton, from the 13th Foot, to be Captain, paying the difference between Infantry and Cavalry, vice Jones, who exchanges, receiving the same ; Harold Esdale Malet, gent., to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Stopford, appointed to the 8th Light Dragoons; Oct. 18.

6th Foot—Staff Surgeon Alexander Peile Cahill, M.D., to be Surgeon, vice Bindon, appointed to the Staff ; Oct. 18.

9th—Herbert Witherstone Mynors Baskerville, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Eccles, promoted; Oct. 18.

10th—Lieut. George William Graham to be Captain, by purchase, vice Aldersey, who retires; Ensign Charles James Barnett to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Graham; Oct. 18.

13th—Capt. Alfred Stowell Jones, from the 18th Light Dragoons, to be Captain, vice Peyton, who exchanges; Oct. 1.

14th—William Thornhill Blois, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Jervis, appointed to the 33rd Foot ; Oct 18. Thomas Charles Watson, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase; Oct. 19.

15th—Ensign Robert Algeo Mostyn, to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Gibson, who retires; Oct. 18.

16th—Major George John Peacocke, to be Lieut. Colonel, by purchase, vice Brevet Col. Cockell, who retires ; Capt. Charles Rowley Platt to be Major, by purchase, vice Peacocke; Lieut. Arthur Platt to be Captain, by purchase, vice Charles Rowley Platt ; Ensign Charles Tempes Sheringham to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Arthur Platt; Oct. 18.

27th—Brevet Lieut. Col. John Ward, from Half Pay Unattached, to be Major, vice Stapylton, promoted; Brevet Major Richard Freer to be Major, by purchase, vice Ward, who retires; Lieut. William Henry Gresson to be Captain, by purchase, vice Freer; Oct. 18.

30th—Capt. William Deedes, from the Rifle Brigade, to be Captain, vice Wood, who exchanges; Oct. 18.

60th—Capt. James Fraser to be Major, without purchase, vice Yonge, who retires upon full pay; Aubrey Vere O'Brien, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Gubbins, promoted; Oct. 18.

75th—Capt. George Black, from Half Pay Staff Corps, to be Captain, vice Brevet Major Dawson, who exchanges; Lieut. Charles Melville Pym to be Captain, by purchase, vice Black, who retires; Ensign Denzil Hammill to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Pym; Oct. 18.

79th—Lieut. Albert Newby Clay to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Walker, who has been taken on the strength of the Depôt; July 8.

80th—Capt. Hamilton Charles Smith to be Major, by purchase, vice Studdert, who retires; Lieut. Robert James Maxwell to be Captain, by purchase, vice Smith; Ensign Joseph Bramley Ridout to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Maxwell; Oct. 18.

86th—Ensign John Wells to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Knipe, promoted; Oct. 18.

96th—William Yates Foot, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Reid, promoted; Oct. 18.

Rifle Brigade—Captain Henry Wood, from the 30th Foot, to be Captain, vice Deedes, who exchanges: Oct. 18.

Cape Mounted Rifles—Arthur Hales, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Brahant, promoted; Oct. 18.

UNATTACHED.—Lieut. John Yates, from the 11th Light Dragoons, to be Captain, without purchase; Oct. 18.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon Henry Vereker Bindon, from the 6th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Cahill, appointed to the 6th Foot; Oct. 18.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.—Deputy Commissary Gen. William Isaac Greig, having been placed upon the Retired List, and being eligible from length of service and meritorious conduct, to be promoted to the honorary rank of Commissary General; Sept. 17.

Commissariat Clerk Robert Dalrymple Ross, having completed the required service as Acting Deputy Assistant Commissary General on the Western Coast of Africa, to be confirmed in the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissary General, Sept. 17, 1858.

BREVET.—Major General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., to have the local rank of Lieut. General in China; Oct. 18.

Major William James Yonge, retired full pay 60th Foot, to be Lieut. Colonel in the Army, the rank being honorary only; Oct. 18.

Capt. George Black, 75th Foot, to be Major in the Army, June 20, 1854.

Capt. Maxwell Lepper, 86th Foot, to be Major in the Army; July 20, 1858.

Paymaster George Bartley, half pay 54th Foot, having completed in all a service of thirty years, twenty-five of which as Paymaster, to have the honorary rank of Major; Oct. 18.

The undermentioned promotions to take place in her Majesty's Indian Military Forces, consequent on the death of Gen. Sir Robert Henry Cunliffe, Bart., K.C.B., Bengal Infantry; Sept. 10.

Lieut. Gen. James Morse, Bombay Infantry; Sept. 20.

Lieut. Gen. Alexander Lindsay, C.B., Bengal Artillery, to be General; Sept. 11.

Major Gen. Joseph Harris, Bengal Infantry, to be Lieut. General, Sept. 11.

Major Gen. John Tulloch, C.B., Bengal Infantry, to be Lieut. General, Sept. 21.

Col. Thomas David Carpenter, Madras Infantry, to be Major General; Sept. 11.

Col. Thomas Alexander Augustus Munsey, Madras Cavalry, to be Major General; Sept. 21.

The undermentioned officers of her Majesty's Indian Military Forces, retired on full pay, to have a step of honorary rank, as follows, viz.:

To be Major Generals.—Col. H. Templar, Bengal Infantry; Oct. 18.

Col. Astley George Francis John Younghusband, Bengal Infantry; Oct. 18.

To be Colonels.—Lieut. Col. W. R. Dunmore, Bengal Infantry; Oct. 18.

Lieut. Col. T. H. Sale, Bengal Engineers; Oct. 18.

Lieut. Col. Benjamin Stuart Sullivan, Madras Cavalry; Oct. 11.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

4th Company of Essex Rifle Volunteers—Octavius Edward Coope, Esq., to be Capt.; Oct. 12.

1st Company of Northumberland Artillery Volunteers—W. Lindsay Emerson, Esq., M.D., to be Honorary Surgeon; Oct. 11.

3rd Company of Staffordshire Rifle Volunteers—Septimus Bourne, gent., to be Lieut.; J. Dimmock, gent., to be Ensign; Oct. 8.

Cambridgeshire Militia—Ensign W. F. Dennis to be Lieut.; July 3.

6th Company of Lancashire Rifle

teers—E. Stanley Heywood, gent, Lieut. ; Fenton Magnall, gent., Ensign; Oct. 7. 12th Company ncashire Rifle Volunteers—W. H. ir, Esq., to be Capt. ; T. Goodair, to be Lieut. ; R. Lamb Ashcroft, to be Ensign ; Oct. 7.
or Duke of Lancaster's Own Light ry Regiment of Royal Lancashire —Lieut. John Joseph Westenra , to be Capt., vice J. H. Gordon, ed ; Ensign W. Sheffield Betham Lieut., vice John Joseph Westenra , promoted ; Ensign C. Ring to be , vice Henry Vowell, resigned ; 0.
illery Regiment of Royal Lanca- Militia—Capt. H. T. Fyers to be , vice G. Hall, resigned ; Oct. 4. ood, gent., to be Second Lieut., . Gregory, resigned ; Oct. 10.

WAR OFFICE, Oct. 21.
al Artillery—Lieut. Gen. Sir Wil- Macbean George Colebrooke, C.B., Colonel Commandant of a Brigade, en. H. Evelegh, deceased; Sept. 25.
Regiment of Dragoon Guards— t Col. Thomas Tulloch, from half nattached, to be Lieut.-Col., pay- e difference between Infantry and ry, vice Brevet Col. Spottiswoode, changes, receiving the same; Ma- mes Robert Steadman Sayer to be Col. by purchase, vice Brevet Col. h, who retires; Capt. Herbert Daw- ade to be Major, by purchase, vice ; Lieut. James Gunter to be Cap- y purchase, vice Slade; Oct. 21.
Light Dragoons—Cornet John t Heron Maxwell, from the Royal Guards, to be Cornet, vice Chur- who has retired; Assistant Surgeon s Henry Browne, from the Staff, Assistant Surgeon, vice Griffith, as resigned; Oct. 21.
al Artillery — Paymaster Fitz- as Landers has been permitted to his Commission.
lstream Guards—Ensign Reginald ald Edward Cathcart, from the Foot, to be Ensign and Lieut., with- archase, vice Cameron, deceased; 1.
Foot—Lieut. Lewis Blyth Hole to obtain, without purchase, vice John tus Fuller, deceased; Ensign Wil- Seymour Selby Lowndes to be , without purchase, vice Hole; 29. Henry Marvin, gent., to be , without purchase, vice Lowndes; 1.

8th—John Randle Minshull Ford, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Bradford, promoted; Oct. 21. Charles Louis Constantine de Robeck, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice C. D. R. Madden, promoted; Oct. 22.

15th—William Henry Hudson, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Mostyn, promoted; Oct. 21.

21st—Lieut Col. Edward W. D. Lowe, C.B., from 32nd Foot, to be Lieut. Col., vice Brevet Col. Last, who retires upon full pay, under the 37th clause of the Royal Warrant of Oct. 14, 1858; Oct. 21.

24th—Lieut. Henry J. Hitchcock to be Capt., by purchase, vice Disney, who retires; Ensign William Richardson Bigsby Chamberlin to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Hitchcock; Oct. 21.

27th—Ensign Francis Coffey to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Gresson, promoted; Oct. 21.

45th—Lieut. William Pearson, from the 95th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Stubbs, who exchanges ; Oct. 21.

48th—Ensign Thomas Hall to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Pigott, who retires ; Oct. 21.

68th—Alfred Gordon Howard, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Cavendish, promoted; Oct. 21.

71st—Frank Brodie, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Musgrave, who retires ; Oct. 21.

84th—Lieut. William Chas. Driberg to be Instructor of Musketry; Oct 21.

95th—Lieut. Jas. Alexander Stubbs from the 45th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Pearson, who exchanges; Oct. 21.

3rd West India Regiment—Ensign Arthur Bambrick Mitchell, from the Royal Newfoundland Companies, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Eckford, promoted; Oct. 21.

Hospital Staff—Assistant Surgeon Alexander Watt Beveridge, M.D., from the 78th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces, vice Brown, appointed to the 15th Light Dragoons ; Oct. 21.

Acting Assistant Surgeon Francis Leveson Gower Gunn, to be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces, vice Greatorex, who has resigned ; April 23, 1858.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Queen's Own Royal Regiment of Staffordshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet the Hon. Henry Paget, commonly called Lord Henry Paget, to be Capt., vice Sir Robert Peel, Bart. Oct. 11.

Wellington Wrekin Sub-division of

Shropshire Rifle Volunteers—Thomas Campbell Eyton, Esq., to be Lieut., Oct. 17.

Artillery Regiment of Royal Lancashire Militia—First Lieut. Henry Tuke Holmes to be Capt., vice Henry Thomas Fyers, promoted; Second Lieut. Thomas Christie to be First Lieut., vice Henry Tuke Holmes, promoted; Oct. 4.

1st Company of Hampshire Rifle Volunteers—Col. Thomas Faunce (late Major in 13th Regiment) to be Capt.; Charles Simeon, Esq., (late Capt. in 75th Regiment) to be Lieut.; Oct. 18.

The Company of Rifle Volunteers in Inverness, holding the 40th place in the Rifle Volunteer Force of Great Britain —Colin Lyon Mackenzie, Esq., to be Capt.; Donald Angus Nicol, Esq., to be Lieut.; Henry Cockburn M'Andrew, Esq., to be Ensign; Oct. 15.

West Riding of Yorkshire Rifle Volunteers—7th Company (Halifax)—Edward Akroyd, Esq., to be Capt.; J. Richard Ingram, gent., to be Lieut.; Charles Fuller, gent., to be Ensign; Oct. 13. 8th Company (Halifax)—William Irving Holdsworth, Esq., to be Capt.: James Franklin, gent., to be Lieut.; Francis Sowerby, gent., to be Ensign; Oct. 13.

Memorandum — 5th Regiment of West York Militia — The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commission held by Lieut. Charles Broomhead.

Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers — 4th Company (Glasgow Northern 1st)—James Fyffe Jamieson, Esq., to be Captain; George Anderson, gent. to be Lieut.; William Simpson, gent., to be Ensign; Oct. 15. 5th Company (Glasgow Eastern 1st)—John Anderson, Esq. to be Capt.; John Wilson, gent., to be Lieut.; James Alexander Wilson, gent., to be Ensign; Oct. 17.

MARRIAGE.

Married on the 24th October, at Ason Church, by the Rev. J. H. Scowcroft, Incumbent of St. Matthew's, Captain William Corbett, H. M. Military Train, to Emma, third daughter of Mr. John Adams, Bloomsbury.

THE MILITIA COMMISSION, THE BALLOT, AND OUR VOLUNTEER CORPS.

NOTHING escapes question and enquiry now-a-days, and perhaps the state of our militia, and the conduct of a great deal in connection with it, gave less reason for a prolonged immunity from that prevalent ordeal than most other matters, which have received earlier attention. There has been nothing right with us for a long time past in any part of our military affairs, at least so we seem to think, for we have managed to change a good deal in an incredibly short space of time, and there is every symptom of our being inclined to go on at an increased pace in upsetting everything that remains of the old state of things. There was no doubt but that a good deal of rust had accumulated about a great portion of the machinery. It could hardly be otherwise after a cessation of nearly half a century in all European warfare. We seem, however, in a great deal that we are doing, or rather in the headlong and hasty way in which we set about improvement, to be rather too ready in accepting it as an axiom, that whatever is old in military detail and organization must needs be inferior to those new suggestions which it is the fashion of the day to give such encouraging ear to. Things, moreover, get old in a week with us as we are now in the habit of acting, and what is done to-day is as likely as not, in a few days, to be subverted for some fresh novelty. There is no stability about anything except, perhaps, where it is least desirable to have it. The only military institution we cling to with the most determined tenacity is that which the welfare and security of the country could best bear to part with. What we call voluntary enlistment, but which in fact is nothing better than trading for our soldiers on the necessities of the poorest and most reckless classes of the community, is still dear to us. We object to everything else besides in no measured terms. We don't like the exclusiveness, more nominal than real, which furnishes us with officers at a cheap rate from the wealthiest and best educated classes of society, but we see nothing objectionable in making the ranks of the army as exclusive as possible, and confining the material for soldiers to the very dregs of the population. We can't endure the purchase of commissions or let anything pass which may help to bring it into discredit. We are ready to wrangle by the hour over the iniquity and absurdity of the system in this respect, but we are quite able to swallow anything, no matter what its effect may be, or what inconsistencies it may involve us in, provided we can escape the ballot and throw the work exclusively on those who are, in many instances, almost as much compelled to enlist as if they were dragged in chains to do so. The press, with the *Times* at its head, cannot tolerate that we should only take those youths as ensigns who are in a position to pay £450 for the honour of serving, and its indignation is beyond all bounds that money or interest should afford any advantage in the way of progressive promotion, even though it is no easy matter to prove that any considerable amount of talent or merit suffers by the system; but the same virtuous and patriotic writers who hold forth on this subject, have

nothing but admiration and boasting for what they call our voluntary enlistment, so voluntary that a large number of those who accept the Queen's money have very little choice between doing so and starving. The whole principle of it is maintained, moreover, from first to last, by the most degrading inducements. It is upheld by so much blackguardism, drunkenness, and vice, that one would think it was purposely intended to be worked, as practically it can perhaps only be worked, by the use of such means. The whole thing reeks of the brothel and the public house, it is associated at every turn with fraud and false swearing, lying, dishonesty, and the most disreputable practices of every kind and description. In at least two cases out of five, especially of late years, the recruit takes the public money and evades the service he ought to perform for it. He repeats the operation as often as he can with every recruiting party he meets, and the latter, provided he does not desert before he is attested, have an interest in silence though they are aware of his guilt. He commits the crime with a light conscience, for as our recruiting is managed it has the appearance of a swindle, and the recruit justifies himself with a kind of feeling for which there is much foundation—that he has only succeeded in cheating those who were bent on cheating him, or entrapping him into doing something of which he would have ample reason to repent afterwards.

This is no exaggerated statement of the way in which we maintain an army, and it is this system which, with all its iniquities, we flourish in the face of all other countries as one which, degenerate as they are in their condition, they can never arrive at. See, we exclaim—or the press exclaims for us—what fine fellows we Englishmen are! We are not to be taken for the defence of the country, even within its own limits, by conscription, or by our own old way of the ballot, or by any other similar means; we are too free and enlightened a people to submit to such laws as these things imply. It is not our custom to fight as a nation—we are not a military people! we take our regular soldiers, on whom the defence of the country must mainly rest, from the poor and reckless classes amongst us. We tempt them with a bounty, and, to make the whole more popular, we are following it up with a slacker discipline.

All this is what we pride ourselves upon, and refuse to alter on any account; and we are willing, besides, to come forward as volunteers upon a loose and disorganized system, or rather, on no system at all, the want of which must make such means absolutely useless.

The meaning of this latter movement, with perhaps individual exceptions, is plain enough. There is an abundance of young men quite ready to take up military titles, to strut about in martial uniforms, or to amuse their leisure hours in rifle practice at a trifling cost to themselves; but only hint at the institution of some law which would bring, in case of necessity, these same parties into the field in some useful form, with a stringent military code to keep them in their places, and to preserve that order and discipline without which a military body is the worst of all mobs, and immediately we hear a loud chorus of something about free Englishmen, and a hint that none but pitiful Frenchmen and other foreigners submit

to such institutions. The only inducement that can possibly allow of an Englishman becoming a soldier in any useful shape, is just so much bounty more or less, according as the market runs and the danger thickens. We have a contempt for all those of other countries who do not trade in this respect upon the means of indulgence in vicious propensities, and which have not as the foundation of their military establishments the fear of starvation, or the love of drink and dissipation amongst a portion of the people.

As this kind of system is rather breaking down—a far better sign of increasing civilization than its flourishing continuance could ever be—we are driven to many shifts and contrivances to keep it up. Its failure is, in fact, the secret of many of our most important changes and the great cause of the agitation which has so long prevailed on military subjects. The want of some efficient means of manning our army is, in fact, the weak point of our military system, and it is the one of all others which requires to be effectively taken in hand. It is no use nibbling at it, or fancying that by any reasonable increase to commissions from the ranks, or by improved barracks, or good conduct pay or badges, better education, and all the other theories which are so much in fashion, that much can be done. All these things can only be of any effect as auxiliaries, not to a voluntary system, but to making recruits who are coerced into the army more contented with their lot, when they find it inevitable, than might otherwise be the case. The want of some judicious measure more or less of a coercive nature, at all events for the militia, is the incubus which weighs most injuriously on the national security at the present moment, and which, as long as it is allowed to remain, must effectually keep all reflecting persons, who see how differently everything in this respect is managed abroad, in an alternation of doubt and uneasiness as to what may happen.

It is idle to say that it is all in vain to argue in this way, and that the country won't submit to it; the country would submit fast enough if it were not flattered and befooled into standing out against it. If the press would do its part, and if a strong and resolute government would take up the matter, and institute any fair and impartial system, allowing all those who desired not to serve in person to provide a substitute, and pay in pocket, we venture to say such a step would not be so generally unpopular as is often imagined. What is the necessity, if all are in earnest, for a volunteer force and a militia force? Why is not the former merged in the latter, and the whole made up by a ballot? If the spirit of the country can furnish both, surely it can afford one, and it cannot in reason object to that one being made up by lot. If the whole art of soldiership, as the "Herefordshire Incumbent," and some other equally experienced military writers seem to think, consisted in firing off a rifle with accuracy at a target, it would be all very well; the argument in that case would be all the other way. We might dispense with regular armies altogether, and reduce ourselves entirely to volunteers. That seems, in fact, the only logical conclusion of the conduct we pursue. We are shutting our eyes to the folly of the course we are taking, and trying to nurse up a confidence, where under the state of things no

confidence whatever ought to prevail. What a miserable self-deception it is to speak of the Zouaves as the most irregular troops in the French service, and to infer a comparison in efficiency and usefulness between them and Garibaldi's troops, and such a volunteer force as we possess. This is the shallow foundation on which we are trying all we can to establish ourselves at this moment. It would be a comfortable assurance to believe, as the *Times* would have us do, that our raw and inexperienced volunteers are cut out of the same pattern as the most crack troops of our next door neighbour, and as likely as not, with such a mere shadow of discipline and organization as they possess, to be able to cope with them in any attempt at invasion. It is a kind of social treason to utter anything in opposition to this belief, and yet it is a growing danger, and as likely to lull us into a false security as anything that the most ultra economist or any member of the peace society has ever advocated. It is the teaching of the great tempter of Lord Brougham, but in a different form; it is allowing ourselves to be persuaded that our means of resistance to aggression are perfect, when in point of fact they do not exist at all. It is making a shield of silver paper, and believing it to be composed of the toughest and most enduring material. A nation utterly unorganized for military purposes as England is, in the strength of its population, can scarcely have the right to hope to maintain its influence, or to contend successfully against the attack of another, possessing equal or greater resources in men, and capable of applying them under a uniform military code, and the strictest rules of discipline. It is weak and absurd in the extreme to think that we can fairly meet such machinery as that which may be opposed to us, perfect in all its arrangements, and uniform in all its parts, by such a heterogeneous medley as that of our regular troops, militia, and volunteer rifle corps, all with a species of antagonism the one to the other, and never likely to be cordially or efficiently worked under one head. The volunteers may be all very well against desultory attacks, and for local defence against small detachments, or in the case of boat landings, but to build upon such a force for resistance against such operations as an invasion upon any large scale (and it is not a likely attempt to be made upon a small one) must necessitate, is tantamount to ignoring all those elements upon which the strength of armies, much more than upon their actual numbers, has hitherto always been supposed mainly to depend. It would be very desirable if we could get rid of the clumsy and confused organization which prevails throughout in our military arrangements.

It is difficult to understand upon what grounds of reason or common sense we should, in a comparatively small compact country like the United Kingdom, have so many instruments intended for the same purpose, all organized on different principles, called by different names, and, as if to make confusion more confounded, serving in many instances under different departments, or dependent on no head at all. Would it not be as well to give the whole of them as much as possible the prestige and the character of a regular force? It could easily be done by uniting each of our militia regiments as a reserve battalion for home service only with some one of our

regular regiments. There can be nothing but inconvenience and the utmost danger of confusion and disaster in the existing arrangements, in which almost every department of the Government, the municipal authorities of cities, and the Lords Lieutenants of counties are all hashed and mixed up together. The more the administration of a military body is centralized the better, and it is a perfect farce to see the hands to which many of our militia corps by our submission to routine, and our persistence in preserving everything in which the importance of our civil power is concerned, however incongruous and injurious it may be, are entrusted. There is one guiding principle which we should carefully observe in the constitution of our militia. It should not interfere in any way with the recruiting of the regular army, and still less should it be treated as a nursery for the latter. It should be considered a force in itself, meant for a particular purpose, that of being a reserve, which could be called out at a moment's notice and, raised in a manner totally different from the system pursued in the regular army. The effort should be to catch all those who would not, if left to themselves, join the latter, or become soldiers at all, if they could help it.

The ballot is the only possible remedy for the defects we complain of in the militia; the want of it is the crowning evil of the whole system One had need however to be of a sanguine disposition, to look forward to the inauguration of anything of the kind. It will probably not come until some decided disaster has proved its necessity. The proceedings of the militia commission are altogether silent on the subject; the word is not even mentioned. It is the more extraordinary, for they must have known that the necessity for this measure is the common topic of the day, amongst officers of any standing or experience in the militia; and there was probably not one amongst the commissioners themselves who did not hold a tolerably strong opinion in the same direction; but as if the mention of the ballot would have produced the plague or the cholera, or a national calamity of some sort or another, the subject is entirely left out. It is the old story of the play of Hamlet, with the principal part omitted. As the whole state of the case with the militia has been as well known as it could possibly be for many years past, the enquiry, like many other enquiries of a similar nature, was a farce from the commencement. And the commissioners in the meagreness of their report, and the very poor nature of their suggestions for improvement, have certainly not succeeded in giving it a more serious or important character.

It hardly required seven members of the peerage, some of them of the most exalted grade, a Lieutenant-General and four Colonels, to tell us such a little story, with so little that we did not know before to recommend it, as the Blue Book of this Commission, after more than twelve months deliberation, and examination of evidences, has brought before the public. It scarcely suggests anything in the way of change, but in matters of the most trifling detail, which if there is any one charged with these matters, or if the War Office was of the slightest use, and not a clog to everything but theoretical vagaries in military affairs, might have been thought of without any

commission at all. There is no suggestion whatever for the improvement of the system. If everything was carried out to-morrow that is recommended, the latter would remain exactly the same; nor would it be easy to show that the country would gain by the alterations, or that the character or efficiency of the militia would be materially benefitted. It would be worth the while, perhaps, of some one interested in knowing how the money goes to prove in the House of Commons, if such a thing is possible to be obtained, for a return of what this commission has cost the country, and as a necessary corollary to it what has been discovered by their labours that was not just as well known, and that could not just as well have been remedied without them. If the militia was in an unsatisfactory state before, is it now, or is it likely to be, when all that is suggested by the Commissioners is carried out, one whit the better? What change of any importance do they bring forward or advocate by any argument upon which a reasonable reflection would be justified in employing itself for a single moment. Every principle upon which the militia force of the kingdom is raised and organized remains quite untouched. If the commissioners thought these principles right they ought to have given the reasons upon which such an opinion was founded. Nothing could have justified their being called together at all but on the supposition that the contrary was the case. The scope of the enquiry was extensive enough to admit of a great deal more than a few suggestions unsupported by any argument or reasoning, and which may or may not work advantageously for the service at large. The points to which attention was drawn were five in number, viz:—

1st. The position of Adjutants, Surgeons, and Quartermasters of the militia.

2nd. What further regulations can be adopted and carried out for the purpose of checking desertions and double enrolments.

3rd. The accommodation now provided for the permanent staff of the militia, and for the custody of the militia stores, and what measures can be adopted for the improvement of the same.

4th. The best method of quartering the disembodied regiments of the militia during the period they are called out for training.

5th. What measures can be adopted to make the militia more efficient, and especially with reference to the number of days for which the regiments of militia are called out for training.

Upon these points the Commissioners begin by a mare's nest, and inform us (we should like to know who has to digest the information who ought not to have known it before) that in England, Wales, and Ireland there are several regiments whose establishment of privates is below 500, while in Scotland, where the quotas are below that number, two or more counties are frequently joined together to form one battalion. They discover (wonderful discovery requiring a Royal Commission to make it) that this arrangement secures both economy and efficiency, and as it does not detract from the county character of the force, a suggestion which leaves it to be inferred that if it did affect the latter, the economy and efficiency would not recommend it, the same principle is recommended to be applied to England, Wales, and Ireland, and to corps of militia artillery.

It is next advised that the age at which volunteers should be accepted for the militia should be from sixteen to forty years, and that the present standard of height should be, except for the artillery regiments, reduced from 5ft. 4in. to 5ft. The number enrolled of this reduced standard in each regiment to be determined by the Secretary of State for War. By the adoption of this recommendation the Commissioners consider that the ranks of the militia would be reinforced by a considerable number of young and active volunteers, who are at present excluded from a service in which they might be enrolled without impairing its efficiency. This surely is another matter of mere detail which any Secretary for War might have discovered for himself. The real meaning of it is to enrol young lads into the militia until, at the expense of the public, they grow into useful soldiers. A much cheaper and better arrangement—and it is one which we wonder, in the difficulties opposed to recruiting, has not been attempted to be carried out long ago—would be to form establishments, where, under a military discipline and controul, the destitute boys of the country might be fed, clothed, and educated; of course selecting those only who are free from constitutional infirmity, and likely to grow into men fit for military service. The sons of soldiers who could pass the necessary medical examination, might be allowed as a right to enter the establishment.

In a free country like this, any coercion in the enlisting of these boys as they reached the proper age and standard might possibly be objected to, and if care was taken in their organization, and in everything connected with them, so as to give them military tastes and feelings, we believe that such coercion would be quite unnecessary, the boys would be only too eager to embrace a military life, in the habits of which they had been educated. If something of this kind was established, economically and earnestly conducted, and not made a job of in a host of exalted and useless officials, we are convinced it would amply repay its cost, while it would assuredly introduce a most useful and trustworthy body of soldiers, relieving society at the same time from many urchins, who, left to ignorance and neglect, have scarcely a possible means of existence but in crime. No one giving a moment's reflection to the depravity and vice which more or less infect all barracks and large assemblages of men, would be induced to approve of the recommendation to enlist boys as soldiers into the army at the early age of sixteen, particularly such boys as are to be picked up in the streets. We doubt if one in ten of such youths would, by the stamina of his constitution, at nineteen be worth the expense he would be to the country. The reduced standard has been carried out, and probably the recommendation as to age also; but we are convinced that neither the one nor the other will add one atom to the efficiency of the militia service. Great encouragement is held out by the Commissioners, and they hold it to be of great importance to secure the services of those volunteers whose period of service is about to expire. To induce such men to re-enrol it is recommended—

1st.—That any militiaman at any time during the last twelve

officers, and the mode of promotion which, as a general rule, it is considered should take place by seniority. Some flagrant instances of nepotism, with regard to this subject, are mentioned in the evidence. One of these is worth quoting as a specimen of what may be done in this country of Great Britain, with its free press and every other freedom of which we are so constantly boasting. It may also illustrate where the shoe pinches in many of our public establishments, and the expenditure and waste which attach to them. When a baronet can be so lightly treated there must be very little hope for small men. Sir Alexander Gordon Cumming was appointed a major in the Inverness Militia in the year 1853, by the present Lord Fife, then Lord Lieutenant of the County of Moray. Sir Alexander had served in the army for eleven years, and was possessed of five different properties in the County of Moray, with a rent roll of from £10,000 to £12,000 per annum. In 1855 the Lieutenant-Colonel, commandant of the regiment, died. One would naturally have supposed the promotion (no reason of any kind existing why it should not) should have been given to Sir Alexander Gordon Cumming, the senior major. He was, however, passed over, so also was the junior major, another gentleman of family, and who had served thirteen years in the regular army, having been, moreover, all through the Caffre War and at the Cape for some years; besides these two officers, four of the captains were similarly treated, and the command of the regiment was given by Lord Lovat, the Lord Lieutenant of Invernessshire, to his son, the Honorable S. Frazer, the fifth captain on the list, one who had never served in any regiment or corps in his life, who had but just joined, and who had only been about a few weeks at his first drill. The natural consequence of this was a disruption of the regiment. It did not take place at the moment, owing to the war, but as soon as the regiment was disembodied Sir Alexander resigned his commission, assigning as his reason for doing so his having been passed over in the manner he had been. Colonel Piper, one of the Commissioners, put the question to Sir Alexander Cumming, whether he was aware if any question had at any time been raised as to his efficiency for commanding the regiment? To which he answered "none in the world. I had from the embodiment of the regiment considerable property in the county, and I had succeeded some time previously to this property, and my hands were pretty full. I gave up much valuable time and expended money in assisting to form the regiment. I got many volunteers from my own county, and I assisted in the recruiting as much as I possibly could. I am not aware of there ever having been any objection found." No excuse was made for what was done. The three counties of Invernessshire, Banff, and Moray made up the Inverness Militia, and the patronage of the regiment went to the Lords Lieutenant of these counties; according to the quotas supplied by each, the appointment to the command of the regiment belonged to Lord Lovat, and he simply did what he liked with his own. The absence of all responsibility in our officials is the prevailing evil of the day. Lord Lovat was probably not considered to have merited reproof or something more for preferring the interest of his son to the efficiency or proper

guidance of the Inverness regiment of militia. It was, we presume, to meet the possibility of the repetition of so gross a job as this that promotion by seniority was recommended. We should like to know what the Secretary for War at the time was about, who allowed it to be perpetrated, and who obtained the Queen's approval of it, without which it could not have been done. Lord Panmure was the minister at the time, and far more culpable than Lord Lovat; but what may a Secretary of War and a Lord of many acres not do, and what did Lord Panmure ever leave undone in the way of jobbery while he had the power to indulge in it? He was as fond of a good thing in that way as he is said to be of a good head of pheasants and a heavy battue in the season. The recommendation of the Commissioners on this head, as far as it goes, is all very well, but it only mitigates the evil which is inherent in the constitution of the militia. The only way, we are convinced, to make this part of the service what it ought to be, is to abolish its name altogether and to merge it with the regular army under the Horse Guards. In maintaining the regular army it is necessary not to have another body differently constituted, but in point of fact intended entirely for the same purpose, bidding against it, and narrowing the sources from which its supply is drawn. Let the net for the army be thrown as widely as possible; for the more restless and ambitious spirit there should be enlistment for general service, for others of a different nature home battalions only, but always grafted on and having close connection with a general service one. These corps should never be compelled to leave the United Kingdom. The mode of recruiting them should be entirely different from that of the service generally, the terms of enlistment of course giving greater advantages to those men who made no conditions. We would further leave it optional with men to enlist for different terms, according as regiments were near or distant from home, for seven, ten, fifteen, or twenty-one years. The latter class, in addition to all other advantages, to have that of free rations. There ought not to be the slightest difficulty, though it would require the utmost care and consideration to draw up some well-devised scheme based on reasonable terms in the first instance, and on a scale gradually increasing in liberality as the term of enlistment was prolonged and the recruit made fewer conditions as to the nature of his service.

The militia, as it now exists, stands in the way of all improvement, and nothing but its abolition will admit of our military system being established on any satisfactory footing. As for the volunteers, in their present form they are more likely to be a nuisance than otherwise. Recognizing the principle that they should never but in cases of the most imminent danger be withdrawn from their immediate localities, they ought to have a well-defined discipline and organization. The Government, and not the imaginations or the will of individuals, should fix the quota to be furnished by each place, and decide what arm they should be required to serve, and the number who refused to come forward short of that quota should be balloted for, and made to do so. There should be regular hours (the most convenient for the avocations of the men and officers) appointed

for drill, and all who did not attend at least once or twice within a certain stated period, should be mulcted in a pecuniary fine, to go to the maintenance of the corps. At present some corps make rules, while others object to them. It must also be observed that the existence of some of the corps is rather mythical. There is a great display of zeal on the part of two or three individuals, anxious to be captains and subalterns, or even majors and colonels, of something or nothing. They get up an imaginary force, and write to the Lord Lieutenant. Application is made to the Government—their services are accepted—and an officer of the regulars is sent down to confer with some civil authority—who knows as much about military affairs as a lamp post, but who is red hot in his belief in what the *Times* and the no less facetious *Punch* tell him, that the mere mention of a volunteer force will scare any amount of Zouaves—about ground for practice, and batteries and guns, but on a little quiet talk it is proved that everything is in its infancy. The number of volunteers in the place turns out not to be exactly known; some have signed and some have not; some are waiting to see the uniform, and to know how much it costs; the regiment which was said to exist dwindles down to a company, and the company to a sub-division, the sub-division to a section. Sometimes it is hard to ascertain—for in most instances the men have never been assembled—whether the volunteers exceed the knot of individuals with whom you have the farce of conferring, and who are rubbing their hands under some vague feeling of a great addition of personal dignity to themselves by the movement. You are ordered to make arrangements for a company of artillery, for instance, which you are told is not to consist of less than fifty, or more than eighty; you find there are only thirty names down, and that many of these are very visionary as to reality. They will give their time for the fun, but money for uniforms is out of the question, and as to submitting to fines for pointing their rifles at any one that comes in their way, or for anything else, they have no idea of volunteering for anything of that nature. When it comes to choosing the officers, some aspiring individual, who feels strongly impressed with the idea that he possesses a military genius, and who has been melancholy for weeks under the cares of the command of an imaginary army, contending against desperate odds, and under desperate circumstances, but through which his military talent and courage bring them, finds that Jones, the fish curer, is elected as captain, and that he has to serve under his orders in the capacity of private, and nothing more. His soul rebels under such an indignity, those of others do the same; there is a division in the camp at once, and that regiment of rifles, or that company of artillery, would be far more ready to settle their differences by a combat on the spot, with such weapons as nature has given them, than we fear the majority of them would be to face disciplined soldiers, with more formidable weapons in their hands.

It is not intended to sneer at or contemn the volunteer spirit, but as it is now being fostered it is the greatest absurdity and delusion upon which any country could be taught to place the slightest reliance. It will end in enormous expenditure and waste of valuable

material, without the slightest corresponding benefit whatever. The great wonder to any sane person at all conversant with the state of things, must be that we should encourage any confidence in it, or fancy that an invasion could possibly be met by such means with any prospect of success.

If a war with France, or rather of France with this country, is intended, we hold that, in the first instance, it will be a purely naval one, that the first effort will be to strive for the supremacy at sea before any idea of an invasion is entertained. The enormous increase to the French Navy, and the increasing attention paid to every improvement connected with it, point clearly to wrenching the command of the sea from us, and it will only be on losing that command that we can possibly become vulnerable to an invading army. The talk of a sudden attempt at anything like invasion on a large scale is sheer nonsense. The Channel must be a tolerably safe highway to France before she can attempt to pass an army over it, and especially an army of such magnitude as that to make any decisive impression must be. If we cannot, or do not think it wise to place our sole reliance, or nearly so, on the results of a contest at sea, where we have so many elements of superiority, and where we are wanting in nothing but the power of rapidly manning our fleets, it is essential that we should have something quite as well organized, and quite as strong as our supposed enemies, on shore. Unless this is the case, when once our navy has been beaten, if such a possibility can for a moment be allowed, the game must evidently be unequally played out. We cannot afford to permit a doubtful state of things with regard to our naval superiority and supremacy, and a manifest inferiority in our army at the same time. Either the former must be made secure and incontestable, or the latter must be looked to without reference to the navy at all. The possibility of an invasion depends solely upon naval superiority, and it is plainly meant that this superiority will be the first thing contended for. If we lose it (it is not easy to think it possible that we can ever do so) we stand in this position, that our outer line, in which we are most strong, will be gone; and the inner line, consisting of a weak army, and a crude military system, with volunteers, who, for want of discipline and organization, will be worthless, can scarcely be expected to offer a very successful or formidable resistance. If our navy can rule the waves we may go to sleep over the rest; but if we have fair reason to be doubtful on this point it follows clearly that our military arrangements must be of a character to meet those we may have to contend against. If we cannot give our navy an undeniable superiority we must have an army equal to the utmost emergency. Our means are abundant enough, and all we want is a proper organization so as to have them in a satisfactory form when they are required. It ought not to be too much to expect that those who preside over our military establishments should look more into this part of the subject than they do. That some responsibility should attach to them, and that knowing the defects which prevail in almost every direction, they should originate something of themselves in the way of improve-

ment, and not be always and everlastingly seeking the aid and shielding themselves under the recommendation of Royal and Parliamentary Commissions of Enquiry, or waiting until abuses have reached a point which excites public clamour for their removal, and under the influence of which there is often much more harm than good perpetrated. We might save ourselves the expense of the War Minister and the Commander-in-Chief, with all their costly adjuncts, if this absence of all administrative effort on the part of the authorities is that which the country is always to exist under.

RESERVE OF ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEERS.

The Regulations for carrying into effect the Act 22 and 23 Vic., c. 40, have just been promulgated. Great industry and pains have evidently been taken in drawing up these Regulations; in fact, we are inclined to say that too little dependence has been placed upon the intrinsic merits of the plan, and which alone will, in the end, make it successful, and too much upon matters of questionable detail. There is a want of explicitness about the Regulations, in the outset in regard to the design, which will, assuredly, not contribute to their reception by the public. Nowhere do we find an avowal of the all-important fact, that the Reserve is mainly intended as a substitute for impressment; the announcement of which would at once have given the scheme favour in the eyes of the seafaring men, to whom its offers address themselves.

We believe that nothing has so greatly tended to render the Royal Navy hateful in the eyes of the merchant seaman—not even the acts of extreme severity alleged against the discipline—as the knowledge that a man-of-war's boat might come alongside his ship and take him a prisoner to the navy ship. The youngest apprentice and the oldest seaman, from this very cause, have alike viewed the pendant with a feeling akin to detestation. Compulsion is not agreeable to any one, much less is it agreeable to be compelled to join a service in which life and limb are to be put in extreme jeopardy. Cheap radical newspapers, which circulate so freely in the humbler spheres, rejoice in picturing the royal service as a very pandemonium, in which the captain and boatswain, flourishing instruments of torture, are brought out in strong relief. The more terrible the tale, the better it pleases the class to which the paper owes its penny supporters. This fierce hatred owes not a little of its origin to impressment. If a man were violently pulled into a house, he would with difficulty be made to believe that the mauling he had received was intended only to contribute to his happiness and comfort and to his future welfare. The unwilling guest would have received an invitation in a very different way; but compulsion, even though the end of it were an injunction to partake of a good dinner, would not be congenial to the feelings of a free-born Briton.

In framing the Regulations, therefore, a grand oversight has, in

this respect, been committed. The preliminary paragraph is very brief: "The following Regulations contain the whole plan, including instructions to all the officers, who will be employed in carrying it into effect. The naval officers so employed will, for the present, be the officers of the coastguard."

QUALIFICATIONS OF A VOLUNTEER.

These are comprised in the candidate's being under thirty-five years, free from physical defect, and in health, character, and every other respect unexceptionable. He must, moreover, be a British subject. The Reserve volunteer must have served at least five years at sea, within the previous ten years, one year of that time as an able seaman. There does not appear, however, a *minimum* as well as a *maximum* age. Possibly the five years' service, one of which as able seaman, is thought sufficient; but the omission has the appearance of an oversight, nevertheless. The men who are to have a preference, other qualifications being equal, are those who have a fixed residence on shore, and who are personally known to the shipping masters; and secondly, men who have regular employment in the coasting trade, or in steamers, or other vessels which return at short intervals to port. Those who have served in the navy, and who have been discharged with good certificates, but without pensions, will be, if otherwise eligible, very acceptable. Soldiers, militiamen, and naval coast volunteers, are ineligible; and no volunteer may be enlisted in the army or militia, and any enrolled man will be liable to six months' imprisonment for so enlisting.

The length and nature of the sea servitude required, will operate as an effectual bar to an otherwise very eligible class of men, we mean watermen, and other "aquatics." There are few men better calculated for the Reserve Volunteer Force, than the able-bodied young men who ply upon our rivers and inland seas; yet none of these come under the denomination of "able seamen," although none would be more readily available in an emergency. Fishermen, also, cannot be enrolled, for few of them have ever been at sea, and fewer have ever been rated able seamen. Yet all these, if trained as marine artillerists and riflemen, would, in a few months, after they were embarked with men-of-war's-men, be as expert and efficient aloft as any of the crew, and as well able to man a gun.

There is a considerable drawback under the head of penalties and forfeitures. We do not allude to those which relate to wilful misrepresentations, as there can be no excuse for deliberate falsehood; but the clause which relates to a man labouring under any disease or injury is open to grave objection. We conclude that no man will be received until he has undergone a thorough medical examination, by a competent surgeon. This ought to be held binding on both parties; and if it is not to be so held, men will be slow to enrol under the apprehension that some hitherto undeveloped disease should, when they most needed assistance, render them ineligible. We pass to the second division of the Regulations.

The Manner of Enrolment.

At every mercantile seaport it is well known that there is a shipping-master. The duties of this official are at times very onerous. He has to superintend the signing of articles, and to pay the wages to the crews of ships at the end of the voyage. To these calls upon his time, is to be added that of inducing men to enter for the Reserve. No doubt their present duties will give them great facilities for communicating with merchant seamen; and the framers of the Regulations express their reliance for the success of the scheme upon the zeal and discretion of the shipping-masters.

The Board of Trade shipping-masters, are enjoined to communicate freely, and co-operate cordially with the coast guard in their district; and those shipping-masters who are officers of customs are to avail themselves of all the customs staff in their ports. The shipping-masters appointed by the local marine boards will also be directed to give all necessary encouragement. Placards descriptive of the scheme are to be posted in the various shipping-offices, and in other conspicuous places; and papers illustrative of its benefits are to be extensively distributed. If unable to answer any objections or questions raised regarding the naval service, the shipping-master is to apply to "the nearest naval officer," or to a more likely source for the solution of his doubts—the Registrar General of Seamen.

Although the duty of primarily selecting the candidates for volunteers rests exclusively with the shipping-masters, it will be the duty of officers of the coast guard to make known the advantages of the Reserve, and to induce eligible men to come forward. It will also be the duty of the coast guard to communicate freely with the shipping-masters.

Let us suppose the system in operation. The shipping master has obtained a few men, whom he considers fit, and who are willing to enter. After reading to them the various details, he must fill up columns of forms which the men are to sign. He is then to enter the names in the "enrolment book," and send the form by post or messenger to the nearest or most convenient naval officer, who alone is authorised to approve men for the Royal Naval Reserve. The candidate is to be instructed to present himself to the naval officer indicated, for examination, "at a time when that officer is sure to be found." Certain times and places are to be appointed for examination by the naval medical officer, and a string of instructions are laid down for the guidance of the naval officer, and the naval medical examiner. All these matters settled, the candidate will be informed that he has been approved, subject to the verification of his services by the Registrar General of Seamen. The approval being attained, the man will be informed that he is entered in the Royal Naval Reserve. If, however, the medical officer is not satisfied, the naval officer is to inform the man that he is rejected, stating the cause of such rejection.

A clause is introduced (No. 21) which enables a naval officer, where time is an object, to communicate direct with the Registrar General,

without the intervention of the shipping-master; but in such cases he is also to acquaint the shipping-master with the steps he has taken." The part to be enacted by the Registrar General is described in no less than fifteen specific instructions, defining what he is to do if the man is rejected, or accepted; and the section concludes with directions as to the steps to be taken in the event of a volunteer losing his certificate.

Sailors are proverbially, of all men in the world, the most impatient; yet these Regulations appear to have been based upon the presumption that they are very Job's. Fancy a merchant seaman listening for half an hour or more to the dry lecture of a shipping-master, upon the liabilities he is about to undertake; then to give an end of particulars as to age, place of birth, servitude, character, etc., etc., etc! Having given in all these particulars, if he is able to recollect or to answer the half of them—being cautioned as he went along that a false answer would be sufficient to vitiate his claim at any future time—the man is to receive an order to wait upon the naval officer. Who this "naval officer" is to be is a question not clearly defined. Whether he is to be the captain of the coast guard block-ship, or the inspecting commander of the district, or the chief officer, is involved in mystery for the present. The "naval officer," whoever he may be, is possibly five miles away from the shipping office. This journey is to be undertaken at the candidate's expense—at least no provision is made in the Regulations for that contingency. Assuming, however, that the man has the money of his own, or is supplied with the means, consider what dangers beset him by the way. He must "freshen the nip" on the road, and, as sailors are communicative, he will be pretty sure to tell his business to those with whom he meets. Three right-minded men will perhaps commend his resolution, but a fourth may denounce the navy, and do his best to dissuade the man from his object, and the evil counsellor is tolerably sure to succeed. Allowing that he does not, the candidate pursues his way and finds, at length, the "naval officer." It must be borne in mind that no provision is made for remunerating the "naval officer," and one may imagine that if the "naval officer" should be an Inspecting Commander, just endeavouring to get through a heap of business, or a chief officer who has been all night on watch, the reception the candidate is likely to meet with will not be very encouraging. But the "naval officer" after a time approves of the candidate, signs the documents, and the man returns to the shipping master.

The medical examination, to be followed by the verification of services by the Registrar General, will still have to be undergone; and after the lapse of a week or ten days the chances are about even that the man will be told he will *not* do. The knowledge of one such rejection will deter ten from undergoing the same ordeal; and thus the scheme will be added to the number of unhappy failures.

Let us, however, proceed to the third section, headed

EMPLOYMENT AND WHEREABOUTS OF VOLUNTEERS.

Every naval volunteer must present himself to some shipping master in the United Kingdom, and produce his certificate at intervals

not exceeding six months. Consequently no volunteer may, except he obtain leave of absence, undertake to go a voyage which there is reason to believe will extend over a period of six months. These restrictions will prevent his engaging in voyages in *steamers* to the Cape of Good Hope, or to any places beyond Cape Horn, or the Cape of Good Hope, or voyages in *sailing* vessels to ports in the Atlantic, south of the line, or to any places situated beyond that limit. Special leave may, however, be obtained. Every time the volunteer changes his ship, whether for the coasting or foreign trade, or changes his place of residence, he must communicate particulars to the nearest shipping master, and forms are provided for the due registration of the information. When men are signing articles under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, the shipping master is to enter in red ink on the original and duplicate agreements, opposite the man's name, the letters "R. N. V.," and the number of his certificate; and also to notify whether the man has leave "*with* liability to serve," or "*without* liability to serve."

The duties with which the shipping master becomes chargeable are numerous, and occasionally inquisitorial, and he is on all occasions to caution men against breaking the conditions of their registration. Further clauses recapitulate the forfeitures and penalties for non-compliance with conditions; and call upon the shipping master to ascertain, by reference to the agreement, and official log of the ship in which volunteers have sailed, what has become of men who may have left on foreign stations. Forms upon forms are prescribed for notifying the man's death, and the shipping master is moreover enjoined to make daily returns to the Registrar General of Seamen, with copies of the entries, and register of engagement.

Training.

The volunteers are to be so drilled as to obtain a thorough practical knowledge of the mode of exercising with great guns and small arms. The naval officers are therefore to apply to the Admiralty for drill instructors in sufficient time. The drill is to be performed under the direction of the officer of the coast guard of the district, and will comprise great gun, "musket, pistol, and cutlass exercise, and naval duties generally." The time for drill is to be twenty-eight days in every year, the time occupied in travelling to and from the drill station included. Should the exigencies of the service admit of it, the man may be allowed to divide the twenty-eight days, so as to do part at one district and the remainder at another. He may thus divide his drill into four separate weeks. The place of drill is not yet determined by the Regulations, but the convenience of the volunteers will be consulted, and the men, as a general principle, will, if possible, be allowed to return home in the evening, and in certain cases, their expenses of travelling to and from the station will be provided for. Or they will be furnished with lodging and bedding. The average number of returns, forms, and schedules, and columns in the shipping-master's books are of course duly prepared.

The officer in charge of the drill, is to satisfy himself that each

naval volunteer, when he attends for drill, is physically competent for service in the Royal Navy; and if he has any doubt he is to cause the men to be medically examined. Besides this very responsible duty the "naval officer" is to make the following returns:—

1. If the volunteer is in every respect fit for duty.

a. He will take and retain till the drill is concluded, the naval volunteer's certificate R.V. 2.

b. He will enter the particulars required in columns, 1 to 4 of his register of naval volunteers. R.V. 14.

2. If the medical officer considers the volunteer unfit for duty.

a. He will immediately make a report to the naval officer.

b. The naval officer will, if he considers the incapacity *temporary*, sanction the naval volunteer's return to his home, for the time, and will enter the fact of his incapacity in the volunteer's certificate R.V. 2, under the head of "attendance at drill." The entry must be made in such a manner as to show that the man has not been drilled.

c. If he considers the naval volunteer's incapacity *permanent*, he will discharge the man from the naval reserve force, give him a certificate R.V. 8, and send a report of the circumstances to the Registrar-General of Seamen on form R.V. 20, accompanied by the volunteer's certificate R.V. 2.

Clause 67 of the Regulations supplies another string of forms and ceremonies, which the naval officer is to fill up prior to the incapacitated volunteer's being discharged without claim to retainer or pension.

While on drill the volunteers are to be rated A.B., and in actual service will be eligible for higher rating. At drill they are to receive the continuous service rate of pay, and their wages will be paid by the paymaster of the coast guard ship on the station in which they are being drilled. But it is not specified how the men who divide their month into four weeks are to be paid.

The naval volunteers are to attend for drill in a decent suit of clothing, but they will be permitted to take up clothing from the paymaster, to the amount of their accruing wages while on drill. If taken seriously ill, or injured while training, they may be sent for treatment into a naval hospital, if practicable, or medical aid may be procured. Of course all these particulars are to be entered in the naval officer's "drill register," R.V. 15; in such cases also the naval officer is to report to the captain of the district.

Naval volunteers at drill are to be subject to the same discipline as seamen in the Royal Navy; but lest this should be carried too far, "officers in command" are enjoined "to bear in mind the difference between the ordinary rules and practices of the Royal Navy, and those of the merchant service; and to endeavour whilst enforcing order and regularity, to do so in such a way as may best conciliate the feelings of merchant seamen."

We are truly sorry to find such a passage in these Regulations. If it means anything it conveys a reflection which naval officers do not deserve. We have no hesitation in saying that the discipline of the navy, is, as a general rule, far more conciliatory than that in vogue

in the merchant service, and that men's "feelings" are no less liable to be wounded in the merchant service, than they are in the Royal Navy or by naval officers.

The punishments provided for the volunteers are forfeiture of pay and allowances, and in cases of grave misconduct, the commanding officer may direct that the volunteer's annual retainer shall be suspended for such period (not exceeding one year) as he may think fit. The usual restrictions are laid down for preventing men making away with clothes, arms, and accoutrements. The section concludes with prescribed returns of lists of defaulters, and of penalties enforced for non-attendance.

Before proceeding to the next section we would offer a few remarks upon the foregoing, which, we regret to say, we can only view in an unfavourable light. That the general plan of reserve is good we freely admit. It is liberal in its offers, and if the force were once formed it would, we have little doubt, be productive of great good to navy and merchant service. It would do good to the navy by reconciling the two services, and showing to merchant seamen that the navy is not the very undesirable service it has been represented. Why then load such a plan with needless weights? Why bury its good qualities beneath a heap of forms? One would suppose from reading the Regulations that shipping masters were sadly in want of something to do, and that "coast guard officers," or naval officers, for both terms are used, without strictly defining the application, were dying of *ennui*. Is this so? Are shipping masters paid for doing nothing, and coast guard naval officers wanting occupation? Are not coast guard commanders, and chief officers, often wearied to death with letters, forms, watch keeping, and drilling? Yet these Regulations will impose upon them much additional duty, without a hint, much less any distinct promise of a penny in the way of remuneration! We are obliged to tell the zealous concoctors of this scheme, that it stands in imminent peril, unless a very different plan is adopted. Why mix up the reserve with the active service? The coast guard is part and parcel of the Royal Navy in commission. Already the coast volunteers are unpleasantly annexed, and now the new reserve volunteers will be mingled with the latter, a class not at all congenial, and from whom no good is likely to be gained.

We earnestly hope the Admiralty and Board of Trade will look closely into this portion of the Regulations, and reconsider their expediency. Why not appoint an additional shipping master to each port, for the express purpose of attending to the reserve men—to feed, pay, watch over their movements and drill them? What necessity is there for mixing them up with coast guard and coast volunteers? yet this, although not we believe intended, and not desired, will be the inevitable effect of carrying out the Regulations as they now stand. There is a wish not to alarm the reserve volunteers by bringing them too closely in contact with naval officers; yet strange to say, they are to be brought in direct collision with them, since they are to be entered or rejected, drilled, and disciplined by coast-guard commanders, and lieutenants, serjeants of marines, and seamen gunners.

ANNUAL RETAINER.

We now come to the inducements, which, it cannot be denied, are considerable. An annual payment of £6. This stipend is to become due quarterly, commencing 1st of January, but is to be paid only to the volunteer himself. After the first broken quarter, no volunteer will be able to receive his retainer, however, unless he has been under drill for at least a week of the twenty-eight days. Should he be absent only six months, with special leave, "without liability to serve abroad," the payment will be suspended during such absence; but will recommence on the first quarter day after the return of the volunteer, provided he has fulfilled the conditions as to drill for that quarter. In case of absence for more than six months, "*with* liability to serve abroad" the retainer will continue, and the arrears be payable on his return under the usual provisions of drill.

If the volunteer has broken the conditions of the Reserve by absenting himself without leave for more than six months, or has broken his leave, he will forfeit all claim to the benefits; but if he is able to show that his absence was unavoidable, his retainer may, upon due explanation, be received.

When the volunteer embarks, his retainer is in abeyance, as he is then put upon the continuous service rate of pay; but on leaving active service, the retainer again becomes payable. The engagement to serve is limited to five years; but at the expiration of that term, it is competent to the volunteer to renew his engagement for another five years.

ACTUAL SERVICE IN THE NAVY.

The Reserve will only be called out by Royal Proclamation, "when an emergency requires a sudden increase in the naval force." The longest period for which he is liable to serve in the Navy is five years. Three years is to be the duration, unless there is war, when it may be extended to five years, but an addition of 2d. a-day (why not say 5s. a month?) will, in that case, be made to his ordinary wages.

Men failing to make their appearance after the issue of the Proclamation are to be liable to arrest as deserters, and will also forfeit all claims to retainer, or pension, unless reasonable cause can be shown for their non-attendance.

Those who are serving abroad may be called upon by the officer commanding any of Her Majesty's ships to embark, unless they have obtained leave for a long voyage "*without* liability to serve abroad." But the commanding officer is enjoined to distress merchant ships as little as possible.

When called out they must join whatever ship the Admiralty may direct, and will have the same pay, privileges of allotment, provisions, and prize money, as continuous service seamen, or petty officers, if they should be qualified for and bearing the rating. They will also be entitled to the clothing, bedding, and mess traps allowed to continuous service seamen on entry. In case of misconduct they will be subject to the same punishments as regular seamen, and may also be struck off the list of Naval Volunteers, and

forfeit all claim to annual retainer, or pension, although previously earned.

Retirement and Discharge.

No volunteer, unless for causes hereafter stated, will ever be discharged against his consent, but may re-enter from time to time. Should he, after entering, desire to be discharged from his obligation, he may, provided the exigencies of the service admit of it, and that he is not called out for embarkation, obtain his release by giving three months notice, and repaying the money received by way of retainer. Should the volunteer obtain a certificate of qualification as master or mate, and be able to prove that he has obtained employment as master or mate, he may, upon that plea, obtain his discharge.

The causes of discharge against the consent of the volunteer are—physical inability; misconduct while on drill or in actual service; neglect or omission to attend drill; neglect or omission to serve in the navy when required; or to make the regular appearance before a shipping-master; and, lastly, conviction in a court of law.

If discharged for physical inability, and it is discovered that the defect was concealed on joining the Reserve, or has been brought on subsequently to entering by imprudence or misconduct, he will forfeit all claim to a pension. So also in all the other cases. If at the expiration of the five years enlistment the man does not make application to renew the term within six months, he will be considered as having voluntarily quitted the service, and as having relinquished all claim to pension, &c.

Should any volunteer leave the Reserve, and join the navy as a seaman, his retainer is to cease, and the time thus served will not count for the Reserve pension; but should he leave the navy, he will be at liberty to re-enter the Reserve, provided he has no naval pension.

Without doubt these restrictions are all more or less needed; but how far they will contribute to the success of the plan, time only will show. Merchant seamen are ever on the watch, and view all stipulations with extreme suspicion. How then will they look at the power which the Admiralty retains of annihilating all their claims, even at the nineteenth year of the enrolment, upon what they will perhaps consider the shallowest pretexts? Possibly a man is constitutionally weak, without knowing it. His weakness may escape the medical examiner, but, after a few years, acute disease may develope itself, and the man set down as an impostor. A man who has served ten or fifteen years may be guilty of getting drunk at drill or on actual service, and thereby forfeit all his previous claims. These points will, we are convinced, give rise to a distrustful feeling; and one word from a designing enemy will be sufficient to set the men dead against the Government scheme.

Pensions, etc.

In addition to paying the naval volunteer £6 a-year, the Government will set aside to provide for pensions, at the rate of thirty-five shillings per annum for volunteers between thirty and thirty-five years of age, and thirty shillings a-year for men under thirty.

This does not seem quite just. Suppose the pensioner to take a smaller amount (say £8), upon condition that his widow should enjoy it at his decease, and a year or two afterwards his wife dies, is there any good reason why he should not receive the £12? The State has been gaining £4 a-year during the time he has been married, consequently they can well afford to let the man succeed to his full pension, the contingency of a pension for his widow having ceased.

Coast guard service is to be open to volunteers who have been enrolled seven years, and two years embarked, or who have been enrolled ten years and never embarked; and ten years enlistment, or three years service in the navy, is to be considered a sufficient claim for Greenwich Hospital.

We have already given the schedule of crimes and offences which will be a bar to the claim for a pension. And clause 153 of the Regulations, after requoting the offence, concludes with the following:—"Those guilty of these offences cannot be restored to the list, and to their consequent claim to a pension, except by special leave of the Admiralty."

The last clause in the Regulations is numbered 160, and runs thus:—"Shipping masters will be remunerated in such manner as may be determined by the Admiralty and Board of Trade."

"Why not coast guard or naval officers be remunerated also?" will be the question naturally arising out of the perusal of this clause. And we echo—"why?"

The shipping masters are to have the trouble of catching the fish, but the naval officer is to dress them for the table; yet the fisherman is to be paid, but not the cook! This is not fair, and we foresee that, combined with many other objectionable clauses, the Admiralty and Board of Trade have in this done much towards crippling this important measure. There are too many masters in it. The Admiralty, the Board of Trade, Registrar-General, and Coast Guard authorities, require certain conditions to be fulfilled, all attended with trouble and responsibility. The naval officers will communicate on all subjects relating to the Reserve with the Controller-General, as their official superior, and the shipping masters with the Registrar-General.

No one will be more rejoiced at the success of this scheme than ourselves, and it is our anxiety to render it a good working principle, which occasions our free comments. In framing this Reserve the Government are attempting to deal with a stubborn, and often impracticable element—with a race who entertain a pious horror of the Royal Navy. They are the descendants of an outraged class, and tradition has handed down to them tales of hardship and misery which they cannot help thinking are applicable to the navy still. This is particularly the case with the coasting seamen, who are the most uneducated of the whole seafaring community. The coasters generally go to sea at ten or twelve years of age, and often end their days in the same owner's employ, without ever aspiring to greater dignity than that of mate. These men are, for the most part, employed all the year round. They load and unload, and have never more than a day to spare; and even that depends upon the wind and

weather. They eschew cleanliness, and are particularly fond of doing things their own way. The coasting steamers are navigated by the same crew, and we fear that few of them would risk the loss of a comfortable ship by entering the Reserve.

Small shipowners will be particularly jealous of the Reserve. They cannot afford to lose the service of their men for a week or a month together; neither will they relish the notion that at any time they may find their ship left without seamen by the issue of a proclamation. These are all difficulties which will have to be overcome. The law is powerless in this matter. Shipowners are under no penalty for telling their men "if you join the Reserve I will discharge you," and this we much fear will be often said to deter young men from entering.

Merchant seamen are now, whatever they were formerly, a cool, calculating class. They will sniff the bait with the caution, but not the gullibility and voracity of the shark. They will turn over the advantages and disadvantages, and those who are learned in the matter, or think they are, will soon be found putting very puzzling questions to the shipping-master. There are certain conditions annexed to service in the navy, and also relative to the pensions, as we have already shown, calculated to excite alarm and distrust. Five years exile from home and kindred will be a heavy lump when placed in the opposite scale to the retainer and prospective pension. Three years they will look upon as an inevitable contingency; although, as we showed last September, there was no necessity for so long a period being demanded. The men should be called out for "one" year only, to be increased to two, or three, if the emergency demanded that servitude.

Then again there is the imperative Regulation which excludes all but able seamen. Numerous fine able-bodied men, as we have already stated, might be enrolled, who now pursue their business as bargemen and watermen. They have been from boyhood on the water, yet perhaps never out of sight of land, and never rated able seamen. Men of this kind would be at hand, and always available. Have the Admiralty still an eye upon the "aquatics?" Do they contemplate the reorganization of a corps of river and sea fencibles, or why have they taken no heed of this useful and efficient body?

But notwithstanding its faults and shortcomings the Reserve scheme is a good move; and we sincerely hope that all parties concerned will pull harmoniously together—losing sight for a time of personal interests, and disregarding a little or may be a great deal of trouble.

We could have wished that the Reserve force had been kept entirely clear of the coast guard. We should have been glad had there been annexed to every shipping office a medical officer, and a proper staff of drill masters and seamen gunners; but the authorities have willed it otherwise, and all loyal and dutiful subjects should use their best endeavours to make the scheme a triumphant success.

The press has everywhere alluded to the measure in terms of approbation; and we cordially join in the hope that the parties to whom the advantages, present and prospective, are addressed, will take the measure upon the whole as a very desirable one.

THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

I.

Introduction—Who enter the Medical Department ?—As contrasted with other professions—Sons of old Medical Officers—Of Military Officers—Other classes, and one in particular—"Qualifications !"—Then and now—The training they undergo—Military Surgery at Fort Putt—Dr. Slammer—Other anecdotes—Our improvement—A retrospect—A paper of promises—"Hope deferred," and its result—Present Medical Officers—Their position—Fungi—Among professional brethren—Other civilians.

The claims of the medical officers of the British army have, from time to time during past years, been advocated in these pages, and it was in the *United Service Magazine* that the tenor of the warrant of 1st October, 1858, had its source. That warrant, wrung as it was from the War Department and the Treasury, has now been a full year in operation. The time has accordingly arrived when we may fairly inquire—has its operation produced that amount of satisfaction to the department generally which the medical officers anticipated from it? Has it, in short, been that immense boon to the department it was confidently expected to prove? Have the interests of the public service been advanced by it, and have the soldiers obtained the professional services of a better class of medical men since this warrant came into full operation than they did previously?

We shall endeavour to develope appropriate replies to these different queries in the remarks which we now propose offering; but before proceeding to analyze the provisions of the warrant, and to consider more in detail the various advantages it was expected to confer upon the body of officers to whom it refers, it seems advisable that we take a cursory view of the class of young men who usually enter the medical department of the army—the course of training they undergo in order, as is supposed, to fit them for the important and responsible duties which as medical officers they shall have to perform; and then of the actual position the army medical officer holds in general society, and among that more purely military.

We would naturally suppose, judging from what is observed in other branches of the public service, that the candidates for medical appointments in the army were chiefly composed of the sons of old officers in the same department—of men who, themselves proud of the particular branch of the army in which the working years of life had been passed, and now in their old age looking back with pride and gratitude to a service in which they were honoured while actively employed, and which in their old age now provides liberally for them—their aim and ambition in their declining years had been to fit at least one of their sons to tread the footsteps that led themselves to reward and honour. In the professions, almost without an exception, this is the case; and not only in the professions, but in almost all the occupations of social life. The clergyman, the lawyer, educates one or more of his sons for that profession by which he himself has risen, if not to actual wealth, at least to a position in which he has the means of providing for those who are his natural successors. The medical man in civil life, in the great majority of instances, loves to see one of his sons qualify himself to aid him in his professional

duties as old age creeps on, and finally to succeed him in his practice, when he himself retires from active life. In like manner the civil engineer educates in his own profession one or more of his sons, by whom he may be succeeded when he himself is no longer fit to actively follow that profession, in which nevertheless he continues to take pride and pleasure. Indeed, while these remarks are being committed to paper, the death of Brunel and of Stephenson are still recent occurrences, these two eminent men furnishing peculiarly apt illustrations of what is now being adduced.

In the various occupations of civil life the same remark holds good. The farmer in his old age hands over to a son the active management of broad acres upon which his own life has been passed, and from which his utmost desire now is, only to sever himself when he bids a final adieu to all earthly things. And so with the handicrafts men; the exceptional cases being made up of the young men, and they are by no means few, whose irresistible desire for adventure leads them to seek in the army, the navy, or in emigration, that excitement with which they cannot be otherwise supplied.

There are, it is true, some other exceptions. These are they who by certain landlords are looked upon as superfluous populations—whose presence upon the land which their grandfathers and fathers had spent their lifetime in reclaiming from the barren waste—whose home-circle is now broken in upon, and they scattered literally to the ends of the earth, in order that the product of their combined labour may once more resume, as far as possible, its pristine condition, and again become what it once was, a sheep-walk, or it may be a deer forest, or a haunt of the grouse and the "black game."

This subject is here introduced incidentally, but it being introduced, the remark may be further added, that it might now have been well for England, both in a political and a financial point of view, had ejectments of tenantry in Ireland and the Highlands of Scotland, and compulsory emigration, been less extensively carried out than they have been during the last twenty years and upwards.

The dimensions of our moors, our "walks," and our forests, might have indeed been smaller by many square miles than they now are, but as a trifling compensation for such important drawbacks as these, our standing army would now have been filled by men of full-grown stature, of unimpaired nationality of feelings, and proud of that country which it would be their boast to defend; we should not have had to pay from the public purse large bounties for boys and men so physically weak as to be unfit for the arduous duties of a campaign, as was more than amply proved in India during the Sepoy mutiny there. Neither would it have been necessary for us to bemoan the ill-manned state of our navy; while those of our countrymen who may during that period have emigrated to America, Australia, the Cape, and elsewhere, would have carried with them a feeling of unalloyed love and affection for their native land.

Here one side only of the medal has been examined—the reverse has not been produced; it is, indeed, not advisable that it should be. It is best left to the imagination of the readers of this paper, each to picture for himself what would form its most appropriate design.

As we proceed with our remarks, we shall discover more than may at first strike us, how appropriate to the subject more immediately under consideration are the observations contained in the two preceding paragraphs.

In what are commonly called the "executive" departments of the navy and army, we see the father succeeded by the son, and the grandson, and so on through generations. Neither is this different in whatever grade of the service they are in. The son of the common sailor paddles about the bay until able to "handle" a fishing boat, and from that again emancipates himself by "going to sea." The son of the naval officer, while yet in petticoats, is taught to look forward to adopting the profession of his sire. Boats and anchors are made his playthings; the name of his father's ship worked conspicuously upon the band which surrounds his first-worn cap; while, long before he enters his "teens," his tiny limbs are encased in "Navy Duck;" his best day suit is otherwise nautical, and the advent of the day is hailed by himself no less than by his parents when he exchanges the semblance for the reality of a "middy."

And so in the army! The son of the pensioner longs to adopt that profession of adventure, of excitement often, of hardship—tales of which instilled into his boyish ears have long determined him to "take the shilling," as his father had done before him. And again, in the commissioned ranks, the officer's child collects his infantile companions into squares, and with them endeavours to imitate, as far as in him lies, the evolutions being performed by children of a larger growth, under the orders of the adjutant, the serjeant-major, a drill corporal, or some such unapproachable magnate, whose manner, voice, or some personal peculiarity it is the ambition of the juvenile field-marshal successfully to imitate.

Nor are the tastes thus early displayed by the child discouraged; on the contrary, they are encouraged, and the father looks forward hopefully to the possible arrival of that day when he—enjoying the honour, and ease, and competence, the fruits of his military service—may welcome back, with a foretaste of similar honours to his own, the child whose gambols and infantile prate now amuse him; but, then, the bronzed face and medal-decorated breast, showing how gallantly and well he has, on fairly entering upon the stern realities of life, so far acted his part.

That all this is as it ought to be, it is presumed no person will for a moment deny. And no less a source of pride and of pleasure to old officers of the two branches of the public service is it to see their sons manifest a taste for their own profession, than is it a source of national pride and glory that such is the case—pride, because the circumstance proves that these services are administered in a manner to secure for them the affection and regard of their members, and of glory, inasmuch as the services of others than mere mercenaries are thus secured; men whose very names have been associated with the services through generations, and who feel, therefore, that with that particular service is associated that family honour which it is the ambition of every Englishman to preserve unsullied in his generation.

From what has just been said, we are naturally led to presume

of these appointments is still far below that of what is deemed the "superior article," the Indian appointment.

Prior to the present "administration" it is beyond doubt that the principal criterion of fitness in a young man for an army assistant-surgeoncy was, during many years, his connection with one particular division of the United Kingdom, and of it, one particular county. During another short but turbulent "reign," the closeness of tie between the candidate, and that gem of the sea—the Emerald Isle; in the latter instance, the open profession of the tenets of the "lady in scarlet" being looked upon as an unquestionable qualification for the highest favours of office. Now-a-days, all this state of "the good old times" has been done away with. Old established customs have been swept away with the removal of what the *Times* was pleased, most irreverently, to designate, "this fine old institution." It seems to matter little at the present time whence the candidate cometh, neither what are his peculiar tenets of belief. It remains to be seen hereafter what shall best fit these aspirants for the higher appointments; but if locality of nativity has hitherto had any influence in obtaining first appointments, what answer think you shall be by the department generally given to this question. Has service in any particular locality, and in any one particular division, been held as giving pre-eminent claims to some of the promotions to the higher grades that have during the last few months taken place?

If a ready reply does not at once present itself, we commend our readers to ponder over the question while we proceed with other matters. We shall not forget it. In the language of a message boy, we "will call for the answer by-and-bye, sir." Meanwhile we proceed to consider what has hitherto been the course of training by which the successful candidate for appointment has been fitted for the performance of those duties that lie before them.

It may be well to observe, that in this portion of our remarks, we refer to a state of affairs as they existed some years ago. It is necessary and just that this should be so, in order that it may be clearly understood that our remarks do not refer to the present chief of the department at Chatham, for whom, although almost a perfect stranger to us, we entertain a high sense of admiration. No! The men who held office there during the period to which we are about to refer are gone, some to that reward in this life which the old rate of half-pay affords, the greater number to other and more lasting rewards in that "bourne from which no traveller returns."

At the time we now refer to, the young medical man who in the attainment of his nomination to Chatham had reached the highest aim of his ambition, no sooner waited upon the dignitaries who presided over the destiny of all the inmates of what was then named the "great military hospital of Fort Putt," than he found the entire mass of the professional education which, during the preceding four or five years it had been his endeavour to accumulate, was utterly at fault in qualifying him for that particular duty upon which he was now taught to look as one of the most important that could fall to the share of an army surgeon.

This duty was none other than noting on the face of the "diet

roll"—the diet upon which each man should be placed during each succeeding day; and woe betide the neophyte, did he not in his very first attempt, correctly prepare a document, to him strange and incomprehensible in appearance, and with which he was most completely and utterly unacquainted.

For a trivial error in such a document he soon found the whole thunders of the establishment to be let loose upon him. The purveyor's clerk—the medical officer in charge of his ward—even the ward master—and not unfrequently the orderlies proclaimed in different strains of indignation and surprise, how heinous was his fault in ordering private John Smith an extra pint of tea, when it was Thomas Smith to whom this "extra" had been granted for especial reasons. A little further experience taught the "super," *i.e.*, "supernumerary," by which appellation young surgeons were then known, that for a soldier to die under his care was deemed nothing—it was only a fatal case; but for committing so glaring an error as to order any "extra" other than the very few then scantily allowed by the regulations, was to commit an offence which could only be expiated by a long course of exemplary behaviour upon his part—that good behaviour consisting in the success with which he kept down his "extra roll."

Other duties had he to perform, for which he had to confess his previous training at college but ill qualified him. He may, indeed, have distinguished himself in his "classes"—have obtained medals, books, and instruments as prizes—or honorary certificates from his professors, and yet discover that he is yet a perfect stranger to the science of military surgery as he now sees it practised.

To "dress" the bedsteads, that is, to see that they are carefully arranged in line—to preserve the hearthstone of unspotted white—the grate of unspotted black, seemed to be the great study of the whole staff of hospital authorities. A patient afflicted, it may be with some painful disease, if in his writhings his bed-clothes became in any measure disarranged, was immediately checked for having his bed irregular; indeed, were we to judge at all from the tone of voice and manner adopted by some senior officers towards the unfortunate men who applied for admission, one could hardly banish the belief that for a soldier to become the subject of disease or bodily injury, was for him to ensure the disapprobation of the class of men who in civil life usually offer sympathy.

This remarkable difference soon made itself apparent to all new arrivals. At first it did so unpleasantly; yet, after all, perhaps it is but "a way" we have in the army—it is what soldiers are accustomed to. It is *fine*, and after all, but a repetition of how they are treated by their military officer, and so the young medical officer soon learns to adopt the air and mein of his "superiors." What were at first artificial soon become confirmed, and thus in his generation continue henceforward to characterise him.

A general belief then existed that the inmates of those wards were almost without an exception malingerers: and probably this circumstance had not a little to do with the particular methods of treatment to which they were respectively subjected.

Sundays were the "field days"—the general inspection days. The

"chief" then visited each ward, carefully examined the all important diet rolls—carefully examined the medical registers to see if reports of each case were daily filled in; taking, however, no account of the degree of necessity that existed for such reports being made at all, or of the particular treatment that was being employed.

It was only at what was called the garrison hospital that the professional management of disease was ever made the subject of inquiry by the presiding medical officer, and here is an example of the profound knowledge which regulated the treatment there:—

The veritable Dr. Slammer, of Pickwickian celebrity, then held supreme sway in that school of medical learning. He was a *young* man of not more than thirty years service (young in those days), and consequently his zeal for the service was great. His daily custom was to visit each ward, and carefully to give to each young medical officer under his superintendence the benefit of his own vast experience.

His attention arrested by any soldier with whose ailment he was not yet familiar, his first inquiry of the young surgeon, who on these occasions always with head uncovered, and with deferential air, walked behind him, was "what's this ye beggar? eh!"

It is right to observe for the benefit of the uninitiated, that a man when admitted into hospital, and the remark is equally applicable to those in civil life as to those in the army, from that moment loses individuality. He, in fact, ceases to be looked upon, while there, as a person—he becomes a *case*. It is from this circumstance that our friend Slammer employs the otherwise somewhat peculiar interrogatory "What's this," in reference to a sick soldier; and it is in this sense that the future Inspector General replies "This is a case of—so and so, Sir."

Let us for the sake of illustration suppose the particular affection under which the man suffers to be a cold, caught by carrying coals on a wet Saturday, and not being able to change his clothes afterwards. It matters not, indeed, what is his particular affection, the case is made to suit the treatment, not the treatment the case.

"What are you giving ye beggar?" our sage mentor next inquires, in phraseology to which in professional circles our ears have been hitherto unused. We consider, however, that this is one more of the peculiar "ways," which, according to song and story, men in the army have. We think it fine, manly, military, and after all, question if much of the gravity with which we have seen learned professors perform their hospital visits be not assumed—sheer pretence—and we long for the day when we can, in our turn, in like terms, address those who may hereafter take the tone of their manner from us.

These thoughts flash like lightning through our minds. We enter timidly and distrustingly into an account of our treatment, and of our particular reasons for adopting the particular means we employ, but have scarcely advanced in our explanations before Slammer turns on his heel abruptly round towards us, taps us on the shoulder with the small cane of whalebone tipped with silver, which is his inseparable companion, and orders us to "Stop it, ye beggar, stop it;" intimating thereby, that he deems our treatment inapplicable, and that it is therefore to be suspended.

But what think you is according to this high authority the uni-

versal panacea for all the ills that flesh is heir to? It is, to use the words of our scientific preceptor, "Rhœi, Rhœi, by — Rhœi!" he thereby meaning, it is to be supposed, powder of rhubarb."

At the principal hospital there were in those days no dispensers of medicine, and the result was that the more important of the daily prescriptions had to be dispensed by the person whose patient was to take the particular medicine ordered.

As might have been anticipated, the articles in most frequent use were truly the "simples" of the pharmacopœia. There were, it is true, some occasions when the prescriber himself did take the trouble of compounding some of the more powerful preparations, but these occasions were comparatively rare. The medicaments most frequently given to the sick being one or other of some half dozen, which were prepared "in quantity" by the corporal who acted as surgery man, and kept for general use.

In order to more fully understand what is about to be related of army hospital practice of the period to which we refer, it is necessary to observe that it was the duty of each young medical man in rotation to take the duty of orderly officer; that is, one had to remain within the precincts of the building throughout the twenty-four hours over which his tour of duty extended, in order that he might be in immediate readiness to give professional attendance in any case of emergency that might occur.

On the occasion to which we refer the weather was cold and rainy, the evenings long and dreary—it was, in fact, during the season of winter—when the medical officer on duty, taking advantage of the clear bright fire that blazed in the "surgery" grate, sat himself down beside it, with the intention probably of passing an hour or two in the alternate occupations of studying Materia Medica and aerial castle building.

His meditations were of short duration. Heavy footsteps were heard coming at a rapid pace down the old creaky wooden stairs, that led to the upper stories of the building. Ribald laughs and jokes, ill-suited to the nature of the place, were heard being exchanged as the sound of footsteps advanced, and in another instant the surgery door was thrown open, and a clumsy, uncouth figure—evidently an "orderly"—bearing three large bottles in his arms, demanded, as if at the bar of a medical tap-room, "Two sarsaparillas and a cough mixture, for No. 11!"

The next instant he was standing abashed, doing his best to express some clumsy apology. It was evident that in his hurry he omitted to observe whom he was addressing, and therefore mistook the "officer" for the corporal, the ordinary presiding genius of this temple of physic.

Our young medical friend thought to himself that he had obtained his third "wrinkle" as to "the way we have in the army," took his departure to his own apartments, whistling that martial air as he went, and leaving the still confused orderly to take or get the "two sarsaparillas and a cough mixture" as best he could.

Many anecdotes might be related illustrative of the manner in which the "training" of young medical officers was conducted once upon a time. The necessary limits of this paper alone precludes the narration of many; one more however must be given.

It has been already said, that one of the means for the cure of disease or injury in a soldier upon which most stress seemed in those days to be placed, was, that his bed should be regular, that is, the bedding without a single turn or a twist, more than if the poor suffering wretch beneath were a thing—a body. Another most valuable adjunct in the treatment of all maladies, consisted in the rigid prevention of tobacco smoking among the patients, and at the same time, some of the senior officers acting upon their convictions, that nearly, if indeed not all, the affections under which the inmates laboured were either pretended or fictitious, a regular crusade was from time to time instituted against the supposed means by which the maladies were induced or aggravated.

Not unfrequently at dead of night, a certain zealous official would enter a ward, dressed in the full uniform of his rank, the sick, almost without an exception, were turned out of bed naked as they were, and thus obliged to sit or walk about, while the bedding was being ransacked for proscribed articles. Some of the younger medical men considered the measure somewhat at variance with the care they had at college been taught was necessary in the treatment of some diseases at least, such for instance, as consumption, dysentery, and not a few others, but then, if they might judge from what they now saw passing before them, the constitutions of soldiers must be different from those of men in civil life, and of course, therefore, require different treatment. They became conscious of how much they had to unlearn as well as to become acquainted with.

During one of these midnight hunts, a small parcel of grey coloured powder rolled up in paper was discovered under the pillow of a fine old soldier, a dragoon of more than twenty years' service, who was now suffering from extensive sores upon his legs, such as are common in men of that period of life. He had stood at attention and in silence, but with a supercilious curl of his lip, such as would out of the army have been deemed one of contempt, and thus watched the search and its final success.

Early the following forenoon the packet was by its finder carried to the office of the "Chief," to whom it was delivered with an air of triumph, such as he might have been expected to assume had he been successful in discovering that somewhat rare object, a mare's nest.

"See here sir, what I have found!" Thus he addressed himself to his superior. "Here is a powder I discovered in the bed of private Busby, of the 19th Hussars. This is what he applies to his legs to produce the ulcers. I have discovered him sir—I've discovered him —ah!—yes, that I have"—and the informer against the poor soldier rubbed his hands, and chuckled to himself, as only he who is conscious of having done a meritorious action can rub his hands and chuckle.

"The "Senior," like an honest fellow as he was, desired to hear the other side of the question; the man was brought to the office, so also were witnesses, patients, orderlies, and others who could give evidence in the important matter.

"Look at this my man," so spoke the worthy chief, in kindly tones, "Look at this, Mr. Blank reports to me that he had detected it

under your pillow, and that you have been in the habit of applying it to your legs to prevent a cure being effected. What have you got to say to it?"

During the delivery of this short speech, all present maintained a respectful silence, such as befitted the place,—for was it not *the* office—and the occasion,—for was the principal medical officer not investigating a case? All remarked, however, the look of triumph and of self-importance which beamed in the countenance of Mr. Blank.

The old soldier raised his hand respectfully, and drawing himself even more upright than he had been before, saluted his questioner as he replied:—"That sir! why that is but the powder I dyes my moustachios with," and as if to give his words still more expression, again he raised his hand, and twirled the long, black, hirsute appendage, which was then the peculiar pride of a light dragoon.

It is needless to relate at length how the tables were turned. How the "sell" given to Mr. Blank was enjoyed by all in the hospital, whether patients, orderlies, officers, or candidates—among none of whom that gentleman was popular; and no doubt some of the readers of this article will have no difficulty in recalling to mind the circumstances now related.

There is, literally, no exaggeration in the illustrations of "professional training" at Chatham that have just been given. The events related actually did take place, and moreover, while, as may have become manifest to our readers, the mere treatment of disease was held as being of secondary consequence, there was in the manner and general demeanour of the majority of the old officers to their juniors, so much of what was arrogant, domineering, and repulsive, that the services of not a few of the more independent as regards pecuniary means, have been lost to the State. They, rather than submit to treatment to which they had hitherto been strangers, threw up their appointments, and are now more or less eminent in private practice.

The universal remark then was, "Surely there must be something in the position and circumstances of medical men in the army, which renders them so very different as they are in their manner from what we had been accustomed to see in civil life."

At that time there was indeed much. By means exterior to the department, a great deal has been done to improve and remove the state of things which then existed. Much, very much remains yet to be done ere the work can be said to be complete. What these means have been, and what their success, which in our endeavour to illustrate, demands that we should take a cursory glance at the department as it has been during the few years before the introduction of the late reforms, as well, as in the short interval that has yet elapsed since they were brought into operation.

In our large military hospitals now-a-days, "surgery men" are no longer permitted to play with human life as in days gone by; neither are medical officers obligated to compound such medicines as the youngest or most thoughtless among them would hesitate to permit a private soldier or a lance corporal to prepare. Dispensers of medicine now take this particular duty, while subordinate to them are

persons who have already undergone, or are undergoing special training for the special and important duties which they have to perform.

This is one of the many respects in which by withdrawing from the medical officer a duty which was always deemed to be at variance with his proper functions, the personal well-being of the soldier has been directly benefitted; and it may, perhaps, be well, if, before passing on to other parts of our subject, we linger for a moment to inquire by what means, and in what manner, have these favourable results been brought about.

The means are readily told. They were none other than the agitation and sifting to which the army medical department was subjected during and immediately subsequent to the Crimean war. But did the change take place from within? Certainly not! It was brought about by the exertion of persons exterior to, and unconnected with the department. So all improvements, whether in the administrative or the executive have been produced,—and so they will ever be.

But how did the sick soldier benefit by the change? what did it matter to him whether his sarsaparilla and his cough mixture were compounded by Doctor Pestle, Assistant Surgeon to the Forces, or by Lance Corporal Mortar, of the "Royal Hashers?" Probably indeed, not much, but the results to him were very different.

Corporal Mortar from ignorance of the potency of the article with which he literally played, cared little about such trifles as exact proportions, and quite as little about the care with which it is necessary that the different ingredients in a prescription should be triturated and mixed. Hence the medicines prepared under these circumstances were irregular and uncertain in their effects, while the administration of the more powerful remedies in carefully proportioned quantities was a thing not to be thought of.

All this was avoided when Assistant Surgeon Pestle, or even Mr. Supernumerary Viall took the trouble to prepare the medicines prescribed by themselves. And to their credit be it said, both these young gentlemen did sometimes bestow half-an-hour upon what they always considered as rather unprofessional work, that mortar grinding.

In these few and decidedly exceptional cases, the sick were most assuredly the gainers. But then, what inducement was held out for care to be bestowed on so important a duty as mere compounding? Was it not, in the first place, in the established belief that medical treatment was of no great use after all, "in the management of soldiers' complaints." Did not every person say, and act upon the impression, that almost all the inmates of the establishment were malingerers, and that the few who were not, were incurably ill, and therefore, merely kept in hospital until such time as they should pass the invalid board and be *sent away?*

Was it not, moreover, notorious that a man obtained neither thanks nor credit for any extra care he might bestow upon the professional management of his cares? He "wrote them up" every day, kept his books clean, was always careful to mark the totals of his extras in words as well as figures, kept his wards clean and regular, and what more was necessary? He would not remain all day

the surgery when the 'bus would be ready in half an hour for Gravesend, where probably the afternoons would be spent in a manner somewhat at variance with strict professional propriety.

Looking back, as we are now enabled to do, through the long vista of not an inconsiderable number of years, looking at the men whose early training in military surgery it has been our business briefly to describe, and considering them in their professional attainments and efficiency as they now are, we naturally wonder how have they succeeded in so far overcoming their early education as they have done? Had that education been imparted with an object directly the opposite of awakening in the mind of the young medical officer a due sense of the responsible situation he was about to fill, and of fitting him for the especial duties he was about to be called upon to perform, a more appropriate method could not have been established, nor for the time being, a more effectual means.

While we are committing these remarks to paper, a document from the War Department is put into our hands, which promises largely for the future.

This document comprises three subjects, viz. :—

"Qualifications and examination of candidates for commissions in the Army Medical Service."

"Organization of the Practical Army Medical School," and

"Rules for the examination of Assistant Surgeons previous to promotion."

It is as yet premature to do more than make a passing remark on this document. If its promises bear fruit according to their present pretensions, the effect will unquestionably be, not only the personal professional improvement of future army medical officers, but what is more, a public question, the material advance of the interests of the service.

Much of these, nay, all, will depend upon the men who may be appointed professors. Upon them will rest a great responsibility. Let us therefore, hope that in their appointment their individual fitness will be the one sole consideration; not their place of birth, their religious belief, the nature of evidence given to them before certain commissions, neither their service in one particular army, nor in one particular division of that army.

From what has been said regarding the "initiation," young men once upon a time received at Chatham, need we wonder that in after days they should each and all look back, as they do, to their residence there, whether it had been long or short, as so much time completely lost and wasted. Their "teaching" there, in as far as they now derived any advantage from it, was a farce, while the treatment they received from some of the seniors there, and the remark is applicable to the military as well as the medical officers, was such as to disappoint, if not to disgust them with a service, of which they were as yet upon the threshold.

"Hope deferred maketh the heart sick," and most especially so in the case of the Army Medical Officers of the period to which we now refer. Bad as is still the position of this class of public servants, it was then doubly so. The relative rank held by them was much inferior to what it now is. Promotion was slow, the honorary distinc-

tions to which their successors of the present day may aspire were to them unattainable; and they, perhaps, more than the present race, saw themselves being passed in the race for advancement by comparatively young men in the "executive" department.

These various circumstances had the effect of souring the medical officers. How could it be expected that they should take either a pride or a pleasure in a service which was thus unjust to them. Hence they became what they most unquestionably were. Let us then profit by the lesson while there is yet time to guard against the recurrence of a similar state of things.

From what has already been said, the fact has no doubt become self evident that we quite agree with an observation, made we believe by a member of the late commission, namely, that the ranks of the medical department of the army are not filled by members of the aristocracy, nor even by members of the landed gentry. Men of aristocratic connections, or men of private fortune, if indeed they study medicine at all, certainly do not do so with a view to enter the army in the capacity of medical officers; the circumstance may therefore well occasion surprise that young lads, whose antecedents and special education have been such as have been described, should in the course of years become metamorphosed into such examples of gentlemanly bearing and professional attainments, as, we make bold to say, the army medical officers of the present day are.

We are naturally led to the conclusion that there must be in the profession and practice of the science of medicine, a "something," which, when not most powerfully counteracted by opposing influences, elevates and improves the tone and manner of the practitioner; a something, which of itself raises him by slow degrees it may be, but yet as surely raises him in feeling and sentiment as well as in external demeanour—as water finds its level.

It is not yet our agreeable task, however, to illustrate what is good and estimable in the army medical department. We reserve that for a future occasion, much as clergymen retain whatever is encouraging in their "discourse" till towards the end of it.

We pass on, therefore, to consider briefly what is the position accorded to the army medical officer in private society and in military.

It is true, the events of the last few years have naturally altered this. Army medical officers of the present day are no longer judged by the illustrations of them given by Lever, or by Dickens, as for instance, in the person of our most esteemed friend, Dr. Slammer, who has already obtained "honourable mention" in these pages. But yet the impression is by no means effectually extinguished, that the surgeons of our army, if not particularly accomplished in the treatment of anything else, are adepts in the management of *black eyes*, and certain affections, the very names of which must not be breathed in "ears polite."

Perhaps, indeed, the late warrant may have the effect to encourage this impression. In the new rank of surgeon-major, if we are to judge from what has already taken place, we are still to have perpetuated the type of men represented by the celebrated Maurice Quill—men who, indeed, are at the head of their profession; men

who have nothing to look forward to, nothing to expect; men of whom it may be said, being unfit for advancement in their department are permitted to remain as mere excrescences—as parasites—as fungi, who give to the trunk a venerable appearance, but are, in reality, injurious to its vitality!

But of this, more hereafter!

Army medical officers now-a-days, unquestionably take a higher position among their professional brethren in civil life than they did even a few years back, and it is now generally allowed, that although perhaps not quite "up to date" in their knowledge of the theoretical improvements that have taken place in the science, still, they rank second to none in the practical treatment of disease. They may, indeed, not be capable of writing so "elegant" a prescription as he whose daily bread depends upon the success with which he ministers to the tastes and whims of a capricious but wealthy patient; yet, if they fail in that one particular, they do, as a rule, understand what are the active principles that are most effectual in cases of illness demanding decisive treatment; while the fact is now generally acknowledged, that there are some diseases, such as those of tropical climates, and some injuries, as for instance, gunshot wounds, and the severer accidents, the management of which are held to be the peculiar province of the army medical man.

In ordinary civil life however, that is, among civilians unconnected in every way, either with the army, or with the medical profession, it must be with regret confessed, that the military surgeon is not looked upon as holding that position which he has a right to demand, first by virtue of his profession itself, and secondly by virtue of his army commission.

This remark is peculiarly applicable to England. It is, indeed, scarcely, if at all, applicable to either Scotland or Ireland: why is this? Possibly, nay, probably, it is from the fact, that the medical profession generally holds a much lower position in England than in either the two other divisions of the kingdom. This [illegible] traced to the circumstance, that one class at home of medical practitioners in England loses much of its professional [illegible] of the tradesman. We allude to what is called the [illegible] titioner.

We would ask any of our readers if this [illegible] themselves have not seen over and over [illegible] hospitality extended by residents of [illegible] other ranks of regimental officers, [illegible] youngest ensign, are, not perhaps in all [illegible] rule, not extended to the medical [illegible] would ask them if, as a general rule [illegible] medium generally looked upon as a [illegible] integral part of—the corps of officers of [illegible]

This paper has already, it is to be [illegible] longer, we must therefore reserve to [illegible] discussion on the past and present [illegible] partment.

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF FRANCE AND GERMANY.

(Concluded from p. 343.)

A WAR undertaken by France against Germany with the Rhine frontier in view, would doubtless be popular in France. But the Emperor is aware of what he should have to contend against. The first cannon shot would draw all the States of the German Confederation closer together, and should Austria be first attacked she might rely upon their support. France may beat Austria on ground not belonging to the German Confederation, but once attacked on that territory, the conflict would assume a far different aspect. Many facts, more important even than the actual war, would have to be considered. The *veto* of England, armed neutrality in Switzerland, in Holland, in Belgium; perhaps their participation in the war. Belgium can bring into the field 73,000 men, Holland 60,000, and Switzerland 42,000, with 36,000 reserve. As soon as Prussia and the army of the Confederation take the field, the order of the day would be "Advance on Paris." The Prussians could advance with 300,000 men on the north-east side, the other States with at least 200,000 to 250,000 on the east side.

Fears have been entertained in Germany that France might attempt a *coup de main*, and make a sudden invasion of South-West Germany through Alsace. It is true France has it in her power to concentrate by railway a large army at Strasburg. But that army would have to halt before Ulm and Rastatt. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and the neighbouring States of the Confederation could surely, under cover of those fortresses, keep the enemy in check for a time. And if it came to the worst the battle of Leipzig would have to be fought over again.

Germany possesses but few fortresses in the south-west. She has only one stronghold on the frontier—Rastatt; 18 miles in its rear lies Ulm, and 16 miles beyond Ulm the fortress of Ingolstadt. These three points fall pretty nearly in a straight line drawn at a right angle from the middle of the Upper Rhine, eastward. North of Ulm, also a considerable distance from the Rhine, there is a fourth point—the fortress of Würzburg.

The fortresses of Rastatt, Ulm, and Ingolstadt are deserving of especial attention in consequence of their strength and position. All three are built upon the German system of fortification, and belong to the strongest fortresses of Europe.

Rastatt commands all the road on the right bank of the Rhine from Basle to the Maine, and some of the passes of the Black Forest. Its especial importance consists in the fact that it gives greater strength to the almost impregnable position of Landau-Germersheim, and that it flanks every passage of the Rhine on the Alsace side. Rastatt is not yet provided with an entrenched camp, as was originally proposed, but, in case of a sudden war with France, earthworks could be thrown up which would compensate for the omission. Even without this, Rastatt is a formidable fortress.

In a strategic point of view, Ulm holds a far more important position. It is the flower of all German fortresses. Its magnificent

strategical position, no less than the technical completion of its works, place it beyond a par with any other fortress in Europe (excepting perhaps Verona). Ulm, moreover, is an immense entrenched camp, capable of holding 100,000 men; an army concentrated here could take the offensive in many directions.

In a strategic point of view, Ingoldstadt is not so well placed as Ulm; it is, however, a second Colt, which would have to be withdrawn to open the path to the Danube. Its fortifications are very strong and admit of a determined defence, especially if a retreating army sought shelter under its guns.

Supposing Sardinia joined France in a war against Germany, Austria holds two fortresses, Mantua and Verona, the importance of which must not be underrated.

Mantua is situated on a small lake formed by the river Mincio, one and a half (German) miles long, and a quarter broad, intersected by various dams. On the north side of the fortress to the citadel there is nothing but thick beds of reeds; in the west and south there are dense swamps which can easily be placed completely under water. There are only two chief ingresses to the fortresses over embankments of great length. Its defences are strong. A small flotilla is kept upon the lake. Even if but poorly defended it can be reduced only by starvation.

Verona stretches itself on both sides of the Adige, and is ranged in by a belt of fortresses. They form an entrenched camp for 50,000 to 70,000 men. The distance between Mantua and Verona is 5 (German) miles; between Verona and Peschiera 3; between Mantua and Peschiera 4½.

Of the two fortresses Mantua must be considered the strongest, but Verona the most important in a strategical point of view. Mantua and Peschiera offer an admirable combination for the defence of the Mincio; Verona offers both a central point of support and closes the valley of the Adige. Within this triangle the most broken down army could hold its ground against immense odds. Verona forms the central point of defence.

As long as this position remains in the hands of Austria, no one can boast of being master of the land which stretches between the Adriatic, the Po, and the Ticino.

Austria does not possess many naval ports. Venice is fortified, but is not of great strength, and the water is shallow; her other naval ports are Trieste, Cattaro, Ragusa, Zara, and Pola. Trieste offers but slight security, either against storms or attack; Cattaro, Ragusa, and Zara are too small. Pola, on the other hand, is a spacious and well-defended naval port. This point is well suited to receive the Austrian fleet, and it is moreover (like Trieste), on the territory of the German Confederation.

Austria is actively preparing her coast-defences; however advisable this step may be, it is not to be supposed for one moment, that she could prevent a landing being effected, on some part of the Adriatic coast in face of the fifty times superior French fleet.

In case of a war between France and Germany, nay, even between France and Austria, there is another land, the geographical position of which makes it worthy of consideration—we mean Switzerland.

Switzerland separates France and Germany for a considerable extent, like a huge wedge, so that her neutrality partially shields either power on this point, or prevents an attack. But the advantages or disadvantages arising herefrom are not equal on both sides.

The range of the Jura mountains, the west frontier of Switzerland, runs almost in a direct continuation of the Rhine, from Mayence to Basle. It stands therefore in juxta position to the east frontier of France in its general features. But on the eastern side, Switzerland, with at least half of her territory, recedes towards South Germany, Austria, and Italy.

In case of a war, therefore, if Switzerland remains neutral, the French line of defence on the eastward would be much simpler and easier than that of Germany on the west. Should Switzerland participate in the war, her alliance with Germany would be of far less disadvantage to France, than her alliance with France would be disastrous to Germany.

There are many other points which would be in favour of France. France can invade Switzerland at ease; Germany could not occupy it without considerable difficulty. Should French troops enter Switzerland from Besançon or Belfort, they could hold communication with other French troops from Alsace, advancing towards Baden or Wurtemberg. A German army entering Switzerland from the Voralberg or Tyrol, or through Lombardy would have great difficulties to encounter, and would have to divide its forces.

The weak points of the Swiss frontier lie between the lakes of Geneva and of Constance. From this point start the easiest roads, to West Germany, and from this same point numerous streams run, in a north-easterly direction to the Rhine. This is all in favour of France.

If a French army occupies Switzerland only as far as the river Aar, it has circumvened the Black Forest, and stands in the flank of any German army on the Rhine. On the other side, supposing Germany had the whole of Switzerland in its hands, it would still have the French natural front in face.

From Berne to the French frontier is little more than two marches. The possession of this point by a French army would place the whole of south-west Switzerland in its power up to the St. Gotthard.

The valley of the Dappes, about which so much has been written lately, has not the importance which has been attached to it as long as the Swiss government prohibits the passage of French troops through Geneva. The object in view is a different one. A pretext is wanted to pick a quarrel so as to command, if necessary, passage for an army, or an excuse for an invasion of Switzerland. Should France attempt to infringe the neutrality of Switzerland, Germany is bound to do likewise in self defence. But, should Switzerland undertake to maintain her position and defend her neutrality on all sides, then it is the bounden duty of Germany to render her every possible assistance.

The Prussian writer enters into a lengthened consideration of the defence of the French frontier in case of invasion. He has evidently carefully studied the whole line of defence on this side of the Appe-

nines, the Jura, and the Alps, and gives a most accurate description of all the rivers that intersect the territory alluded to, with minute details which might prove serviceable should such an invasion really take place. He unhesitatingly expresses the opinion that France will be the invader, not the invaded.

The poor natural defences of the north-east provinces of France have been strengthened by the erection of numerous fortresses. Up to the Mosel there are 28 in 3 lines (3 first class, 6 second class, and 19 third and fourth class). If number constituted strength, this would be the strongest frontier line of France. But most of these fortresses built by Vauban are not of much importance at the present day, as they simply represent great forts. They require large garrisons, and may be easily blockaded and surrounded. Moreover, close opposite to them lie many German and Belgian fortresses, which considerably limit their importance. The principal fortresses are Metz, Lille, and Gravellines. As a line of defence they cannot bear comparison with the German fortresses. They are strategically ill-placed. Lille and Gravellines are in Flanders, and do not command more than 10 miles (German) between the sea and the Scheldt, whilst the distance of Metz, the only important point from the Vogesen (Jura) to the Scheldt is 45 miles.

And on which side do the French suppose that a German army (and this is the only eventuality that can be presumed) would invade their north-east provinces? It would be simply folly to suppose it would make a circuit with a view to attack strongholds. Two or three fortresses like Rastatt and Ulm would render much greater service at far less cost.

Of the fortifications of Paris the Prussian writer makes little account. Their very extent is against them. To defend them properly an army of 200,000 to 300,000 men would be requisite, and to enable an enemy to appear before them would imply that the French army had already been routed in the open field.

As regards Belgium. Belgium has always been selected as the battle field where German and French armies have met in combat. The occupation of Belgium affords France a fine basis for operations against North Germany, much superior to that of Alsace against Central and South Germany. Without taking this step, in a war with Germany her action would be circumscribed.

The most important fortress of Belgium is Antwerp. It forms an entrenched camp for 100,000 men. On both sides of the Scheldt up to its mouth there are forts and defences, so that it cannot even be easily attacked on the sea side. Antwerp may be styled a citadel for the whole Belgian army, should a sudden and overpowering attack be made upon it by France. It is true that in such an eventuality the rest of the kingdom would not be defended, but Belgium could hold out in Antwerp until foreign aid came to her support.

Along the valley of the Rhine excellent roads run on both sides. Between Mayence and Strasburg the number of these roads both on the right and left bank is most considerable. For the defence of the Middle and Lower Rhine and the adjacent territories, Germany has nine fortresses. Of these, six—Wesel, Cologne, Coblentz,

Mayence, Germersheim, and Landau, are real Rhine fortresses; the remaining three—Luxemburg and Saar-Louis in the South, and Jülich in the North of the German Rhineland, shelter it in some measure against the French, Belgian, and Dutch frontier. The grouping of these fortresses, and the fact that the first named places are much stronger than the latter, shows that the German system of fortification is founded on quite different principles than that of the French in the north east. Germany never made the attempt to keep its frontier hermetically closed, as it were, by a number of small forts, which, indeed, would have been impracticable, considering the number of roads that are there. It has simply withdrawn further inland, leaving the rest to a large army in the field, which, supported by the admirable Rhine fortresses, could soon advance against an invading enemy in any direction, and even if beaten at first, could manage to hold its ground on the Rhine till reinforcements should arrive.

This object has been attained by the erection of the chief fortresses on the Rhine: Cologne, Coblenz, Mayence, and Germersheim, as great entrenched camps. Of these four places, all of which are connected by strong works with the right bank of the Rhine, each may be looked upon as almost impregnable. It is true they require strong garrisons—together, a considerable army. But without considering that Germany is never badly off for soldiers, it also implies a proportionate strength of the invading army. As long as 150,000 to 200,000 men are concentrated in or near these four points, and as long as neither of them is taken, no French army, under 300,000 strong, could attempt to cross the Rhine between Lauterburg and Wesel. The Rhine-line from Germersheim to Coblenz is the strongest. Here Landau and Germersheim close the valley of the Rhine on the left hand completely on the Strasburg side, as on this point 100,000 men could easily hold their own for a long time against very superior numbers. The weakest point is between Wesel and Cologne. The vicinity of the Dutch frontier renders an attack on that side improbable; moreover, the position of Wesel there on the right bank offers great advantages. No great strategic importance can be attached to Luxemburg. This is owing to its somewhat isolated position, because, despite its strength, it is rather a fortress of the old style, and is almost neutralized by the vicinity of the French fortresses of Thionville, Metz, Verdun, Longwy, and Mont-Medy. Jülich and Saar-Louis are of still less importance. It is evident that Germany is better defended in the north west by a few first-rate fortresses than France in the north and north east by her very numerous, but, generally speaking, weak fortresses.

The middle of Western Germany has more natural defences than the points we have just considered: first, the Upper Rhine and the Black Forest which rises immediately in its rear. In former days these defences would have been of much greater importance, but now-a-days, such extended places of cover are only really valuable when defended by powerful armies, or closed by strong fortresses.

The Black Forest, the highest range in West Germany, runs from the sharp angle of the Rhine near Bâsle, along the Upper Rhine, from which its main ridge is never more than from three to seven

miles (German) distant, in a northerly direction to the Neckar. In the south and south west it occupies nearly that whole corner of the Rhine, whilst in the west it recedes many miles from the river. Its extent is 30 (German) miles in length, its breadth, south, between Schliengen and Fürstenberg 10½ miles, in the centre between Baden and Weil 6 miles, and in the north between Wiesloch and Wimpfen, 4½ miles. It gradually diminishes northwards. The mountains are covered with forests of thick pine trees (firs). It is divided into Upper, Middle, and Lower Black Forest.

The Upper Black Forest stretches from the south to the Murg and the Glatt (rivers). This is the highest range (4400 feet), and has most branch ranges. It is intersected by deep defiles in all directions. With the exception of the Kinsig Valley, all the other valleys are narrow and steep. The main-ridge forms between Freiburg and Neustadt, the so-called Höllen-thal, a difficult defile, and stretches, intersected by the Kinsig (stream), over the Kniebig and the Murg (rivers), of which the valley of the latter is not narrow but shut in by sloping mountains. The average range here is 3000ft.

The Middle Black Forest stretches from the Murg and the Glatt to the Pfinz and Wurm (rivers). The mountains here dwindle into wavy undulations, with broad plains here and there. Two deep valleys deserve mention, those of the Enz and Nagold.

The Lower Black Forest extends north of the Pfinz to the Neckar (river), and here the highest point of the range does not exceed 1300 feet. Its most important valley is that of the Elsenz. Some of the highest points of the Black Forest hills have always snow on them. There are, moreover, impassable bogs and impenetrable thickets. It would appear at the first glance that the impediments offered to the advance of a French army by the Black Forest were very considerable, but, after a careful study of the localities, this is not the case. There are a number of excellent roads through it, and numerous bye-paths available for cavalry and artillery. Moreover, the Black Forest can be easily doubled (circumvened) on the Swiss side, as was done with complete success by the French in 1800. It would therefore be of no avail to fortify the chief passages of the forest until this road was closed. It would be far more important to take strong possession of the lands lying in its rear, locked in by the Upper Neckar, the Upper Danube, and the Iller.

In conclusion, let us say that if the armies of Germany come forth with the necessary resolution, it is not to be supposed that France can spare even a single man to undertake anything against our coasts. But should that take place, it would be a proof that we had not well understood our interests. The French fleet alone could do nothing. Landing troops would be required. Moreover, such a diversion would not tend much to decide the struggle.

We are in expectation of great events. Not an hour passes in which it might not be said that the crisis was at hand. It places Europe in a new attitude. On our side we have a consolation as well as a duty. If Germany holds together, a war will not add one shovel of earth to boasting France. And when the cloud bursts, we already see in our imagination, Germany coming forth, perhaps somewhat changed in form, but, on the whole, strong and unharmed.

GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS ON FORTIFICATION AND NATIONAL DEFENCE.

At a moment when a Royal Commission is inspecting our fortifications, with a view to their improvement, when we are augmenting our navy, organizing a system of internal defence, and making every preparation for the coming war with France, a work which embraces all these subjects, from the pen of an eminent officer of the British army, makes its appearance very opportunely, and is sure to attract universal attention. So long as forty years ago, Sir Howard Douglas impressed the military world with his views on fortification, arresting the tide that had then set in for the system of Carnot, which he forcibly and successfully combatted. He now embodies those observations, with much new matter, in a section of the work before us, calling attention to the faulty structure of many of the principal fortresses of Europe, which are relied upon as barriers against the irruptions of France. These strictures may yet awaken continental powers to a sense of their danger. But the greater portion of the work before us is addressed especially to ourselves. It refers to matters that concern England alone—Englishmen of all classes, as well civil as military; and we cannot give a better idea of its character than by describing it, in its application to what is passing around, as, *par excellence*, a book for the time.

The first part of the work is appropriated to the demolition of the defensive system of Carnot, showing its erroneous principles, and how they would work, as well in the construction of new fortresses as in their application to those already existing. It also points out the fallacy of Carnot's theory of vertical firing, demonstrated by repeated experiments at Woolwich. On this point the gallant author cites likewise the testimony of the Duke of Wellington, who says—"I recollect that at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo our trenches were bombarded by eleven or thirteen large mortars and howitzers for ten days—in which time 13,000 shells were thrown—which occasioned us but little loss, notwithstanding that our trenches were always full; and I may safely say they did not impede our progress for one moment."

Sir Howard Douglas devotes the second part of his book to an examination of the modern German or polygonal system of fortification. This is founded on the principles of Carnot, introducing some modifications, but, like Carnot, abandoning bastions. Sir Howard Douglas is not insensible to the disadvantages which seem to be inseparable from bastions, but after canvassing them in their full extent, and fairly considering all that can be urged for the polygonal system, dwelling particularly on the advantage gained by the peculiar structure of the salient angles of the *enciente*, he considers that we are not yet warranted in discarding bastions. In short, the superiority of attack over defence remains where it was left by Vauban, as even Sebastopol was brought to admit.

The third part of the work is occupied by an examination of the capabilities of intrenched camps, and their use in defensive warfare.

Sir Howard Douglas places no reliance on such works, and the facts he adduces from military history show how thoroughly he has mastered the subject, and on what conclusive data his convictions are grounded. Intrenched camps were first introduced by Vauban, as an appendage to fortresses of an inferior class, but the principle has since been extended in a manner that the great engineer never contemplated, and intrenched camps are constructed to accommodate armies. In the late war the Austrians found they could not leave detached corps in their intrenched camps, without a certainty of their being cut off, and hence they withdrew their troops, leaving their strong places, which had been constructed with so much care, to the enemy. Sir Howard Douglas mentions the capture of the whole Saxon army by Frederick II., owing to its having taken possession of an intrenched camp, and the Prussian monarch himself narrowly escaped destruction, when posted in an intrenched camp near Buzelwitz. The lines at Torres Vedras Sir Howard proves to have been a structure *per se*, and hence not open to the objections which form the rule. That famous position formed a grand *tête*, having uninterrupted communication with the sea, with its base on Lisbon, which it completely covered; and being only assailable in front, the occupying force could not be reduced by famine. Sir Howard Douglas shows the fatal consequences that occurred to Napoleon from his adoption of intrenched camps, as a means of retaining the strongest positions in Germany, but which broke up his armies into fragments, depriving him of their assistance when most needed. The gallant author, however, by no means denies that intrenched camps may be made to play an important part, and form a prominent feature, in defensive warfare. Space will not permit of our going so fully as we could wish into the remarks he advances on this subject. All who are interested in the science of attack and defence should diligently study not only this, but the two previous sections of the work. They form together a complete synopsis of the principles of fortification, indicating their application under every condition. The same spirit pervades the whole book, presenting the views of a large and sagacious mind, deeply versed in military science, trained in the stern uses of the trenches and the field, and able to instance from history the mistakes of great commanders, and elucidate the cause of their successes. Thus a book strictly professional is given a popular character, and read with interest. Sir Howard Douglas's services in the north of Spain, where he organized the guerilla resistance during the Peninsular war, enable him to speak with authority on all points connected with arrangements for internal defence. He does not come before us with any old, worn-out papers from the Horse Guards, such as we have read over and over again, and which only tell us the same used-up tale, but he looks over our defenceless country and round our naked shores with an alert, searching, and original glance, bringing out every capability, and turning to account every resource. This masterly view of our situation will attract, as it claims, profound attention. Its statements are so clear, its reasoning so logical, its suggestions so obvious, that it must carry

conviction to every mind; and will reassure Englishmen, while it operates as a warning to foreigners. Sir Howard Douglas is no vain alarmist. He has looked deeply into this problem, and he here presents us with its solution. It takes the subject, as we have said, in all its bearings, embracing our naval, littoral, and internal defence. In our present number, we can only find room for Sir Howard's remarks on the navy, but hereafter we shall have occasion to refer again to the work, and, meanwhile, our readers will no doubt make themselves acquainted with its pages:—

"203. When the navies of Europe had been swept from the face of the ocean, by the gallant achievements of the sailing navy of Great Britain, and her supremacy at sea had been firmly established in every region of the earth, Napoleon I. affected to imagine that, favoured by tempests which might scatter our fleets, or by superior strategy, he might obtain a temporary superiority in the British Channel, which would render it possible for him to make a descent on our shores. This was considered rather as a menace than a probability, and, accordingly, it was little regarded by the people of this country: the battle of Trafalgar seemed to put an end to every chance of success, and the idea of an invasion ceased to be entertained.

"204. Vast changes have taken place in the maritime affairs of all the nations of Europe since the termination of that war; and the introduction of steam, as a propelling power for ships of war, will necessarily modify—and, to a great extent, overturn—the still existing tactics of war on the ocean. And, though we may entertain a strong opinion that the maritime strength of Great Britain will rather be increased than diminished by the use of steam for the propulsion of our ships of war; yet it would not be prudent to assume a certainty of success in a new, and, as yet, untried, mode of naval warfare for the protection of the country, with as much confidence as in times past, when, in then existing circumstances, Great Britain proved herself invincible at sea.

"Amongst the changes which steam-propulsion for ships of war will introduce in naval operations, may be included the abandonment of the blockade system. For a steam fleet superior in strength to the fleet blockaded—if well supplied with Armstrong's incomparable guns, and other descriptions of rifle cannon, and with abundance of mortars for firing at high elevations—will be able to destroy from afar the fleet, or the arsenal in which the ships are crowded, and probably both, at the same time. Thus, it will not be necessary to keep a steam fleet before an enemy's port during long intervals of time, as was the case formerly with our blockading fleets of sailing ships; which were, often in vain,—from the enemy remaining close in port,—kept knocking about in all weathers on the sea, with great danger to the ships, and at enormous expense to the nation.

"205. On contemplating the steps by which England and France made the great transition from a sailing to a steam navy, it will be seen that our country took the lead. England worked out the new problem, experimentally, during many years, and at a vast cost; while

France, profiting by our labours, at once put in practice the results of our researches. English artists discovered that the screw was the fittest instrument for the propulsion of steam ships of war; and the screw the French immediately adopted. France, having few sailing ships of war, began immediately, with great industry, to construct new ships of the line with screw-propellers; and they furnished them with engines of great power. On the other hand, England, having a vast number of sailing ships of every class, endeavoured to turn them to account by converting them into steamers; and it was not till after much delay and expense had been incurred, that we succeeded in forming a steam fleet, by the construction of new ships, on the most approved principles.

"206. The efforts of France have been particularly directed, during the last ten years, to the re-attainment of that rank which she formerly held among the naval powers of Europe; and the steam fleet of France has, during the whole of that period, been in a state of progressive augmentation: the government of that country having steadily acted upon the recommendations propounded in the 'Enquête Parlementaire' (1849), and it is now equal, if not superior, to that of Great Britain. The author having procured a copy of that document in 1853, deemed it his duty to submit to Her Majesty's Government, copious notes and extracts from the proceedings of that commission, showing the vast sums voted, and proposed to be employed during the ten years which were to follow. The author, also, pointed out the spirit of rivalry, if not of hostility, both implied and expressed in that official document. These "Notes" were printed confidentially, in 1853, at the private press of the Foreign Office;* and he must observe, that we ought to have begun, as unostentatiously as the French began, to take countervailing measures, in order to maintain the numerical superiority of the British steam fleet, instead of deferring the step, as it was deferred, during several years. By this postponement, the progress made by the French becoming generally known to the public, the country is thrown into consternation by the announcement that there must be made immediate and extensive additions to the British navy, in order to make up for the time which has been lost.

"207. The changes which political events have produced in the maritime affairs of all the nations of Europe, and the great improvements which have been made in naval constructions and armaments, and particularly the introduction of steam as a motive power since the termination of the wars arising from the great French Revolution, are matters with which it behoves the statesmen of this country to be thoroughly acquainted. One great naval power in Europe has disappeared as such, and another has sprung up in the New World. The steam fleet of France is in a state of progressive augmentation, the government of that country having acted upon the decision of

* This is the document referred to by Mr. Cobden, in his speech of the 29th July, 1859; but he gave it a colour very different from that which it clearly shows. The confidential character of that document having thus been violated, it may, very properly, be cited by the author.

its 'Commission d'Enquête,' of 1849,* and it has now attained a very formidable degree of strength. The division of the Russian fleet now in the Baltic, amounting to about 40 sail of the line, will speedily become a steam fleet; and the navies of the minor powers, Denmark, Sweden, and Holland, under the able administrations of those countries, are in a very efficient state. In short, the navies of Europe and of America have so increased in the number and strength of the ships, and their *personnel*—in all that relates to the science and practice of war, that, in a future contest, the sea will become the theatre of events, more important and decisive than have ever yet been witnessed.

"208. It has been said that the efforts of our nearest continental neighbours have been particularly directed during the last nine years to the re-attainment of that rank and consideration which their nation formerly held among the naval powers of the world; and, admitting this to be a just and laudable policy for France to pursue, Great Britain should, at the same time, keep steadily in view the measures now being carried out in that country, conformably to the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry just referred to; and must take corresponding measures to increase in due proportion the power, efficiency, and numerical strength of her naval forces, in order to maintain her present position. Thus, the naval arsenals of two great nations in alliance with each other, one of them impelled by a necessity of the first and highest order—that of providing effectually for its own security,—are resounding with the din of warlike preparations; while both nations might be participating in the financial advantages and social benefits of a sound, substantial, and lasting peace.

"Viewing France as that which she really is, a great power, whose safety depends upon her military forces, we have no right to cavil at any measures which the government of that country may adopt for its own security against its powerful continental neighbours. Her military preponderance is as essential to her safety, as the maritime preponderance of Great Britain (an insular and colonial power) is indispensable to hers. Neither should be jealous nor distrustful of the other, in any legitimate use which either may make of the powers with with nature has endowed them, respectively, for providing effectually for their own safety.

"209. Preponderating naval power not being essential to the security of France, the effort to acquire it can only be considered as a hostile measure towards Great Britain—to which naval supremacy is indispensable, and must be maintained at any cost.

"The author makes these observations in no unfriendly spirit; he takes the facts and circumstances which prove that the French are actuated by sentiments inimical to our naval superiority, as he finds them recorded in official documents; and he uses them merely in proof of the necessity which Great Britain is under, as an insular and colonial empire, of maintaining her position by keeping up a navy which will protect her, not merely against any one maritime

* See the 'Enquête Parlementaire, sur la Situation et l'Organisation des Services de la Marine Militaire, ordonnée par la Loi du 31 Octobre, 1849.' Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1851.

power, but against any coalition to which political circumstances may give rise.

"Whilst the naval power of France, in the event of a war, will be chiefly collected in two seas, on the shores of which her great arsenals are established, the navy of England must be dispersed over the whole world, with strength sufficient in every region to protect her numerous colonies, and widely extended commerce; and, at the same time, have dominant power in the waters which surround the British islands. For both of these great objects, she cannot provide with a navy of its present strength.

"210. Sincerely disposed to maintain, in his humble sphere, the friendly relations which happily subsist between the governments of Great Britain and France, the author cannot but approve of the policy by which France is actuated, in so re-organising her maritime resources as to enable her to regain that position which she formerly held as one of the great naval powers of Europe. The Commission of Inquiry, in its sitting of the 3rd February, 1851, decided, that the number of the line, which, by the Ordonnance of 1856, was limited to forty, should be increased to forty-five; and that each ship should be provided with steam power. This was the number adopted; but it appears, from the discussion which took place on the occasion, that the proposition of M. Charner—one of the members of the Commission—to increase the number to fifty ships of the line, was rather postponed than rejected. It was recommended to have the greatest number possible of ships of the line finished, afloat, and ready armed, whenever they might be required. The reason for adopting the smaller number was, that forty-five ships would be finished in less time; and thus the funds voted would be economised, and the country be better prepared in the event of war soon breaking out. The number of ships actually finished is forty-seven; and there is little doubt it will soon amount to fifty, as proposed by M. Charner.

"211. In the sittings of the 12th February, and the 10th March, 1851, it was resolved that the number of steam-frigates, *à grande vitesse*, should be twenty; of frigates, moved by sail and steam, also twenty; at the same sitting it was decided that the number of corvettes should be fixed at fifty, and that there should be eighty avisos. It was also decided that the construction of the twenty swift steam-frigates, and the fifty corvettes, should be completed gradually within the next ten years. At the same time it was determined that all sailing transports should be suppressed; and that, instead of them, there should be twenty steamers to serve as transports.* The line-of-battle steamers are recommended to be built on the model of the 'Napoleon,' formerly the 'Vingt-quatre Février.' The engines of this ship, though rated at 960 horse power, can be worked up to 1,500 horse power, and the ship is capable of stowing coal for ten days, when steaming at full speed. It was subsequently resolved that the 'Equipages de ligne' (ship's crews), and the 'Mécaniciens,' or engine-men, should continue to be kept up by means of the maritime conscription; that

* "The transport 'Calvados,' which was lately launched at L'Orient—the first of twenty vessels of the same class—is said to have accommodation for 2,500 men, 150 horses, and 1,200 tons of stores.

fourteen ships of the line, then afloat, should undergo the alterations necessary to convert them into steam-ships; that the number should be made up to thirty from the ships then on the stocks, and that twenty of them should be completed within ten years.

"The decisions of French Commissioners, on subjects referred to them, are not subject to change with a change of government, as with us: they are, on the contrary, immutable, and are perseveringly acted upon till they are effectually carried out. It is well known, that the idea of constructing a great harbour at Cherbourg, originated with Louis XIV., though the work was commenced only in the reign of Louis XVI.; and in the last year, 1858, we saw the completion of that vast work, which, in the language of the President of the Commission appointed in 1849, 'is to contain the fleets which are to defend the French coasts, and attack the English in their own country.'*

"In the decision respecting the establishment of ships' crews for manning the forty-five ships of the line decreed by the Ordonnance of 1846, it was regulated that an adequate increase should be made in the number of companies, each of which was appointed to consist of sixty seamen of the first, second, and third classes, with twenty seamen apprentices; also, that the establishment of seamen-gunners should be on so large a scale, that there might be one well-trained gunner to every gun in the ships to which they should be drafted.

"212. Manning the British navy was, in former times, so promptly accomplished by compulsory service, that often the dangers which menaced the country by sea were arrested by a consciousness on the part of the enemy, that our fleets were fully prepared to oppose any attempt at aggression.† But now that we have renounced the prac-

* "In a speech delivered at a sitting of the Commission of Inquiry before referred to, Jan. 27th, 1851 ('Enquête Parlementaire,' tom i., p. 149), M. Daru, after observing that, in the expedition to Rome, the whole French army was embarked and conveyed in ten days from Toulon to Civita Vecchia, infers that 24 steam frigates, 24 transports, 3 corvettes, and 3 avisos, concentrated at Dunkirk, Cherbourg, or Brest, would suffice to disembark 30,000 men and 3,000 horses on any part of Great Britain or Ireland.

† "As an instance of the kind of menace which was held out by influential persons in France against this country, we give the following quotation from the speech of M. Granier de Cassagnac, and published in the 'Constitutionnel,' August, 1859.

"'Before the Revolution, soldiers in France were raised as soldiers and sailors still are in England. Sub-officers, crowned with laurel, traversed Paris, mounted on carriages preceded by fifes and drums, and followed by carts laden with hams, fowls, and wine. At every publichouse a halt was made, and recruits were enrolled, who were seduced much less by the prospect of glory than by good cheer. The Revolution of 1789 created our present army. Civil and polical equality has imparted to the soldier dignity, emulation, and love of glory; the organization of the Consulate, and of the Empire, has raised the army to its highest power, by giving it, with discipline, the useful employment of all its strength. At the present day there exists not in the world an army at once better provided, better administered, better fed, better kept, better instructed, or braver than ours; and, when once there shall have been completed the service of marine transport, which will permit the unexpected throwing of a *corps d'armée* on a point of the enemy's shore, the enemies of France—or those who are jealous of her—will have to think twice before provok ng her."

tice of compulsory service, and depend upon voluntary enlistment for the supply of seamen to man our ships of war, whilst the French have greatly extended and organized their system of compulsory service to man promptly their fleet, the case is materially altered. Far from being able to deter aggression, we invite it. The commencement of a naval war will always be a period of comparative weakness for us, whatever be the abundance of the material for arming the ships, if the men who are to serve in them are not immediately forthcoming at the time of need. But this being so, there can be no security for England should she reduce her naval and military forces to a peace establishment in the same proportion as the forces of her neighbours may be reduced. That made by France would consist in the *licenciement* of the men, said to be reduced, to return to their respective *foyers*, all of whom, whose period of service had not expired, would be subject to be called back at any moment, with as many more fresh men as might be required. The reduction of the forces of Great Britain would be a *bonâ fide* discharge of her soldiers, a paying off of ships, and a dispersion of their crews; to restore which to a war establishment could only be done by the slow processes of enlisting and drilling raw recruits, and of raising seamen by voluntary engagement: while the men thus obtained would moreover be totally unskilled in the exercises of war.

"In times gone by, when the naval superiority of England was firmly established, and her fleets could at any moment be powerfully manned, the peace establishment of her navy for home service, in particular, was very much reduced: whilst her standing army was maintained in great strength, notwithstanding the constitutional scruples and financial objections to provide for a large military force: but in these days, this principle of reduction should, for the reasons stated above, be reversed. We should keep up, without reference to what any other nation may do, a large standing active navy, fully manned with well-trained gunners and seamen, with reserves to boot: and then we might concede to constitutional scruples, and the objections of the economists, the folly of keeping up likewise a large standing army: provided always, that the militia force is complete on paper ready to be called out; and that all our scientific corps and appurtenances—which, like the fleet, require well-skilled men—are well kept up, and we might carry the savings to the account of the navy estimates. No constitutional or financial objections would, we presume, be made to such a measure.

"213. France, on her side, cannot reasonably complain of anything that may be said or done in this country to provide for its safety by an adequate augmentation of its fleet. The passages we have quoted from the proceedings of the French Parliamentary Committee, show that France has taken the initiative in augmenting its naval force. Not only has the French steam fleet become numerically equal or superior to ours, but, through the alliance with this country, it has had vast opportunities of improving itself in warlike practice; particularly of the kind which is the subject of this chapter—the forced descent on an enemy's coast. Our success-

ful landing at Aboukir Bay on the 8th of August, 1801, and the more recent landing of the allies in the Crimea in 1854, prove sufficiently that a disembarkation might, if not resolutely opposed, be effected by force—provided the invaders have even a temporary superiority on the ocean. In the late invasion of Italy, France, by our neutrality, has held the trident as well as the sword, and has been enabled to combine naval and military operations with as much facility as if the Mediterranean were indeed a French lake.* Neutrality being our policy, we have no ground for complaint; and the circumstance is mentioned only as illustrative of the power which a nation acquires by having the command of the sea.

"214. It follows, from what has been said, that it is in the highest degree obligatory on the Government of this country to prevent the British Channel from being crossed by a hostile fleet; all the resources of Great Britain, personal and material, should be devoted to this object, as the only effectual means of preventing her from experiencing the miseries attending a successful invasion. Great advances have been made towards the attainment of this important object by Sir John Pakington, the late First Lord of the Admiralty; and, if the steps taken by that minister be followed up with energy, an attempted invasion may be averted, and the highest duty of the Government will be accomplished."

* "Detailed instructions for the very difficult operations of embarking and disembarking troops, were drawn up to regulate the embarkation, at Boulogne and other ports, of the army for the invasion of England, and for the debarkation of that army on some part of the English coast, and were published for the first time in 1809, in a 'Traité sur le Service de l'Etat-Major Général des Armées, par M. le Général Grimoard'—a work which should be in the possession of every staff officer, and be made a class book in our Staff-college. The reader of the eighth chapter of that book will find, in the detailed instructions therein given, sufficient to account for the order and regularity with which all stores and equipments for the French army were arranged and easily got at; whilst evils the most serious were experienced by our troops in the Crimea, from the disorderly manner in which stores of every description were thrown, without classification, and, it is said, without invoice, into the British transports.

"General and staff officers, who may be employed with troops prepared to oppose a landing, will do well to consult this important work; more particularly the parts which relate to a debarkation in presence of an enemy, and the modes by which a lodgment may be established. For this, chevaux-de-frise should be placed on first landing, to defend the troops against cavalry, whilst pioneers should be pushed forward to throw up slender defences in their front, some of the pioneers being provided with petards to force entrances into any adjacent buildings of masonry, which should serve as military posts to cover the formations of the invading troops (a striking specimen this of the stern realities of war, and of what the British householders may expect, if, unhappily, the invaders should make a good landing on the shores of this country)."

THE PROPER STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

By Theseus, late R.N.

In attempting to solve a problem which is now puzzling the brains of many of our most intelligent countrymen, from the financier to the naval officer, we propose in the first place to lay down certain axioms that we believe will be admitted by all.

I. The naval supremacy of England must be maintained at all hazards. By this we mean that the British navy must be always strong enough, not only to defend our own coasts and colonies from attack, but also be able to blockade the ports of our opponent, and thus, whilst destroying the enemy's trade, protect our own merchant vessels from capture. If we lose this supremacy, or even become on an equality with our enemy, we may account it as the first step of the degeneration of England in the scale of nations.

II. In order successfully to maintain our naval superiority it is necessary that the British navy be at least one-third larger than that of any other nation. We possess more colonies and more trade than any other country, and therefore we ought to possess a corresponding superiority in our naval force.

III. Although the British navy may contain the largest number of ships, it is also expedient that they be fitted with all the latest improvements in guns and machinery, and be manned by efficient crews.

By agreeing to the above resolutions, we must also consent to the large increase of the navy estimates, which has of late years so much surprised some of us. It is all very well to grumble at the enormous cost of our navy, and call out for the aid of Manchester cotton-spinners to show where there ought to be retrenchment; but if we really wish our beloved country to maintain her position among first-class nations, we must pay for it. It is absolutely necessary that we should always take the initiative in all naval improvements, as we cannot afford to wait and see the result of experiments made by other nations, for by so doing we should risk our superiority. This system of experimentalising in building ships, in constructing machinery, and in inventing guns, swallows up a considerable sum of money.

Look what an enormous advantage France had over Austria in the late Italian campaign, by the possession of the newly-invented rifled cannon. As our ships have a speedy prospect of being fitted with the Armstrong guns, they will not have to meet the French ships at a disadvantage. But the mere substitution of the Armstrong gun for the old 68-pounder will be a very heavy cost, and what is more annoying still, it may not be a final but only a current expense, as by the time every ship is fitted with this gun, some improved piece of ordnance may be invented to excel the Armstrong, and so cause another substitution and another very great outlay of money. Surely there is no person so foolish as to say that we ought to wait until a perfect gun has been invented, for long before the date of

that discovery England's navy might have been annihilated, which disaster would all be owing to a false system of economy.

Having decided that, be the cost what it may, the British navy must reign supreme on the seas, and that in order to keep that supremacy our ships must be more numerous and more efficient than those of any other nation, we pass on to consider what the real strength of our navy ought to be.

By referring to the report of the Committee appointed by the Treasury to inquire into the navy estimates, we obtain the following comparison between the navies of England and France :—

	ENGLAND.			FRANCE.			SUPERIORITY FOR	
	Built	Building or Cnvrtng	Total	Built	Building or Cnvrtng	Total	England	France
Screw Line of battle-ships	33	17	50	31	9	40	10	...
Screw Block-ships ...	9	...	9	...	...	...	9	...
Screw Frigates	19	6	25	18	9	27	...	2
Do. iron plated ...	...	...	...	...	4	4	...	4
Paddle-wheel Frigates ...	9	...	9	19	...	19	...	10
Screw Corvettes and Sloops	38	9	47	9	4	13	34	...
Paddle-wheel do. ...	35	...	35	9	...	9	26	...
Screw Mortar-ships ...	4	...	4	...	...	...	4	...
Screw Floating Batteries...	8	...	8	5	...	5	3	...
Screw Gun-vessels ...	29	...	29	17	10	27	2	...
Paddle-wheel do. ...	24	...	24	66	...	66	...	42
Screw Gun-boats ...	161	1	162	28	...	28	134	...
Steam Troop-ships ...	15	...	15	22	4	26	...	11
Steam Yachts, Tugs, &c.	47	...	47	...	...	...	47	
Totals	431	33	464	224	40	264	269	69

This comparison, made for the year 1858, showed that England was much inferior to France in steam frigates and steam troop-ships, about equal in screw line-of-battle-ships already complete, and far superior in steam sloops and gunboats. The British navy possessed 200 more steam ships at this time than the French navy.

In accordance with resolution II (previously laid down) the British navy should have contained 60 screw line-of-battle-ships, 40 screw frigates, 28 paddle-wheel steam frigates, and 40 steam troop-ships.

Since the publication of the comparison between the English and French steam navies, there has been a great activity in the dock-yards of both countries. France seems to be devoting all her energies to building steam rams, to be fitted on the sides with steel-plates, small gunboats built of steel-plates, and steam transports. The English Admiralty, on the contrary, have one steam ram building at Blackwall, and have ordered Mr. Napier to build another at Glasgow. The old wooden 90-gun screw two-deckers, 50-gun frigates, 20-gun corvettes, and 4-gun dispatch gunboats, are the class of vessels being rapidly added to the British navy. The late experiments on the Trusty floating-battery seem to have convinced the

English authorities that iron or steel plates are not of sufficient importance in steam warfare to cause all our ships to be fitted with them. The French are reported by the newspapers to be building 20 more steel-plated floating batteries, as if they were perfectly satisfied that these ships would have superior advantages over the old "wooden walls."

The exact increase to the French navy during the last year is not known, but it is stated to be considerable, and not much below the number of ships added to the British navy. On the 1st November, 1859, the British steam-navy was composed as follows:—Line-of-battle-ships, in commission, 26; in ordinary, ready for commission, 10; in ordinary, fitting engines, &c., 5; building, 11; converting, 5; ordered to be built or converted, 3; total, 60. Of these 41 are now afloat, 5 of those building can be launched within the next six months, and 4 of those converting will also be ready for commission by April, 1860. So that within fifteen months we shall have added 17 screw line-of-battle-ships to our navy. Blockships, in commission, 9. No addition has been made to this class of vessels.

Screw Frigates.—In commission, 16; in ordinary ready for commission, 4; in ordinary, fitting engines, &c., 4; building, 6; converting, 4; ordered to be built or converted, 3. Total 37. Twenty-four frigates are now afloat, and as two of those building could be launched, and all four converting finished, we shall have by April, 1860, about thirty powerful screw frigates afloat. This would make an addition of eleven frigates in fifteen months.

Iron-plated Screw Frigates or Rams.—Two are now building, but will not be ready for commission before the end of next year.

Paddle-wheel Steam Frigates and Sloops.—There has been no increase to these vessels, which still number respectively 9 and 35.

Screw Mortar Ships.—Afloat 4. No addition.

Screw Corvettes and Sloops.—In commission, 42; in ordinary, ready for commission, 12; in ordinary, fitting engines, 7; building, 13. Total 74. Of these vesels sixty-one are afloat, and six of those building could be launched by April next, so we should then have sixty-seven screw corvettes and sloops. The large increase in the number of these vessels is mainly owing to the transference to this class of nineteen screw gun-vessels, which are now denominated sloops. The actual number added is therefore only eight.

Screw Floating Batteries.—Afloat 8. No addition.

Screw Gun-Vessels.—In commission, 9; in ordinary, ready for commission, 4; building, 20. Total 33. Although nineteen of these vessels have been classed as sloops, their place will be filled by twenty more now building, which are to be ready by April next. Four of the larger class of gun-boats are also added to this list.

Screw Gun-boats.—In commission, 54; in ordinary, 100. Total 154.

Paddle-wheel Gun-vessels.—Afloat, 24. No addition.

Steam Troop-ships and Yacht-tugs, &c.—Afloat, 62.

Grand Total.—Steam-ships afloat, 444; building or converting, 61; ordered to be built or converted, 6. Total 511.

Thus there has been an increase of forty-seven steam vessels to the navy since the commencement of the present year.

Having satisfactorily explained the effective composition of the British Navy at the present period, we propose to consider what has been its strength at those times when it won the most glorious victories. In order to do this effectually we quote from a most admirable chart of the navy, compiled by Mr. Frederick Perigal.

REIGN OF	YEAR	SHIPS OF THE LINE	FRIGATES	SMALL VESSELS	TOTAL	TONS	GUNS	MEN
William and Mary	1702	130	45	97	272	159,020	10,469	40,000
Anne	1714	135	67	49	247	167,219	10,600	10,000
George I. ...	1727	124	54	55	233	170,862	9,800	20,000
George II. ...	1760	127	115	142	412	321,104	13,953	86,626
George III. ...	1793	153	134	102	411	402,555	17,138	59,042
Do. ...	1810	243	246	543	1,048	860,990	27,800	146,312
George IV. ...	1830	132	192	255	579	551,084	19,362	31,160
Victoria	1857	100	161	456	717	736,572	14,287	53,919

The above table points out how much our ancestors depended upon the line-of-battle ships for protection, as they were much more numerous than the frigates and smaller vessels until the beginning of this century.

The Royal Navy attained its greatest numerical strength in 1810, at which time England was at war with nearly every European nation, and her fleets reigned supreme over every sea. How soon we may be in the same position as our predecessors we cannot tell, but if such a calamity was to occur it is quite certain that we could not maintain our superiority without a navy more numerous than that of 1810; for although our ships may be larger and more heavily armed, still the vessels of other nations have likewise undergone the same improvements.

The foregoing statements, however, although of much value and interest, do not exactly bring us to a satisfactory answer of the question we proposed to solve. We will therefore take a somewhat practical view, and make a supposition—which God grant may never become a reality—that France and Russia had declared war against England. Of course England is in the right, and we only take up arms to defend ourselves against tyrannical aggression. What steps ought to be taken to defend ourselves and maintain our naval superiority in case of such an emergency?

Home Defences.—The first consideration undoubtedly would be to prevent any foreigner from invading our own shores. Steam guard-ships would be required to protect all our principal ports, and the steam block-ships would answer this purpose well. There ought, however, to be a few more of them, as one is required to replace the Eagle, old sailing frigate, at Milford Haven, one in the Tyne, one at Holyhead, one in the north of Scotland, one at Galway, and one at Londonderry. Although these block-ships are slow steamers, yet being heavily armed, and manned by the Coast Guard, they would be quite sufficient to drive off an enemy's frigate or privateer. Each block-ship should have three or four gun-boats as tenders, and these

gun-boats should be armed with the Armstrong gun, and be kept in a more efficient state than they now are. This coast defence would take fifteen screw block-ships, of sixty guns each, and sixty gun-boats.

The Dockyard Defences.—At the present time our principal dockyards are almost entirely dependent upon stone walls and forts for their protection. What are termed the guard-ships are old sailing ships, carrying only a few guns, and mostly so rotten that one broadside would quickly sink them. The Victory, Excellent, St. Vincent, Britannia, Impregnable, Royal Adelaide, Queen Charlotte, and Hibernia, are ships of this description. The guard-ships are also only half manned. From 1858 to April 1859 there was employed a screw line-of-battle-ship at Portsmouth, Devonport, and Sheerness as guard-ship of the steam reserve, and these ships being two-thirds manned were found very useful when a sudden increase of our steam fleet abroad was determined upon. The Hannibal 90, Exmouth 90, and Cressy 80, were soon got ready for sea, and are now employed in the Mediterranean. Their place at each of the large ports has been filled, however, by an old sailing line-of-battle-ship, that would prove of no value in case of a sudden emergency.

We would suggest that screw line-of-battle-ships be always employed as the port Admiral's flag ship and the guard-ship of the steam reserve. If these vessels had two-thirds of their full complement, and were kept in other respects ready for sea, it would add much to the safety of our shores. The Royal George and Windsor Castle would serve as port flag-ships admirably, as they are not equal to our new steam ships in sailing and steaming; and the 80-gun screw-ships could be usefully employed as guard-ships of the steam reserve.

In time of war it would also be necessary to keep a fully-manned screw line-of-battle-ship as guard-ship at Spithead, at the Nore, in Plymouth Sound, and at Queenstown.

Thus for the defence of Portsmouth, Devonport, Sheerness, and Queenstown, we should require ten screw line-of-battle-ships, and ten gunboats as tenders to those ships.

The first class steam reserve of each of the large ports should contain at the least six screw line-of-battle-ships, four screw frigates, twelve gunboats, and ten mortar vessels. So that in case any of our ships get damaged in a storm or battle they could return to port, and the crews be turned over immediately to efficient ships.

Many a time during the old French war did the enemy's fleet escape from port, on account of the English blockading fleet being compelled to go into harbour for a refit.

This steam reserve kept ready for commission would amount to eighteen screw line-of-battle-ships, twelve frigates, thirty-six gunboats, and thirty mortar vessels.

The Channel Fleet.—There is a great diversity of opinion as to the strength this fleet should assume, and also as to its component parts. Sir Charles Napier says, that ten line-of-battle ships in peace, and twenty in war time would be sufficient. Sir Maurice Berkeley would rather rely upon a mosquito fleet in the shape of 150 to 200

fast screw steam gunboats. We think that twenty screw line-of-battle ships would be enough, but they should be employed solely for the defence of the Channel, and should on no account be sent to roam after an enemy's fleet at a distance from our own shores. Portland would seem the most appropriate rendezvous for the Channel fleet. In case of necessity the fleet could always be augmented by the ten screw line-of-battle ships acting as guardships at the principal ports. About twenty screw frigates, twenty steam sloops and gun-vessels, and sixty gunboats would also be required for the protection of our merchant vessels in the Channel. The increased facility offered to an enemy for the capture of our sailing trading vessels, by the possession of a war steamer, would render additional precautions on our part necessary.

For the sole purpose of defending the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, and keeping the Channel safe for our trade, we should require about thirty screw line-of-battle ships, fifteen screw block-ships, twenty screw frigates, twenty steam sloops or gun-vessels, and one hundred and thirty gunboats. Adding these ships to the number required as a steam reserve, makes a total of forty-eight screw liners, fifteen block-ships, thirty-two frigates, twenty steam sloops or gun-vessels, and 156 gunboats. Of course the above is the number that will be required, supposing we possess fleets blockading the principal ports of our enemies. If the first line of attack, our blockading fleets, meet with any disaster, they would fall back upon the second line, our Channel fleet, and if necessary to the line especially of defence, our block-ships and steam reserves.

Attacking or blockading fleets.—Commencing from the north, and supposing that England is at war with Russia, we shall require a fleet in the Baltic and a small squadron in the White Sea. The experience obtained during the late war will help to point out the exact force needed in the Baltic, although the late additions of screw line-of-battle ships to the Russian Navy must also be taken into account. For the simple purpose of blockading the chief Russian ports in the Baltic, we believe that a fleet of twenty screw line-of-battle ships, twelve steam frigates, twenty steam sloops and gun-vessels, and twenty gunboats would be sufficient. If an attack upon one of the Russian strongholds was determined upon, we might require in addition eight screw liners, thirty gunboats, five floating batteries and twenty mortar vessels.

The White Sea squadron ought only to be employed as a blockading force, and a steam frigate and three steam sloops would be ample for this purpose.

Approaching the coast of France, we find that four naval ports bordering on the Atlantic, viz., Cherbourg, Brest, L'Orient, and Rochfort, and two in the Mediterranean, Toulon and Algiers, would each require a blockading squadron. The strength of our blockading fleets must of course greatly depend upon the amount of naval force possessed by the enemy in the port blockaded. If the French continue to increase their navy so fast as to keep nearly equal to us in the number of line-of-battle ships, we shall find it very difficult to form fleets of sufficient strength to blockade the enemy, and at the

same time keep our home defences intact. If we had to fight France alone, our possession of three screw line-of-battle ships to every two belonging to the French would insure us our naval superiority. The Russians being allied with the French against us would necessitate a further numerical superiority on our part necessary. It is not exactly necessary that our blockading fleet should be larger or even equal to that of the enemy blockaded, as nine or ten English liners, led by an efficient Admiral, would not hesitate to attack a fleet of twelve French liners, which was often done during the long French war. Supposing war to break out during the next year, we believe that four fleets averaging about ten line-of-battle ships each would be required to blockade the Atlantic French naval ports. The blockade of Toulon and Algiers, and the maintenance of our naval superiority in the Mediterranean, which is absolutely necessary, if we wish to retain Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu, and the safety of the overland route to India, would require about thirty screw line-of-battle ships. We may estimate that every fleet of ten liners ought to have about three frigates, ten corvettes and gun vessels, and twelve gunboats attached to it.

The efficient blockade of the French ports and our naval superiority in the Mediterranean would, therefore, require about seventy line-of-battle-ships, twenty-one frigates, seventy corvettes and gun-vessels, and eighty-four gunboats.

An attacking or bombarding fleet might also be formed for the special purpose of attempting the destruction of the French fortified ports. This fleet should be composed of six screw line-of-battle ships, eight frigates, ten steam sloops, ten floating batteries, forty gunboats, and forty mortar-vessels. By the formation of such a fleet as this great injury might be done to the enemy, and no risk would be incurred on our part so long as our blockading fleet was not damaged. Thus, having bombarded Cherbourg for four or five days, the bombarding fleet might return to Portsmouth or Plymouth, and, having repaired all damages and replenished ammunition, could proceed to Brest and give the dockyard an incessant shower of shot, shell, and rockets, and so on to Rochfort and L'Orient. By carrying on war in this active manner we should excite great terror all along the French coast, and by giving the French people a taste of what war was like and the destruction of property caused by it, we might hope to obtain a more speedy and secure peace.

Our Foreign Naval Stations.—When war does break out of course it will be necessary to reinforce our squadrons abroad, in order to defend our colonies and our trade, and also attack and destroy the enemy's vessels and possessions.

North America and West Indies.—The command of this station used formerly to be held by a Vice-Admiral, but the Whigs, a few years ago, wishing to provide for one of their own party, declared all the Vice-Admirals to be too old for active service, appointed a Rear-Admiral to the command, and have also lately nominated Sir Alexander Milne to succeed Sir Houston Stewart, who is now the Commander-in-Chief. The squadron usually consists of a sailing

line-of-battle ship, a screw corvette, a paddle-wheel steam frigate, five or six steam sloops, two sailing sloops, a floating battery, four gunboats, and a depôt ship at Jamaica. The Nile 90, screw-liner, has lately sailed to join the squadron. We would suggest that the Admiral's flag on this station ought always to be carried by a screw-line-of-battle ship. The importance of our possessions in the West Indies and Canada, and the vast amount of our trade that is carried on in this part of the world, require that we should have an efficient naval force to protect them. The squadron ought, therefore, to be increased during war time by eight screw line-of-battle ships, ten screw frigates, ten screw corvettes and sloops, and thirty gunboats. The gunboats would be found of great use during a war by protecting our merchant vessels whilst passing between the various islands that form the West Indian Archipelago. A floating battery should also be stationed at Port Royal.

South East Coast of America or Brazils.—As we possess no colonies in this locality, we consider the present squadron sufficiently strong to protect our trade. Rear-Admiral Sir Stephen Lushington has now the command of the squadron, which is composed of three steam frigates, two steam sloops, two sailing vessels, and a depôt ship at Rio Janeiro.

Pacific.—This station, comprising the whole of the western side of North and South America, is at present under the command of Rear Admiral R. L. Baynes. The great and increasing importance of our North American possessions, and Vancouver's Island, and the insulting conduct lately pursued by our Yankee neighbours, make it necessary that a strong British squadron, commanded by an officer of energy and discretion, should always be stationed in the Gulf of Georgia. Whilst the constant squabbling and fighting between the numerous South American republics render the presence of a British naval force of essential service in protecting our countrymen from injury. We would therefore suggest that a Commodore be appointed on this station, to hold command under the Rear Admiral.

The squadron now consists of a sailing line-of-battle ship, a screw frigate, two sailing frigates, two screw corvettes, three steam sloops, a sailing corvette, and two depôt ships. The Topaze 51, screw frigate, Clio, 22, screw corvette, and the Forward and Grappler gunboats have lately been dispatched to reinforce this squadron. This is not sufficient however, and we would strongly advise that all the sailing ships be recalled, and that an addition of one screw line-of-battle ship, three steam frigates, six steam sloops, and eight gun-boats be sent out to the Pacific. If it be possible to take a floating battery round Cape Horn, there ought to be one stationed at Vancouver's Island; but at all events a steam guard ship should be constantly kept there. Vancouver's Island should also be made the naval depôt for the Pacific squadron, and, by constructing a small dock-yard and a graving dock there, we should add immensely to the efficiency of our fleet not only in the Pacific, but also on the China station. The Dido some years ago having injured her bottom by getting aground, was obliged to return to England for repairs, and this cost a large sum of money, without doing any service to the

state, for a period of ten months elapsed before she returned to the station in an efficient condition. The Vixen steam sloop has also been reported to be in a most rotten condition for the last two years, and fears are entertained that she will not be able to round Cape Horn in safety. Had a dockyard and a graving dock existed at Vancouver's Island, these vessels might soon have been rendered effective at a great saving of expense to the country.

East Indies and China.—The late disaster in the Peiho, although much to be regretted, has still shown us that our officers and sailors possess the same pluck and bravery as their predecessors of old. Being under the necessity of retrieving our prestige, which was damaged by the late defeat, a large increase of naval force has been sent to China. At the time of the fight at the Peiho, our squadron was commanded by Rear Admiral James Hope, and consisted of the following ships in the China seas—one screw frigate, two paddle-wheel frigates, two screw corvettes, six steam sloops, a sailing frigate, two sailing sloops, a surveying ship, twenty gun boats, three steam troop-ships, and six hospital and depôt ships.

Rear Admiral L. T. Jones has since been appointed second in command, and the following additional force has been dispatched to China—one screw frigate, three screw corvettes, one paddle-wheel frigate, five screw sloops and gun vessels, two steam sloops, eight gun-boats, and one steam troop ship. The Roebuck screw sloop has also been sent from India to China. The Indian part of the squadron now consists of the Retribution, 28, paddle-wheel frigate, Cyclops, 6, paddle-wheel sloop, and Sparrowhawk, 4, screw sloop, all under the command of Commodore Harry Edgell. There is, however, in addition, for the special protection of India, H.M. Indian Navy, comprising thirty steam vessels, mostly gun-boats, and twenty sailing vessels, under the immediate command of Commodore G. G. Wellesley.

The naval force on the China station is exceptional on account of the renewal of war with China, but, when a firm and lasting peace is concluded, the squadron can be more distributed. The Indian portion of the station would certainly require more protection in case of war being declared with France and Russia, than it now has. On the whole, the naval force required on the East India and China station in case of such a war, would be about 8 steam frigates, sixteen steam corvettes and sloops, and thirty gun-boats. The Russian fortifications on the river Amoor would require to be attacked, and, if possible, destroyed, as well as the numerous steam vessels the Russians have lately despatched to that part of their possessions.

Australia and New Zealand.—This station formerly formed part of the East Indian and China command, but Sir John Pakington very wisely detached it, as the Admiral was never known to visit this portion of his extensive station. Commodore W. Loring now commands the few ships stationed to protect these colonies. The squadron consists of one sailing frigate, two screw corvettes, a steam sloop, a sailing sloop, and a surveying ship. The occurrence of a

war with France would necessitate a large additional naval force, on account of the neighbourhood of the French colony of New Caledonia. The vast wealth and importance of our possessions and trade in Australia would doubtless stimulate the French to make an attack upon some of the large and populous towns situate upon the coast. The actual strength of our naval force must depend upon the number of French ships; but six steam frigates, twelve steam sloops, and thirty gunboats would at least be required for the protection of these valuable colonies.

The Cape of Good Hope and West Coast of Africa.—Rear-Admiral Hon. Sir Frederick Grey and Commodore Charles Wise have the command of the ships on this station. The usual naval force consists of a sailing line-of-battle ship, a sailing sloop, two screw corvettes, twelve steam sloops, and a depôt ship at Ascension. The Arrogant, 47, screw frigate, Sidon, 22, paddle-wheel frigate, and two steam sloops, have been dispatched to join this squadron. Some of the steam sloops might be found of great service at the commencement of a war, as the squadron need not be kept so strong merely for the slave preventive service. The following force would, we think, be found sufficient for the protection of our colonies and our trade in this part of Africa, two steam frigates and eight steam sloops.

The protection of our colonies having been provided for, there only remains to consider what force would be necessary for the safe convoy of our merchant vessels. There being no authentic data on which to ground any estimate, we will suppose that twelve steam frigates and twenty-four steam sloops will be required for this purpose.

Steam troop and store ships would also be required during a war, but the Government rely on being able to hire merchant steamers to serve as transports. We are very glad to see that the Admiralty have at length adopted a suggestion first mentioned by us in the *United Service Magazine* for January, as we understand that the Simoom steam transport has been specially fitted up as an hospital ship for the China expedition.

The estimates we have made of the naval forces required in case of a war with Russia and France, will of course meet with many objections. We believe, however, that the practical view we have taken of this matter, in order to obtain a satisfactory solution of the question first proposed, may bring it under the consideration of the Government.

Estimated Summary of the British Steam Navy required in case of a War with France & Russia.

STATIONS	LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS	BLOCK-SHIPS	FRIGATES	CORVETTES AND SLOOPS	FLOATING BATTERIES	GUN-BOATS	MORTAR VESSELS	TOTAL
Home Defences;	...	...	In Commission		...	...	...	—
Coast of Great Britain and Ireland	...	15	...	...	...	60	...	75
Portsmouth, Devonport, Sheerness, and Queenstown	10	...	...	...	...	10	...	20
Channel Fleet	20	...	20	20	...	60	...	120
Blockading Fleets, &c.				...	...	...	...	...
Baltic ...	28	...	12	20	5	50	20	135
White Sea ..	...	...	1	3	..	...	...	4
Coast of France	40	...	12	40	...	48	...	140
Mediterranean	30	...	9	30	...	36	...	105
Bombarding Fleet	6	...	8	10	10	40	40	114
Foreign Naval Stations;								
N. America and W. Indies	8	...	10	12	2	34	...	66
S. E. Coast of America	...	...	3	2	...	...	...	5
Pacific ...	1	...	5	12	...	10	...	28
E. Indies and China	...	...	8	16	..	30	...	54
Australia ...	...	...	6	12	...	30	...	48
Cape of Good Hope and West Coast of Africa	...	...	2	8	...	...	...	10
Convoying Ships	...	...	12	24	...	...	...	36
Total	143	15	108	209	17	408	60	900
Steam Reserve at Portsmouth, Devonport and Sheerness	18	...	12	...	...	36	30	96
Grand Total	161	15	120	209	17	444	90	1,056

On comparing the totals of this estimated summary, with the number of steam ships now belonging to the British Navy, we find there is the following deficiency:—101 screw line-of-battle ships, 6 block ships, 74 steam frigates, 67 steam corvettes and sloops, 7 floating batteries or rams, 266 gunboats, and 86 mortar vessels. We calculate that it will take at least ten years to make up this large deficiency, but if we sincerely wish to be in a perfect state of defence and to retain our naval superiority, we must not submit to any triennial reductions of the navy estimates merely to satisfy the whims of the economical cotton-spinners. Let us go on urging our Government to place this country and her colonies in a perfect state of defence, and let us rest satisfied that it is far better to pay a little increase of taxation annually, than to have our houses pillaged and our families insulted by the brutal soldiers of a French or Russian tyrant.

THE DEFENCE OF TURKEY.—SIR JOHN BURGOYNE AND GENERAL MACINTOSH.

THE articles which appeared in our recent numbers on the subject of the Defences of Turkey and the indication of the Malakoff as the key of Sebastopol, have elicited the following letter, which, as we shall show, entirely fails to prove that the merit of having been the first to draw the attention of the British authorities to both those questions, may not justly be ascribed to Lieut.-Gen. Macintosh.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

SIR,—General Macintosh appears throughout the Russian war to have given very sensible advice to the Government, but it is difficult to understand how the recommendations made by him can affect the services rendered by Sir John Burgoyne, or how the recommendations made by the latter officer can affect the services rendered by General Macintosh, with regard to the question of the defensive capabilities of the Turkish Empire. So long ago as the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828, the existence of two strong defensive positions, respectively covering the Dardanelles and Constantinople was known to military men, who had studied the defence of the Turkish dominions—and as early as the autumn of 1853, naval officers belonging to Admiral Dundas's fleet, had sent home sketches of the position of Maitos on the Dardanelles, and the officers of Etat-Major, attached at that period to the French Embassy at Constantinople, had likewise reported to their government on the subject of the Karasoo position between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora.

To give an instance of how well-known was the military importance of the occupation of the Chersonese by at least one of the belligerent powers, I may mention that the officers of the Royal Engineers employed upon the survey of it in January, 1854, found large cairns of stones on all its principal features, and on enquiring amongst the inhabitants, it appeared that these cairns had been erected by the Russian Staff Officers, to serve as trigonometrical points, when they surveyed the Chersonese, during their temporary occupation of that part of the country, at the period of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

It will therefore be seen from the above, that it is absurd to suppose that Sir John Burgoyne or General Macintosh could ever have made any claim to the exclusive discovery of the defensive positions in question; what they both appear to have done is by following out the same train of reasoning to have pointed out to the English Government the importance of occupying two well-known strategical points, and the exact period at which their respective recommendations were made appears to me, as an impartial observer, a matter of no moment whatever.

There is, however, this difference between the two cases:—that whereas General Macintosh's recommendations were made by him privately and without any official character—those of Sir John Burgoyne were made under the responsibility of an official position, and a special and public mission for the purpose, and for which at the time, under a misapprehension of the facts, he was subject to considerable misrepresentation, and it is but fair that those who undergo the obloquy of unpopular measures, should also bear whatever credit may be due for them.

As regards the attack upon the Malakoff—the facts are these. At the period of the first Engineers' reconnoissance of the fortress, on the 28th or 26th of September, 1854, Sir John Burgoyne issued a general order to the Corps of the Royal Engineers, in which he pointed out that the Malakoff Tower was the key to the position in front of the English, and as soon as we

had possession of the ground, *i.e.* after the battle of Inkerman, and the great increase in the Russian power of resistance necessitated a considerable extension of our works of attack, Sir John Burgoyne, taking a more comprehensive view of the subject than the French officers of Engineers, recommended that the principal attack upon the *whole fortress* should be made against the Malakoff, in preference to the Bastion du Mat. This he strongly urged in several written memoranda, of which the first is dated a few days after the battle of Inkerman. If your readers wish to know more upon this subject, they should consult the official account of the siege operations, which has just been compiled and published under the authority of the War Office. In the appendix will be found a number of official documents bearing upon this subject.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
A FIELD OFFICER.

P.S.—It appears by General Macintosh's account that when he visited Sebastopol, none of the defensive works on the land side were in existence. He very truly remarked that the Malakoff Hill commanded the harbour, but I cannot see how this affects in the slightest degree, Sir John Burgoyne's recommendations of making that point the principal object of attack in a great combined operation, which was directed against works extending over a considerable ground, and comprising several points which answered General Macintosh's description of commanding the harbour. There were many reasons besides this one, which weighed in the determination of making the Malakoff the point of attack.

It will be seen that the "Field Officer," although he assumes the character of an "impartial observer," betrays a very strong bias in his arguments, and as they tend to disturb the opinion expressed on our side, we have thought it advisable, after seeking for information in every quarter, calmly to review the whole case, that none of the parties concerned may have anything to complain of. We are the more impelled to this course, from the discussion having excited great interest among our readers, as is evident from the communications we have received on the subject, and for which it would be impossible, with the present demands on our space, to find room. Moreover, the "Field Officer" has given it a new phase, bearing upon the highest interests of the public service; for he advances the strange doctrine that an officer who incurs great cost, and even personal risk, to procure valuable information, and places it before the Government at a critical emergency, deserves neither reward nor credit, while, on the other hand, an officer who is handsomely paid for acting on this information, and is exposed to no risk whatever, cannot be rewarded enough. The "Field Officer" may decide to his own satisfaction how far the two officers concerned in this discussion are respectively affected — Sir John Burgoyne by the prior recommendations of General Macintosh, or General Macintosh by Sir John Burgoyne's services; but he omits to mention that Sir John Burgoyne appears to have given to the world as his original views the substance of reports which had been previously laid before Government by General Macintosh. Documents, seven or eight in number, among which were the papers recently published in our pages, parallel with nearly

identical passages from Sir John Burgoyne's *Military Opinions*, and a paper on the Crimea and Sebastopol, were, we find, at the end of 1853 in the Ordnance office, and were still there in 1854, after Sir John Burgoyne's first return from the East, when they were seen and perused by officers of the scientific branches of the service. By some of these officers we have been informed that they perfectly recollect the interest excited in the Ordnance office at the time by the papers in question; in consequence of the fund of peculiar information afforded by their author, and thus opportunely brought forward when the authorities were seeking for information which did not seem to exist. No military man, indeed, had ever inspected Sebastopol. It was visited by a commission of a diplomatic nature, which included one officer, who, however, did not land; and Mr. Oliphant and another English civilian who passed through Sebastopol when on a tour, confessed, as we know from authority, that they had observed nothing of a military nature. It has been stated to us, by one of these informants, that the papers of General Macintosh described the ground and positions in front of Constantinople and in the Balkan and Crimea with a most military eye, on which account they were much valued. This much, therefore, is certain, that General Macintosh had furnished Government with such a knowledge of localities as led to Sir John Burgoyne and other scientific officers being sent to the Dardanelles and the Checkmedgees, and there rendering valuable services.

As General Macintosh has never received any recognition that would show an appreciation of his services, it was hardly to be expected that he should see placed before the country, as acquired by another officer, information and opinions which he had with cost and labour, and in a public spirit obtained, and communicated at a critical moment to the authorities. We cannot think, with the "Field Officer," that the country will hold General Macintosh less entitled to credit for having rendered it this great service at his own expense, than if he had gone out with the most regular letter of service from the Horse Guards, and with all the authority of the most liberal pay and allowances. If only services rendered under such conditions were to be recognised, Sir William Armstrong's gun and Mr. Fergusson's system of fortification would still be unavailable to the country. But, in point of fact, General Macintosh was encouraged to make these *reconnaissances*, as we may justly term them, by the British ministers abroad, with the full sanction of the authorities at home. Even were this not the case, we could not admit the argument that the whole credit of these services is due to Sir John Burgoyne, because he acted under the responsibilities of a special position and a special and public charge, while General Macintosh, by whom they were originated, is to go unrewarded, because not officially employed. If this be the creed in high places, it will explain the inconsistency of our military authorities, who have latterly constantly expressed great anxiety to raise by education and stringent examination the attainments of our officers, and yet when an instance occurs of an officer having voluntarily and laboriously exercised such attainments to the public advantage, at a period when they were more rare than at pre-

sent, and brought forward the result of his labours at a moment when their utility was undeniable, his services remain totally unrecognised by the Government, or at most their value is only recognised in a faint and lukewarm manner, and all distinctions withheld. This warrants a suspicion of insincerity, and a belief that the authorities exhibit this fervour in the cause of military education solely to obtain popularity.

But did General Macintosh make his communications in so private and unofficial a character as this "Field Officer" would have us believe? An individual who then held a high official situation, bears testimony at this moment that he submitted General Macintosh's reports to Lord Hardinge, as *Commander-in-Chief*, and that by him they were submitted to Lord Aberdeen's Government, to Lord Raglan, then Master-General of the Ordnance, and, he has every reason to suppose, to Sir John Burgoyne. Himself an authority on military affairs, he expresses his belief that no military man could read these reports without profiting by them—in short, that perusing these papers at the time and benefitting by them are synonymous terms, and that he has no hesitation in considering that great assistance was obtained from, and advantage taken of, General Macintosh's "valuable reports" on the Dardanelles and Constantinople positions, in 1853.

It is difficult to understand what the "Field Officer" means, when he tells us that Sir John Burgoyne incurred obloquy, in consequence of carrying out the duties required of him, but those who watch events of professional interest must have observed that Sir John Burgoyne has now received full recognition of all his valuable services. It is true that in 1815 his services at Burgos, New Orleans, &c., seem only to have been considered as entitling him to the honorary grade of a Companion of the Bath, while some officers of his army rank were rewarded with the decoration of a higher class; but although not employed again in the field until 1854, he was advanced in 1838 to the rank of a Knight Commander of the Bath, and in 1852 to that of Grand Cross. In 1856 he was made a baronet, and as he left the Crimea in March 1855, returning to England soon after the first attack had been commenced on the Malakoff, and before either of the assaults had been made on the Redan, and furthermore, as he appertains to the engineer service, which would confine his merit to siege operations, it is not too much to assume that this last honour was conferred upon him in consequence of his recommendations concerning the Checkmedgees and Gallipoli. His admirers can hardly be wise in seeking to smother the discussion of a subject which has led to such a result, affecting to believe, when Sir John has secured the reward, and had all but appropriated the credit, that the matter is too trivial to engage attention.

The "Field Officer" is willing to give up Sir John Burgoyne's claim to priority, when it can no longer be sustained, but he will not admit that of General Macintosh, affirming it is absurd to suppose that either officer can claim the exclusive discovery of the two positions which Sir John ultimately surveyed, and one of which he afterwards fortified. The statements given in parallel columns in a

recent number of this journal have most certainly set at rest the pretensions of Sir John Burgoyne to any such discovery, but we think it very important to show also how vague were the impressions entertained respecting the site of the positions covering Constantinople and the Dardanelles until General Macintosh furnished his reports, and to him is incontestably due the credit of having first brought them to notice. In 1834 he pointed them out to the Government, through Her Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, to whom he addressed his reports, and subsequently in 1853 drew them to the attention of the authorities at home, who eagerly received the information he had been the first to obtain as to the military value of these positions, and also his military notes on the Crimea and Bulgaria, then almost unknown.

The "Field Officer," touching upon the defensive capabilities of the Turkish empire, states, that so long ago as the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828, the existence of *two* (?) strong defensive positions respectively covering the Dardanelles and Constantinople was known to military men who had studied the defences of the Turkish dominions. This can hardly apply to officers in the British service for besides that they are by no means addicted to exploring with such views any foreign country, Turkey especially was a sealed book to them; and we are of opinion that no officer but General Macintosh can be cited, who about that time made such explorations, and bearing in mind the return he has met with from the authorities, after he has served their turn, we are not inclined to think any officers will hereafter have sufficient "private zeal" as it has been termed, to follow his example. This was a case in which we might have expected the Horse Guards to have taken a different course, when it is notorious that the failure of our expeditions has always been traceable to our ignorance of the countries in which they were carried on.

If reference be made to the published statements of the scientific officers of other nations who have visited Turkey, the "Field Officer" will find that we have looked into those of most repute in search of the positions in question. Valentini mentions no position covering Constantinople, but that of the old Anastasian wall, and this is at least ten miles in front of the Checkmedgees or Karasoo, resting its left on Selivria. He says nothing whatever of a position at the isthmus near Gallipoli. Beaujour, whose *Voyage Militaire dans l'Empire Othoman*, stands deservedly high, states that, "the best manner of defending Constantinople is, to defend the approaches to it; and that Constantinople is situated at the summit of an angle, the opening to which was formerly defended by the long wall of Anastasius, and which could be defended at this day, being a line of natural intrenchments, extending from one sea to the other, and following the traces of this wall, bordered almost everywhere by ravines. This line must be first defended by making use of the *ancient constructions*; and on leaving this position, by retiring to the plateau, which sheds its waters on one side into the lake Derkon, on the shore of the Black Sea, and on the other into the two lakes of the Great and Little

Bridge (Checkmedgees) on the shore of the Propontis (sea of Marmora); and, at last, to retire to the plateau which debouches into the plain of Daoud-Pacha, in front of Constantinople." Beaujour thus begins his defence at the Anastasian wall, ten miles in front of the Checkmedgee position; then falls back on the Checkmedgees, and, lastly, to the position of Daoûd-Pacha, close to Constantinople. Here there is no preference of one position over the other; and, moreover, he states that owing to their length none of the three can be defended except by a very large army, and that if pierced at one point, these positions would become useless in their whole extent, and might even serve as lines of circumvallation to an enterprising enemy to blockade Constantinople and separate it from the rest of Thrace. Beaujour then recommends for that city a most elaborate system of defence, with a radius of three or four leagues, comprising all the positions on both sides of the Bosphorus. It cannot be pretended, therefore, that there is here such an indication of the Checkmedgees as would mark its commanding importance, and present it as the strong line that obviously covers Constantinople, in the manner represented by General Macintosh; but, on the contrary, the description is calculated to give a wrong impression of its character and capabilities.

As regards the peninsula of Gallipoli, Beaujour says, that "the isthmus by which it is joined to Thrace, was formerly shut by a wall which joined the two seas, and which embraced the three fortresses of Cardia, Lyzimachus, and Pactia; Cardia, which still exists, was at the bottom of a bay; Lyzimachus in the middle of the isthmus; and Pactia on the Hellespont, between Gallipoli and Ganos." This is not the position pointed out by General Macintosh, who fixed upon the line near Boulair, and which, as he states in his *Military Tour in European Turkey* (page 2), he discovered by ascending a height, now fortified, and called Fort Sultan, in the line of the works since constructed.

Captain (now Sir Adolphus) Slade, published his amusing and interesting travels in the east, about the time that General Macintosh travelled there. This book is full of information of every kind, and he treats largely of military matters. He does not, however, say one word of the Dardanelles position, but merely points to the erection of Martello towers on the height, behind the castles and batteries on the shore, as the means which suggest themselves to him for preventing an attack from the rear. The same talented writer, in describing the advance of the Russians to Constantinople in 1829, is equally dumb as to the Checkmedgees or Karasoo position, and, from what he states, it is plain that it was wholly unknown at that period; for he tells us that the Ambassadors pointed out to the Sultan his dangerous position, representing to him that, should the enemy advance (from Adrianople), his capital would certainly rise against him, that he would be obliged to pass into Asia, where his life would not be safe, and that Europe would be lost to him for ever. The same night two of the Sultan's Ministers proceeded by steamer to Rodosto, and thence to Adrianople, to treat with the Russian Commander; but as, after a fortnight's delay, no terms were con-

cluded, Diebitsch pushed on his advance guard to Tchorloo, twenty hours' march from Constantinople. The Ambassadors at the Porte renewed their advice, and orders were dispatched to the two Turkish Envoys to subscribe to *any terms;* and the Prussian Minister, the representative of a *military* power, started the same evening to facilitate the adjustment. The English and French Ambassadors urged these measures, and on the 13th of September was signed the peace of Adrianople, giving Russia the entire Eastern coast of the Euxine as far as the Poti, and bringing her frontier through the middle of Georgia. It is thus obvious that "so long ago as the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828 the existence of two strong defensive positions [or even one], respectively covering the Dardanelles and Constantinople," were *not* known either to the Sultan or the Ambassadors at his court, nor had they been observed by Captain Slade.

Long after the fullest information had been communicated to the authorities by General Macintosh, and about the time that the ground was being surveyed by the Military Commission, the position of the Checkmedgees was described by Colonel Chesney in his work on Turkey; but, of course, without any claim to its discovery, as the explorations of General Macintosh were then well known, and his reports to the authorities were accessible, both at Constantinople and in the public departments at home. We may add that the Duke of Ragusa, whose work of Turkey treats largely of military questions, says not one word of the two positions.

The "Field Officer" says, that as early as the autumn of 1853, naval officers belonging to Admiral Dundas's fleet had sent home sketches of the position of Maitos, but this has nothing whatever to do with the position discovered by General Macintosh, being quite at the other extremity of the Chersonesus, nearly opposite to Point Nagara, and would not be of the slightest use in defending the Peninsula against a land attack. But the presence of naval officers in the *autumn* of 1853 in the Chersonesus is accounted for by the following passage in the letter of General Macintosh to Lord Stratford, dated July 6, in that year, and given in our September number—"It would also be very desirable that the Gulf of Saros behind that peninsula should be accurately surveyed, and the soundings near the isthmus correctly laid down, as a favourable opportunity for doing which is afforded by the presence of the fleet at Besika Bay. I say this in the belief that no such survey at present exists. In the event of our ships having at any period to act there, and possibly to land troops, this would be found of great utility." The circumstance of French officers of the *Etat-Majeur* attached to the embassy at Constantinople having reported to their Government on the subject of the Karasoo and Checkmedgee position is explained by the following passage in the same letter—"Constantinople might be defended by occupying a position which extends towards the Black Sea, from the creeks or lakes called Buyuk Checkmedgee and Kutchuk Checkmedgee on the Sea of Marmora. This position, however, ought also to be artificially strengthened. . . . . The peninsula on the European side of the Dardanelles ought to be artificially strengthened by works raised across the nar-

rowest part of the isthmus." Nothing can be more natural than that the two ambassadors, in daily communication, should have decided between them that the naval reconnaissance should be made by the English, and that on the land by the French.

The "Field Officer" is so eager to take away the credit of General Macintosh, that he even demolishes the claim of Sir John Burgoyne, and would make us suppose, because the importance of occupying the Chersonese might have been known, that, therefore, the strong position since fortified had been discovered; but for this he can adduce no other argument than the fact that certain cairns of stones, such as are used in making trigonometrical surveys, were found there by our officers in 1854, and which the inhabitants reported to have been placed there by the Russians in 1833. Supposing that the positions were indeed known to the Russians, those who are aware how well the Russians kept their own secrets, would as soon have expected them to divulge that the Malakoff was the key to Sebastopol, as to have revealed this position to any foreign power. In another article treating of the siege of Sebastopol, we have shown what are the respective pretensions of Sir John Burgoyne and General Macintosh to the merit of penetrating this key, and we think even the "Field Officer" will admit that the claim of General Macintosh is now, to borrow the words of a contemporary, "fairly established." We will only remark here, that it is something like a shuffle to say that General Macintosh's description of the Malakoff height applied only to its command of the harbour. The report of the General distinctly mentions that it commands the dockyard harbour and dockyard—that is, the Karabalnaya; and, moreover, its situation was precisely marked on a map which accompanied the report.

General Macintosh's military explorations were not confined to the localities immediately in question. He visited Kars and the neighbouring Russian fortress of Goomri (Alexanderopol) when under construction, and besides making detailed reports to the British Ambassadors in Turkey and Persia on those places and the surrounding territory to a great distance, he forwarded similar reports to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, in a perfectly official manner, and which received the approbation of the Duke of Wellington. When in Persia, where he was more formally attached to the British embassy, in 1836, the ambassador there took advantage of his presence to obtain reports upon matters of a military character, which he considered it useful to the public service to get from one "whose professional knowledge and judgment," as he termed it, "could be relied on." The Shah of Persia had set out with the avowed intention of attacking Herat, regardless of the remonstrances of the British Minister; and as the prospect of an Affghan war made it most important to compel him to desist—as negociation had failed, the occupation of the Island of Karrack in the Persian Gulf was determined on, in a great measure owing to the report made on that island by Gen. Macintosh, after careful examination, its fitness for a military station and general strategical importance being previously very imperfectly known. On the arrival of the force from India at the island of

Karrack, the Shah's authority and revenue in the southern provinces of his kingdom were so endangered that he abandoned the siege of Herat, a result the Ambassador had before been unable to bring about.

General Macintosh's researches in the Caucasus, and on the lines to the north of that chain, made by the desire of the same minister, developed the military position of Russia in that quarter, and especially the distribution of her forces and general state of preparation. These reports also were declared to be most satisfactory, and had influence on the subsequent measures of Government. When on a recent occasion it became necessary to compel Persia a second time to relinquish Herat, the measures pursued were founded upon those which had previously been successful.

As the "Field Officer" has urged that the labours of General Macintosh were undertaken privately and without an official character, avowedly with the intention of detracting from his merit and ignoring his claims, we have been more circumstantial in our detail than were otherwise necessary; but it is important to decide whether services can be regarded as non-official, which are performed in distant countries at the request of Her Majesty's representatives, particularly when attended with personal danger; for General Macintosh, in the course of these expeditions, frequently incurred peril, was once attacked and robbed by Arabs, and narrowly escaped shipwreck when reconnoitring Karrack.

THE LAST CHINESE WAR.

From the Attack, Capture, and Occupation of Canton, 1857, 1858-9, by the Allied Forces of England and France, to the Departure of the Plenipotentiaries.

(Continued from page 383.)

As the blockade of the river and port of Canton is to be raised on the 10th inst., the following regulations are promulgated for general information and guidance during the military occupation of the city and suburbs by the allied forces.

Article I.

The city and suburbs being under martial law, no foreigner whatever is permitted to enter them without a passport signed by the allied commanders-in-chief.

Art. 2.

A mixed commission has been nominated by the allied commanders-in-chief to preserve good order, and to inquire into all infractions of these regulations, or of martial law, with power to inflict fine or imprisonment; and in grave cases to hand over offences to the commanders-in-chief.

Art. III.

Every foreigner wishing to enter the city or suburbs, must apply

in writing to the Commissioners. The Commissioners will submit the application to the allied commanders-in-chief, who, if they see no objection, will grant the applicant a pass, revocable at pleasure, which must be visèd by the Commissioners every fourteen days.

ART. IV.

A police force, English and French, is charged with the surveillance of the city and suburbs. The police are directed to require the production of passes, and any person refusing to comply with their demands, being without a pass, or guilty of any offence against good order, will be taken before the Commissioners.

ART. V.

Officers of the Allied Army and Navy, and foreign officers in uniform, do not require passes. Seamen and Marines are not to be allowed to land except on duty.

ART. VI.

The gates of the city will be open from sunrise to sunset, and no foreigners will be permitted to be in the streets of the city or suburbs after the firing of the sunset gun.

ART. VII.

No foreigner is permitted to enter the official buildings, without special permission from the Commissioners.

ART. VIII.

Merchant vessels are not to anchor between the ships of war and the walls of the city, or except where directed by the Harbour Master.

ART. IX.

The introduction of arms or munitions of war, is strictly prohibited.

ART. X.

In all cases of alarm, red flags will be hoisted on the heights of Magazine Hill, and at the Commissioner's yamun, followed by two guns, and the beating of the retreat in all quarters. All persons should then immediately provide for their safety, either by leaving the city, repairing to the allied lines, or to the police stations.

Canton, 4th February, 1858.

NOT TRANSFERABLE.

Pass for the City and Suburbs of Canton, and Allied Lines:—

NAME.	NATION.	PROFESSION.	RESIDENCE.

Signature of Bearer ————

(Signed) M. SEYMOUR,
Rear-Admiral and Com.-in-Chief of H. B. M.'s Naval Forces.

(Signed) C. RIGAULT DE GENOUILLY,
Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French.

(Signed) C. T. VAN STRAUBENZEE,
Major-General Commanding the British Military Force.

Canton, the of 1858.

The consequence of the raising of the blockade and opening the gates was for a time a great influx of people, principally small traders, and the poorer sort; a few more shops too were opened, but nothing really done in the way of trade.

The chief mandarins had all left the city at the time of the bombardment, and none of these would return to give countenance to our occupation, or to serve as an example to others of the better class: consequently, although a chair would occasionally be carried past, the streets were filled entirely by petty shop-keepers, the poor, the maimed, and the blind. Of this latter, especially among the female portion, from childhood to old age, the streets abounded; troops of them following in strings, and holding on to each other, while one, who perhaps had a glimmer of light or could guide better with the stick, would lead the way. For these poor creatures compassion was quickly raised, and a soup and rice kitchen, established by subscriptions among the officers, and superintended by the Rev. H. Huleatt, Chaplain to the Forces. At this kitchen as many as eighteen hundred, totally blind, have presented themselves and been relieved in one day. There was also a small hospital attached for treatment of any of the Chinese who had been wounded in the attack. Many were admitted with wounds six weeks old—now become nearly incurable—but althougth some died, many, to the surprise even of themselves, were discharged cured.

On the 20th of February a small party of officers, accompanied by their servants and a few others, all armed, and amounting in all to 30 persons, went a few miles into the country to endeavour to reach the top of the White Cloud mountain, from whence an extensive view of the surrounding country could be obtained. Having no guide to point out the pass, instead of ascending it they were content to wind round its base, and on again opening the valley which led to the city walls, nearly six miles distant, they came upon a large village with wood in its rear. In this wood they purposed bivouacking for a few hours to avoid the increasing heat of the sun, but on approaching they heard the hum of voices, and saw the sun shining on the hats of Chinese soldiers, of which the wood proved to be full.

The numbers of Chinese were so superior, that an immediate retreat was the only chance of preventing the rear being cut off. An interpreter first stepped forward, and told them that the party intended no hostility, as could be seen by the country through which they had already passed, to which they had done no damage, and where the people they had encountered had all been on good terms with them. They only replied by brandishing their arms, shouting, and beating gongs, until one fellow fired a gingal, which was a signal for the rest to begin.

The whole of the plain is divided into sections by wet and deep paddy fields, separated only by narrow ridges that in many places will not admit two men abreast, and along this the party had to retreat in single file; the enemy running in rear and parallel to them, sometimes as near as a hundred yards, firing their gingals and matchlocks, and increasing in numbers as other villages were passed,

the people of whom were roused to join in the attack by the firing and continued beating of gongs, until they amounted to at least 200 men.

The firing from the party was kept under as much as possible, as it delayed the retreat, but an occasional shot was necessary to prevent the enemy closing on the rear, which they followed for about three miles, fortunately, without causing a single casualty on our part, although one or two of their own men dropped by our rifles.

For some weeks after this the people were evidently in a state of alarm, expecting some retributive act on our part to punish their aggression, but operations in the country directly afterwards became impracticable from a succession of heavy rains, which flooded the valleys, and rendered them impassable; besides which it was not the policy of the general at that time to send troops into the country.

As yet no progress towards an arrangement had been made, beyond a communication with the Emperor, forwarded over-land from Canton; the reply to which was that Hwang-tsoung-Han should be sent to treat as Imperial Commissioner with the foreign plenipotentiaries.

The date when he should arrive was however uncertain, and on the 3rd of March, Lord Elgin sailed in the Furious, for Shanghae, whither he had been preceded by Mr. Oliphant, one of his staff, and an officer from the French *corps diplomatique*.

An attempt was made at this time by the Commissioners to induce some of the principal mandarins to return to the city. Mr. Consul Parkes, accompanied by a body of nearly 500 men, went to the Temple of Longevity in the western suburb, and had an interview with the Judge and Chief Treasurer, two of the highest and most influential authorities, but without having the desired effect.

Two days afterwards Peh-Quei paid his first official visit to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, at the head-quarters of Major General Van Straubenzee, and afterwards to the Commissioners in the city.

The quarters occupied by the General were in a new or renovated temple, built on the slope of Magazine Heights, and ascended from below by a flight of about one hundred steps with platforms at intervals.

The room or hall intended for the reception was on the top of these facing the city, and here were assembled the Major General Commanding, the French Admiral, the senior British naval officer (Sir M. Seymour had gone to Hong Kong previous to sailing for the north), Mr. Consul Parkes, and all the staff and numerous attending officers in full dress. The hall was tastefully decorated with flags, and tables of sweets and tea in the centre, while on the terrace in front was formed the guard of honor with the band of the 59th Regiment.

The steps were lined on both sides with troops, English and French, and on the South Parade ground below was drawn up a saluting battery of Royal Artillery.

Eleven a.m. was the hour named for the meeting, by which time all was in readiness at head-quarters, but noon arrived before Peh-Quei made his appearance on the South Parade, when he was received by a salute of 19 guns.

His mode of conveyance was a sedan chair covered with crimson cloth, and carried by four men. Two Chinese mounted on ponies rode on each side, and about fifty attendants followed on foot, at the head of whom were five executioners who always, as a matter of form, accompany the Governor; a set of dirty-looking old fellows, the ugliest and most ferocious that could be seen, wearing on their heads a large clumsy hat like a chimney pot, with a green horsehair plume.

At the entrance to the Joss House or Temple, Peh-Quei got out of his chair and ascended the steps to the hall, where he was received by the authorities, who shook hands with him, and then the whole became seated; the Guard of Honour having previously presented arms. The attendants of Peh-Quei crowded close behind his chair, and the rest of the officers who were not seated filling up the spaces on each side of the hall, which was divided into three parts by two colonnades.

A conversation, interpreted by Mr. Parkes, commenced by Peh Quei wishing the allied commanders-in-chief the compliments of the season and a happy new year: which the General responded to by saying he was happy to see him in his yamun, and congratulated him on his appointment of Governor of Canton being confirmed by the Emperor, and that of Acting Imperial Commissioner of the Province of Quantung for the time being.

Peh Quei being fully an hour over the time appointed, now looked at his watch, and observed that his time was different from ours, and that he did not think he was very late; but that if he was, he had been detained by having to receive some mandarins before leaving his yamun. He then remarked that a very important appointment, that of judge, had that morning been filled up, and that the Acting Lieutenant Governor was going to live with him in his yamun.

On being questioned by the General, Peh Quei said that he expected the Imperial Commissioner would arrive in about a month or six weeks, as he must have left Pekin on the 10th or 11th of February, and the distance was generally accomplished in three months, although by pushing, it might be done in two. He himself took six months, but then he came by way of the maritime provinces, in order to avoid the rebels, who were in arms in the interior. He had much difficulty in escaping them.

Up to this time Peh Quei had been laughing and in good humour, but became grave on the recent attack on our officers in the village being adverted to.

He used his utmost endeavours to prevent a strong party being sent out, and insisted that proclamations posted in the village would be sufficient, but both the General and the French Admiral said that it was necessary that we should send a force, in order to shew the people that if we wished to do so, we both could and would.

Peh Quei then observed, that "of course we should go with peaceful intentions, but that the people would not know it, and as there were a great number whom he could not control,—if we should make trouble—what then?"

Mr. Parkes said it was not we who would make the trouble: and

the General urged that Peh Quei should send a mandarin to accompany the party and explain to them the object of our visit; at the same time proposing the following Thursday for the expedition.

To this Peh Quei replied, that "Thursday and Friday would be all the same, he could not send anybody." The subject then dropped.

The General having proposed Wednesday as the day on which he might return the visit, Peh Quei said he could not receive him on that day, as it was the anniversary of his mother's birthday, and she being dead, he always kept that and the day previous in retirement and mourning. Any subsequent day would do.

Speaking of news, Peh Quei said there was not much, except that they had recently gained two victories over the rebels; upon which Mr. Parkes congratulated him. "Oh!" replied Peh Quei, "but they have only run and gone somewhere else."

He was now asked if he often visited Magazine Heights before we took possession of the city. He replied that he came up about twice a month with others, to the god of rain and other gods, and the temple they were now in, he said, had been recently rebuilt by "Yeh," at a cost of about 10,000 dollars.

The temple was built in honour of some men once celebrated, and who are now deified, and the object of Yeh's worship.

During the interview an attendant handed Peh Quei a particularly dirty looking piece of rag, steaming, from having been dipped in hot water, and with which he constantly wiped his face.

Having taken a sip or two of tea, and eaten some sweets with his fingers, although a silver fork was handed to him, he now rose to take his departure, and left, accompanied by his train, the same honours being given as on his arrival.

On the 16th Rear Admiral Rigault de Genouilly left for Hong Kong, and on the 26th both Admirals sailed for the north of China.

The visit to Peh Quei was returned by the General and Captain D'Abouville, who had succeeded to the command of the French, on the 27th, the guard of French and English marching side by side through the streets. On arriving at the Governor's yamun, a salute was fired according to Chinese custom, out of small guns, or more properly *saluting irons*, that stand on their breech and jump into the air and topple over at each discharge. There were three of these, and the Chinese salute being nine guns, they were obliged to be carried away between each three discharges to be reloaded, causing a long cessation between the rounds. The whole of the long causeway through the centre of the building was passed, and at a large hall at the farthest end the reception took place.

After the usual polite introductory speeches, the General enquired for his "old acquaintance," the Tartar General, and was informed that he was laid up with a bad foot, upon which he said that he presumed that was the reason why he had not honoured him with a visit, and that he would therefore do himself the pleasure of calling upon him after the present interview—due notice of which was immediately despatched to Mhow.

The General remarked that he never met his Excellency (Peh anywhere in the city, to which he replied that he had so much

to do in the government of Quang-si as well as Quang-tung with nobody to help him, that he had no time to leave his yamun. He also said that he was 69 years of age, and then asked the ages of the General, the French Commandant, and several others, which caused much amusement.

The chiefs now retired to a private apartment for a consultation, which lasted for an hour and a half; during which the lesser mandarins and attendants were much amused in admiring the different uniforms, hats, &c., of the officers in the hall.

On quitting the yamun, the same salute was fired, and again repeated at the Tartar General's, where the authorities were ushered into a small room, and in a few moments informed that no message had been received, and that Mhow-ki-tenar (the Tartar General) was out; so there was nothing for it but to return, although it was generally believed that he was at home, but unprepared to receive the visit.

To make up, however, for any lack of courtesy, he hastened to return the call, and was received with all due honours by the allied commanders, similar to those given to Peh Quei.

The Tartar General is a man of large frame, of a more frank manner, and without that appearance of cunning that hangs about Peh Quei. He certainly had been suffering from a bad foot, as although leaning on the arm of an attendant, it was with difficulty that he mounted the steps of the temple.

He was also very polite in his conversation, said that he was sorry he had not been able to make personal acquaintance with all the gentlemen round; and that he was unable to speak or understand the English language. Although he much admired the band of the 59th Regiment, when the General asked him if they should play another tune, he politely replied, that he would much rather be talking to him.

A photographic apparatus having been brought forward by the Royal Engineers, Mhow sat very quietly to have his likeness taken, and was much pleased with it, although he did not shew any surprise or curiosity at the novelty of the process, which it must have been to him.

He was dressed in a thickly-wadded purple silk coat, with a gown beneath of grey flowered silk. The usual hat, with pink mandarin ball and feather; and on the thumb of his left hand was a ring of jade stones, so broad that it came above the joint and prevented the thumb being bent. Throughout the visit he was in high good humour.

Up to the middle of April the occupation of Canton was held pretty quietly, but after that date a restless feeling seemed to spring up among the people, and a very doubtful air over future proceedings. Constant rumours of intended attacks were circulated, the shopkeepers and others left the city in shoals; Peh Quei sent his family off to Fatsham; petty annoyances were practised on individuals, shewing the growth of ill-feeling, such as cutting down solitary policemen, seizing and imprisoning our Coolies of the Military Train, &c., and yet nothing in the shape of an attack in force was ever attempted.

It was a general opinion, and doubtless a correct one, that these rumours and annoyances were in consequence of direct instructions from Pekin, in order to keep the Allies in constant expectation of an attack, and prevent any of the force being detached to the north.

It was ascertained from the shopkeepers who were fast closing, that they were compelled to do so by the mandarin soldiers, who were sent round to their houses in disguise, threatening them that if they continued to keep their shops open and sell goods to the Fanquis, they should lose their heads when the mandarin power was again established.

At length Peh Quei himself was discovered with his things packed ready for removal, and this had now gone so far that a guard of 200 Marines marched to his yamun just in time to prevent his flight with the Chief-Justice and Comptroller of Customs, all of whom were then informed that they must consider themselves prisoners, and that the guard would remain in the yamun. Peh Quei took it pretty quietly, but the Judge, who was rather a blusterer, became furious, and said we should have such an army to attack us as would take our best energies to repel. How much of this was a vain boast, the end has proved.

The coolies of the Military Train who had been imprisoned were missed for some time, but no trace of them being obtained it was concluded they had deserted, until some weeks afterwards one of them escaped and gave information respecting the rest, fourteen in number; when the police were quickly sent to release them.

Since the escape of one the rest had been beaten, one into sores, into which broken china had been hammered; and another had had red hot irons thrust through his ankles. These poor fellows all agreed in the same story when examined separately as to the manner of their capture, and that it was solely for being in the service of the Allies.

The Chinese authorities stated that they were taken in the act of housebreaking, but be that as it may, they were men in our service and we held possession of the city, so that whatever their crime they should have been handed over to the Commissioners to be dealt with; and not hidden away and tortured according to their barbarous modes of punishment.

As these men were accused of housebreaking, a court martial afterwards sat to try them for the offence, but, although the Chinese had been warned to come forward as evidences, none made their appearance to substantiate the charge, and they were accordingly acquitted.

At the end of April a telegraphic wire was laid down from head quarters, Magazine Heights, to the landing place, with a central station at the east gate. This gave great facility of communication with the senior naval officers in the river, and the engineers', commissariat, and other stores at the landing place.

As the summer advanced and the heat increased, it was found that it would be impossible to keep the troops in health, living in a crowded state in the different Joss houses and magazines; so that a number of commodious huts were erected within the lines, well

ventilated and with double roofs. All the rooms occupied by the men too were cleared of their Josses, which took up space, prevented circulation of air and harboured dust; windows were knocked out and other improvements made which greatly tended to the comfort of the men, and keeping them in health It was doubtless hurtful to the feelings of the Chinese to see their Josses dismounted from their high places and scattered to the winds.

On the highest point of Magazine Heights a large Joss room was cleared of thirty or forty Josses: one, a woman of meek countenance and of an immense size, was carefully removed to the head of the flight of steps leading to the court of the building, and placed on a vacant pedestal. Although in a very comfortable position, her ladyship was exposed to the open sky, which coming to the knowledge of some priests in the city, a deputation waited on the General for permission to erect a covering over her, for she was their most valuable Joss—the Goddess of all Virtue—who never failed to give a family to any woman who *chin chinned* her for that purpose. They would not have it destroyed, nor would they part with it for three millions of dollars; both on account of its virtues, and its having been a gift from the Emperor. The permission was of course given, and they built a wooden covering over it, collecting all the satellite Josses, and placing them around the large one.

At various periods the strength of the occupying force was slightly diminished by the embarkation of small detachments of English and French marines to their ships, and increased at others by the arrival of small bodies of Royal Engineers, 59th, &c.; but in the middle of May a great addition was given by the arrival at Hong Kong of the 47th, and at Canton of the 65th, both Bengal Native Infantry Regiments. A new quarter not before occupied was found for this latter in the Treasury.

The next day a whole company of Royal Engineers with everything complete went off to join the Admiral in the north, and the 59th Regiment was placed under orders for a move in the event of their being required there.

News was now axiously looked for from the Peiho, as it was known that operations of some kind would take place, if terms were not speedily agreed upon.

Soon the report came that the six forts at the mouth of the river had been attacked and destroyed, and that the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros with the allied forces had gone on to Tien-tsin, sixty miles up the river, and about the same distance from Pekin. This was approaching rather nearer the royal person than the Emperor approved, so that rumours of an early settlement were soon spread.

There is no doubt the destruction of these forts, that mounted a great number of heavy brass and other guns, took the Chinese in that part of the country quite aback, for that they depended on their keeping at bay any force the shallow water would allow us to bring is evident from a conversation reported by a Russian officer to have been held between himself and a mandarin on the spot the day before the capture.

The Russian remarked that the Allies were going to attack on the

following morning. The mandarin rubbed his hands and laughed, and pointing to the forts, said, "let them come, we're ready for them." The result proved *how* ready, for in less than two hours they were all in our possession.

The people at Canton were still restless, and continued rumours of attacks were afloat, and that sundry bodies of Braves were in the neighbourhood.

To attempt to put an end to this state of things, the General took a strong escort to the top of the White Cloud mountains on the morning of the 2nd of June, for the purpose of making reconnoissance, and was successful in discovering a large camp among the range of hills to the eastward, towards Whampoa, and accordingly sent back to the city for re-inforcements, in order to attack on the following morning.

The whole force consisting of about 1,400 men, artillery, infantry, and Naval Brigade, was divided into two parts, one consisting of Royal Marine Artillery, Royal Marines, 59th Regiment, and some French, to march that night to the mountain and join the General. The other, formed of Royal Artillery, 70th Bengal Native Infantry, and Naval Brigade to embark in gun boats, go down the river to Whampoa Reach, and disembark the following morning, to endeavour to take the enemy in rear, and place them between two fires.

On the morning of the 3rd, the General marched off towards the camp, and the other brigade disembarked for the same purpose, but as they proceeded, mile after mile in single file, across the narrow ledge of clay that separates the deep paddy fields, no path could be found to turn off in the desired direction, so that they were compelled to take the circuit of the path they were already traversing, which eventually led through a defile in the chain of hills; and at 11 a.m., they came in sight of the main body, halted in a village about two miles in front of the enemy's camp.

The General having been to the front with a detachment, to reconnoitre, had already had a smart skirmish with the Braves, but the heat being so intolerable, it was deemed very unadvisable to lead the men to a general attack, and orders were therefore given to seek shelter from the sun until 5 p.m., when a movement was to be made towards the camp.

It unfortunately happened. that the sun on this day was more powerful than it had been before, reaching 90 deg. in the shade, and the men had been from daylight till 11a.m., in the eye of the sun; one or two had already died from sun stroke, and in the two brigades, above forty were down from its effects. Could the result however have been foreseen, it would doubtless have been better to have risked a few more sun strokes, and have attacked at once with those who could go on, but it could not have been anticipated that the camp that had quietly awaited our approach for hours, should suddenly withdraw. Such, however, was the case; no sooner were the troops placed under cover of a wood and a village, than the enemy struck their tents and made off over the mountains, where to follow them at that moment was of course impossible.

In the evening, the force fell in and marched towards the site of

the encampment, but beyond that no trace could be discovered of the course taken by the Braves. A large village that appeared to belong to them was burnt, and the men returned to their old ground to bivouac for the night; returning to Canton the following day.

In this affair, Dr. Turnbull, R.N., acting on the staff, was unfortunately killed. He foolishly rode alone from one party of sick to another that had been left in rear under a guard, when he fell into an ambush, was overpowered and decapitated. Three officers, Lieutenant Colonel Wynn, R.E., Major Travers, R.M., Brigade Major, and Lieutenant Rokeby, R.M., and eight men were slightly wounded in the skirmish.

As a retaliation for this affair, on the night of our return some Braves collected on the hills outside the walls and fired some arrow rockets into the lines without doing any damage. It was too dark to distinguish their numbers, but a few rifle balls soon dispersed them.

The Chinese posted placards in the villages with their version of the expedition, as usual exaggerating greatly. The total numbers they said we had out were 2,180, and those killed 119, whereas they acknowledged but to *eight* killed.

The most amusing part was their description of what our men had to carry. "The foreign soldiers carried three days provisions, each man had his gun, 10lbs. of ammunition in powder and ball, a sword, a *camp bed*, a water bottle, and flannel change of clothes. With such a load, so great heat, and a march of several lis, they could only be conquered."

Negociations with the Court of Pekin not progressing as favourably as was expected, the 59th Regiment and a company of Royal Marine Artillery were on the 16th June despatched from Canton in the troop ship Adventure, and H.M.S. Retribution, to co-operate with the Admiral in the Peiho. These troops under the command of Colonel Hope Graham reached the mouth of the river on the 29th June, three days after the treaty had been signed by the Chinese High Commissioners, Quei Liang and Hwa-sha-na, and it had then gone on to Pekin for due ratification by the Emperor. Still further delay occurring, and the treaty with the Americans and Russians being concluded, while that of the British and French was still under consideration, the force was ordered to advance in gun boats up to Tien-tsin, three days before which a demand had been made on the Chinese officials for yamuns to be given up as barracks for soldiers.

This had the desired effect, for when half way up the river, gunboats were met with some of the French troops that had also been on their way up and were now returning, with despatches that the treaty had been duly ratified by the Emperor, and bearing orders from the Commander-in-Chief for all to return to their ships.

Four days afterwards Tien-tsin was evacuated and the river cleared of British and French vessels, the whole soon returning to the southward.

In the meantime difficulties were increasing at Canton. Hwang-tsoung-han, the Imperial Commissioner, had issued a proclamation by authority of the Emperor, calling upon the people of all classes

to join and drive the barbarians into the sea, promising "everlasting rest" to all who did so; the consequence of which was that a series of annoyances was carried on without intermission. Policemen were way-laid; individuals attacked and killed; patrols blown up, by powder bags being left in their route, with a string leading into some neighbouring house or alley, which, being pulled as the patrol passed, drew into the bag a lighted Joss stick, causing it instantly to explode. Gingals, too, loaded to the muzzle with slugs and small bullets, were planted so as to cover a spot where bodies of men were sure to pass, and on one occasion did fearful execution, killing and wounding no less than nine men at one discharge.

It was rarely that the perpetrators of these deeds were caught, as they invariably made off in the moment of confusion and surprise; but wherever these things took place the houses in the neighbourhood suffered.

Even the ramparts were not safe, for passers by were shot at from the houses below, so that a clearance of houses was made from the east gate completely round the lines, so as to leave no screen for a lurking enemy.

This was doubtless a great destruction of property, but it was a necessary act of self defence, and preservation of life.

An instance of the treachery of the Chinese occurred at Whampoa, a few miles down the river. For several nights lights and signals had been observed on the hills on Danes Island, commanding the shipping and our works at Whampoa, and it was imagined that some scheme was in process for setting fire to the docks and vessels.

To ascertain what these lights meant, Captain Jenkins, R.N., with a party of seamen and marines, landed on the evening of the 2nd July, and passed through a large village called French Town, which they were permitted to do without molestation.

In the meantime the lights on the hill had been removed, and nothing could be discovered; but in readiness for their return, a gingal had been placed pointing up the street of the village through which it was known the party would again pass, and was fired as they approached; killing two marines, wounding several others, one in no less than twenty-seven places, and Captain Jenkins himself severely in three places.

The village in consequence suffered a bombardment for several hours, the inhabitants having first received notice to quit, in order that life might be spared. No act of treachery was ever passed without a just retribution.

In addition to these acts of the Braves and others, the mandarins continued their intimidation of those Chinese in our employ, compelling them to quit on pain of the destruction of their families, so that the lines as well as the city gradually became deserted by artificers, servants, coolies, and all who had relatives without the walls: those only remaining who had none for whom to fear.

By the beginning of July, Hwang succeeded in bringing from the interior some hundreds of Braves who had never yet been brought under British fire. These endeavoured to fire the Commissariat and Engineers' stores at the landing place; and the quarters

of the Military Train at the Examination Hall; and finally on the 21st of the month were daring enough to make an attack in force against the walls. They came on in a body after dark, their position being distinctly seen by a line of coloured lanterns as they advanced over the hills. These were then picketed on bamboos, and the men again advanced, firing matchlocks and rockets, and a few shot from a piece they had dragged up to the ruins of Fort Lin. A check was kept on them by the fire from the different guards on the walls, and some grape from Mud Fort, but the main body of the troops was never turned out. The firing was kept up at intervals throughout the night, and shortly after daylight the enemy succeeded in scaling the walls between the north and west gates, and on the east wall, (both points being without our lines) but were repulsed in a very few moments, and driven back over the wall, after which the whole retreated and could never again be brought to the attack. Not a man of the allies was hit.

After this, the same state of feeling on the part of the Chinese continued, and the authority of the mandarins over the people began to be felt even in Hong Kong. Boats were forbidden to bring supplies of meat, vegetables, or fruit from the main land; shopkeepers closed their shops, and servants quitted their masters, and in a few days thousands of Chinese had left the colony in obedience to the orders of their Taoutais to join their families; where report says they were instantly *squeezed*, that is, money was extracted from them to satisfy the cupidity of their rulers.

By the beginning of August so many had left the town of Victoria, and provisions were getting so scarce, that some steps were necessary to be taken to turn the tide of affairs, and as the neighbouring district of Si-non was known to be a chief one of those coercing the people, a gun boat was sent to its principal town, Nam-Tow, to post proclamations to the effect, that if the annoyances complained of were continued with regard to Hong Kong, the mandarins of Nam-Tow should be punished.

After posting the proclamation, the boat carrying the flag of truce was fired upon and one marine killed. To avenge this insulting and aggressive act, and at the same time to carry out the punishment threatened in the proclamation, a force of 600 men, Artillery, Infantry, and Naval Brigade, under the command of the General in person, embarked at Canton and Hong Kong on the morning of the 10th, in the steam frigate Sampson, the hired steamer "Canton," and gun boats, and proceeded to Nam-Tow, which is on the left bank of the river, about thirty miles from Hong Kong; anchoring for the night in the bay off Nam-Tow, while the General and Commodore, the Honourable Keith Stewart, in command of the Naval Brigade, went in shore in a gun boat to reconnoitre.

The water on the approach to Nam-Tow is remarkably shallow, and the beach unapproachable except at high water. This prevented the landing taking place at daylight the following morning, as the tide did not serve until 10 a.m. on the 11th.

At 9 o'clock the 59th were removed from the Samson into paddle-box boats, and the 12th Madras N. I. into a gun boat, when the five

gun boats got under weigh and stood in for the shore, towing the larger boats, and coming to an anchor at about 600 yards from the beach.

A landing immediately commenced under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. H. Clifford, the Assistant Quarter-Master General, and the gun boats at the same time opened fire on an earthwork mounting two very large brass guns, and five or six smaller iron ones, which quickly returned the fire.

In landing, this earth battery was on the left, the walled town on a hill in front, about 300 yards, and a large suburb on the right, a great portion of which had to be passed through.

As soon as the troops were landed and had advanced a short distance along the narrow streets, the Braves began to shew themselves, and soon kept up a smart fire of matchlocks, killing two and wounding several of our men. The Braves, however, suffered severely. The 59th were in advance, followed by the Naval Brigade, Royal Marines, Royal Artillery, and 12th Madras N. I., and in about two hours the streets were cleared, and on the troops opening out above the earthwork it was abandoned by the enemy, although they had stood to their guns for an hour-and-a-half against the fire from the gun boats, whose shell burst repeatedly immediately over their heads and in their battery, scattering the fragments among them, as well as round shot continually tearing up the breastwork in their front.

The men now rested among the houses while the scaling ladders were being landed and brought to the front by the Naval Brigade, who planted them against the walls, when the general assault immediately took place without opposition, the people appearing to have fled from the town.

The gates having been blown open, the scaling ladders, sick, and wounded were now re-embarked, the boats sent off, and all the force drawn within the walls of the town to hold it for the night. The demolished gates were barricaded, pickets planted along the walls, and the troops distributed, but the night passed quietly and without any attempt at an attack or re-capture.

(To be Continued).

SHIPS AND GALES, AND THE SIMULTANEOUS OBSERVATIONS OF WIND AND WEATHER.

There is a logic that has a supreme eye for facts. A logic that brings

Hammer to nail,
Oar to boat,
Wind to sail,
And water to moat.

Logic of this sort follows the sequence of nature. It is realastic, and upon which mere words make no impression. This faith in

causation, the coupling of means to ends, this unconditional mode of surrendering themselves to facts, has given to the practical men of England the leadership of the modern world.

So well is this understood, that no new invention passes current with the rest of mankind, until it has received the stamp of practical England. 'Tis an old sneer against this island that she will in time be properly drained, and so rise a second time out of the waters. That she is a land of paradoxes, where artificial aids of all kinds are cheaper than natural resources; that gas light in our foggy climate is cheaper than daylight, that no man can afford to walk when the parliamentary train carries him for a penny a mile; that our trade consists in making well everything which is ill-made elsewhere; that we make ponchos for Mexico, bandannas for the Hindoo, ginseng for the Chinese, beads for the Indian, laces for the Fleming, telescopes for astronomers, steam engines for the whole world, and cannon for kings.

Without endorsing these remarks with our entire approval, we may be permitted to add that our foggy and rainy country furnishes the world with astronomical observations. And we are about to extend our labours in this respect in a very marked manner. The Board of Trade, with that directness of purpose that clinches every nail it drives, has recently issued a memorandum inviting co-operation for the simultaneous observation of wind and weather over and around the vast area of the North Atlantic during the next twelve or fourteen months consecutively.

The object of the meteorological department of the Board of Trade is to collect a store of facts and observations caused by storms, cyclones, hurricanes, squalls, and winds of all kinds, and the general circulation and changes of the atmosphere. For this purpose anemometers are now in position at Halifax and Bermuda, and in connexion with this subject a series of wind charts is in progress, and will be extended to show the simultaneous states of atmosphere over the ocean and its boundaries once a day during certain selected periods of special observation.

Information will be gathered from every source available, from ships at sea, as well as from observers on land, and it is only necessary to make known the object in view to secure the co-operation of all whose opportunities and tastes may combine to encourage a share in this extensive undertaking, the resulting value of which will chiefly depend on the extent of operations, and their subsequent discussion.

The meteorological department of the Board of Trade therefore, earnestly requests that all information respecting wind and weather may be transmitted to their office* during the next twelve months, or up to October, 1860.

The observations should be as follows:—

About nine o'clock Greenwich mean time, each day, the direction and character of wind, and the kind of weather prevailing at that hour should be recorded.

* Addressed to the Secretary of the Board of Trade, London, S.W. meteorological; no postage, being on public service.

When there are means it is very desirable that the temperature and pressure of air, with other meteorological facts should be recorded, though wind and weather are principally sought, for the special objects at present contemplated.

The direction of the wind should be given as most convenient to the observer, either by magnetic or by true bearing, stating which, whether by magnetic needle, or by the world, sun, or pole star.

Winds or currents near the earth's surface being affected so much by its inequalities, it is advisable to notice the lower and upper clouds, as well as smoke, vanes, or weathercocks.

Strength or force of wind may be estimated in common terms, where no better method is available.

Next to an anemometric scale in value is the Beaufort, and in default of either the words usually employed, such as STRONG, FRESH, MODERATE, &c., should be adopted.

Forms have been issued with the above memorandum, suitable for daily observations; but for the registry of wind no specific form is requisite, as the direction and character of wind, with the description of weather, may follow successively as noted, thus :—

June 22nd, 8 a.m., N.W., fresh, 5, cloudy, with any further remarks that may seem useful.

From time to time, monthly or quarterly, such records as may be made should be transmitted direct to the Board of Trade, London, addressed to the secretary, the word "METEOROLOGICAL" being in the lower left hand corner.

We have given publicity to this memorandum because we think it is a step in the right direction. It is a great improvement upon the blind guess work and weather wisdom of our almanacks. Readers now-a-days require something more than prediction to guide them, and they prefer the registration of a barometer to the prophecies of a Zadkiel or a Whistlecraft. But important as this instrument is, its indications ought not to be misunderstood as they often are, for they refer rather to the present than to the future state of the weather. If we examine a faithfully kept register we shall doubtless find that "fair" and "wet" weather correspond with a "high" and "low" state of the "glass." But this does not indicate that when the mercury is low in the tube, that we can predict with certainty when it is to rise, or when high when it is to fall.

If we observe the action of a sensitive "glass" in all kinds of weather, we shall find that it is continually rising or falling. But what is worthy of attention by all shipmasters and others to whom great changes of wind are important matters, is—that a decisive rise or fall denotes a real change.

The most certain sign of a change from wet to dry weather is when the rise is quick and to a great height.

Again, the mercury rising during heavy rains also indicates a return of fair weather.

It is also well known that the "glass" does not fall so much with rain as wind, and in winter its ranges are both higher and lower than summer, and that in tropical regions it keeps still nearer a medium.

It is at sea, however, that the barometer assumes an importance

unknown on land. Its sinking quickly gives notice, though perhaps a very short one, of a coming storm, and in such a case, even half-an-hour is often of the utmost importance. Half hours at sea are of a value sometimes that but few landsmen can realize, for delay in being caught unawares in affairs maritime, is not only dangerous, but often fatal.

The barometer, although giving but a limited peep into futurity, indicates the exact time a storm may be raging at a distance. It is on record that the great earthquake at Lisbon affected the barometers in England in a striking manner. The effects of a storm have been felt as far off as 2,000 miles. On the 13th January, 1843, a storm in the English and Irish Channels was denoted at Edinburgh by a fall of the barometer to 27·9 inches lower than it had been for some years before. That afternoon at Edinburgh hardly a breath of wind was felt, and yet a storm was raging in the English and Irish Channels that wrecked 180 ships and drowned 500 sailors.

It will be observed that the barometer alone affords valuable assistance, but it is when interpreted in conjunction with other indications to be obtained from the thermometer—the present aspect of the sky, and the character of the past weather, that its warnings become perfectly intelligible and of real value.

When so studied, the "readings" of the instruments give us timely notice of bad weather, and enable scientific observers to foretel (we use the word in its fullest sense) the approach of a coming gale.

Thus the storms of the 25th, 26th, and 31st of last month were not only foretold, but the quarters from whence they would come were plainly indicated by these two instruments.

The barometer was depressed on both occasions, while the thermometer was low previous to the gale of the 25th and 26th, and just the reverse before the storm of the 31st. Admiral Fitzroy read these signs with singular tact and fidelity. He says, "a word in respect of the last two gales may now be in season. That of the 25th and 26th was preceded and foretold as to strength and general (polar) northerly direction by a *low* barometer (29.1 at the sea level) and for the season a very *low* thermometer (22 degs.) The storm of the 31st inst. was preceded by a very *low* barometer (28.8 at the sea level), and a thermometer at 50 *degs.*, indicating a storm from the southward, or equatorial direction.

"Remarkably in the first gale our Channel Fleet were at the very meeting of the conflicting winds, where a temporary south-easterly was stopped and overpowered by a north-westerly torrent of (polar) air, which had previously chilled the south-easterly and caused deposition of its vapour in rain. Of the last storm it is only yet known that it veered as usual from southward towards the west, and moderated after the barometer had risen nearly to 30 inches (29.9), but as the mercury in the barometer did not move higher, and as the temperature of the air remained tolerably high, there was no reason for expecting a polar or northerly gale of any great strength for some time, but rather a continuance of westerly winds."

The deduction from these facts is, that when the thermometer or

barometer both fall low, a storm may be expected from a general northerly or polar direction, but when the thermometer stands high, as it did on the occasion of the storm of the 31st, and the barometer low, then we may anticipate a gale from a southerly or equatorial direction, and as Admiral Fitzroy foretold, it so occurred.

Both ancients and moderns have been much addicted to looking into futurity as to the weather, and it is exceedingly instructing to notice the old sayings of our ancestors, founded on the appearance of the heavens. Many of their rules are indeed recognized as sound, when tested by the laws of science. Philosophy may fail to explain satisfactorily why a ruddy glow at sundown foreshadows a fine "to-morrow," and a ruddy glow at sunrise a "dripping day;" but nevertheless, these old saws are true in the main. Again—why a bright yellow evening sky indicates wind; a pale yellow sky, wet—or why, an iron grey tinted sky is a favourable sign in the evening, and just the reverse in the morning—are questions that science has yet to answer. In the meantime the Board of Trade has thought proper to accept these simple signs as truths, and to publish them for the use of our maritime population.

The clouds and the moon are favourite objects with the weather wise. By observing the motion and appearance of the clouds, and a few other simple phenomena, it may be possible to foretell with some fidelity whether we are to have a wet or dry day tomorrow, but nothing more, and it is considered that all predictions from the changes of the moon are more fanciful than true, for they are as often wrong as right.

It has, however, been partially proved, that the phases of the moon have some influence on the weather, as not long since, tables were published containing observations extending over forty years. However, it has been admitted, that the calculations are more problematical than conclusive, and the information more curious than valuable. The only safe conclusion come to after forty-five years observation of the influence of the lunar orb upon the weather is, that the atmospheric conditions were so often in an indescribable or doubtful state, at the period of the moon's change, that it was impossible to say if a change in the weather had taken place or not.

The clouds (nature's scene shifters), speak to us in a tongue most people can understand, so that when dark bloated masses are hurrying across a lurid sky, we are pretty certain of a coming storm of wind and rain. While on the contrary, if their forms are delicate, soft, undefined, and fleecy, with clear blue azure gaps between them, we may expect the weather will be fine.

These broad outlines are of course known to all, but the object we wish to arrive at is a complete foreknowledge of the weather. To attain perfection in this, it is necessary to combine and notify all the facts and signs, both of the sky and of the instruments of science. And even then it is necessary to correct one class of signs and portents by the other.

It is obvious that the mere aspect of the sky often deceives the most skilful mariner, but this is not applicable to very bad weather. Fortunately, when nature frowns in earnest, and intends to put

forth a stronger storm than usual, she makes it known beforehand. So much so is this a fact, that it is now known, that no tempest or wind violent enough to involve great danger can approach our shores, or our ships at sea, without advertising its appearance upon the barometer. Warning has always been given by nature, and if man is heedless, he must take the consequences. For some time past we have been busy putting fact and fact together, and have arrived at the conclusion, that this is a law.

But to pierce farther into futurity, and to predict the quarter from whence the storm is to burst upon us, or its duration, is a task requiring the additional aid of meteorology—a branch of weather wisdom, yet in its infancy, and requires nursing. As we before remarked, an old rhyming prophecy often contains as much truthful observation upon the weather, as the profoundest remarks of philosophy. Nothing but observations upon an extensive scale will conduct us from fact to fact, until we are able to arrive at and trace out governing laws. It is with this end in view that the Board of Trade made its arrangements in the month of June last, for the simultaneous "logging" of the wind and weather over the vast area of the Atlantic and surrounding countries, and the returns tending to throw a light upon this most important subject will be thankfully received, and when the entire observations have been gathered together in October 1860, they will be studied and arranged, and perhaps may lead some keen scented *savant* upon the track of a new law of nature, by putting sign and sign together, and connecting phenomena.

For ages past we have been compelled to accept tradition for fact in meteorology. The babbling tongues of Sire and Son have faithfully wafted over the wreck of ages, the rites, sayings and customs of our Saxon and Danish ancestors before putting to sea. And, notwithstanding the flood of information that has been poured over the country, during the last half century, superstition, at once the child and mother of ignorance, still sits darkly brooding in the public mind. Even the pages of the utilitarian *Times* are not closed against such nonsensical advertisements as the efficacy of a child's caul for the preventive of shipwreck or drowning at sea.

However, it is consoling to know that if we only earnestly desire to become weather-wise, that we have it in our power to do so, and instead of relying upon probabilities we can pin our faith upon certain signs with tolerable security. This is important to all mariners and others whose business leads them into contact with powerful natural agents. Such men ought to be on their guard against dependance upon probabilities. They have to deal with the strongest powers of nature, the wind and the sea, and they should never allow their vigilance to be relaxed by flattering appearances. It cannot be too often told to them, that the weather is a paradox—it is regular enough to authorise expectation, and yet so irregular as to make us all feel a necessity for activity, vigilance, and precaution.

OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL

On the 30th of September, 1856, Lord Panmure, in a letter to the Military Secretary, called upon the Inspector-General of Fortifications and the Adjutant-General of Artillery, to prepare an official narrative of the siege of Sebastopol, embodying the respective operations of the engineers and the artillery, on the model of the celebrated work of Sir John Jones. After exactly three years and two months' incubation, this work is at length brought into the world, but in a manner so clandestine, and with so little sign of animation, that it may be regarded as still-born. We have failed, indeed, even by resorting to the well-known process of Dr. Hall—turning it first on one side and then on the other, so to inflate its lungs as to elicit those trumpet notes which it would fain blow in honour of its gallant parents. We have not grudged for this object either pains or money, having expended in the purchase of these weighty volumes—weighty in every sense of the word—the sum of £4 4s. Never was such an attempt made to smuggle a book into being, and then to smother it with a feather bolster. When a work is got up at the public expense for a national object, and, as Lord Panmure designed, "for future instruction and as a matter of history," it surely could not have been intended that its statements should be made in secret—that, if published at a prohibitory price as regards the community, it should also be sent into the world without any announcement, and that the Government should withhold from the press those presentation copies which, by prescriptive usage, it always receives—thus denying the means of communicating their existence and revealing their character to the public. But if the design was to advance misstatements, to pervert facts, to give a false colouring to what was done, and what was left undone, to award the honour where it was not due, and embody all this in a work which, though carefully shielded from contemporary criticism, should hereafter be looked upon as an authorized and indisputable record, then the course taken was well adapted to the object in view. But as an anonymous letter has drawn our attention to this concealment of birth, the body of the unfortunate mouse, which Shooter's-hill or some other Woolwich mountain, after three years' labour brought forth, has been made the subject of an inquest, and history may borrow some light from the results.

It is well known that the fortifications of Malta are celebrated for their growth of capers, and there was formerly, and, perhaps, still is, a standing order that no one was to cut them but the engineers. This regulation would appear to have been extended further east; for, according to the united testimony of Major Elphinstone and Sir Harry Jones, the engineers have the merit of all the capers cut at Sebastopol. Major Elphinstone claims them for Sir John Burgoyne; Sir Harry, on the other hand, modestly appropriates them to himself. By the pen of the gallant Major we are told that everything admitted to be successful, and much more that ought to have been successful, was originated by his chief; Sir Harry declares, on the contrary, that it was not till he—Sir Harry—appeared on the field,

and *from "that period only,"* that "the siege really commenced." Indeed we may apprehend that Major Elphinstone has permitted his zeal for the honour of his chief to carry him beyond the bounds that facts warrant, or that Sir John Burgoyne will sanction. It would certainly have been more satisfactory had Sir John Burgoyne, with his great facility of composition and large experience, taken the same course as Sir Harry Jones, and himself related the story of his achievements, instead of delegating the task to an officer who, from his subordinate rank, might be expected to become more an eulogist than a historian. This, while not unworthy of his position, would have given authority to the narrative and have reflected honour on the corps of which he is so distinguished an officer. The engineers are at present in no good odour. The Royal Commissioners have discovered that the fortifications at Portsmouth, respecting which we have at times heard so much, are really as bad as they have been represented—that the batteries have no cross fire, but fire only in front. The defences lately erected on various points of the coast are nearly all condemned. Lord Melville has officially reported that the works constructed in Scotland are "disgraceful;" and only a few weeks ago the inspecting artillery officer refused the certificate for the armament of Fort Matilda, on the Clyde, because it could be taken in reverse. Yet no one will assert that there are not many of our engineers, in the subordinate ranks, who are equal to any duties they may have to discharge. It is not individuals, but the corps—we say it in no unfriendly spirit—that needs stirring up, and we cannot doubt that it will receive this impulse, when it numbers among its superior officers such men as General Portlock, Sir Frederick Smith, and one or two others of equal note.

The object of the first volume of the work before us is to show that the whole glory of the Crimean campaign pertains to Sir John Burgoyne, and if there remain any little surplus, it is claimed for the officers serving immediately under him. It would seem that the engineers intended the siege of Sebastopol to be a model siege from the very outset. The place was to be taken on the most correct principles, and on those alone. Molière somewhere gives a dialogue between two physicians, one of whom contends that it is better for a patient to die under proper treatment—*selon les règles*—than to recover through a skilful *coup*, and the Engineers, whom the great Duke used facetiously to designate the "Woolwich doctors," operated at Sebastopol in such strict accordance with routine that the siege nearly expired under their hands. And this result would appear the less surprising if we accepted Major Elphinstone's volume as a true record of the siege, for the gallant author shows that the Engineers were not only determined to proceed on established principles themselves, but they tried to bend all the other arms to the same task. We are given to understand that Sir John Burgoyne kept his eye on everyone else's business, as well as his own; told everybody, from Lord Raglan downwards, precisely the right thing, and had a wrinkle for every emergency. In proof of this, the appendix contains a number of Sir

John's memoranda, addressed to nobody in particular, but to everyone in general, telling them how to do it, and which were just as applicable to the siege of Burgos as the siege of Sebastopol. We are made to infer that these memoranda took the shape of suggestions to Lord Raglan, whose indefatigable supervisions of every detail of his command claimed the admiration of even his bitterest revilers. The assertions are made, we say, obliquely, not in an open straightforward way. We are told of certain operations that "it was considered," "it was suggested and determined," and a note directs us to some paper in the appendix, which bears the signature of Sir John Burgoyne. Thus a permanent record secures the credit to the Engineer chief, though in such a dexterous manner that few of those who might dispute the claim will ever know it has been made. The indicated documents are far from proving the case; and though Lord Raglan is dead—though we alone are left to guard the *immortelles* on his grave, the army and the country, and even the Royal Engineers will refuse to despoil him of his laurels on such evidence. The narrative would lead us to believe that Sir John Burgoyne recommended the landing at Eupatoria, but the document referred to in the appendix gives quite a different impression. It is true, Sir John Burgoyne objected to landing at the Katcha, the spot recommended by Sir George Brown after a personal reconnoissance; but whether the Katcha was or was not the most eligible point, the specific reasons urged against it by Sir John, proved to be without ground. The claim of suggesting Eupatoria is overthrown by the very first line of the document on which it is based, and by which it plainly appears that Sir John Burgoyne, who had never seen the Crimea, knew as little concerning the spot where the landing would be effected, as anyone in the expedition. Lord Raglan was not the man to tell his secrets; and accordingly the memorandum in question begins quite in the dark on this subject:—"In the event of a landing being effected on any part of the coast of the Crimea, *between Sebastopol and Eupatoria*," which is something like saying between Dover and the Land's End.

On the 20th of September was fought the great battle of the Alma, in which the English army and its chief showed that England, after forty years of peace, had no way degenerated from the standard of Vittoria and Waterloo. This famous encounter is passed over by Major Elphinstone in three or four lines, as it could not be made over to the Engineers, but we may thank him for preserving in his appendix, the despatch of Lord Raglan, which is complimentary to Sir John Burgoyne, and claims no great merit for the noble chief himself. But our limits oblige us to hurry on to the flank march, which again is ascribed to Sir John Burgoyne, though it has been openly attributed to the Quarter-master Generals of both armies; and a much better case has been made out in favour of Sir Richard Airey. The truth is, the idea originated with Lord Raglan, who took counsel upon it with his leading officers, and, among others, Sir John Burgoyne furnished a memorandum in favour of the movement. This document has fallen to the hands of Major Elphinstone, and he jumps to the conclu-

sion that he has discovered a mare's nest. If Major Elphinstone's zeal for his chief had been more tempered by discretion, he would, instead of parading, have suppressed the memorandum; for the views it puts forward, like those of the Katcha paper, were completely refuted by the event. Whatever may have been the merits of the flank march—and that it was a brilliant movement no one will gainsay—it did not achieve the result confidently anticipated by Sir John Burgoyne. The object he desired was a surprise, by taking the Russians on the side where we were not expected. But Sir John himself tells us, in a subsequent memorandum, that "on arriving before Sebastopol, after the battle of the Alma, and the taking possession of Balaklava, the place appeared to be in such a state, and the garrison so busily, and with so much apparent confidence, engaged in improving it, that, with a fine battering train on board a ship close at hand, no one for a moment contemplated the attempt of so rash an act as to storm it at once, &c." In fact, on all these three points of the Katcha, Eupatoria, and the flank march, Sir John Burgoyne proved completely wrong. The gallant General, who knew all that was going on or in contemplation, seems to have volunteered his hints on every possible occasion, and because Lord Raglan, with his proverbial good nature, accepted the proffered paper, and dropped it into a corner of his pocket—though we are nowhere directly told that matters went so far—his reputation has to square accounts with Major Elphinstone.

We have only space left to speak of the memorandum issued by Sir John Burgoyne on the 1st of October, in which he says that, "on the right, the great tower (the Malakoff) appears to be the key of the whole position." This indication of the Malakoff is claimed for Sir John Burgoyne as a discovery, but we can assure Major Elphinstone, it was quite as well known to Lord Raglan and to some other officers of the British army as to the distinguished Engineer. Before leaving England Lord Raglan had been furnished with a report on Sebastopol by General Macintosh, the only English officer who had ever visited the place; and who, in his report, not only pointed out the dominating character of the Malakoff height, but furnished a map, indicating its precise position. We may ask why that report, respecting which so much has lately been said, and which we are informed was copied by order of the authorities at the old Ordnance office—which we have even been told was positively shown to Sir John Burgoyne—has not been produced in this volume, as it undeniably afforded the British Government the first information concerning Sebastopol, and would be far more appropriate than many of the papers introduced. The necessity of making these remarks has imposed upon us a painful task, but it has been performed in no hostile spirit; and we regret that Major Elphinstone has allowed a partisan spirit to pervade a work which, with much irrelevant matter, embraces a fund of useful information, though we fear it is not conveyed in a form that will render it accessible. The volume of Sir Harry Jones may engage our attention another time. At present, it is but just to say that it displays great ability. The maps, which are numerous, are well and accurately executed;

but so awkwardly folded, that they can scarcely be opened without being torn. We shall see how this has been managed by the French Government, which has also just published an official account of the siege; but, unlike our own, they invite criticism, and we have been favoured with a programme of the work, which may itself arrive in due course.

PEEPS FROM THE LOOPHOLES OF RETREAT.

By Retired Major Marksman.

The Examination of Subalterns.—Since the memorable order of the Duke of Wellington, after the retreat from Burgos, in which he soundly rated commanding and all other officers for the disorderly state of the troops, I do not remember reading so severe a rebuke as that which the Duke of Cambridge lately administered to Lieutenant-Colonels of regiments for neglecting to have aspiring subalterns examined. Humiliating as it was, however, to the officers concerned, they have nobody to blame but themselves. Over and over again they have been warned by the professional press that no ensigns or lieutenants would be promoted until they had proved their eligibility, by passing an examination as to their regimental attainments; and in this the press only repeated, as I understand, the injunctions of the Adjutant-General addressed personally to the commanding officers. If our army has improved in some things, I do not think it has advanced in the quality of obedience. Veneration is not the principle of the day. In my time no officer would have dreamt of disobeying the grim old chieftain at the head of the army. He would have been displaced *sans façon*. A laxity has crept into the service, and it may be set down to the habitual disregard of the Queen's Regulations, which is countenanced at head-quarters, and the impunity which attends the perseverance of commanding officers in tolerating a reckless mess expenditure.

It is strange how habits grow upon us. We pay a great deal above the *regulated* price for our commissions; we entertain a larger number of men for our band than is permitted by *regulation*; we wear *mufti* when we ought to be in uniform; and these things being winked at, we neither study the Regulations as prescribed, nor do anything else which we think can be escaped. Can it be wondered at, then, that our subs try to shirk the second and the third examinations, remembering, as they do, the irksomeness of the first? But they pay the penalty of indifference in being suddenly pulled up. Talk as we may of the tyranny and martinetism of the men who exact a rigid respect of the very letter of the law, it is nothing compared to the terrible danger of dealing with a capricious executive. In the one case you know that you are always safe as long as you conform to the Regulations; in the other you are *never* safe, because that which you do to-day in security, may to-morrow be pronounced a crime, and visited accordingly. Now, regarding this rule respecting the examination of subalterns, I hold it to be of that wholesome character

which entitles it to rigid observance. We must have knowledge in the army now-a-days, if we wish to escape a renewal of all the fatal consequences of going into the field just as we went to the Crimea; and that knowledge will not come to us intuitively or by inspiration. It must grow with us, and its existence be tested in good time. Was not the reproach of incompetency in the higher ranks on the lips of every junior before Sebastopol, when he was tasting the bitter fruits of a system of promotion and appointment, which rested only on family connection and the power of purchase? Would our troops have been ill-clad, ill-provided, and indifferently led if the field officers and the staff had passed through those ordeals which we now deem imperative? I look back upon the history of the terrible winter of 1854—55 with a shudder, and my old bones twinge when I recall my own sufferings in Spain and the Pyrenees, some forty years previously. And all this arose from the supposition, then common in the service and with the whole country, that any fool would make a soldier. All that he needed was courage and a good digestion. Experience demonstrated the reverse to some thousands of officers in the Peninsula, but no one profited by the lessons these poor fellows learned. When the war was over, no M.P. or military official dreamt of suggesting an improvement in our army system. Marlow remained exactly upon the old footing, and this was continued at Sandhurst until very recently. We did not even gradually move. It was in 1849, I believe, that a light first broke in upon the mind of the ruler of the Horse Guards, and induced him to recommend that young gentlemen, before they were granted their commissions, should know a little of *something*. I don't know who proposed the scheme of education, or rather the standard of efficiency, but I do know that a very slight *cram* sufficed to bring youth up to the mark, and a very large harvest was reaped by certain professors and booksellers, whose works were enumerated in every circular to aspirants as the most appropriate for their study. The Rev. Dr. Chepmell's "Select Course of History" was among the favoured volumes; but I speak advisedly when I say that, with all its merits of accuracy, there never was a book so happily devised to confound the youthful mind, and give it a lasting distaste for history in any shape. Macaulay's "Field Fortification" would have been a proper book enough, if the examiners had been authorized to inquire into the attainments of youth in that particular branch of study. As a preparation for drawing a front on Vauban's first system it was naught. After all, however, the syllabus established in 1849 inaugurated a course of instruction which, after various mutations and reforms, is now bearing good fruits, and if the Commander-in-Chief allows of no relaxation of the rules he has laid down, we shall soon have a very good crop of efficient captains, for which the whole army will have cause to be grateful. Good captains make competent commanders, and capital staff; and therein lies the safety as well as the efficiency of our army.

Regimental Schools.—The education of the officer carries the mind by a very natural chain of induction to the education of the men. I see that lectures are to be delivered at Aldershott during the

winter, and that the Government has liberally provided magic lanterns in aid of the lecturers. Without diagrams and illustrations lectures are of little use as a means of teaching, for the mind cannot always carry away the facts and arguments of the speaker. This, if true of university and medical students, and educated people who attend literary institutions, is still more applicable to the private soldier, who, in too many cases, does not absolutely understand the language spoken to him. He must be addressed through a different medium. He is a child, and pictures are his best instructors. But neither lectures nor pictures will teach reading, writing, and arithmetic, and without these no soldier can ever make a non-commissioned officer. According to the able report of Colonel Lefroy, who, it is much to be regretted, has ceased to be an Inspector of Schools, there are 30,000 men in the British army who are quite ignorant of letters, and about the same number who have very crude ideas regarding the rudiments of knowledge of any kind. Now if these men were all infants or young children, they could be taught after the ordinary fashion, and would soon display their competence to understand that "*John—is—a—good—boy*," "*The—cat—jumps*," "*The—dog—barks*," and so forth. But if the main object of acquiring the art of reading is to impart information, elementary books of a very different character must be prepared. Colonel Lefroy distinctly points to this as an object worthy the consideration of able men. The task is gigantic. What amount of knowledge regarding even the common things of life, to say nothing of history, geography, &c., can be taught in monosyllables, or even in words of two syllables? Our language has been made rich by borrowing from others, and, consequently, almost all the words relating to any of the sciences contain the Latin, Greek, French, or other root, as well as the Saxon original. This fills our dictionary with hard words—at all events with polysyllables which constitute the learner's stumbling-block. He would be a real benefactor of his species who should carry the art of manufacturing reading books to such perfection, that interesting truths might be acquired without the preliminary bother of a multitude of formidable explanations. But where is the man who will undertake such an office without adequate remuneration, and where is the Secretary of State who will offer the man of talent a sum of money that will render the application of his time to such an object well worth his while? I have been told that a highly accomplished gentleman did offer to make the attempt, and he was referred to the Council of Military Education, who have since got the Regimental Schools placed under their government. I fear much that the proper education of the soldier, while we remain without a settled system of National Education, will be an unsolved problem for many a long year to come. The "three R's.," as the old village pedagogue is related to have called "reading, writing, and arithmetic" must occupy more ground in the agricultural districts before our Regimental Schoolmasters can have a satisfactory starting point. The Royal Engineers require that every recruit should be able to read and write before he is enlisted. As a consequence of this very

natural and proper requirement in a corps where certain sciences have to be acquired before a man can do more than wield the spade, the recruiting has lately fallen off. The national teaching does not keep pace with the military demand.

THE VOLUNTEER FORCE.—Since General Sir William Napier (will he allow me to congratulate him on the step?) has taken the volunteers by the hand, no doubt can now exist that the force will soon become respectable in numbers, and formidable as a body of marksmen. Indeed, their practice at Hythe and elsewhere is something remarkable. Money appears to flow in very freely from all quarters, and the organization is proceeding *a grands pas*. The Government does not stint the supply of rifles when the number of a company justifies the application, and shooting ground has been obtained. All that we have to fear is that too many of the volunteer privates will be wanting to become officers, and the elements of disaffection may possibly creep into a description of service which can only be held together by a spontaneous sense of the importance of discipline. Obedience to the officers is an indispensable guarantee for efficiency. We cannot hope that many George Washingtons will arise to command the respect of voluntary subordinates, but we may at least believe that there are thousands of Englishmen influenced by the strong common sense which suggests that in union and subordination lie the welfare and strength of armies. It may not be out of place to copy a passage from Upton's *Life of Washington*, as demonstrating the possibility of the co-existence of social equality and military deference.

"In a service like that on the Virginia frontier, and in the American Wilderness, it was of course impossible to separate, to any considerable extent, officers and soldiers. The commander could not retain his authority by standing aloof from the presence of his troops. He was necessarily crowded together with them in narrow forts and tents, and had to partake of their fare and condition. He was younger, too, than the larger portion of them, yet, how profound was their respect and almost reverence for him!"

This equally conveys a lesson to officers and men. We cannot expect that every captain or major of a volunteer corps will be of a character to rule by

> "The pow'r of thought, the magic of the mind,
> Which moulds another's weakness to its will,"

but their steady demeanour, and a close attention to their self-imposed duties, may give them claims, in addition to the adventitious rights of rank, to the regard and ready obedience of their subordinates; and it cannot be too forcibly impressed upon the volunteers themselves, that they afford the best proof of their loyalty and devotion to their country's welfare in abstaining from all ambitious flights and discontented grumblings.

THE MILITIA.—As the encouragement given to the volunteers to become good shots warrants the supposition that the Government intends to rely upon them in the event of an invasion, one is naturally tempted to ask what part the militia is to play in the anticipated emergency? The training, as it is called, is certainly calculated to make *parade* soldiers of the militia; and if nothing more is needed it

would be a waste of money to serve out ball cartridge to them. I cannot, however, divest my mind of the impression that the local force is meant for something more effective than the merely showing themselves on Dover heights, as marks for the French tirailleurs. The embodied corps which *do* get ball cartridge, do not constitute one-fifth of the entire militia, yet we have nothing else to depend upon at the present moment than that fraction; the rest could do little, at a distance, beyond looking like an army. Time was when the red petticoats of a few Welsh women scared an approaching enemy. Modern soldiers are not "frightened with false fire." Death from the unseen hand—unseen because of the extensive range of the conical bullet—is the thing to be dreaded. Hence the importance of the grey uniform; it blends with the murky atmosphere common to our climate for the larger part of the year. Don't talk any longer of the brave old scarlet, which only makes our poor fellows dangerously conspicuous. A Napier has avowed that the chief thing needful is the art of hiding behind "sticks and stones"—next to that the science of running away. But *invisibility* would render us independent of either of these moves—and an invisible soldier sending his *pinging* messenger among the enemy is a very desirable fellow, indeed.

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT.—When the late Duke of Wellington said in the House of Lords (speaking of the Colonel Whyte case) that the diminution of corporal punishment had been the object of all his arrangements throughout the service ever since he first commanded a regiment, he did not hesitate to add that it was impossible to carry on the discipline of the British army without some *punishment of the description which the individual should feel.* His Grace had deeply studied the mental composition of the British soldier. He knew that in a vast number of instances any appeal to the moral sentiment was utterly vain. The course of life of three-fifths of the soldiery before they had been admitted to the honourable profession of arms had not prepared them to estimate the degradation of solitary confinement, which, with them, was only another name for idleness, nor were they animated by the honourable desire for promotion and distinction, which is a safeguard against the commission of crime. Still the Duke was of opinion that the day might come when it would be possible to abolish corporal punishment altogether, and "he hoped to live to see that day."

Thirteen years have elapsed since those words were spoken, at which time the power of court-martial had been restricted to the infliction of fifty lashes, and it is only within the last month that there has been any official indication of a desire to diminish the *frequency* of the punishment. The General Order issued by the Duke of Cambridge is discriminative, and has not come one hour too soon. In India and the colonies, where we have no military prisons, and where confinement of any kind is exceedingly injurious to the health and minds of the soldiery, it has been customary to award corporal punishment. No matter what the crime, if it at all came within the limits of the power of a court-martial, the intervention of the drummer was the *sine qua non* of cor-

rection. Now all this has reached a termination, and the Duke of Cambridge, by classifying crimes, has provided a new safeguard against that excess of flagellation which revolted public feeling, and has, at the same time, provided the soldier with a fresh motive for self control, by stigmatizing a certain class of offences as sufficiently debasing and derogatory to the notions of discipline to merit the exclusive visitation of the lash. The wisdom of the measure is undeniable. If it cannot be accepted as a prelude to the entire abolition of the lash, it, at least, manifests the humane feeling of the Commander-in-Chief on the one hand, and his conviction on the other, that the penalties which the law has provided for the worst of military crimes cannot be dispensed with at present. Indeed, there never was a time when authority required such a weapon for the chastisement of offences. The *personnel* of the army has somewhat degenerated. The tremendous drain upon the population by the new battalions of the line, the embodiment of the militia, the campaign in India following quickly upon that in the Crimea, has driven the recruiting officer to seek his men among the lowest dregs of society. Every other man now enlisting seems to do so for the sake of getting the bounty and other moneys, and no sooner has he spent what he has obtained by taking an oath of allegiance, than he is off to some other locality. It is incredible how great a number of fellows of this kind have caoried on their game through as many as half-a-dozen regiments before they have been detected and brought to justice. Would you imprison these vagabonds? Would you put the country to the cost of maintaining in comparative comfort a lawless set of ruffians who revel in their system of plunder, when a little salutary flogging can be made the means of bringing them to their senses? The great mistake of the humanitarians lies in their arguing from their own feelings alone. They seem to lose sight of the fact of the criminals themselves being incapable of understanding that there is anything dishonourable in the punishment, or that even their sense of personal suffering is as acute as that of the well-intentioned. They are not aware of the numerous instances in which men, after receiving the full complement, turn upon the officer of the parade and utter some violent piece of bravado, having the while received the punishment without a murmur. For my own part, I would rather run the risk of being deemed the most hard-hearted old soldier that ever received a shilling of the money of the State, than contribute a vote to the total abolition of flagellation. I contend for its indispensability in the maintenance of discipline. "If we are to have an army," exclaimed the great Duke, "we must have it in a state of discipline—a state of subordination to command and of obedience to the State. The country does not like an army under any circumstances; but in no case would it have any but the best troops that can be had. We must have the *very best* troops in this country, and in every part of the world where we employ them. We require the best conduct and the most perfect subordination and order." And those objects the Duke felt were only to be accomplished by holding the corrective lash over the very bad soldiers.

The Ninth of November.—The General Order to which I have alluded in the foregoing paragraph, bears date the 9th of November, the anniversary of the birth of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. Is it to be accounted as payment in full of the debt due by the authorities to the army? That a great deal more was expected no one can doubt who has read the letters in the naval and military papers. They all spoke of the hope of advantage being taken of the anniversary to distinguish it by some act of grace, such as the conferment of brevet rank upon the old captains, the grant of additional pay to the retired majors, or the increase of the stipend of subalterns. As for the last, I do not expect we shall witness any augmentation until the purchase question has been disposed of. The two matters are, in the estimation of the authorities, indissolubly united. But I did hope something for the retired full-pay majors and the older captains. The suppression of general brevets by promotion following immediately on the death of a general officer has very much thrown back those who have not had the chance of getting employed. The captains are no longer lifted up at the end of six years as they were wont to be. Engaged with their regiments in the Canadas, West Indian and Australian Colonies, or in India before the mutiny, many old officers have seen boys run up to the top of the regimental ladder, getting field rank in seven or eight years service, while they, poor fellows, with equal ability, more experience, and the claims of tropical service, are still captains. I think the Duke of Cambridge, in his evidence on the purchase question, distinctly laid down the doctrine that officers ought not to be passed over in the selection for command, simply because they had been unavoidably debarred sharing in the toils and honours of field service. They were ready and most willing to go anywhere, and at any time, but could not regulate their own destiny and movements. Why should not this principle be applied to the captains? On the score of justice the step was theirs—on the score of expense there could be no objection, the cost being so very slight. As for the retired majors on full pay I am unwilling to speak, as a party concerned. Besides, I believe our case is in very judicious hands, and that the next session of Parliament will show that we have champions and advocates, and a not unwilling Secretary of State for War. What is wished for is simply that the majors should have the same retired pay as the lieutenant-colonels, upon the intelligible ground that the majors had been in receipt of allowances almost equivalent to those of the lieutenant-colonels—had performed the same duties continually, and had years of service to urge in favour of a liberal consideration of their claims. How happily the Prince of Wales, now a Colonel, might have been identified with the army by some concession to these old officers upon the anniversary of his birth! But our Government always times things badly. Napoleon I. was accustomed to take advantage of some great event to do his troops a good turn, and George IV. imitated him on one memorable occasion. He gave the officers of the Guards steps of army rank for the defence of Hougoumont—he gave us colour sergeants to commemorate the same piece of soldiership. Have we signalized the Crimean war and the

mutiny in India by anything beyond a medal? Was the wonderful discipline of the troops who remained firm when the Birkenhead was sinking, and the Sarah Sands was in flames, recognized by any special act of bounty? If there had been any desire to abate corporal punishment *those* would have furnished the opportunities, and not the present hour, when indiscipline is rife. But, I repeat, our people never know how to time their favours. When they do come they appear to have been the result of much press worrying.

THE LAUNCH OF THE VICTORIA.

THERE is a question of despotism and liberty taking fast hold of men's minds, a war of races often predicted and making itself a war of opinion. Upon this subject Englishmen are capable of a sublime resolution, and should it menace civilization, they will like their sea kings of old, take to their floating castles, and sweep the seas of all opposition.

To be plain, one of the signs of the times is that the western powers, England and France, are playing high for a great stake—the empire of the seas—and we echo the sound of many voices when we say there must be no mistake about this matter. This is a subject upon which we are patriotic at all times, but it came out intensely strong on the 12th of November last, when Queen Victoria honoured with her presence the launch of this noble ship at Portsmouth. Everybody felt that she was the proudest triumph of naval architecture afloat—a Colossus amongst Colossi.

Well, we don't care about dimensions, we shall not stop to register "her length between perpendiculars and extreme breadth over all." It is enough that the Victoria is the last three-decker launched, and that includes all known improvements. Neither do we care for the pattern of the carpet—the rosewood table, and the golden bowl upon it (filled of course with the choicest cut flowers), that decorated the ante room appointed for the Queen, except so far as these elegancies afforded her Majesty gratification. Antique sofas, and chairs, *en suite*, Italian cabinets, rich gilt girandoles, silver gilt inkstands, jardinières and Sevrès porcelain, are all very well in their way, but they seem out of place in a dock yard smelling of pitch and tar, and surrounded by huge anchors, cannon, vast cables, and the rough, earnest, manly enthusiasm exhibited at the launch of a grand ship of war.

More to our fancy was the honest English feeling that lit up the whole affair. There was a hum of thousands of voices, in lofty praise of the mighty ship. Then, there came a shout—a shout that can be heard only in England—it rent the heavens when the Queen took her place surrounded by nobles, ambassadors, knights, and the shining accompaniments of her court. But, after all, was this shout,

great as it was, equal to the human thunder that came from twice ten thousand lungs, when the Victoria, majestically glided down her ways, and became the proudest and most daring specimen of naval architecture in the world. No—great as was the shouting—loud as were the huzzas for the Queen, it was increased by one voice when the noble ship entered her native element, only one voice—but that one was Queen Victoria's own.

It is pleasant to speculate in face of unbroken traditions, though vague, and losing themselves in fable. We confess that the fervent glow of enthusiasm that radiated upon every face in that vast crowd, convinced us, that Englishmen come honestly by their seamanship. Our ancestors, the rough old sea kings of Scandinavia, might have been proud of their offspring had they witnessed that wild tempest of joy. Indeed, we could not avoid filling up in our fancy the wide gap there is between the old Norse boat and its load of piratical sea kings that landed some thousand and odd years ago in Kent, and the splendid specimen of naval ship building that had just left the stocks. It has taken many generations to trim, and comb, and perfume the first cargo of Norse pirates into royal highnesses, most noble Knights of the Garter, admirals, &c., &c.; but every medal, every badge and ornament that sparkled upon the breasts of England's proudest heroes at that launch, dates back to the old Norse boat. The same strong energy, the same powerful yearning for maritime supremacy sparkled through the mists of buried centuries. Its strength was unabated, though mellowed by circumstances, time, and the influences of religion, into a more polished civility.

It is in the deep traits of this Anglo-Saxon race that the fortunes of nations are written, and at the hour we write, with the remembrance of that wild huzza ringing in our brain, we call to mind that fear of change, that distrust of nations that pervades all Europe from Lisbon to Moscow. Full well we know how to interpret the burst of enthusiasm when the Victoria floated safely. She was regarded, —trusted, as a champion, sent by England to maintain her power and dignity upon the deep. And let there be no mistake about the meaning of the Empire of the Sea. For England, it means the quiet enjoyment of uninterrupted traffic. For France, it means, or we do her great wrong, the humbling of perfidious Albion, which means, heaven knows what. But we have not come to that pass yet, nor are we likely to, if the enthusiastic loyalty that displayed itself at the launch of the Victoria is the exponent of the population elsewhere. Success then attend the Victoria—she is aptly named, for she represents Britain's power on the seas, and the stability of England is the SECURITY of the modern world.

CAMPAIGN OF 1849 IN PIEDMONT.

Chapter I.

State of Italy—Condition of the opposing Armies—Plans of Campaign on both sides.

Seven months elapsed between the signature of the armistice on the 9th of August, 1848, and its denunciation on the 12th of March, 1849. Preparation and distrust marked this period. Decisive success had been gained by neither party. Each felt that the struggle was not yet over. The dream of Sardinian supremacy—the iron crown coveted by Charles Albert — the vision of Italy united in one great federative republic, of which Turin should be the head, which perpetually haunted the Piedmontese liberals, had not yet passed away. True, the liberating army had been cast forth from the Austrian territory; true, the Imperial commander could assert that there "was no longer an enemy on Lombard ground." Still that army amidst all its reverses had preserved its military honour, and even in defeat made itself respected by its adversaries. The devastating torrent of war had not poured into their own land, so the Piedmontese democrats had lost no confidence, for they had experienced no suffering. On the contrary, their whole efforts, as well as those of the liberal party in all Italy, had been unceasingly directed to one object, that of breaking off the negociations for peace, and renewing the contest in the spring.

Nor was this contest so unequal as at first sight it might appear. The Austrian empire was convulsed to its centre with the great struggle now going on in Hungary. Every disposable man, and gun, and guinea, was drafted off to support the contest there. Windischgratz had captured Pesth, and advanced almost to the Theiss, but the effort was too great for his limited means, and already the balance seemed to be turning against the Imperial arms. The Emperor Ferdinand, despairing of making head against so many internal and external enemies, had resigned his crown, his brother had not courage to assume it, and left the glorious but dangerous task to his son, Francis Joseph—a young soldier who had served his apprenticeship to war under Radetzky in the preceding campaign. The army under Radetzky in Lombardy was strong, numbering about 130,000, but the blockade of Venice and numerous garrisons required by the Lombardo-Venetian towns were a heavy drain on its disposable force; while, in case of reverse, it could look for no reinforcements from the north of the Alps. The entire population of the towns, and those engaged in manufactures, were devoted to the liberal cause, whilst the emigrant noblesse resident in Turin, being allowed to retain their estates, employed their whole resources and influence in keeping up a spirit of revolt in their native land. The peasantry alone were inclined to favour the Austrian cause, but their aid necessarily was more of a negative than a positive nature.

The resumption of the conscription for the army spread general dismay and disgust, especially amongst the inhabitants of the towns, and thousands, to escape it, fled over the frontier into Sardinia,

Switzerland, and Venice. Severe repressive measures, proceeding in some instances to the height of capital punishment, had been resorted to by the military authorities, against the offence of concealing arms, and Brescia had to pay a heavy fine on account of a magazine of them discovered there. A most ill-judged step also, and one which caused much discontent, was a great emission of paper money, which from the first was depreciated to the amount of 20 per cent. This was rendered necessary by the pressing wants of the army, and the impossibility of getting any specie from the central Government at Vienna—whilst any increase to the direct taxes would have punished with equal severity the inhabitants of the towns who had made, and those of the country who had suffered from, the revolution. Radetzky's first plan was to impose a tax upon the refugee proprietors who refused to return under the amnesty he had granted, to the amount of a year's income upon their estates. But this was, from the difficulty of carrying it out, abandoned, and an issue of paper resorted to as the only remaining means of supplying the immediate necessities of the Government.

On the other hand, all central Italy was in arms for the liberal cause. At Rome, after the murder of Count Rossi, his minister, the Pope, had fled to Gaeta, and a republic been established. In Tuscany, the authority of the Grand Duke had been overthrown, and a republic proclaimed both at Florence and Leghorn, with Rome for its capital. In every town of central Italy a crusade against the Austrians was preached, and an army of 15,000 Romans and 12,000 Tuscans was ordered to be assembled for a march upon the Po to unite, in their rear, with the troops of the Venetian republic.

The democratic clubs of Turin exerted themselves during the armistice with extraordinary activity and success. Aided by the Committee of Emigrant Lombards, they spread abroad the report that a general insurrection of all Lombardy was organized, and waited only for the passage of the Ticino by a liberating army to burst forth in every quarter. That the Austrian empire, torn by domestic dissensions, was on the verge of dissolution, and lay as a prize to be seized on by whoever was bold enough to grasp at it. Directing all their efforts in this direction, the liberal party acquired such influence in the country, that when the election came on in March, 1859, they everywhere obtained the majority, and returned a chamber which from the first was pledged to war.

Charles Albert himself had no alternative; his own wish was to preserve peace. Knowing well the power of the Austrian army, and the losses his own had sustained, he was anxious above all things, before engaging in a fresh contest, to gain time to complete the numbers, and reorganize the materiel of his own forces. He had no wish to encounter Radetzky's veterans with battalions filled up with a rabble of half drilled recruits. But he had no alternative; having put himself at the head of the democratic movements, he must either continue to lead it, or resist it by force of arms. His throne depended upon the support of the liberal party, and it would be given on no other terms. This he well knew. When the representatives of France and England represented to him in the strongest terms

before the armistice was denounced the feeble chances he had of success, he replied—"Gentlemen, the war is the wish of the nation. I must submit to its desire, or expose my crown to hazard. I begin this war to escape a republic. If you cannot engage upon behalf of your Governments to guarantee me my throne, I can no longer delay to adopt the last resource which remains to me—war."

So much was Charles Albert in his heart opposed to the republican movement, that when the revolution in Tuscany took place, he determined to restore the Grand Duke by force of arms, and actually sent General La Marmora with a strong division to Sarzana on the Tuscan frontiers, and his march was only arrested by the energetic remonstrances of the Chamber at Turin, who naturally shrunk from the inconsistency of employing the liberating army of Piedmont to crush the republicans of Florence. Had this movement taken place, it would have given Sardinia a preponderating influence in central Italy such as that which Austria, from the same cause, subsequently enjoyed. As it was, it merely led to the employment in an eccentric direction at a moment when they could be ill spared, of a good division of veteran troops.

Such being the real causes which rendered a renewal of the contest inevitable, it is of little moment to examine the diplomatic grounds assigned for it. These were not wanting upon either side. The mediation of France and England had been offered, and a conference arranged to meet at Brussels. But Austria required as a basis for all proposals the treaty of 1815 in its full integrity, and this Sardinia would not agree to. In consequence, no Austrian representatives appeared when the conference should have assembled. Piedmont demanded a cession of territory to indemnify it for the losses of the war, and not obscurely hinted at the Duchies of Parma and Placentia as a fair equivalent. She accused Austria of infringing upon the armistice by withholding the surrender of half the artillery park of Peschiera, by occupying the Duchies of Parma and Modena with a military force, by besieging Venice, by moving her troops in a hostile manner into the town of Ferrara, and by the persecution of persons implicated in the political troubles of the previous year. On the other hand, the Austrians asserted that the treaty of 1815 must be taken as the starting point for all territorial arrangements, and recriminated against their opponents for having violated the armistice by the delay of the Sardinian fleet at Ancona in the Adriatic, where it had wintered, and from whence it had repeatedly succoured Venice with supplies of every kind, by the encouragement given to their Hungarian and Italian soldiers to desert by Piedmontese agents, by the constant agitation fomented in the Lombardo-Venetian provinces by the committee of Lombard refugees, openly encouraged and favoured by the Court of Turin; and justified the temporary occupation of Ferrara, by the necessity of obtaining satisfaction and indemnity for the murder of three soldiers who were assassinated on their way from the hospital to the citadel; and pointed to the immediate withdrawal of the troops on the required satisfaction being given. On the 5th of March the new Chamber of Deputies presented an address to Charles Albert, demanding a

renewal of the war. The Italian Consulta, or Committee, did the same. On the 10th of March the King's minister demanded from the Chamber the credits necessary to carry on the war, and on the 12th Major Cadorna was the bearer to Milan of a written denunciation of the armistice, concluding with the intimation that the King gave this notice, "only in conscientious observance of the rules of honour." He delivered it into the hands of Radetzky, at his head-quarters in the Villa Reale.

This sudden declaration of war took no one more by surprise than Chrzanowsky, the Sardinian Commander-in-Chief. This officer, a Pole by birth, and educated in the Engineer Academy, at Warsaw, had served on the staff of the Russian army in the campaign of 1829 against the Turks. In 1831 he commanded a division of the Polish national army with distinction, and, though permitted by the Russians to remain in Poland after their suppression of the insurrection, he soon after emigrated. Moderate in his opinions, and courteous towards his adversaries, he was looked on with distrust by the ultra-Polish party. Small in stature, Calmuc in feature, energetic by disposition, indefatigable in exertion, he was admirably fitted to have been second in command of an army. But though far from deficient in strategic skill in forming his plans, with a good tactical eye in disposing his troops on the field of battle, and great coolness in handling them under fire, he was not yet gifted with that power of divining his enemies' plans, which is the unmistakeable mark of a great general, nor had he that practical skill in combining the movements of large bodies of men, which is indispensable to great success in war. A good general of the second, he cannot be ranked as one of the first class. It has been keenly remarked by Georgey, the Hungarian, that generals do not differ so much in their skill in making plans as in their power of executing them.

Though invested with the responsibility of the chief command, he had not the title of Commander-in-Chief. Charles Albert held that post nominally, with Chrzanowsky as his Major-General. The command of the Piedmontese army had been most unwisely taken from the hands of General Bava, whose abilities had been clearly proved in the previous campaign, and who was personally known to, and respected by, the men, and offered to Bedeau, Lamoricière, Changarnier, and Bugeaud, but declined by them all. It was then conferred upon Chrzanowsky, and great and unwearied were his exertions to do justice to the onerous charge he had accepted. But, a foreigner, unknown to his troops, and ignorant of their peculiarities, his position was both invidious towards them as superseding all their own generals, and presented peculiar difficulties to himself as a stranger suddenly required to handle, in presence of a most able adversary, tools with which he was not acquainted.

The greatest efforts had been made to increase the army. By calling out the reserve classes, and incorporating the Lombard, Parmesan, and Modenese troops, the number of infantry regiments was increased by thirteen, a fourth battalion was added to each line regiment, and five battalions to the corps of Bersaglieri, whilst a Lombard regiment was given to the cavalry. Altogether on paper

the returns showed 120,000 men under arms, of whom 6,000 was cavalry, with 156 field and 200 siege guns. But this great increase of numbers which, after making all deductions for garrisons, sick, &c., left about 85,000 for field operations, was made at a considerable sacrifice of the efficiency and strength of the force as a whole. The soldiers of the reserve embraced many married men, so that there came to be altogether 30,000 of this class in the ranks. These were naturally enough nearly all opposed to the continuance of the war. The great number of recruits thrown into the line regiments, and more particularly the great increase given to the Bersaglieri, had much diminished their steadiness and power of moving under fire; for there had been no time even to teach them properly their drill, far less to embrue them with that *esprit de corps* which is the corner stone of military discipline. The morale also of the old soldier had been much shaken by the late campaign; they had lost confidence in themselves and their officers, and were all, both officers and men, decidedly opposed to a renewal of the contest. They were prepared to do their duty, but they entered upon it without enthusiasm and without hope. The artillery were not well horsed; the commissariat department very defective, and the cavalry inferior in number in proportion to the infantry. So completely was the War Department taken by surprise by the sudden denunciation of the armistice, that 400 commissions for sub-lieutenants were unfilled up at the time, and the division of General La Marmora was still absent at Sarzana on the Tuscan frontiers; while such was the little consideration shown to the Commander-in-Chief by the ministry, that he was only informed of the denunciation of the armistice six hours after it had been notified to Radetzky. Dreaming only of a war of invasion into Lombardy, the Sardinian ministry neither put the fortress of Alexandria into a state of defence, nor fortified the passages over the Po, but turned all their efforts to overwhelming the army, on the eve of taking the field, with a mass of raw recruits, who added to its number on paper and took from its power in the field; and to organising a revolutionary movement in Lombardy, with Brescia for its centre, a matter of comparatively little moment in a struggle which must be decided between the regular forces alone.

Very different was the condition of the Austrian army, numbering in all about 130,000 men. It could furnish for the field, after deducting the blockading force before Verona, a brigade at Placentia, 400 men at Milan, and the various garrisons required for the towns and fortresses, as well as 12,000 sick, about 65,000 or 70,000 men, with 200 guns. But these troops were all in the highest state of discipline and efficiency. All the elements of weakness had been sifted out of them by the trying events of the late campaign. The recruits, hardened by constant exposure to outpost duty, had become fit for any emergency. The great majority of the soldiers, moreover, were veterans inured to all the dangers and fatigues of war. The whole were animated with the very best spirit, and had the most entire confidence in, and most devoted love for, their veteran chief. Enthusiastic for a renewal of the contest, they never for a moment doubted of victory. The harmony amongst the generals, the brotherly

feeling amongst the officers, left nothing to be desired. Devoted to their leader, confident in one another, they hailed with shouts of joy the news of the denunciation of the armistice, and assumed with one accord the green branch in their shakos, the national mark of warlike satisfaction. On the evening of the day on which the news reached Milan, the whole bands of the garrison came to serenade Radetzky, followed by thousands of the men singing the national hymn. The army preserved the same organization as in the last campaign. Hess remained Chief of the Staff, Schonhals was Adjutant-General. The corps for field service remained as before. Wratislaw commanded the first, Aspré the second, Appel the third, Thurn the fourth, and Wocher the reserve. Haynau was put in command of the force blockading Venice, and had the charge of preserving tranquillity in the interior of the kingdom. The whole army responded to the appeal of the Field Marshal, when he said in his proclamation on the 12th of March, "Soldiers, your warmest wishes are fulfilled. The enemy has denounced the armistice. Be it so, we are prepared, and the peace we once offered we will now compel within the walls of his capital. Soldiers, the struggle will be short; God is with us, for our cause is just. Up, once more, and follow your veteran commander to battle and to victory. Forward, 'To Turin' is our watchword; there lies the peace for which we fight. Long live the Emperor; long live our country." Different was the spirit to be discerned in the address of Chrzanowsky to his men two days later. "Soldiers! the greater the energy of your onset the more rapid will be your victory, the earlier your return, crowned with laurels, to the peace of your homes, proud of a free, an independant, and a prosperous native land."

What its famous quadrangle of fortresses between the Mincio and the Adige is to Austrian Italy, that the triangle formed by the junction of the Tanaro and the Po, with the fortresses of Alessandria on the former, and Valence and Casale on the latter stream is to Piedmont. Here is the natural position of an army charged with the defence of the country. If the enemy marches by Novara upon Turin, it can throw itself on his flank by Casale and Valence. If he follows the right bank of the Po on Voghera and Tortona, it can move against him by Alessandria, and there are several strong positions where it can give battle, covering the lateral road to Genoa, which is almost of more consequence as a base of operations than the capital itself. The strength of this position has been illustrated by the stand made there by Moreau against Suwaroff in 1799, and by the check it brought the Austrian invading army to in 1859. Here, accordingly, General Bava was prepared to have taken up a defensive position.

But with the accession of the ultra liberal party to power, and the appointment of Chrzanowsky to the command, an entire change of plans took place. The war declared by Piedmont was essentially an offensive one—all thoughts of standing on the defensive were thrown aside. The liberating army, conquering and to conqueror, was to throw itself into Lombardy and chase the Imperial eagle far from the fair Italian plains. For this change the democratic party and not Chrzanowsky are responsible. He was only there to carry out

their wishes. To invade Lombardy three courses lay before him. 1. To concentrate at Alessandria, advance down the right bank of the Po, turning the Austrian lines of the Ticino and the Adda, and cross to its left bank from the Duchies. 2. To concentrate towards Valence and advance down its left bank, crossing the lower Ticino, near Pavia. 3. To concentrate at Novara, cross the Ticino at Buffalora, and march by the great road from Turin through Magenta straight on Milan. The first plan was advantageous in so far as the point of concentration was equally suited for defence as attack. But its execution involved the passage of the Po from the Duchies in the face of the whole Austrian army, an operation of no common difficulty and danger, whilst during the movement it left both Alessandria and Turin open to attack. The second was difficult of execution so long as the Austrians held the fortified town of Pavia, and when the Ticino was crossed, the invading army would have to give battle with the Po and the Ticino in their rear, into the angle formed by which they would, in case of defeat, be thrust back. The third presented the fewest difficulties of ground to overcome—the only strong position for a defensive army being on the high grounds bordering the canal called the Naviglio Grande, in front of Magenta, which enclose the valley of the Ticino. But this point once passed, a vast plain extends to the gate of Milan. It was also the shortest line on which to operate against that town, and kept the liberating army close to the lake district, and the towns situated where the last spurs of the Alps melt into the plains, which were the points where the expected insurrectionary movement was to break out. It presented, however, the grave inconvenience of exposing the flank and communications of the army, should the enemy cross the Ticino at Pavia; as they could from thence operate against either its base at Alessandria, or its line of communications at Vercelli; but, on the other hand, in so doing, they would expose themselves to be taken in flank from the side of Novara, and would have to accept battle in a close and difficult country, with the angle formed by the Po and the Ticino in their rear, and the bridge of Pavia the only permanent one by which they could retreat if defeated. Moreover, the firm impression of Chryanowsky was, that the Imperialists would never dream of an offensive, but would at once withdraw to the line of the Mincio.

Influenced by these considerations, he chose the last course, and arranged his army, in order to assume the offensive against Milan on the 20th, the day when the armistice would expire, as follows:—The main army, 60,000 strong, was distributed in the neighbourhood of Novara in such a manner as to be able to concentrate upon that point in one march. It consisted of five divisions. Of these, the 3rd (Perrone) and 4th (Duke of Genoa) were between Novara and the bridges of Buffalora and Turbigo, on the Ticino. To their right, further down the Ticino, lay the 2nd (Bes) at Cerano and Castelnovo. Behind Bes, at Vespolate, was the 1st (Durando), with a detachment of four battalions at Vigevano, to cover the right of the army and connect it with Ramorino's corps of observation on the Po. Behind Novara, on the Mortara road, was the reserve division of the Duke of Savoy. To the left of this mass of five divisions, at Oleggio, on the

Upper Ticino, was Solaroli's brigade, 5,000 strong. He was intended to cross the Ticino and advance from Sesto Calende upon Varese and Como, so as at once to cover the left flank of the invading army, turn the right of the Imperialists, and lend a helping hand to the expected outbreak in the hill country and mountain towns. On the right, at Casteggio, on the right bank of the Po, was the 5th division (Ramorino), 8,000 strong, almost entirely composed of Lombard recruits. He was ordered to cross that river by the boat-bridge of Mezzano Corte, and take post in the position of La Cava, on its left bank, from whence he was to observe the course of the Lower Ticino, and more especially the issue from Pavia. If attacked in force, to hold out as long as possible, and then retire by San Nazaro on Mortara, destroying the floating bridge at Mezzano Corte, and it was hoped that the sound of his guns would give timely notice to the main army of any offensive movement of the enemy on that side. At San Giovanni, on the right bank of the Po, in front of the important pass of Stradella, and observing Placentia, was the brigade of Belvedere, 4,000 strong; while at Sarzana, on the Tuscan frontiers, with orders to advance on Parma and raise the popular party in the Duchies, was La Marmora with his division, the 6th, 8,000 strong.

The plan adopted by Chzranowsky, and consequent distribution of his army, was one which, looking at it merely in the light of an invasion, and supposing the Austrians to stand only on the defensive, offered considerable chances of success, and bears strong marks of vigour and talent in conception. Its greatest fault, in this point of view, was, that it left La Marmora's division, 8,000 strong, away on the Tuscan frontiers when the contest was to be decided between the main armies, of nearly equal strength, between Novara and Milan. But this was no fault of Chryanowsky; it was the necessary results of the sudden declaration of war made by the Liberal party against his most strong and earnest representations, and the direction on Parma given to it was the one which would most speedily bring it to bear upon the contest. Viewed, however, with regard to the Austrian army being in a condition to assume a vigorous and immediate offensive, it presented the greatest dangers. Did Radetzky throw himself, by Pavia and Mortara, on their line of communications by Vercelli, there was the utmost danger of their being entirely cut off from their line of retreat, and obliged to give battle with their backs to the Alps, when, in case of defeat, the whole army must surrender. True, in doing so, the Austrians exposed themselves to a counter-attack in flank from Novara, by Vigevano, and, if defeated, would be thrust into the angle formed by the junction of the Ticino and Po; but then they could always retire either across the Ticino by Pavia, or by bridges thrown over the river, to the other side of the Po, and descending its right bank, regain the left at Placentia; whilst to the Piedmontese, in case of defeat, there was no means of retreat—their case was desperate. Radetzky, therefore, had the means of striking a blow against his adversary which, if successful, would ruin him; but, if unsuccessful, still left his own line of retreat comparatively open—and this is the great object of strategy. To prevent his right flank being turned, and his rear reached by the Imperial

commander, Chrzanowsky depended entirely upon Ramorino's division, ordered to take post opposite to the bridge of Pavia at La Cava. And this decisively proves the exact amount of the danger he anticipated at that point—for it was the point upon which his whole *defensive* operations must turn—and he entrusted it to the care of Ramorino with his Lombards—in other words, to an untried general at the head of notoriously the weakest and least trustworthy division of the army. Had he really anticipated an attack there, he would have sent the most experienced of his generals with his most veteran troops.

Aware of the concentration of the Piedmontese about Novara, and of their belief in his intention to retire, Radetzky at once formed his plan; simple, sure, and decisive were its main features. To maintain the Piedmontese in the belief that he intended to evacuate Milan and retire behind the Adda, whilst by a rapid movement he threw his whole forces across the Ticino at Pavia on their right flank and rear, was his object. His dispositions to execute this were as follows:—Nearly the whole of Lombardy was to remain unoccupied, not more than 10,000 men were to be left between the Ticino and the Mincio. Of these, 4,000 were in the Castle of Milan; the remainder in Bergamo and Brescia, and beyond the Po, holding the fortified points of passage at Placentia and Brescello. The line of the Mincio and Adige to have all its fortresses fully garrisoned. The five corps, 65,000 strong, composing the operating army, to be collected towards his rear, at Lodi, on the Adda; to move swiftly on Pavia on the Ticino, where they were all to concentrate on the 19th; to cross there at mid-day on the 20th; move by Mortara on the enemies' rear; deliver battle to their main body "probably at Novara" (so did the chief of the staff express himself in the plan of campaign he drew out); cross the Po, by a movement to the left, at Mezzana Corte or Casale; disperse the hostile right wing left on that bank of the river, and then march on Turin. The concentration of the army at Pavia to be concealed by a cordon of troops spread along the left bank of the Ticino.

HARBOURS OF REFUGE.

North-East Coast of England. Warkworth — Blyth — the Tyne — Sunderland — Hartlepool — Filey.

Third Article.

In our last impression we noticed the Report of the Royal Commissioners on harbours of refuge, referring to the east coast of Scotland, the north and east coasts of Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the Bristol Channel. It now remains for us to offer a few remarks upon the report relating to the north east coast of England, and to conclude this important subject with a few brief observations upon the utility of the works proposed to be constructed by the Royal Commissioners.

North-East Coast of England.

One half of the wreckage that happens upon the shores of the United Kingdom takes place in this section of our coast, which extends from the Farn Islands on the Northumberland coast to Flamborough Head in Yorkshire. It includes all the coal ports of the east coast of England.

It is necessary to notice the configuration of this important seaboard. From the Farn Islands to Whitby Rock, a distance of about 75 miles, the coast curves inwards to a considerable extent, the deepest point of embayment being found towards the southern extremity in "Tees Bay." From Whitby Rock, south to Flamborough Head, 30 miles, the shore may be considered practically as straight, throughout the whole extent of this coast, during on shore gales, no shelter is to be found for many hours out of the twenty-four at any of its various ports, the entrances of which are closed by want of water.

The safest way to consider the north east embayment is to look at it as one great "bight," within which vessels using the coal ports must or may pass and be exposed to the risk of becoming embayed. The direct embaying wind is east by north, and it is said by an eminent authority, that the greatest loss actually resulting from the want of refuge takes place during gales from these quarters. A great number of vessels are lost in south easterly gales, not because a south east gale is on this coast necessarily a dangerous wind, and refuge from it required, but because shipmasters will sooner risk their ports of destination, when they are dangerous, than pass them and obtain shelter elsewhere.

When we consider what a vast amount of shipping resorts to the Tyne, the Wear, and the Tees, we are not surprised, considering the quality of the vessels employed, the difficulties they have to encounter, and the want of harbours, to find the neighbourhood of the coal ports the centre of a great crop of wrecks. To show what an extensive amount of mischief occasionally happens on this iron bound coast, we have only to instance the loss that took place in two gales of wind when 140 ships and 116 lives were sacrificed for want of refuge. An analysis of the casualties that took place on these memorable occasions, given below, exhibits the extent of damage sustained and indicates to which port the majority of the shipmasters felt themselves compelled to run to, when driven to extremity—

Table showing the Casualties arising from two remarkable gales of wind in 1854-7.

VESSELS LOST.						TOTAL	DISTRICT.	LIVES LOST.						TOTAL.
LIGHT.			LADEN.					LIGHT.			LADEN.			
1854	1857	Total	1854	1857	Total			1854	1857	Total	1854	1857	Total	
0	0	0	2	0	2	2	Berwick, Holy Island	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
0	1	1	0	1	1	2	Farn Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	1	4	1	2	3	7	Bamborough, N. Sunderland, Boulmer, Alnmouth, Warkworth	0	0	0	0	9	9	9
1	1	2	1	4	5	7	Amble	4	0	4	0	7	7	11
4	0	4	5	0	5	9	Coquet Island, Hauxley, Bondicar, Cresswell, Newbiggen	0	0	0	5	0	5	5
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Blyth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	2	8	8	2	10	18	Shields	8	1	9	1	9	10	19
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Souter Point, Whitbrn Steel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	5	19	15	9	24	43		12	1	13	6	25	31	44
12	2	14	3	1	4	18	Sunderland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ryhope	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Seaham	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	4	4	0	0	0	4	Seaham to Hartlepool	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
13	14	27	11	2	13	40	Hartlepool	0	22	22	9	5	14	36
1	3	4	0	2	2	6	Seaton Carew, Tees	0	0	0	0	7	7	7
0	2	2	0	2	2	4	Coatham, Redcar, Markse, Huntcliffe, Skinningrove	0	0	0	0	4	4	4
0	0	0	0	2	2	2	Runswick Bay	0	0	0	0	14	14	14
14	23	37	11	8	19	56		0	23	23	9	30	39	62
0	6	6	1	0	1	7	Whitby	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	2	2	0	0	0	2	Robin Hood's Bay	0	4	4	0	0	0	4
1	4	5	0	2	2	7	Scarborough	0	0	0	0	5	5	5
0	1	1	0	1	1	2	Filey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	1	2	0	2	3	Flamboro' Head	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	14	15	3	3	6	21		0	4	4	0	5	5	9
41	44	85	34	21	55	140	GENERAL TOTAL.	12	28	40	16	60	76	116

The number of vessels caught in both gales of wind has been estimated at 641. The returns, however, are incomplete, but the numbers that ran for some of the ports are as follows: at Shields, 197 sought refuge, when 18 were lost with 19 lives. Between Seaham and Hartlepool 33 ran for protection, when 4 were lost with 1 life. At Hartlepool 233 ran in, 40 of which were sacrificed with 36 lives. In the neighbourhood of the Tees 27 sought safety, and lost 6 vessels and 7 lives; and lastly, 7 sought shelter at Scarborough, where they were all destroyed, together with 5 lives.

It will be noticed that out of the 631 vessels caught in the line of embayment in both gales, that 197 ran for Shields, and 233 for Hartlepool, and that the large number lost at the entrance and in the vicinity of these ports clearly indicates the unsafe character of access to them.

It will also be further observed that the ratio of the loss of *laden* vessels to light vessels is as 1 to 1·54, while that of *lives* lost in *laden* to those lost in *light* vessels is as 1·9 to 1; therefore, for every three lives lost out of light four were lost from laden vessels. And also that the largest loss of both vessels and life took place at Hartlepool, for which place the largest number of vessels ran for shelter.

At the Tyne the loss of life was considerable, though the number of vessels lost was comparatively small in proportion to the number that ran for shelter, while at Sunderland the case was reversed, the number of vessels lost was comparatively high, and no lives were lost.

At Filey, where the Commissioners have recommended the sum of £800,000 to be expended for harbour purposes, only one laden and one light vessel was lost in both gales; but as no mention is made of the number of vessels that sought shelter there on these occasions, we have no data to judge as to the capabilities of the place.

In the great bight, in which the above casualties took place there, are no ports as before stated in which vessels can enter at all times of the tide. Thus Scarborough is dry at low water; Whitby has about a foot; the Tees from seven to eight feet; and West Hartlepool and Old Hartlepool between three and four feet at low water. Seaham, again, is nearly dry, while Sunderland dock has nearly eight feet at low water. But to counterbalance any benefit that might be derived from this shallow depth, Sunderland cannot be run for without considerable danger, except in moderate weather and smooth water. The Tyne has at present about seven or eight feet, and Blythe about nine inches at low water, and all the ports further north are nearly dry until we arrive at the Firth of Forth.

The extreme difficulty of dealing with these ports and rivers, so as to render them to any extent available as life harbours, is stated by the Royal Commissioners to be so great as to forbid all attempts to improve them to effect that object. But they state, were it not so, that the system of improving existing harbours would not meet the wants of the traffic upon its dangerous coast. Vessels bound southwards, after reaching Flamborough Head, are often met by head

winds, and are sometimes compelled to run as far north as the Firth of Forth for shelter, and in so doing many are wrecked.

Again, the Commissioners say that Flamborough Head is made a "landfall" and "point of departure" by vessels engaged in the foreign trade, and the large number of vessels that collect at times at that headland are increased by fleets of light colliers bound to the northward, and the meeting of these with the loaded colliers and others windbound off the "head" is the fruitful cause of the collisions that occur in that locality—an evil which a harbour to the north would not remedy. They, therefore, divide this district into two parts; thus, the portion from Whitby Rock, southward, when the wind is to the north or east, would derive no benefit from a life harbour in "Tees Bay"—of the Tyne traffic, which exceeding that of the Thames, one-fifth goes to the northward, and to these vessels a harbour in that bay would evidently be of no use. So they conclude upon these premises that neither the improvement of existing ports nor the construction of one harbour will wholly meet the exigencies of the traffic on the north-east coast.

Under these circumstances, the Royal Commissioners earnestly recommend the construction of life harbours, partly national and partly local, at the entrances of the Tyne and Hartlepool, and of a *national* refuge harbour at the fishing village of Filey.

In order to divest this subject of any complication that may seem to attach to it, we will briefly detail the circumstances connected with each locality selected as eligible for sites, and of that portion of the district dependant on such for life and refuge purposes.

Thus the sections selected by the Commissioners, resulting from the configuration of the coast, are—

To the north—from Souter Point to the Farn Islands.

To the south—from Whitby Rock to Flamborough Head, and that central portion of the coast containing Tees Bay, which intervenes between them.

The districts so divided have, as nearly as possible, an equal amount of casualties happening in each, with the exception of Sunderland, which are exceptional, having a peculiarity we shall notice hereafter.

In the first section, the Commissioners state that a harbour at the entrance of the Tyne will be advantageous not only to its own trade, but from its proximity to Sunderland, it will afford shelter to the shipping of that important port in south-easterly gales, when shut out of that port for want of water. Again, in south-easterly gales, they state that vessels from the Tyne going northwards can keep off the coast, and if the wind backs round to the eastward the offing they may attain will enable them to return to their port. Also in north-easterly gales, such vessels would have the Tyne under their lee, and those bound southerly would, if the wind draws forward, have Hartlepool, or if further on their voyage, Filey to run for.

Finally, the heaviest losses on this coast have not arisen simply from *stress of weather*, but, as the casualty returns prove, from an untoward combination of circumstances, such as sudden shifts of wind, low water on the bar, the position in which vessels have been caught at the commencement of the gale, and the like.

Having thus noticed in a general way a few of the recommendations of the Commissioners, it is now necessary to take a rapid glance at some of the leading features of the navigation of this coast. It may, we think, be fairly presumed that the majority of the losses in this part of the kingdom happen to colliers and small coasters; and although a refuge harbour ought not to be constructed for them alone, but for ships of all classes, yet it is in reference to the vessels frequenting the coal ports that refuge seems to be most required.

It was stated in evidence, that there are a larger proportion of badly found colliers than any other vessels, and that in bad weather many of them are unable to keep the sea, that they are undermanned, crews over-worked, liable to leakage in consequence of the practice of grounding them, and that they are often patched up, when breaking them up would be the wisest as well as the most economical course.

Under such conditions, it is not surprising to find that there is a general desire on the part of the captains of these ill-found and unseaworthy vessels, when caught in a gale on the north-east coast, to run for the port they belong to. Consequently a great many witnesses, particularly the owners of these vessels, desire to improve the existing harbours rather than to construct one large national refuge at a distance from their respective ports. Indeed a general opinion prevailed that vessels would pass a refuge harbour and run to the ports they were bound to, so that it appears that the improvement of existing harbours is quite as necessary, according to the views of these parties, as the construction of a large one, no matter where situated.

Such being the opinion of many shipowners and others, it is only fair to notice in succession the capabilities of the different ports on this coast, in order to estimate at its proper value the local claims of each place for improvement, so as to meet the necessities of the enormous traffic on this important section of our coast. We will commence with—

WARKWORTH.

The situation of this harbour is about twenty miles north of the River Tyne and ten miles north of the harbour of Blyth, and has been formed at the mouth of the River Coquet at an expense of £200,000, in order to obtain an outlet for a very valuable and extensive district of superior steam coal. It is supposed that if the north pier, which runs in an easterly direction about 800 yards, was extended 300 yards farther east, and a breakwater thrown in a northerly direction from the Coquet Island, it would shelter the anchorage from north-east gales, and all the advantages of a good refuge harbour be obtained at a very trifling cost. It should be mentioned that these views of the capabilities of Warkworth are local, and are embodied in a memorial addressed to the Royal Commissioners, but as they have not recommended any works here, we infer that all improvements are left to the management of the Warkwork Harbour Commissioners themselves.

BLYTH.

The river at Blyth is only a small stream, indeed it may be called a tidal estuary, for the river is cut short in its course to the sea by a

dam across the head of the estuary about four miles from the harbour's mouth. It was stated by the engineer to the harbour, that loaded colliers are frequently driven north of the Tyne mouth by south-easterly gales, and run for the Firth of Forth. But, by the extension of the eastern breakwater at Blyth as far as the "Beacon Rocks," aided by dredging operations, the greater number of the tempest-driven colliers might at an early period of the tide in south-easterly gales take refuge at Blyth. It is presumed that this statement presented a series of contingencies too complicated for the Commissioners, for they are silent about the capabilities of this port, so that Blyth is left to its own enterprise to carry out its breakwater and in deepening and straightening its navigable channel by dredging, and so provide for the mere local wants of the place.

The Tyne.

In the memorial of the Tyne Improvement Commissioners it was stated that "the most effectual means of diminishing the loss of life and property on the north-east coast would be the *improvement of the entrances of the existing harbours*, and that one or two great refuge harbours would not alone answer the purpose contemplated." The inhabitants of this thriving port are entitled to have an opinion on this subject, for the shipping of their river amounts to nearly half of that frequenting the north-eastern ports, and about one-eleventh of the whole traffic of the ports of the United Kingdom. In 1856 the enormous amount of 3,000,000 tons of shipping cleared from the Tyne.

The great majority of the wrecks that occur at the mouth of the Tyne happen in *south-easterly gales* to vessels bound thereto. As it is found in practice that masters of ships invariably press on, almost at any risk, to their port of destination, and if compelled to put back, they seek to make their port of departure. The Tyne Improvement Commissioners, therefore, advocate the improvement of existing harbours rather than apply the public funds to the erection of any artificial harbour of refuge, which in their estimation would not meet the exigency of the case.

At the present time the Tyne Commissioners are constructing piers at the mouth of the river, for the purpose of improving the depth of water at the entrance. The estimated cost of completing these piers is said to be £400,000, but the Tyne Commissioners being encouraged by the appointment of a Royal Commission, to investigate, and if necessary to devote a grant of public money for a refuge on this coast, they requested Mr. Walker to report to them his views as to the possibility and cost of converting the Tyne into a harbour of refuge.

The plan proposed is to extend the piers into 36 feet at low water, instead of 15, as originally intended. It is expected these works will occupy ten or twelve years in execution, and it is hoped that the result will be to secure a passage of 18 feet deep at low water, from the sea to Shields harbour.

To secure this great benefit an outlay of a further sum of £400,000 will be required, making the sum necessary to complete the piers

£800,000, but this cannot be done without the aid of a grant of £400,000 from Parliament.

The above is the substance of the requirements put forth in the memorial above alluded to. A great deal might be said about the pilotage system of the Tyne, and its bearings on the preservation of life and property, particularly the cost of pilotage, and the reasons why ships refuse pilots; but these being local matters, we will at once pass to the matter in hand, viz.: the possibility of making the Tyne a harbour of refuge.

(To be continued.)

Arctic Searching Expedition.—The following is an extract from a reply by Captain M'Clintock to some queries addressed to him by Mr. Selby, of Spalding:—

"Dublin, October 17, 1859.

"In my published report I simply stated the leading facts of our discoveries. There was not room to express opinions; besides which I wished that all interested readers should draw their own inferences. The boat was only 65 miles from the ship, and I believe it to have been returning for more provisions. The two skeletons found in it were probably the boat-keepers—men unable to march with the others, all of whom I suppose to have proceeded for the short remaining distance without the boat. There was ammunition in abundance, but the country—the early spring, at least when our countrymen were there—affords no game whatever. Even Esquimaux cannot live there.

"With regard to provisions, you will observe that I mentioned chocolate, tea, and tobacco. It is clear that these alone will not sustain life. You are doubtless aware that an unusually large quantity of solid animal food is necessary, even to men in vigorous health, in cold climates. Had the country been capable of sustaining natives, not one of these traces would have remained for us to gather up.

"With respect to an overland expedition, you may recollect that such was sent out by the Admiralty under a Hudson's Bay officer, Mr. Anderson, in 1855, in preference to a naval expedition by Barrow's Strait. Mr. A. descended the Black River to its mouth, and discovered traces of Europeans upon Montreal Island. Therefore, I do not think further records would be found by a second expedition over the same ground. You will observe that my first care was to reach Montreal Island and Point Ogle, where Mr. Anderson's search terminated, and after re-examining those positions to complete the search from thence to where the lost people landed from their ships. The greater part of this painfully interesting route was gone over three times—twice by Lieutenant Hobson and once by myself. The natives repeatedly told us that all the white people had died."

Wellington College.—The greater portion of the ground surrounding this college has been laid out with shrubs, &c., and the work is still going on under the occasional inspection of His Royal Highness Prince Albert. A large lake has been formed, and several men are engaged in completing it, and rendering it fit to receive a supply of water. A bathing place in the open air has also been constructed, for the use of the students during the summer months. Since the opening of the College the washing has been executed in London, but an extensive laundry is now in course of erection near the College.

EDITOR'S PORTFOLIO;
OR,
NAVAL AND MILITARY REGISTER.

FRANCE AND ENGLAND.—France and England have at last mutually come to an understanding to drop the mask they have so long worn, and show each other their mounted embrasures. This is the best mode of delaying the war that had become all but inevitable. We have been so eager for peace—we have talked so much of our defenceless condition, and the facility of sacking London—that forgetting the lessons of history, our bellicose neighbour has looked upon our subjugation as already achieved. Indeed, much the same sentiment has prevailed over the whole of Europe, and it has been universally believed that we could any day be extinguished by the "master of 700,000." The position now taken up by England so alters the question, that war seems rather to wait on our bidding than on that of the French Emperor. If foreigners will only take the trouble to "hark back" in their history, they will find this is no new issue, for in nearly all the struggles between England and France, it is England that has first drawn the sword. But neither our French neighbour nor German cousins will ever be brought to understand us. They keep telling us we are not a military nation, yet we are the only people in the world who man a large navy, equal to that of all the other powers combined, and an army, if we include that of India, superior to that of the greatest military states, entirely by voluntary enlistment. Because peace is on our lips, as it is assuredly in our hearts, and is, moreover, bound up with our national and commercial interests, they persuade themselves that we have forsworn the pugnacious spirit of our ancestors. But this spirit exists in all its original force, and if the French OWEN GLENDOWER once calls it from the vasty deep, it will not be easily allayed. Some weak minister will make it the pillar of his power, and before he can open his astonished eyes, OWEN will find HOTSPUR on his back. It is time to cease jeremiads over our weakness, and show that we are rising in our strength. We have now a powerful squadron in the Mediterranean and another in the Channel; we are forming a reserve of trained and efficient seamen, while, in an emergency, we can man a fleet with the Coast Guard; and our dockyards are rife with preparation, by the side of which the efforts of France are contemptible. With the augmentations now in progress, we shall soon have such a force

of regular troops in the United Kingdom, that, by means of railways, we can throw 50,000 men on any one point, before half that number of invading troops could disembark: our militia, after all deductions, numbers 50,000 men; our volunteers already number 200,000. The sham defences on our coasts will, we may hope, soon, under the auspices of the Royal Commission, be replaced by tenable works, and manned by volunteer artillery. This great change in our situation appears to have made a due impression on the Emperor NAPOLEON. He has put the curb on the French press, and only just in time. The tide was rising on this side of the Channel with more force than on the other; and he is too familiar with Lord JOHN RUSSELL'S mode of making political capital, to give it any further impulse.

THE CHINA EXPEDITION.—Our "faithful ally" is showing us what to do in the matter of the China expedition, and it will certainly not be the fault of the French War Department or of the French Marine if we enter on our Chinese campaign in ignorance of the equipments required. Everything that can be expected to contribute either to the efficiency of the force or of the individual soldier is carefully provided, and due consideration made for the exigencies of climate and the special requirements of localities. We shall not be surprised to hear, when active operations commence, that, owing to this wise forethought, the French soldier has marched on under a broiling sun, while his English comrade has been knocked down by sun-stroke—that he has borne up in his blouse through a toilsome march, while the Englishman, in his buttoned coat and stock, has dropped on the road—that in his high boots he has gone easily over a swamp, while the Englishman has had to scramble over as he could. The British soldier, fighting in such company, would have little chance of winning glory, were it not for his indomitable pluck. This is his make-weight, by which he bears down the scale. What would he not do, if all his requirements were cared for? Surely, in the present instance, when so much emulation will be excited, it were worth while to make the experiment, by giving him every advantage of outfit. Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT has a character to retrieve, and here an opportunity presents itself. Let us not have a repeat of the Sebastopol Committee on China. The Minister for War has indeed proved that a public man in this country can emerge from the densest cloud; but in the present temper of the public mind, and the national jealousies which this expedition will provoke, a second breakdown might be fatal. It is a bad augury that while the French make a parade of their preparations, announcing every fact bearing on the expedition and its character, in this land of publicity all our arrangements are, up to the present moment, enveloped in mystery. Is it possible that the two rival roses of the Horse Guards and the War Department—the red coat and the white waistcoat—have fallen asleep? As matters stand, the French force will be on its way, before we know where ours is to muster, or, of what it is to be composed. It is time that the public received some information on these

points. The French, we observe, are sending out a cavalry force, to be mounted on the horse of the country. This will be a new element in Chinese campaigning; and our ally has shown his usual discernment in giving it the direction most likely to be effective. To meet the Tartar hordes we must despatch with the expedition horsemen of a similar stamp, and we can find no better than the light and irregular horse of India. We should, however, provide a European force at least equal to that of the French; and give such freedom of action to its Commander that he will not always feel bound to say—"*après vous, monsieur!*"

REFORM OF THE ORDER OF THE BATH.—If it be borne in mind that the Order of the Bath is the only honorary distinction at the disposal of the SOVEREIGN for the recognition of military and naval services, apart from those deeds of personal heroism which claim the Victoria Cross, the interest it possesses for the Army and Navy, and the ardour with which its decorations are coveted, will appear less surprising. During the past few years it has been impossible to understand on what principle its honours have been conferred, or to trace, by the light of the nominations, any line of qualification by which they may be won. It is not with the view of unravelling this mystery that we again address ourselves to the subject; for such an investigation would be as painful as invidious, and lead to no result. We should have to speak of meritorious officers passed over, their claims ignored by some convenient regulation, which in the next *Gazette* has been violated in favour of an officer, whose elevation to the Order, viewed in connexion with shadowy services, excites a feeling of painful astonishment. We should be unable to ignore the fact that some of the appointments can only be accounted for by the operation of personal or political influence, and that some General Officers of unquestionable merit seem to owe their exclusion to caprice. But our object is not to censure, but to reform. Such a design, in the face of such facts, may seem Quixotic; but from what we have achieved in the past, we have no misgiving as to the issue. The cause we maintain will month by month gather volume, until the snow-ball becomes an avalanche. It is one that the nation must hear, canvass, and adjudge. It appeals to the QUEEN on her throne by a prerogative alienated—to Parliament, by an administrative function impaired—to the public, by a national institution perverted. It is of the highest import to all that the fount of honour should be untainted, and the first principle of monarchical government vests it in the SOVEREIGN and in the SOVEREIGN alone. We claim for the Order of the Bath that it shall be restored to this high destiny, by assimilating it, in its organization, to the other military orders of Europe, which are all independent of bureaucratic control. In no other way can it maintain its prestige under our political system, so prone to convert every trust into a source of patronage. What can be more unsatisfactory than the present mode of nomination, by which the initiation is vested in the General Commanding-in-Chief for the time being, who is thus consti-

tuted the sole arbiter of the merits of every officer in the army, and through him alone can the name of any aspirant to the Order be brought before the Minister for War, as the channel for submission to the QUEEN. We are accustomed to sneer at the institutions of Austria, yet even Austria excludes bureaucracy from her orders of knighthood, and may give us a suggestion on this head, which we shall do well to adopt. Only a few weeks ago there was a vacancy in the military order of St. Stephen, for which thirteen officers, whose services rendered them eligible, sent in their claims; these were submitted to a Chapter of the Order, and the result was the selection of two of the aspirants, whose names were brought before the EMPEROR. Thus the principle of high qualification is vouched by election, while the nomination remains with the EMPEROR, who chooses one of two. Can we not give a similar organization to the Order of the Bath, rendering its honours more precious from coming direct from the SOVEREIGN, at the same time that a capitular election secures an unimpeachable initiative? We shall return to this subject in our next number.

THE ADMIRALTY AND THE AFRICAN SQUADRON.—The recent captures of slavers on the west coast of Africa, amounting to half-a-dozen within a few weeks, show what could be effected for the prevention of this horrible traffic if our squadron in that quarter were composed of efficient steam-vessels, capable of overtaking the long-legged craft engaged in the trade. The Admiralty, however, seem to have no zeal for such an object; for they notoriously select for this service the worst vessels our dockyards can furnish, and, while we have noble cruisers rotting at home, we send out these miserable hulks on a hopeless errand. We perceive by the newspaper reports that the old, broken-winded *Viper* is at last thoroughly knocked up, her boilers one tissue of shreds and patches, and the vessel a mere log. It may be asked how long the public money is to be wasted, and the lives of the crew endangered, in keeping such a vessel afloat? If not sufficiently seaworthy to come home, it would be well to condemn her at once, and draft the officers and crew into other ships. Let something be done before it is too late.

WOOLWICH ARSENAL AND THE ARMSTRONG GUNS.—So many rumours have been afloat respecting the Royal Arsenal, at Woolwich, that it may be as well to state that the only change in contemplation has already been carried out, by the appointment of Sir WILLIAM G. ARMSTRONG, C.B., to the post of Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factories, while that of Assistant-Superintendent has been conferred on Mr. ANDERSON. At any time these appointments, and particularly the first, would create universal satisfaction, but they are doubly welcome at the present moment, when we are notoriously so backward in our armaments. Sir WILLIAM ARMSTRONG promised no guns before the end of the year, but he has made greater progress than he anticipated, and for some weeks past two guns have been ready for service, besides the experimental ones. By the arrange-

ments since made fresh guns will be delivered almost daily; two batteries of 12-pounders will be furnished for the Chinese expedition, and a number of Armstrong guns for boat service. It will thus be seen that affairs are in a very good way, and are committed to the best hands. Nothing has been settled respecting the contemplated new arsenal in the interior.

THE ARMY MEDICAL SCHOOL.—The circular on this subject from the War Department has engaged our attention, but we are compelled by the pressure on our space to defer the insertion of the article, which is of considerable length, till our next issue.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

MR. AND MRS. ASHETON. By the Author of "Margaret and her Bridesmaids." 3 vols.

"Margaret and her Bridesmaids" was so favourably received, that a new novel from the same pen is sure of a friendly reception. This is certainly deserved by the story before us on its own account, for it is both clever and amusing. The narrative does not give any extravagant views of life, but is confined to that sphere in which the author may be presumed to move, and which she thoroughly knows. The plot, if simple, is ingenious, founded on incidents of every day occurrence, but presented in a light that invests them wth new interest. From first to last, we meet with nothing improbable, yet the action never flags. The same truthfulness is apparent in the delineation of character, and though we meet with little displays of spite and malice, there is no attempt at melo-dramatic effect, or outbreak of passion. The story is thus never very exciting, but is always fresh and cheerful, holding us on to the end. Mr. and Mrs. Asheton represent two generations—the first are a worthy pair whose family consists of two daughters and a son, the heir to their great wealth, and who, consequently, is a person of no little importance. At the venerable age of twenty-four, however, he is still a bachelor, and his parents are becoming alarmed, when, in a solitary ramble, he encounters a beautiful girl, with whom he falls desperately in love. After some impediments from her cousin Beatrice, who had marked out Asheton for herself, Marion is wooed and won, much to the chagrin of a young Italian, who has persecuted her with his addresses. Mr. and Mrs. Asheton are delighted with the match, but Marion is regarded as an interloper by their younger daughter, Mrs. Trevor, and from the beginning she endeavours to sow dissension between the youthful pair. The manœuvres she resorts to and the results, afford ground for some effective scenes, worked out with delicacy and tact. The varied emotions of Marion are well described, and she goes through the ordeal in a manner that elicits our sympathy and enchains our attention. Her distresses are aggravated by the intrigues of Beatrice, who seeks to destroy her reputation by again bringing forward her Italian suitor. From all these toils Marion escapes, and the story ends happily in her complete vindication.

WISE SAWS AND MODERN INSTANCES. By the Author of "Sam Slick."
ADAM GRÆME. By the Author of "Margaret Maitland."

Hurst and Blackett's monthly library presents us here with two standard works, adding two new volumes to the collection. From the character of those already published, we are now able to judge of the scope which the undertaking is to embrace, addressing itself to readers of every class and all tastes. The judicious union of fiction, biography, history, and humour,

such as hitherto maintained, must render the series universally attractive. Sam Slick is now a national favourite, and we know none of his works more entertaining than "Wise Saws and Modern Instances." It embodies all the characteristics of his peculiar vein, his rare humour, shrewdness, and sarcasm. Among the humourous writers of the day he is the foremost and chief, and, at the same time, the most original. "Adam Græme," is a work of another stamp—a fiction, but serious, truthful, and life-like. It has already won considerable popularity, and those who have not read it in its more expensive form, will do well to secure possession of it in the handsome volume now put forward.

Curiosities of War, and Military Studies; Anecdotal, Descriptive, and Statistical. By Thomas Carter, Adjutant-General's Officer.

This is a very entertaining volume, evincing great research, and a peculiar instinct for turning it to account. It is surprising what a fund of incidents and facts the author has brought together, and placed before us in an attractive form. The work is just the one suited to a soldier, inasmuch as it may be taken up to wile an hour, and laid down at any moment, without losing its thread, or weakening its impressions. The author tells us, in his short preface, that he has aimed to produce "a manual of amusement, instruction, and example," and certainly he has fully succeeded. We can cordially recommend the book, and are glad to hear it has been ordered by the Minister for War for the military libraries.

The Way of the World. By Alison Reid. 3 vols.

The way of the world is a path that, whatever it may promise, seldom leads to happiness. It proceeds not straight to its object, but by many a crooked wind and circuitous sweep. There are many in high places whose elevation we need not envy; for were all known, it would be found that they owe their greatness to miserable intrigues or abject toadyism. Wealth may be acquired by the same means. For its paltry glitter, or for the mere smiles of the great, how many sell themselves to work evil. The story before us is based on this text. It is a well-written tale, full of clever sketches, and presenting some effective scenes. The author has evidently seen a good deal of the world, and learnt to understand its "way" before he made it his theme. He writes with ability and force, and gives to his characters that natural colouring which always marks the artist. The narrative abounds in dramatic effects, at one time subdued, at another worked out to their full extent, and with no ordinary power. There are few surprises, and the story seems to follow the chain of incidents as a defined course, yet there is no pause in the interest. Alice, the heroine, is the great character of the book, commanding all the author's care, and all the reader's attention. A calamity, which is graphically described, leads to her being left an orphan, with a younger brother, in her childhood, and the attachment she forms for this boy, and her devotion to him as they grow up, impart a touching feature to the tale. As is too often the case, the object of all this affection deserves none. After a profligate career, he becomes a forger; and Alice is required to abandon a worthy suitor whom she loves, and unite herself to one she detests as the price of his deliverance from justice. What is the issue of this entanglement we must not disclose; we may say, however, that it is adroitly conceived, and, as regards both plot and treatment, the story ends in a manner that leaves us nothing to complain of

---

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

Umballa: C. M. late 34th Native Infantry.—Many thanks for your obliging offer, of which we shall gladly avail ourselves. The stations of the Bengal Army appear in our present number.

Madras Army.—Will none of our Indian friends oblige us with the stations of the Madras Army, corrected monthly?

NAVAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

NAVAL AND MILITARY ORDERS AND CIRCULARS.

The Secretary for War has addressed a circular to magistrates, calling attention to the fact that Deserters, who upon their committal to civil custody have been examined and reported fit for service, have, upon joining their Corps, and on re-examination, frequently been found to be totally unfit for Military duty. In order to prevent unnecessary expense to the public, and inconvenience to the service, the Secretary for War requests that greater care may in future be observed in the medical examination by the medical and civil practitioners.

Examinations of Captains and Lieutenants.—The following Confidential Circular Memorandum has been addressed to General Officers and to Officers commanding Regiments and Depots :—

"Horse Guards, S.W., Oct. 5.

"On the 19th July, 1858, a General Order directed the attention of Commanding Officers to the necessity of having Officers examined for promotion without waiting for expected vacancies, and pointed out the inconvenience to the Service, and the injury to interests of individuals, arising from procrastination and disregard of the regulations on this head.

"That order has been unpardonably neglected, and at this time there are numerous Regiments from which no examination papers for the ranks of Captain or Lieutenant have been received. The neglect of this duty calls for the severest reprehension of the General Commanding-in-Chief, who regrets to find many Commanding Officers so utterly unmindful of the interests of those under their command.

"The Corps to which this rebuke especially applies are those named in the margin.*

"* For the rank of Captain.—12th Lancers; 3rd Foot, 2nd Batt.; 4th Foot, 2nd Batt.; 7th Foot, 1st Batt.; 8th Foot, 1st Batt.; 9th Foot, 2nd Batt.; 18th Foot, 2nd Batt.; 20th Foot, 1st and 2nd Batts.; 21st Foot, 1st Batt.; 24th Foot, 2nd Batt.; 29th Foot; 30th Foot; 34th Foot; 35th Foot; 42nd Foot; 43rd Foot; 54th Foot; 60th Foot, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batts.; 61st Foot; 63rd Foot; 64th Foot; 66th Foot; 79th Foot; 81st Foot; 82nd Foot; 83rd Foot; 84th Foot; 85th Foot; 90th Foot; 93rd Foot; 97th Foot; 1st West India Regiment; 3rd West India Regiment; Royal Newfoundland Companies; St. Helena Regiment.

"For the rank of Lieutenant.—24th Foot, 2nd Batt.; 42nd Foot; 56th Foot; 60th Foot, 4th Batt.; 61st Foot; 79th Foot; 82nd Foot; 93rd Foot; 97th Foot; Royal Newfoundland Companies."

"His Royal Highness requests that the General Officers under whom these Corps, or their depots, are serving will call upon the Commanding Officers to explain the cause of their remissness, and enjoin them strictly to fulfil their duty.

"The General Commanding-in-Chief has had occasion frequently to remark on the insufficiency of the examination to which Officers are subjected; many of the questions being such as are not calculated to elicit the professional acquirements of those under examination on important points, and, His Royal Highness regrets to add, sometimes evincing a want of intelligence on the part of the examiners. The answers to the questions are often badly expressed, and written in a careless and ineligible manner; the inaccuracies are noted by the Board; nor, in forwarding the proceedings, do General Officers at all times give the required opinion on the course of the examination and the eligibility of the examined. When Boards examine Officers of different Regiments, the proceedings in connection with each Regiment are to be transmitted separately.

"His Royal Highness trusts he may not be obliged to recur to this subject, and assures Commanding Officers that he will not recommend Officers for promotion unless their certificates of qualification have been received; and he holds Commanding Officers responsible for the neglect of a regulation in which public as well as private interests are so much involved.

"By order of
"His Royal Highness, the General Commanding-in-Chief,
"G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant General.

AUGMENTATION OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY.

We cordially congratulate the Royal Artillery and the country upon the announcement contained in the following General Order. The measure adopted reflects the highest credit upon the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War:—

GENERAL ORDER.

HORSE GUARDS, S.W., 1st Nov., 1859.

Her Majesty having been pleased to approve of an augmentation to the Royal Artillery, of 1 Major, 7 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant Major, 1 Quartermaster Serjeant, 5 Staff Serjeants, 24 Serjeants, 6 Corporals, 9 Bombardiers, for the purpose of forming a new Brigade, to be called "The Coast Brigade of Artillery," the present Invalid Artillery being amalgamated therewith, His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief has much pleasure in notifying the same to the Royal Artillery; and as the appointments to this Brigade, both in officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as gunners, will be given as a reward for good and faithful service, His Royal Highness hopes that the additional advantages thus offered will be met, on the part of those appointed, with a corresponding amount of zeal and attention; and that the very important duties which will devolve upon every individual in the Brigade, will be performed in a manner worthy of commendation and calculated to reflect credit upon the Regiment.

As its name implies, the Coast Brigade will be distributed amongst the forts, batteries, and towers of the United Kingdom; and, in addition to the duties now performed by the Invalid non-commissioned officers and gunners, will be required to afford instruction in gunnery to the various Regiments of Militia and Volunteer Artillery Companies, as may from time to time be necessary.

The Officers of the Brigade will be stationed at convenient distances along the coast, and will have the entire charge (under the Commanding Officers of Artillery) of the districts allotted to them, the master gunners in which will be placed under their orders.

The Brigade will be composed of eight Divisions, each under a Captain, who will be responsible for everything connected with the pay and subsistence, as well as the discipline and instruction, of the men belonging to it; and he will be required to visit his detached parties from time to time, to satisfy himself that every attention is paid to keeping the guns, ammunition, stores, &c., in proper order, and the men in a state of efficiency.

As the men belonging to the Brigade will be old soldiers, perfectly acquainted with their drills and exercises, His Royal Highness does not desire that they should be constantly drilled the same as recruits, but that they may be sufficiently so during every week to keep them thoroughly conversant with, and efficient in the discharge of, their duties; whilst the fact of their being accustomed to stores, &c., will lead His Royal Highness to expect that every article in charge, and the several magazines, &c., will be kept in the very highest order.

The instruction of Volunteer Artillery Companies will be one of the principal duties required of the Brigade, and too much attention cannot be paid to uniformity in the manner of imparting instruction, and the officers will be expected to take a lively interest in this important duty, and be ready at all

times to afford every information on artillery subjects to the volunteers who, living in the neighbourhood, will doubtless avail themselves of this means of acquiring much interesting knowledge in the science of gunnery beyond that of the mere drill and exercises in the use of ordnance, which should, however, be made as comprehensible as possible.

In making these observations, His Royal Highness by no means wishes it to be supposed that every point has been touched on, as there are many subjects of minor detail which will suggest themselves to the officers, and others of a local description which it would be impossible to treat of in a General Order; but His Royal Highness trusts that sufficient has been advanced to give a general idea of the duties which will be required of the Brigade, and he doubts not they will be carried out in such a manner as to add to the *prestige* of the Royal Regiment of Artillery.

By command of
His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief.
G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PRACTICAL ARMY MEDICAL SCHOOL.

I.—After passing his preliminary examination, every Candidate for a Medical Commission in the British and Indian Armies will be required to attend one entire course of practical instruction at the Army Medical School, and at the Military Hospital in connexion with it, on the subject herein-after named, before admitted to his examination for a Commission.

Cadets and Officers of the Royal Engineers and of the Indian Engineers may also attend a course of instructions on Hygiene and a course of Chemistry.

Combatant Officers will have the same privilege extended to them should they desire it. Army Medical Officers will also have access to the School. The course to last six months.

II.—The special practical instruction which the school is intended to afford will be given by the following five professors: The Professor of Hygiene. The Professor of Clinical and Military Medicine. The Professor of Clinical and Military Surgery. The Professor of Pathology. The Professor of Chemistry.

III.—The school has a distinct and independent existence under the Secretary of State for War, and is governed by its own Senate, which will hold a meeting for the dispatch of business at least once a month or oftener if necessary.

IV.—The Senate consists of five Professors and the Director General of the Army Medical Department, who will preside, when present, at the meetings of Senate; but only those members of Senate who may be present shall vote on the questions discussed.

The subjects for the three last heads of examination will be taken from the following books:—

(1.) Carpenter's Zoology. Edited by W. S. Dallas, F.L.S.

(2.) Rymer Jones' "Outlines of the Structure and Functions of the Animal Kingdom;" or "Cours Elementaire d'Histoire Naturelle," par Milne Edwards.

(3.) Lindley's or Henfrey's "Elements of Botany."

(4.) Somerville's "Physical Geography."

(5.) Kemptz' "Treatise on Meteorology."

(6.) Lyell's Elementary Geology," or Page's "Advanced Text-book of Geology.

VII.—The names of Candidates who pass the preliminary examination of the Examining Board will be sent to the Director General, and communicated to the Professors of the Army Medical School. The names will be arranged in the following classes:—

Class I.—Names of those who have passed a pre-eminently distinguished examination, arranged in their order of merit.

Characters which distinguish the excellence of each. General estimate of individual capacity, or fitness for special service.

Class II.—Names of those who have passed a creditable examination, arranged in alphabetical order.

Statement of the topics in which each has individually excelled, and a general estimate of his individual capacity.

Class III.—Names of Candidates who have passed the minimum examination, arranged in alphabetical order.

Statement of the particular branches of science in which each has been found to be deficient.

This information will enable the Professors of the Army Medical School to carry out their instructions with a definite aim as regards each class.

VIII.—After passing his preliminary examination, every candidate will be required to attend one entire course of practical instruction at the Army Medical School, before being entitled to his examination for a Commission, on

(1.) Hygiene.
(2.) Clinical and Military Medicine.
(3.) Clinical and Military Surgery.
(4.) Pathology of Disease and Injuries incident to Military Service.
(5.) Applied Chemistry.

These courses to be of not less than four months' duration.

IX.—At their conclusion the Candidate will be required to pass an examination on the subjects taught in the school. The examination will be conducted by the Professors of the school.

The Director General, or any Medical Officer deputed by him, may be present, and take part in the examination. If the Candidate give satisfactory evidence of being qualified for the practical duties of an Army Medical Officer, he will be eligible for a Commission as Assistant Surgeon.

X.—During the period of his residence at the Army Medical School, each Candidate will receive an allowance of 5s. per diem with quarters, or 7s. per diem without quarters, to cover all costs of maintenance. And he will be required to provide himself with uniform—viz., the regulation undress uniform of an Assistant Surgeon, but without the sword.

XI.—All Candidates will be required to conform to such rules of discipline as the Senate may from time to time require.

RULES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF ASSISTANT SURGEONS PREVIOUS TO PROMOTION.

This examination is intended as a test for promotion, and may be taken at any time after the Assistant Surgeon has served five or more years.

When Assistant Surgeons have served the requisite time they will be examined in the following manner:—

A series of printed questions, prepared by the Examining Board, will be sealed and sent by the Director General to the Principal Medical Officer of stations where Assistant Surgeons may be eligible for examination. It will be the duty of the Principal Medical Officer of the station to deliver these sealed questions to the Assistant Surgeons, and to see that they are answered without the assistance of books, notes, or communication with any other person. The answers are to be signed, delivered sealed, to the Principal Medical Officer, who is to send them, unopened, to the Director General, together with a certificate from the Surgeon of the Regiment, or other superior Medical Officer, that the Assistant Surgeon has availed himself of every opportunity of practising surgical operations on the dead body *

* The Assistant Surgeon may see this certificate before it is sent to the Director Genera

The Assistant Surgeon will also be required to transmit, together with his answers to the Director General, a Medico-Topographical account of the station where he may happen to be at the time, or of some other station where he may have been resident sufficiently long to enable him to collec the necessary information for such a report. Failing this, he will send a Medico-Stasistical report of his Regiment for a period of at least twelve months.

If the Examining Board is satisfied with the replies to the questions, and the Director General is satisfied with the certificates and with the Medico-Topographical or Statistical report, the Assistant Surgeon will be held qualified for promotion. The Assistant Surgeon will thus be subjected to three separate examinations within the first ten years of his service, each examination having a definite object. The first, to ascertain, previous to his admission into the Service as a Candidate his scientific and professional education, and to test his acquirements in the various branches of professional knowledge. The second, after having passed through a course of special instruction in the Army Medical School, to test his knowledge of the special duties of an Army Medical Officer; and the third, previous to his promotion, to ascertain that he has kept pace with the progress of Medical Science.

War-Office, October 17, 1859. SIDNEY HERBERT.

Leather Leggings.—A Circular Memorandum, dated Horse Guards, Nov. 12, has been received by the several colonels commanding the battalions at Chatham garrison, intimating that the General Commanding-in-Chief has decided that the leather leggings ordered to be worn by the troops belonging to the British Regiments are to be issued to the depots of all those regiments now serving in India, in common with the troops at home.

Flogging in the Army.—General Order.—Horse Guards, S.W., Nov. 9. —His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief having had occasion lately to remark on the unequal estimate of crime and allotment of punishment by Courts-Martial, especially as regards corporal punishment, has taken this important subject under his anxious consideration, with a view to amendment and correction. With this object he has decided upon establishing a classification of soldiers, for the purpose of maintaining a distinction between the classes as regards liability to corporal punishment. All men on entering the army will be placed in the first class, and will not, except for aggravated mutinous conduct, be liable to corporal punishment. They will continue in the first class unless they should incur degradation into the second class by the commission of certain crimes hereafter specified. For this purpose His Royal Highness has further decided on classifying the offences committed by soldiers under two distinct heads. Crimes under the first head are to be the following:—Absence from parade, drunkenness, riotous conduct in the streets, absence without leave from tattoo, preferring frivolous complaints, disrespect to non-commissioned officers, striking a comrade; absence without leave, as defined by 51 Art. of War; escaping from confinement, insubordination, making away with necessaries, falsely imputing improper conduct to a superior; sleeping on post, depending on the circumstances and nature of the service. Crimes under the second head are to be the following:—Desertion, mutinous conduct, aggravated cases of insubordination and violence, drunkenness on duty or on line of march, embezzling public money, stealing from a comrade, theft, designedly maiming; repeated acts of making away with necessaries, arms, accoutrements, ammunition, &c.; other disgraceful acts showing vicious or unnatural propensities, indecent assaults. No man guilty of offences under the first head is to be subject to corporal punishment, except during time of war, when the army is in the field. Men guilty of offences under the second head

being crimes of a very serious description, will, if in the second class, be liable to corporal punishment. If, however, they are in the first class, they will, together with their other punishment, not being corporal punishment, be disrated and passed into the second class, when they will, thenceforth, on the repetition of crimes under the second head, be liable to corporal punishment, as having degraded themselves by their own bad conduct. Uninterrupted good conduct for a year will, however, again restore the soldier from the second to the first class, as proving a desire for reformation and amendment. Though thus classified, it does not follow that all men under the second class are to be condemned to corporal punishment. Each case is to be decided upon its own merits, and corporal punishment as much avoided as possible; but a man who by misconduct has placed himself in the second class is liable thereafter to corporal punishment, whereas the man in the first class is not liable to such punishment, except in the case of aggravated mutinous conduct, when severity must at once be resorted to to repress more serious mischief resulting from such conduct. His Royal Highness trusts that the above classification will greatly simplify to the officers of the army the method of dealing with crime; will deter the evil-disposed from committing offences justly subjecting them to severe punishment, which, though necessary to maintain discipline, should be restricted as much as possible; and will give confidence to the good soldier by securing to him on entering Her Majesty's Service, an immunity from degrading punishment, which immunity it will be in his power to preserve to the day when his engagement shall expire.

By command of
His Royal Highness the General Commander-in-Chief.
G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

NAVAL PRIZE MONEY.

"Arab."—Notice has been given in the *Gazette* that the distribution of tonnage bounty awarded for the *name unknown*, captured by the Arab, on the 12th of April, 1857, will commence at the Prize Department of the Admiralty, Somerset House, on Thursday, the 17th instant.

The following are the shares due to an individual in the several classes:—Flag share, 81*l.* 3s. 9d.; Commander, 199*l.* 19s. 2d.; Third class, 59*l.* 16s. 8d.; Fourth Class, 38*l.* 9s. 3d.; Fifth class, 21*l.* 7s 4d.; Sixth class, 19*l.* 4s. 7d.; Seventh class, 12*l.* 16s. 6d.; Eighth class, 6*l.* 8s. 3d.; Ninth class, 4*l.* 5s. 6d.; Tenth class, 2*l.* 2s. 8d.

"Conflict."—Also the distribution of proceeds received, and tonnage bounty awarded, for the schooner Wintermoych, captured by the Conflict, 27th Feb., 1858, on the same day:—Flag share, 50*l.* 15s. 8d.; Commander, 120*l.* 12s. 5d.; Third class, 25*l.* 19s. 10d.; Fourth class, 16*l.* 13s. 9d.; Fifth class, 9*l.* 5s. 5d.; Sixth class, 8*l.* 6s. 10d.; Seventh class, 5*l.* 11s. 3d.; Eighth class, 2*l.* 15s. 7d.; Ninth class, 1*l.* 17s. 1d.; Tenth class, 18s. 6d.

"Conflict."—Also the distribution of proceeds received, and tonnage bounty awarded, for the barque Almeida, captured 12th March, 1858, payable same day:—Flag share, 75*l.* 12s. 3d.; Commander, 179*l.* 11s. 9d.; Third class, 38*l.* 12s. 10d.; Fourth class, 24*l.* 16s. 9d.; Fifth class, 13*l.* 16s.; Sixth class, 12s. 8s. 4d.; Seventh class, 8*l.* 5s. 7d.; Eighth class, 4*l.* 2s 10d.; Ninth class, 2*l.* 15s. 2d.; Tenth class, 1*l.* 7s. 7d.

"Retribution."—Notice has been given that the distribution of proceeds arising from a raft of timber picked up in the Black Sea, on the 23rd of Aug., 1855, by Her Majesty's ship Retribution, will commence on Monday, the 5th of December next.

The following are the shares due to an individual in the several classes:—Flag share, 15*l.* 17s.; Captain, 37*l.* 13s.; Second class, 5*l.* 19s. 2d.; Third class, 4*l.* 15s 4d.; Fourth class, 3*l.* 1s. 4d.; Fifth class, 1*l.* 14s. 1d.; Sixth class, 1*l.* 10s. 8d.; Seventh class, 1*l.* 0s. 3d.; Eighth class, 10s. 5d.; Ninth class, 6s. 9d.; Tenth class, 3s. 4d.

"Hecate."—Notice has been given in the *Gazette* that the distribution of proceeds received and tonnage bounty awarded for the schooner Niagara, captured 7th Dec., 1859, by the Hecate, will commence on Thursday,* the 31st Dec., 1859, at the Prize department of the Accountant General of the Navy, Admiralty. The shares will be as follows:—Flag share, 62*l.* 8s. 8d.; Commander, 148*l.* 5s. 9d.; Third class, 37*l.* 12s. 11d.; Fourth class, 24*l.* 4s.; Fifth class, 13*l.* 8s. 10d.; Sixth class, 12*l.* 2s.; Seventh class, 8*l.* 1s. 4d.; Eighth class, 4*l.* 0s. 8d.; Ninth class, 2*l.* 13s. 10d.; Tenth class, 1*l.* 6s. 10d.

"Teazer."—Also for the capture of the General Scott by the Teazer, on the 5th of May, 1858, payable on Monday, the 31st of October:—Flag share, 125*l.* 7s. 3d.; Lieutenant Commander, 297*l.* 14s. 9d.; Fourth class, 128*l.* 9s. 7d.; Fifth class, 71*l.* 7s. 7d.; Sixth class, 64*l.* 4s. 9d.; Seventh class, 42*l.* 16s. 6d.; Eighth class, 21*l.* 8s. 3d.; Ninth class, 14*l.* 5s. 6d.; Tenth class, 7*l.* 2s. 9d.

MILITARY LAW.

Lord Clyde has found it necessary to issue the following General Order: "The Commander-in-Chief has lately had before him a return of the trials by inferior Courts-Martial that have been held in the Bengal Presidency during the past year, and his Lordship is concerned to find from this return that no less than 7 per cent. of the trials by district Courts, and about 10 per cent. of those by Regimental or Detachment Courts, have been set aside altogether, or the sentences quashed for illegality. In a great majority of these cases the illegalities might have been avoided, had the convening officers, or the members of the Court Martial, given more care and attention to the performance of the respective duties assigned to them. Such a state of things is not creditable to the Officers of the Army, and Lord Clyde earnestly calls upon them to exert themselves to prevent a recurrence of such serious irregularities as those now brought to notice."

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

The *Gazette* of Nov. 11 contains the following:—The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria Cross on the undermentioned Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Private Soldiers of her Majesty's Army, whose claims to the same have been submitted for Her Majesty's approval, on account of acts of bravery performed by them in India:—86th Regiment (now of the 19th Regiment), Captain (now Brevet Major) H. E. Jerome; 72nd Regiment, Lieut. A. S. Cameron; Royal Engineers, Corporal M. Sleaven; Royal Artillery, Bombardier J. Brennan; 34th Regiment, Private G. Richardson; 95th Regiment, Private B. M'Quirt; 86th Regiment, Private J. Bryne; 71st Regiment, Private G. Rodgers.

Presentation of the Victoria Cross.—On the 28th ult. Admiral Talbot arrived on board the Donegal, and in the presence of the Officers and crew, presented the Victoria Cross to George Hall, a coloured man, for his gallant conduct on the 7th October, 1857, while he belonged to Her Majesty's ship Shannon, by repulsing the enemy by himself with a 24-pounder gun at Lucknow. The gallant Admiral gave a lengthened address to the ship's company and to the crews of Amphion and Hawke on board.

Water Police at Devonport.—A water police force is to be established in Hamoaze. It will consist of three serjeants and nine privates, who will be selected from the force in Devonport and Keyham yards. The men will have the hulk Endymion for a rendezvous.

* The 31st Dec. will fall on Saturday.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

The following is the distribution of the Bombay Army, corrected to 1st of Oct. last.

HOME TROOPS.

ARTILLERY.

D Battery Horse Artillery	Mhow
13th Brigade, 1st Bat.	Baroda
Do. 2nd Bat.	Morar
Detachments	Seepree, Goona, and Seronge
13th Brigade, 3rd Bat	Dwarka, Kulladghe
Do. 5th Bat.	Aden
Do. 6th Bat.	Indore
Detachments	Mallignaum and Sehore
13th Brigade, 7th Bat.	Poona
Detachment Field Service	Kattywar

CAVALRY.

3rd (The Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards	Mhow
Squadron	Ahmednuggur
Squadron	Sholapore
6th Inniskilling Dragoons	Kirkee
Squadron	Sattara
8th (The King's Royal Irish) Light Dragoons (Hussars) Head Quarters	Nusseerabad
Squadron	Neemuch
14th (King's Light Dragns)	Kirkee
17th Lgt Dragns (Lancers)	Morar
Detachment	Jhansi

ENGINEERS.

11th Company	Poona
21st Company	Central India

INFANTRY.

4th (The King's own Regt.) 1st Bat.	Ahmedabad
Detachment	Field Service
Do.	Baroda
Do.	Surat
18th Royal Irish Regiment	Secunderabad
Detachment	Dhoolia
Do.	Asseerghur
Do.	Adjunta
Do.	Jaulna
28th Regiment of Foot	Field Srv. Kattywar
Detachment	Nassick
31st Huntingdonshire Regiment	Poona
33rd (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment)	Deesa
Detachment	Mount Aboo
40th South Devonshire	Mooltan
51st (2nd Yorkshire West Riding, or the King's Own Light Infantry)	Punjaub
56th West Essex Regiment	Belgaum
Detachments	Dharwar, Kulladge. Sholapore
57th (W. Middlesex) Regt	Ahmednuggur
Detachment	Aden, Malligaum
64th (2nd Staffordshire	Kurrachee
72nd (Duke of Albany's Own Highlanders) Regiment	Mhow
Detachment	Indore, Sehore, and Auggur
83rd Regiment Foot	Nusserabad
Detachment	Ajmere
92nd Highlanders	Jhansi
95th Derbyshire Regt	Neemuch

INDIAN TROOPS.

ARTILLERY.

Horse Brigade, Head quarters	Poona
1st (or Leslie's) Troop, Head Quarters	Deesa
2nd Troop	Kurrachee
3rd Troop	Nusserabad
4th Troop	Poona
1st Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Ahmedabad
2nd Company	Belgaum
3rd Company	Hydrabad
4th Company	Bombay
2nd Battalion, Head-quarters	Bombay
1st Company	Neemuch
2nd Do.	Sattara
3rd Do.	Sholapore
4th Do.	Mhow

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Kurrachee
2nd Do.	Jaulna
3rd Do.	Kolapoor
4th Do.	Bhooj
Detachment	Kurrachee
3rd Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmedabad
1st Company	Ahmedabad and Rajkote
2nd Do	Ahmedabad
3rd Do.	Deesa
4th Do.	Nusseerabad
5th Do.	Ahmedabad
6th Do.	Aden
4th Battalion, Head-quarters	Ahmednuggur
1st Company	Do.
2nd Do.	Do.
4th Do.	Kopergaum
6th Do.	Ahmednuggur

ENGINEERS.

Head Quarters	Poona

SAPPERS AND MINERS.

Head Quarters (Poona)	Poona
1st Company	Poona
2nd Do.	Aden
Detachment	Jhansi
3rd Company	Poona
4th Do.	Poona
5th Do.	Poona
Detachment	Jhansi

LIGHT CAVALRY.

1st Regt. Bomb. L.C. (Lan)	Nusserabad
2nd Regiment Light Cavalry	Neemuch
Squadron	Deesa
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	Jhansi
Left Wing	Sholapore

INFANTRY—EUROPEAN.

1st European Regiment (Fusiliers) Head Quarters	Kurrachee
Detachment	Hyderabad
2nd European Regiment L. I.	Belgaum
Left Wing	Kolapore
3rd European Regiment	Mhow

INFANTRY—NATIVE.

1st Regiment N I. (Grenadiers)	Kurrachee
Detachment	Bhooj
2nd do. do	Bombay
3rd Regiment	Malligaum
Detachments	Nassick, Chandore, and Kopergaum
4th do. do. (Rifles)	Sehore
Detachment	Shilas
5th do. N. L. I.	Kulladghee
Detachment	Beegapoor
6th do. N. I.	Fld. Serv. Kattywar
7th do. do.	Bombay
8th do. do.	Sattara
9th do. do.	Morar
Detachment	Seepree and Goona
10th do. do.	Seronge and Goona
Detachment	Baroda
11th do. do.	Ahmedabad
Detachment	Dohud
12th do. do.	Nusserabad

13th do. do.	Neemuch
14th do. do.	Ahmedabad
Detachment	Baroda
15th do. do.	Kolapore
16th do. do.	Surat
Detachment	Broach and Godra
17th do. do.	Rajkote
Wing	Field Service
Detachment	Gogo
18th do. do.	Belgaum
19th do. do.	Mhow
Detachment	Mundlasir
20th do. do.	Dharwar
22nd do. do.	Ahmednuggur
23rd do. N. I. I.	Mhow
Wing	Indore
24th Regiment N. I.	Jhansi
Depot	Mhow
25th do. N. I. I.	Poona
26th do. N. I.	Adjunta
Detachment	Chalisgaum
Do.	Sewgaum
Do.	Asseerghur
Do.	Toka
Do.	Boorhanpoor
28th do. do.	Sholapore
29th do. do.	Aden
30th do. do.	Dholia
Detachment	Asseerghur
31st do. do.	Deesa
1st Extra Regiment	Kurrachee
Detachment	Hyderabad
2nd Extra Regt.	Baroda
1st Belooch Regiment	Hyderabad
2nd Do. Do.	Dhera Ghazee Khan
Depot	Shikarpoor
3rd Extra Regiment	Belgaum
3rd Belooch Regiment	Field Service
Wing	Hyderabad

IRREGULAR AND LOCAL CORPS.

Military.

Poona Irregular Horse	Seroor
Detachment	Toka
1st Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
3rd Regiment Do.	Jacobabad
1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
2nd Regiment Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	Kulladghee
Detachment	Kolapore, Beejapoor
Marine Battalion	Bombay
Detachment	Fld. Srv. Kattywar
1st Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
2nd Regiment Jacobs Rifles	Jacobabad
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolie
Detachment	Bhewndy

Civil.

Guzerat Irregular Horse	Ahmedabad
Detachment	Field Service
Guzerat Police Corps	Kaira
1st Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
2nd Khandeish Bheel Corps	Dhurrumgaum
Ghaut Police Corps	Tanna
Sawunt Waree Local Corps	Sawunt Waree
Kolapore Infantry Corps	Kolapore
Rutnagherry Rangers	Rutnagherry
Guzerat Coolly Police Corps	Ahmedabad
Aden Mnted Police Troop	Mhow
Kutch Legion	Kutch

SANITARIA.

Ghizree.—Mount Aboo.—Poorundhur.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

The following is the Distribution List of the Madras Army, corrected up to October, 1858.

CAVALRY.

Right Hon the Governor's Body Guard .....Madras
H. M. 1st Dragoon Guards ....Bangalore
H. M. 12th Royal Lancers Head quarters and Rt. Wing .....Secunderabad
Left Wing—Field Service—Gen. Whitlock's Division
1st Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Trichinopoly
2nd do. do.....Sholapore (under orders to Secunderabad.
3rd Regt. Native Light Cavalry, Head quarters. Left Wing.....Bangalore
Right Wing .....Bellary
4th Regt. Native Light Cavalry..Bengal Field Force
do. do.....Bellary
do. do.....Bengal Field Service
do. do.....Kamptee
1 squadron Secunderabad

ARTILLERY.

H. Troops Royal Horse Artillery. St.Thos.' Mount
Head quarters Madras Horse Artillery .....Bangalore
A. Troop, Field Service Gen. White'ock's Division
B. Troop .....Secunderabad
C. Troop .....Bangalore
D. Troop .....Kamptee
E. Troop.....Bengal Field Service
F. Troop .....Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 5. Comp. 1st Bat. Royal Artillery, and No. 1 Field Battery...St. Thos.' Mount
No. 3 Comp. 3rd Bat. Royal Artil. lery, and No. 9 Field Battery...Bellary
No. 5 Comp. 14th Bat. Royal Artillery, & No. 8 Field Battery..Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
No. 6 Cpy. 9th Bat. Ryl. Artillery. Secunderabad

FIRST BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....St. Thos. 'Mount
A Company { Head quarters & 2-thirds Co. ..Singapore; Half Company ...Penang; Detachment .....Masulipatan
B. Company .....Moulmein
C. Co. (No. 7 Horse Battery).....Bellar
D. Com. (No. 3 Horse Battery)...Rangoon

SECOND BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters .....Kamptee
A. Cop. (No 8 Bullock Battery) Trichinopoly
B. Co. Head quarters and ½ Co...Tonghoo
Half Company ...Shuaygheen
C. Comp. (No. 5 Horse Battery) Bangalore
D. Copy. (No. 4 Bullock Battery) Head quarters and half .....Kamptee
Half Company.....Seetabuldee

THIRD BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY

Head quarters .....Rangoon
A Company (No. 2 Horse Bat.) Bengal Service
B. Company (No. 4 Horse Bat.) Tongho
C. Company (No. 2 Bullock Bat.) Thayetmew
D. Company (No. 5 Bullock Bat.) Field Service Gen. Whitelock's Division

FOURTH BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....Secunderabad
A. Company (No. 1 Horse Bat.)...Field Service Gen. Whitelock
B. Company (No. 10 Bulk. Bat.) Ditto
C. Company (No. 3 Bulk. Bat.)...Secunderabad
... Company Head quarters and two-thirds.....Rangoon
One-third .....Bassein

FIFTH OR GOLUNDAUZE (NATIVE) BATTALION MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Head quarters.....St. Thos.' Mount
A. Company Head quarters and two-thirds Company.....Penang
One-third Company.....Malacca
. Company.....Singapore
C. Company (No. 1 Bulk. Bat.) Bengal Service
D. Company (No. 7 Bulk. Bat.)...Cannanore and Mangalore
E. Company (No. 9 Bulk Bat.)...Cuttack and Sumbulpore
F. Company.....Meeaday
1st Supplemental Company.....St. Thos.' Mount
2d do. do. .....Vizianagram
Details of several Companies ...Labuan

MADRAS ENGINEERS.

Head quarters.....Fort St. George

MADRAS SAPPERS AND MINERS—NATIVE.

Head quarters.....Dowlaishweram
A. Company.....Ditto
One Section with Gen. Whitlock's Field Service
B. Company.....Nerbudda (Bombay) Field Service
C. Company.....Bengal Service
D. Company.....Rangoon
E. Company.....Dowlaishweram
One Section with Gen. Whitelock's Division
F. Company.....Secunderabad
One Section.....Paumbum
G. Company.....Padoungmyo
H. Company.....Thayetmew
I. Company.....Tongho
K. Company.....Dowlaishweram
L. Company.....Field Division Gen. Whitelock
M, Company.....Dowlaishweram

INFANTRY.

EUROPEAN.

H.M. 1st Royal Regt. (1st Bat.)..Secunderabad
H.M. 43rd Light Infantry.....Gen. Whitelock's Division Field Serzice
H.M. 44th Regiment.....Fort St. George
H.M. 60th Roya Rifles (3d. Bat.) Bangalore
3 Companies.....Bellary
1 do. .....Mysore
1 do. .....Hurryhur
H.M. 66th Regiment.....Cannanore
Company.....Mangalore
1 do. .....Sircee
H.M. 68th Regiment.....Rangoon
H.M. 69th Regiment.....Tonghoo
H.M. 74th Hi hlanders.....Berhampore
1 Company.....Sholapore
Companies.....Field Service Southern Mahratta Country
The Madras Fusiliers.....Bengal on Field Service
2nd European Light Infantry . Trichinopoly
3rd Madras European Regiment. Field Division under Gen. Whitlock

NATIVE INFANTRY.

1st Regiment N.I. (Rifle Comp.) Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
2nd Regiment N. I.....Quilon
3rd N. I. or Palamcottah Light Infantry.....Cannanore
4th N. I. .....Thayetmew
5th N. I. (Rifle Company) Head quarters Right Wing.....Mangalore
Left Wing .....Sumbulpore
6th N. I. .....Rangoon
7th N. I. .....Secunderabad
8th N. I. .....Tonghoo
9th N. I. .....Secunderabad
10th N. I. .....Secunderabad
11th N. I. .....Bellary
12th N. I. .....Rangoon
13th N.I. .....Maulmein
14th N. I. .....Singapore
15th N. I. .....Thayetmew
16th N. I. (Rifle Company).....Mangalore
17th N. I. .....Bengal Field Service
18th N, I. .....Bellary
19th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitelock's Division
20th N. I. .....Bangalore
21st N, I. .....Trichinopoly
22nd N. I. .....Penang
23rd N. I. (or Walajahbad Light Infantry) .....Rangoon
24th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Henzedah
25th N. I. .....Madras
26th N. I. .....Kamptee
27th N. I. .....Bengal, on Service
28th N. I. .....Hoosingabad
29th N. I. .....Masulipatam
30th N. I. .....Bellary
31st N. I., or Trichinopoly Light Infantry.....Vizianagram
32nd N. I. .....Kamptee
33rd N. I. .....Kamptee
34th or (Chicacale Lt. Infantry) Trichinopoly
5th N. I. .....Hurryhur
36th (Rifle Company) .....Kurnool
37th N. I., (Grenadiers) Head quarters .....Shuayghoen
Left Wing .....Tonghoo
38th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Vizagapatam
39th N. I. .....Thayetmew
40th N. I. .....Cuttack
41st N. I. .....Burmah
42nd N. I. .....Haichoor Field Service
43rdN.I. .....Russelcondah
44th N, I .....Thayetmew
45th NI .....Madras
46th N. I. .....Vizagapatam
47th N. I. .....Bellary
48th N. I. .....Moulmein
49th N. I. (Rifle Company) .....Secunderabad
50th N. I. .....Service Gen. Whitlock's Divid
51st N. I. .....Palamcottah
52nd N. I. .....Mercara
Left Wing .....French Rocks
1st Extra Regiment N. I. .....Sammicottah
2nd Extra N. I. .....Trichinopoly
3rd Extra N. I. .....Cuddapah
Sappers' Militia .....Madras
Madras Rifles, temporarily formed for Service in Bengal by the Rifle Companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 30th, 49th, Regiments N. I., and 2 Companies 34th N. I.—Service Bengal.

VETERANS' ESTABLISHMENT.

EUROPEAN VETERANS

Artillery Company.....Palaveram
Infantry Company.....Vizagapatam

NATIVE VETERANS

1st or Madras Native Vet. Bat. Madras
2nd or Arnu Native Vet. Bat. Arcot

DEPÔTS.

For H.M. Regiments.....Poonamallee
European Infantry.....Arcot
Native Infantry.....Palaveram

NATIVE INFANTRY RECRUITING DEPOTS.

No. 1 Recruiting Depot.....Dindigul
No. 2 do. .....Arcot
No. 3 do. .....Chicacole
No. 4 do .....Ellore

BENGAL ARMY.

(*Corrected to September*, 1859.)

1st Brigade Horse Artillery	Meerut
2nd Do.	Lahore
3rd Do.	Umballa
1st Battalion Foot Artillery	Delhi
2nd Do.	Ferozepore
3rd Do.	Jullundur
4th Do.	Lahore
5th Do.	Agra
6th Do.	Peshawur
Corps of Engineers	Calcutta
Sappers and Miners	Boorkee
Governor General's BodyGuard	Ballygunge
1st European Light Cavalry	Allahabad
2nd Do.	Meerut
3rd Do.	Lahore
4th Do.	Lucknow
5th Do.	Peshawur
1st European Fusiliers	Dugshare
2nd Do.	Delhi
3rd European Regiment	Gwalior
4th Do.	Allahabad
5th Do.	Berhampore
6th Do.	Hayarebaugh
4th Native Infantry	Noorpoore
21st Do.	Peshawur
31st Do.	Calpee
32nd Do.	Barrackpore
33rd Do.	Jullundum
43rd Do.	Barrackpore
47th Do.	In China
58th Do.	Rawul Pindee
59th Do.	Unnitsur
63rd Do.	Berhampore
65th Do.	In China
66th Do.	Seetapore
70th Do.	In China
73rd Do.	Jelpigoree
1st Regiment Hodson's Horse	Fyzabad
2nd Do.	Lucknow
3rd Do.	Nawabgunge
Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment	Peshawur
Nazepore Regiment	
Loodianah	Benares
Seikh Volunteers	Allahabad
,, Battalion	
Shekhawattere	Midnapore
Nusseree	Meerut
Sirmoor Rifles	Deyrah Dhrn
Kemaoon	Kemaoon
Extra Goorkha Regiment	Almorah
Allipore Regiment	Allipore
Hill Rangers	Bhangulpore
1st Assam Light Infantry Bat.	Debroogurh
2nd Ditto	Gowahatty
Mhairwanah Battalion	Bewar
Mhairwanah Regiment	Ajmere
Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion	ChenaPoonje
Arracan Battalion	Ahyab
Sehundy Sappers	Darjeeling
Resident's Escort	Nepaul
Local Company's Artillery	Debroogurh
Nemaw Police Corps	Mundlaisir
Bheel Corps	Bhopawur
Meywar Bheel	Kherwarah
Pegu Light Infantry Battalion	Pegu
United Malwah Contingent	
Bhopal Contingent	
Kotah	
Joudpore Legion	
1st Regt. of Seikh Infantry	Ivans Gogra
2nd Do.	Moradabad
3rd Do.	Goruckpore
4th Do.	Abbottah
Corps of Guides	Field Service
Cawnpore Infantry Regiment	Cawnpore
Allahabad Do.	Allahabad
Meerut Do.	Meerut
Agra Do.	Agra
Allygurh Do.	Allygurh
Bareilly Do.	Bareilly
Moradabad Infantry Levy	Gonah(Oude)
Mynpoorie Do.	
Sealkote Do.	
Juttehgurh Do	Cmp Raowah
Bhopal Levy	
Goojranwallah	
1st Regiment Mahrattah Horse	
2nd Ditto	
Alexander's Horse	Cawnpore
Rohilcund	
Mooltanee	Peshawur
1st Seikh Cavalry	Roi Bareilly
2nd Do.	(Oude)
3rd Do.	
4th Do.	Delhi
Behar Cavalry	Patna
1st Regiment Beatun Horse	
2nd Do.	Jaulnah
Madras Horse	Gwalior
Benares Horse	Ghazeepore
Jat Horse	Goruckpore
The Gwalior Camel Corps	Jadoonath
Regiment of Lucknow	Cawnpore
Loyal Poorbeeah Regiment	Phillom
Furruckabad Police Corps	Furruckabad
Ghazeepore	Ghazeepore
Seikh Police Corps	Bulliah
1st Batt. Bengal Military Police.	Dehree
Baghalcund Police	Mgheer
1st Irregular Cavalry	Jullundur
2nd Do.	Goordaspore
3rd Do.	Saugor
4th Do.	Seetapore
6th Do.	Mooltan
7th Do.	Peshawur
8th Do.	Seetapore
9th Do.	Bunno
16th Do.	RawulPindee
17th Do.	Do.
18th Do.	Peshawur
Kamroop Regiment	Furruckpore
16th Punjaub Infantry	Peshawur
17th Do.	Bareilly
18th Do.	Peshawur
19th Do.	Roy Bareilly
20th Do.	Ferozepore
21st Do.	Jullundur
22nd Do.	Jullallabad
23rd Do.	Delhi
24th Do.	
25th Do.	
Munepore Regiment	Jamulpore
Hyderabad Foot Artillery—	
1st Company	Hingolee
2nd —	Ellsihpore
3rd —	Bolarum
4th —	Aurangabad
1st Regiment Cavalry	Mominabad
2nd Do.	Bolaum
3rd Do.	Aurungabad
5th Do.	Hingolee
1st Punjaub Cavalry	Barwitch
2nd Do.	Kohat
3rd Do.	Dera Ghazee Khan
4th Do.	Asnee
5th Do.	Dera Ishmael Khan
1st Punjaub Infantry	Dera Ghazee Khan
2nd Do.	Bunno
3rd Do.	Kohat
4th Rifles	Bunno
5th Infantry	Ivans Gogra
6th Do.	Kohat
7th Do.	Phillom
8th Do.	Nowshera
9th Do.	Fyzabad
10th Do.	Dera Ishmael Khan

11th Punjaub Infantry	Lahore
12th Do.	Jullundar
13th Do.	Delhi
14th Do.	Peshawur
15th Do.	Lucknow

STRENGTH.

EUROPEANS.

3 Brigades Horse Artillery
6 Batteries Foot Artillery
5 Regiments of Light Cavalry
6 Regiments of Infantry

NATIVES.

2 Camel Corps
Corps of Sappers and Miners
14 Regiments of Regular Infantry
14 Regiments of Irregular Horse
11 Regiments of Irregular Cavalry
40 Regiments of Irregular Infantry
4 Regiments of Seikh Infantry
25 Regiments of Punjaub Infantry
4 Regiments of Seikh Cavalry

CONTINGENT FORCES.

4 Companies of Foot Artillery
1 Troop of Horse
5 Regiments of Cavalry
11 Do. Infantry

1st Regiment Hyder. Cont. Inft.	Murungal
2nd Do.	Arungabad
3rd Do.	Hingolee
4th Do.	Lingeesoor
5th Do.	Ellukpore
6th Do.	Bolaum
Nagpore Irregular Force—	
Field Horse Battery	Seetabuldee
Regiment Irregular Cavalry	Do.
1st Regiment Infantry	Do.
2nd Do.	Umdah
3rd Do.	Rajpore
Gwalior Contingent—	
1st Regiment Infantry	Gwalior
2nd Do.	Gwalior

STATIONS OF H.M. REGIMENTS IN BENGAL.

(*Corrected to October*, 1859.)

ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

F. Troop	Seetapore
E. Troop	Meerut

ROYAL FOOT ARLILLERY.

1st Battery 11th Brigade	Calcutta
2nd do do	Lucknow
3rd do do	Lucknow
4th do do	Allahabad
5th do do	Roy Barrelly
6th do do	Futteghur
7th do do	Peshawur
8th do do	Dum Dum
1st do 14th do	Azimghur
2nd do do	Benares
3rd do do	Mooltan
4th do do	In Oudh
5th do do	Gorruckpore

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

4th Company	Fyzabad
21st do	Dugshare
23rd do	Lucknow
2nd Dragoon Guards	Lucknow
3rd do (Carabineers)	Muttra
7th do	Sealkote
7th Hussars	Umballa
3rd Regiment Buffs	Dum Dum
5th Fusiliers	Allahabad
6th do	Azimghur
7th Royal Fusiliers	Peshawur
8th King's Own	Futtyghur
13th Light Infantry	Gorruckpore
19th	Dinapore
20th	Camp Gouda (Oudh)
23rd Fusiliers	Lucknow
24th	Ferozepore
27th	Umballa
34th	Fyzabad
35th Fusiliers	Meerut
37th	Ghazipore
38th	Roy Bareilly
42nd Highlanders	Bareilly
43rd	Sirsgor
46th	Mooltan
48th	Cawnpore
51st	Meean Meer
52nd	Sealkoté
H.M. 86th Regiment	Calcutta
54th	Sultanpore
1st Battalion 60th Rifles	Benares
2nd do do	Oudh and Benares
67th Regiment	Furruckpore
70th	Rawul Pindee
71st	Morar and Gwalior
73rd	Dinapore
75th	Allahabad
77th	Allahabad
79th Highlanders	Meean Meer
80th	Cawnpore
81st	Rawul Pindee
82nd	Shahjehanpore
87th Fusiliers	Jullundur
88th	Delhi
90th	Seetapore
93rd Highlanders	Subathoo
94th	Nowshera
97th	Banda and Howgong
98th	Peshawur
99th	Calcutta an Berhampor
1st Battalion Rifle Brigade	Lucknow
2nd do	Agra

STATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

(Corrected up to 25th November, 1859, inclusive.)

[Where two places are mentioned, the last-named is that at which the Depot is stationed]

2st Life Guards—Windsor.
Rnd do.—Regent's Park.
Royal Horse Guards—Hyde Park.
1st Dragoon Guards—Madras: Canterbury.
2nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
3rd do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
4th do.—Brighton.
5th do.—Aldershot.
6th do.—Bengal: Maidstone.
7th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
1st Dragoons—Dublin.
2nd do.—Newbridge.
3rd do.—Dublin.
4th do.—Manchester.
5th do.—Newbridge.
6th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
7th Hussars—Bengal: Canterbury
8th do.—Bombay: Canterbury.
9th Lancers—Portsmouth.
10th Hussars—Hounslow.
11th Hussars—Birmingham.
12th Lancers—Madras: Maidstone.
13th Light Dragoons—Piershill.
14th do.—Bombay: Maidstone.
15th Hussars—Dublin.
16th Lancers—York.
17th do.—Bengal: Canterbury.
18th Dragoons—Aldershott.
Military Train [1st bat.]—Aldershot.
Do. [2nd bat.]—China.
Do. [3rd Bat.]—Woolwich
Do. [4th bat.]—Shorncliff. } Depot at Aldershot
Do. [5th bat.]—Curragh. }
Do. [6th bat.]—Woolwich. }
Grenadier Guards [1st bat.]—Wellington Bar.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Windsor.
Do. [3rd bat.]—Dublin.
Coldstream Guards [1st bat.]—Portman St. Bar.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Tower.
Scots Fus. Guards [1st bat.]—St. George's Bar.
Fus. [2nd bat.]—Wellington Barracks.
1st Foot [1st.] —Madras: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—China: Birr.
2nd do. 1st [bat.]—C. of G. Hope: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Cephalonia: Walmer.
3rd 1st [bat.]—China: Limerick.
Do. do. Malta: Limerick.
4th. do. [1st bat]—Bombay: Chichester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Chichester.
5th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Mauritius, Pembroke.
6th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Colchester.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Cork.
7th do. [1st. bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Walmer.
8th do. [1st bat.]—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Gibraltar: Templemore.
9th do. [1st. bat.]—Shorncliff: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Corfu: Limerick.
10th do. [1st bat.—Devonport.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Curragh.
11th do. [1st bat.]—Aldershot: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
12th do. [1st bat.]—N. S. Wales: Walmer.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
13th do [1st bat.]—Bengal: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Cape of Gd. Hope: Fermoy.
14th do. [1st bat.]—Corfu: Fermoy.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Mullingar.
15th do.—Jersey: Pembroke
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta, Pembroke.
16th do.— Aldershot: Templemore.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Clonmel.
17th do.—Canada: Limerick.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
18th do.—Madras: Buttevant.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
19th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
20th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Dublin.
21st do.—Malta: Birr.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershott.
22nd do.—Dublin: Parkhurst.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Malta: Parkhurst.
23rd do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Walmer; Malta.
24th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
Do. [2nd bat.]—Aldershot.
25th do.—Gibraltar: Athlone.
26th do.—Dublin: Belfast.
27th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
28th do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
29th do.—Preston: Devonport.
30th do.—Curragh: Parkhurst.
31st do—Bombay: Chatham.
32nd do.—Devonport: Dover.
33rd do.—Bombay: Fermoy.
34th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
35th do.—Bengal: Chatham.
36th do.—Devonport: Athlone.
37th do.—Bengal: Colchhster.
38th do.—Bengal: Colchester.
39th do.—Bermuda: Templemore.
40th do.—N. S. Wales: Birr.
41st do.—Jamaica: Devonport.
42nd do.—Bengal: Sterling.
43rd do.—Madras: Chatham
44th do.—Madras: Colchester.
45th do.—Preston: Parkhurst.
46th do.—Bengal: Buttevant.
47th do.—Shorncliffe: Cork.
48th do.—Bengal: Cork.
49th do.—Barbadoes: Belfast.
50th do.—Ceylon: Parkhurst
51st do.—Bengal: Chichester.
52nd do.—Bengal: Chatham
53rd do.—ditto: ditto
54th do.—Bengal: Colchester
55th do.—Curragh: Devonport.
56th do.—Bombay: Colchester
57th do.—Bombay: Cork.
58th do.—Aldershott: Birr.
59th do.—Cape: Athlone
60th do.—[1st bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal. Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Madras: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Waterford: Winchester
61st do.—Mauritius: Pembroke
62nd do.—Nova Scotia: Belfast
63rd do.—ditto: Belfast
64th do.—Bombay: Canterbury
65th do.—New Zealand: Birr.
66th do.—Madras: Colchester
67th do.—Bengal: China
68th do.—Madras: Fermoy
69th do.—Madras: Fermoy
70th do.—Bengal; Canterbury
71st do.—Bengal; Perth
72nd do.—Bombay; Aberdeen
73rd do.—Bengal: Devonport.
74th do.—Madras: Aberdeen
75th do.—Bengal: Chatham
76th do.—Dublin: Belfast
77th do.—Bengal: Chatha
78th do.—Fort George.
79th do.—Bengal: Stirling.
80th do.—ditto: Buttevant.

81st do.—Bengal: Chatham
82nd do.—Bengal: Canterbury
83rd do.—Bombay: Chichester.
84th do.—Sheffield: Pembroke
85th do.—Cape: Pembroke
86th do.—Gosport: Templemore
87th do.—Bengal: Cork.
88th do.—Bengal: Colchester
89th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
90th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
91st do.—Madras: Chatham.
92nd do.—Bengal; Stirling
93rd do.—Bengal; Aberdeen
94th do.—ditto: Chatham
95th do.—Bombay: Fermoy
96th do.—Manchester: Parkhurst.
97th do.—Bengal: Colchester
98th do.—Bengal: Canterbury
99th do.—Bengal: Cork
100th do.—Gibraltar [Parkhust.
Rifle Brigade [1st bat.]—Portsmouth: Winchester
Do. [2nd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [3rd bat.]—Bengal: Winchester
Do. [4th bat.]—Malta, Winchester
1st West India Regiment—Bahamas
2nd do—Jamaica
3rd do.—Barbadoes
Ceylon Rifle Regiment—Ceylon
Cape Mounted Rifles—Cape of Good Hope
Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Canada
St. Helena Regiment—St. Helena
Royal Newfoundland Corps—Newfoundland
Royal Malta Fencibles—Malta
Gold Coast Corps—Cape Coast Castle

DEPOT BATTALIONS.

1st Depot Battalion—Chatham.
2nd do.—Chatham.
3rd do.—Chatham.
4th do.—Canterbury.
5th do.—Parkhurst.
6th do.—Walmer.
7th do.—Winchester.
8th do.—Pembroke.
9th do.—Colchester.
10th do.—Colchester.
11th do.—Devonport.
12th do.—Athlone.
13th do.—Birr.
14th Depot Battalion—Belfast.
15th do.—Buttevant.
16th do.—Templemore.
17th do.—Limerick.
18th do.—Fermoy.
19th do.—Fermoy.
20th do.—Cork.
21st do.—Chichester.
22nd do.—Stirling.
23rd do.—Aberdeen.
Cavalry Depot—Maidstone.
do.—Canterbury.

STATIONS OF THE EMBODIED MILITIA.

ENGLAND (20).

Bedford—Weymouth.
2nd Cheshire—Shorncliffe
Durham Artillery—Gosport
Hampshire Artillery—Pembroke
East Kent—Portsmouth
Lancashire Artillery—Kinsale.
Norfolk Artillery—Sheerness.
North Lincoln—Newry
5th Middlesex—Aldershot
Northumberland Artillery—Tynemouth.
Oxford—Dover.
1st Stafford—Portsmouth
2nd Stafford—Dublin.
Suffolk Artillery—Gosport.
Sussex—Glasgow
King's own Light Infantry—Aldershot*
2nd Warwick—Newport
Wilts—Dover.
1st York, (W. R.)—Edinburgh
3rd York—Newcastle on Tyne

SCOTLAND (5).

Edinburgh Artillery: Dunbar
Forfar Artillery—Sheerness
Fife Artillery—Devonport
2nd Lanark—Aldershot
Stirling—Shorncliffe

IRELAND (12).

Antrim Rifles—Bristol
Antrim Artillery—Shorncliff.
North Cork—Ayr & Hamilton
Donegal—Yarmouth & Deptford
Dublin (city)—Plymouth
Dublin City Artillery—Colchester
Fermanagh—Chester
Kerry—Curragh.
Limerick (County) Plymouth
Louth (Rifles)—Cobh & Bar
Tipperary Artil.—Gosport
Waterford Artillery—Basla

* The 1st Tower Hamlets is called the "King's own Light Infantry."

STATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to 27th November.)

With the Dates of Commission of the Officers in Command.

Aboukir, 90, sc., Capt. C. F. Schomberg, 1851 Channel Fleet.
Acorn, 12, Com. R. B. Pearse, 1856, East Indies.
Actæon, sury.-v., Com. J. Ward (b), 1858, E. Ind.
Adventure, sc. store-ship, Com. E. Lacy, 1856, East Indies.
Agamemnon, 91, sc., Capt. T. Hope, 1852, Mediterranean.
Ajax, 60, screw, Captain J. McNeil, Boyd, 1846 Coast Guard.
Alert, 17, sc., Com. W. A. R. Pearse, 1855, Pacific.
Algerine, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. Arthur, 1854, East Indies.
Algiers, 91, screw, Capt. G. W D. O'Callaghan, 1846, Channel Fleet.
Amethyst, 26, Capt. S. Grenfell, 1850, Pacific.
Amphion, 36, sc., Capt. T. Cochran, 1857, Channel Fleet.
Arachne, 18, Com. J. E. Montgomerie, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Archer, 13, screw, Capt. W. N. W. Hewelt, V.C., (acting), Coast of Africa.
Ardent, 3, steam-vessel, Com. J. E. Parish, 1857, Woolwich.
Argus, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. F. W. Ingram, 1856, Mediterranean.
Ariadne, 26, sc., Capt. E. W. Vansittart, 1856, Chatham.
Arrogant, 47. screw, Capt. W. Edmonstone, 1853, Ascension.
Asia, 84, Capt. G. T. Gordon, 1846, Portsmouth.
Assistance, screw store-ship, East Indies.
Assurance, 4, screw, Com. C. M. Aynsley, 1856, Mediterranean.
Atalanta, 16, Com. T. M. S. Pasley, 1855, North America and West Indies.
Atholl, 4, Com. E. Wilson, 1845, Greenock.
Banshee, 2, st.-vessel, Com. C. A. Campbell, 1858, Mediterranean.
Banterer, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Jenkins, 1853, East Indies.
Basilisk, 6, st.-vessel, Com. G. A. Phayre, 1854, North America and West Indies.
Beagle, 4, sc., Com. E. Hay, 1858, Portsmouth.
Black Eagle, st.-yacht, Mast.-Com. J. E. Petley, 1844, particular service.
Blenheim, 60, screw, Capt. F. Scott, C.B., 1848, Coast Guard.
Boscawen, 70, Rear Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, K.C.B., Capt. R. A. Powell, C.B., 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Bouncer, 2, sc.-gunbt., Lieut. Com. A. R. Owen, 1852, East Indies.
Brisk, 16, sc., Capt. A. F. R. D'Horsey, 1857, Cape of Good Hope.
Britannia, Training Ship, Capt. R. Harris, 849, Portsmouth.
Brune, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. E. F. Lodder, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Brunswick, 80, sc, Captain E. Ommanney, 1846, Mediterranean.
Buffalo, screw, Mas.-Com. A. Brown, 1854, particular service.
Bustard, 2, sc.-gunbt., Lt.-Com. F. W. Hallowes 1856, East Indies.
Buzzard, 6, st.-vessel, Com. T. Peel, 1855, S.E. Coast of America.
Cadmus, 21, sc., Capt. H. S. Hillyar, C.B., 1854, Mediterranean.
Cæsar, 90, screw, Capt. T. H. Mason, 1849, Mediterranean.
Calypso, 18, Capt. F. B. Montresor, 1851, Pacific.
Cambrian, 40, Captain J. J, M'Cleverty, C.B., 1848 East Indies.
Cambridge, Gunnery Ship, Capt. A. W. Jerningham, 1851, Devonport.
Camilla, 16, Com. G. T. Colville, 1855, E. Indies
Caradoc, 2, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. C. M. Buckle, 1847, Mediterranean.
Centaur, 6, st.-vessel, Com. E. D'o. D'a, Aplin, 1853, East Indies.
Centurion. 80, sc., Capt. G. E. Patey, 1846, Mediterranean.
Chesapeake, 51, screw, Rear-Admiral J. Hope, C.B., Capt. G. O. Willes, 1856, East Indies.
Clio, 22, sc., Capt. F. Miller, 1855, Devonport.
Clown, sc.-gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. F. Lee, 1855, 1842, East Indies.
Cockchafer, 2, sc.-gunbt. Lieut.-Com. H. L. Holder, 1854, Devonport.
Conflict, 8, sc., Lt.-Com. F. W. Sullivan, 1856, Devonport.
Conqueror, 101, screw, Capt. W. J. C. Clifford, C.B., 1847, Mediterranean.
Coquette, 4, sc.. Com. the Hon. F. A. Foley, 1855, Mediterranean.
Cordelia, 11, sc., Com. C. E. H. Vernon, 1855, Australia.
Cormorant, 4, sc., Com. A. Wodehouse, 1856, East Indies.
Cornwallis, 60, sc., Captain G. G. Randolph, C.B., 1854, Coast Guard.
Cossack, 20, sc., Capt. R. Moorman, 1857, North America and West Indies.
Cressy, 80, screw, Capt. the Hon. C. G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., 1841, Mediterranean.
Crocodile, 8, rec.-ship, Com W. Greet, 1854, off the Tower,
Cruiser, 17, sc., Com. J. Bythesea, 1856, East Indies.
Cumberland, 70, Capt. E. B. Rice, 1855, Sheernes
Curaçoa, 31, screw, Capt. A. Phillimore, 1855, S. E. Coast of America.
Cyclops, 6, st.-v., Capt. W. J. S. Pullen, 1856, East Indies.
Dasher, 2, st.-vessel, Com. E. G. Hore, 1854, particular service.
Dauntless, 31, sc., Capt. L. G. Heath, C.B. 1854, Coast Guard.
Dee, 4, troop-ship, Mast-Com. T C. Pullen, 1844, particular service.
Diadem, 32, sc., Capt. J. H. Cockburn, 1850, Channel Fleet.
Donegal, 101, sc., Capt., H. Broadhead, 1846, Channel Fleet.
Doris, 32, screw, Capt. E. Heathcote, 1852, Mediterranean.
Drake, sc. gunbt., Lieut-Com. A. R. Blane, 1856, East Indies
gle, 50, Capt. E. Tatham, 1854, Coast Guard.
Edgar, 91, sc., Rear-Adm. J. E. Erskine, Capt. J. E. Katon, 1856, Gibraltar.
Edinburgh, 58, screw, Capt. E. C. T. D'Eyncourt, 1849, Coast Guard.
Elk, 12, Com. H, Campion, 1855, Australia.
Emerald, 51, sc. Capt. A. Cumming, 1854 Channel Fleet.
Encounter, 14, screw, Capt. R. Dew, 1858, East Indies.
Esk, 20, sc., Sir. R. J. Le M. M'Clure, C.B., 1850, East Indies.
Euryalus, 51, sc., Capt. J. W. Tarleton, C.B., 1852, Mediterranean.
Excellent, 46, gunnery ship, Capt. R. S. Hewlett, C.B., 1850, Portsmouth.
Exmouth, 90, sc., Capt. J. J. Stopford, 1841 Mediterranean.
Fairy, sc. yacht, tender to Victoria and Albert yacht, Portsmouth.
Falcon, 17, sc., Com. A. G. Fitzroy, 1857, Coast of Africa.

Fawn, 17, sc., Com. R. P. Cator, 1858, Sheerness.
Ferret, 8, Com. W. E. Fisher, 1856, part serv.,
Firebrand, 6, st.-vessel, Com. J. Dayman, 1858, particular service.
Firefly, 4, st. ves., Mas.-Com. F. F. F. Taylor, 1846, Woolwich.
Irm, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. R. Boulton, 1854, East Indies.
Fisguard, 42, Commodore the Hon. J. R. Drummond, C.B., Woolwich
Flamer, sc. gunboat, Lieut. Com. H. M. Bingham, 1851, Portsmouth.
Flying Fish, 6, c., Com. C. W. Hope, 1854, Particular Service.
Forester, 2, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. A. J. Innes, 1853, East Indies.
Formidable, 84, Capt. R. B. Watson. C.B., 1842, Sheerness.
Forward, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. C. R. Robson, 1851, South America.
Furious, 16, st.-ves., Capt. O. J. Jones, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Fury, 6, st. ves., Com. W. A. J. Heath, 1856, E. I.
Ganges, 84, Rear-Adm. R. L. Baynes, C.B., Capt. J. Fulford, 1848, Pacific.
Gannett, 11, Com. E. H. G. Lambert, 1854, Mediterranean.
Gladiator, 6, st.-vessel, Commander H. D. Hickley (1858), N. America and W. Indies.
Gorgon, 6, st.-ves. Com. B. C. T. Pim, 1858, North America and West Indies.
Grapler, 2, sc., Lieut.-Com. A. P. H. Helby, 1849, Pacific.
Grasshopper, sc gunboat, Lt.-Com. J. C. Tucker, 1855, Portsmouth.
Growler, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. E. Crozier, 1854, Mediterranean.
Hannibal, 91, sc., Rear-Admiral G. R. Mundy, Capt. M. Connolly, 1858, Mediterranean.
Hardy, 2, sc.-gbt. Lieut.-Com. A. G. Bogle, 1855, Portsmouth.
Hastings, 60, screw, Captain W. R. Mends, C.B., 1852, Coast Guard.
Haughty, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Broad, 1851, East Indies.
Havock, 2, sc.-gunbt, Lieut.-Com. C. Fairholme, 1851, Portsmouth.
Hawke, 60, sc., Capt. W. Crispin 1852, Coast G.
Herald, 8, surv.-ves., Capt. H. M. Denham, 1846, Feejee Islands.
Hermes, 6, st.-v., Com. W. E. A. Gordon, 1854 Cape of Good Hope.
Hero, 91, screw, Capt. G. H. Seymour, C.B, 1844, Channel Fleet.
Hesper, sc st.-ship, Mast.-Com. J. Loane, 1846, East Indies.
Hibernia, rec.-ship, Rear-Admiral H. J. Codrington, C.B., Captain F. Warden, C.B., 1845, Malta.
Highflyer, 21, sc., Capt. C. F. A. Shadwell, C.B., 1853, East Indies.
Himalaya, sc. store-ship, Com. J. Seccombe, 1855, particular service
Hogue, 60, screw, Capt. R. J. J. G. Macdonald, 1854, Coast Guard
Hydra, 6, st.-vessel, Com. R. V. Hamilton, 1857, particular service.
Icarus, 11, sc., Com. N. Salmon, 1858, Sheerness.
Illustrious, 72, Com. H. C. Harston, 1845, Portsmouth.
Imaum, 72, Commodore H. Kellett, C.B., Com. H. J. Grant, 1855, rec.-ship, Jamaica.
Impregnable, 104, Vice-Adm. Sir B. Reynolds, K.C.B., Capt. W. H. Stewart, C.B., 1854, Devonport.
Impereuse, 51, screw, Rear-Adm. L. T. Jones, C.B., Capt. R. Maguire, 1854, East Indies.
Indus, 78, Rear-Admira Sir H. Stewart, K.C.B. Capt. W. K. Hall, C.B., 1853, North Americ, and West Indies.
Industry, st.-ves., 2, st.-ship, Mast.-Com. G. J. Hodges, 1841, South America.
Inflexible, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. A. C. Brodie 1856, East Indies.
Intrepid, 6, screw, Com. J. H. Marryat, 1855, Mediterranean.
Iris, 26, Commodore W. Loring, C.B., Australia
Jackal, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. A. G. E. Murray, 1846, particular service.
James Watt, 91, screw, Capt. E. Codd, 1853, Mediterranean.
Janus, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. H. P. Kneriti, 1855, East Indies.
Jasper, 1, sc. gun-vessel, Lt.-Com. W. H. Fyn, 1849, W. Indies.
Kestrel, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. G. D. Bevan, 1853, East Indies.
Lapwing, 4, screw, Com. M. F. O. Reilly, 1857, Mediterranean.
Lee, 1, screw gun-vessel, Lieut.-Com. ———, East Indies.
Leopard, 18, st.-ves., Rear-Admiral Sir S. Lushington, K.C.B. Capt. J. F. B. Wainwright, 1856, S. E. Coast of America.
Leven, 1, sc. gun-vessel, Lt.-Com. J. S. Graham, 1854, East Indies.
Liffey, 51, screw, Capt. G. W. Preedy, C.B., 1853, Mediterranean.
Locust, 3, st.-ves., Lieut.-Com. J. B. Field, 1848, particular service.
London, 90, sc. Cpt. H. Chads, 1841, Mediterranean
Lynx, 4, screw, Lieut.-Com. H. Berkeley, 1854, Coast of Africa.
Lyra, 9, sc. Com. R. B. Oldfield, 1855, Cape of Good Hope.
Madagascar, store ship, Capt. E. D. White, 1856, Rio Janeiro.
Mœander, 44, Capt. Sir M. MacGregor, 1856 Ascension.
Magicienne, 16, st.-vessel, Capt. J. E. Commerell (acting), E. Indies.
Marlborough, 131, sc., Vice Adm. A. Pasthaw, C.B., Capt. the Rt. Hon. Lord F. H. Kerr, 1852, Mediterranean.
Mars, 80, sc., Capt. J. N. Strange, 1854, French.
Medina, st.-ves., 4, Capt. T. A. B. Spratt, C.B. 1855, Mediterranean
Medusa, 4, steam-vessel, Com. W. Bowden, 1854, Coast of Africa
Melpomene, 50, screw, Capt. C. J. F. Peart, 1855, Channel Fleet.
Mersey, 40, screw, Capt. H. Caldwell, C.B., 1853, Channel Fleet.
Minotaur, Capt. E. P. Halstead 1842, Sheerness,
Mixture, 17, sc., Com. W. Graham, 1856, Sheer
Mohawk, 4, screw. Com. P. C. C. McDougall, 1856, Portsmouth.
Monkey, steam tug, Sec. Mas. G. Sydercomb, (acting), Woolwich.
Mutine, 17, screw, Com. W. Graham, 1854, Sheerness.
Naiad, 42, store-ship, Mast.-Com. W. W. [illegible], 1845, Callao
Nautilus, 6, Lieut.-Com. W. B. Grant, 1852 apprentice ship.
Neptune, 91, screw, Capt. Sir W. Hoste, Bart., 1848, Mediterranean.
Nereus, 42, store-depôt, Mast.-Com. J. C. Barlow, 1835, Valparaiso
Niger, 14, sc., Capt. G. P. Mends, 1858, Australia
Nile, 90, sc., Capt. A. P. E. Wilmot, C.B., 1854, North America and West Indies.
Nimrod, 6, sc., Com. R. J. Wynniatt, acting, East Indies.
Oberon, 3, st.-vessel, Lieut-Com. F. G. C. Paget, 1852, South Coast of America.
Odin, 16, steam-vessel, Capt. Lord J. Hay, C.B., 1854, East Indies.
Opossum, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. C. J. Balfour, 1850, East Indies.
Orion, 91, screw, Capt. J. J. R. E. Freze, 1854, Mediterranean.
Osborne, st.-vessel, Mas. Com. G. H. K. Bower, 1842, particular service.

Osprey, 4, screw, Com. H. J. Blomfield, 1855 Mediterranean
Pearl, 21, screw, Capt. J. Borlase, C.B., 1855, East Indies.
Pelorus, 21, sc., Capt. F. B. P. Seymour, 1854, Australia.
Pembroke, 60, Capt. E. P. Charlewood, 1855, Coast Guard.
Perseverance, 2 troop ship, Com. E. R. Power, 1850, particular service.
Persian, 12, CommanderE. Hardinge 1856, Cape of Good Hope.
Pioneer, 6, sc., Com. H. A. Reilly, 1858, E.Indies.
Plover, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. B. Smith (acting), East Indies.
Plumper, 9, screw, Capt. G. H. Richards, 1854, Pacific
Pluto, 4, st.-vessel, Lieut.-Com. C. H. Simpson, 1848, Coast of Africa
Porcupine, 3, st.-ves. Capt. H. C. Otter, 1854, particular service.
Princess Charlotte, 104 Mast.-Com. H. G. Thomsett, 1854, Hong Kong.
Princess Royal, 91, sc., Capt. T. Baillie, 1845, Portsmouth.
Prometheus, 5, st.-ves., Com. G. Skipwith, 1842, Portsmouth.
Pylades, screw, 21, Capt. M. de Courcy, 1852, Pacific
Qua'l, 2, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. N. Osborn 1856, Mediterranean.
Queen, 86, sc., Capt. C. F. Hillyar, 1852, Sheerness.
Queen Charlotte, 104, Vice-Adm. E. Harvey, Capt. H. Harvey, 1852, Sheerness.
Racer, 11, screw, Com. the Hon. T. A. Pakenham 1856, North America and West Indies.
Racoon, 21, screw, Captain J. A. Paynter, 1854, Mediterranean.
Recruit, 6, st.-v., Com. D. Spain, 1856, Mediterranean.
Renard, 4. screw, Com. J. G. Goodenough, 1858, East Indies.
Renown, 91, sc Capt. A. Forbes, 1846 Mediter.
Retribution, 28, st.-vessel, Commodore H. E. Edgell, East Indias.
Rhadamanthus, 4, st. ves., Master-Com. F. R Sturdee, 1843, particular service.
Ringdove, 4, sc., Com. R. G. Crai.gie, 1856, East Indies.
Roebuck, 6, sc., Com. E. C. Symons, acting, East Indies.
Rolla, 6, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Nelson, 1854, Portsmouth.
Royal Adelaide, 104, Rr.-Ad. Sir T. S. Pasley, Bt.; Capt. W. J. Williams, 1841, Devonport.
Royal Albert, 121, sc., Rear-Admiral Sir C. H. Freemantle. K.C.B., Capt. H. J. Lacon, 1856, Channel Fleet.
Russell, 60, sc., Capt. G. Wodehouse, 1854, Coast Guard.
St. Jean D'Acre, 101, screw, Capt. T. P. Thompson, 1847, Mediterranean.
St. Vincent, 102, Rear Admiral the Hon. G. Grey, Capt. T. Wilson, 1853, Portsmouth.
Sampson, 6, st.-v., Capt. G. S. Hand, 1852, East Indies
Saracen, 4, Mast.-Com. W. Stanton, 1852, E. Ind.
Satellite, sc., 21, Capt. J. C. Prevost, 1856, Pacific.
Saturn, 72, Capt. G. Ramsay, C.B., 1843, Pembroke.
Scourge, 6, sc, Com. Prince of Langenberg 1857, Mediterranean.
Scout, 21, sc., Capt. J. Corbett, 1857, E. Indies.
Scylla, 21, sc., Capt. R. Lambert, 1855, particular service.
Seagull, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Chimmo, 1850, particular service.
Sharpshooter, 8, screw, Lieut.-Com. C. Gibbons, 1848, Coast of Africa.
Sidon, 22, st.-ves., Capt. R. B. Crawford, 1856, Cape of Good Hope.
Simoom, 8, sc., Com. J. M. Cooke, 1852, particular service.
Siren, 16, Com. G. M. Balfour, 1856, South East Coast of America.
Skipjack, sc. gunbt., Lieut.-Com. J. Murray, 1848, West Indies.
Slaney, 2, sc. gunbt., Lt.-Com. H. R. Leet, 1855, East Indies.
Snake, 4, sc., Com. H. Harvey, 1857, E. Indies.
Snap, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. W. O. Butler, 1855, East Indies.
Sparrowhawk, 4, sc., Com. J. C. Byng, 1856, East Indies.
Sphinx, 6, st.-ves., Com. G. F. Day, V.C., 1855, East Indies.
Spitfire, 5, st.-v., Lt.-Com. ——, Coast of Africa.
Spy, 3, Lieut.-Com. J. Hanmer, 1848, South East Coast of America.
Starling, sc.-gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. A. Whitshed, 1854, East Indies.
Staunch, 2, sc.-gunboat, Lt.-Com. E. J. Pollard, 1855, East Indies.
Styx, 6, st.ves., Com. C. Vesey, 1854 N. America and W. Indies.
Supply, st.-sh., Mast.-Com. W. H. Balliston, 1845, Woolwich.
Surprise, 4, sc., Com. Lord E. H. Cecil, 1857, C. of Africa.
Tartarus, 4, st., Com. A. L. Mansell, 1855, Mediterranean.
Termagant, 25, screw, Capt. R. Hall, 1855, South East Coast of America.
Terrible, 21, st.-vessel, Capt. F. H. H. Glasse C. B., 1846, Mediterranean.
Terror, 16, Capt. F. Hutton, 1844, Bermuda.
Topaze, 51, sc., Capt. the Hon. J. W. S. Spencer, 1854, Pacific.
Tortoise, 12, store-ship, Capt. W. F. Burnett, C.B., 1854, Ascension.
Trafalgar, 91, sc., Capt. E. G. Fanshawe, 1845, Channel Fleet.
Tribune, 30, screw, Captain G. T. P. Hornby, 1846, Pacific.
Triton, 3, st.-ves. Lieut.-Com. R. H. Burton, 1849, Coast of Africa
Urgent, sc. troop ship, Com. H. W. Hire, 1854, particular service.
Valorous, 16, st.-ves., Capt. W. C. Aldham, C.B. 1853, West Indies.
Vesuvius, 6, steam-vessel, CommodoreC. Wise, Coast of Africa.
Victor Emanuel, 91, sc., Capt. J. Willcox, C.B., 1850, Mediterranean.
Victoria and Albert, 2, steam yacht, Captain the Hon. J. Denman, 1841, Portsmouth.
Victory, 101, Admiral W. Bowles, C.B.; Capt A. Farquhar, 1849, Portsmouth.
Vigilant, 4, sc., Com. W. Armytage, 1855, Mediterranean.
Viper, 4, screw, Com. ———, Coast of Africa.
Virago, 6, st.-ves., Com. M. B' Dunn, 1856 particular service.
Vixen, 6, st.-ves., Com. L. Lambert, 1858, Pacific.
Vulcan, 6, screw troop-ship,.Com. A. C. Strode, 1856, Portsmouth.
Vulture, 6, st.-v., CaptainF. A. Campbell, 1856, Mediterranean.
Wanderer, 4, screw, Com. M. R. Pechell, 1854, Mediterranean.
Watchful, 2, sc.-gunbt. st. East Indies.
Weazel, 2, sc gunbt., Lieut.-Com. W. Howorth, 1856, East Indies.
Wellesley, 72, Captain Superintendent G. Goldsmith, C.B., 1842, Chatham.
Wellington, 72, Capt. R. S. Robinson, 1840, Devonport.
Weser, 6, st.-vessel, Com. H. J. Raby, 1855, V.C Woolwich.
Woodcock, 2, sc., gunbt., Lt.-Com. G. S. Bosanquet, 1855, East Indies.
Wrangler, 4, sc., Lt.-Com. R. J. Douglas, 1853, particular service.

LIST OF H. M. INDIAN NAVY IN COMMISSION.

(Corrected to the 26th Oct., 1859.)

With the dates of Commission of the Officers in command.

Acbar, 22, Flag-ship of Commodore G. G. Wellesley, C.B.; Captain J. W. Young, C.B., 1856, Bombay.
Ajdaha, 24, preparing for commission, Bombay
Auckland, 6, paddle, Captain J. Stephens, 1859, Red Sea.
Assaye, 10, paddle, Commander G. N. Adams, 1858, Trauxibar.
Assyria, 2, paddle, Master-Com. T. O. Jones, 1859, River Indus.
Augusta, 6, yacht, tender to Acbar, Bombay.
Australian, screw troop ship, Master-Com. E. Boon, 1858, Bay of Bengal.
Berenice, 2, paddle troop ship, Lieut.-Com. G. T. Robinson, 1847, Bombay.
Beeas, 6, flat, Master-Com. E. Nash, 1851, River Indus.
Bee, 2, sc. gunbt., River Indus.
Charlotte, 2, Lieut.-Com. T. M. Philbrick, 1858, Andaman Islands.
Chenab, 2, paddle, Master-Com. W. Walton, 1859, River Indus.
Clive, 14, Lieut.-Com. J. Sedley, 1847, Expedition to Beyt Island and Dwarka.
Clyde, 4, sc. gunboat, Lieut.-Com. J. G. Nixon, 1847, Expedition to Beyt Island and Dwarka
Constance, 3, Lieut.-Com. W. B. Dickson, 1851, Expedition against Beyt Island and Dwarka.
Comet, 5, paddle gunboat, Com. W. B. Selby, 1855, River Euphrates.
Conqueror, 2, paddle, Master-Commander W. Fivey, 1858, River Indus.
Coromandel, screw troop ship, Lieut.-Com. R. G. Henlock, 1858, Bay of Bengal.
Cursetjee, Flat, Mast.-Com. ——, River Indus.
Dalhousie, screw troop ship, Com. T. W. Hopkins, 1858, Bay of Bengal.
Dromedary, Flat, Master-Com. ——, River Indus.
Elphinstone, 12, Lieut.-Com. C. E. Brooman, 1858, Persian Gulf.
Euphrates, Flat, Mast.-Com. ——, River Indus.
Euphrates, 10, Lieut.-Com. R. Williams, 1859, surveying vessel Malabar Coast.
Ethersey, Flat, Master-Com. ——, River Indus.
Ferooz, 13, paddle, Commander C. J. Cruttenden, 1855, Expedition to Beyt Island and Dwarka.
Freere, 2, paddle, Master Commander W. Marsh, 1858, River Indus.
Falkland, 12, Lieut.-Com. P. W. Fendal, 1857, Persian Gulf.
Fox, 2, sc. gunbt. River Indus.
Goolanair, screw yacht, Master-Commander T. J. Kennelly, 1850, Bombay
Georgiana, 2, Lieut.-Com. H. Ellis (Acting), 1857, River Euphrates.
Hawk, 2, sc. gunbt., River Indus.
Indus, 2, paddle, Master-Commander E. S H. Neale, 1853, River Indus.
Jhelum, 2, paddle, Master-Com. R. L. Lawson, 1857, River Indus.
Kedawarree, 2, flat, Mst.-Com. A. Wilkins, 1854,
Kite, 2, sc. gunbt., River Indus.
Kotree, Flat, Mast.-Com. D. Morison, 1857. River Indus.
Lady Falkland, paddle, Mast.-Com., B. Tarleton, 1851, River Indus.
Lady Canning, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. E. Feever, 1846, Red Sea.
Mahi, 3, Lieut.-Com. R. W. Whish, 1858, Persian Gulf.
Marie, 3, Com. C. G. Constable, 1859, Persian Gulf, Surveying Vessel.
Mootree, 1, pendant ves., Capt. E. W. Daniell, 1857, Kotree.
Mooltan, Flat, Mast.-Com. A. Harrison, 1856, River Indus.
Napier, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. ——, River Indus.
Nerbudda, 2, Lieut.-Com. C. Forster, 1856, surveying vessel, Malabar Coast.
Nimrod, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. W. Bawas, 1858, River Indus.
Nitocris, Flat, Master-Com. J. R. Linton, 1849, River Indus.
Outram, 2, paddle, Mast.-Com. T. B. Butler, 1856, River Indus.
Planet, 1, paddle, Master-Com. T. R. Fletcher, 1857, River Indus.
Punjaub, 10, paddle, Commander A. Fouserton, 1857, Calcutta
Prince Arthur, screw troop-ship, Com. J. Twynham, 1859, en route to China.
Pleiad, 2, screw, Mas.-Com. D. White, 1858, Malabar Coast.
Ravee, Flat, Master-Com. C. T. French, 1851, River Indus.
Sutledge, 6, Flat, Master-Com. H.W. McLaunie, 1857, River Indus.
Satellite, 1, paddle, Master-Com. G. Peck, 1859, River Indus.
Semiramis, 8, paddle, Com. W. Baltour, 1855, Persian Gulf.
Snake, paddle, tender to Acbar, Bombay.
Sir H. Havelock, 2, paddle, Master-Com. E. Davies, 1857, River Indus.
Sir H. Lawrence, 2, paddle, Master-Com. C. Tickel, 1857, River Indus.
Sydney, screw troop ship, Master-Com. ——, Bay of Bengal
Sukkur, Flat, Mast.-Com. G. Swain, 1858, River Indus.
Shark, 2, sc. gunbt., River Indus.
Tatta, Flat, Mast.-Com. ——, River Indus.
Tigris, 5, Lieut.-Com. W. A. Dyer, 1856, Bombay.
Victoria, 4, paddle, Lieut.-Com. A. W. Chitty, 1847, Expedition to Beyt Island and Dwarka
Zenobia, 10, paddle, Com. J. Tronson, 1858, Expedition to Beyt Island and Dwarka.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

Commander to be Captain—William Charles Backer, 1848.

Lieutenants to be Commanders—C. G. Constable, 1845; Thos. S. H. Twynham, 1845.

Junior Lieutenants to be Senior Lieutenants—G. T. Robinson, 1847; G. T. Holt, 1847; A. D. Taylor, 1847.

Mates to be Lieutenants — W. Harris, 1849, and R. Williams, 1850.

APPOINTMENTS.

Commanders—J. Tronson, 1858, to Zenobia; T. S. H. Twynham, 1859, to Prince Arthur.

Lieutenants—J. Sedley, 1847, to command Clive; G. T. Robinson, 1847, to command Berenice; A. D. Taylor, 1847, to Ferooz, for special duty; W. A. Dyer, 1856, to command Tigris; Charles Forster, 1846, to command Nerbudda; P. W. Fendall, 1857, to command Falkland; R. G. Henlock, 1858, to command Coromandel; R. Williams, 1859, to command Euphrates; A. Chitty, 1847, to command Victoria; B. C. S. Clarke, acting, 1859, and F. Dawkins, acting, 1859, to Semiramis; E. Butt, acting, 1855, to Semiramis; F. L. Seaton, acting, 1857, to Assaye; H. Le Messurier, acting, 1855, to Ferooz; C. E. Beddome, acting, 1859, to be Registrar of Indian Naval Seamen.

Masters.—T. Bennett, 1858, to Indus Flotilla; H. J. Hunter, 1859; R. G. Salmon, 1859, to Prince Arthur; A. C. Dando, 1859, to Euphrates.

Assistant Surgeons.—P. W. Cockell to Berenice A. Johnson to Acbar; T. A. F. Scott to Auckland; E. Sexton to Prince Arthur; P. W. Cockell to Clive.

Pursers.—Charles Daniells, 1858, to Zenobia.

1st Class 2nd Masters.—J. Attrey and H. Ask, 1859, to Prince Arthur; J. Leslie, 1859, to Victoria.

Midshipmen.—H. W. Estridge and J. B. Morgan, to Nerbudda; G. G. Lowder, E. J. Rudd, F. W. J. Williams, and C. King to Euphrates; H. Hewer to Assaye, A. J. Kettey to Semiramis, W. J. Powell to Elphinstone, G. A. Cheek to Ferooz, J. G. Greig to Clyde, J. D. Budd, A. Bruce, J. G. de Boulay to Acbar.

Clerks.—A. R. Arnot to Elphinstone (in charge) Sidney Wilson to Constance (in charge).

PRESENTATION.—A presentation of a gold pen and pencil case to Serjeant John Richardson, 2nd Class Instructor of Musketry, on his departure to join Head-quarters, stationed at Montreal, C.E., took place in the Serjeant's Mess Room, Detachment Royal Canadian Rifles, Tete de Ponte Barracks. Colour-Serjeant (acting Serjeant-Major) Underwood in making the presentation, spoke as follows:—The duty which I am now called upon to perform is in behalf of my brother non-commissioned officers—a duty which is to me one of the greatest pleasure—that is, to present you with this gold pen and pencil case, in the name of us all here present, as a token of our esteem towards you as an instructor of a weapon, the use of which we were heretofore totally ignorant of—namely, the Enfield Rifle; the kind and gentle manner in which you imparted your instructions; your ever ready and willing assistance in the many difficult matters connected with your craft; your untiring zeal to propagate in others an esteem for that noble and honorable calling which ever animated the minds of our predecessors in clinging to that flag, yes, that "Flag that braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze"—has won for you the kind feeling of your brother non-commissioned officers, which is now manifest to you. I therefore present you with this gold pen and pencil case, and do hope it will be received by you as generously as it is given by us. We therefore bid you a hearty farewell, and hope that your conduct through life will be always marked with that manly frankness and devotion to your profession of arms which you have at all times exhibited during your stay amongst us, which is the principal characteristic of the British soldier.

"By a recent regulation made by the Board of Admiralty, no person after the 1st of April next, will be nominated to a Naval Cadetship who shall be under 12 or above 14 years of age at the time of his first examination. The examination days are fixed for the first Wednesday in the months of March, June, September, and December."

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

NAVY.

ADMIRALTY, Nov. 8.

To be Honorary Physicians to Her Majesty—Sir John Liddell, C B., M.D., F.R.S., Director General of the Medical Department of the Navy; Inspectors General of Hospitals and Fleets John Wilson (b), M.D., F.R.S.; Alexander Nisbett, M.D.; and Alex. Bryson, M.D., F.R.S.

To be Honorary Surgeons to Her Majesty—Deputy Inspectors General of Hospitals and Fleets Oliver Evans, M.D.; John Grant Stewart, M.D.; James Wingate Johnston, M.D.; and Thomas R. Dunn, M.D.

ADMIRALTY, Nov. 9.

Corps of Royal Marines—First Lieut. E. C. L. Durnford, to be Adjutant; Serjt. Major W. Healey to be Quartermaster; First Lieutenant W. Taylor to be Captain, vice Lawrence, to Half Pay; First Lieut. H. N. C. Blanckley to be Captain, vice Meade, to Half Pay; Second Lieutenant J. M. W. Silver to be First Lieut., vice Taylor; Second Lieutenant J. W. Inglis to be First Lieut., vice Blanckley; Second Lieut. C. B. Smith to be First Lieut., vice Durnford.

ADMIRALTY, Nov. 17.

Corps of Royal Marines—Gentleman Cadet John Alfred Siveny to be Second Lieutenant.

ADMIRALTY, Nov. 21.

Corps of Royal Marines—Colonel Second Commandant Alexander Anderson, to be Colonel Commandant, vice Hurdle, retired; Colonel Second Commandant John Fraser, to be Colonel Commandant to Artillery Division; Colonel Second Commandant Thomas Holloway, C.B., to be Colonel Commandant, vice Dywer, retired; Lieut. Colonel and Brevet Colonel Thomas Lemon, C.B., to be Colonel; Second Commandant, vice Hollaway, promoted; Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet Colonel John Mitchell to be Colonel Second Commandant, vice Anderson, promoted; Captain and Brevet Major T. Dudley Fosbroke, to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Lemon, promoted; First Lieut. Charles William Carrington, to be Capt., vice Fosbroke, promoted; Second Lieutenant Duncan Gordon Campbell, to be First Lieutenant, vice Carrington, promoted.

ADMIRALTY, Nov. 22.

Corps of Royal Marines—First Lieut and Adjutant Robert William Bland Hunt, to be Captain, vice H. Spratt, placed on Half Pay; Second Lieutenant Thomas Palmer Norton, to be First Lieutenant, vice Hunt promoted; First Lieutenant Francis Lean, to be Adjutant, vice Hunt.

PROMOTIONS.

Lieutenant to be Commander—C. F. F. Boughey, 1846, in consequence of his long services, and the creditable state of H.M.S. *Havannah* on paying off, of which ship he was First Lieut.

Second Master to be Master—W. C. Bicknell, 1854.

Assistant Engineers, first class, to be Chief Engineers, Jas. Coode. *Third Class*, Thomas J. Sweeny, confirmed in rank; William Lowther, Richard Sleeman, James Sangster, T. H. Symons.

Assistant Surgeons to be Surgeons—Henry Eales, 1849; George B. Moore, M.D., 1850.

APPOINTMENTS.

Captain—Henry Broadhead, 1846, to *Donegal*.

Commanders—H. D. Selby, 1856, to *Orion*; Wm. Graham, 1858, to *Mutine*; Ralph P. Cator, 1858, to *Fawn*; Henry S. Hawker, 1846, to *Fizgard*; Nowell Salmon, V.C., 1858, to *Icarus*.

Lieutenants—Theodore B. Hollinworth, 1855, to *Prometheus*; Alex. Philips, 1850, and J. S. Trotter, 1859, to *Ariadne*; Charles Pringle, 1856, to *Royal Albert*; A. J. V. Collins, 1859, and J. M. D. Elphinstone, 1859, to *Queen*; Wellesley Gregory, 1855, and R. J. L. Cox, 1859, to *Icarus*; N. C. Barton, 1859, to *Himalaya*; Alfred Luckraft, 1846, to be agent for mails; Hon. Albert D. S. Denison, 1857, to *Fawn*; G. S. Peard, 1859, to *Mutine*; W. Seaward, 1830, to *Wellesley*; H. Vaughan, 1856, to *Hero*; C. C. Robinson, 1854, to *Fawn*; W. W. Howell, 1856, to *Vulcan*; A. M. Byam, 1859, to *Diadem*; H. C. Onslow, 1859, to *Cornwallis*; C. A. J. Heysham, 1854, to *Mutine*; W. R. Kennedy, 1859 to *Trafalgar*; W. H. Phipps, 1846, to *Mars*; F. C. W. Liardet, 1855, to *Ringdove*.

Masters—R. L. Cleveland, 1854, to *Queen*; Cornelius Fox, 1853, to *Ariadne*; Joseph Wallis, 1850, to *Vulcan*; Charles

F. Puckett, 1858 (additional), to *Cumberland*; John D. Rogers, 1857, to *Fawn*; Charles Prickett, 1858, to *Mutine*; James M. Share, 1854, (additional), to *Cumberland*; Charles Prickett, 1858 (additional), to *Fisgard*.

Surgeons—Henry Eales, 1859, to *Prometheus*; Geo. P. Cooke, 1859, to *Ardent*; J. W. Bradshaw, 1857, to *Ardent*; John Nihill, M. D., 1858 additional to *Chesapeake*; James Henry, 1855, to *Mutine*; Wm. Fasken, M.D., 1859, to *Fawn*; George B. Moore, to *Ardent*.

Assistant Surgeons—W.H.Lloyd, M.D. 1856, (additional) to *Formidable*; G. B. Newton, 1852, to the Woolwich Division of the Royal Marines; W. H. Cruice, 1853, (additional) to *Fisguard*; C. B. Lamb, 1856, to *Illustrious*; J. F. Stoddart, to *Nautilus*; John S. Adams, B.A., 1853, to the Chatham Division of Royal Marines; J. M. Bateson to *Diadem*: E. J. Butler to *Mutine*: James Clarkson to *Fawn*: W. H. Carter, 1852, to Greenwich Hospital: Alfred King, 1856, to *James Watt*.

Assistant Surgeons (Acting)—M. Coates, to *Hero*; W. Yarde, M.D., 1859, and B. L. Bett, 1859, (additional) to *Chesapeake*: Thomas Hamilton to *Trafalgar*: R. J. McMorris to Donegal.

Paymasters—James B. Moorman, 1846, to *Queen*: George Teait, 1855, to *Icarus*: Robert Deveson, 1855, (additional) to *Eagle*: James B. McAvoy, 1858, to *Mutine*: J. J. Hayward, 1857, to *Fawn*.

Assistant Paymasters—Henry Pangelly, 1851 (in charge), to *Atholl*; Geo. Prince, 1859, to *Royal Adelaide*; J. K. Pierce, 1856, to *Mutine*.

Chief Engineers—W. B. Baird, 1853, to *Queen*; James Patterson, 1854 to *Ariadne*; James Coode, 1859, to *Mutine*; T. Anderson, 1855, to *Royal Albert*; C. Cottew, 1857, to *Blenheim*; W. W. Williamson, 1852, to *Marlborough*; S. Clements, 1858, to *Liffey*; W. Pitt, 1858, to *Wellington* for *Sanspareil*; G. Robertson, 1859, to *Ardent*; W. Lowther, 1859, to *Prometheus*; R. Sleeman, 1859, to *Sphinx*; J. Sangster, 1859, to *Spitfire*: W. H. Houghton (Acting) to *Fisgard*: George Park, to *Ardent*: George Kent, 1859, to *Hydra*.

Chief Engineer (acting)—James Coode, to *Mutine*.

Second Masters—Charles Wotton, to *Jasper*: G. D. Downing, 1859, to *Nautilus*: W. J. Cunningham, to *Sealark*: Charles Wotton, to *Royal Albert*.

Assistant Engineers (first class)—John Prowett, confirmed to *Victoria and Albert*; Wm. Wotton to *Icarus*. *Second class*—Wm. Steel to *Ariadne*; Jas. Vercoe and T. H. Morgan to *Queen*; Wm. Gibson to *Icarus*. *Acting Second Class*—Richard Alvin to *Asia*, as supernumerary; Francis Martin to *Ariadne*. *Third class*—John Parry to *Ariadne*; Henry Hull to *Queen*; C. J. Gilbert to *Icarus*; Thomas Murray confirmed in *Intrepid*, *Acting Third Class*—William Tempest to *Vulcan*; Albert Jolliffe to *Asia*, for service in *Colossus*; R. Wyllie to *Jackdaw*; Robert Anderson (b.), G. J. Stanfield, J. Gellatly, and J. Turner to *Asia*, as supernumeraries; J. Smith and T. Ritchie to *Ariadne*; J. Forrest (a.) to *Edinburgh*, for service in *Louisa*; G. T. Bates, J. R. Hancock, and W. Wallace, to *Queen*; J. Slater to *Algiers*; G. T. Ludlow to *Himalaya*; Thomas Scott (b) to *Erne*; G. A. Bone to *Himalaya*; David Sharp to *Dauntless*; John Bruce (b.) to *Cumberland*, for service in *Alacrity*; Wm. Holland to *Encounter*, on promotion. *Acting first class*—J. W. Smith to *Cumberland*, for *Wrangler*. *Second Class*—Thomas Crossman to *Mutine*; John Langrish to *Cornwallis*, for service in *Ruby*; Robert Bacon to *Inflexible*; Edward Browne to *Partridge*. *Third class*—C. Lund to *Mutine*; R. E. Denison to *Wellington*; C. Ware to *Partridge*. *Acting third class*—J. Crawford to *Mutine*; J. Peach to *Centaur*; J. Fraser, J. Meiklejohn, A. Leitch, A. Shanks, T. McFarlane, and R. Walters, to *Chesapeake*, as supernumeraries; D. Cartmel to *Asia*, for service in *Wallace*; D. Sinclair to *Hydra*; J. C. Gouchy to *Wellington* for service in *Goldfinch*; O. Owens to *Rhadamanthus*; T. W. Bower to *Bouncer*; Edwd. Parsons to *Satellite*; Edward Newman to *Pelorus*. *Second class*—James Hopkins to *Bouncer*. *Third class*—C. Lund to *Prometheus*; T. Wilson and W. Sides to *Ardent*. *Acting third class*—W. Wallace to *Asia*; J. Peach to *Centaur*; R. Roberts to *Prometheus*; J. Christie to *Ardent*; P. Blanch to *Locust*; A. F. McIntyre to *Queen Charlotte*, for service in *Lizard*; Alex. Wilson to *Royal Albert*; G. E. Foote to *Simoom*; F. T. Elliott to *Fawn*. *Acting second class*—Thomas Scott to *Fawn*; R. H. Alvin to *Vulcan*. *Third class*—W. Fenton to *Renown*. *Acting third class*—James Bell (a.) to *Quail*: Albert Jolliffe, Wm. Pratt, and James Wood, to *Asia*; George McLean to *Ringdove*; A. R. Gray to *Flamer*; W. B. Trenwith to *Wellington*; David Francis to *Snap*: Joseph Sharp to *Prometheus*: John Parkin to *Fawn*: James Russell to *Vulcan*: Robert Winfield to *Asia*, for service in *Fire Queen*.

Midshipmen—A. L. Nugent to *Odin*:

Charles Stuart to *Centaur*: W. H. Bond and R. Barnett to *Sphinx*.

Naval Cadet—W. T. N. Barron, to *Odin*.

Masters' Assistants—W. J. F. Butcher, to *Amphion*: John Boniface, to *Hydra*: B. Harding, to *Fawn*: T. H. Elliott, to *Mutine*.

Clerks—Thomas Silk, to *Ardent*: J. E. Elsworthy, to *Queen*: Arthur Hughes, to *Victory*.

Assistant Clerks—F. G. R. Wright, to *Mars*: H. B. Edwards, to *Algiers*: Alfred Hirtzel, and W. M. Mitchell, to *Ariadne*: G. R. Johnson, to *Illustrious*: W. J. Sumner, to *Queen*: W. A. Westaway, to *Russell*: H. W. Hore, to *Tearus*: M. B. Williams, to *Cumberland*: W. A. Dangerfield, to *Prometheus*: T. A. Carter, to *Hogue*.

COAST GUARD.

APPOINTMENT. *Inspecting Commander.* Commander Thomas J. Young to Dublin Division, vice Shears, period of service expired. George Durbin, 1857, to the Coast Guard.

REMOVALS. *Chief Officers.* Lieut. John Dunsterville, from Arklow to Carlingford, as Inspecting Lieutenant, vice Charles Servante, deceased: Mr. John Kellock, Master, R.N., from Shoreham to Blatchington: Mr. Fenton Wake, from Hill to Sidmouth.

ARMY.

WAR OFFICE, OCT. 28.

56th Foot—Lieut. Gen. J. Home Home, to be Col. vice Gen. the Earl of Westmoreland, G. C. B., deceased; Oct. 17.

WAR OFFICE, OCT. 28.

(The following Commissions to bear date Oct. 30.)

2nd Life Guards—Lieut. H. J. L Wynne to be Capt., by purchase, vice Lumley, who retires; Cornet and Sub-Lieut. H. S. Pakenham to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Wynne.

6th Dragoon Guards—Cornet W. Gair to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Grainger, who retires.

4th Light Dragoons—Ensign N. Clark, from the 89th Foot, to be Cornet, paying the difference, vice England, promoted.

7th Light Dragoons—Lieut. R. N. Pedder to be Capt. by purchase, vice Brisco, who retires; Cornet A. H. Scrope to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Pedder.

9th Light Dragoons—Cornet J. Russell has been permitted, to resign his Commission.

16th Light Dragoons—B. Winthrop, gent., to be Cornet by purchase, vice Agg, promoted.

Grenadier Guards—Lieut. and Capt. J. J. Johnstone to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Earle, appointed to the Staff; May 12.

1st Foot—Capt. A. H. Versturme, from the 17th Foot, to be Capt., vice H. H. Smart, who exchanges; Lieut. A. T. Jones, from the 24th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Plasket, who exchanges.

3rd—Ensign S. Graves to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Wright, deceased; July 6th.

8th—Lieut. Col. and Brevet Col. F. P. Haines, from half pay unatt., to be Lieut. Col., vice Brevet Col. Greathed, C. B., who exchanges.

12th—Ensign W. S. H. Dunlevie to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Page, who retires.

16th—R. W. Robinson, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Godwin, promoted.

17th—Capt. H. H. Smart, from the 1st Foot, to be Capt. vice Versturme, who exchanges; Ensign A. M'Neil Caird to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Torre, who retires; Ensign H. C. Deane to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Houghton, who retires; J. G. Wood, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Caird; H. E. Dent, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Bros, promoted.

20th—Major G. Bennett, to be Lieut. Colonel by purchase, vice Brevet Colonel Eveleigh, C. B., who retires; Brevet Major W. D. S. Dickins, to be Major by purchase, vice Bennett; Lieut. G. B. Duffin, to be Captain by purchase, vice Dickins; Ensign C. Enys, to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Duffin.

22nd—A. E. Tollemache, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Denny, promoted.

23rd—Lieut. J. Lawrence, to be Captain by purchase, vice Radcliffe, who retires; Lieut. G. Packe, to be Instructor of Musketry, vice Lieut. Hutton, who has resigned that appointment, Aug. 29.

24th—Lieut. W. A. H. Plasket, from the 1st Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Jones, who exchanges.

25th—Lieut. J. O'Hea, to be Adjutant, vice Sheppard, promoted.

41st—J. W. Westby, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Caulfield, promoted.

47th—Ensign J. R. Murphy, from the 86th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Sperrin, who exchanges.

54th—W. E. Wilkinson, gent., to be Ensign, vice Chute, promoted.

55th—Quartermaster S. Milward, from Half Pay 2nd Light Infantry British Swiss Legion, to be Quartermaster, vice Green, who exchanges.

61st—G. E. P. Madden, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Rumsey, promoted.

67th—Lieut. M. Nugent to be Captain, without purchase, vice Arnold, deceased; Ensign C. H. B. Turner to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Nugent, Aug. 11; Ensign H. W. Pollard, from the 2nd Foot, to be Ensign, vice Turner.

70th—Capt. R. Eckford, from the 3rd West India Regiment, to be Captain, vice Brevet Major Saunders, who exchanges.

76th—J. Talbot, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Harding, promoted.

79th—Ensign G. Duff to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Smith, who retires.

80th—P. Swinburne, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Howard, promoted; A. R. B. Dowling, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice O'Connor, promoted, Oct. 29.

86th—Ensign J. E. M. Sperrin, from the 47th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Murphy, who exchanges; the Hon. T. J. Wynn to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Wells, promoted.

88th—H. G. Bowen, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice De Blaquiere, who retires.

89th—C. V. Hassall, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice N. Clark, appointed to the 4th Light Dragoons.

92nd—M. T. Carmichael, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Campbell, promoted.

96th—J. Moubray, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Hogg, promoted.

98th—E. Haughton, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Simpson, promoted.

1st West India Regiment—Ensign A. Temple to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Gilborne, deceased, Aug. 28; J. Sealy, gent., to be Ensign without purchase, vice Temple; Quartermaster W. Thomson to be Paymaster, vice Stokely, deceased.

2nd West India Regiment—Lieut. T. Macmillan Fogo to be Adjutant, vice O'Shaugnessy, promoted.

3rd West India Regiment—Brevet Major H. F. Saunders, from the 70th Foot, to be Captain, vice Eckford, who exchanges.

STAFF.—Major R. Carey, from the 40th Foot, to be Deputy Adjutant General to the Troops serving in Australia, with the rank of Lieut. Colonel in the Army, vice Brevet Colonel Neill, deceased.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.—The first Christian name of Assistant Commissary General Gaudet, is Joseph and not James, as stated in the *Gazette* of the 29th July, 1859.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—The Commission of Assistant Surgeon W. B. Davies, M.D., to bear date 6th September, 1858, instead of 30th September, 1859, as previously stated.

PURVEYOR'S DEPARTMENT.—Purveyor's Clerk, First Class J. Bush, to be Purveyor to the Forces, vice Simpson, deceased.

BREVET.—The undermentioned promotions to take place consequent upon the decease of General John, Earl of Westmoreland, G.C.B., Col. of the 56th Foot, on the 16th October:—

Lieut. General Sir W. F. P. Napier, K.C.B., Colonel of the 22nd Foot, to be General, Oct. 17.

Major General J. Fraser, Col. of the 37th Foot, to be Lieutenant General, Oct. 17.

Brevet Colonel W. G. Gold, Half Pay, Unattached, to be Major General, Oct. 17.

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel W. Macpherson, Captain, Half Pay, Unattached Staff Officer of Pensioners, to be Colonel, Oct. 17.

Major H. Grierson, 15th Foot, to be Lieut. Col., Oct. 17.

Capt. T. D. Fosbroke, Royal Marines, to be Major, Oct. 17.

Brevet Major G. Black, late of the 75th Foot; to be Lieutenant Col. in the Army, Feb. 13.

The Brevet Rank of Brevet Major T. B. Spurgin, 1st Madras Fusiliers, has been ante-dated to the 19th January, 1858.

Brevet Major T. B. Spurgin, 1st Madras Fusiliers, to be Lieut. Col. in the Army, March 24, 1858.

To be Majors in the Army—Captain J. B. Y. Matheson, 52nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, July 20, 1858. Captain T. T. Haggard, Bombay Art., July 20, 1858, Captain W. M. S. Bolton, 2nd Bombay Native Infantry, July 26, 1858. Captain W. Murray, 46th Madras Native Infantry, July 20, 1858. Captain P. A. Brown, 1st Madras European Fusiliers, July 20, 1858.

WAR OFFICE, Oct. 28.

MEMORANDUM.—Lieutenant V. S. Griffith, having obtained a First Class Certificate at the School of Musketry at Hythe, has been appointed by his Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, to act as Instructor of Musketry to the Donegal Regt. of Militia, vice Captain Elliott, resigned, Feb. 21.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Staffordshire Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet the Hon. H. Paget, commonly called Lord H Paget, to be Captain, vice Sir R. Peel, Bart., resigned, Oct. 11.

Royal Lancashire Artillery—First Lieut. H. T. Holmes to be Capt., vice H. T. Fyers, promoted; Second Lieut. T. Christie, to be First Lieut., vice H. T. Holmes, promoted Oct. 4.

5th West York—Memorandum—The Queen has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commission held by Lieut. C. Broomhead.

Hampshire Artillery—G. S. Lynch, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Beeching, promoted; J. W. Tighe, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Mansel, promoted, Oct. 21.

Shropshire—W. Boyce, gent., to be Lieut., July 8.

Montgomeryshire Yeomanry Cavalry—T. O. Lomax, gent., to be Cornet, vice Adams, promoted, Oct. 23.

Wicklow Rifles—D. Wright, Esq., to be Surgeon; J. H. Leonard, gent., to be Ensign.

VOLUNTEER RIFLES GAZETTE.

Shropshire (Wellington Wrekin Subdivision)—T. C. Eyton, Esq., to be Lieut. Oct. 17.

Hampshire (1st Company)—Col. T. Faunce (late Major in the 13th Regiment), to be Captain, C. Simeon, Esq., (late Capt., in the 75th Regiment), to be Lieut. Oct, 18.

Inverness—C. L. Mackenzie, Esq., to be Capt., D. A. Nicol, Esq., to be Lieut, H. C. McAndrews, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 15.

Yorkshire, West Riding—(7th Company Halifax)—E. Akroyd, Esq., to be Captain, J. R. Ingram, gent., to be Lieut. C. Fuller, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 13. (8th Company Halifax)—W. I. Holdsworth, Esq., to be Captain., J. Franklin, gent., to be Lieut., F. Sowerby, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 13.

Lanarkshire—(4th Company Glasgow, Northern 1st)—J. F. Jamieson, Esq., to be Capt., G. Anderson, gent., to be Lieut., W. Simpson, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 15. (5th Company Glasgow, Eastern 1st)—J. Anderson, Esq., to be Capt., J. Wilson, gent., to be Lieut. J. A. Wilson, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 17.

Cornwall Artillery—1st Company—J. Tredwen, Esq., to be First Lieut.; H. Pearse, gent., to be Second Lieut., Oct. 17.

Cornwall Artillery—2nd Company—W. T. Sobey, gent., to be First Lieut.; R. Hicks, gent., to be Second Lieut., Oct. 17.

Cornwall — 2nd Company — J. S. Bichford, Esq., to be Capt., T. Hutchinson to be Lieut.; W. Pike to be Ensign, Oct. 17.

Glamorganshire—1st Company—C. R. M. Talbot, Esq., M.P., to be Capt.; T. M. Talbot, Esq., to be Lieut.; W. Llewellyn, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 12. 2nd Company—G. T. Clarke, Esq., to be Captain; W. Menelaus, gent., to be Lieut.; G. Martin, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 12. 3rd Company—L. L. Dillwyn, Esq., M.P., to be Capt.; J. C. Richardson, Esq., to be Lieutenant; R. M. Richards, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 12. 4th Company—H. H. Vivian, Esq., M.P., to be Capt.; L. Thomas, Esq. to be Lieut.; E. Strick, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 12. 5th Company—J. D. Llewellen, Esq., to be Capt.; J. T. D. Llewellyn, to be Lieut.; W. Edmond, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 12.

Gloucester—2nd Company—W. V. Guise, Esq., to be Captain; J. Jones gent., to be Lieut.; T. A. Pearson, Esq. late Capt. 43rd Foot, to be Ensign, Oct 21. 3rd Company—Capt. T. De Winton, late Royal Artillery, to be Capt.; J. H. Dowling, gent., to be Lieut.; R. T. Smith, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 21.

Kent Artillery, 1st Company—W. Gladdish, Esq., to be Capt.; G. E. Sharland, gent., to be First Lieut.; E. A. Hilder, gent., to be Second Lieut., Oct. 20.

Norfolk—5th Sub-division—Sir W. Jones, Bart., to be Lieut.; R. N. Hammond, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 20. 6th Sub-division—J. Holloway, Esq., to be Lieut.; C. H. D. Biyth, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 21.

County of Warwick—The Hon. C. G. Scott, late Capt. in the Scots Fusilier Guards, to be Lieut. Colonel Commanding the different Rifle Volunteer Corps of Warwickshire; Oct. 20.

Lancashire — 40th Company — J. Leigh, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 19.

Wiltshire—B. Robinson, Esq., to be Lieut. of the 1st Company, Oct. 21.

Northamptonshire—2nd Company—The Right Hon. G. W. Fermor, Earl of Pomfret, to be Capt., Oct. 18.

Essex—4th Company—W. Gonne, Esq., to be Lieut.; J. Bulwer, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 19.

WAR OFFICE.

Hospital Staff—To be Assistant Surgeons to the Forces—J. T. Tulloch, M.D.; A. C. Gaye, gent.; W. E. Alsten, M.D.; J. S. Joyney, gent.; C. Henderson, gent.; J. A. Scott, gent.; A. Royle, gent.; W. D. Smith, gent.; T. Wood, M.D.; J. B. Jardine, gent.; J. E. Stewart, M.D.; H. C. Guinness, gent.; A. O. Cowan, M.D.; J. S. C. Collier, gent., Oct. 11.

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 4.

(*The following Commissions to bear date Nov. 4.*)

15th Light Dragoons—Lieutenant R. L. Parker to be Captain by purchase, vice Miller, who retires. Cornet P. Bury to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Parker. Cornet B. Winthrop, from the 16th Light Dragoons, to be Cornet, vice Burrell, promoted.

Coast Brigade of Artillery—Second Captain and Adjutant J. Campbell, of the Invalid Artillery, to be Major.

To be Captains—Capt. H. M'Gorrery, from half-pay of the late Land Transport Corps. Second Capt. W. Handyside, from half-pay of the late Land Transport Corps. Second Captain W. Henry, from half-pay of the late Land Tranport Corps. Second Captain A. Henry, from half-pay of the late Land Transport Corps. Second Captain J. Mackenzie, from half pay of the late Land Transport Corps. Quartermaster W. Elliott, from the Gentlemen Cadet Company. Deputy Assistant-Commissary James Rogan, from half-pay of the late Field Train Department.

To be Second Captain—Lieutenant and Adjutant J. Sweeny, from the Military Train, vice Campbell promoted.

To be Lieutenants—Deputy Assistant Commissary J. McGillivray, from half pay of the late Field Train Department. Serjeant Major J. Scott, Royal Artillery. Serjeant Major R. Kettle, Royal Artillery. Quartermaster Serjeant D. Anderson, Royal Artillery. Serjeant Major C. Phillips, Royal Artillery. Serjeant Major J. T. Cole, Royal Artillery. Serjeant J. Thompson, Royal Artillery Serjeant G. McMurray, Royal Artillery. Lieutenant J. T. Cole to be Adjutant. Lieutenant D. Anderson to be Quartermaster.

Royal Engineers—Lieut. Col. and Brevet Col. E. Frome to be Col., vice Foster, removed as a General Officer, 25th Oct. Capt and Brevet Major S. Westmacott, to be Lieutenant Colonel, vice Frome, 25th Oct. Second Captain G. E. L. Walker to be Capt., vice Westmacott, 25th Oct. Lieutenant G. N. Kelsall to be Second Captain, vice Walker, 25th Oct. Lieutenant P. H. Scratchley to be Second Captain, vice Donelly, placed on the Seconded List, 1st Oct.

Military Train—Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Robertson, C.B., to be Lieutenant Colonel without purchase. Captain J. M. Hill to be Major, without purchace, vice Robertson. Second Captain St. John Willans, from half pay late Land Transport Corps, to be Captain, vice Hill. Capt. J. Balcombe, from half pay Unattached, to be Captain.

Coldstream Guards—A. B. R. Myers, gent., to be Assistant Surgeon, vice Bowen, appointed to the Royal Hibernian School, 26th Sept.

Scots Fusilier Guards—Lieutenant and Captain F. Lambton, to be Capt. and Lieutenant Colonel by purchase, vice Holder, who retires; Ensign and Lieutenant H. G. Bowden, to be Lieut. and Captain by purchase, vice Lambton; F. J. N. Barne, gent., to be Ensign and Lieutenant by purchase, vice Bowden.

4th—Lieutenant J. Constable, to be Captain without purchase, vice Clark, deceased, Aug. 2; Ensign C. R. Durrant, to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Constable, Aug. 2, 1859.

7th—Lieutenant H. Plummer, to be Captain without purchase, vice Maskelyne, deceased, Sept. 18, 1859; Ensign W. J. Frampton, to be Lieutenant without purchase, vice Plumber, Sept. 18, 1859.

21st—Captain J. Henderson, from the 78th Foot, to be Captain, vice Finlay, who exchanges.

22nd—H. P. Leader, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Pocock, promoted; W. B. Hatton, gent., to be Ensign by purchase, vice Carey, promoted, Nov. 5, 1859.

23rd—Lieutenant C. F. Gregorie to be Captain, by purchase, vice Brevet Major Duff, who retires.

40th—Captain H. T. F. White to be

the 21st Foot, to be Capt., vice Henderson, who exchanges.

84th Foot—Lieut. A. J. Hassard, from the 76th Foot, to be Lieut., vice Forster, who exchanges.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

West Kent Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet W. S. Nicholson, to be Lieut. vice Hayward, resigned, Oct. 22.

The Victoria Rifles—First Lieut. B. Greenhill to be Captain, vice Cook, resigned; Second Lieut. W. Dickenson, to be First Lieutenant, vice Greenhill, promoted; Second Lieut. W. L. Collins to be First Lieut., vice Trew, promoted; Lord John Hay, Captain R.N., to be Second Lieutenant, vice Dickenson, promoted; W. Bonser, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Collins, promoted; J. K. Haworth, gent., to be Second Lieut., Sept, 16.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 18th Oct., inst.]

4th Royal Lancashire—Ensign C. G. Ring to be Lieut., vice H. Vowell, resigned, Oct. 10.

West Essex—C. Hyder, gent., to be Quartermaster, Sept. 23

Royal North Lincoln—Capt. J. Golden to be Major, vice W. C. Amcotts, resigned, Oct. 26.

Royal North Lincoln—Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation by Captain G. S. Smith of his Commission in the Royal North Lincoln Regiment of Militia.

2nd Duke of Lancaster's Own—H. Curry, gent., to be Ensign, vice E. E. Bromilow, who, being absent without leave, has been struck off the strength of the Regiment, Oct. 26.

Royal Lancashire Artillery—R. A. Johnson, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice W. F. Fosbery, promoted, Oct. 26.

VOLUNTEER RIFLES GAZETTE.

Brecknock—J. Maund, Esq., to be Lieut. of the 1st Company, R. Raikes, Esq., to be Ensign of the 1st Company, Oct. 24.

Bath, or 1st Somerset—J. R. Ford, Esq., to be Captain, T. F. Inman, gent, to be Lieut.; T. W. P. Airey, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 20.

Bathwick, or 2nd Somerset—E. F. Anstey, Esq., to be Captain; H. H. Burne, gent., to be Lieut; W. Attfield, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 21.

Taunton, or 3rd Somerset—W. A. Stanford, Esq., to be Captain; A. Allen, gent., to be Lieut.; R. Easton, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 22.

Cornwall, 3rd Company—G. Reid, Esq., late Captain 2nd Dragoons, to be Captain; M. V. Bull, Esq., late Lieut. 10th Foot, to be Lieut.; H. Sterman Esq., late Lieutenant 16th Lancers, to be Ensign.

Cornwall Artillery, 2nd Company—W. F. Essell, Esq., to be Captain.

12th Middlesex—W. Taylor, Esq., to be Captain, Oct. 20.

Worcestershire—F. W. Knight, Esq., to be Captain; A. J. Hancocks, Esq., to be Lieut.; A. T. Hancocks, Esq., to be Ensign.

1st Lincolnshire—W. C. Amcotts, Esq., to be Captain; A. Trollope, Esq., to be Lieut.; J. Shuttleworth, Esq., to be Ensign, Oct. 26.

Shropshire, 1st Subdivision — The Hon. R. C. Herbert to be Ensign, Oct. 28.

Berkshire, 1st Subdivision—The Hon. A. L. M. H. Ruthven to be Lieut., Oct. 27.

Gloucestershire, 7th Company—H. Bromby, gent., to be Lieut.; W. Martin, gent., to be Ensign, Oct. 28.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 25th Oct. last.]

Glamorganshire, 4th Company—I. Thomas, Esq., to be Lieut., Oct. 12.

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 8.

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT—Deputy Assistant Commissary General F. G. Woolrabe has been permitted to resign his Commission; Sept. 28.

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 11.

(*The following Commissions to bear date November* 11.)

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.—To be Deputy Commissaries General—Assistant Commissaries General W. H. Maturin and R. Routh.

To be Assistant Commissaries General—Deputy Assistant Commissaries General R. Baker, C. W. Eichbaum, G. A. Skinner, A. F. Adams, J. H. Tubby.

To be Deputy Assistant Commissaries General—Commissariat Clerks—T. S. Marshall, A. M. Festing, E. C. Saunder, F. Casolani, J. F. Manning, E. Cattell, S. Reynett Brown, T. B. Prissick, J. M. Rattle, W. G. Walker, H. J. Wild, C. D'Osly Forbes, F. Innis, W. W. Moore, R. Stanes, E. F. G. Greenwood, J. P. Wilkinson, R. E. Hunter, C. E. Courtney, A. C. Ryland, H. W. Hackman, W. Ogilvy, W. O. Chislett, G. R. Gibson, F. B. Wingfield, J. Draper, A. Ewing, J. L. Robertson, J. H. Randall,

R. L. Matthews, T. A. Le Mesurier, G. W. W. Ingram, H. N. Tharp, H. B. A. Middleton, A. L. Haliburton, W. R. Snow, W. H. S. Marshall, E. Estridge, I. R. C. Cunningham Graham, E. Dunn, C. W. Penrice, N. Taylor.

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 11.

MEMORANDUM.—The next Annual Examination of the Senior and Junior Division of the Students of the Staff College, will take place on 1st December, and following days.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Cumberland—W. J. Robinson, gent., to be Quartermaster, Oct. 12. Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commission held by Lieut. W. J. Robinson.

Oxfordshire—Lieut. T. M. Crowder, to be Captain, vice Roitt, resigned; Ensign C. R. Bulkely, to be Lieutenant, vice Crowder, promoted, Nov. 1.

1st East Middlesex—F. J. T. Nantes, gent., to be Ensign, vice Crespin, resigned; C. Dowell, gent., to be Ensign, vice Wells, promoted; Oct. 11.

4th South Middlesex—R. F. Sproule, gent., to be Ensign, vice Gunning, resigned; Aug. 5. G. R. Harriott, gent., to be Ensign, vice Page, promoted, Oct. 27.

North Devon Mounted Rifles—F. Fortesque to be Lieutenant, vice Marshall, deceased; L. S. Northcot to be Cornet, vice Trulusis, promoted; E. C. Bishopp to be Cornet, vice Mallett, promoted, Oct. 18.

King's Own Light Infantry—Lieut. J. Hamilton to be Captain, vice Adams, promoted, Nov. 3

East York—Ensign W. H. Middleton to be Lieut., vice Swan, resigned; Nov. 4. R. Lister, gent., to be Ensign, vice Morris, resigned, Nov. 4.

Edinburgh City Artillery—W. Pounsett, gent., to be Second Lieut., vice Davidson, promoted, Nov. 4.

3rd West York—Lieut. F. C. C. Loftus to be Capt., vice Waite, who retires; Ensign T. Bolger to be Lieut., vice Loftus, promoted; Oct. 20. Ensign F. A. Verner to be Lieut., vice Bottomley, appointed to the Royal Marines; W. L. B. Coulson, gent., to be Ensign, vice Bolger, promoted Oct. 20.

MEMORANDUM.—Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to permit Capt. W. Waite, on his retirement, to retain his rank, in consideration of his having served 29 years in the same Regiment.

VOLUNTEER RIFLES GAZETTE.

Oxfordshire—J. H. Warner, Esq., o Baliol College, Lieut. of the 2nd Company, to be Capt. of the 3rd Company, vice Cullen, resigned; W. Hobling, Esq., of St. John's College, to be Lieut. of the 2nd Company, vice Warner, promoted, Nov. 2.

Surrey. 6th Company—Sir H. Fletcher to be Capt.; Oct. 29.

South Middlesex—The Right Honourable T. H. J. Viscount Ranelagh, to be Major; Oct. 14.

4th Middlesex—A. Alexander, Esq., to be Capt; E. R. Cummins, gent., to be Lieut,; J. W. Docwra, gent., to be Ensign; Oct. 15.

9th Middlesex—The Right Hon. G. A. William B. Radstock, to be Capt.; Oct 11.

14th Middlesex—J. Wilkinson, Esq., to be Capt.; W. A. Langdale, gent., to be Lieut.; R. Barclay, gent., to be Ensign, Nov. 2.

Exeter and South Devon Rifles—A. C. Chichester to be Capt., vice Brown, resigned; L. T. Clark to be Lieut., vice George, promoted; R. K. Vallance to be Lieut., vice Haines, resigned; H. W. Clark to be Ensign, Oct. 1.

Devon Artillery, 1st Company—J. Holman to be First Lieut., vice Adney, resigned; R. Holman to be Second Lieut., vice J. Holman, promoted, Oct. 1.

Lanarkshire—6th Company (Glasgow Northern 2nd—Jas. Taylor, Esq., to be Capt.; J. Rankin, gent, to be Lieut.; D. Winton, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 4. 7th Company (Glasgow Northern 3rd)—Archibald Keir Murray, Esq., to be Capt.; J. L. Lang, gent., to be Lieut; W. G. Murray, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 4. 8th Company (Glasgow Northern 4th) J. G. Galbraith, Esq., to be Capt.; C. Inglis, gent., to be Lieut.; R. Buchanan Stewart, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 4. 9th Company (Glasgow Bankers 1st)—J. Robertson, Esq., to be Capt.; J. Syme, gent., to be Lieut., H. Cowan, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 4. 10th Company (Glasgow Southern 2nd)—W. S. Dixon, Esq., to be Captain; C. O'Neill, gent., to be Lieut.; J. London, gent., to be Ensign; Nov 4.

1st Edinburgh (City) Artillery—J. Paton, to be Capt. J. Fard, Esq., to be First Lieut.; J. Archer, gent., to be Second Lieut.; Nov. 4.

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 15.

4th Light Dragoons—Cornet J. W

Kelly to be Quartermaster, vice J. Hill, retired on Half Pay.

17th Light Dragoons—F. W. Blumberg, gent, to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Tucker, promoted in 13th Light Dragoons.

Military Train — Lieut.-Colonel B. O'Brien, from 87th Foot, to be Lieut.-Colonel, vice Browne, who exchanges. Surgeon O'Connor d'Arcey, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon, vice Surg.-Maj. Dolmage, appointed to the Staff.

Royal Artillery—Assist.-Surgeon R. C. Crean, from the staff, to be Assist-Surg, vice Bubb, deceased.

2nd Foot—J. V. Bates, gent, to be Ensign by purch., vice Squirl, promoted.

6th—Ensign C. W. H. Wilson to be Lieutenant. with purchase vice Mansergh, promoted.

10th—G. W. Carter, gent, to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Barnett, promoted.

15th—Ensign H. W. K. Hawks to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Bush, who retires.

19th—Assistant-Surgeon C. E. Wikeley from the Staff, to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Webb, who exchanges.

24th—Lieutenant O. Goldsmith, from the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment, to be Lieutenant, vice Prendergast, appointed to 52nd ; Lieutenant W. Franklin to be Instructor of Musketry.

35th—Ensign T. J. Dillon to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Vandaleur, promoted.

51st—Lieutenant P Chaplain, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Herrick, who retires ; Ensign W. P. L. Lewis, to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Chaplin.

52nd—Lieutenant C. O'Loughlin L. Prendergast, from 24th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Suckling, appointed to Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment.

58th—Surgeon-Major H. Downes, M.D., from the Staff, to be Surgeon-Major, vice Thomson, who exchanges.

60th—R. F. St Andrew St John, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Cox, promoted.

71st—The Christian name of Ensign Brodie is Francis, and not Frank, as previously stated.

75th—A. J. Buckle, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Hammill, promoted.

78th—Lieut. T. H. Thompson to be Instructor of Musketry.

79th—Ensign J. Brebner, from 85th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Duff, promoted.

87th—Lieutenant-Col. H. R. Browne, from the Military Train, to be Lieut.-Col., vice O'Brien, who exchanges.

1st West India Regiment—Ensign T. B. Eames to be Lieut., with purchase, vice E. Smith, deceased ; H. C. Mansergh, gent., to be Ensign, with purchase, vice Eames.

Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Lieut. F. H. Suckling, from 52nd Foot, to be Lieut., vice Goldsmith, appointed to 24th Foot.

Hospital Staff— Surgeon-Major G. Dolmage, from the Military Train, to be Surgeon-Major, vice Surgeon D'Arcey, appointed to the Military Train : Surgeon-Major A. S. Thomson, M.D., from 58th Foot, to be Surgeon-Major, vice Downes, who exchanges ; W. Creagh, gent., to be Assistant-Surgeon to the Forces: Assistant-Surgeon W. M. Webb from 19th Foot, to be Assist.-Surgeon to the Forces, vice Wikely, who exchanges : Assist.-Surgeon G. R. Woolhouse, from 46th Foot, to be Assistant-Surgeon to the Forces, vice Crean, appointed to Royal Artillery : Acting Assistant-Surgeon R. Dale has ceased to do duty, there being no longer occasion for his services.

BREVET—Brevet-Major D. S. Dodgson, 30th Bengal N.I., to be Lieut.-Col. in the Army; Captain R. R. Glyn, Rifle Brigade, to be Major in the Army; Quartermaster J. Hill, retired on Half-Pay, 4th Light Dragoons, to have the honorary rank of Captain, under the Royal Warrant of December 17, 1855.

Memorandum—Captain Wykeham-Martin, 4th Light Dragoons, has been permitted to assume the name of "Fiennes Cornwallis." instead of "Fiennes Wykeham-Martin."

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 18.

Royal Engineers—Lieut. John Oldfield to be Col. Commandant, vice Lewis, deceased ; Oct. 25.

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 18.

3rd Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Lieut. Jon Charles Boucher, to be Captain, by purchase, vice Still, who retires; Cornet Henry Mapleton Hookin to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Boucher, Nov. 18.

8th Light Dragoons—Cornet Michael Clarke to be Adjutant, vice Lieut. Harding deceased ; Nov. 24, 1858.

11th Light Dragoons—Lieut. Charles Philip Viscount Royston, from the 7th Light Dragoons, to be Lieut., vice Yates, promoted, without purchase, to an Unattached Company ; Nov. 18.

13th Light Dragoons—Cornet James White has been permitted to retire from

the service by the sale of his Commission; Nov. 18.

Royal Artillery—Serjeant Major G. Alexander Shepherd to be Quartermaster, vice Elliott, promoted to be a Captain in the Coast Brigade; Nov. 4.

Royal Engineers—Brevet Major W. Collier Menzies to be Lieut. Col., vice Fenwick, deceased; Capt. Douglas Galton, from the Seconded List, to be Capt, vice Menzies; Oct. 25. The promotion of the undermentioned officers to be dated 13th, instead of 25th October, viz: Lieut. Col. Spencer, Westmacott; Capt. George E. L. Walker; Second Capt. Gustavus N. Kelsell.

Scots Fusilier Guards—The second Christian name of Mr. Barne, appointed to an Ensigncy and Lieutenancy, by purchase, on the 4th Nov., is St. John, and not John, as then stated.

2nd Regiment of Foot—Ensign John Mackie Laurent to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Page, who retires; Nov. 18.

3rd—Lieut. William Pitt Butts, from the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment, to be Lieut., vice Merret, who exchanges; Nov. 18.

6th—Lieut. H. J. Lawrell to be Capt. by purchase, vice Mill, who retires; Nov. 18.

10th—Ensign Ernest Archibald Berger to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Kenny, who retires; Assistant Surg. W. Langworthy Baker, from the Staff, to be Assistant Surg., vice Rennie, promoted on the Staff; Nov. 18.

11th—For Ensign Henry Joseph "Webbs" to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Mounsell, promoted, which appeared in the *Gazette* of 15th Janua 1858, read, Ensign Henry Joseph "Webb," &c.

15th—Lieut. W. G. Herbert Taylor Fairfax, from the 31st Foot, to be Capt., by purchases vice J. Smyth, who retires; Nov. 18.

22nd—Ensign W. S. Ward to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Henry B. Chichester, who retires; Nov. 18.

27th Foot—Wm. Herring, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Coffey, promoted; Nov. 18.

32nd Foot—Brevet Major Richard Henry Magenis, from the 90th Foot, to be Captain, vice Knox, who exchanges; Nov. 18.

54th Foot—Ensign Sir Charles Wentworth Burdett, Bart., to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Parr, deceased; Aug. 15.

57th—Ensign Charles Mansfield Clarke to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Slade, promoted; Nov. 18.

60th Foot—Ensign George Hewitt Trotman to be Lieut., without purchase, vice Steel, deceased; Aug. 13. Capt. James Henry Archer has been permitted to assume the surname of "Lawrence Arthur," in lieu of that of "Archer."

77th—Ensign Randle Jackson to be Lieutenant by purchase, vice Peach, who retires; Nov. 18.

90th—Captain Robert Trotter Knox, from the 32nd Foot, to be Captain, vice Brevet Major Magenis, who exchanges; Nov. 18.

96th—Lieutenant William Osborne Barnard to be Captain, by purchase, vice Nugent, promoted to an Unattached Majority; Ensign John Leslie Toke to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Barnard; Augustus Frederick Arthur Hill, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Toke; Nov. 18.

98th—Ensign Thomas F. Swinford to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Woolward, whose promotion by purchase, on the 11th March, has been cancelled, Nov. 18.

Rifle Brigade—Lieutenant Frederic Carl Playne to be Captain by purchase, vice Rowles, who retires; Ensign Cecil George Asseton Drummond to be Lieut., by purchase, vice Playne; Ensign Rowland Egerton to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Evans, who retires; Ensign the Hon. Thomas John Wynn, from the 86th Foot, to be Ensign, without purchase; Richard Winstanley Ormerod, gent., to be Ensign, without purchase; Nov. 18. The Hon. Charles North to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Drummond; Nov. 19. Frederick William Duncome, gent., to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Egerton; Nov. 20.

1st West India Regiment—Serjeant Major Patrick Maloney, to be Quartermaster, vice Thomson, appointed Paymaster; Nov. 18.

Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment—Lieutenant Thomas Merratt, from the 3rd Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Butts, who exchanges; Nov. 18.

UNATTACHED.—Captain St. George Mervyn Nugent, from the 96th Foot, to be Major, by purchase; Nov. 18.

Brevet Colonel Thomas Holmes Tidy, Major on half pay 14th Foot, late Deputy Adjutant General in Jamaica, to be Lieutenant Colonel, without purchase; Oct. 1.

HOSPITAL STAFF.—Surgeon Major Edward Hugh Blakeney, who retires on half pay, to have the honorary rank of

Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, in accordance with the Royal Warrant of 1st October; Nov. 18.

Assistant Surgeon Duncan Robertson Rennie, from the 10th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Thornton Marshall, placed upon half pay; Nov. 18, 1858.

Assistant Surgeon St. John Killery, from the 29th Foot, to be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces, vice Baker, appointed to the 10th Foot; Nov. 18.

BREVET.—Major and Brevet Lieut. Col. George Durnford, retired full pay 70th Foot, to be Colonel in the army; the rank being honorary only; Nov. 18.

Brevet Major H. B. Lumsden, 59th Bengal Native Infantry, to be Lieut. Colonel in the Army; May 15, 1858.

Major William Henry Cobbs Lye, 13th Bombay Native Infantry, to be Lieutenant Colonel in the army; Dec. 7, 1858.

Captain Alfred William Lucas, 7th Bombay Native Infantry, to be Major in the army; July 20, 1858.

Captain Edward Armitage Hardy, 1st Bombay Cavalry, to be Major in the Army; July 20, 1858.

Captain John Gordon Petrie, Bombay Artillery, to be Major in the army; July 20, 1858.

Captain George Gleig Brown, Bombay Artillery, to be Major in the Army; July 20, 1858.

Second Captain Henry William Gulliwur, Bengal Engineers, to be Major in the army; Aug. 28, 1858.

MEMORANDUM—Major Edward Carter Giffard has repaid the difference which he received on exchanging to half pay Unattached in 1847, and been permitted to retire from the service by the sale of an Unattached Majority, he being about to become a settler in Canada; Nov. 18.

THE MILITIA GAZETTE.

Royal Bucks King's Own Militia—John Cross, gent., to be Quartermaster, Sept. 30.

2nd Regiment Royal Bucks Yeomanry Cavalry—Cornet Wm. Maberly to be Lieutenant, vice Fitzgerald, resigned.

County of Stafford—Lieutenant Col. Francis William Newdegate to be Deputy Lieut.; Henry Elwell, Esq., to be Deputy Lieut.; Nov. 4.

1st Regiment of King's Own Staffordshire Militia—Wm. Henry Armitage, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 10.

Renfrewshire Volunteer Rifles—5th Company: John Anderson, gent., late Captain Prince of Wales Royal Regt. of Renfrew Militia, to be Captain; John Birkmyre, gent., to be Lieutenant; James Dunbar, gent, to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

Warwickshire Rifle Volunteers—2nd Company: Josiah Yeomans Robins, gent., to be Lieut.; Nov. 8.

City of Edinburgh Artillery Militia—John Boulton, gent., Adjutant of that Regiment, to serve with the rank of Capt. from 6th Sept.; Nov. 14.

Brecknock Volunteer Rifles—James Williams, Esq., to be Honorary Surgeon to the 1st Company; Nov. 15.

Royal Gloucester Regiment of Hussar Yeomanry—John E. Dorington, gent., to be Cornet, vice Dickenson, resigned; Nov. 14.

City of Bristol Rifle Volunteer Corps—Captain Arthur Mowbray Jones to be Adjutant, with the rank of Capt.; Nov. 14.

1st Company of Derbyshire Volunteer Rifles—John Johnson, Esq., M.D., to be Honorary Surgeon.

Robin Hood Rifle Volunteer Corps—Thomas Hawstone Starey, gent., to be Captain; Anthony John Mundella, gent., to be Lieutenant; Robert Evans, to be Ensign; Richard Birkin, the younger, gent., to be Captain; Richard Robert Patterson, gent., to be Lieut.; Bernard Bradley, gent., to be Ensign; Thomas Isaac Birkin, gent., to be Capt.; John Patterson, gent., to be Lieutenant; Francis Bryan Baker, gent., to be Ensign; Frederick William Parsons, gent., to be Captain; John Smith Wright, gent., to be Ensign; Henry Smith, gent., to be Captain; Wm. Lambert, gent., to be Lieut; Wm. Walter Miller, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

Royal Monmouthshire Militia—Arthur Edwd. Benson, gent., to be Lieut., vice Dowling, resigned.

The London Scottish Rifle Volunteer Corps—George Mackenzie, Esq., to be Capt.; Nov. 7.

Dorset Regiment of Militia—Captain Edward Atkyns Wood to be Major, vice Heming, resigned; Nov. 12.

2nd Worcestershire Rifle Volunteers—Colonel Arthur Charles Lowe to be Captain; William Norris, Esq., to be Lieut.; William McLaughlin, Esq., to be Ensign.

Reigate, or 5th Surrey Company of Volunteer Rifle Corps—The Hon. Wm. John Monson to be Capt.; Sept. 12, and not September 2, as previously gazetted. Francis Henry Beaumont, Esq., to be Lieut.; Sept. 12, and not Sept. 2, as

previously gazetted. Henry Lainson, Esq., to be Ensign; Sept. 12, and not Sept. 2, as previously gazetted.

[The following notice is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of the 21st of October last.]

Inverness-shire Volunteers—1st Company—Colin Lyon Mackenzie, Esq., to be Capt.; Donald Angus Nichol, Esq., to be Lieut.; H. Cockburn M'Andrew, Esq., to be Ensign.

County of Worcester—Henry John Wentworth Hodgetts Foley, M.P., to be Deputy Lieutenant; John Parker, to be Deputy Lieutenant.

Cambridgeshire Militia—Ensign Joshua Brereton to be Lieut.; Nov. 5.

14th Company of Lancashire Rifle Volunteers—Charles John Brady, gent., to be Lieut.; Henry Jones, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 10.

1st Subdivision of Rifle Volunteers of Berks—Samuel Thomas George Evans, of Eton College, to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

Kent Artillery Volunteers, 2nd Company—William Hill, Esq., to be Capt.; William Augustus Munn, Esq., to be First Lieut.; John Farrars Crookes, gent., to be Second Lieut.; William Parker Hoare, Esq., to be Honorary Surgeon; Nov. 15.

Kent Volunteer Rifles, 1st Subdivision—William Bristow, gent., to be Lieut.; Thomas Wm. Marchant, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 11.

The notices of Commissions in the Kent Artillery Volunteers and Volunteer Rifles, gazetted on Nov. 11, as follows, viz.:—George Milner Schorley, gent., to be Second Lieutenant, should have been George Milner Scholey; Wm. Harrold Lordiston Barnett, gent., to be Ensign, should have been Wm. Harold Loodilow Barnett.

Dundee Rifle Volunteer Corps, 1st Company—George Lloyd Alison to be Captain; John Jack, jun., Esq., to be Lieut.; Wm. Smith Stephen, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15. 2nd Company—Patrick Anderson, Esq., to be Captain; James Henderson Bell, Esq., to be Lieutenant; James Bell, jun., Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15. 3rd Company—David Pitcairn, Esq., to be Captain; Alexander Ogilvy, Esq., to be Lieut.; Peter Geddes Walker, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15. 4th Company—Andrew Low, Esq., to be Captain; Robert Small, Esq., to be Lieut.; Wm. Wylie Neish, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15. 5th Company—Alexander Anderson, Esq., to be Capt.; Henry Bosse, Esq., to be Lieut.; Alexander Bell, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

2nd Forfarshire Rifle Volunteers—Wm. Gray, Esq., to be Captain; George Lyon, Esq., to be Lieut.; David Crighton, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

3rd Forfarshire Rifle Volunteers—James Anderson Dickson, Esq., to be Captain; David Salmond, Esq., to be Lieut.; Charles W. Corsar, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

4th Forfarshire Rifle Volunteers—James Muir, Esq., to be Captain; John A. Anderson, Esq., to be Lieut.; David Corsar, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

5th Forfarshire Rifle Volunteers—Major Thomas Renny Tailyour to be Captain; Robert Smart, Esq., to be Lieut.; Andrew Greig, Esq., to be Ensign; Nov. 15.

Northumberland Regiment of Militia Artillery—Henry John Ryde, gent., to be Second Lieut.; Nov. 17.

West Riding of Yorkshire Rifle Volunteers, 9th Company (Wakefield)—Joseph Hulme Holdsworth, Esq., to be Captain; John Barff Charlesworth, gent., to be Lieut.; George Wm. Alder, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 17. 11th Company (Leeds)—Williams James Armitage, Esq., to be Captain; Abraham Horsfal, gent., to be Lieut.; Thomas John Kinnear, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 17. 1st Subdivision (North Craven)—Walter Morrison, gent., to be Lieut.; John Ingleby, gent., to be Ensign; Nov. 17.

MEMORANDUM.—West York Rifle Regiment of Militia—Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of the Commissions held by Capt. Robert Mowbray Darnell and Lieut. Edward John Cooke. Her Majesty has also been pleased to permit Capt. Darnell, on his retirement, to retain his rank, in consideration of his having served upwards of 19 years.

[The following appointment is substituted for that which appeared in the *Gazette* of Nov. 15]—

Warwickshire Rifle Volunteers, 1st Company—John Williams Sanders, Captain and Brevet Major late 41st Bengal Native Infantry, to be Captain; Nov. 4.

INDEX

TO THE

THIRD PART FOR 1859.

Admiralty, the, and Sir Howard Douglas's Screw Propeller, with diagram, 177.
Alexander, Col. Sir J. E., K.C.L.S., 14th Regt. Military Examination for Junior Officers of Infantry, comprising 600 Questions and Answers in Discipline, Drill, Interior Economy, etc., by, *noticed*, 124. The Arts of Camp Life, by, 199.
Alliances, Franco-Sardinian, 86.
Almost a Heroine. By the author of "Charles Auchester," *noticed*, 277.
Amoor River, Russian Official Description of the, 416.
Anniversary of Balaklava, the First, 428.
Appointments and Promotions, 145, 616, 472, 627.
Arctic Search, the Last, 276, 282.
Arms Damaged, 131.
——, Packing of—Circular Memorandum, Horse Guards, 127.
Armstrong Gun and Captain Blakeley, the, 226.
Army Medical Department, The, 507.
Army, British, Stations of the, 138, 309, 465, 621.
——, Promotions and Appointments, 146, 317, 474, 627.
——, Bombay, Distribution of the, 135, 306, 460, 616.
——, Madras, Distribution of the, 136, 307, 463, 617.
—— in the Field, or Fortifications—our National Defences, 1.
Austrians and the Allies, Losses of the in the late War, 129.

Balaklava, the First Anniversary of, 428.
Bath, the Order of the, 448.
Bengal Naval Brigade, Stations of the, 143, 314, 470.
Bentley Priory. By Mrs. Hastings Parker, *noticed*, 451.
Blakeley, Captain, and the Armstrong Gun, 226.
Bombay Army, Distribution of the, 135, 306, 462, 615.
Bormann, General, on the Shrapnel and Boxer Shells and Fuze, 23.
Brevet, the, 148, 150, 153, 155, 156, 157, 318, 319, 322, 323, 475, 477, 480.
British Army, Stations of the, 138, 309, 465, 621.
British Navy, The Proper Strength of the, 536.
British Navy during the Russian War. By Theseus, late R. N., 218.
Burgoyne, Sir John, Comparative View of the Opinions and of the Reports of Lieut. Gen. Macintosh on the Defence of Turkey, 42, 277, 281.

Camp to Quarters, from, or Life in an Indian Cantonment after Field Service, 401.
Camp Life, the Arts of. By Colonel Sir J. E. Alexander, K.C.L.S., 14th Regt., 193.
Campaign of 1848 in Lombardy, 71, 231.
Campaign of 1849 in Piedmont, 587.
Cannibalism and other Atrocities in Western Africa, some Account of. By Consul Thomas J. Hutchinson, F.R.G.S., 439.
Ceylon, the Defences of, 134.
China, the Seikhs for, 271.
Chinese Policy, a Glance at our, 397.
Chinese War, the Last. From the Attack, Capture, and Occupation of Canton, 1857, 1858-9, by the Allied Forces of England and France, to the Departure of the Plenipotentiaries, 371, 555.
Clyde, a New Battery on the, 459.
Coast Defences, 279.

Coast Guard, Appointments and Removals, 146, 317, 474.
Collins, Wilkie, The Queen of Hearts by, *noticed*, 150.
Colonization of India, 362.
Correspondence, General, 125, 279.
Correspondents, Notice to, 124, 608.
Critical Notices, 123, 277, 450, 607.

Deaths, 158.
Defences, our Home, with a few words on our Military, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, 109.
Defences, our National. — Fortifications, or an Army in the Field, 1.
Defences of Turkey, The, 413, 547.
Desertion—the true Method for Effectually Checking it, 94.
Dominica Militia, the, 461.
Douglas, Sir Robert, Screw Propeller and the Admiralty, with diagram, 177.
Dover, the Fortifications of, 132.

East India Army, Parliamentary Return of the Strength of the, 133.
Editor's Portfolio ; or Naval and Military Register, 119, 274, 446, 603.
Ellis, E. L., Esq., Bengal Civil Service, 158.
Encroaches of Foreign Shipping, 130.
England, the Wars of, 131.
England and America in the Pacific, 274.
Enquiries touching the Ethnology of certain Tribes of Africans interior to the Bight of Biafra. By Consul Thomas J. Hutchinson, F.R.G.S., 115.

Female Influence. By Lady Charlotte Maria Pepys, *noticed*, 123.
Fire-arms, 51.
Forces, Land our—England--Second Line of Defence, 139.
Foreign Troops of France, the, 389.
Fortifications and National Defences, General Sir Howard Douglas on, 527.
Fortifications, or an Army in the Field —our National Defences, 1.
Fox, the, Expedition to the Polar Regions of, 133.
France and Germany, the Relative Strength of, 386.
France, Sardinian Alliances, 86.
Franco-Spanish Invasion of Morocco, 447.
Franklin Expedition, Fate of the, Official Reports—Proceedings of the Yacht Fox, 282.
French Camp Life, 132.
Fuze and Boxer Shells, General Borman on the Shrapnel, 23.

Gardener, Sir Robert, Minute on the Ordnance Department, 121.
Gazette, Militia, 148, 150, 151, 153, 157, 318, 320, 322, 323, 475, 478, 479, 480 481.
General Correspondence, 125, 279.
General Sir Howard Douglas on Fortifications and National Defences, 527.
General Orders and Circulars, 127, 609.
German View of the Italian War. A, 27, 207.
Germany and France, Relative Strength of, 336. 521.
Glance at our Chinese Policy, a, 397.
Gordon, Lord Francis, Monument to, 445.
Grant, Sir Thomas, K.C.B., and F.R.S., Memoir of, 461.
Great Yarmouth, Defence of, 445.
Guard Coast, Appointments and Removals, 146, 317, 474.
Gun Exercise, the Great—General Order Horse Guards, 128.
Gunners, Seamen, Admiralty Circular, 460.

Harbours of Refuge, 182, 344, 596.
History of British India, a Familiar, from the Earliest Period to the Transfer of the Government of India to the British in 1858. By J. H. Stocqueler, Esq., Author of the "Handbook of India," the "Life of the Duke of Wellington," etc., etc., *noticed*, 124.
Home Defences, our; with a few Words on our Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, 109,
Hope, Admiral, in the Peiho River, 268,
——— Official Despatches from, 297,
Hutchinson, Consul Thomas J., Enquiries touching the Ethnology of certain Tribes of Africans interior to the Bight of Biafra, by, 115.—Some Account of Cannibalism and other Atrocities in Western Africa, by, 439,

India, British, a Familiar History of, from the Earliest Period to the Transfer of the Government of India to the British Crown in 1858. By J. H. Stocqueler, Esq., *noticed*, 124,
India, Colonization of, 362,
——— Legislation for, 102,
——— Medical and Commissariat Services in, 125,
Indian Army, East, the, 133,
——— Forces, Her Majesty's, 457,
——— Navy in Commission, Stations of the, 143, 314, 470, 623.
Intelligence, Naval and Military, 127, 282, 252, 609.

Italian War, a German View of the, 27, 207.

Land Forces, our, England—Second Line of Defence, 159,
Legislation for India, 102,
Life for a Life, a. By the Author of "John Halifax," etc., *noticed*, 123,
Lombardy, Campaign of 1848 in, 71, 231,
Loopholes of Retreat, Peeps from the. By Retired Major Marksman, 63, 240, 383, 578.
Launch of the Victoria, 585.

M'Clintock, Capt., R.N., Reports of, on the Franklin Search, 282,
Madras Army, Distribution of the, 136, 307, 463, 617.
Manning the Navy, 325,
Marines, Royal, Appointments and Removals, 145, 316, 472,
Marksman, Retired Major, Peeps from the Loopholes of Retreat, by, 63, 240, 383, 578.
Marriage, 482,
Method for Effectually Checking Desertion, the True, 94,
Military Academy, Royal, Woolwich, Additions to the, 459,
——— Commissions on Indian Expenditure, 132,
——— Examinations for Junior Officers of Infantry, comprising 600 Questions and Answers on Discipline, Drill, and Interior Economy. By Colonel Sir J. E. Alexander, K.C.L.S., *noticed*, 124,
——— History, 449,
——— and Naval Intelligence, 127, 282, 452, 609.
——— ——— Register; or, Editor's Portfolio, 119, 274, 446, 603.
——— Savings' Bank, 132,
Militia Commission, the; the Ballot, and our Volunteer Corps, 483.
Militia Bill, the, 132,
——— Gazette, 148, 150, 151, 153, 157, 318, 320, 322, 323, 475, 478, 479, 480, 481,
———, Stations of the Embodied, 139, 310, 466, 621.
———, the Dominica, 461,
Movement, the War, 54,

National Defences, our—Fortifications, or an Army in the Field, 1,
Naval Benevolent Society, 461,
——— Brigade, Bengal Stations of the, 143, 314, 470,
Naval Volunteers, Reserve of Royal, 495.
Naval Force Reserve Volunteer, 133,
Naval and Military Intelligence, 127, 282, 452, 609.
——— ——— Register, or Editor's Portfolio, 119, 274, 446, 603.
——— Prize Money, 457,
———Reserve, Royal, 15,
Navy, Royal in Commission, Stations of the, 140, 311, 467, 623.
———, India in Commission, Stations of the, 143, 314, 470, 626.
———, Admission of Boys into the, 460,
———, British, during the Russian War. By Theseus, late R.N., 218,
———, Manning the, 325,
———, Turkish, the, 460,
Neill, General, Inauguration of the Statue of the late, at Ayr, 460,
Notice to Correspondents, 124, 608.
Notices Critical, 123, 277, 450, 607.

Official Account of the Siege of Sebastopol, 574.
Official Description of the River Amoor, Russian, 416,
Opinions of Sir John Burgoyne, and the Reports of Lieut.-Gen. Macintosh on the Defence of Turkey, Comparative view of the 42
Orders, General and Circulars, 127, 609.
Owen, Mrs. Octavius Freire. Raised to the Peerage by, *noticed*, 278,

Parker, Mrs. Hastings. Bentley Priory by, *noticed*, 451,
Pay Documents of Supernumeraries, Admiralty Circular, 129
Peace, Armed, 446
———, Movement, the, 54
———, Prospects of the, 119
Peeps from the Loopholes of Retreat. By Retired Major Marksman, 63, 240, 383, 578
Peiho River, Admiral Hope in the, 268,
———, Operations in the, 275,
Official Lists of the killed and wounded, 293,
Pepys, Lady Charlotte Maria. Female Influence by, *noticed*, 123,
Policy, our Chinese, a glance at, 397,
Portfolio, Editor's, or Naval and Military Register, 119, 274, 446, 603
Promotions and Appointments, 145, 316, 472, 627

Quarters, from Camp to; or Life in an Indian Cantonment after Field Service, 407,
Queen of Hearts, The. By Wilkie Collins, *noticed*, 450,

Reserve of Royal Naval Volunteers, 495.
Royal Marines, Appointments and Removals, 145, 316, 472

Royal Memorials at Chelsea, 133,
—— Naval Reserve, 15,
—— Navy in Commission, Stations of the, 140, 311, 467, 623 Promotions and Appointments, 145, 316, 472
Russian Official Description of the River Amoor, 416,
Russian War, the British Navy during the. By Theseus, late R.N., 118.
Raised to the Peerage. By Mrs. Octavius Friere Owen, *noticed*, 278,
Rajpootana, Field Force, the late, 129,
Reade, John Edmund, Wait and Hope, by, *noticed*, 278,
Refuge, Harbours of, 182, 344, 596
Register, Naval and Military, or Editor's Portfolio, 119, 274, 446, 603
Relative Strength of France and Germany, the, 336, 521
Retreat, Peeps from the Loopholes of. By retired Major Marksman, 63, 240, 383, 578

Sappers and Miners, Royal. Quartermaster Conolly's History of the, 122.
Screw Propeller, Sir Howard Douglas's, and the Admiralty, with diagram, 177.
Ships and Gales, and the Simultaneous Observations of Wind and Weather, 568.
Sebastopol, Official Account of the Siege of, 574
Seikhs for China, the, 271.
Shrapnel, and Boxer Shells and Fuze, Gen. Bormann on the, 23.
Signal Lights, Telegraphic, 129.
Staff College, the—General Order, 127.
Stations of the Bengal Naval Brigade, 143, 314, 470.
———— British Army, 138, 309, 465, 621.
———— Embodied Militia, 139, 310, 466, 622.
Stations of the Indian Navy in Commission, 143, 314, 470, 626
———— Royal Navy in Commission, 140, 311, 467, 623
Strength of France and Germany, the Relative, 336, 521.

Tattnall, Commodore U. S. Service, Testimony of, to the Gallantry of the English in China, 450—his Despatch, 452.
Trevelyan Scheme and the War Office Committee, the, 248.
Troops, Foreign of France, the, 389.
Turkey, a Comparative View of Sir John Burgoyne's Opinions, and of the Reports of Lieut.-Gen. Macintosh on the Defence of, 42.
Turkey, the Defences of, 413, 547.

Victoria Cross, List of Recipients, 458.
View, a German, of the Italian War, 27, 207.
Volunteer Rifle Corps, Circular, War Office, 456.

Wages and Badge Pay of Pensioners, Admiralty Circular, 139.
Wait and Hope. By John Edmund Reade, *noticed*, 278.
War, Chinese, the Last. From the Attack, Capture, and Occupation of Canton, 1857, 1858-9, by the Allied Forces of England and France, to the Departure of the Plenipotentiaries, 371, 555.
War, Italian, a German View of the, 27, 207.
War, Russian, the British Navy during the. By Theseus, late R.N., 218.
War-office Committee and the Trevelyan Scheme, 248,

MAR 28 1917

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 04841 8563